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Beyond Peace and War

Towards a Typology of Power Transitions

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Power Transition, China and Africa, Global Health, Genocide, Operation Serval, and the Indian-American Partnership

Given the meteoric rise of China, the emergence of other important powers, and major redistributions in the global balance of power, Prof. Carsten Rauch argues in “Beyond Peace and War: Towards a Typology of Power Transitions” that power transition theory (PTT) has again become an important intellectual factor. Although highlighting the inherent dangers of power transitions, PTT does acknowledge that they might result in peace as well as war. The spectrum of these transitions—or better situations for them—is even broader. The author believes that PTT should be amended by a variable that captures the willingness of rising powers to commit themselves to change the status quo. In addition, it is necessary not only to focus on the rising power(s) but also to take the dominant power into account. Doing so extends the nonpeaceful/peaceful power transition dichotomy to a more complex and realistic power transition typology that should be employed when one assesses the prospects of current power shifts.

In “China’s Worldview and Representations of Its Engagement with Africa,” Dr. Earl Conteh-Morgan submits that China’s relationship with Africa has generated both positive and negative discourse. He utilizes a select number of sources—articles, official speeches, and policy documents, among others—to compare and contrast representations of China’s role in the continent. Conteh-Morgan observes that discourse on China’s engagement stems from (1) differences between the West’s and China’s worldviews; (2) the perceived threat that China poses to the West’s hegemonic status in Africa; (3) China’s lack of commitment to some international regimes; (4) the fact that China may be providing an alternative development model not grounded in liberal democratic values; and (5) the tangible infrastructure projects that China has completed in Africa.

Prof. Annamarie Bindenagel Šehović’s article “Where Are Rights? Where Is Responsibility? Who Acts for Global Public Health?” contends that an inherent tension exists between rights and responsibility. Whose and which rights are to be protected? Who or which entity bears responsibility for ensuring those rights? Who acts—and how—for (global) public health? Despite decades of advocating for rights and acceptance—promoted and solidified in the public health arena by advances in access to public health services—these questions remain largely unanswered.

In “South African Springtime, Rwandan Winter: Why April 1994 Illuminates the Limitations of Political Analysis in Predicting Genocide,” Dr. Arthur Gilbert and Kristina Hook investigate the aforementioned “springtime” and “winter.” Genocidal criteria must exist alongside leadership and political systems. Did international publicity create antigenocidal momentum in South Africa? Do economic variables encourage reconciliation, given Rwanda’s poor agricultural economy and South Africa’s developed industrial status? What disparities existed under apartheid versus colonial-encouraged ethnic divisions? What role was played by the relative absence or predominance of fears of an outside invasion (South Africa and Rwanda, respectively)? Only by looking beyond personality and politics can one comprehend why April 1994 ushered in two such disparate eras and how this fact informs genocide-prediction frameworks.

Lt Col Stéphane Spet’s piece “Operation Serval: Analyzing the French Strategy against Jihadists in Mali” informs us that Serval fulfilled limited objectives set by the French president to liberate northern Mali. He explains this initial victory against terrorists in the Sahel in terms of adherence to strategic principles: first, a clear political direction shaped at the highest political level, relying on a good understanding of the situation and its causes to avoid political traps; second, a combination of economy of means, initiative, and concentration of forces displayed in the use of special forces in mentoring local military forces, supported by airpower to track and destroy the enemy and weaken his will to fight; third, the full use of “boots on the ground” not only to maintain the initiative by holding territory acquired by the special forces and air campaign but also to focus massive force on the enemy’s weakness during the final assault against the jihadist stronghold; and, finally, the shaping of an exit strategy to avoid a quagmire. France benefited from many contextual advantages, including its knowledge of the area of operation, support from countries neighboring Mali, the enemy’s lack of support within the Malian population, the proximity to French forward bases in Africa, and optimal geography for this kind of military operation.

In “Building a Partnership between the United States and India: Exploring Airpower’s Potential,” Dr. Adam Lowther and Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan examine current and prospective opportunities for the United States Air Force and the Indian Air Force to collaborate in the development of airpower diplomacy as a means of building partnerships. In suggesting that soft power plays an important role in achieving American and Indian objectives in the Asia-Pacific, the authors offer a number of examples that illustrate how soft power initiatives between the two air forces helped strengthen the larger Indian-American relationship. They also identify additional initiatives as possible options for expanding airpower diplomacy.

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Beyond Peace and War

Towards a Typology of Power Transitions

CARSTEN RAUCH, PHD*

Given the meteoric rise of China, the emergence of other important powers, and major redistributions in the global balance of power, power transition theory (PTT) has become an important intellectual factor again. Many observers are anxious about China's ascendance (and that of other powers) and expect serious conflict between Washington and Beijing in the years to come. Many of them ground their skeptical expectations in PTT or at least a much curtailed understanding of it. To give just two examples, former US official Susan Shirk claims in her book about China that “history teaches us that rising powers are likely to provoke war,” and political scientist Christopher Layne echoes that “throughout the history of the modern international state system, ascending powers have always challenged the position of the dominant (hegemonic) power in the international system—and these challenges have usually culminated in war.”¹ Such skepticism, however, is problematic for three reasons. First, it is false theoretically; PTT does not claim that all rising powers will resort to war or that all power transitions will result in war. While highlighting the inherent dangers of power transitions, PTT actually acknowledges that they might result in peace as well as in war. Satisfaction with the existing status quo is the key factor here. Second, it is false empirically; not all power transitions in history have resulted in great-power wars. Third, it leads to flawed policy advice; if rising powers are always aggressive and always challenge the international order, then it makes sense to attempt to contain or oppose them. If, however, rising powers are not always dissatisfied and do not always challenge the status quo, then policies meant to oppose them might breed dangerous dissatisfaction in the first place. Recognizing that even traditional PTT allows for “peace-

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ful power transitions” as well as for “power transition wars” is a useful antidote against such self-defeating policy choices.

This article argues that the spectrum of power transitions or better power transition constellations is even broader than this and goes beyond just war and peace. Consequently, the article amends PTT by adding a variable that captures the willingness of rising powers to commit themselves to change the status quo. (This is not the same as mere dissatisfaction, and both might not be congruent.) Such an addition increases the potential types of power transitions from two (peaceful power transition and power transition war) to four. In addition, the article maintains that it is necessary to discuss the peculiar role of the dominant power within the PTT framework. Indeed, the dominant power (and its behavior) is much more important for the course of a given power transition than traditional PTT would have it. It is important to grant the dominant power the same variance with respect to its evaluation of the status quo (i.e., its satisfaction) and its “will to power” that we also grant the respective rising powers. That is, if we can imagine rising powers that are dissatisfied as well as those that are satisfied, and if we can imagine rising powers with a strong or a weaker will to power, then the same must hold true regarding the dominant power. Thus, a complete scientific analysis of power transitions would also have to include the satisfaction status and will to power of the dominant power. The final section of the article offers a first sketch of such an endeavor. Doing so extends the erstwhile nonpeaceful/peaceful power transition dichotomy to a much more complex and realistic typology of power transition constellations that should be employed when one assesses the prospects of current power shifts.

Power Transition Theory in a Nutshell

A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler established PTT.² A central element of the theory, one in which it differs most profoundly from all forms of realism (and many other international relations [IR] theories), concerns the international order. Many IR theories assume that the ordering principle of the international system is anarchy.³ In contrast, PTT describes international politics as less marked by anarchy and more by a hierarchy resembling a pyramid structure overseen by the respective dominant (i.e., most powerful) power. This dominant power once created and designed the international order according to its convictions, wishes, and interests and since then guarantees and defends this order.⁴ It can do so not only through sheer, overwhelming force but also through international organizations in which the dominant power and its allies obtain disproportional voting powers and therefore can enact their dominance directly and materially. According to this view, in addition to material factors, the normative fabric of the international order is also angled towards the dominant power.⁵

The goods and profits that the international order produces often benefit mainly the dominant power and its allies.⁶ The dominant power and its entourage can enjoy the benefits of the order, but some states outside this inner circle receive none (or, at least in their perception, not enough) of the aforementioned goods and thereby “consider the

international system to be unfair, corrupt, biased, skewed, and dominated by hostile forces.”⁷ The dominant power can cynically disregard complaints as long as they come from lesser powers, but the situation changes when discontent is found within a great power or when a discontented power starts to rise.⁸ Ascendant powers that are not satisfied with the order and their place in it—according to PTT—typically wish to change the status quo or even establish an entirely new international order. Because those who profit from the old order rarely agree to such a restructuring (which would almost certainly diminish their share of benefits), PTT expects the new, dominant power to enforce or at least try to enforce changes violently.⁹ In these cases, power transition wars are common. Since rising or challenging powers are not suicidal, PTT does not expect them to attack the dominant power before they have at least reached parity with it.

In a nutshell, then, PTT holds that times of massive power shifts, a situation of power parity, or even an overtaking at the top of the international system might lead to a systemwide great-power war over the control of the international order. Thus, if a power transition (defined as overtaking at the top of the international system), prolonged parity, or at least massive disruptions of power are on their way, PTT warns that we are entering risky times. The power development, however, merely provides an opportunity that PTT does not assume is automatically realized.¹⁰ PTT also requires some measure of willingness that is commonly understood in terms of satisfaction with the status quo of the international order—or, more precisely, a lack thereof. A power that is overtaking the former dominant power or is finding itself in a prolonged period of parity with that power will likely initiate a war *only* when it is dissatisfied with this status quo.¹¹ Although proponents of PTT mainly use the theory to explain the outbreaks of (power transition) war, it also entails a somewhat less developed theory of (power transition) peace.

Towards a Typology of Power Transition Constellations

Adding the Will to Power

Besides power development and satisfaction with the status quo, however, another factor should be added to the theoretical corset of the PTT. This factor concerns the willingness of a power to affect its international environment. Benjamin Fordham asserts that this willingness cannot be presupposed: “We should be cautious with accounts of foreign policy ambition that assume enhanced international power and influence are intrinsically appealing. In the last two centuries, potentially powerful states have not mobilized their national resources to the extent one would have expected if this were the case.”¹² Maybe such a factor is even necessary to identify *great* powers in the first place. Elli Polymeropoulos and others, for example, mention foreign policy central themes (*Leitideen*), which they believe are a deciding factor in whether or not a potentially powerful nation can be called a great power.¹³ Fordham calls his similar concept “foreign policy ambition.”¹⁴ In the context of PTT, this article prefers to speak of “will to power.”¹⁵

In PTT the power development decides whether a power transition is possible at all.¹⁶ The satisfaction of the rising power then decides whether a given power transition will be peaceful or nonpeaceful. Overlooked, however, is the possibility of an actor that denies or even transcends a possible power transition—for example, a rising power that increasingly accumulates power but at the same time either intentionally or unintentionally refuses to take on the role of a contender/challenger and subsequently the role of the dominant power.¹⁷ Hence, a power transition may happen arithmetically but not substantially. Such a pure arithmetic power transition should be distinguished from other forms of power transition. To secure this kind of case theoretically, PTT needs a variable that can capture the will of an actor to utilize its (potential) power to sustain or challenge the status quo of the international order.

In fact, this is less novel for PTT than it may seem. Proponents of this theory have for a long time pointed out that it combines aspects of opportunity with aspects of willingness.¹⁸ Instead of introducing a new factor to capture the aspect of willingness, though, the latter was often mixed up with the existing variables. Especially the satisfaction variable has often been used to capture willingness. However, satisfaction is generally more about what an actor dislikes about the status quo of the international order and less about the intensity with which actors pursue changes. Therefore, it seems reasonable to introduce a different factor that better reflects the willingness of a rising power to make a possible power transition a reality.¹⁹

To do so, this article proposes adding the factor *will to power* to the theoretical framework of PTT.²⁰ Will to power has at least three possible dimensions. First, it can be understood as *level of activity* concerning the interaction of an actor with its international environment. The second dimension asks if the actor in question has—besides a general international activity—a *specific project of order* that it wishes to implement in the international arena. The final dimension addresses the *means that an actor is willing to utilize to assert its preferred policies and interests*. The more an actor accepts or even embraces the use of force, the more it will be ready to make a potential power transition a reality by all means necessary. The more an actor rejects the actual use of military means, the more likely it will not enforce a potential power transition. All of these dimensions are highly relevant for the will-to-power factor and are possibly interdependent. (For example, an actor that has a specific policy project it would like to implement internationally will most likely also show some international activity to further this project.)

One should note that will to power is probably not strictly dichotomous but an ordinal scale ranging from very low to very high. A tipping point must be somewhere on this scale, however, with states below eschewing and those above embracing the possibility of realizing a potential power transition. One must also remember to understand will to power as contingent upon time and place, as Fordham reminds us: “The specific foreign policy ambitions of particular states depend heavily on the time and place in which they find themselves. Establishing overseas colonies was once a goal of many states but has now been almost entirely abandoned.”²¹ Will to power influences *whether* an actor is ready to deploy its accumulated political, economic, and military power to shape the in-

ternational order. *If* an actor is willing to do so, then (dis)satisfaction gives information about the direction and form this action will take.²²

At this point, it is helpful to introduce another differentiation—namely, one between those power transitions *in the broader sense* and those *in the narrower sense*. Without a corresponding power development, a power transition is simply not possible. One might argue whether it is fitting to talk about such a power development only after an overtaking takes place, or when parity is reached, or even before that if the rising challenger is rapidly approaching—but we can agree that without such a development, no power transition can ever occur. At the same time, a certain power development taken for it is not enough. In a sense, power is always virtual and latent (before actually being exercised); a power *transition* is not a physical event that emerges solely from a change in the raw power development. Much more, it is necessary to bring about a power transition actively. A power that deliberately isolates itself from its environment—a power that explicitly denies taking advantage of its power resources—will never cause a power *transition* despite all of its increase in power. If such a power somehow winds up at the top of the international power pyramid (i.e., if it has accumulated more power resources than all potential competitors), then we can talk only of a *power transition in the broader sense*. A *power transition in the narrower sense* is different; it occurs then—and only then—when the power development is met by a certain will to power. Only in such a case does the question emerge regarding whether or not the power transition will be peaceful—a question answered by the satisfaction variable.

Recall now the different conceptual and theoretical meaning of the three variables of PTT. The pairing of power development and will to power explains whether a given historical point in time is ripe for a power transition in the international system—in other words, whether a power transition in the narrower sense will take place. If so, both factors must be present. Nevertheless, we still have no clue about whether or not this power transition will be peaceful. Remember that *every* power transition is hallmarked by a corresponding power development and will to power; thus, these variables cannot give us any further information. At this point, satisfaction comes into play. In standard PTT, satisfaction is (falsely) often regarded as a measurement of the willingness to bring about a power transition in the narrower sense. This, however, gives away the analytical surplus value of the satisfaction variable: the special value of satisfaction shows when the willingness of the rising power to initiate a power transition is already established.

With the three elements of PTT that we have established (power development, will to power, and satisfaction with the status quo of the international order), we can now move beyond the dichotomy of power transition war / peaceful power transition and assemble a *typology of power transitions*. We have a total of eight combinations for our three elements (fig. 1). Only one of them entails a peaceful power transition, and only one entails a power transition war. The other six combinations lead to events that do not meet our criteria for power transitions in the narrower sense, but two of them can still count as power transitions in the broader sense.

	<i>No power transition</i>				<i>Power transition in the broader sense</i>		<i>Power transition in the narrower sense</i>	
Power development	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+
Will to power	-	+	-	+	-	-	+	+
Satisfaction	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	+
Result	Mute dissatisfaction	Powerless criticism	Fellow traveling	Bolstering the status quo	"Missed" power transition	"Eschewed" power transition	Power transition war	Peaceful power transition

Figure 1. Combining the elements of a peaceful power transition

These different combinations describe varying events induced by the presence/absence of the three variables of PTT. As we can see, the peacefulness of a power transition depends upon the satisfaction variable. Consequently, from a policy viewpoint, whenever we can detect signs of dissatisfaction or even decreasing satisfaction among rising powers, we should implement policies to work against this tendency. Furthermore, whenever we detect rising powers that are not (yet) dissatisfied, we should refrain from policies that might fuel dissatisfaction. This is all the more important because dissatisfaction with the international order is regarded as a source of conflict and turmoil not only in the context of PTT but also in IR generally.

If the necessary power development is visible but a will to power is missing, then we are dealing with a power transition in the broader sense and could talk about an "eschewed" or a "missed" power transition. A power transition is eschewed when the rising power is satisfied with the current order and is not willing to become the new, dominant power in this order. A power transition is missed when the rising power is indeed dissatisfied with the international order and therefore has a real motive to change it, but the necessary willingness, embodied in the will to power variable, is absent. For example, the rise of the United States in the nineteenth century is much better understood as a missed or an eschewed power transition than as an example of a peaceful power transition.²³ This perspective is also underlined by Organski and Kugler's observation that the United States voluntarily kept its distance from the European theater (then the center of world politics and the international order) a long time after it had already formally reached the top power position.²⁴ A few centuries later, the United States finally realized the (peaceful) power transition. Hence, the absence of one condition for the emergence of a power transition in the narrower sense may be only temporary. It would be a mistake, then, to assume that a once eschewed or missed power transition stays that way in the long run. This notion holds especially true in cases in which a power transition in the broader sense is combined with dissatisfaction and thus bears the danger of a nonpeaceful power transition once the power transition in the narrower sense is realized.

The other constellations are not power transitions at all but should also be described. Specifically, when we cannot identify a power development that could lead to parity in

the foreseeable future, a rising power that is satisfied with the international order and has shown a will to power most likely will support and stabilize the status quo. When such a power is dissatisfied, it probably will utter powerless criticism directed against an international order that is perceived as unjust. When such a power is satisfied but shows no will to power, we can call it a “fellow traveler.” Finally we say that a nonrising power is trapped in “mute dissatisfaction” if it has no will to power and at the same time is dissatisfied.

Taking the Dominant Power Seriously

All of the above have been quite in line with traditional PTT in that the final responsibility for the peaceful or nonpeaceful occurrence of a power transition rests solely on the shoulders of the rising power. Its rise starts the entire process; its will to power decides whether we are dealing with a power transition in the broader sense or one in the narrower sense. Ultimately, its satisfaction is the key to whether a peaceful or nonpeaceful power transition occurs.

The role of the dominant power, in contrast, is rather passive and limited in standard PTT.²⁵ At best, the dominant power can hope to *manage* an impending power transition by accommodating the rising power one way or the other, thereby increasing the latter’s satisfaction with the status quo of the international order and maximizing the chances of a peaceful power transition.²⁶ Such a scenario, however, downplays the agency of the dominant power itself. It seems curious to disregard the wishes, desires, and interests of the (still) most powerful actor in the international order even when it is declining.

At a minimum, when analyzing the dominant power, PTT should check for the very same variables that should also be checked with regard to the rising power. That is, we should definitely inquire about the dominant power’s satisfaction with the status quo of the international order since it is far from certain that the dominant power is always satisfied.²⁷ In fact, PTT has long argued that the dominant power *is* satisfied by definition, maintaining that it created the international order, presides over it, and thus has no reason to be dissatisfied.²⁸ Such an argument, however, disregards the possibility that either the international order or the interests of the dominant power—or both—may change over time, especially during a long period of dominance.²⁹ It is not implausible that a dominant power that was indeed perfectly satisfied with the way things were at some point in the past has, over time, changed its views. Think no further than the current dominant power—the United States—that arguably has defied the rules and norms of “its own” international order many times during the last decades.³⁰

Will to power (or the lack thereof) should also be surveyed regarding not only the rising power but also the (declining) dominant power. Of course at some point in time, a dominant power must have possessed a certain will to power; otherwise, it would not have come into its position. But it is faulty to assume that will to power must remain unchanged over a long period of time. In other words, it makes sense for PTT to suppose that a dominant power that has just assumed this position and has formed an interna-

tional order according to its wishes and interests has a healthy dose of will to power. At the same time, however, such a historical snapshot should not be perpetuated theoretically. A dominant power—one that probably begins its reign not only with will to power but also with a great deal of satisfaction—can grow dissatisfied over time, either because the international order it created develops a life of its own and moves away from its original settings or because the interests of the dominant power itself (e.g., through a change of ruling elites) change over time and are no longer reflected in the international order. Similarly, will to power could erode over time and give way to a kind of fatigue in international leadership that can be defined as “unwilling[ness] to pay any substantial price in lives or money for international goals.”³¹ Eroding will to power could also (but does not have to) be the result of growing dissatisfaction. A declining dominant power that “resigns” would enhance the prospects of a peaceful power transition. At the same time, however, a dissatisfied dominant power—that retains its will to power—could choose to counter its dissatisfaction by proactively trying to change or re-create the international order. In such a case, the presence of a dissatisfied dominant power decreases the prospects of a peaceful power transition.

Taking the dominant power seriously in such a manner expands the list of power transition scenarios enormously (fig. 2). We now end up with eight scenarios for power transitions in the narrower sense alone.³²

Power transition in the narrower sense								
Power development	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Rising power's will to power	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Rising power's satisfaction	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-
Dominant power's satisfaction	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Dominant power's will to power	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+
Type	Peaceful power transition (Type 1)	Peaceful power transition (Type 2)	Peaceful power transition (Type 3)	Peaceful power transition (Type 4)	Uncertain power transition (Type 1)	Uncertain power transition (Type 2)	Power transition war (Type 1)	Power transition war (Type 2)

Figure 2. Extension of the typology of power transition constellations

The illustration also shows that by taking the dominant power fully into account, new situations arise that were hitherto unimaginable. For example a *peaceful power transition* is possible *despite* a dissatisfied rising power if the dominant power is lacking in its will to power (peaceful power transition types three and four). We can also identify different forms of a peaceful power transition. Type one exemplifies the ideal, typical, peaceful power transition imagined by PTT and may be described as a kind of “passing of the torch.” Types two and four can be more aptly described as a “leave me alone” attitude of the dominant power that has grown dissatisfied with its international order and has lost its will to defend it. Type three, in which the dominant power is satisfied but still unwill-

ing to shoulder the burden of defending its order against the remonstrance of the dissatisfied challenger, might be termed “resignation.”

Furthermore, two kinds of *uncertain power transitions* emerge whose outcome must remain unclear for the time being. In type one of such an uncertain power transition, the rising power is satisfied with the international order, thereby signaling a peaceful power transition. However, the declining power has retained its will to power, thus signaling that it intends to keep its top spot. Furthermore, since the declining power is also satisfied with the current international order, such a constellation might be primed for a kind of coleadership out of which a peaceful power transition might result over time. At the same time, persisting will to power on both sides could still lead to conflict. More dangerous, however, is type two of an uncertain power transition. Here, too, we deal with a satisfied rising power, and will to power is present regarding both the rising and the dominant power. Differing from type one, however, the dominant power is dissatisfied with the status quo of the international order, making an amicable comanagement with the rising power less likely.

