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Some materials listed below require access to subscription databases.  If you cannot gain access, contact your local library for availability. AU students and faculty can contact  AUL's  Web Maintainer for a password.

All sites listed were last accessed on April 4, 2005.

Internet Resources

Capturing the Essential Factors in Reconnaissance and Surveillance Force Sizing and Mix. David Vaughan, Joel Kvitky, Keith Henry, Mark Gabriele, George Park, Gail Halverson, Bernard Schweitzer. Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corp., 1998. 80 p. (Project Air Force).
Documented briefing provides model for evaluating ISR options.
Available online at: http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB199/DB199.pdf

Caterinicchia, Dan. DOD Changing Face of Urban Warfare. Federal Computer Week 2 p.
Role of Distributed Ground-Surface System (DCGS) in ISR.
Available online at: http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2003/0519/web-urban-05-21-03.asp

Command and Control & Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C2ISR) Sector (AFRL/XPC).  
Available online:  http://www.afrl.af.mil/xp/xpc/

Defender:  Spotlight on National Defense Technologies.  Rand. 
Available online:  http://www.raytheon.com/missions/stellent/groups/public/documents/legacy_site/cms01_045987.pdf

Siegel, Anna.  Warfighters Reach Back to Langley.  Air Force Link October 8, 2003.
Available online:  http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123005757

Ghashghai, Elham.  Communications Networks to Support Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Strike Operations.  Rand, Santa Monica, CA, 2004.  35 p.
Available online:  http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2004/RAND_TR159.pdf
Book call no.:  355.33041 G411c

U.S. Army Reconnaissance and Surveillance Handbook.  Guilford, CN, Lyon's Press, 2004. 1 vol.
Book call no.:  355.4130973 U84

Documents

Some of the documents cited in this section are student papers written to fulfill PME school requirements.

Bradley, Carl M.  Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom:  Challenges for Rapid Maneuvers and Joint C4ISR Integration and Interoperability.  Newport, RI, Naval War College, 2004.  21 p.
Also available online:  http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA422709
Doc. call no.:  M-U 41662 B8111i

Branin, John A.  The Advent of the NATO Response Force and Its Potential Effect on the United States Air Force.  Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004.
"The advent of the NATO Response Force (NRF) is the result of the call for NATO to create a warfighting capability to meet the security threats of the 21st Century. The NRF is a joint force comprised of air, land and maritime assets designed to conduct operations across the full spectrum of conflict. Missions include opposed entry scenarios, counter-terrorism, crisis response and peace enforcement, embargo operations, interdiction, and human relief and non- combatant evacuations, meeting the need called for in the U.S. National Security Strategy as well as the European Union Security Strategy. The NRF will also serve as a catalyst for transformation, encouraging European nations to downsize and retool their legacy forces in order to participate in the NRF. Political influences and operational constraints threaten to limit the NRF. The tangible effect the NRF will have on the Air Force will be its disproportionate need for Air Force assets to meet its required operational mandate. The result of the EU's inability to readily address their capability shortfalls will be the NRF's dependence upon Air Force to provide strategic airlift, air refueling, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and the procurement and use of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) for the foreseeable future."
Also available online:  http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA427290
Doc. call no.:  M-U 42525 B8213a

Corsano, Scott Edmund.  Joint Fires Network ISR Interoperability Requirements Within a Joint Force Architecture.  Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003.  87 p.
Also available online:  http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA417501
Doc. call no.:  M-U 42525 C826j

Coyne, Kevin M.  The Impact of Network Centric Warfare on ISR Operations.  Maxwell AFB, AL, Air command Staff College, 2004.  36 Leaves.
Doc. call no.:  M-U 43122 C881i

Donovan, Paul B.  JFMCC:  Theater C2 in Need of Sole.  Newport, RI, Naval War college. 2003.  unpaged.
"Functional operational command and control is an absolute necessity for the successful employment of sustained combat operations. During the past ten years, "revolutionary" changes have occurred in the conduct of war. Airpower seems to have become the weapon of choice. Airpower, directed onto targets by Special Operations Forces (SOF), produced devastating results against the Taliban during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The command and control (C2) network for the war in Afghanistan has functioned well. Although the Joint Force Commander (JFC), the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), and the combat ground and air assets were geographically separated by thousands of miles, our high-tech command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISk) network overcame the traditional limitations of geographically separated C2. While our C4ISk capabilities are a tremendous asset, they are also a potential Achilles heel. Could a resourceful, asymmetric opponent disrupt and degrade our C4ISk network, ultimately rendering theater C2 ineffective? "
Also available online:  http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA415445
Doc. call no.: 41662 D6873j

