All sites listed were last accessed
October 13, 2004.
[Return to Table of Contents]
Air Interdiction in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam,
edited with an Introduction by Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan. Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1986. 105 p. (USAF Warrior Studies)
An Interview with Gen Earle E. Partridge, Gen Jacob E. Smart, and Gen John W. Vogt, Jr.
World War II, pp 18-41.
Bibliography, pp 97-99.
Index, pp 101-105.
Also available online at: http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/kohnairinter.htm
Book call no.: 358.4142 P275a
Air Power History Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo, edited by
Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray. London, Frank Cass, 2002. 362 p. (Cass series
studies in air power, no. 13)
Each paper considers the significant turning point in the air conflict considered these include the 1991 bombing of Baghdad, Britain and NATO's strategy in Kosovo, the UK's doctrine and practice during the Gulf War, air tactics in North Africa during WWII, Soviet air doctrine from 1935-1941, and the development of air power during WWI.
Book call no. 358.4009 A2981
Air Superiority in World War II and Korea, edited with an introduction by Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan. Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1983. 116 p. (USAF Warrior Studies)
An interview with Gen James Ferguson, Gen Robert M. Lee, Gen William Momyer, and LtGen Elwood R. Quesada.
"Air superiority as an idea reached full maturity during World War II. In the American experience, air superiority over enemy forces was tested first in North Africa. There, as Generals Momyer and Quesada recall vividly, British Royal Air Force leaders showed the way in asserting the primacy of air superiority and centralized control over all theater air operations by an air commander. According to RAF Air Vice Marshal Arthur Coningham, the principal air leader in western Africa, air superiority had to be achieved before close air support and interdiction missions could be carried out. Without air superiority the other tactical air missions would be inconsequential."
Select Bibliography, pp 109-111.
Index, pp 115-116.
Also available online at: http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/kohnairsuperiority.htm
Book call no.: 940.544973 A2983
Boyne, Walter J. Silver Wings--The Human and Technological
Achievements in the History of the United States Air Force. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1993. 336 p.
Foreword by General James H. Doolittle.
Introductory Note by Lee Ewing.
Chapter Three. The Trying Years of the Golden Age, 1919-1939, pp 81-126. (Creating the Doctrine, pp 90-92).
Chapter Four. The Challenge of the Century, 1940-1945, pp 127-175.
Suggested Reading, p 332.
Index, pp 333-336.
Book call no.: 358.400973 B792s
Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam.. New York, Free Press, 1989. 297 p.
Chapter 1. From Unconditional Surrender to Flexible Response, pp 1-37 (World War II, pp 3-12).
Book call no.: 959.704348 C643L
Copp, DeWitt S. Forged in Fire: Strategy and Decisions in the Airwar over Europe, 1940-45. Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1982 by the Air Force Historical Foundation. 531 p.
Notes, pp 485-503.
Bibliography, pp 505-510.
Index, pp 511-531.
Book call no.: 940.544973 C785f
Davis, Richard G. Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe. Washington, Center for Air Force History, 1992. 808 p. (General Histories)
Also published by the Smithsonian Institution Press (92 S7321da).
Spaatz and Changes in AAF Air Support Doctrine, pp 210-220.
Notes, pp 677-734.
Bibliography, pp 741-758.
Index, pp 759-808.
Also available online at: http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/davisspaatz.htm
Book call no.: 92 S7321d
Emme, Eugene M. The Impact of Air Power: National Security and World Politics. Princeton, NJ, Van Nostrand Co., 1959. 914 p.
Part Two, The Revolution in Warfare.
Chapter IV. World War II, pp 209-302.
References, pp 294-299.
Chapter V. Lessons of World War II, pp 300-343.
References, pp 501-505.
Index, pp 895-914.
Book call no.: 358.08 E54i
The End of the Beginning: Bracknell Paper No. 3, A Symposium on the Land/Air Co-Operation in the Mediterranean War 1940-43. London, Royal Air Force Historical Society, March 1992. 104 p.
Land/Air Co-operation in the Mediterranean War 1940-43 is the title of the third of the on-going series of seminars entitled the Bracknell Papers. The seminar was convened jointly by the RAF Historical Society and the RAF Staff College on 20th March 1992 at Bracknell.
