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Divining Victory: Airpower in the Israel-Hezbollah War
William Arkin
2007, 356 pages
ISBN: 978-1-58566-168-8
$30.00
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The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War may well be a paradigm for twenty-first century warfare. The technically sophisticated Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were confronted by a much smaller but well-armed and highly unconventional “state within a state” opponent. Israel launched an intensive 34-minute air assault designed to essentially disarm Hezbollah; it did not. Hezbollah’s interspersion within the civilian population presented major targeting problems for the IDF, setting up condemnation of Israel’s “over-reaction” in the international press. Airpower became the big loser in the press and after-action reports. Divining Victory examines the decisions, the effects, and the lessons learned for those who must confront similar enemies.
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Reviews and reader comments:
“A study of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war...concludes that Israel's use of air power was of diminishing value as the fight dragged on...the study argues air power remains the most flexible tool in fighting groups like Hezbollah, because ground forces alone could not have achieved Israel's aims.... By bombing too many targets of questionable importance for its aims, and not explaining why it bombed what it did, Israel lost the war for public opinion In this new kind of warfare against terrorism, fighting a nonstate force like Hezbollah that occupies a large part of a fragile state, Lebanon, the battle for public opinion is as important as any military victory, Arkin argues.... Mr. Arkin draws two main lessons. The United States and Israel should 'practice greater transparency about what you’re doing, about what you’re bombing and why you’re bombing it.'
. .” reviewed by Steven Erlanger in The New York Times, nytimes.com (14 October 2007). |
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