In contrast, not much change can be found in the *power transition war* category. That is, when a dissatisfied rising power meets a dominant power clinging to its superior position, the probability of conflict is high, regardless of whether the dominant power is satisfied or dissatisfied with the status quo. However, we might speculate that a constellation in which *both* the rising power *and* the dominant power are dissatisfied is at even greater risk of degenerating into war (because hostilities can be expected from both sides) than a constellation in which *only* the rising power is dissatisfied.

Conclusion

Common wisdom’s treatment of PTT often cuts it down to statements like “power transitions often lead to war” or “rising powers will challenge the dominant power for leadership in the international system.” In fact, however, even traditional PTT has never been this narrow. Besides the possibilities of a power transition war, the theory always included the potential of peaceful power transitions.

Broadening PTT by including the factor of *will to power*, which enables the detection of power transitions in the narrower sense (in contrast to formal overtaking that can be called power transitions in the broader sense), widens the spectrum of power transition constellations. Besides *peaceful power transition* and *power transition wars*, we now can identify *missed power transitions* and *eschewed power transitions*. Going one step further and taking into account the possibility that the dominant power’s satisfaction with the status quo and its will to power not only matter but also may vary, we find that the number of potential power transition constellations can increase even further.

What does this tell us about the future of world politics? Most of all, it tells us that—even if the United States is declining and other powers are rising—war and conflict are not inevitable, even in the case of a power transition. War is only one of many outcomes that may arise from a power transition constellation. The declining dominant

power and rising powers can make policy choices that decrease this possibility, mainly by boosting each other's satisfaction with the status quo of the international order. Keeping a power transition constellation peaceful is demanding but possible, and discerning this possibility is the first step towards putting it into effect.

Notes

1. Susan L. Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4; and Christopher Layne, "China's Challenge to US Hegemony," *Current History* 107, no. 705 (January 2008): 16.

2. A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1958); and Jacek Kugler and A. F. K. Organski, "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation," in *Handbook of War Studies*, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 171–94. See also Douglas Lemke and Jacek Kugler, "The Evolution of the Power Transition Perspective," in *Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger*, ed. Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 3–34; Ronald L. Tammen et al., *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century* (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000); Douglas Lemke, "Great Powers in the Post-Cold War World: A Power Transition Perspective," in *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 52–75; Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler, "Power Transition and China—US Conflicts," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 1, no. 1 (2006): 35–55; and Ronald L. Tammen, "The Organski Legacy: A Fifty-Year Research Program," *International Interactions* 34, no. 4 (2008): 314–32. For a harsh critique, see Richard Ned Lebow and Benjamin Valentino, "Lost in Transition: A Critical Analysis of Power Transition Theory," *International Relations* 23, no. 3 (September 2009): 389–410.

3. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

4. Randolph M. Siverson and Ross A. Miller, "The Power Transition: Problems and Prospects," in Kugler and Lemke, *Parity and War*, 59.

5. Harald Müller, "Mächtekonstellationen," in *Internationale Politik als Überlebensstrategie*, ed. Mir A. Ferdowski (München: Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2009), 5.

6. One problem of PTT, however, is that these profits are seldom clearly defined. See John R. Oneal, Indra de Soysa, and Yong-Hee Park, "But Power and Wealth Are Satisfying: A Reply to Lemke and Reed," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 4 (August 1998): 518. See also Tammen et al., *Power Transitions*, 6.

7. Tammen et al., *Power Transitions*, 9.

8. Siverson and Miller, "Power Transition: Problems and Prospects," 59.

9. PTT does not expect all of these attempts to be successful. Precisely because former and future dominant powers usually clash in a period of parity, the outcome of a war can't be predicted. History reflects many unsuccessful bids for power transition in which the declining major power was able to defend its position at least for a certain time.

10. Kugler and Lemke, *Parity and War*, 12.

11. Unfortunately, in the past, PTT has been rather unsuccessful when it comes to convincingly conceptualizing and operationalizing satisfaction. Carsten Rauch, "Why They Don't 'Get' No Satisfaction: Satisfaction as Concept in IR Theory and Power Transition Theory" (paper prepared for presentation at the Fourth Global International Studies Conference, Goethe University, Frankfurt, 6–9 August 2014).

12. Benjamin O. Fordham, "Who Wants to Be a Major Power? Explaining the Expansion of Foreign Policy Ambition," *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 5 (September 2011): 601.

13. Elli Polymeropoulos et al., *Asiatische Großmächte—China, Indien und Japan als Akteure regionaler und internationaler Ordnungspolitik*, SWP-Studie S 11 (Berlin: SWP, April 2011), 7.

14. Fordham, "Who Wants to Be a Major Power?," 601.

15. I deal with the will to power and its relationship to the other variables at length elsewhere. See Carsten Rauch, *Das Konzept des friedlichen Machtübergangs: Die Machtübergangstheorie und der weltpolitische Aufstieg Indiens* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), chap. 8.

16. Studies of PTT usually understand a power relation as entering into a period of parity when the weaker (rising) power has reached 80 percent of the power resources (often measured in terms of gross domestic product) of the stronger (declining) power. See A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). Debates within PTT address whether parity alone already leads to a higher probability of conflict or whether a power transition in the form of an actual overtaking is necessary.

17. Such a possibility can even be found in the writings of Kenneth Waltz: "The possibilities of rising in the international system, and the costs and benefits of doing so, vary as systems change; but *states decide* whether making the effort to advance is worthwhile. Japan has the capability of raising herself to great-power rank, but has lacked the inclination to do so. Systems change, or are transformed, depending on the resources and aims of their units and on the fates that befall them" (emphasis added). Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 343.

18. See, for example, Woosang Kim, "Power, Parity, Alliance, Dissatisfaction, and Wars in East Asia, 1860–1993," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 5 (2002): 655; Douglas Lemke and Suzanne Werner, "Power Parity, Commitment to Change, and War," *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 2 (1996): 237; Suzanne Werner and Jacek Kugler, "Power Transitions and Military Buildups: Resolving the Relationship between Arms Buildups and War," in Kugler and Lemke, *Parity and War*, 191–92; and Henk W. Houweling and Jan G. Siccama, "A Two-Level Explanation of World War," in Kugler and Lemke, *Parity and War*, 115.

19. One can find some rudimentary approaches in this direction. See Lemke and Werner, "Power Parity, Commitment," 235–60; and Suzanne Werner and Jacek Kugler, "Power Transitions and Military Buildups: Resolving the Relationship between Arms Buildups and War," in Kugler and Lemke, *Parity and War*, 187–207.

20. Because I believe that this factor actually is already part of the deeper understanding of PTT and only needs to be brought to the forefront, I have named it the *forgotten variable* elsewhere. See Rauch, *Das Konzept*, 253.

21. Fordham, "Who Wants to Be a Major Power?," 602.

22. Note, however, the bounded range of PTT. Indeed, high satisfaction with the status quo of the international order increases the probability of a peaceful *power transition* and decreases the probability of a *power transition* war. Apart from that (i.e., apart from the power transition context), however, other reasons, of course, might lead powers (and even declining and rising powers) into conflict and war. PTT can be used only to explain conflicts and wars emanating from a power transition situation; a low probability of such a conflict does not need to imply that no conflict will occur between the respective actors at all.

23. Rauch, *Das Konzept*, 154–55.

24. Organski and Kugler, *War Ledger*.

25. Tammen et al., *Power Transitions*, 9.

26. Rauch, *Das Konzept*, 278–80; and T. V. Paul and Manesh Shankar, “Status Accommodation through Institutional Means: India’s Rise and the Global Order,” in *Status in World Politics*, ed. T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 165–91.

27. Steve Chan, *China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 40–41; and Rauch, *Das Konzept*, 230–33.

28. Lemke and Kugler, “Evolution of the Power Transition Perspective,” 8; and Tammen et al., *Power Transitions*, 9.

29. Martha Finnemore, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be,” *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 70; and Rauch, *Das Konzept*, 231.

30. Chan, *China, the U.S.*, 40–41. Another form of dominant power dissatisfaction could be fueled by disagreement, not with the current but with the future international order that one expects the rising power to create. Rauch, *Das Konzept*, 232.

31. Stanley R. Sloan, “US Perspectives on NATO’s Future,” *International Affairs* 71, no. 2 (April 1995): 221. See also Michael Mandelbaum, *The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era*, 1st ed (New York: PublicAffairs, 2010).

32. Including power transitions in the broader sense would boost the total set of constellations to 16. I have decided, however, to focus on power transitions in the narrower sense for the rest of this article.

China's Worldview and Representations of Its Engagement with Africa

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During the past two decades, political-economic and diplomatic ties between China and Africa have widened in scope and have become intensive. This development has occurred largely because of the onset of China's remarkable economic industrialization, its need to ensure access to strategic and other raw materials, and its desire to develop closer diplomatic ties with allies in an international system dominated by the West—an entity whose current hegemonic worldview differs fundamentally from its own in many respects. Accordingly, China generates a great deal of narrative (both positive and negative) on its engagement with Africa. For instance, some of the issues that prompt Sinophobic discourse include its cozy relationship with authoritarian African governments, its policy of noninterference, its seeming lack of concern for systemic corruption in Africa or for environmental degradation, and what is perceived as its looming threat to the current structure of global trade and governance. At the same time, the tangible effects of its role in Africa—such as new or upgraded infrastructure, increased trade and investment, and a strong aid relationship with Africa, among others—equally generate a positive narrative of its involvement in Africa.

This article examines the narratives (both positive and negative) that have emerged as a result of China's rise and the way they are related to its worldview, which challenges that of the West. In other words, it is predicated on the competing narratives of individuals, institutions, and states (private and public actors) as a basis for addressing the ways in which the China-Africa partnership is represented by the West and by Africans themselves. The study begins with an overview of both disparaging and affirmative narratives about China's engagement with Africa. Subsequent analysis elaborates upon China's human rights worldview in particular and its contribution to both dimensions of the discourse. The theoretical and empirical emphasis of this analysis concerns “clashing world-

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views,” but the discussions also have implications for Africa’s development in China’s engagement in the continent.

Differences in worldviews spawn social constructs of nation-states, ideologies, and cultures situated within discourses/narratives of power, geostrategy, and geopolitics.¹ Geostrategic or geopolitical differences and rivalries by hegemonic powers often produce competing representations of each other. In this article, the language of analogies, rhetoric, synonyms, metaphors, and so forth, found in newspapers, the Internet, books, articles, official speeches, policy documents, and the like informs a great deal of the discussion. The focus is on the images/narratives and representations of the China-Africa relationship or the perceived intentions of China in Africa that pervade written material and public speeches.

The ongoing Sino-African partnership has spawned a plethora of commentaries from the Western hegemonic powers, much of it negative and directed at China’s role in the continent. Both national and international media, academics, think tanks, international financial institutions, bloggers, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals have criticized China’s investment, trade, aid, and extractive activities, among others, in Africa.² Western reactions, whether governmental, popular, or individual, could be interpreted in terms of political economy. What one might call criticisms of China’s engagements with Africa is a case of competitive, spatial regional-power relationships between other great powers and China. One could also interpret them as indicators of threat perception generated by China in a geographic location traditionally perceived as “the domain” of the West. The competition or rivalry is restricted largely to the framing of China’s activities in Africa as a recolonization of Africa, exploitation of the continent, or its conquest of Africa, among other statements with undertones of insecurity regarding China’s presence there.

Changes in great-power rivalry in Africa are best understood within the context of overarching great-power objectives. Competition over ideology had a different discourse and framing compared to current competition over a much broader (political, economic, cultural, etc.) form of contention underlined by a globalization paradigm. Today’s international system—especially the great-power rivalry in Africa—is a subtler, quieter, and more rhetorical contest for regional influence/dominance. What one could interpret as a Sino-Western rivalry in Africa may simply be competition between a capitalist dictatorship represented by China and the capitalist democracy represented by the West. For a long time, the traditional understanding has been that liberal democracy and capitalism go together—a notion seriously challenged by this new Chinese model/consensus. The latter is having a noticeable impact in Africa to the extent that the framing of China’s presence in Africa is investing the continent with the aura of a spatial competition for power and influence between China and the West. Spatial and power competition tends to be preoccupations of major powers. In a world currently dominated by markets, economics, trade, and investments, the competition involves economic resources in general and strategic minerals in particular, as well as a contest between a liberal democratic West and a nondemocratic but “capitalist” China. The latter has emerged as an economic su-

perpower in search of economic resources in Africa and thereby has ignited what seems to be regional competition with the West in Africa.

This article argues that the foundation of the narrative (either negative or positive) of the China-Africa partnership lies in the following three factors: (1) differences in a human rights worldview between China and the West; (2) China's recent and ongoing phenomenal rise, perceived as threatening the status quo in Africa (particularly the enormous size of China's economic investments there), a place long dominated by the West; and (3) the perceived and/or real threat that China may end up unraveling the Western consensus in Africa, especially since some African countries are beginning to adopt a "look East" policy.

The Anti-China Narratives: A Brief Overview

The most prevalent and often repeated criticisms of China's presence in Africa are that its strategy in the continent is totally self-serving, aggressively business oriented, and solely focused on gaining access to strategic minerals, notably oil, to feed its rapidly industrializing society.³ In its ongoing preoccupation with Africa's natural resources, China turns a blind eye to African states that blatantly violate the civil rights and political liberties of their citizens. In the process, China undermines the promotion of democracy in the continent. In addition, critics argue that China is very comfortable doing business in Africa because it capitalizes on the corrupt practices already rife in the oil and mineral sectors. This suits China because its own society is pervaded by corrupt practices. For instance, at the international regime level, it is not a supporter of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, a set of rules and regulations aimed at promoting transparency and accountability in the management of natural resources.⁴ The fact that China ignores dictatorial rule and corruption, solely focusing on economic self-promotion, has earned it the label, according to critics, of economic ruthlessness.

Since Africa was the victim of partitioning by Europe in 1884–85 and has since been the target of plunder and economic exploitation, China's engagement with Africa today is viewed by critics as an economic invasion or another instance of colonization of the continent. For instance, even some Africans are critical of China's role in Africa, likening it to the practices of European colonial rule. According to Lamido Sanusi, former governor of the Nigerian Central Bank, "In much of Africa, they have set up huge mining operations. They have also built infrastructure. But, with exceptions, they have done so using equipment and labour imported from home, without transferring skills to local communities. So China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was the essence of colonialism."⁵ The fact that China is upgrading long-neglected infrastructure or constructing brand-new roads, airports, seaports, or stadiums, among other projects, does not seem to impress critics of its growing presence in Africa. In fact, these infrastructural projects are seen as a means of China making it easier to transport African raw materials to the homeland, as did the European colonialists.

Moreover, China's cordial relationship with authoritarian leaders is especially criticized because it is seen as decreasing Western influence over dictators; furthermore, it constitutes an attack on good governance and democracy in particular and the spread of universal human rights in general. For instance, Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ), chairman of the US Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, expressed his concern over China's support of dictators: "China is playing an increasingly influential role on the continent of Africa, and there is concern that China intends to aid and abet African dictators, gain a stronghold on precious African resources and undo much of the progress that has been made on democracy and governance in the last 15 years in African nations."⁶

Because China openly goes against Western objectives to promote democracy in Africa, its relationship with Sudan and Zimbabwe has especially been the source of many of the negative comments directed against it. China is even far more responsible for the accusation that it is in Africa solely for economic reasons and is not constrained by any ethical standards. Consequently, during a meeting with representatives of Western oil companies in February 2010 in Lagos, Nigeria, Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson stated that "the United States does not consider China a military, security or intelligence threat. China is a very aggressive and pernicious economic competitor with no morals. China is not in Africa for altruistic reasons. China is in Africa for China primarily."⁷ In other words, the United States considers China more of a predatory power preoccupied with gouging Africa's raw materials. It is therefore not surprising that a little over a year after Carson's remarks, former secretary of state Hillary Clinton responded in a similar fashion during a visit to Zambia when asked if she believed that China is an important role model in terms of good governance: "In the long run, the medium run, even the short run, I don't." She then added: "We saw that during colonial times it is easy to come in, take out natural resources, pay off leaders, and leave. And when you leave, you don't leave much behind for the people who are there. . . . We don't want to see a new colonialism in Africa."⁸

Again, in 2012, during a speech in Senegal, Secretary Clinton continued her disparaging portrayal of China's growing presence in Africa, noting that Africa needs "a model of sustainable partnership that adds value, rather than extracts it." Additionally, unlike other countries, "America will stand up for democracy and universal human rights even when it might be easier to look the other way and keep the resources flowing."⁹ This was not only a reference to China's role in Africa but also a warning to African nations to be wary of a country that seems preoccupied with extracting oil and other strategic minerals from the continent.

Many of the critical comments either explicitly or implicitly portray China as threatening to Western hegemony in Africa—especially to American objectives there. It is therefore not surprising that some observers see China's presence in Africa as threatening to the United States. For instance, Cong. Donald Payne (D-NJ), a member of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, expressed concerns about a US-China rivalry in the continent: "Engagement of China

and the U.S. in Africa has begun to resemble a competition for resources and influence that has the potential to result in an ugly dynamic akin to that created by the Soviet Union and the U.S. during the Cold War.”¹⁰ However, comments by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Swan in February 2007 show a perception of China in Africa as nonthreatening compared to the sampling of statements and comments between 2010 and 2013 mentioned above. According to Secretary Swan, “For the Chinese, there are three primary interests: access to resources, access to markets, and securing diplomatic allies. None of these is inherently threatening to U.S. interests. We do not see involvement, economic or diplomatic, in Africa as a zero-sum game for the U.S. and China. The important thing is to encourage China to become involved in Africa in a way that supports international norms, rather than subverts them.”¹¹

In other words, in the early 2000s, China was not thought to be as threatening as it is now. The narrative on China in Africa seems to have become more negative. Although China is now considered more of a predator state in Africa, a colonizing actor, or a nation aggressively focused on business transactions to the neglect of good governance, during the George W. Bush administration, the narrative was more neutral and/or rather positive. For example, in 2005 National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice observed that “America has reason to welcome the rise of a confident, peaceful, and prosperous China. We want China as a global partner, able and willing to match its growing capabilities to its international responsibilities.”¹²

China in Africa: Some Positive Comments

Just as there are many negative views of the China-Africa engagement, so does one find a number of complimentary statements from both public figures and private individuals. For example, former Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade commented in 2013 that

when it comes to China and Africa, the EU [European Union] and the US want to have their cake and eat it. In an echo of its past colonial rivalries, European leaders and donor organisations have expressed concerns that African nations are throwing their doors open too wide to Chinese investors and to exploitation by their Asian partners. But if opening up more free markets is a goal that the West prizes . . . why is Europe fretting about China’s growing economic role in Africa?¹³

That is, some key African political elites see the Sino-African relationship as just part of the normal process of international economic relations and not a case of China adopting a predatory economic role in the continent. Some African public officials even see China as a role model for Africa. Accordingly, Helen Mamle Kofi, Ghana’s ambassador to China, considers China’s economic structure and behavior an “example to follow in terms of economic, financial, social, technological and cultural integration.”¹⁴ Such a statement underscores the tangible examples of China’s presence in Africa, but other observations emphasize the psychological boost that Africa has received because of

China's activities there since the end of the Cold War. Its engagement with African nations has been a morale booster and a source of hope for a continent largely abandoned after the Cold War.¹⁵ The retrenchment of the superpowers from Africa and the devastation caused by requirements of the Washington Consensus were in varying cases responsible for the severe economic decline and violent conflicts in Africa during the early 1990s. In particular, the West's interest in Africa markedly decreased, reflected in a sharp drop in demand for the continent's basic exports. Thus, China's presence in Africa in the late 1990s served as a psychological boost and restoration of self-esteem to African nations. With 2000 and the formation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the rapid growth in economic involvement, and an emphasis on resuscitating Africa's long-neglected infrastructure, China became a source of hope and inspiration for much of the continent. It provided some African nations an alternative from the austere measures of the Washington Consensus.

Many of the favorable comments on China in Africa also depict China as a capable power with the willingness to help develop the continent. The consistent policy posture toward Africa began with the era of independence and China's help in the struggle against colonial rule. The current fight against Ebola in West Africa is cited in addition to China's meager but significant help during times when China itself was underdeveloped. News bulletins released by the World Health Organization commended China's efforts in helping Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone fight Ebola. This recognition came from diverse sources, both private and public, underscoring the fact that China does more than simply concentrate on trade and investment; rather, it also has concerns about the health security of African states. Many major European newspapers such as the *Financial Times* of the United Kingdom and the *Global Times*, among others, comment on the fact that China is acting responsibly in the world by assisting African nations plagued by other insecurities and is not just safeguarding its own economic interests.¹⁶ Further, China's focus on upgrading and developing Africa's infrastructure is a source of positive comments by both private and public actors. They assert that China has made infrastructure development a priority, compared to the actions of the West, which built infrastructure only to ship Africa's resources to Western nations. The area of infrastructure is seen as a strong indicator of China's genuine, honest, and sincere attitude toward African countries. Supporters point to the reality that speaks louder than words. For example, China has completed 1,046 projects, including the construction of railways totaling 2,230 kilometers and highways covering 3,530 kilometers, thereby helping to improve the social and economic lives of ordinary Africans.¹⁷

China's View of Human Rights versus Universal Human Rights

In June 1993, during the 49th meeting of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Commission and the Vienna Conference on Human Rights, China articulated its position on human rights as a process of historical development predicated on a country's socioeconomic, political, and specific history as well as its cultural values. In other words,

for China, human rights requirements vary from country to country, depending upon each one's historical development. Differences among countries mean that the understanding and practice of human rights also differ. Accordingly, no one standard of human rights should be required of all countries because of variations in the stages of historical, socioeconomic, political, and cultural development.¹⁸ This conception of reality differs fundamentally from that of the West and in actuality becomes a source of conflict with China. It informs much of China's African policy and generates concerns, perceived threats, and negative statements about its role in the continent.

Second, China also emphasized that for Third World countries, priority should be given to combating hunger, reducing poverty in general, and acquiring improved living standards. In China's view, the right to live or subsist is considered the preeminent human right. That is, it does not make sense to discuss human rights when the quality of human existence (ensuring people's right to subsistence) is absent.¹⁹ This means that technical and industrial development is one of the necessary conditions for universal human rights. The emphasis, according to China, should be on creating an environment that would enable people to achieve economic and social progress so that they meet the basic needs of food, clothing, and overall decent living standards. Accordingly, the key criterion for judging the human rights situation of a country is whether its government formulates relevant and appropriate policies effective enough to provide basic needs and improved quality of life. The emphasis is definitely not on civil liberties and political rights as understood in the West. The foremost inalienable right for China is the right to development, defined as promoting economic and social progress or meeting basic human needs. Consequently, it is not surprising that the promotion of democracy, defined as freedom of speech, an independent media, and overall protection of civil liberties or political rights, among others, is not a priority for China in its dealings with African states.

