AIRPOWER DOCTRINE
Korean War/Post War Period

Contents

All sites listed were last accessed October 13, 2004.

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Books

Air Interdiction in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, edited with an Introduction by Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan. Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1986. 105 p. (USAF Warrior Studies)
An interview with Gen Earle E. Partridge, Gen Jacob E. Smart, and Gen John W. Vogt, Jr.
The Korean War, pp 41-58.
Bibliography, pp 97-99.
Index, pp 101-105.
Also available online at: http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/kohnairinter.htm
Book call no.: 358.4142 P275a

Air Superiority in World War II and Korea, edited with an introduction by Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan. Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1983. 116 p. (USAF warrior studies)
An interview with Gen James Ferguson, Gen Robert M. Lee, Gen William Momyer, and LtGen Elwood R. Quesada.
"In the Korean War air superiority as a tactical doctrine was never questioned explicitly. Instead, the issue arose indirectly in the form of questioning centralized command and control over tactical air forces. Army, Marine, and Navy commanders all differed in their understanding of the organization of tactical air support."
Select Bibliography, pp 109-111.
Index, pp 115-116.
Also available online at: http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/kohnairsuperiority.htm
Book call no.: 940.544973 A2983

Armitage, M. J. and Mason, R. A. Air Power in the Nuclear Age. Second Edition. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1985. 318 p.
Chapter 2. Air Power in Korea, pp 20-45.
Notes and References to Chapter 2, pp 281-284.
Select Bibliography and Further Reading, pp 303-307.
Index, pp 308-318.
Book call no.: 358.400904 A733a 1985

Boyne, Walter J. Silver Wings--The Human and Technological Achievements in the History of the United States Air Force. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1993. 336 p.
Foreword by General James H. Doolittle.
Introductory Note by Lee Ewing.
Chapter Three. The Trying Years of the Golden Age, 1919-1939, pp 81-126. (Creating the Doctrine, pp 90-92).
Chapter Four. The Challenge of the Century, 1940-1945, pp 127-175.
Suggested Reading, p 332.
Index, pp 333-336.
Book call no.: 358.400973 B792s

Center for Air Force History. Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority, edited by Benjamin Franklin Cooling. Washington, 1994. 678 p. (Special Studies)
Chapter 9. Korea, by Thomas C. Hone, pp 453-504.
Notes, pp 499-502.
Bibliographical Essay, pp 502-504.
Also available online at: http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/coolingairsup.htm
Book call no.: 358.414 C337

Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. New York, Free Press, 1989. 297 p.
Chapter 1. From Unconditional Surrender to Flexible Response, pp 1-37.
    Korea, pp 12-26.
    The Post-Korea Decade, pp 26-37.
Book call no.: 959.704348 C643L

Dorr, Robert F. and Thompson, Warren. The Korean Air War. Osceola, WI, Motorbooks International, 1994. 192 p.
"This is a history of the Korean air war as seen by Americans who fought it."
Bibliography, pp 190-191.
Index, pp 191-192.
Book call no.: 951.9042 D716k

Fabyanic, Thomas A. Strategic Air Attack in the United States Air Force: A Case Study. Manhattan, KS, Military Affairs/Aerospace Historian, Kansas State University, 1976. 206 p. 
Chapter VI. Limited Strategic Attack in the Nuclear Era: Korea and Vietnam, pp 142-158.
   Korea: Targetry and Force Structure, pp 143-152.
Notes on Chapter VI, pp 199-201.
Also published as Air War College Research Report, M-U 32983 F136s.
Book call no.: 358.42 F136s

Futrell, Robert F. The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953. Revised Edition. Washington, U.S. Air Force, Office of Air Force History, 1983. 823 p.
Bibliography, pp 713-717.
Notes, pp 719-771.
Index, pp 779-823.
Also available online at: http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/futrellUSAFKorea.htm
Book call no.: 951.9 F996u 1983

The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, edited by Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press, 1992. 374 p. (Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education Publication)
Air Power since World War II--Consistent with Doctrine? by Dr. Williamson Murray, pp 95-113. (Notes, pp 110-113).
Also available online at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/catalog/books/Shultz_B48.htm
Book call no.: 358.403 F996

Hadley, Arthur T. The Straw Giant--Triumph and Failure: America's Armed Forces.. New York, Random House, 1986. 314 p.
Chapter Four: Korea and NATO--Successes and Failures, pp 100-124.
Bibliographical Notes, pp 303-304.
Book call no.: 355.00973 H131s

Momyer, William W. Airpower in Three Wars (WWII, Korea, Vietnam). Reprint edition. Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press, 2003. 401 p.
See Index for Subject: Doctrine.
Index, pp 381-401.
Also available online at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/catalog/books/Momyer_B89.htm
Book call no.: 358.4 M733a  2003

A Quarter Century of Air Power: Studies in the Employment of Air Power, 1947-1972, edited by John H. Scrivner, Jr. Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University, Air Force ROTC, 1973. 249 p.
Chapter 2. The Korean War, by Dr. Kenneth R. Whiting, pp 19-62.
Footnotes, pp 61-62.
Book call no.: 358.40973 S434q

U.S. Air Force. Office of Air Force History. Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, edited by Benjamin Franklin Cooling. Washington, 1990. 606 p. (Special Studies)
Korea, 1950-1953, by Allan R. Millett, pp 345-410. (Notes, pp 400-405; Bibliographical Essay, pp 406-410).
A Retrospect on Close Air Support, by I. B. Holley, Jr., pp 535-555.
Also available online at: http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/coolingclose.htm
Book call no.: 358.4142 C337

Watts, Barry D. The Foundations of US Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War. Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press, 1984. 166 p.
Chapter 6. Friction in 20th Century Warfare: Epilogue in Korea: Railway Interdiction, August 1951-May 1952, pp 85-87.
Notes, p 102.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Also available online at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/catalog/books/Watts_B8.htm
Book call no.: 358.400973 W348f
 

Documents

Some of the documents cited in this section are student papers written to fulfill PME school requirements.