Book call no.: 940.5423 E56
Fabyanic, Thomas A. Strategic Air Attack in the United States Air Force: A Case Study.
Manhattan, KS, Military Affairs/Aerospace Historian, Kansas State University,
1976. 206 p.
Chapter III. World War II: The European Test, pp 46-96.
Chapter IV. World War II: Modifications in the Pacific, pp 97-120.
Notes on Chapter III, pp 186-192.
Notes on Chapter IV, pp 193-195.
Also published as Air War College Research Report, M-U 32983 F136s.
Book call no.: 358.42 F136s
Fussell, Paul. Wartime--Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War. New York, Oxford University Press, 1989. 330 p.
Chapter 2. "Precision Bombing Will Win the War," pp 13-19.
Notes to Chapter 2, pp 300-301.
Index, pp 321-330.
Book call no.: 940.5488673 F994w
Audio call no.: 940.5488673 F994wa
Garrett, Stephen A. Ethics and Airpower in World War II: The British Bombing of German Cities. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1993. 256 p.
"...the genesis of what is offered here: certainly not a full history of British air policy in World War II, but an attempt at systematically examining the moral issues presented by the British bombing offensive against German cities in the period 1939-1945. It should be clear from the outset that this is a basically critical look at Bomber Command, at least insofar as the ethical implications of its work are concerned. Yet the spirit of the enterprise is not so much prosecutorial, the simple levying of moral condemnation, as it is an attempt to let both the supporters and the opponents of British strategy speak for themselves and to arrive at a reasonably fair assessment of the viewpoints presented."
Book call no.: 940.544941 G239e
Great Britain. Air Ministry. The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, 1933-1945. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983; First Published in 1948. 425 p.
With a new introduction by Air Commodore H.A. Probert.
Part Five: Conclusions, pp 393-425.
Chapter 20, Lessons and Conclusions, pp 410-403.
Epilogue. Extract from the Memoirs of General Koller, pp 405-409.
Appendix. The Part Played by the Air Force in German Combined Planning, pp 411-423.
Book call no.: 940.544943 R595
Hansell, Haywood S., Jr. The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir. Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1986. 300 p. (USAF Warrior Studies)
Chapter I. Integrating Strategy, Air Doctrines, and War Plans, pp 1-41.
Also available online at: http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/hansellstrategic.htm
Book call no.: 940.544973 H249sa
Harvey, Maurice. The Allied Bomber War, 1939-45. Tunbridge Wells, Kent, Spellmount, 1992. 207 p. (Pictorial History Series)
Chapter One. Strategy or Delusion
The Development of a Strategic Doctrine, pp 15-17.
Rearmament, pp 17-20.
The Collapse of a Strategic Plan, pp 20-21.
Chapter Five. Laying a New Foundation--1942, pp 104-128.
Bibliography, p 205.
Index, pp 206-207.
Book call no.: 940.544 H342a
MacCloskey, Monro. The United States Air Force. New York, Praeger, 1967.
Chapter III. Air Power in World War II, by Dr. Robert F. Futrell, pp 37-60.
Bibliography, pp 237-238.
Index, pp 239-244.
Book call no.: 358.0973 M127u
MacIsaac, David. Strategic Bombing in World War Two: The Story of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. New York, Garland Pubs., 1976. 231 p.
Chapter One. All the Winds of Doctrine, pp 1-20.
Notes, pp 169-215.
Select Bibliography, pp 217-226.
Index, pp 227-231.
Book call no.: 940.544 M152s
McFarland, Stephen L. and Newton, Wesley P. To Command the Sky--The Battle for Air Superiority over Germany, 1942-1944. Washington, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991. 328 p.
See Index for subjects: Air superiority doctrine; Doctrine of daylight strategic precision bombing; Strategic bombing.
Selected Bibliography, pp 305-315.
Book call no.: 940.544 M143t
Meilinger, Phillip S. Hoyt S. Vandenberg--The Life of a General.
Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000. 279 p. (Originally published
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1989)
"Vandenberg's concept of air power was crucial to his success because he struck a balance between the tactician and the strategist: advocating the primacy of strategic bombardment doctrine as a deterrent to war and a potentially decisive weapon, but never forgetting the necessity of tactical air support for the ground forces. The general's technical expertise as a pilot, combined with his managerial ability, dynamic personality, and aggressive leadership, made him a dominant and respected figure in the cold war era."