Third, in China's view of human rights, individual rights and freedom are not absolute except as spelled out by law and within the confines of law. Within this context, a citizen's rights and obligations are indivisible. Thus, external impositions and expectations of one universal view of human rights would contradict the principle of state sovereignty. Hence, the state, considered responsible for the welfare of all groups, has the absolute right to determine what should be allowed to constitute binding human rights. China's noninterference principle would amount to a violation of its human rights principle if not upheld in its relations with African states. This view is considered quite contrary to the Western view of human rights, reflected in the promotion of democracy or requirements by the World Bank or International Monetary Fund for free and fair elections as a condition for the transfer of foreign aid and technology, among other matters.

Furthermore, China sees past injustices of colonialism, imperialism, or foreign interventions as obstacles that prevented people in the Third World from enjoying human rights. Accordingly, the existing inequalities between North and South due to the unfair global economic structure also act as obstacles to the enjoyment of human rights by Third World people.²⁰ Their freedom is also constrained by continuing interventions and impositions. Accordingly, China deliberately distances itself from the Western record in Africa

by describing its relationship with the continent as one of “win-win,” “mutual respect,” or “equality,” among other descriptors. This stance is quite different from what has been described as the patronizing, arrogant, and impositional policy attitude of the West.

In addition, China's view of human rights underscores the fact that the UN Charter expresses the right of all countries, regardless of their size or level of development, to choose their own political system, path to development, and cultural values without interference from any entity. Thus, to accuse another country of abusing human rights and even seeking to impose universal criteria of human rights amounts to violation of the national sovereignty principle and therefore interference in the internal affairs of that country. Oftentimes, the outcome is political instability or social strife within the target country. Interference in the internal affairs of other countries is tantamount to power politics, which infringes on the UN Charter and in no way safeguards the rights of citizens. During the World Conference on Human Rights, China responded to the threat of universal human rights by underscoring four principles that it claimed would strengthen international cooperation in the field of human rights in general.

First, it called on the international community to pay attention to gross human rights violations resulting from foreign aggression and occupation, foreign invasion, colonial rule, apartheid, and regional conflicts. Second, China called for the promotion of a favorable global environment that would facilitate human rights—specifically, creation of relationships of mutual respect; equality; amicable coexistence; and mutual, beneficial cooperation in accordance with the UN Charter and norms of international law. This is why China favors national (African) or regional (African Union) solutions to African problems. China argues that conflict settlement should be based on mutual accommodation and understanding; therefore, no country should be preoccupied with world dominance or hegemony through power politics, aggression, or military interventions. Third, China believes that developed countries are obliged to help developing countries achieve economic stability by establishing a fair and new international economic order based on justice and equity. This includes, but should not be limited to, debt cancellation, capital transfers, trade, aid, and technology transfer. In this way, the North-South gap would gradually diminish, bringing about development and peace in the South. In many of these issues, China's actions invoke criticism from the West because it does not abide by the regimes set up to deal with them. For instance, China does not recognize the debt-cancellation regime set up by the West. When it is ready, China simply cancels the debt of African states without imposing any conditions on them and without making sure that they deal with corruption issues or adopt good governance in general. Fourth, China believes that each country has the right to formulate its own policies on protecting human rights based on its own historical, political, economic, and sociocultural conditions. No country should impose its own views of human rights on others. Discussions of human rights should always proceed from a spirit of mutual respect and equality. Here, China directly set itself apart from the West, which is inclined to and whose global policy is to promote universal human rights, defined as the protection of civil rights and political liberties.

A fundamental difference exists between US and Chinese conceptions of human rights. The Chinese emphasize economic rather than political rights. In particular *Sreng-cun quan* (subsistence rights) is largely an economic notion considered more important than political rights and individual freedoms. The Chinese position on human rights and that of many developing nations received a boost in 1966 when the UN General Assembly passed the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The covenant is significant because it underscores the similarity of national interests between China and many developing countries, including African states. Although the Carter administration looked favorably on the covenant, the US Senate in 1978 refused to ratify it. The US understanding of the covenant's substance was based on a fundamental superiority of political rights over economic, social, and cultural ones. In fact, under the Reagan administration, the covenant was explicitly undermined not only by officially rejecting economic, social, and cultural rights but also by defining human rights to mean strictly political rights and civil liberties.²¹

On a more disparaging level, commentators use China's position that it does not mix business and politics as a major justification to level serious criticisms of that country's attitude toward human rights violations or African dictators. Its posture of noninterference in politics is viewed as lack of support for Western and international efforts to promote democracy and human rights in African states by putting pressure on corrupt, despotic leaders to liberalize or respect political rights and civil liberties. At the UN multilateral level, for instance, China even supports governments considered despotic, thereby weakening the diplomatic and economic pressure applied on them either by the UN, international financial institutions, or major Western powers. For example, China has thwarted efforts to impose sanctions on Sudan and Zimbabwe, abstaining in July 2004 from voting on UN Resolution 1556, which called for disarmament of the Janjaweed militias in Darfur. In August 2006, it again abstained from voting on Resolution 1706, which called for an expanded UN Mission in Sudan to encompass Darfur. It voted favorably only when 1706 was replaced by a very watered down Resolution 1769 in July 2007, authorizing a UN–African Union peacekeeping force.

Because China is primarily interested in making business deals and building strong diplomatic ties with African states, it does not think that arms sales constitute political interference in a state's politics. Accordingly, and as part of the lucrative arms deals between African states and major powers, China sells weapons to many African states.²² For example, China not only has sold weapons to Ethiopia, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, among others, but also has provided military training to many of those countries. Since arms transfers perform a number of geopolitical functions, one could argue that China's arms-transfer activities are not just for economic gain; rather, they strengthen geopolitical ties, diplomatic support, and military technological dependence on China by African states. The geopolitical importance of the arms-transfer relationship translates into a greater role for the Chinese government in decisions regarding the transfer of weapons to African states in particular. In terms of human rights concerns, arms sales per se are not a violation of those rights; otherwise, all major and medium

arms-transfer nations would be guilty of gross human rights violations. The problem with China is that it at times does not abide by arms embargoes or sanctions imposed by international financial institutions, the UN, or Western nations. However, the overall problem with arms sales is that the weapons have often been used to fight genocidal civil wars, commit extrajudicial killings, and retard human development by decades. This is especially the case when arms are supplied to dictatorial regimes and warlords in African countries.

China has had a long tradition of despotic rule from the time of the emperors to its current communist system. Its political culture, therefore, de-emphasizes individual rights in favor of collective rights with an exclusive emphasis on economic and social rights underlined by interest rather than moral duty. In its worldview, China adheres to the belief that interests supersede rights.

China's geoeconomic and geopolitical ambitions in Africa are easier to achieve because African states prefer the principles of China's foreign policy compared to the top-down approach of the West. For example, China's principles of mutual respect for sovereign territorial integrity and mutual noninterference in domestic affairs are appealing, not only to African autocratic governments but also to semidemocratic and democratic ones. The substantial contrast between the patronizing, top-down approach of the West and the mutual respect and noninterference of China has created a great deal of influence for China in Africa.

China's geopolitical objectives in Africa and globally are directly tied to the support of and maintenance of positive/cordial relations with all African states. China needs African states at the UN to counter condemnation of its human rights record by the West and to help advance its "One China" policy as well as other political objectives. Its geopolitical ambitions and advantages in Africa are directly a result of its mutual position on human rights and noninterference in the politics of African states. In sum, human rights considerations are subverted by China's need for African allies in global politics and by the geoeconomic objective of satisfying its energy requirements in order to continue its rapid industrialization. In other words, interests are paramount, but human rights considerations are relegated to a secondary level.

This discussion has pointed out both favorable and adverse reactions to China's engagement with Africa. On the negative side are accusations of China undermining the promotion of democracy by supporting dictators and even shielding them from UN and/or Western sanctions. Further, China has been charged with contributing to environmental degradation in the continent and failing to employ many Africans at the same time it flouts labor standards or violates the human rights of African workers. In brief, on the positive side are China's contributions to economic development in the infrastructural, agricultural, medical, educational, peacekeeping, and peace-building fields. China also seems to have broken the monopoly of the West in Africa by providing an alternative source of technology, trade, investment, and international support at the UN and other international venues. This article attempts an objective evaluation of China's role by

critically interrogating both the dominant and positive narratives of that country's extensive involvement in Africa.

Attempt at a More Critical and Balanced Examination

The question for analysis concerns whether China's support of authoritarian African regimes is outweighed by its extensive developmental activities in the continent. One could argue that African states at independence were in no way democratic because the colonial administration bequeathed them with regimes prone to autocratic rule. In essence the African state at independence was external to African society and not an internal, indigenous formation.²³ Therefore, it is not the business of China to interfere with historical, political legacies that pervade African nations as a result of colonial rule. Besides, supporters of China's engagement with Africa could argue that democratic, semi-democratic, and authoritarian regimes in Africa approve of China's role in the continent at a time when Western assistance is not only tight but also characterized by all types of impositions and calls for austerity measures. At the same time, China is viewed as a benevolent power because it is upgrading long-neglected and dilapidated infrastructure, flooding the continent with interest-free loans, transferring appropriate technology, and establishing special economic zones to stimulate the local and regional African economies. For the past two centuries, Africa has been unwillingly incorporated into—and marginalized within—the Western-dominated global capitalist system, but China is offering it a sigh of relief and a thought-provoking development alternative, as well as a source of aid, trade, and investment.²⁴

However, a question worth reflecting upon—one that is part of the discourse of China's engagement in Africa—is whether Africa is being recolonized by China. Is China an imperialist power? Is China also transforming Africa's subsistence economies into mercantilist economies tailored to serve the industrial needs of China? During European colonial rule, the colonies supplied raw materials to the colonial power and served as an import market for its manufactured goods. In general the economy of each colonial territory was suitably designated to produce and supply raw materials for European industries. The overall objective was to ensure maximum profits for the business interests of the colonial power. The question to examine concerns whether China's infrastructural investments (especially roads, railway systems, ports, airports, hydroelectric power, etc.) in Africa are mainly geared toward profit maximization at the expense of African states.

As a communal-oriented society, China has a great deal in common with African societies that are also based on communalism or that emphasize the community as opposed to the individual. In communal societies, social and economic concerns are given priority over individual civil and political rights. In its political culture, China emphasizes the state's interests because it views the state as the protector of groups—and groups' interests in communitarian values are privileged over individual interests. Thus, it is not surprising that China does not interfere even with despotic African governments. China's foreign aid or assistance to such countries is premised on the understanding that a project

contributes to the basic development needs (food, shelter, health care, transportation, etc.) of collectivities or population groups as opposed to assistance to promote civil rights and political liberties—hence the clash between China's and the West's worldviews regarding human rights in Africa. For the West, the objective of foreign assistance is to give priority to promoting democracy, establishing good governance, or strengthening civil society. These goals fall squarely within individual human rights. China, however, emphasizes social and economic rights, defined as rights to basic subsistence, work, education, employment, and overall security. The community's security in food, clothing, and shelter is considered the most important function of government; as a result, the state expends many resources toward that end. China's foreign policy concerning African nations reflects this emphasis on ensuring basic human needs or social and economic rights. In the Chinese communist tradition, inspired by Marxism, civil and political rights preferred by the West are possible only if a society has established a solid socioeconomic rights foundation. In China's conception of human rights, the West is putting the cart before the horse by insisting on civil and political rights before the acquisition of a solid socioeconomic foundation.

During the immediate postindependence era, African states and China promoted the "right to pollute" and "right to development" philosophy as a call for newly independent states to work toward providing basic human needs to their citizens. Furthermore, because of the preoccupation of developing countries with economic growth in particular, in 1986 the UN General Assembly proclaimed the Declaration of the Right to Development. The declaration charges states with ensuring that their people have access to basic human needs, including health care and employment, and assurance of distributional equity in income. These rights or securities are either interrelated or mutually supportive. Education and good health, for example, are necessary conditions for acquiring gainful employment that would allow people to afford the basics of food, housing, clothing, and adequate health care. In China's view, interfering with the functions of the state impedes the latter's capacity development that would ensure such social and economic human rights. Because African states strongly endorse economic and social rights, in 1981 they institutionalized them to development by signing the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. Since most African states are incapable of offering the key ingredients of food, clothing, housing, health care, and education, which constitute the right to development, China steps in to help them meet these social and economic objectives. China identifies with Third World nations, and it is geopolitically advantageous for it to do so because China has received a great deal of international support for them, especially from African states. Indeed, by many measures and indicators, China is more Third World than industrialized world.

The Western domination of members of the Third World has always been based on rules and regulations imposed on them as colonial territories and now as independent states. Such domination, manifested in the economic hegemony of international financial institutions (especially the policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund), translates into political and economic conditions detrimental to the right to develop-

ment. For example, the World Bank's and International Monetary Fund's structural adjustment policies plunged a large segment of the global South into deeper deprivation and poverty. As a condition for receiving loans or foreign aid, developing nations are forced to end subsidies on food, health, and education, among other things. They are forced to emphasize export crops instead of food crops for local consumption, lower the minimum wage, and open their small markets to external competition. Consequently, the Washington Consensus has proven detrimental to basic human needs that constitute the core of economic and social rights.²⁵ The neoliberal paradigm has produced more poverty in Africa since the mid-1980s but has not generated any meaningful growth. Even where growth has occurred, vast distributional inequity remains because of this emphasis on political rights and civil liberties at the expense of a state's role in ensuring a modicum of social welfare.

China: An Alternate Model?

China's presence in Africa, coupled with its near-miraculous economic growth and industrialization, has impressed many African states, offering them an alternate model of development. China has also broken the monopoly or geopolitical and geoeconomic hold of the West and its neoliberal impositions. China's success has brought back in full force the question of the role of the state in providing the right mix of state intervention and private initiatives necessary to ensure economic growth that will promote human development.

China's leverage over African states has increased because of its unchanging attitude toward them since the early days of their independence. Thus, not only is China free of the baggage of colonial rule in Africa but also its African foreign policy has been consistent, based on the proclamation of Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai and Indian prime minister Jawarharlal Nehru during the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1954. Those principles were reiterated in 2000 as the core of China's African policy. The five principles are mutual respect, nonaggression, noninterference, equality and mutually beneficial relations, and peaceful coexistence. A decade later, during his visit to African states in 1964, Zhou Enlai articulated a philosophy of foreign aid that differed radically from the West's. Among the principles that constitute China's foreign aid philosophy are that it should be based on equality and mutual benefit; that economic relationships and aid in particular should not be subjected to any heavy burdens or impositions; and that the objective of economic and technological assistance is to help the recipient country reach a level of self-reliance. The question is whether China's aid relationship with Africa is true to these principles. That is, does rhetoric correspond to reality, or is China's professed goodwill to Africa contributing in any way to the continent's development, morale, or confidence?

A significant advantage that China has over the West is its largely unconditional aid as well as the growing visibility of its aid-based projects (schools, stadiums, hospitals, roads, etc.) all over the African continent. The West's African policy, especially that of the

United States, presents a stark contrast to China's. The US policy, for instance, varies from administration to administration. After World War II, that policy, for the most part, has been relegated to a marginal position or considered the domain of Africa's former European colonial masters. Clinton was the first American president to actually initiate a significant US African policy focused on extensive economic interactions through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), signed into law as Title 1 of the Trade and Development Act of 2000. The objectives of the AGOA are to widen the scope of US trade and investment with sub-Saharan Africa as a means of stimulating economic growth and further integrating it into the global economy. A major condition of the act is that the US president must determine annually whether to renew the act, based on whether African countries have met conditions such as abiding by the rule of law, reducing corruption, lowering poverty, protecting workers' rights, and making progress in establishing and strengthening a market-based economy, among other requirements. Since 2000 the AGOA has been the primary and official economic link between the United States and Africa. Trade ties between the two entities have been significantly on the downward trend since 2011. For example, between 2011 and 2013, US-Africa trade experienced a reduction of \$39 billion from \$99 billion. Trade in goods is set to decline further in 2014 to a figure far below \$80 billion.²⁶ The AGOA is up for renewal in September 2015. Discussions largely deal with whether or not to continue the legislation. If so, the negotiations must address the length of renewal and whether some aspects should be changed or maintained.²⁷ The AGOA relationship between the United States and Africa is similar to that between China and several African countries in terms of items traded because it mainly consists of oil and, to a lesser degree, textiles. The decrease in US-Africa trade is especially due to a sharp drop in oil and gas exports from African states to the United States. Specifically, between 2008 and 2013, energy exports from AGOA countries to the United States declined by 66 percent to a value of \$20 billion.

The foreign policy of George W. Bush toward Africa could be described as a reaction to the profound and extensive Chinese engagement there. An outcome of this response was the establishment of US Africa Command and the Bush administration's HIV/AIDS policy for Africa. On 4 August 2014, President Obama hosted nearly 50 African heads of state in Washington, DC, for the most significant summit on Africa ever held by an American president. Two facts motivated this unprecedented summit. First, as an African-American with an African (Kenyan) father, President Obama is determined to build his legacy by showing his commitment to Africa, especially after enduring criticisms about his lack of attention to the continent. Second, in 2009 China surpassed the United States as Africa's largest trading partner. Perhaps a third fact has to do with Africa's great potential related to its geoeconomic endowments and the continent's rapid economic growth and expanding middle class.²⁸ Indeed, the United States wants to be in competition with China for the purchasing power of this growing middle class. America has an opportune moment to enhance its relationship with African states because President Obama is also under pressure to satisfy the expectations of both Afri-

can leaders and many US policy makers who hope that the son of a Kenyan would not only elevate Africa's status in Washington but also deepen and expand US-African ties.

Following the end of the Cold War, US and European neglect of Africa contrasted rather vividly with the expansive involvement of China on the continent. Before addressing the unprecedented scope and intensity of China's interactions with Africa since the late 1990s, one should underscore the fact that China has had consistent engagement with Africa since the Cold War years or the era of wars of African liberation. The scant historical knowledge of transactions between China and Africa during the time of the Chinese emperors contrasts very sharply with the rather bellicose and exploitative involvement of Europeans at about the same period or a few centuries thereafter. China, in other words, retrenched from Africa while the West became very involved, either for good or bad. From the early Ming Dynasty, China neglected Africa for five centuries until after the end of World War II and the era of African independence.

With the establishment of modern China in 1949, interactions with Asia resumed. Between 1956 and 1977, China provided close to 60 percent of its total foreign aid, valued at approximately \$2.7 billion, to Africa. Such assistance during this period in China's development is significant because the country was at the same time experiencing political turbulence in its attempt to stabilize its revolution. The years 1956–77 included the internal crisis of the Great Leap Forward (1957) and mass extermination of the Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–76). The scope of aid offered during this time was extensive/broad, benefiting 36 African nations.

Although China's disbursement of aid at this time was not large by today's standards and those of the rest of the major Western donors, China nonetheless used aid to accomplish a geopolitical and diplomatic penetration of the continent that would later prove beneficial. Further, China used its aid selectively to cement political-economic and diplomatic relationships with the African countries of Tanzania and Zambia, its largest recipients, who used Chinese resources for the ambitious TanZam Railway that connects the two countries via a 2,000-kilometer track. Other recipients included Egypt, Somalia, and Zaire.²⁹ Small amounts of aid were extended to several other countries as part of a diplomatic path-breaking instrument (aid serving as a diplomatic recognition function) that has now become a strong Sino-African political and economic partnership.

China embarked on this selective and penetrative use of foreign assistance in spite of its own domestic difficulties and Third World status because it needed friends to help it gain legitimacy/acceptance at the UN and other world bodies in the face of US and Western opposition. China established significant diplomatic goodwill with African states by agreeing to fund the TanZam Railway after all of the Western nations and the USSR, as well as the World Bank, declined requests to fund the project. China, though, was very generous in its assistance to Tanzania and Zambia, supplying an interest-free loan to the two countries payable over 30 years. The purpose of the project was to help landlocked Zambia export its goods through Tanzanian ports.

In addition to the economic instruments of its African policy, China reached out to African countries to alleviate Western and Soviet pressure directed at it and to end its

diplomatic isolation. Zhou Enlai paid a second visit to Africa in 1964–65 and selectively targeted aid to seven African countries that included Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Tanzania, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. China's \$190 million in aid to the seven countries was directed at the critical developmental sectors of agriculture, light industry, power plant infrastructure, health support, and overall technical assistance, forming the bedrock of Sino-African relations since the 1960s. These sectors constitute China's formidable African development diplomacy that facilitates effective crop cultivation, the establishment of factories and hydroelectric power, upgrades of roads and railways, the provision of and training of medical personnel, and educational assistance, among other endeavors. The significance of China's assistance to Africa does not lie in the amount committed, especially prior to the 2000s, but in its deliberate focus on acutely needed assistance or support, as in agriculture, medicine, hydroelectric power, and other essentials of development. China's diplomacy in the 1950s and early 1960s was so impressive vis-à-vis African countries that African diplomatic recognition of China jumped from 18 African states in 1965 to 44 by 1979.

China utilized both grandiose projects and small-scale ones as part of its African diplomatic push. For example, the previously mentioned TanZam Railway, an example of a large-scale infrastructural project, connects landlocked Zambia and coastal Tanzania, covering a distance of 1,156 miles. The project not only benefited the two African countries but also helped China gain a newly independent African ally (Tanzania), marginalized by the West, Russia, and major international financial institutions. China also acquired mineral access to Zambia's huge deposits of copper. This is a good example of China's emphasis on a mutual benefit or win-win relationship in its geoeconomic and geopolitical interactions with African states. Since the 1960s, China has established numerous projects in Africa, including nuclear plants, hydroelectric dams, roads and railways, hospitals, sports complexes, factories, and agricultural training stations. Still, the question of whether China is exploiting or recolonizing Africa remains unanswered.

Summary and Conclusions

Because China's engagement with Africa has become an emotional subject, it has generated both negative and positive discourse. Western hegemonic powers are the source of a great deal of negative framing of China's intentions, including such matters as (1) China's noncritical stance regarding human rights violations in Africa; (2) its economic support for authoritarian rulers and diplomatic support at the UN and other international bodies; and (3) its economic support to African governments without imposing any conditions for democracy and good governance in general. Furthermore, some critics assert that the structure and pattern of Sino-African trade today replicate the pattern of trade between countries in Africa and the European colonizers. This belief is reflected in the fact that China exports finished high-tech goods and apparel whereas African states overwhelmingly export raw materials.

However, the opposing complimentary discourse notes that China catapulted Africa into geostrategic and geoeconomic importance by its extensive investment activities in the continent, which has reignited Western economic and political interest there. Such interest is largely a result of the West's perceived threat to its hegemony in Africa. The enormous Chinese investments amount to nearly 2,000 projects that include mining, energy, health, and education. They have boosted the morale of a continent that was very marginalized and considered virtually incapacitated just before and after the end of the Cold War.