Gardner, Keith and Brown, Michael.  The Future Operations Quilt:  An ISR Tool for Future Military Operations.  Rome, NY, Air Force Research Laboratory, Information Directorate, Rome Research Site, 2003.  55 p.
Doc. call no.:  M-U 44289-13 2003 no. 242

Jackson, Jonathan Lee.  Solving the Problem of Time-Sensitive Targeting.  Newport, RI, Naval War College, 2003.  21 p.
"The military community and defense contractors have developed an active interest in improving the military's ability to destroy time-sensitive targets (TST) ever since the threat of Scud missile launchers during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. More recently the Yugoslavs demonstrated in Kosovo that adversaries are getting even better at protecting these important and dangerous targets by continually moving them, building vast numbers of decoys and using camouflage and concealment. This will only make the problem more difficult in the future. However, along with the adversaries improving their techniques to protect these targets, the United States military has developed enormous capabilities in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) ; Command and Control (C2) communication; and computer systems that have improved their ability to destroy these time-sensitive targets. The only major problem that remains is how to integrate all these capabilities into the most efficient time- sensitive target destroying machine. The answer is a time-sensitive targeting cell resident in the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) that builds a total picture from all of the ISR assets available, makes rapid decisions based on the information gathered, and assigns the right asset to destroy the fleeting target. "
Also available online:  http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA415574
Doc. call no.:  M-U 41662 J13s

Liedman, Sean R.  Finding the Demons in our Midst: Utilizing DOD ISR Assets to Combat Terrorist use of CBRNE Weapons.  Newport, RI, Naval War College, 2002.  unpaged.
"The horrific terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the U.S. homeland highlighted the threat that terrorism poses to U.S. national security. DoD operates globally a large network of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets which could be brought to bear in the effort to combat terrorism. The geographic Commander's-in-Chief(CINCs) set the priorities for the intelligence networks in their Areas of Responsibility (AORs) according to their interpretation of the strategic guidance from the National Command Authority (NCA). A key tenet of the new strategic setting is the grave threat to national security posed by terrorism, potentially using Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or Enhanced High Explosive (CBRNE) weapons. This fact, coupled with the new strategic mandate that sets defense of the homeland as the highest priority for the U.S. military, dictates that each of the geographic CINCs set combatting terrorist use of CBRNE weapons as the highest priority for their intelligence networks. The success or failure of this operational intelligence effort could have major strategic effects."--
Also available online:  http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA402235
Doc. call no.:  M-U 41662 L718f

Oluvic, Michael N.  A Concept of Operations for a Global ISR Campaign.  Newport, RI, Naval War College, 2004.  31 p.
"The new threat to national security is characterized as transnational, adaptable, asymmetric, and persistent. The U.S. military most likely will be tasked to conduct significant operations in fundamentally weak states and will place a greater emphasis on Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) to enable combat or strike functions. Future operations will depend on globally coordinated and executed ISR operations vice regionally focused ISR operations and despite many early successes, challenges remain. The Department of Defense transformation to meet 21st Century security challenges requires a change in how ISR operations are planned and executed. A continuous, global, joint ISR campaign is necessary that will require Commander, United States Strategic Command to act as a supported commander by defining the objective of an ISR campaign and then planning and conducting that campaign. This paper will provide the background and argument for a change in ISR planning and who should do it. It will also provide one suggested method for how to go about designing and executing an ISR campaign. "
Also available online:  http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA422743
Doc. call no.:  M-U 41662 O525c

Quitno, Yvette S.  Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Interoperability.  Maxwell AFB, AL, Air Command and Staff College, 2003.  35 leaves.
Doc. call no.:  M-U 43122 Q8a

Raffetto, Mark.  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Contributions to Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Missions for Expeditionary Operations.  Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004.  74 p.
"This study analyzes the impact of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities on intelligence gathering missions for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) commander in 2015. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) is developing requirements for an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) UAV that supports rapid planning and decision making for multiple concurrent operations and facilitates maneuver and precision engagement. The acquisition of a 2008 Pioneer replacement also is underway at Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM). However, the importance of various capabilities for this replacement UAV presently lacks quantitative analysis. Through modeling, agent-based simulation, and data mining, this study explores the validity of current requirements and provides insights into the importance of various UAV characteristics, such as airspeed, endurance, sweep width, and sensor capability. Each year, the Navy/Marine Corps conducts Fleet Battle Experiment Sea Viking in Southern California. The primary objective is Command and Control and ISR development. This study looks at UAV operations in the Sea Viking scenario provided by MCWL in the MANA agent-based modeling environment utilizing robust design, Latin hypercubes, data farming techniques, the Maui High Performance Computing Center, and the JMP Statistical Discovery Software package. The Sea Viking Experiment, the Marine Corps' largest annual experiment, provides a credible scenario for model development. The advantages of tactical routing, a 7 hour (or greater) on-station time, a minimum 4,500 meter sweep width, and a probability of classification of at least 0.4 are verified for the Sea Viking scenario. This analysis indicates that a UAV in this scenario does not need to travel in excess of 200 knots. The results have design consequences for MCWL's Sea Viking 20XX and provide key parameters for physics-based simulations such as COMBAT XXI.
Also available online:  http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA427707
Doc. call no.:  M-U 42525 R137u