Bibliography, pp 259-274.
Index, pp 275-279.
Book call no.: 92 V227m
Momyer, William W. Airpower in Three Wars (WWII, Korea, Vietnam).
Reprint edition. Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press, 2003. 401 p.
See Index for Subject: Doctrine.
Index, pp 381-401.
Also available online at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/catalog/books/Momyer_B89.htm
Book call no.: 358.4 M733a 2003
Mortensen, Daniel R., ed. Airpower and Ground Armies: Essays on the Evolution of Anglo-American Air Doctrine, 1940-43. Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press, 1998. 206 p.
Getting Together: Tedder, Coningham, and Americans in the Desert and Tunisia, 1940-43, by Vincent Orange, pp 1-44.
A Glider in the Propwash of the Royal Air Force? Gen Carl A. Spaatz, the RAF, and the Foundations of American Tactical Air Doctrine, by David R. Mets, pp 45-91.
The Legend of Laurence Kuter: Agent for Airpower Doctrine, by Daniel R. Mortensen, pp 93-145.
Patton and Weyland: A Model for Air-Ground Cooperation, by David Spires, pp 147-163.
Bibliography, pp 183-195.
Index, pp 197-206.
Also available online at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/catalog/books/Mortenson_B50.htm
Book call no.: 358.403 A2984
Mowbray, James A. The Fabric of Air Warfare Doctrine, Operational Experience,
and Integration of Strategic and Tactical Air Power from World War I to World
War II. Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press, 1991. 41 p. (CADRE paper
Also available at: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA424803
Book call no. 358.400973 M936f
Orange, Vincent. Coningham--A Biography of Air Marshall Sir Arthur Coningham. Washington, Center for Air Force History, 1992. 292 p.
Originally published: London, Methuen, 1990.
"Without question, the late Air Marshall Sir Arthur Coningham is the architect of modern air power doctrine regarding tactical air operations. This volume is a reprint of a classic study of Coningham and his impact on air power thought." (From Richard Hallion's Foreword).
Notes, pp 261-274.
Bibliography, pp 275-280.
Index, pp 281-292.
Also available online at: http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/orangeconingham.htm
Book call no.: 92 C751o
Overy, R. J. The Air War, 1939-1945. Chelsea, MI, Scarborough House Pubs, 1991. 263 p.
"By the 1930s the lessons of the earlier conflict (1914-18) had been turned from a hasty empiricism into a refined doctrine. By 1939 even the refined doctrine was becoming obsolescent, overtaken by scientific and strategic events. But even though doctrine was sometimes inappropriate to the circumstances of war, the formulation of air theory before 1939 was crucial in understanding the actual development of air forces and the choices made about how they should be used. It is possible to distinguish four separate, though not mutually exclusive, areas of strategic thinking on air power: co-operation between ships and aircraft; co-operation between armies and aircraft; 'independent' or 'strategic' bombing; and aerial defence."
Book call no.: 940.544 O96a 1991
The Proceedings of the Royal Air Force Historical Society, Issue No. 6--September 1989. Bristol, UK, The Society, 1989. 107 p.
Portal, Harris and the Bomber Offensive, by Denis Richards and others, pp 10-34.
Book call no.: 358.400941 P963 No.6 September 1989
Smith, Dale O. U.S. Military Doctrine: A Study and Appraisal. Foreword by General Carl Spaatz. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1955. 256 p.
Chapter 5. The Beginnings of Air Doctrine, pp 110-150 (Air Doctrine of World War II, pp 144-150).
Bibliography, pp 237-245.
Index, pp 247-256.
Book call no.: 355 S645u
U.S. Air Force. Office of Air Force History. Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. Edited by Benjamin Franklin Cooling. Washington, 1990. 606 p. (Special Studies)
Developments to 1939, by Lee Kennett, pp 13-70. (Notes, pp 61-66; Bibliographical Essay, pp 67-70).
The Luftwaffe Experience, 1939-1941, by Williamson Murray, pp 71-113. (Notes, pp 105-109; Bibliographical Essay, pp 110-113).
Soviet Air-Ground Coordination, 1941-1945, by Kenneth R. Whiting, pp 115-151. (Notes, pp 144-147; Bibliographical Essay, pp 148-151).