The competing narratives will continue for years to come because China's extensive and intensive activities in Africa have been ongoing for roughly two decades. Consequently, it is difficult to make any conclusive statements about whether Africa is experiencing real economic development as a result of China's investments in Africa. It is also too early to say with any certainty that China is reversing the spirit of democratization that began in Africa in the early 1990s. Perhaps what can be said with some certainty is that China's engagement in Africa has generated a great deal of debate about its intentions, impact, contributions, and activities on the continent.

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Where Are Rights? Where Is Responsibility? Who Acts for Global Public Health?

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An inherent tension that exists between rights and responsibility is particularly acute with regard to access to health and health care services. Despite decades of rights advocacy and acceptance, promoted and solidified in the public health arena by advances in access to public health services, these questions remain largely unanswered: *Whose and which rights are to be protected? Who bears or which entities bear responsibility for ensuring those rights? Who acts—and how—for global public health?* This article explores these questions by analyzing the response and the responsibility to respond to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa and to Ebola in West Africa.

The tension between rights and responsibility is not new. Three broad shifts have taken place pertaining to their allocation—and assumption—notably since the 1990s. First, roughly since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, responsibility—though not individual human rights—for territorial and, eventually, corporal security lay with the sovereign state. Second, from about the 1960s, the language of human rights entered the discourse in relation to a sovereign state’s responsibility, eventually coming to encompass the ideas and ideals of human security. The independent international Commission on Human Security formulated the latter as “vital freedom” and defined them as “protecting people from severe and pervasive threats, both national and societal, and empowering individuals and communities to develop the capabilities for making informed choices and acting on their own behalf.”¹ The onus for creating conditions conducive to such freedom continued to reside with the sovereign state.

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Significant change, however, has since occurred in *who* exercises responsibility. It coincided with the so-called unipolar moment following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of human security, notably in the 1994 United Nations (UN) Development Programme's *Human Development Report*, whose second chapter is appropriately entitled "New Dimensions of Human Security."² Although state sovereignty continues to be the building block of local, national, and international relations and global governance, its real power to enact responsibilities and assume accountability for the provision of the rights of its citizens has arguably waned—not uniformly but almost regardless of whether the state in question is considered consolidated, fragile, or failing/failed. Consequently, the ostensibly sovereign state is *ultimately* responsible for the traditional territorial security and physical security of the populace within its borders. In addition, it is accountable for both of these securitizations both internally and externally (i.e., within the international community of states). However, the same state is increasingly confronted with nonstate actors (NSA) that both demand its action and assume some of its functional responsibility—but not state (-citizen) accountability. As such, the state-centric international governance system is characterized less by power relationships between sovereign states than by a diffusion of power between states and NSAs.

Who determines and who decides whose and which rights are to be protected? Who bears or which entities bear responsibility for ensuring those rights? Who acts—and how—for global public health? Where does the power lie?

To illuminate the trajectory of rights along the (fragmented) alignment of global responsibility for public health, this article looks first at the case for health rights and responsibilities; second, at the case of HIV/AIDS response in South Africa; and third, at the ongoing interventions with regard to the Ebola epidemic. Finally, it seeks to draw these disparate arguments and insights together to propose possible solutions for harnessing rights and responsibilities in a way that would guarantee their protection and implementation.

The Schism between Rights and Responsibilities: How Did We Get Here?

What are the origins of the schism between the allocation of rights and responsibilities? What is it attributable to? This article argues that the increasing disconnect—the diffusion between state and nonstate assumption of responsibility for rights—has come in shifts. This diffusion is a symptom of the dynamic relationship between changes in the global ordering of responsibilities and accountabilities over time.

Relevant for the argument here are those changes in the articulation and allocation of responsibility and accountabilities within the time frame from the end of World War II through 2014. Conceptually, this span includes the sweeping shifts in global order identified by James Rosenau's concept of "governance without government" thesis first

wrought in his book of the same title, through Stephen Krasner's assertion of sovereignty as "organized hypocrisy," to what this article calls "disorganized hypocrisy."³ Rosenau maintained that a number of governance "regimes" would form to tackle specific issues in the international realm. To a large extent, he has been proven correct: if NSAs are included, then a plethora of organizations exists dedicated to treating HIV/AIDS, providing water and sanitation, and even administering public transportation in municipalities around the world. However, these are not "regimes" in the sense that they have a central organizational structure, that their interventions are legally binding, or that any mechanisms are in place to ensure the continuation of their work if and when they opt out. Krasner hypothesized that states, as the central building block of government and governance, were not omnipotent in their sovereignty.⁴ Concurring, I hypothesize further that states nonetheless remain the key organizing entity in a global order increasingly characterized by actors acting outside the state system.

That is, states are assumed to be capable of meeting three tenets of human security: (1) ensuring the territorial and physical security of citizens; (2) protecting lives and livelihoods through basic economic stability, health, and welfare; and (3) bearing accountability internally and to the international community.⁵ The onus for guaranteeing these obligations remains with the state even when functional implementation lies with NSAs. As long as such obligations could be coordinated by the state, the latter remained the definitive agent.

However, the continued rise of NSAs represents a fundamental shift in the nature, not just the organization, of sovereignty as pertaining to both territorial and human security. Here the term *disorganized hypocrisy* refers to the current state of affairs in which many actors are "in on" the action of addressing—even providing—provisions of security and human security but are beyond the realm of state government as well as international or global governance. The critical difference today is that, instead of shoring up states' lack of capacity, NSAs have contributed to the fragmentation of their power—including their ability to guarantee traditional and human security:

NGOs' [nongovernmental organizations'] role and influence have exploded in the last half-decade. Their financial resources and—often more important—their expertise, approximate and sometimes exceed those of smaller governments and of international organizations. "We have less money and fewer resources than Amnesty International, and we are the arm of the U.N. for human rights," noted Ibrahima Fall, head of the U.N. Centre for Human Rights, in 1993. "This is clearly ridiculous." Today NGOs deliver more official development assistance than the entire U.N. system (excluding the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund). In many countries they are delivering the services—in urban and rural community development, education, and health care—that faltering governments can no longer manage.⁶

Three examples briefly cited here illustrate this accelerating fragmentation. First, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, championed by Lady Di (Princess Diana): pictures of maimed children ignited global public outrage, fueling the 1996 Ottawa Treaty in which the Canadian government promoted the concept of human security.

Second, the transnational alliance between the US Act-Up and the South African Treatment Action Campaign to advocate for HIV/AIDS treatment on the part of the state: here, too, images of children (born with HIV in refugee camps in Cambodia) helped prompt Richard Holbrooke, the US ambassador to the UN, to bring the issue of the pandemic to the Security Council. Third, the Global Witness campaign to ban “blood diamonds,” whose sale filled the coffers of fighters in the brutal civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia: American consumers seeking diamonds for marriage proposals, as well as diamond houses such as DeBeers and jewelers such as Tiffany & Company, joined the effort that resulted in the Kimberly Process to certify nonconflict (nonblood) diamonds. Working around and yet on the state, these three examples illustrate the translocation of power in *international* relations: from the state itself, to alliances of NGOs or NSAs, to state-NGO/NSA-market actors. The fact of these extra-state actors leveraging influence upon the state—over, under, and around the state—is arguably contributing to a remaking of the state from a provider of human security to a regulator thereof. This transformation is changing the nature but not the scope of state responsibility.⁷ If the state is not capable of providing but is charged with guaranteeing citizens’ rights, who decides whose rights and where the responsibility lies? What does the reallocation of rights and responsibilities mean for health and, specifically, for health in Africa?

Whose Rights?

The revolution of human security and rights-based development lies in their universalism. States become the bastions not only of ultimate responsibility for the extent of the provision of rights for what is possible within their capacities but also, arguably, for the highest standard internationally. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s now-famous “Four Freedoms Speech” of 1941 preceded the call for human security in the 1994 UN Development Programme and again in the 2003 publication of the report “Human Security Now” by the Commission on Human Security.⁸ From the very beginning of the post-World War II period, Article 1 of the UN Charter, and Article 25 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights encoded the principles of human security, including emphasis on the right to health: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care . . . and the right to security in the event of . . . sickness, [and] disability. . . . Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance.”⁹

The centrality of health among global policy priorities is reiterated in the constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1948; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the 1994 United Nations Development Program; and the adoption of the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 1969 and most recently updated in 2005. These agreements have transformed normative ideas into principles of action.¹⁰ Yet real implementation lags, lost in the opaque realm between theoretical and practical responsibility.

Thus, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—as well as the Convention against the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the World Trade Organization’s Doha Declaration on “Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,” which allows for the production of generic versions of essential medicines under certain conditions before patent protection runs out—appears to provide an *implicit* obligation on the part of states to improve health and to establish and secure health as a human (security) right. However—and crucially—none of them prescribes an *explicit* obligation.

Similarly, the IHRs emphasize the universal and expanding right of each individual citizen (of the world) to the highest standard of health. In fact, the IHRs, having gone into effect in 2007, require their 196 signatory state parties to “develop public health capacities to detect and respond to public health emergencies of international concern (PHEIC), with states required to cooperate in building these capacities. However, the regulations do not provide incentives, sanction states for failing to cooperate, or allocate responsibility.”¹¹ No specific or enforceable obligation to ensure that individuals attain physical and mental health and no guidelines for how the state’s obligations are to be discharged exist.¹² This situation obviously creates problems for the implementation of the right to health within the remit of a state’s responsibility to provide (human) security. The consequences are particularly obvious with regard to states’ responses to threats to human security of health. Two of these are HIV/AIDS and the Ebola epidemics.

Whose Responsibility?

The (inter)national system based on sovereign states continues to operate under the assumption that “governments have a responsibility for the health of their peoples which can be fulfilled only by the provision of adequate health and social measures.”¹³ Critically, “while only States are parties to the Covenant, and thus ultimately accountable for compliance with it, all members of society—individuals, including health professionals, families, local communities, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, as well as the private business sector—have responsibilities regarding the realization of the right to health.”¹⁴ As Milli Lake notes with regard to judicial processes in the Congo, “The *de facto* assumption of power by these diverse sets of actors has created opportunities through which nonstate actors can enter and influence juridical processes by engaging in tasks normally reserved for representatives of the sovereign government. These activities would not be possible in contexts where the state had greater reach.”¹⁵ This exacerbates the problem of responsibility because merely counting the number of convictions of a prioritized crime or the number of people inquiring about health treatments and antiretroviral medications for HIV, for example, “tells us little about the dynamics of power” that determine the necessary response to the problem (including the problem definition) at hand.¹⁶ Lake notes that “on a broader scale, it could also be argued that the involvement of international actors in micro-level governance activities in DR [Democratic Republic of] Congo has served not to build capacity but in

fact to further relieve the Congolese state of its responsibilities to provide basic goods and services to its citizens.” Indeed, because there is a litany of “international and domestic organizations ready to engage in this work, there may be little incentive for the central government to re-invest its own time and resources into developing a functional state apparatus.”¹⁷

Such developments actively undermine the state’s sovereignty and capacity to exercise responsibility, leading to absurdities such as Indonesia’s claim to “viral sovereignty”—the idea that viruses belong to the state in which they originate. It was invoked to prevent and delay sharing data and samples of H1N1 influenza also due to the anticipated costs of being branded a state of contagion amidst exclusion from research and treatment benefits. Indonesia’s was an ill-fated attempt by the state to seize control over information pertaining to the outbreak, its domestic response, and its interdependence sovereignty—notably its ability to regulate any potential medical interventions and possible patents created externally and sold (back) to Indonesia.

These examples all iterate the theory and practical reality in the still state-centric international system that

there are roles that only the state—at least among today’s polities—can perform. States are the only nonvoluntary political unit, the one that can impose order and is invested with the power to tax. . . . Moreover, it may be that only the nation-state can meet crucial social needs that markets do not value. Providing a modicum of job security, avoiding higher unemployment, preserving a livable environment and a stable climate, and protecting consumer health and safety are but a few of the tasks that could be left dangling in a world of expanding markets and retreating states.¹⁸

Assuming then the necessary vitality of a responsible sovereign state to the guarantee of access to rights, notably health rights, and admitting the increasing roles played by NSAs in the same arena, what is the current status quo? What does it mean?

Diffuse Power: Disorganized Hypocrisy

If sovereign states were omnipotent and omnipresent in the territories under their ostensible control and purview, such reordering would not be necessary. States alone would carry and wield their responsibility and accountability, both internal and external, to guarantee security and human security within their borders. However, this is not the case. In terms of external geopolitics, each state is—and has always been—influenced and affected by its neighbors both near and far. According to Paul Farmer, “Enforcing rights is another matter altogether, since it is often the signatory states themselves who are responsible for rights violations, from torture to neglect of the public sector.” Indeed, “health and human rights needs a legal framework to impose on national governments, true, but who is responsible?”¹⁹ This is evidenced in the period under review during which (national) state sovereignty was exported to most of the world while it was also purposefully corralled. It occurred through the geopolitical East-West conflict as well as through issue-specific governance regimes. Its circumscription was further entrenched through

the asymmetric establishment of institutions of global governance, including the UN, and the proliferation of NSAs, whose organized assumption of responsibility and accountability for human security is unclear at best and nonexistent at worst. Consequently, the centrality of the state is rapidly becoming more conceptual than actual, the result of which is disorganized hypocrisy, with very real implications. The contemporary consequences of this disorganized hypocrisy pertain particularly to transnational threats to human security posed by disease outbreaks (notably HIV/AIDS and Ebola) as well as the immediate and the attendant responses to financial crises (such as cutting health care provisions) and crime syndicates (including the mafia or the Islamic State).

The next section and its two subsections compare the two brief case studies—the global response to HIV/AIDS and Ebola. They illustrate the hypothesis of sovereignty today as disorganized hypocrisy and delve into an analytical discussion of what might be done about *diffuse sovereignty*.

Global Health Governance: Who Does It? (Re)defining the Roles of Actors—State and Nonstate

The current architecture of global governance, including governance for health, rests on the presumption that governments of states are the entities responsible for human—at least citizen—rights. Fulfilling this right to health requires a state to possess the necessary means for individuals to access health care.²⁰ But whether that means that the state has to provide health care beyond access—and to what extent it is obligated to provide it—remains unclear. That is, a gap exists. Indeed, into that gap step myriad NSAs that take on some functional responsibility in addressing the epidemic but do not assume the final guarantee for HIV/AIDS response or broader public health vested in the state.

Tracing the trajectory of the local emergence of global responses to HIV/AIDS and Ebola reveals the fragmentation of the global order into disorganized hypocrisy. As both pandemics make abundantly clear, no global governance regime for human security exists. Furthermore, given the gaps in an international global system based on the responsibilities of ostensibly sovereign states—without formal, functioning, mandatory capacities—it is not surprising that additional actors have entered the fray. As both cases here illustrate, NSAs have taken the lead in responding to HIV/AIDS and Ebola.

HIV/AIDS

Regarding the global response to HIV/AIDS over a 30-year period, NSAs have been able to (1) raise the alarm and goad states—initially wealthy and relatively unaffected (notably the United States and Europe)—into springing into action on behalf of their infected populations; (2) perform a triage role in the worst-affected states, predominantly in sub-Saharan Africa, caring for and eventually treating the ill;²¹ and (3) pressure the

states whose populations suffered the most to accept the final responsibility and accountability for the provision of life-long treatments on an ever-greater scale. These events happened in a number of phases. First, NSAs, both local and global, offered care for HIV-infected persons. Second, as treatments became available, local and global NSAs lobbied for access to them, even going to get them on occasion.²² Such actions were reinforced by international and multilateral organizations like the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS; political statements such as the 2000 UN Security Council Resolution 1308 and the 2006 and 2011 UN General Assembly political declarations on HIV/AIDS; bilateral agreements (e.g., the US President's Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief, launched in 2003); and philanthropic activities (notably by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation). The HIV/AIDS response advocated by these organizations was further cemented by tenders for anti-HIV medications, which effectively locked recipient states such as South Africa and Uganda into agreeing to provide a particular kind of HIV/AIDS response *ad infinitum*. Finally, in accepting the prescriptions of this course, South Africa, for example, rose to the occasion to honor chapter 2 of its constitution to bear responsibility for the health of its population. It seemed to illustrate the lasting power and authority as well as the vested responsibility and accountability for human security on the part of the state.

The state remained the focal point of advocacy and action. The myth of its sovereignty reinforced the notion of its ultimate responsibility for and accountability to the populace within its borders. Nonetheless, there is little escaping the fact that the states charged with the ultimate response to HIV/AIDS had precious little room for maneuver, and their agency constrained from above, horizontally, and below.²³

Ebola

Similarly, the currently raging Ebola pandemic is putting enormous pressure on the worst-affected states—Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone—from below, horizontally, and above. This case highlights both similarities to and differences with the trajectory of the HIV/AIDS response. A response here might be characterized as even more urgent than that to HIV/AIDS (whose incubation period is measured in years, not days). These worst-affected states, by their own accounting and the standards of sovereign statehood that continue to govern the analysis of a functioning global order, are incapable of mounting an adequate response—too little is being done from all directions. Liberia has pleaded for outside help, effectively declaring its lack of sovereignty.

NSAs, notably the commendable *Médecins Sans Frontières* (Doctors without Borders), are overwhelmed. In an unprecedented war cry, MSF has asked for military intervention to stem the tide of the pandemic. Samaritan's Purse, another humanitarian aid organization responding to the Ebola epidemic in Liberia (two of whose volunteers were evacuated to the United States upon testing positive to the virus), voiced concern that states had left NGOs to fend off such a security threat.

In an attempt to undergird NSAs and the most afflicted and affected states, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2177 on 18 September 2014. The resolution declared Ebola an international emergency, concluding that the pandemic's spread could reverse peacekeeping and development gains. It "called on member *states* to deploy medical assets, expand public education, and end travel bans . . . [but] left unclear the exact duties required of states" (emphasis added).²⁴ The resolution triggered the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response.²⁵ The UN Humanitarian Air Relief service is also flying medical supplies to the worst-affected region.

Where are the states? Three hundred Cuban doctors have arrived in Sierra Leone, and about half that number are expected from China. The United States and the European Union are building makeshift hospitals and isolation wards, but neither is sending delegations of medical personnel although some volunteers are headed to the region.

The state-centric stalwarts of the global order—international and multilateral institutions from the UN to the WHO—have done little. It took the WHO five months to declare an international health emergency (from the first identified case on 25 March 2015 until 8 August 2015). Since then, it has publicly abdicated its role as a response coordinator, declaring itself "only" a "technical agency." It is supporting the training of the Cuban doctors in Sierra Leone.

No one seems to be in charge. No one—no NSA, state, or international/multinational organization—is in a position of authority. None is sovereign over the situation. None is either responsible or accountable for the human security of the persons most affected. Power is diffused. Sovereignty is not only disorganized but also increasingly hypothetical. And yet. . . .

The default guarantor of human security then remains the obviously not-quite sovereign state. The HIV/AIDS response revealed the weaknesses in this arrangement—even if from the contemporary perspective it appears that the most-affected states are able to muster the financial and human capacity to contain that pandemic. With regard to the current Ebola crisis, despite the obvious fragility of the states involved, the state-centric global order remains. It does so despite the fact that it appears patently unable to guarantee the human security of an increasing number of people. No plausible alternative arrangement has emerged. How might that change?

Conclusions: Spanning Schisms, Containing Complexity

Assuming that the hypothesis of disorganized sovereignty proposed here proves viable, the question becomes, what does it mean? To guarantee human security, one must assure that the responsibility and accountability for the components thereof be allocated somewhere. Mechanisms to trigger action for such a guarantee need to be found.²⁶

The world needs a multilateral framework that can provide both rapid responses to emergencies and long-term capacity building that targets the underlying deficiencies in

infrastructure, expertise, and funding in these weak states. Otherwise, they will remain weak links in global public health. As Terje Tvedt, a Norwegian expert on nonprofit organizations, argues, such failed states are better served by intergovernmental organizations representing sovereign nations.²⁷

The case studies above primarily reveal two aspects of the current global order: (1) that it continues to rest on assumptions of the theory of ultimate state sovereignty, and (2) that these same assumptions are simultaneously undermined by the presence and the power diffusion of elements of sovereignty by multinational/international actors and organizations, as well as by NSAs, each at the local, national, and global levels. The inherent contradiction in these two positions is intensified in their conceptual and technical manifestations. That is, where, if not with the state, could responsibility and accountability for human security conceivably lie?

The state system is here to stay for the moment. Yet, considerable weaknesses characterize it at both the national and the international levels. In an attempt to recognize the rights demands placed upon it, despite its weaknesses, and to engage the responsibility of the international community, *The Responsibility to Protect* report of 2001 sought to erect a global response to cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.²⁸ Put forward by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, it has so far failed on two fronts: it has not garnered a global conceptual consensus about when to intervene, and it lacks automatic mechanisms to compel those viably capable of doing so to respond.

A similar lack of automatic-response triggers has hampered global response to the Ebola outbreak. No mechanism exists to compel an intervention. Even UN Security Council Resolution 2177 only “calls on” member states that deploy personnel to the worst-affected countries to provide medical evacuation should the need arise. No provision compels such deployment or the deployment of urgently needed medical personnel (in accordance with the above). Affected national states are left largely to cope on their own, with a smattering of support from NSAs.

Conceivably, some approaches could overcome this schism. On the conceptual level, “containing complexity” for the allocation of responsibility and accountability for human security is necessary. Furthermore, on the technical level, doing so is contingent upon the necessity and willingness of states to formally share sovereignty, the institution of legal mechanisms to delegate sovereignty, and the creation of conditions and attendant mechanisms by which sovereignty is returned to the states. The purpose and goal here are to acknowledge the durability of the current state system, with the caveat that no state is sovereign, and to reapportion the diffuse power in the global order not only to provide for human security on an ad hoc and short-term basis but also to guarantee its provision over the long term. The following proposal, consisting of three conceptual positions and four technical solutions as applied to (inter)national health agencies, seeks to allow such a realignment of rights and responsibilities to work.

First, explicit acknowledgement of the preeminence of the state as the guarantor of human security is necessary. Given the plethora of NSAs operating at the local, national,

international, and global levels, curtailing or terminating their work is unlikely to be either possible or useful. However, having them register at the state and international levels might add some transparency to their activities while enabling a host state to determine where and how to negotiate the allocation of its (meager) resources.

Second, as evidenced in the Ebola response, (weak) states asking for or acceding to assistance should formally be in the position of power with regard to whom they petition, for what, and for how long; moreover, those states, NSAs, and multinational or international organizations receiving requests should not be able to decline but should be compelled to meet the demand and coordinate their actions. Such shared or delegated sovereignty would offer a way to shore up the provision of human security while clearly delineating the lines of responsibility and accountability. A plausible precedent for doing so might be the current Ebola response taking shape under the UN secretary-general.