Stanley, Robert W.  Spacelift: The Achilles' Heel of American Space Power.  Newport, RI, Naval War college, 2002.
"During Desert Storm, U.S. forces relied heavily on space-based assets to defeat an enemy. For the first time, space assets played a key role, and America has since grown even more dependent on these capabilities. Warfighting Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) now routinely plan exercises and employ forces under the assumption that they will have unimpeded access to navigation and communications satellites as well as meteorological and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. But if one or more of these fragile capabilities are diminished as the result of enemy action, or simply because of natural phenomenon, how quickly can we replace the neutralized satellites? The answer is not comforting, and revolves around the limited capability of the U.S. spacelift program. Attention has been especially focused on this program during periods following major failures. In addition to the loss of life, launch failures have cost our nation billions of dollars, significantly reduced our access to space for lengthy periods, and resulted in delayed deployment of next-generation national ISR assets. While many measures taken after these disasters were effective in getting America back in space, much work remains. Our launch programs must become more responsive to the warfighting CINC. It simply takes too long to get a working satellite ready for operations. Secondly, the government needs to work more efficiently with industry. National security depends on the ability of American launch service providers to compete well with thriving foreign counterparts. Finally, U.S. launch programs must become robust and less reliant on single-points of failure."
Also available online: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA401126
Doc. call no.:  M-U 41662 S788s

Belonus, Frank R.  The Evolution of Reconnaissance in the 21st Century.  Armor  111:20-24 March-April 2002.
Addresses the multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance needed to combat guerrilla units and terrorists in complex terrain. Discussion on the technological developments in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; Types of reconnaissance organizations; Overview of urban operations.

Bond, Stephen J.  Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance:  The CAESAR Project.  Military Intelligence 29:22-25 January-March 2003.

Case for "Near Space."  Air Force Magazine 88:15 February 2005.
Reports on the consideration of "near space" as an area of enticing military possibilities for persistent intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, by the U.S. Air Force. Description of near space; Initiative of the Space Battlelab for the creation of near space maneuvering vehicle; Qualities of near space for ISR capabilities.

Cook, Nick.  Briefing:  Unmaned Air Vehicles. Jane's Defence Weekly 37:24-27 January 16, 2002.

Hebert, Adam J.  Building Battlespace Awareness.  Air Force Magazine 87:66-82 September 2004.
Explains that the United States Air Force plans to improve its intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities by using what it learned from its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. High priority on shortening the "kill chain"; Air Force's standing goal of compressing the required time to single-digit minutes; Use of machine-to-machine connections to that attacks are not slowed by human intervention at every stage of the process.

Jacobi, Kevin L.  Battle Command to ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) Planning.  Armor 111:21-25 September-October 2002.
Examines several issues involved in the midst of U.S. Army transformation, from battle command to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) planning. Definition of battle command according to the U.S. Army Field Manual 'Command and Control'; Significance of leadership and decision making to military practice; Contribution of ISR operations to the commander's vision of the battlefield; Tiers of reconnaissance.

Koch, Andrew.  US Moves to Integrate Global Missions.  Jane's Defence Weekly 42:9 January 5, 2005.
Reports that the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is preparing to move forward its efforts to activate global missions. Role of STRATCOM in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), space and global strike, network warfare, and integrated global missile defense; Establishment of the ISR office; Integration of the global missions according to STRATCOM Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Thomas Goslin.

Meyer, David A.  On a Wing and a Prayer:  Reversing the Trend in BCT (Brigade Combat Team) ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) and Shaping Operations.  Armor 221:21-25 July-August 2003.
Suggests ideas for the enhancement of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets of a Brigade Combat Team. Relevance of ISR operations; Mission of ISR operations under the U.S. Army Field Manual; Logistics support to ISR operations; Characteristics of a dedicated ISR executor.

Walters, Keith R.  The RSTA (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition) Squadron:  Agile and Adaptive, Relevant and Ready.  Armor 113:17-22 November-December 2004.
Discusses the capabilities and potentials of the U.S. reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron. Stryker variations in the RSTA squadron that carries a similar suite of equipment with a few mission-oriented variations; Information on the existing tactical limitations to RSTA squadron capabilities; Ability of the RSTA squadron to provide information dominance in any operational environment.
 

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