The Tunisian Campaign, 1942-43, by David Syrett, pp 153-192. (Notes, pp 186-189; Bibliographical Essay, pp 190-192).
Also available online at: http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/coolingclose.htm
Book call no.: 358.4142 C337
U.S. Military Academy. Department of History. The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean. Brigadier General Thomas E. Griess (USA, Ret), Series Editor. Wayne, NJ, Avery Pub. Group, 1989. 429 p. (The West Point Military History of the Second World War Series)
Chapter 3. The Battle of Britain.
The Foundations of Air Doctrine, pp 55-58.
The British Application of Air Doctrine, pp 58-64.
German Air Doctrine and Relationship to Strategy in World War II, pp 68-73.
Book call no.: R 940.54 S4451 vol.1
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey. New York, Garland Pub., 1976. 10 vols.
Contains 31 of the separate reports previously issued by the survey with an introduction to each report by Dr. David MacIsaac.
Volume I: General Introduction to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey Reports, by Dr. David MacIsaac.
Over-All Report (European Report #2).
Volume VII: Summary Report (Pacific Report #1)
See summary report of European war at site below.
Also available online at: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/ETO-Summary.html
See summary report of Pacific war at site below.
Also available online at: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/PTO-Summary.html
Book call no.: 940.53 S898u
Vallance, Andrew G. B. The Air Weapon: Doctrines of Air Power Strategy and Operational Art. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1996. 214 p.
The Development of Air-Power Thought: World War II, pp 10-20.
Notes, Chapter 1: The Database: A Historical Background, pp 191-193.
Select Bibliography, pp 204-209.
Book call no.: 358 U177a
Watts, Barry D. The Foundations of US Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War. Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press, 1984. 166 p.
Chapter 3. The First Strategic Air War Plan, pp 17-26.
Daylight, High Altitude, Precision Bombardment Doctrine.
The Image of War in AWPD-1.
Notes, pp 25-26.
Chapter 6. Friction in 20th Century Warfare, pp 59-104.
Friction in the Combined Bomber Offensive, World War II.
October 1943: Information, Doctrinal Rigidity, Enemy Countermeasures.
Big Week and the Problem of Industrial Impact Assessments.
March and April 1944: Friction as a Weapon.
Notes, pp 95-104.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Also available online at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/catalog/books/Watts_B8.htm
Book call no.: 358.400973 W348f
Webster, Sir Charles and Frankland, Noble. The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945. London, HMSO, 1961. 4 vols. (History of the Second World War, vol. 7, pts. 1-4)
Part I: Preparation.
Part II: Endeavor.
Part III: Victory.
Part IV: Annexes and Appendices.
Book call no.: 940.542 H673 v.7
Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. New York, Macmillan, 1973. 584 p.
Part Four: American Strategy in Global Triumph, 1941-1945: (The AAF, RAF and Strategic Bombing, pp 334-348; 354-359).
Book call no.: 355.0973 W418a
Some of the documents cited in this section are student papers written to fulfill PME school requirements.
Bryan, Ian B. W. Bomber Command, the Air Staff and the Cabinet: Politics, Grand Strategy and the Quest for a Bombing Policy from the Eve of World War II Through August 1941. Columbus, OH, 1993. 79 p. (Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio State University)
"...throughout this period, evidence mounted that Bomber Command could not in fact reliably hit targets any smaller than a city. Bomber Command's inaccuracy and a widespread doctrinal belief that morale was the most productive target, led Britain to slowly shift from precision targets to "industrial areas" or towns. Britain also targeted German towns out of revenge for attacks against British cities. Although by this time British leaders were disappointed in Bomber Command's capabilities, and new strategic alternatives were opening up, the bombing offensive had acquired a momentum which would make it a major part of British strategy and consume large resources until the end of the war."
Bibliography, pp 77-79.
Doc. call no.: M-U 43567-730
Chilstrom, John S. Mines Away! The Significance of US Army Air Force's Minelaying in World War II. Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press, October 1993. 52 p. (Air University. School of Advanced Airpower Studies. Thesis)
Chapter 6. Aerial Minelaying--An Air Force Mission, pp 37-39.