Third, states (overly) reliant on or sharing or delegating some of their sovereignty to other states or NSAs must have a mechanism through which to reclaim it. This provision might also prove useful in the event of the abuse of shared or delegated sovereignty by NSAs that fail to meet their obligations or that actively circumvent the state above, horizontally, or below which they are operating.

Beyond these conceptual options are four technical solutions to a global reordering of human security for health. With the lessons from the HIV/AIDS and Ebola responses fresh in mind, it is vital that one internationally recognized and legitimate organization serve as the notification center for declaring and providing information on an international health emergency. This entity need not be the WHO, whose international authority and legitimacy in the aftermath of its curtailed HIV/AIDS response and its abdication with regard to Ebola are severely compromised.²⁹ The WHO, however, could serve as an information portal (competing with *Wikipedia*, whose site has apparently taken the lead as a source of information on the Ebola pandemic), much as it releases respected guidelines on HIV/AIDS treatment.

Second, once an international health emergency has been declared, mandated actions are necessary. Currently only voluntary ones exist—not a solution and certainly not a sustainable one. Making this clear are the following: NSAs that can pick and choose where they serve, under what policies, and for how long; a lack of protocols or the provision of protective gear to fight Ebola; and a dearth of deployment of medical personnel, also in the case of Ebola. In emergencies, all of the following conditions should also be mandated: if and when treatments are available, if they are produced and who produces them, and who pays and how much.

Third, health emergencies do not erupt without some forewarning. Zoonoses (diseases that cross over from animals to infect human beings) such as HIV and Ebola have long been predicted. Preparing for them involves health as well as educational, financial, and governance structures. In terms of predicting and reacting to the next such outbreak, the US-led Global Health Security Initiative, proposals for a Universal Health Systems Fund and Universal Health Insurance, and revamped IHRs outfitted with adequate national and international financing as well as incentives and sanctions are absolutely vital.

Fourth, contingencies to health are also determinants of health. In the long term, technical interventions for health must take into account food security and economic security—and vice versa.

As this article has striven to show, the current arrangement to guarantee rights via responsibilities relies on a state system that is fracturing. It is up to the actors, both state and nonstate, as constitutive agents of the international community, to realign rights with responsibilities. More research on the allocation and interplay of rights and responsibilities, as well as constructive solutions for their realignment, is necessary.

Notes

1. Sadako Ogata and Johan Cels, “Human Security—Protecting and Empowering the People,” *Global Governance* 9, no. 3 (July–September 2003): 274.

2. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report, 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf.

3. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

4. See Krasner, *Sovereignty*, 8–9, 42.

5. Vittorio Hösle, *Morals and Politics*, trans. Steven Rendall (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004); and Thomas Risse, “Paradoxien der Souveränität: Die konstitutive Norm, auf der die heutige Staatenwelt gründet—dass nämlich Staaten souverän sind—gilt uneingeschränkt nicht mehr. Was heisst das?,” *Internationale Politik*, July/August 2007, 40–47.

6. Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift,” *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 1 (January/February 1997), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-01-01/power-shift>.

7. See Laurence Jarvik, “NGOs: A ‘New Class’ in International Relations,” *Orbis: Journal of World Affairs* 51, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 217–38; and Mathews, “Power Shift.”

8. “Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941 State of the Union Address (“The Four Freedoms”) (6 January 1941),” *Voices of Democracy: The US Oratory Project*, accessed 29 June 2015, <http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/fdr-the-four-freedoms-speech-text/>; and Ogata and Cels, “Human Security,” 273–82.

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10. "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1966), Article 12, accessed 22 June 2015, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx>.
11. Lawrence O. Gostin and Eric A. Friedman, "Ebola: A Crisis in Global Health Leadership," *Lancet* 384, no. 9951 (11 October 2014): 1323.
12. Sara E. Davies, *Global Politics of Health* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010).
13. "Constitution of the World Health Organization" (1946), 1, accessed 22 June 2015, http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf.
14. "Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 14 (2000)," Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 22nd sess., Geneva, 25 April–12 May 2000, http://apps.who.int/disasters/repo/13849_files/o/UN_human_rights.htm.
15. Milli Lake, "Organizing Hypocrisy: Providing Legal Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Areas of Limited Statehood," *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 3 (September 2014): 519.
16. *Ibid.*, 523.
17. *Ibid.*, 524.
18. Mathews, "Power Shift."
19. Paul Farmer, *Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 11.
20. See "Constitution of the World Health Organization" (1946), 1; and World Health Organization, *International Health Regulations (2005)*.
21. Notably with treatments and antiretroviral cocktails developed and patented in pharmaceutical powerhouses in the global North and West (mostly in the United States, Britain, France, and Israel) until India in the 2000s became the "world's pharmacy" by providing generic, often innovatively recombined, medications at a fraction of the initial cost.
22. See the Treatment Action Campaign, accessed 22 June 2015, <http://www.tac.org.za>.
23. The case of Uganda is starker. When the initial incarnation of the President's Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief required states to earmark 33.3 percent of funding for abstinence-only HIV prevention programs, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda drastically changed his political message of "zero-grazing." The result was both a funding increase and a rise in HIV incidence.
24. Gostin and Friedman, "Ebola: A Crisis in Global Health Leadership," 1324.
25. "Ebola: What Lessons for the International Health Regulations?," *Lancet* 384, no. 9951 (11 October 2014): 1321, [http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736\(14\)61697-4.pdf](http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(14)61697-4.pdf).
26. The 2001 concept of the "responsibility to protect" as an attempt to force the assumption and action of the global community in cases of genocide or crimes against humanity has failed to be effective.
27. Cited in Jarvik, "NGOs: A 'New Class,'" 217–38.
28. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa, ON, Canada: International Development Research Centre, December 2001), <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>.

29. See Stewart M. Patrick and Daniel Chardell, "Course Correction: WHO Reform after Ebola," *Internationalist* (blog), Council on Foreign Relations, 27 January 2015, <http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2015/01/27/course-correction-who-reform-after-ebola/>.

South African Springtime, Rwandan Winter

Why April 1994 Illuminates the Limitations of Political Analysis in Predicting Genocide

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In *Worse than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity*, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen salutes and honors Nelson Mandela as a shining light in genocide prevention.¹ Indeed, we are left with the thought that cloning Mandela would be the solution to so many examples of mass killing that the world would be a much healthier place to inhabit. Although Mandela is universally honored as the founding father of modern South Africa, the potentiality that his role may have prevented a South African genocide has received less attention. Goldhagen is determined to prove that eliminating bad leaders is the key to genocide prevention. He calls for something like a league of democratic states to intervene in genocidal situations and to stop them by resorting to economic sanctions, international legal action, and, finally, military intervention. In his view, since the United Nations was set up to address war and has failed miserably in preventing genocide—which, Goldhagen reminds, is worse than war—violence in the name of ending a genocide is both legitimate and possible in international politics.

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Yet, Goldhagen's praise of Mandela is interesting for what is *not* part of the transition from the apartheid state to a modern democracy—namely, genocide:

The conditions for a murderous onslaught by whites against blacks and then blacks against whites were there. The conventional wisdom about what produces genocides, focusing on structural conditions, conflict-ridden societies, enormous suffering, enormous hatred, or a previously suppressed and newly empowered majority's thirst for revenge, suggests a bloodbath or perhaps two reciprocal bloodbaths.²

Focusing on why there was “no substantial revenge, no eliminationist onslaught” becomes the question of utmost importance in this very long and passionate book.³ Goldhagen argues that “the answer is as obvious as theories of structural causes are wrong: political leadership, and specifically the character, disposition, and foresight of the African National Congress' most critical leader, Nelson Mandela, who had no desire to undertake an eliminationist program.”⁴ Here, comparisons with what happened in Rwanda take on important meaning for students of comparative genocide. Under Mandela, whites were neither demonized nor treated as subhuman; instead, a “truth and reconciliation” process was created whereby the confession of sins offered reentry into, in Peter Gay's felicitous term, the “party of humanity.”⁵ This antigenocidaire explanation has special meaning for the horrific Rwandan winter that occurred at the same time Mandela was assuming power in South Africa.

Brief accounts of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and quasi-genocidal killing in previous years from the newly ascendant Hutu majority offer Goldhagen the opportunity to draw contrasts with the Mandela-led South Africa.⁶ In Rwanda, the period saw a newly ascendant majority but not the oppression characteristic of apartheid. The Hutus resented the social, political, and economic exclusion for good reasons, but the clear and pervasive racial rules put into place in 1948 South Africa and beyond are not comparable to the nature of society in Rwanda. Once again Goldhagen concentrates on leadership, for mass murder became the preferred option only when “Hutu leaders decided that it should.”⁷ In a chilling description of Hutu failed leadership, he argues, “From 1990 to 1993 on a sporadic and clearly preparatory scale with Hutu perpetrating at least seventeen trial massacres, and then in 1994, when the opportunity finally seemed propitious, [the genocide occurred] in the intended final comprehensive annihilationist scale.”⁸

In this deadly game of an eye for an eye, the Tutsis had been slaughtering Hutus in neighboring Burundi, thus creating a curious game of mutual killing in two adjoining countries until the final genocidal culmination in Rwanda. Goldhagen's leadership-based approach to the mass violence in South Africa and Rwanda leaves us with some fascinating thoughts about governance. Could a Mandela-like figure in Rwanda and/or Burundi have saved what may be a million souls who died in the three violent months in Rwanda? Is genocide prevention and elimination simply about the survival of good leaders in the nasty game of politics? Is the perpetration of genocide a function of the mystery of birth, which sometimes produces good leaders and sometimes very bad ones (e.g., “If Hitler

had died in childbirth . . . , etc.?). Where else can we turn to examine the differences between South Africa and Rwanda in the crucial year of 1994?

We must return to structural analysis to test Goldhagen's rejection of all explanations but Mandela-like leadership. The most often cited accounts of South Africa's non-genocidal springtime turn their attention to economics, political power-sharing agreements, international relations with special emphasis on sanctions and developments in states that border on South Africa, and important historical and ideological differences that formed each nation-state.

Remembering Mandela's South Africa: The Personality X-Factor

Our exploration began by examining the role of power-sharing agreements in Rwanda and South Africa, drawing from Marisa Traniello's structural analysis of the role of the Arusha Peace Accords in 1994 Rwanda and the Interim Constitution Pact in 1994 South Africa in her interesting article "Power-Sharing: Lessons from South Africa and Rwanda."⁹ Yet, as the title above indicates, our first foray into structuralist explanations for Rwanda's genocide and South Africa's relatively peaceful democratic transition yielded surprising results. In the end, even her structurally framed article emphasized personality and political leadership, a conclusion not so different than Goldhagen's decidedly non-structural reasoning.

We began by noting that Traniello's structural analysis of these two nations was important to the broader genocide canon for several reasons. The most important one is that with few exceptions, the field of genocide studies has been marked by an examination of historical cases that yielded roughly the same levels of genocidal violence, and from there narratives of causation have been extrapolated and proposed.¹⁰ Although such methods were understandable as genocide studies developed as a discipline, Scott Straus rightly points out that in order for causal theories to be tested and refined, "a research design that primarily selects cases with the same outcome on the dependent variable will be profoundly limited."¹¹

Power-Sharing Agreements in Rwanda and South Africa

Given the above critique of the modern genocide canon, Traniello's selection of Rwanda and South Africa for her assessment of political power-sharing agreements can be complimented. After Traniello briefly reviews power-sharing literature, her analysis traces the very different directions that each nation took in 1994 despite the presence of power-sharing agreements in both Rwanda and South Africa. Intriguingly, South Africa and Rwanda share other surface similarities in addition to power-sharing peace agreements. For instance, both the Tutsi political leadership in Rwanda and the National Party in South Africa exemplified contexts in which dominant minority governments controlled sizable majorities. In 1994, Rwanda's population of 7 million people was composed of

three ethnic groups: Hutu (approximately 85 percent of the populace), Tutsi (14 percent), and Twa (1 percent).¹² During this period, South Africa's population was larger, numbering approximately 33 million people, broken into roughly 4 racial categories of "White," "Colored," "Indian," and "Black African."¹³ Societal privileges, however, were split between whites and those who were not, with the white population also coincidentally composing 14 percent of South Africa's population. Each nation had also experienced political unrest over the course of the prior five decades, as exemplified by South Africa's township revolts and provincial civil war in the 1980s as well as Rwanda's Hutu Revolution in 1959, ethnic massacres in the early 1960s, coups in 1973, and civil conflict in 1990.¹⁴

Elites and Shares of the "Political Pie"

In Traniello's view, however, the most important parallel in these two countries was that the violence potentiality resided in the intentions of political elites and their "share of the pie."¹⁵ She additionally draws on a number of other scholars who examined not only whether power-sharing agreements were able to keep the peace in South Africa but also whether they could incentivize peace and bring parties to the table. Donald Horowitz, for example, found no evidence to support the latter.¹⁶ Focusing exclusively on the relationships of political elites to political power (i.e., control of resources, land, and distributive power), Traniello does not address the relationship between the elites and their targeted victims. Her failure to do so contrasts Goldhagen's work, which combines the relationship between perpetrators to their political goals *and* the relationship between perpetrators and their intended victims. In Goldhagen's view, a driving political goal within the right sociopolitical context must combine with an ideological, eliminationist impulse to move decision making beyond the fantasy realm from wishful thinking to policy reality. In other words, Goldhagen focuses not only on a convenient political goal, as Traniello does, but also on achieving such a goal in relation to the victim: "Eradicating the enemy in one's midst or next door . . . living in a purified society free of social, cultural, and political human pollutants . . . radically refashioning society according to a promissory blueprint."¹⁷ He contends, for example, that the presence of deeply entrenched anti-Semitism in Germany paved the way for genocidal policies to occur, noting that in order for people to comprehend such goals as committing genocide "as a real option, as a legitimate and practical political option, eliminationist possibilities must be part of politics' repertoire, which requires a real-world political context that permits and makes practical the act, and permits and makes practical the thinking."¹⁸

Goldhagen's emphasis on eliminationist impulses in cultural and ideological mind-sets is illustrative of a wider school of thought in the modern genocide canon—one that focuses less on structural explanations for mass violence like war and conflict, noting instead that ideological paradigms are equally important as causal explanations of genocide.¹⁹ His famous assertion that "genocide begins in the minds of men" is an obvious fit here.²⁰ However, many other scholars similarly link consideration of ideological world-

views with state-centric power considerations, discussing not only the political elites' desire for a piece of the political pie but also their internal visions for and of the nation they control as well as the ways they envision who the legitimate polity is.²¹ This research theme includes ideological explanations such as utopian ideals, exclusionary themes, or racist dogma, which are linked to unstable, conflict-ridden environments. Consequently, they drive national mechanisms to extreme lengths, which can include either orchestrating genocide or conceding to groundswell support for it. As Jacques Sémelin notably asserts, this framework views ideology as the connective tissue that couples a state's ability to undertake mass murders with its readiness to do so. He calls ideology the "binding agent" that connects a population's worst fears, grandest hopes, and sense of self into a reactive posture that allows genocide to occur as people begin to view the world in the zero-sum logic of "kill or be killed."²²

The Importance of Nonstructural Factors in Power-Sharing Agreements

Despite the wealth of literature on motivating forces that may sway the political calculus, Traniello frames her analysis as dealing exclusively with structural factors—that is, power-sharing agreements and institutions—in explaining the Rwanda slaughter and the South African democratic transition.²³ Her analysis occasionally shifts toward other explanations (e.g., when she seems to acknowledge the presence of triggering events in the Rwandan genocide by mentioning unforeseen, uncontrollable events like the shooting down of Rwanda president Habyarimana's airplane); nevertheless, she urges that such events be compared to the institutions at work in her case studies, thereby positioning her argument—and her explanation of mass violence—as squarely concerned with structural explanations.²⁴ The one conspicuous exception to this almost absolute focus on structuralism is Traniello's concession of the role (or lack thereof) of leadership in these two nations. Interestingly, however, this one area of nonstructural concession seems to permeate and influence the structures that she examines at length. Even as she is guided by her major premise that power-sharing agreements shaped the respective success and failure of the 1993 Interim Constitution Pact and Arusha Peace Accords in preventing mass violence in South Africa and sparking it in Rwanda, she allows that South Africa was "led by a dream team of elites."²⁵

In the end, then, even Traniello's structural analysis of institutions and power sharing begins to blend political constructions with societal conditions and the intangible factors of leadership—sociopolitical conditions that are not quite so different than what Goldhagen emphasized in his *Worse than War* analysis. Her major conclusion is that South Africa was successfully and peacefully able to transition from apartheid to democratic rule because the "necessary and favorable" conditions in which power-sharing agreements thrive were present in South Africa yet not in Rwanda. Specifically, Traniello argues that South Africa's strong, moderate leadership—including eventual Nobel Prize winners F. W. de Klerk and Mandela—were motivated by a common vision of a "bloodless unified state."²⁶ She notes other factors that helped each South African leader to

move toward middle ground and compromise, including the economic stagnation that endangered white prosperity and added pressure from the international community. However, Traniello does develop the idea that “both [South African] elites did possess true leadership qualities” and that their constituency support gave them “the will to accommodate” in order to reach the ultimate goal of a peaceful future.²⁷ Therefore, she writes, such factors allowed the consociational design of the 1993 Interim Constitution Pact not only to stabilize that state but also to prevent extraordinary levels of violence.

In Traniello’s assessment, the 1993 Interim Constitution Pact was meticulously designed to mitigate fears and to ensure that each party to the agreement believed it could secure its power and interests even in the face of a changing future and shifting racial dynamics, thereby incentivizing participation.²⁸ The emphasis here on easing elite apprehension of a loss of power, as well as mitigating broader societal fears, can be linked back to the classic genocide premises of Robert Melson. He asserts that as war gives rise to feelings of vulnerability, this in turn engenders concern that the state’s internal enemies are working to sabotage the nation or political community during this time of tumultuous upheaval. At this stage, the heightened tension and high stakes can push elites into viewing political competition as a zero-sum survival scenario; additionally, more common policy options of dealing with perceived enemies—such as expulsion, assimilation, or segregation—are closed off.²⁹ Other genocide scholars have also carefully considered the role of fear in sparking these extreme scenarios of violence, including Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, whose four-part typology of motives for genocidal violence prominently includes “creating terror” as one of the four major suggested incentives.³⁰ Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley’s excellent work on the logic of mass killing expounds upon this motive by stating that fear was the foremost motivating force in diverse, historical mass political murders. The latter include the systematic fratricides that characterized the fifteenth century Ottoman Empire (and continued regularly until the seventeenth century), the sixteenth century ethnoreligious “cleansings” of 300,000 Moriscos in Spain, and the violent breakdown of Serbian-Croat relations in Yugoslavia during the twentieth century.³¹

After framing the 1993 Interim Constitution Pact as an overall success, Traniello notes the contrasting result of the Arusha Peace Accords in Rwanda.³² She argues that the agreement, meant to bring lasting peace after the Rwandan internal conflict beginning in 1990, failed to prevent the 1994 genocide due to a combination of factors that again intersect squarely with issues of leadership, personality, and commonalities of purpose. Traniello summarizes the conclusion of her analysis on Rwanda by declaring that the “Rwanda power-sharing peace settlement . . . failed to mitigate violence because it lacked such necessary factors as committed leadership, a shared destiny and the will to accommodate. The Accords themselves led to the zero-sum scenario that South Africa avoided, thus contributing to conflict rather than mitigating it.”³³ Here we are again left with an interesting quandary: a thorough examination of Traniello’s arguments shows that her assessment is framed as a structural analysis of institutions in preventing or mitigating violence. Several of her major conclusions, though, appear to involve the role

of “intangibles”—that is, leadership, personality, vision, and the ability to build coalitions around messaging within one’s constituents, all factors backed by the decidedly unstructurally focused work of Goldhagen. One cannot help thinking of Richard Overy’s socially focused examination of the complicated relationship between leaders and their populations, which he demonstrates through a comparison of Stalin’s and Hitler’s regimes.³⁴ In a position not so dissimilar to Traniello’s findings, Overy asserts that neither Hitler nor Stalin maintained control over his large populations exclusively through terror. He also states that the leaders’ principles were widely popular at the time and backed by mass popular support—an important point since he maintains that at various junctures in their roles, each leader depended upon the cooperation of the people he ruled.

Consistent with Goldhagen’s conclusion and Overy’s emphasis on leadership, Traniello’s structural analysis of institutions in the end prompts an important question regarding the leadership engaging these institutions: did the peace agreements actually have any causal effect on preventing or exacerbating South African and Rwandan violence, *or* did the peace agreements merely illuminate the underlying leadership qualities and motivations in each nation? Given Traniello’s emphasis on the prevailing attitudes of Rwandan and South African political deal makers, her analysis raises the question of whether the individual differences of the two power-sharing peace agreements had any real, significant effects or whether the negotiating table simply served as the stage on which South African and Rwandan political elites acted out their predetermined course of action.³⁵ Would any institutional changes have improved the odds of Rwanda experiencing a peaceful shift in ethnopolitical power or, conversely, have shifted South African leaders to cling to power through any means necessary?

In South Africa, de Klerk and Mandela continued to support the peace agreements even as an estimated 14,000 politically motivated deaths (a significant number, yet a relatively small percentage of South Africa’s total population of 33 million at the time) occurred during the first 3 years of the peace agreement negotiations. The continuance of these high-level talks despite this initial wave of violence has been signaled as vitally important by other researchers since the leaders’ determination seemed to spread to other public arenas in South African social life.³⁶ The unity of the South African leaders contrasts sharply with the fractured, disorganized 1994 Rwandan government. Depicted as faltering, indecisive, and a captive in his own entourage, President Juvénal Habyarimana of the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development vacillated between the extremist and moderate factions of his party and undermined his own cabinet officials by vetoing commitments they had previously made.³⁷ Habyarimana also lacked the force of personality to persuade the Rwandan Patriotic Front to allow the extremist Commitment for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) to participate. His credibility was also undermined by his own words, including a 1992 speech in which he called the Arusha Accords mere “pieces of paper.”³⁸

“Shared Destinies” and the Question of Genocidal Intent

In addition to highlighting the political importance of political unity, Traniello develops throughout her article the idea that Rwandan leadership suffered from the lack of a “shared destiny.”³⁹ Not only did President Habyarimana’s ruling party fail to foster a common sense of purpose among Arusha Accords participants, but also, even more extreme worldviews were evident in other participants as well, as exemplified in Traniello’s assertion that “it is obvious that with the [CDR extremist party] that there was no vision of co-existing.”⁴⁰ After the CDR’s exclusion from the negotiation process, the party was summarily shut out of political power and responded by acting as a spoiler to the Arusha Accords’ implementation stage. Even at the time, this dynamic was recognized as problematic, as epitomized by various versions of a colloquialism reported by multiple sources during this period: “It is better to have the CDR inside the tent than outside, threatening to burn it down.”⁴¹ Excluded from the process, CDR leadership leveraged the Arusha Peace Accords process to build up their support through fear-mongering, including public statements asserting that “the extermination of the Tutsis would be the inevitable consequence . . . of the implementation of the Arusha accord.”⁴² As additional moderates became disgruntled at the final versions of the Arusha Accords, the CDR was able to increase its recruiting pool.⁴³

From a genocide studies perspective, Traniello’s section on the lack of a shared common future holds important implications in that it intriguingly links to an ongoing discussion in genocide literature—the ultimate intended purpose of genocidal violence.⁴⁴ Throughout her article, she describes political elites in each nation in terms of sharing a common vision (or not), a sense of mutual destiny (or not), and a willingness to accommodate (or not). In extolling the uniqueness of South African leadership, for example, she notes that “both de Klerk and Mandela were educated, carried *broad* and *deep* support among their constituents and shared the *common destiny* of a bloodless unified state” (emphasis in original).⁴⁵ Intriguingly, if Traniello’s assessment here is correct, such a dynamic might shed new light on whether South Africa was really at risk of genocidal violence in 1994 even as it underscores the fraught genocidal mind-sets already at work in Rwanda.

In Straus’s excellent article “‘Destroy Them to Save Us’: Theories of Genocide and the Logic of Political Violence,” his incisive summary of core features that characterize genocidal violence winnows down a modern preponderance of definitions to include two common traits among them all. The first is unqualified group selection—that is, entire people groups are targeted, in contrast to combatant- or rival-selected violence, whereby members of one group may be targeted but only those members who pose a credible or perceived threat. The other commonality that Straus culls from major genocide definitions is that the ultimate goal of violence is destruction, as distinguished from repression, harm, negative communication, or some other purpose. Genocidal violence is thus distinct from indiscriminate or individually selective violence or from violence whose desired outcome is something short of absolute group destruction. Straus’s important distinction

is most clearly seen in his discussion of violence used for a “communicative function” in war or terrorism:

For example, a significant number of scholars who study terrorist violence and violence against civilians in civil war argue that such violence has a “communicative” function. “Corpse messaging” in the context of a drug war is a vivid illustration. The violence is designed to deter and punish defection, to destabilize or weaken opponents, to goad opponents to engage in self-defeating strategies, and to attract attention (and recruits and money). By contrast, in genocide the violence is not generally communicative, but rather an end in itself. Communication is not the function of violence, but rather destruction is. In civil war, the general objective is to defeat, weaken, or compromise with an enemy as well as to control territory; violence is deployed to achieve those ends. In these scenarios, the ultimate vision of interaction is usually group submission, surrender, or negotiation—but there is a future of sharing territory. The logic of genocide differs. In genocide, negotiation, control, surrender, and submission are off the table. The perpetrating organization pursues group destruction as the best available strategy. Thus, a central question is when and why would alternative strategies, such as group submission, removal, or negotiation, be off the table? Why is group destruction the chosen option? The question is rarely asked in genocide studies, but it seems essential for the theoretical development of the field.⁴⁶

Straus’s description of genocidal intent is therefore at odds with the one that Traniello’s article suggests for the 1994 South African context. If her premise that South African elites shared a common vision—one in which they could imagine the other party coexisting—is correct, then we are left with the potential conclusion that the 1994 threat of violence was elevated and severe in South Africa but that it was not ultimately the threat of *genocidal* violence. This potentiality that South Africa was not at risk for genocidal violence in April 1994 should be more fully examined because it holds repercussions for those such as Goldhagen who cite it in the context of genocidal explorations.⁴⁷ Could it be possible that Goldhagen is championing elite leadership as a genocidal deterrent in climates that, at their essence, are violent but not really at risk of genocide at all?

Imaging South Africa without Mandela: A Return to Structural Analysis

Traniello’s analysis is useful, then, in prompting further questions to consider, but in the end, the relationship between leadership and structure remains inconclusive. That is because the emphasis remains on a very limited set of internal state structures without an examination of broader structural conditions that include economic and political angles and that position the context and its leadership, ideology, and state structure within the international community at the time. Only by expanding the analytic scope can one more robustly assess the possibilities of genocide and determine when its prevention in South Africa adds new dimensions to the question of great leaders and the structural world in which they find themselves.

For the sake of argument, let us return to April 1994 and imagine a world in which Nelson Mandela had abandoned South Africa and taken up residence in Kigali, Rwanda, in a position of power—but not total power. This exercise is not frivolous since it allows us to look more closely at how state structure, as well as South African and Rwandan relations with the outside world, either retarded or encouraged genocide. We will look at three important variables. First, we examine the vulnerabilities of both countries to the world economy (including the role of punitive sanctions). Second, we assess the changing nature of events along the borders and developments in neighboring states. Finally, we scrutinize how international developments sometimes far from the African continent affected the possibility of genocide in each nation.

Economic Issues

As Nigel Worden and many other scholars have noted, South Africa was prone to international economic pressure, including sanctions, because of the nature of its economy and simply because it was well integrated into world economic activity in a very different way than Rwanda.⁴⁸ The existence of a large and powerful business class meant that the white minority rulers not only focused on race and political control but also on their collective purses. P. W. Botha's infamous and unrepentant 1985 response to tentative comments indicating an internal willingness to reform by then-foreign minister Pik Botha exemplifies this point. P. W. Botha's unabashed refusal to give in to international reforms or transition to majority reform marked a political crossing of the Rubicon. As Worden correctly argues,

The response was immediate. Loans granted by foreign banks in 1982 were now called in, with no facility for renewal. As a result the rand collapsed, and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was temporarily closed. These events spurred South African business leaders on to the offensive. Within a month leading business directors were visiting the ANC [African National Congress, the party that eventually elected Mandela president] in Lusaka.⁴⁹

In the end, white governance could not separate itself from the pressure of larger and more powerful states that could wreak economic havoc on both whites and blacks in the relatively advanced and complex economy of South Africa. That country was in the forefront of African economic development, but its very success also spelled both economic and political weakness. Apartheid could have financially ruined South Africa. Ultimately, businesses do not thrive in political climates wracked by uncertainty; thus, the economic crisis literally forced the National Party to reconsider apartheid for the sake of the economic bottom line. South Africa was not able to and could never attain anything like economic autarchy, which only the very strongest actors in the international political economy might do. On the other hand, Rwanda, with its less developed agricultural economy, could (and did) proceed on its genocidal path without any thought of economic consequences. Indeed, so far as we know, no books on the Rwanda genocide portray Hutu extremists or anyone else in the country worrying about the economic consequences of

genocide, which might have been the case if the Hutu leaders as well as others were going to suffer massive economic loss by their action. Hence, we see in South Africa and Rwanda two radically different economic environments, the first of which appears to have been much more vulnerable to international carrot-and-stick economic measures and the latter of which was not. We also see differing economic considerations on the part of potential genocidaires since no Hutu leader appeared to worry about his income, small business, or agricultural holdings when picking up his machete to slaughter his neighbors.

Borders and Neighboring Countries

Additionally, South Africa and Rwanda went through profoundly different experiences in the years leading up to 1994 with regard to bordering countries. In this short article, we cannot discuss the complexity of international relations close to home, but it is clear that what we might call the borderlands played a significant role in dimming the prospects for genocide in South Africa and encouraging them in Rwanda. Take for example the independence of Namibia in 1990, which both settled and eliminated conflict in German Southwest Africa. As Adrian Guelke has noted, events in Southwest Africa profoundly changed the dynamics of relations between the ANC and the National Party forever: “The Namibian settlement process led to the ANC losing its base camps in Angola. The ANC also faced virtually no prospect of re-establishing them elsewhere in southern Africa. . . . The ANC was left with no real option but to seek negotiations in good faith.”⁵⁰

South Africa had been deeply involved in a war in Namibia, with the ANC as one of its opponents. In Angola, where Cuban and Angolan forces were engaged against South African-supported rebels, as Saul Dubow has correctly noted, the 1998 battle of Cuito Cuanavale weakened the government in Pretoria and revealed the vulnerability of South Africa with regard to its border conflicts.⁵¹ Thus—and paradoxically—both the ANC and the white government of South Africa were wounded by borderland issues. In the end, both of the contesting parties were chastened by these events; consequently, space was created for finding a solution to the political strife at home. Therefore, losing abroad (but close to home) presented an opportunity for negotiations. Further, if we add international changes at the time in both Mozambique and Zimbabwe to the mix, we have a complex and fortuitous series of events in countries just to the north geographically, which ironically and unpredictably changed the structure of international relations in the region as well as the nature of politics and political opportunities. None of this means that Mandela and de Klerk were not important actors in the borderland dramas or that they should relinquish their Nobel Peace Prizes in the name of borderland structural adjustment. It does suggest, however, that focusing too much on the nature of leadership can cause as many distortions of the historical record as Goldhagen’s eloquent defense of great men like Mandela.

The Rwanda border paints a very different picture—sadly, one that made genocide likely with or without great or even average leaders. Our hypothetical planting of Mandela in Kigali would not have affected the radically different borderlands situation he would have faced. The episodic killings in both Rwanda and Burundi had driven large numbers of minority Hutus into bordering countries where they had formed military forces in conjunction with, or with the approval of, those neighboring states or what amounted to independent militias. Accordingly, Rwanda's government was surrounded not only by other countries that were relatively nonthreatening to their body politic but also by ex-Hutus who had once lived in the country and who were now on the border in Uganda, in Burundi, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. We are reminded of an interesting historical example that has relevance here and elsewhere. At the time of the horrific massacre of Protestants by Catholics in August 1572, referred to as the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre, the Catholics in Paris were well aware of and fearful of a Protestant army on the outskirts of the city. Therefore, part of the motivation for murdering all of the Huguenots on that hot and steamy night was fear generated by a "them or us" psychology, which has often tied fear of both invasion and subversion to rather nasty results. One east African example from Mahmood Mamdani's fine work on the Rwanda genocide will suffice. In Burundi, large numbers of Hutus had been killed (including many young students) by Tutsis, causing a flood of angry, displaced Hutus to flee over their northern border into Rwanda. In addition to the important factor of Tutsi armies in bordering Uganda, angry Hutus in the country added to the very flammable mix that helped ignite the genocidal conflagration in April 1994.⁵² In his drive to eliminate structural variables as significant in genocidal events, Goldhagen simply ignores the subtle and no-so-subtle ways in which structure and personality act together in specific cases. Comparative analysis of South Africa and Rwanda reveals a much more complex and problematic picture. It is highly unlikely that either Mandela or any other great leader could have changed the circumstances of these conditions.

International Perceptions and the Fall of the Berlin Wall

In a recent book on the history and demise of apartheid, Saul Dubow examines internal South African politics in the context of major changes in international affairs that were occurring thousands of miles away. The international key to understanding begins in 1989. In Dubow's words, "The single most transforming event was the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the ensuing swift collapse of Communist rule in eastern Europe. At a stroke, a key factor underpinning National Party rule in South Africa . . . was removed."⁵³

It is impossible to overestimate the importance of the collapse of communism. It not only changed the domestic debate in South Africa by undercutting claims that the country might become communist but also destroyed the arguments of many conservative observers abroad that in the cruel world, realpolitik made apartheid the lesser of two evils, the other one being communism firmly established at the tip of the continent. Just

as Mikhail Gorbachev moved the Soviet Union away from its communist past to a more liberal and democratic state, so did de Klerk, in imitation of the Russian leader, opt for equally dramatic political and social change. Most importantly, the United States no longer had to fear Soviet conquest in confronting a racist state.

Although South Africa was dramatically influenced by the collapse of communism, it was a virtual nonevent in Rwanda. The Rwandan history of violence and outbreaks of mass killing had little or nothing to do with the Cold War; thus, there was no Berlin Wall chain reaction in the Hutu/Tutsi text to encourage reconciliation of ethnic differences. Because the Cold War was relatively unimportant in terms of territorial gain in Rwanda, its end did not provide any room for dispute settlement. However, the Rwanda genocide was not free of larger international events. For example, the reluctance of the Clinton administration to intervene in Rwanda was partly a function of its withdrawal from Somalia, where attempts to help in that war-torn country resulted in graphic American military deaths, as images of bodies publicly dragged through the streets of Mogadishu were transmitted around the world. Still, conflict in Rwanda remained relatively immune from Cold War politics, allowing genocide to occur beneath the radar.

It is also important to note that race-conscious activists in the United States turned their attention to color rather than ethnicity. They were strengthened in their drive to end the apartheid state by the collapse of communism, but their sympathies were not focused on black-on-black violence. In the United States, with its racially troubled past and, most importantly, its history of slavery, racial issues have always had high salience. Black ethnic violence could not and did not seem to register or resonate in the same way, and no coalition existed to build either pro-Hutu or pro-Tutsi coalitions in the United States or to sustain interest in events so foreign to the American experience. Our own past focused attention on South Africa in a manner that a potential genocide in Rwanda simply could not. Moving Nelson Mandela to Rwanda could not possibly affect historical memory and experience in any substantial way. Paradoxically, the long, terrible history of colonialism created a canvas of black-white relations that seems to have worked in favor of genocide prevention in South Africa. The story of black tribal violence had no resonance in the West and was not the core of its genocidal imagination or anticipation.

Conclusion

We are not suggesting that great leaders and structural dynamics within states do not matter, and we are resolute in our refusal to condemn the issues we flagged in the work of Goldhagen and Traniello—and many others—who limit the complex factors that cause or prevent genocide to one or a few variables. Having said that, we do call for extending the parameters of structural analysis to the economic and political structures that exist independently of the political personalities in a nation and that reach far beyond the internal structures and institutions in place in that context. Doing so will allow us to ask a host of new questions about why genocide does and does not occur, and it may open new doors of inquiry on the actual level of risk. For example, if Traniello's summary

of the shared sense of destiny was accurate in 1994 South Africa, then this nonstructural factor would have comprised an important resiliency that subtly de-escalated the risk of genocidal intent as each of the parties in conflict never crossed the Rubicon into desiring the outright elimination of the rival group. The challenge for further genocide prevention strategies, then, is not only to identify such resiliencies but also to ensure that the implementation of atrocity-prevention strategies bolsters and does not unconsciously chip away at these positive “intangibles.”

Further, both Rwanda and South Africa were operating in radically different international environments, particularly with regard to international economic ties, borderland issues, and the impact of global political transitions on the place of these African nations in the ever-changing nature of international politics. International events like the fall of the Berlin Wall can influence the global order in ways that are traumatic for some countries but barely register in others. In this case, South Africa proved to be profoundly affected by the events, their fallout, and the shifting power dynamics of countries thousands of miles away, while Rwanda was not. The Soviet Union’s collapse was largely a nonevent for both Hutu genocidaires and their Tutsi victims, a small ripple in the international pool in which all nations swim. Conversely, for South Africa, the fall of communism constituted a tidal wave from which the nation emerged, never to be the same.

Finally, what more can we say about genocide prevention in light of this analysis? Certainly these conclusions are not meant to imply that genocide prevention policies that seek to improve the risks inherent in at-risk nations’ structures and institutions do not matter. We can still proclaim loudly and clearly, “Never again,” yet at the same time acknowledge that the unpredictability of international politics and events beyond the control of human action may shape “never again” in ways that both save and cost human life on a massive scale. “Never again” is a hope and a prayer, but international economic and political changes qualify those hopes and prayers in profound ways. By turning it into an axiom and a commandment, we will always be doomed to disappointment and perhaps even contribute to disillusionment in the field. Instead, we must remain clear-eyed in our recognition that the world system does not always follow the most carefully laid plans, and we must make the conscious decision to remain nimble in both our assessments and our response strategies.

Notes

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3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*, 296.

5. Peter Gay, *The Party of Humanity: Essays in the French Enlightenment* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971).

6. Goldhagen, *Worse than War*, 30, 67–74, 294–97.

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15. Traniello, "Power-Sharing."

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17. Goldhagen, *Worse than War*, 485.

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21. See Jacques Sémelin, *Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide*, trans. Cynthia Shoch (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Ben Kiernan, *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007); and Richard Overy, *The Dictators: Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia*, 1st American ed. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2004).

22. Sémelin, *Purify and Destroy*, 22.

23. Traniello, "Power-Sharing."

24. Ibid., 30.

25. Ibid., 41.

26. Ibid., 35.

27. Ibid., 35, 38.
28. Ibid., 35.
29. Melson, *Revolution and Genocide*, 18–19.
30. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 12–15.
31. Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley, *Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 31–36.
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43. Traniello, “Power-Sharing,” 39; and Scorgie, “Rwanda’s Arusha Accords,” 72.
44. Traniello, “Power-Sharing,” 29, 35–36, 38, 39, 41, 42.
45. Ibid., 35.
46. Straus, “Destroy Them to Save Us,” 554–55.
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Operation Serval

Analyzing the French Strategy against Jihadists in Mali

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Similar to the events that occurred two years earlier in Benghazi, the crews of the four Mirage 2000Ds that took off on the evening of 11 January 2013 from Chad inbound for Kona in central Mali knew that they were about to conduct a mission that needed to stop the jihadist offensive to secure Bamako, the capital of Mali, and its population. This time, they were not alone because French special forces were already on the battlefield, ready to bring their firepower to bear. French military forces intended to prevent jihadist fighters from creating a caliphate in Mali. They also knew that suppressing any jihadist activity there would be another challenge—a more political one intended to remove the arrows from the jihadists' hands.

By answering the call for assistance from the Malian president to prevent jihadists from raiding Bamako and creating a radical Islamist state, French president François Hollande consented to engage his country in the Sahel to fight jihadists. Within a week, Operation Serval had put together a joint force that stopped the jihadist offensive and retook the initiative. Within two months, the French-led coalition had liberated the entire Malian territory after destruction of jihadist strongholds in the Adrar des Ifoghas by displaying a strategy that surprised both the coalition's enemies and its allies. On 31 July 2014, this first chapter of the war on terror in the Sahel officially closed with a victory and the attainment of all objectives at that time.

This initial success in the struggle against terrorists in the Sahel is explained by adherence to three main strategic principles: (1) clear political direction shaped at the

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This article is dedicated to the memory of Capt Mathieu Bigand (French Air Force, 1/3 Navarre Fighter Squadron), who took part in the first bombing mission of Operation Serval and died on 26 January 2015 during a Tactical Leadership Program mission in the service of his country.

highest political level, relying on a good understanding of the situation and its causes as a means of avoiding political traps; (2) a combination of economy of means, initiative, and concentration of forces displayed in the use of special forces who mentored local military forces and relied on support from airpower to track and destroy the enemy and weaken his will to fight; and (3) full use of “boots on the ground” to keep the initiative not only by holding the ground acquired by the special forces and the air campaign but also by focusing massive force on the point of enemy weakness during the final assault against the jihadist stronghold—and by shaping an exit strategy to avoid a quagmire.¹ After reviewing the roots of the conflict, this article analyzes how the French strategy proved successful by respecting major strategic principles to defeat the jihadists in Mali. It then examines the exit plan that sowed the seeds of long-term success.

The Roots of the Conflict

A Weak State with a Weak Army Unable to Secure a Huge Country

Twice the size of France, landlocked Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 176th on the Human Development index.² Known for its corruption, it relied on a patronage system created by ousted president Amadou Toumani Touré from 2002 to 2012 through which the political elite enriched itself.³ Despite the efforts of the US, French, and German special operations forces training program intended to create a military force designed for counterterrorism, Malian military forces were defeated and forced by jihadists to withdraw from the northern 60 percent of the country in spring 2012.⁴ Moreover, since Mali’s independence in 1960, its government has showed no interest in developing the northern part of the country. The lack of support and assistance during times of drought helps to explain the Arab and Tuareg populations’ feeling of abandonment.

The Tuareg Rebellion

Representing approximately 5 percent of the Malian population, the Tuaregs are nomadic pastoralists whose area spreads all along the Sahel and into Mali.⁵ Located predominantly in Tessalit, Gao, and Kidal, they practice a syncretic form of Islam that blends many forms of indigenous and pre-Islamic practices.⁶ Marginalized for years, the Tuaregs have traditionally aspired to independence or autonomy; consequently, they have led numerous uprisings that were severely crushed by the central government in 1963, in 1990 under the leadership of Iyad ag Ghali, in 2006, and in 2011. From their perspective, the two agreements signed with the Malian central government in Tamanrasset (1992) and Algiers (2006) failed to bring greater autonomy or a larger role for local Tuaregs in security forces and economic development. Thus, political and economic marginalization represents the genuine roots of the Tuaregs’ claims whereas religious beliefs and ethnicity have proven only secondary elements that complicate the problem.

Reinforced by the return of former mercenaries of Mu‘ammar Gadhafi with heavy weapons and ammunition from Libyan stores, leaders of the different Tuareg factions formed the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MLNA) in October 2011.⁷ It is important to note that this group, under the leadership of aristocratic tribesmen from Kidal, represents neither all of the Tuaregs nor all of the northern populations. Divisions between Tuaregs mainly rely on their status within that aristocratic society and are central to explaining the numerous factions within the Tuareg ethnicity.

Jihadist Groups

Formerly known as the Salafist for Preaching and Combat Group, al-Qaeda in the Maghrib (AQIM) traces its roots to Algeria, as reflected by the citizenship of its leaders. Successful and brutal Algerian counterterrorism actions pushed AQIM into neighboring countries where it developed a very lucrative campaign of kidnappings for ransom.⁸ Originally from Gao, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) is a terrorist group known for smuggling, whereas Ansar al Dine is a Salafist group created by Iyad ag Ghali, the famous Tuareg aristocrat who turned Islamist after the turn of the century. AQIM shares with these main allies its goal of replacing all of the governments of “Sahelistan” with proper Sharia states.⁹ Those jihadist groups, which found favorable ground in the radicalized Wahhabi communities that spread in northern Mali, consider Sharia an option as provided by the declaration of the chairman of the Malian Islamic High Committee on 19 January 2012.¹⁰ Thus, the Tuaregs’ political claims developed a religious dimension.

The Faustian Pact

Between January and April 2012, the MLNA, under the command of Mohamed Ag Najem and Bilal Ag Acherif (two former colonels in Gadhafi’s army) and allied with the three jihadist groups, conquered much of northern Mali. This series of defeats for the Malian army led to a strategic retreat south of the Niger loop and to a military coup in Bamako on 22 March 2012. Among the Malian defeats, it is interesting to note that current Malian general El Hadj Gamou, a lower-cast Tuareg who integrated the Malian armed forces after the Tuareg uprisings in the 1990s, fiercely defended the city of Kidal against mujahedeen forces in early 2012. Nevertheless, he was forced to withdraw with his troops towards Niger.

Following their agenda, Islamists sidelined the secular MLNA since they had little interest in the idea of a free and secular Azawad and implemented strict Sharia law in the conquered area.¹¹ Thus, the MLNA, rewarded for its Faustian pact with the jihadists who took control of Azawad, unilaterally proclaimed a cease-fire. Concerned by the unwillingness of the Malian military to restore democratic institutions, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) reacted with an economic boycott that succeeded in coercing the putschists into installing House Speaker Dioncounda Traoré as president of Mali in accordance with the constitution. Because negotiations with the ji-

hadists failed, ECOWAS, the African Union, and Malian military experts adopted a joint strategic concept of operations to deploy West African forces in order to restore the integrity of Mali.