"Mining during World War II, on any scale, had to overcome more than the absence of established doctrine and centralized control. At issue were serious questions of service autonomy and traditional roles, not to mention the convictions of some very strong-willed commanders."
Notes, pp 44-46.
Sources Consulted, pp 47-52.
Also available online at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/SAAS_Theses/SAASS_Out/Chilstrom/Chilstrom_about_out.htm
Doc. call no.: M-U 43998-1a C538m
Cody, James R. AWPD-42 to Instant Thunder Consistent, Evolutionary Thought or
Revolutionary Change? Maxwell AFB, AL, School of Advanced Airpower Studies,
1996. 62 p.
This study analyzes the air war plans in World War II and the Persian Gulf War. The goal of this study is to ascertain whether there is a continuity of thought reflected in American air planning over the years. This study also evaluates Korea and Vietnam as a bridge between World War II and Operation Desert Storm and evaluates the implications of this demonstrated continuity of thought on current and future Air Force doctrine and strategy.
Also available at: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA424862
Doc. call no. M-U 43998-1 C671a
Finney, Robert T. The Development of Tactical Air Doctrine in the U.S. Air Force, 1917-1951. Maxwell AFB, AL, USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, 1952. 52 p.
II. Air Organization and Doctrine Between the Two World Wars, pp 12-19.
Creation of the GHQ Air Force, pp 14-17.
Field Manual 31-35, pp 17-19.
III. Development of Tactical Doctrine in North Africa, pp 20-23:
Misuse of Tactical Air Power in Tunisia, pp 23-26.
Establishment of Unified Command, pp 26-27.
The New Tactical Air Doctrine, pp 28-31.
The New Field Manual, 100-20, pp 31-33.
The New Doctrine Is Proved Sound, pp 33-42.
Tactical Doctrine, 1945-1950, pp 43-44.
Footnotes, 5 p following p 52.
Doc. call no.: M-U 44229
Gilbert, Silvanus Taco, III. What Will Douhet Think of Next? An Analysis of the Impact of Stealth Technology on the Evolution of Strategic Bombing Doctrine. Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press, June 1993. 48 p. (Air University. School of Advanced Airpower Studies. Thesis)
Chapter 4. Post-World War II Airpower Doctrine, pp 17-29. (Notes, pp 27-29).
Bibliography, pp 43-48.
Also available online at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/SAAS_Theses/SAASS_Out/Gilbert/gilbert.pdf
Doc. call no.: M-U 43998-1a G466w
McMullen, John K. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey and Air Force
Doctrine. Maxwell AFB, AL, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 2001. 60 p.
This study analyzes the impact of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) on the post World War II doctrine of strategic bombing. It begins with an investigation of pre-war theory and doctrine with special emphasis on the Air Corps Tactical School. While this organization developed an elaborate theory of strategic bombing, key assumptions, especially in light of current technology, led to shortfalls in its applicability to war.
Also available at: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA407815
Doc. call no. M-U 43998-1 M168u
Stout, Elizabeth G. Airpower Strategies in Europe During World War II. Maxwell AFB, AL, April 1996. 36 p. (Air University. Air War College. Research Report)
"As indicated, US airpower doctrine was similar to that of the British. The US Army Air Corps Tactical School conceptualized the basic function of airpower... While this doctrine did not ignore the necessity of defensive aircraft, it certainly subordinated it to the value of strategic bomber aircraft. As was the case in both Germany and Britain, external factors impacted on the development of the US Army Air Corps (USAAC). However, unlike Germany and Britain, the US circumstances actually fostered the development of a force structure that was actually in synch with its general employment strategy--strategic bombing."
Bibliography: pp 34-36.
Doc. call no.: M-U 43117 S889a
Biddle, Tami Davis. British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive. Journal of Strategic Studies
18:91-144 March 1995.
"Despite their efforts to sort out the science of bombing in the 1930s, the Americans still fell short of doing so, and had to endure and overcome the bitter wartime consequences of that failure. In many respects, the air campaign of World War II resembled the ground campaign of World War I. It was characterized by a struggle to understand and master new instruments and methods of warfare, by large-scale battles of attrition, and by the critical importance of defense techniques... In the end, the monumental efforts of the RAF and USAAF did force Germany to devote vast resources to a defensive effort, including two million soldiers, civilians, and prisoners of war engaged in ground anti-aircraft defense, and an additional million in repair and rebuilding."