The French Strategy in Mali and Its Implementation

Clear Political Direction

The jihadists decided to take the initiative as pressure grew with the adoption of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2085 authorizing the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), which sanctioned the taking of all necessary measures to restore the territorial integrity of that country.¹² Two columns of around 80 and 30 vehicles, most with a weapon platform and 5–6 crew members, moved towards Konna and Diabaly, following two parallel axes.¹³ Realizing that the jihadists were within a day of Bamako, President Traoré formally requested assistance from France, which acted on 11 January under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which provides for the right of countries to engage in self-defense—including collective self-defense—against an armed attack.¹⁴ It is possible that the “Dakar speech” of President Hollande, explaining that France was done with its intrusion in African internal affairs, and the inaction of French troops in Central Africa in December 2012 might have led the jihadists to believe that France would not act.¹⁵

For months—and despite doubts from its allies—France used diplomacy in a vigorous effort to build an African solution to an African problem.¹⁶ That solution, although causing concern about its military efficiency since it relied only on African forces, involved embracing a French “leading from behind strategy” without committing fighting forces. Thus, France would avoid economic and political disadvantages because it was still perceived as the former colonial power in West Africa.

Unsurprisingly, France wished to stick to the initial multinational plan with a few adjustments. According to President Hollande, the objectives were to help the Malian military forces stop the jihadist thrust towards Bamako and repel them, assuring the security of the civilian population; to help Mali recover its territorial integrity and sovereignty; and to facilitate the implementation of international resolutions by a quick deployment of two complementary missions: AFISMA and the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM).¹⁷ Consequently, as was the case 30 years ago in Chad against Libyan forces, France intended only to halt the jihadists and contain them in a first phase. Then, once Malian military forces were fully trained by the EUTM, French forces would back a Malian counteroffensive supported by AFISMA to repel the jihadists.¹⁸

On 12 January, after the initial French counteroffensive, President Hollande decided to adapt the initial strategy by seizing the initiative.¹⁹ Hence, after stopping the jihadist offensive, French forces along with the remains of the Malian forces would liberate northern Mali without waiting for the African coalition to develop.²⁰ That political

decision was far riskier for France since casualties could be heavier. In fact, considering the casualty-averse nature of public opinion, a dangerous option that would put the operation in jeopardy could quickly lose both domestic and international support. One element that weighed heavily in this decision was the desire to destroy the jihadists before they could quit the battlefield and slip out of reach.²¹ Indeed, “Seize the initiative and never decrease the pressure on the jihadists” was the French forces’ motto. Within a few days, relying on 75 percent on its allies for the first force projection, France would produce enough military power to complete that task by retaking the Niger loop.²²

Avoiding Political Traps

Clearly, France had adopted a tailored, flexible strategy that took into consideration all of the context and difficult local issues throughout the operation. The first trap to avoid was isolation and the ghost of colonialism. On the diplomatic stage, France gained the support of every African country in the area, including Algeria, albeit discreetly.²³ The AFISMA deployment process speeded up, Mauritanian borders were closed, and Chad sent more than 1,000 of its best troops for desert operations. On 17 January, the first several hundred African soldiers from AFISMA arrived at Bamako. Thus, France succeeded in internationalizing this cross-border conflict, and African countries took on their share of the burden.

Building a coalition is always a challenge, as reflected by the European Union’s lack of consensus regarding getting involved on the Malian front line (the major European countries acted bilaterally to bring logistics support to the French operation).²⁴ France succeeded in bringing most of the Sahel’s countries into a coalition. The fact that each country brought its own agenda, perspective, interests, strategy, command structures, rules of engagement, and caveats could have led to tensions and weakened the coalition. In fact, however, French leadership avoided that classical trap by fully assuming the command and conduct of the operation and by imposing its strategy during the offensive phase on its African allies, who gave the French *carte blanche*. As a result, France enjoyed unity of effort and was able to adapt quickly in a clearly changing environment when consultations among allies were not necessary to make decisions.

French leaders also wished to avoid the trap of losing domestic political support if the populace did not believe that such an operation was of vital interest. With the exception of a few individuals of little influence, members of all political parties quickly expressed support for the French operation. Because that support could have collapsed, though, Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian played a key role by explaining the military operations to the media and aggressively labelling jihadists as France’s worst enemy. Subsequent opinion polls showed that popular support was strong.²⁵ Furthermore, by using a small footprint and relying on highly efficient means—namely, special forces and air assets—France kept its human losses at a level acceptable to the public. In fact, the French had many advantages that improved their strategy’s chances of success, including reasonable political objectives, a favorable battlefield (tracking jihadists in open terrain was

easier than doing so in an urban area), support of citizens who had suffered from jihadist abuses, the Malian army's knowledge of the environment, and years of collecting intelligence on jihadists, which proved of key importance in the targeting process.

Aware of the fact that one of the major issues which led to the success of the jihadists in 2012 was the internal struggle between some Tuaregs and the Malian government, the French avoided the deadly trap of feeding a local insurgency by turning Tuaregs against the forces of Operation Serval. Their first move was to accept the support of the MLNA—but discreetly because the population of southern Mali might interpret such action as treason. The second move proved to be the effective use of Colonel Gamou, who took part in the liberation of Tuareg cities. In the contested area where Tuaregs were settled, France prevented non-Tuareg Malian forces from trying to liberate Tuareg cities, where they could have been considered invaders rather than liberators—not to mention the fear of retaliation for Tuareg support of the jihadists. Hence, Chadian forces replaced Malian forces for the liberation of Menaka (along with the Niger armed forces) and Kidal (with French special forces). The presence of Tuaregs in the coalition meant that the jihadists were losing their main support. Undoubtedly, French troops and their allies improved their chances of success in the long run by implementing that strategy.

Last, rather than engage in classic nation building, France sought to bring security to Mali by containing the jihadist threat. The idea was to provide conditions that would allow Mali to rebuild by itself on a reliable foundation. Far from nation building, France simply wanted to restore the status quo. Between the coups of 1992 and 2012, Mali was close to a constitutional democracy in which presidents of the Malian Republic as well as mayors and representatives were democratically elected. That key element, combined with an economy that could be fostered by international support and the lack of grounds for insurgency (except in the Tuareg area), explains France's choice not to interfere in Malian internal affairs. The only exceptions were (1) the pressure that France put on Traoré, the interim president of Mali, to organize presidential elections in July 2013 and (2) its prevention of Malian troops from liberating the Tuareg areas, both of which were intended to sow the seeds for a long-term political solution.²⁶ Within that context, France could concentrate on its counterterrorism mission and avoid the loss of energy and political weight that would come from interfering in Malian internal political struggles.

Economy of Means, Initiative, and Concentration of Forces

Given President Hollande's concern about a surprise attack before the arrival of AF-ISMA, planners spent weeks using satellite imagery and intelligence gathered by French special operations forces to prepare 64 target folders for the purpose of destroying jihadist command and logistics centers.²⁷ Relying on its network of permanent overseas operations bases in Ivory Coast, Senegal, Chad, Niger, and Burkina-Faso, France used the speed and reactive ability of airpower, combined with its daring special forces, to stop the offensive. After an initial attack of two Malian Mi-24 helicopters on a gathering of jihadists inside Konna, two French Gazelle attack helicopters dashed towards that town and

destroyed numerous pickups on the afternoon of 11 January 2013. This showing of full French commitment surprised the jihadists and boosted the morale of Malian land forces.²⁸ In the evening, fighter aircraft from N'Djamena destroyed the Ansar Dine command center and some logistics centers in and around Konna. The psychological effect proved devastating on the poorly motivated mercenaries fighting for the jihadists.²⁹ The air campaign continued with strikes on numerous logistics and ammunition stores in Gao and Tombouctou conducted by four Rafales en route to N'Djamena. After arrival, they combined their firepower with six Mirage 2000Ds to conduct strikes all over the area under jihadist occupation and wherever support of the special forces was required.

On 14 January, the second column of jihadist pickups reached Diabaly on the western axis without being engaged due to the late arrival of the two Mirage 2000Ds from Chad.³⁰ A daring combination of special operations forces' attack helicopters and fighter aircraft engaged the pickups for two nights and succeeded in stopping the second axis of the attack, thus terminating the initial jihadist offensive.

On 17 January, a combined force of 400 Malian fighters and 40 French special forces supported by French Mirages retook Konna. Without a doubt, the entrance of Malian forces at the head of the column contributed to boosting the morale of the entire nation, as reported on the TV news. Within a week, that force retook all of the towns on the road towards Gao where a daring joint assault defeated the last jihadists who didn't flee. Leading his elite troops, the famous Malian colonel Hadj Ag Gamou, who had remained loyal to the central government, was first to liberate the town.

On 30 January, France decided to send 30 special forces commandos to secure MLNA-controlled Kidal, a key town where many former fighters of Ansar Dine had just created a new movement that they claimed was not a terrorist organization. A few days later, Chadian forces joined in capturing Kidal, thus respecting Tuareg sensitivity and liberating an important community with few resources. Unlike the plan for Afghanistan, the liberated Malians would not build a Western-like democracy but reinstall an acceptable political system.

Boots on the Ground

As expected in all good strategic planning, in case the initial containment did not succeed, quick-reaction forces in Chad and Ivory Coast were sent to Bamako on the afternoon of 11 January to prepare for a possible emergency evacuation of all French and European citizens. However, before the buildup of African forces that would counterattack, the mission changed from securing Bamako and containing the jihadist offensive to quickly liberating the Niger loop. Two elements prompted that evolution of the initial plan: the success of the air strikes and the results of the thrust of the French special forces and the remains of the Malian elite forces.

Consequently, on 16 January a column of Malian and French troops that gathered at Bamako began its advance without fighting towards Tombouctou. Despite the early success, President Hollande, aware that the French media would soon describe the situa-

tion as a quagmire, pushed the military to increase the tempo of operation and quickly retake one of the major northern towns. After time-compressed planning for D-day had been advanced on numerous occasions, an airborne operation retook Tombouctou on 26 January without any opposition from jihadists, who had fled earlier.

By early February, only a small mountainous area remained under control of the jihadists. However, it soon became their stronghold where, after all of those retreats, they found shelter. Despite little fighting, conventional land forces that had advanced in the face of logistics problems would shortly confront the enemy. During a visit to the Emirates, President Hollande said that he intended to “destroy [the jihadists] or hold them captive if possible.”³¹ The framework gave some freedom to the military, and after a heavy air strike on the night of 2 February, forces proceeded towards the Adrar des Ifoghas. This decisive battle would show that radical jihadists were determined to fight to the death. A combined force of the French brigade Serval, including 800 Chadians and Tuaregs from the Malian army (Gamou’s men) supported by fighter aircraft and attack helicopters, would destroy the jihadists’ stronghold within two weeks. This success relied on a simple joint tactic of using foot patrols to force the enemy to break cover and expose himself to the firepower of fighter jets or artillery.³² Only three French soldiers died during heavy battles involving close combat. Firepower, concentration of effort, and massive power proved essential to defeating an extremely motivated enemy.

Despite a few desperate attacks before the official end of Operation Serval on 31 July 2014, no more major battles took place, and France adapted its strategy to improve security within the liberated areas. Land forces proved essential by carrying out stabilization missions to prevent jihadists from returning to these areas.³³ During that time, special forces and air assets monitored, tracked, and destroyed the last jihadists in Mali. As described previously, France utilized an efficient military strategy that led to success, but aware of the possibility of obtaining tactical success without strategic victory, it settled on achievable goals almost from the beginning of Operation Serval.

Achievable Goals and the Long-Term Solution for France

The French exit strategy for Operation Serval can be summed up as follows: a multinational solution, a political process, and the containment of terrorists at a manageable level. The first key element of the French exit strategy took shape before the operation with the passage of Resolution 2085 and the deployment of AFISMA to bring security to Mali, both of which were prompted by the jihadist offensive. France avoided a quagmire and a unilateral commitment by formulating an exit strategy that included a progressive withdrawal that would occur simultaneously with the transfer of responsibility for security and stabilization to a UN-sponsored peacekeeping force drawn from ECOWAS and supported by EUTM. Furthermore, France used economic leverage through a donors’ conference on Mali organized by the African Union on 29 January that produced contributions totaling \$453 million.³⁴

Bringing legitimacy to an elected government in Bamako proved essential. Despite the US government's commitment to democracy, it hesitated to recognize an illegitimate government brought to power by a coup that translated into reluctance to refuel French fighter aircraft during its initial phase. This situation certainly pushed French political leaders to maintain pressure on Malian authorities to quickly organize elections, which were successfully held on 28 July and 11 August 2013, leading to the selection of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta as president.³⁵ In Kidal the democratic process had been fully completed, bringing hope for a negotiated solution between Tuareg rebels and the Malian central government.

Undoubtedly, the resolution of this internal conflict is the key for solving the long-term terrorist issue in the Sahel. For months France succeeded in preventing the physical retaliation of the Malian central government towards Tuaregs by keeping Malian troops from massing in Tuareg areas of population. The Tuaregs were initially accepted by the southern population; as time passed, however, pressure arose from the street, and the Malian army was dispatched everywhere in the country. The dilemma lies in the tension between the Tuaregs' will for autonomy and the respect of Malian territorial integrity. France displayed a determined reluctance to become involved in Malian internal matters since the beginning of Operation Serval. Of course, actions lead to reactions, and France knows that the jihadists could return if the Tuareg claim for autonomy doesn't find a solution. As the former colonial power, France has much to lose in all of its former colonies by interfering in internal Malian affairs. Balancing the short term with its grand strategy, France prefers to rely on a Malian compromise that for once has a reasonable chance for success since neither side wishes the jihadists to return.

With the destruction of the terrorist stronghold in Adrar des Ifoghas, France knew that the beginning battle was won but not the war. Hence, a decision had to be made about what to do after the deployment of AFISMA- and EUTM-trained Malian troops. The solution would entail a light but enduring force with two missions: (1) act as a quick-reaction force to support AFISMA and the Malian forces and (2) hunt terrorist groups throughout the Sahel.

Because jihadist activity was not limited to Mali, France decided to call for a regional response and successfully gathered into a coalition all of the countries affected by that plague. One of the key advantages of that organization proved to be the capacity to share intelligence—a central factor in the fight against terrorists since it helps coalition forces hunt and defeat them. The main trap to avoid was losing the support of local populations by conducting nondiscriminate strikes in areas where civilian casualties would occur. Thanks to the geography of Mali and the lack of natural support from the local population, French fighter aircraft were able to conduct strikes on high-value targets in places where civilians would not sustain injuries. For instance, the death of Abou Zeid, one of the three most important jihadist leaders, in an air strike demonstrated the effectiveness of the high-value target process to suppress jihadist leaders.³⁶

That strategy has proved reasonable and efficient, balancing effectiveness and sustainability. Fighter aircraft, elite infantry troops, and special forces relied on remotely

piloted aircraft to monitor terrorists' tracks and destroy them whenever possible. If France can maintain the support of its people for this humane and inexpensive operation, in all likelihood the terrorists will not return.

Conclusion

Operation Serval completely fulfilled President Hollande's reasonable objectives. The French never intended to create a new, fully democratic, and prosperous Mali; more pragmatically, they sought to stop the jihadist expansion in the Sahel. France did not fall into the common strategic traps in that kind of conflict—namely, imperialism or unilateralism, blurred objectives, weak leadership, interference in local internal political debates, erosion of internal support, and lack of understanding of the local culture and history.

The efficiency of the military operation stemmed from its main strategic principles and the fact that the political leadership allowed French forces to choose the best means and ways to succeed. Special forces and airpower were of central importance in stopping the jihadist offensive and in liberating occupied Mali. There was no chance that French strategists would fall into the “Billy Mitchell syndrome” by believing that war can be won only from the air.³⁷ Nevertheless, some individuals might argue that “precision [air] strikes in fact accounted for France's success, whereas the value of the ground campaign was marginal and needlessly risky.”³⁸ As is usually the case, the truth certainly lies in a balanced analysis, and the worst lesson learned would call for building a generic *modus operandi* from a specific, contextually dependent operation.

France was playing with a number of contextual advantages that need to be considered during the designing of strategy for future operations. For years jihadists kidnapped French citizens in the Sahel, triggering strong support campaigns in the media, which can explain why French domestic opinion deemed the operation necessary and just. The same issue led France to gather intelligence on terrorists for years—a process that proved critical when Operation Serval needed to strike the jihadists' logistics capacity.

Moreover, France was not alone in its endeavor, enjoying support from numerous sources. All of the countries surrounding Mali were involved in preventing jihadists from using safe havens and from conducting cross-border operations. Considered the Malian leadership's last hope, France received *carte blanche* from that desperate government, allowing French leaders to quickly adapt their strategy to seize the initiative in a changing situation. Finally, the principal support came in the form of key intelligence on jihadists provided by the Malian population, who saw the French troops as their liberators after months of persecution from the jihadists.

Culture also played a significant role in the victory. France has a long history in Africa and knows how to fight in its “backyard” as well as against jihadists. For example, French colonial troops and the Foreign Legion, which fought insurgents in Africa and Afghanistan for decades, launched the final assault in the Adrar des Ifoghas in February 2013.³⁹

Finally, geography proved advantageous for French forces. Mali's proximity to France and to numerous military bases of the French network in Africa facilitated air strikes and rapid power projection. Furthermore, chasing jihadists in the desert or striking them from the air in their isolated strongholds proved far easier than in an urban area.

Regardless of that initial success, the fight against jihadists is not over. France can sustain a small footprint operation in the Sahel with its air assets and special forces backed by the French army's quick-reaction forces. It receives support from the United States and all countries that share concerns about the threat from these terrorists. Choosing to become less involved would seriously jeopardize France's position in West Africa where it is still seen as a strong and reliable ally.

Notes

1. Col Géraud Laborie, "The Afghan Model More Than 10 Years Later: An Undiminished Relevance," *Air and Space Power Journal—Africa and Francophonie* 4, no. 3 (3rd Quarter 2013): 49–60. The second principle was similar to the one implemented during the initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

2. "Mali," United Nations Development Program Human Development Reports, accessed 24 June 2015, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MLI>.

3. "Corruption Perceptions Index, 2013," Transparency International, accessed 24 June 2015, <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results>. Mali ranked 127th on the 2013 corruption perception index.

4. John T. Bennett, "Pentagon: All U.S. Elite Commandos in Mali 'Accounted For,'" *U.S. News & World Report*, 23 March 2012, <http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/dotmil/2012/03/23/pentagon-all-us-elite-commandos-in-mali-accounted-for>; and Adam Nossiter, Eric Schmitt, and Mark Mazetti, "French Strikes in Mali Supplant Caution of U.S.," *New York Times*, 13 January 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/world/africa/french-jets-strike-deep-inside-islamist-held-mali.html?pagewanted=2>. "According to one senior officer, the Tuareg commanders of three of the four Malian units fighting in the north at the time defected to the insurrection 'at the crucial moment,' taking fighters, weapons and scarce equipment with them. He said they were joined by about 1,600 other defectors from within the Malian Army, crippling the government's hope of resisting the onslaught." Nossiter, Schmitt, and Mazetti, "French Strikes in Mali."

5. "Mali," accessed 31 January 2015, <http://www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/afrique/mali.htm>.

6. "Though the Tuareg are Muslim, women traditionally do not wear the veil. Despite the diversity of Malian society, inter-ethnic and inter-religious tolerance has been the norm. This is, in part, attributed to the presence of syncretic forms of Islam that blend Islam, including Sufi variations, with traditional practices and beliefs." Dona J. Stewart, *What Is Next for Mali? The Roots of Conflict and Challenges to Stability* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 2013), 27, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1185.pdf>.

7. Jean-Christophe Notin, *La guerre de la France au Mali* (Paris: Éditions Tallandier, 2014), 61–62. About 400 to 1,000 Tuaregs who fought for Gadhafi returned to northern Mali to

resume the fight for independence as well as to contain the jihadists' influence. See also "Crisis in Mali," International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, accessed 31 January 2015, <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-mali>.

8. "Kidnapping for ransom and facilitation of drug trafficking have helped AQIM rake in an estimated \$100 million." Freedom C Onuoha and Alex Thurston, *Franco-African Military Intervention in the Mali Crisis and Evolving Security Concerns* (Doha, Qatar: Aljazeera Center for Studies, 19 February 2013), 3, http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2013/2/19/201321984326956734FrancoAfrican_Intervention_Mali.pdf.

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11. Bilal Ag Acherif, "Déclaration d'indépendance de l'Azawad," RFI, 6 April 2012, <http://scd.rfi.fr/sites/filesrfi/documentMNLA.pdf>. *Azawad* is the Tuareg name given by MLNA to the area it declared independent and that comprises the Malian regions of Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao, as well as a part of the Mopti region.

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13. Notin, *Guerre de la France au Mali*, 158.

14. "Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," Charter of the United Nations, accessed 25 June 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>.

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19. Notin, *Guerre de la France au Mali*, 222.

20. Shurkin, *France's War in Mali*, 9.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Jean-Pierre Chevènement et Gérard Larcher, *Rapport d'information n°513 (2012–2013) fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées par le groupe de travail "Sahel"* (Paris: Sénat, 16 April 2013), 20, <http://www.senat.fr/notice-rapport/2012/r12-513-notice.html>.

23. Notin, *Guerre de la France au Mali*, 233.

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27. Notin, *Guerre de la France au Mali*, 176.

28. "The pilot (Lt Damien Boiteux) of one of those helicopters will die a few minutes after its landing at Sevare-Mopti, and the second helicopter will be forced to land in enemy territory due to damage." *Ibid.*, 182.

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37. Rebecca Grant, "The Billy Mitchell Syndrome," *Air Force Magazine* 89, no. 12 (December 2006): 52–56.

38. Shurkin, *France's War in Mali*, 3.

39. Kevin Dougherty, "French Military Effort in Afghanistan Earning Respect of U.S. Troops," *Stars and Stripes*, 31 October 2009, <http://www.stripes.com/news/french-military->

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Building a Partnership between the United States and India

Exploring Airpower's Potential

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Relations between the United States and India have expanded in the nature, content, and depth of the countries' partnership over the last decade. Highlighting the importance of these relations, President Barack Obama during his visit to India in November 2010 described relations with India as "one of the defining and indispensable partnerships of the 21st century."¹ Manmohan Singh, the Indian prime minister at that time, echoed similar sentiments when he said that India had "decided to accelerate the deepening of our ties and to work as equal partners in a strategic relationship that will positively and decisively influence world peace, stability and progress."²

Bilateral relations are important on their own; however, Prime Minister Singh emphasized "a shared vision of security, stability and prosperity in Asia based on an open and inclusive regional architecture" that both India and the United States share as the apex of the relationship.³ Therefore, if this partnership is as important as the two leaders seem to suggest, a greater strategic synergy is needed. One way of attaining it is through improved

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military-to-military relations. That is, as the two countries better understand and appreciate each other, they can work jointly for the greater good of the region and beyond.

This article suggests that a greater focus on the development of “airpower diplomacy” by both the US Air Force (USAF) and the Indian Air Force (IAF) as a strategic and operational capability integrated into the mission set of both services could mitigate conflict, preserve USAF and IAF assets during a time of tight budgets, and further the interests of both nations in the Asia-Pacific. As we define *airpower diplomacy*, it is a proactive approach to preventing and deterring conflict, building partnerships, and defending national interests by employing airpower in nonkinetic operations as an instrument of national power. Such an approach to the use of airpower may be particularly relevant to the United States as it seeks to pivot to a region where alliances in the style of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are unlikely and where the citizenry of many potential partners is sceptical of American intentions in the region. This article explains why a joint US-India airpower diplomacy strategy is a relevant objective and offers some thoughts on such a strategy’s ends, ways, and means.

Setting the Strategic Context and Rationale

With Asia in the midst of a major shift in the balance of power as China rises rapidly, the impact of the Chinese on the Asian strategic framework has become a major driver for greater cooperation between India and the United States. If those countries are to be successful, though, they need greater coordination and synergy in terms of both policies and approaches. US-India military engagements have been growing since the 1990s, but they have primarily remained dominated by their navies. On the one hand, the manner in which both of those services were able to coordinate and respond to the 2005 Christmas tsunami and subsequent reconstruction programs is a testimony to their level of cooperation. On the other hand, the two air forces have done their part in annual exercises and training but have not been able to effectively sell the critical importance of their cooperation from a strategic perspective. It is important for both the air force and the political leadership to understand and appreciate their soft-power roles if they are to play a meaningful part in building regional peace and stability.

In broader terms, both India and the United States have to be realistic about the shifting balance of power in Asia and beyond. Also, as India’s political and strategic landscape changes, with its influence spreading beyond South Asia, it must remain mindful of the implications of that power dynamic. Few issues are as pertinent as India takes on a more important role in the emerging Asian strategic order. If India is unwilling to play the role of a junior partner in a China-centric Asia, then it has to ensure continued “American primacy,” which has guaranteed peace and stability in Asia and beyond for several decades.⁴ One of the overriding factors of concern is that India’s unwillingness to see an Asia dominated by one power would mean that New Delhi is left with balancing China as a more acceptable option. However, the power differential between India and China today does not present India with many choices for intraregional balancing be-

cause significant expenditures would be necessary to match Chinese military capability. Consequently, external balancing is the most feasible option, at least in the near to mid-term. India has not been forthcoming in displaying its options despite its inability to balance China on its own. However, this situation is likely to change over the next decade, if not earlier. Very likely, India's interests as well as the lack of full-scale capacity to deal with these issues on its own will move India closer to the United States and other Asian partners, including Japan and Australia.

Even as the two countries speak different languages in reaching the same strategic ends, they face common threats. Thus, it might prove beneficial to share information more frequently about the evolving force ratio and thereafter develop appropriate measures in a more coordinated and coherent manner. As for the common challenges, threats to India's northeastern region are quite similar to the ones that the United States confronts in the Western Pacific, including advanced integrated air defense systems, advanced fighters, and increasingly sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities. These common issues suggest that both countries, particularly their militaries, should talk to each other more often, learn from each other's experience, and develop more coordinated and coherent approaches as a means of ensuring regional stability.

Why should India choose the United States? Looking at the international hierarchy of power, New Delhi must realize that Washington will continue to be a central player in Asia for the foreseeable future. India would do well to see the positive attributes of a closer strategic partnership between New Delhi and Washington—encouraging the military-to-military relationships that lie at the heart of the airpower diplomacy strategy proposed here. In reality, as both India and the United States make efforts at crafting sophisticated strategies to deal with Asian uncertainties, neither can afford to distance itself from the other. The fluidity of the situation in Asia is such that both have to effect a policy of cooperation in order to ensure stability. Doing so calls for greater synergies in their foreign-policy orientations with all the major powers, particularly Japan, Australia, and Russia. The role of small and middle powers such as Vietnam, Taiwan, and South Korea is equally significant in stabilizing the Asian continent.

Context for Promoting Airpower Diplomacy

Generally associated with the pursuit of peaceful relations between states, diplomacy nevertheless comes in many forms. Although somewhat of an arbitrary distinction, diplomacy can be divided into two broad groups—incentive based and threat based—with more than a dozen specific types of diplomacy falling within these broader groupings. On the one hand, incentive-based diplomacy relies on soft power and the carrot. It succeeds when states engaged in diplomacy reach an agreement that serves the interests of all parties. On the other hand, threat-based diplomacy is coercive in nature, employing means such as the threatened use of force or sanctions. The use of incentive-based diplomacy (traditional, commercial, conference, public, preventive, resource, and humanitarian) is increasing as the Obama administration shifts away from a grand strategy centrally

focused on the use of hard power.⁵ This movement in policy will give the USAF an opportunity to play a greater role in the conduct of soft power or, more specifically, incentive-based diplomacy.

Although many American Airmen may dismiss the notion of the USAF conducting diplomacy at a time when it seeks to retire the A-10, stand-down flying units, and cut or terminate acquisition programs, there is a pragmatic benefit to convincing Congress of Airmen's ability not only to drop bombs and destroy targets but also to win friends and influence people with those same assets. In many respects, airpower diplomacy highlights the capabilities of airpower at the opposite end of the spectrum where we usually direct our efforts.

Logic of Airpower in the United States–India Context

Viewing the present and future Asia-Pacific security environment as analogous to the post–World War II period would be a mistake. NATO has been successful at keeping the peace in Europe for more than half a century, but no such organization exists in the Asia-Pacific—nor is a multilateral security organization likely in the near future. The ties that bind NATO members demand a system of formal alliances and cooperation that many national leaders in the Asia-Pacific are unwilling to entertain.⁶ They are, however, open to pursuing their shared interests when opportunities arise. One such means available to the United States and India is airpower diplomacy—a capability ideally suited for conditions in the region. Airpower diplomacy as we define it (see above) can be critical in supporting Indian and American foreign policy objectives without resulting in major anxieties and disruptions.

At a time when fiscal pressures are unlikely to dissipate in the next decade and when the number of conventional and nonconventional challenges is increasing, it is incumbent upon both the Indian and American leadership to find cost-effective, nonkinetic means of defending their interests in the Asia-Pacific and in the larger global context. Airpower diplomacy offers India and the United States an opportunity to do just that. It also provides two additional benefits not found elsewhere: it reduces the need for a large military footprint to maintain relationships, and it offers a level of speed and flexibility that cannot be replicated elsewhere within the government. Further explanation is instructive. Simply stated, airpower diplomacy is a means of defending vital national interests, building necessary partnerships, preventing conflict, and expanding Indian and American influence without creating the anti-American or anti-Indian sentiment that often accompanies boots on the ground.

Speed, Flexibility, and Footprint

Airpower diplomacy will grow in importance for another reason. Other forms of military soft power do not have the advantages of speed, flexibility, and a limited footprint. These attributes are attractive for obvious reasons, but they are also appealing to decision makers in the current political environment. With the US military withdrawn from Iraq and

exiting Afghanistan—all while the United States pivots to the Asia-Pacific—the invade, occupy, and rebuild grand strategy of the early 2000s is proving increasingly less appealing to the American public.⁷ The hard-power concentration on Afghanistan and Iraq not only was costly in blood and treasure but also required a US presence that cannot be replicated across Asia. As President Obama looks for a better way to build successful partnerships—a core function of the USAF—airpower diplomacy may prove an attractive choice. For India the challenges associated with a rising China and its more muscular and aggressive military posture complicate the regional stability question, making it imperative to work in partnership with the United States.

Practicing US-India airpower diplomacy deliberately and coherently could effectively leverage the two air forces' capabilities in the interests of both nations and Asian stability. Although the IAF and USAF prepare—in peacetime—to fight and win their respective nation's wars, preventing war is equally desirable. Airpower diplomacy is a primary contributor to that mission.

USAF-IAF Partnership in Pursuing Airpower Diplomacy

A rising India, like other countries, has multiple foreign-policy tools available to pursue its national interests. For an India whose power differential with China is significant, it should be careful when it demonstrates its limited capability. By doing so, it would avoid provoking Chinese angst and worsening the situation for New Delhi and the region. That is, India should not demonstrate military power projection in ways that would invoke strong regional responses. Partnering with the USAF to conduct soft-power missions can have the strategic effects desired without the negative consequences that a more aggressive approach would risk. Joining the United States in any number of passive military and nonmilitary operations that include observation flights of the sea lines of commerce and communication, disaster response, and humanitarian missions could prove critical. These options can project India's military power without necessarily upping the ante. Given the IAF's budgetary constraints, such missions are possible for the IAF and would be well received by the United States, which wishes to expand its partnerships across the region. America is interested in finding regional partners that may shoulder some of the security burden—an important contextualizing factor that strengthens the attractiveness of a US-India airpower diplomacy partnership.

Although China may be a central factor driving American and Indian behavior, such concerns cannot be expressed overtly, as is suggested by Indian rhetoric. This may be so because China is a powerful and immediate neighbor that will have to be dealt with in a more nuanced manner than is necessary for the United States. However, America has had its share of problems with China. Despite intertwined economies, Washington is careful to avoid facing the wrath of China unnecessarily. In the India-China-US context, the United States has not yet had to take a stand on the India-China border and territorial problems. A conflict, even a limited one, would force America to take sides—a choice that may be far more complicated than what is understood, at least on the surface. There-

fore, for both India and the United States, the optimal course is to pursue closer military-to-military ties without necessarily provoking adverse reactions from China. Airpower diplomacy provides an ideal opportunity to do that while highlighting the soft-power aspects of airpower.

Given the complexities of an uncertain Asia, India and the United States need to tread carefully as they consider soft power as a viable means of cooperation. Some of the relatively noncontroversial forms of airpower diplomacy could include humanitarian, coercive, traditional, and commercial diplomacy.

Humanitarian diplomacy. America and India can strengthen their cooperation in the area of humanitarian diplomacy without creating much controversy. Given that the Asia-Pacific region is prone to a variety of natural disasters fairly frequently, and in the absence of adequate capacities at a regional level, countries in the region have had to bear the brunt of disasters. Thus, for humanitarian operations, airpower diplomacy should be pursued with great vigor. In the wake of the 2005 tsunami, India and the United States were able to respond with immediacy because their two militaries had more than a decade of experience with joint exercises and training. However, US-India military cooperation is primarily driven by the two navies, a fact that became evident in the wake of the post-tsunami reconstruction efforts.⁸ This collaboration could be expanded to the sphere of airpower, a domain that will be of particular significance in future military operations. Civil-military cooperation (with active participation of civil and military bureaucracies) in disaster response and reconstruction efforts should become a driving force of humanitarian diplomacy.

Several recent examples of the USAF's participation in humanitarian diplomacy include operations Provide Hope (1992–94), Provide Promise (1992–96), and Support Hope (1994).⁹ Furthermore, when a 7.9-magnitude earthquake struck a remote area in Sichuan Province, China (12 May 2008), two USAF C-17s deployed from the United States with desperately needed relief supplies, arriving within a week.¹⁰ One final example is instructive. Joint Task Force Port Opening provided relief to victims of the 2010 Haitian earthquake—serving as a temporary communications node in a country whose communications infrastructure was destroyed.¹¹ Because of its ability to deploy rapidly to locations around the world, the USAF is undoubtedly America's best tool for supplying immediate assistance. These low-cost missions are also an excellent way to build goodwill with governments and citizens around the world—a key capability in the Asia-Pacific, where formal alliances are far less prevalent and personal relationships are far more important.

Similarly, though usually under a United Nations aegis, the IAF has supported many humanitarian operations, including those in assistance of UN missions in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and the Congo.¹² The IAF also undertook one humanitarian mission in its neighborhood when it dropped food over the northern Sri Lankan town of Jaffna when it was besieged by Sri Lankan forces fighting a Tamil rebellion. This operation, however, could also be seen as force projection rather than a pure humanitarian mission.¹³

Coercive diplomacy. The coming years could also see India and the United States cooperate in coercive diplomacy. Potential hot spots in Asia include North Korea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, among others. By working to shape and affect the circumstances and situations in these zones of uncertainty without the actual deployment of military forces, India and America could significantly improve regional stability. So far, resource diplomacy has not been explored in the Asia-Pacific context although it has the potential to emerge as an area of cooperation. This is particularly true of the South China Sea, where China is taking an aggressive position in the area, in part because of the large hydrocarbon deposits believed to lie beneath the sea floor.¹⁴ The United States and India have a shared interest in working out safe sea lines of commerce and communications, given the importance of securing energy interests as well as important trade corridors.

Traditional diplomacy. Airpower diplomacy in the form of military interactions also has the appeal of soft power in the air domain. Most of the current efforts fall within the “train, advise, and equip” category. India does not participate in any Inter-American Air Forces Academy type of program, but the number of Indian pilots participating in USAF training programs has grown from 6 in 2006 to 93 in fiscal year 2010. Also in 2010, 170 IAF members participated in non-professional military education (PME) training programs with the USAF. PME is in fact one area in which India and the United States have a growing partnership. The IAF currently sends one officer per year to the USAF’s Air Command and Staff College and one to the Air War College. In 2011 that service sent its first officer to the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Similarly, the USAF sends a colonel to the Indian Defense College every fourth year and an officer to the Defense Service Staff College every other year. The USAF also sent its first Council on Foreign Relations Fellow to India in 2009.

More traditional high-level visits between senior airmen are also increasing as the United States and India strengthen their partnership. Exercises such as Cope India 2002, Red Flag 2008, the Building Partnership Seminar (2009), and a dozen such others build trust between air forces and countries that were once (and often) at odds with one another.¹⁵ Given the convergence of interests, much more is possible in the years ahead.

Commercial diplomacy. Although the sale of weapons systems to foreign governments—through an embassy’s office of defense cooperation—often receives much attention, this example of commercial/military diplomacy is limited in scope.¹⁶ However, this is one area in which the United States and India are expanding their relationship.¹⁷ Over the years, India has made significant shifts in its procurement policy (although unstated) to diversify and thus move away from Russia toward the United States, Israel, and France, among others. Marking this shift, India’s major purchases from America include LM2500 marine turbines to power warships, C-130J Super Hercules aircraft, C-17 Globemaster III heavy cargo aircraft, and P-8I Poseidon long-range maritime reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare aircraft. Additionally, the two sides are in dialogue to finalize deals for AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopters, and M-777 lightweight howitzers.¹⁸ Acquisition of the American C-17 Globemaster III in

particular has been significant in the US-India context. Possession of one of the world's largest cargo planes, able to airlift troops and deliver substantial amounts of humanitarian supplies, has a particular relevance in executing several forms of airpower diplomacy, including humanitarian diplomacy and assistance in peacekeeping operations.

Challenges

Despite significant progress over the years in implementing the different facets of airpower diplomacy in the US-India context, drawbacks have occurred as well. India's decision on the procurement of medium multirole combat aircraft (MMRCA) is one such case in point (a deal not yet concluded, even after selection of the French Rafale). Eliminating the American companies early on and finally narrowing their choices to the French Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon options were naive decisions made by Indian political leaders. Basing the decision on technical parameters alone was a strategic blunder.¹⁹ An agreement as high-profile as this could have been used to send a political message to India's friends and foes alike.²⁰ In addition, an American fighter aircraft in India's inventory could have proved strategically significant. India's major adversaries to the east and west would have thought seriously before venturing into a conflict had New Delhi decided differently.

Despite the adverse MMRCA decision and given that the deal with France has not been concluded, the United States showed interest in selling the F-35—the Joint Strike Fighter—to India. In 2011 Robert Scher, deputy assistant secretary of defense for South Asia at that time, remarked, “The F-35 is something that we would be more than willing to talk to the government of India about should they request to find out more information about purchasing it.”²¹ The aircraft is one of the most expensive and sophisticated systems ever developed under select international partnership with American allies. India has not shown any interest, citing cost as a major issue. However, the radar-evading nature of the F-35 may be sought after at a later stage, particularly if India does not make much headway in its indigenous stealth aircraft program. Sale of the F-35 came up two years later, again with no decision taken although it reflects strong US interest and desire to deepen ties with India.²² The new government has not yet made a statement on this matter although murmurs in the last few years suggest that India may drop the Rafale and choose the F-35 option. Such a decision could come in 2015.

Of additional concern is the fact that a few recent agreements have come in the way of strengthened bilateral defense relations. India's hesitancy to sign the Logistics Support Agreement—the India-specific version of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, currently in negotiation—has also been a hurdle.

Regardless of such issues, India and the United States are already practicing airpower diplomacy. However, the need to institutionalize these efforts cannot be overemphasised. Given the multiple challenges facing Asia and the shifting balance of power, Indian use of soft power is increasingly important. Thus, the opportunity to engage in

regional airpower diplomacy with the United States is an option that should be pursued further.

The Ends, Ways, and Means of an Airpower Diplomacy Strategy

Using the previous examples and conceptual discussion to underpin an airpower diplomacy strategy requires concentrated thinking. If predictions of the future fiscal, political, and security environment are correct, then development of an airpower diplomacy strategy is worth the effort for the United States and India. Examining its evolution in terms of ends, ways, and means offers a useful framework.

Ends

The objectives of an American airpower diplomacy strategy focused on India should address three central tenets. First, the strategy should develop cost-effective approaches to building and maintaining partnerships with that country. Although India is unlikely to enter into a formal security arrangement that resembles the North Atlantic Treaty (1949), less formal agreements can build a formidable partnership between the IAF and the USAF. Second, the strategy should develop proactive approaches to engaging with India for the specific purpose of cultivating a partnership that can temper the ambitions of China or a rogue regime in the region—although not limited to this end by any means.²³ India and the United States will not always agree on national strategy, but airpower diplomacy can remain a method of first resort for improving Indo-American relations. Third, the strategy should consolidate the disparate diplomatic capabilities from across the USAF. At present, both the Indian and American air forces conduct numerous airpower diplomacy missions—great and small—but do not leverage them for their own and for India's and America's long-term benefit. Despite considerable efforts by the US Office of the Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) to formulate a service strategy for building partnerships, further efforts are necessary. India as well should institute such mechanisms to formulate more coherent policies for cooperation.

Ways

The methods that the organization uses to achieve those ends are perhaps more difficult to develop than are the ends.²⁴ Although the following list is incomplete, the recommendations may offer a starting point for discussion of those “ways” for an airpower diplomacy strategy that assists in bringing the IAF and USAF together as their respective countries pursue strategies for a stable region.

First, for the United States, the plethora of departmental and service guidance found in the Theater Security Cooperation Strategy, Department of Defense Report on Strategic Communication, Air Force Global Partnership Strategy, Core Function Master Plan, and individual instructions, plans, and approaches could be consolidated and sim-

plified into one document that facilitates creating a strategy that targets a specific country (India) while incorporating the range of airpower diplomacy activities.²⁵ Admittedly, SAF/IA and its regional affairs specialists do much of this already. The USAF has the benefit of starting from a firm foundation of experience and conceptual understanding. Harmonizing and simplifying competing interests and responsibilities, however, may prove difficult.

Second, clearly elaborating where airpower diplomacy begins and ends will go a long way toward winning support for such a strategy, both at home and in India. Just as other foreign policy tools have strengths and weaknesses, so does airpower diplomacy. Having a clear way to determine when it is succeeding or failing is important. The ability to measure (e.g., progress, success, and failure) is particularly important in justifying expenditures during tough fiscal times.

Third, an airpower diplomacy strategy should provide a clear component specifying the who, what, when, where, why, and how that the USAF, combatant commands, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Indian partners can all understand. When the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) reorganized the Department of Defense, it left the services responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces while moving much of the “strategy” development into the OSD—making the combatant commands the war fighters. This approach makes it difficult for the services to develop and employ a strategy. Such an organizational weakness is difficult to overcome, but the Air Force must do so in order to present the combatant commander—of US Pacific Command in the case of India—with forces prepared to conduct a range of airpower diplomacy missions in conjunction with IAF partners. In light of airpower’s (air, space, and cyber) ability to perform hard- and soft-power missions with equal success, the employment of force (systems and personnel) deserves significant consideration since commanders are unlikely to support retasking a shrinking force to perform soft-power missions.

Fourth, the USAF should actively promote airpower diplomacy as an alternative approach within American foreign policy—especially true in the case of India and many other Asia-Pacific nations where, as previously stated, formal alliances are less attractive. Seamlessly transitioning from a hard-power-focused strategy (Afghanistan and Iraq) to a soft-power approach (airpower diplomacy) will have great appeal over the next several years. As the Obama administration looks for a distinct alternative to the present strategy, the time is right to offer an airpower diplomacy strategy.

Means

Thought of by many people as the operational element, the means of an airpower diplomacy strategy are less than straightforward. An examination of the USAF’s *Building Partnership Core Function Master Plan (BPCFMP)* illustrates why. Ownership of the approximately 60 programs that fall under the *BPCFMP* is widely dispersed across the Air Force. This situation makes coordination of assets difficult not only because of the complex chain of ownership that exists but also because the commands that own these dual-

capable systems and personnel often view soft-power missions as lying outside their core mission. For the IAF—which is attempting to understand American motivation and objectives, partly through reading unclassified government publications—the result can be confusion because of the lack of clarity.

Although SAF/IA, Air Education and Training Command, Headquarters Air Force A8 (Strategic Plans and Programs), and the Air Force’s major commands all collaborate on the development of the *BPCFMP* and strategic documents (e.g., Air Force Global Partnership Strategy), it is not possible to say that a consensus supports the use of airpower assets for airpower diplomacy missions. Thus, the means to carry out an airpower diplomacy strategy are often employed in other operations. Elevating the significance of airpower diplomacy within the strategic planning process would make it possible not only to develop an airpower diplomacy strategy for India, for example, but also acquire the necessary resources to carry out the mission.

Conclusion

In the end, the wide range of soft-power missions regularly performed by airmen makes airpower an attractive option for building partnerships, assuring allies, and dissuading enemies. Developing an airpower diplomacy strategy that strengthens the relationship between India and the United States is in the interest of both nations and constitutes a positive step toward promoting stability in the Asia-Pacific. The IAF and the USAF must always remain capable of fighting and winning India’s and America’s wars, but hard power should not serve as either country’s means of first resort. Airpower diplomacy is a soft-power capability having sufficient force behind it such that other nations view it as more than just empty words. As defense spending faces prolonged pressure, innovative approaches to defending the national interest can and will prove attractive. Airpower is such an option. For India, the value of soft balancing against China makes joining the United States an increasingly compelling choice.

Notes

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