"All in all, the Anglo-American experience of World War II ought to be a cautionary tale for anyone tempted to come to the conclusion that long range bombing is anything less than a profoundly challenging and complex form of warfare.
Notes, pp 129-144.
Bogardus, Anneke-Jans. Prelude to Operation Overlord: The Air Campaign. Military Review
74:64-66 March 1994.
"From the outset of the war, strategic bombing (attacks against German industrial and population centers) had been a mainstay of British war efforts against Germany... This doctrinal concept found its roots in the ideas of Sir Hugh Trenchard, father of the Royal Air Force, at the end of World War I."
Also available online at: http://search.ebscohost.com/direct.asp?an=9605072734&db=aph
Carter, William R. Air Power in the Battle of the Bulge--A Theater Campaign Perspective. Airpower Journal
3:10-33 Winter 1989.
"At the January 1943 Casablanca Conference the Anglo-American leaders and their staffs defined the alliance's grand strategy, established the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and agreed on both a strategic bombing and tactical support policy. It was the successful, battle-honed model of Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery and Air Vice Marshal Coningham that defined the principles of air support that became US Army Air Corps doctrine on 21 July 1943 in FM 100-20. These intellectual tools forged early in North Africa served the Allied air commanders well in the Battle of the Bulge."
Also available online at: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj89/carter.html
Chilstrom, John S. A Test for Joint Ops: USAAF Bombing Doctrine and the Aerial Minelaying Mission. Air Power History
40:35-43 Spring 1993.
"The story of aerial mine laying is about overcoming the absence of doctrine, grappling with serious questions of service autonomy, and knocking down preconceptions about naval and air force traditional roles."
"Throughout the war, but particularly in the concentrated campaign known as 'Operation Starvation,' the significant contribution that long-range air power made to minelaying signaled a new partnership in sea control between the Navy and the future U.S. Air Force."
A Commemoration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Normandy Invasion of June 6, 1944. Air Power History
41:entire issue Summer 1994.
"This issue of Air Power History commemorates the fiftieth anniversary of D-Day--Operation OVERLORD, the Normandy Invasion of June 6, 1944. It is no exaggeration to claim that this historic battle truly marked "the beginning of the end" of the war in Europe. Our focus here is on the Allied air power--indeed, air supremacy--which made it all possible."
POINTBLANK Versus OVERLORD: Strategic Bombing and the Normandy Invasion, by Richard G. Davis.
Big Week: Gaining Air Superiority over the Luftwaffe, by Walton S. Moody.
Air Power Against Rommel: The Battle To Isolate German Reserve Forces, by Eduard Mark.
That Is It! Dropping the Airborne, by Martin Wolfe.
Air Power for Patton's Army: The Role of the XIX TAC, by David N. Spires.
Air Power and the Battle for Normandy, by Richard P. Hallion.
D-Day Bibliography, p 62.
Copp, DeWitt S. The Pioneer Plan for Air War. Air Force Magazine
65:74-78 October 1982.
"World War II was coming. Hal George was determined that strategic airpower requirements not be lost in ground-based thinking. Racing the clock, he and his team produced AWPD-I..." (Excerpt from the book 'Forged in Fire')
Davis, Richard G. Operation 'Thunderclap': The US Army Air Forces and the Bombing of Berlin. Journal of Strategic Studies
14:90-111 March 1991.
"Because of the 35,000 lives lost in Dresden a mythology has grown up to give meaning to seemingly purposeless deaths and to make that raid the product of a sadistic, brutal, Allied plot. In actuality the dead were victims of a technically perfect RAF raid, no different in intent than hundreds of others. Ironically, Thunderclap, an American raid almost twice the size of the American attack on Dresden and launched eleven days before it with, at least, some intention of terrorizing the German people and Government, has been ignored because it probably failed to kill tens of thousands of people. If one wants proof of the AAF departure from its staged goal of precision bombing of targets of military value, Thunderclap, not Dresden, makes a far more convincing example."
Hansell, Haywood S., Jr. The First of the Twenty-First. Air University Review
18:2-17 May-June 1967.
"The author shepherded the B-29 air offensive plans, including establishment of the Twentieth Air Force and capture of the Mariana Islands, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Hansell served as commander of the XXI Bomber Command until 20 January 1945."
Jacobs, William A. Tactical Air Doctrine and AAF Close Air Support in the European Theater, 1944-1945. Aerospace Historian
27:35-49 March 1980.
"One of the most important elements of the heated debate over the strategic air offensives mounted against Germany and Japan in World War II has been the analysis of the relationship between Air Corps doctrine developed before the war and the practices actually followed during its course. This essay undertakes a similar analysis of tactical air operations; specifically, it examines the extent to which the American system of close air support employed in the European theater in the last year of the war reflected the major ideas prevailing on that subject in the Army Air Corps Tactical School in the 1930s."
Joint Royal Air Force/United States Air Force Seminar. Held at the Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon, on 29 October 1990. Air Power History.
Part I: Higher Command Structures and Relationships, 1942-45. 38:19-35 Summer 1991.
Remarks by Richard G. Davis and Henry Probert; comments by a panel of experts.
Part II: The Strategic Air Offensive in Europe. 38:39-48 Fall 1991.
Remarks by Alfred Goldberg, Richard Overy, and a panel of experts.
Part III: Land/Air Operations in the Mediterranean and Northwest Europe. 38:30-42 Winter 1991.
Remarks by I.B. Holley, Jr., John Terraine, and a panel of experts.
Lee, Russell E. Impact of Victory Through Air Power. Air Power History.
Part 1: The Army Air Forces' Reaction. 40:3-13 Summer 1993.
Part 2: The Navy Response. 40:20-30 Fall 1993.
A two-part study examining how and why the U.S. Army Air Forces and the Navy reacted to Alexander P. de Seversky's 1942 book Victory Through Air Power, and the 1943 film based on it and produced by Walt Disney.
"Military historians correctly pay little attention to Seversky's influence on the development of air power doctrine because he originated no new methods for fighting with airplanes."
"The publicist's most significant but least understood influence did not involve air power theory, but air power publicity. Victory Through Air Power stimulated public awareness and discussion of strategic bombing as nothing had before, and this intense public interest drew strong reactions from the Army Air Forces and the Navy."
Manzo, Louis A. Morality in War Fighting and Strategic Bombing in World War II. Air Power History
39:35-50 Fall 1992.
"The debate on the morality of strategic bombing in World War II is the subject of this article. The aim here is to examine the issue in the context of the traditional Western ethics of warfare."
"The lesson is that in American society warfighting will be severely hampered if the moral issue is not considered in planning and execution, and if the political and military leaders cannot provide a moral justification for their operations. To be able to do this, these leaders should have some knowledge of the traditional thinking on moral conduct in war."
Meilinger, Phillip S. Winged Defense: Airwar, the Law, and Morality. Armed Forces & Society
20:103-123 Fall 1993.
"American air doctrine ... envisioned an enemy's industrial capability as a "web" that was tied together and interdependent. The goal of an air strategist was to select the key nodes in this web that, when destroyed, would cause the whole to unravel. Precision bombing would implement this industrial web strategy. British air doctrine was similar, and as a consequence, both countries entered World War II emphasizing precision bombing of military objectives. That attitude soon changed."
Also available online at: http://search.ebscohost.com/direct.asp?an=9405240007&db=aph
Moore, Thomas E. Employment of Strategic Air Power. Air University Quarterly Review
1:57-65 Spring 1948.
The author concludes... "Let us have the courage of the pioneers of Air Power who perpetuated the development of the Flying Fortress by first visualizing what it could do. Let us not forget that a bold concept brought victory in the last war, and that only by developing another will we survive the next."
Murray, Williamson. A Tale of Two Doctrines: The Luftwaffe's 'Conduct of the Air War' and the USAF's Manual 1-1. Journal of Strategic Studies
6:84-93 December 1983.
"Given the importance of doctrine to the conceptual preparations of military forces for war, this author thought that it would be particularly instructive to compare two doctrinal statements for not only their realism but their adaptability. The first statement comes from the 1930s, and somewhat ironically enunciates the clearest vision of how air power would be used in the Second World War. It is an especially clear statement on the considerable difficulties that air forces would face in the conduct of air operations during that conflict. The second doctrinal statement comes from the air force of one of the world's strongest military powers today. It has, of course, a wealth of experience on which to draw--nearly all of which was not available in the 1930's."
Quesada, E. R. Tactical Air Power. Air University Quarterly Review
1:37-45 Spring 1948.
"The RAF had to provide air support for British ground forces in Africa. Digesting the tremendous lessons learned from the Battle of Britain, they constructed their philosophy on the foundation of air supremacy. They advanced the theory that air superiority must be established and maintained before a major ground campaign may be launched with reasonable assurance of success. This tenet further dictated that Tactical Air Power should constitute a separate and distinct force, coequal but independent of the surface force. The last portion of this doctrine envisaged direct support in the immediate area of contact as prescribed in the German theory. Thus, we see the evolution of an entirely new and different doctrine, evolved under stress and trials, that permitted greater exploitation of Tactical Air Power than previously achieved. This precept of operation provided a logical and firm basis for the construction of our own philosophy of air-surface operations."
Richardson, R. Dan. The Development of Airpower Concepts and Air Combat Techniques in the Spanish Civil War. Air Power History
40:13-21 Spring 1993.
"By World War II standards, air operations in the Spanish conflict were of modest proportions. They nevertheless provided a great deal of practical experience for those directly involved and the opportunity to learn many important lessons, both for participants and for other interested observers. Some lessons were learned well; for example, the Germans' effective use of close support in their blitzkrieg campaigns in World War II. Others were not so well learned; for example, the Germans, British, and Americans all had to rediscover the hard way that daylight bombardment operations without fighter superiority were too costly. Whatever the specifics of the conclusions drawn, the air war in Spain, the first in which modern aviation technology and tactics were tested in combat, demonstrated to most everyone the awesome warmaking potentialities of air power, the new dimension in modern warfare."
Scamehorn, Howard Lee. American Air Transport and Airpower Doctrine in World War II. Airpower Historian
8:148-155 July 1961.
"World War II air transportation was as much a triumph for industry as for the Army Air Forces and the civil airlines. Manufacturers, with ample encouragement from military planners and private carriers, provided quality equipment in quantity to meet requirements for strategic supply. Sober reflection leads to the conclusion that all three played indispensable roles in forging a new weapon. Without the contributions of each, air transportation could not have given combat units the mobility and striking power which proved decisive against the Axis."
Simpson, Albert F. Tactical Air Doctrine: Tunisia and Korea. Air University Quarterly Review
4:4-20 Summer 1951.
"Of all the lessons none was of greater significance in the successful prosecution of the war than the lesson of how to employ air power properly in a tactical situation. ...the application in Tunisia of the battle-tested doctrines of the Western Desert quickly rectified the misuse of tactical airpower which had been so evident in the early days of the Tunisian Campaign."
"In a few short months the AAF in Africa had switched from an unsound to a sound set of principles of tactical air operations and at very little cost had greatly improved the science of air-ground cooperation. That these accomplishments owed much to the RAF goes without saying; but it must not be forgotten that the basic principles of the new air doctrine were ones in which the AAF had long believed and for which it had long struggled. Now that the validity of the principles had been demonstrated in combat, General Arnold wasted no time... Arnold pushed the new doctrine through the War Department. On 21 July 1943 there appeared a new Field Manual, 100-20, "Command Employment of Air Power."
Spaatz, Carl. Strategic Air Power: Fulfillment of a Concept. Foreign Affairs
24:385-396 April 1946.
The German Strategic Failure, 1940.
The Strategic Concept: The Idea and the Weapons.
Fulfillment of the Concept.
Lessons of Strategic Air Power.
Vogel, Robert. Tactical Air Power in Normandy: Some Thoughts on the Interdiction Plan. Canadian Military History
3:37-47 Spring 1994.
"The interdiction plan was of considerable importance and helped the Allied cause. It did not fully succeed in blocking either German reinforcements or German supplies but it helped to slow them down. It deprived the enemy of much flexibility and initiative. In other words it was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the victory. In the final analysis the Allies still had to fight on the ground and learn how to beat a stubborn and sometimes skillful enemy who remained in the field despite everything that the air forces accomplished."
[Return to Top] [Return to Table of Contents]
Return to Bibliography List