Caddell, Joseph W. Orphan of Unification: The Development of United States Air Force Tactical Air Power Doctrine, 1945-1950. Chapel Hill, NC, June 1984. 399 p. (Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University)
"In 1950, ironically, the United States Air Force evidenced problems providing tactical air support in Korea. Many critics claimed that the airmen had forgotten the lessons of World War II. How and why this could have happened are addressed in this study. The obvious suspects are the doctrinal reliance on strategic bombing and the organizational separation from the Army. This investigation addresses, but is not limited to, these considerations."
Sources, pp 345-396.
Doc. call no.: M-U 43567-175

Finney, Robert T. The Development of Tactical Air Doctrine in the U.S. Air Force, 1917-1951. Maxwell AFB, AL, USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, 1952. 52 p.
IV. Tactical Air Doctrine in Korea, pp 45-52.
Footnotes, 5 p following p 52.
Doc. call no.: M-U 44229

Royal Australian Air Force. Air Power Studies Centre. The Transformation in Air Power in the Aftermath of the Korean War, by Jeffrey Grey. Fairbairn, Australia, August 1993. 11 p. (Air Power Studies Centre Paper, no. 16)
"At one level Korea was a transitional period in the development of airpower. There were no technological breakthroughs, no dramatic new applications ... no resolution of the serious doctrinal disagreements between the Army and the Air Force. Organisationally the US Air Force was transformed, however, with the Korean War providing the necessary incentive for the rapid expansion of the Air Force in peacetime to a size without previous parallel."
Doc. call no.: M-U 36760-81
 

Periodicals

Air War in Korea. Air University Quarterly Review 4:19-39 Fall 1950.
Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the Air University Quarterly Review.

Air War in Korea: II. Air University Quarterly Review 4:47-78 Spring 1951.
Prepared in the USAF Historical Division for the Air University Quarterly Review by Dr. Robert F. Futrell, Historian, Pacific and Dr. Albert F. Simpson, the Air Force Historian.
"Although many journal articles are not explicitly concerned with doctrine, in fact they offer many insights on doctrine in their descriptions of experience encountered. Sound doctrine rests on the hard-won lessons of experience summarized in after-action reports. Articles published in professional journals are in many instances just another form of after-action report." BrigGen I.B. Holley, Jr., USAFR.
    Air War in Korea: III. Air University Quarterly Review 4:83-96 Summer 1951.
    Air War in Korea: IV. Air University Quarterly Review 5:86-92 Winter 1951-1952.
    Air War in Korea: V. Air University Quarterly Review 5:87-103 Spring 1952.
    Air War in Korea: VI. Air University Quarterly Review 5:49-59 Winter 1951-1953.
    Air War in Korea: VII. Air University Quarterly Review 6:83-101 Spring 1953.
    Air War in Korea: VIII. Air University Quarterly Review 6:78-92 Summer 1953.
    Air War in Korea: IX. Air University Quarterly Review 6:114-127 Fall 1953.
    Air War in Korea: X. Air University Quarterly Review 6:111-117 Winter 1953-1954.
    Air War in Korea: XI. Air University Quarterly Review 7:99-115 Spring 1954.
    Air War in Korea: XII. Air University Quarterly Review 7:71-89 Summer 1954.

Carter, Willis G. Strategic Bombardment and National Objectives. Air University Quarterly Review 4:14 Spring 1951.
"The Korean phase of the conflict between Communism and its opponents has heavily underscored the strategic doctrine of the USAF. Air superiority (practically handed to the United Nations forces) permitted application of air power which enabled UN surface forces first to stem and then to overcome superior forces."

Futrell, Robert F. Tactical Employment of Strategic Air Power in Korea. Airpower Journal 2:29-41 Winter 1988.
"In a summary article on the Korean War, General Weyland was highly complimentary of the B-29s, saying that their employment served notice that air power was indivisible and ought not to be arbitrarily classified by types of aircraft, targets, or operations. Examining the experience from the vantage point of more recent times, it is apparent that the cooperative employment of the Fifth Air Force and FEAF Bomber Command was successfully orchestrated. In the last months, enemy opposition was such that our strike and support forces had to begin integrating into packages, foreshadowing arrangements that would be used over North Vietnam."
This essay is principally based upon three declassified historical monographs prepared by the author as official Air Force histories.
Also available online at: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj88/futrell.html

Hallion, Richard P. Naval Air Operations in Korea. Air Power History 40:31-41 Fall 1993.
"After Inchon, MacArthur affirmed that the Air Force had responsibility for coordinating tactical air power in Korea, and though the Navy and Marine Corps chafed somewhat under this arrangement, it remained the basic working arrangement through the end of the war. Indeed, though the official Marine Corps history notes that doctrinal differences were never fully reconciled, it does conclude that the command structure did work."

McDonnell, Robert H. Clausewitz and Strategic Bombing. Air University Quarterly Review 6:43-54 Spring 1953.
"The Korean conflict has served as a sounding board for added criticism of strategic bombing. A great deal is made of the fact that the strategic air components in the Far East seem to have contributed only incidentally to the progress made there. The real truth lies in the fact that strategic air operations in Korea are a classic example of the mal-employment of a military force."

Roman, Peter J. Curtis LeMay and the Origins of NATO Atomic Targeting. Journal of Strategic Studies 16:46-74 March 1993.
The Korean War and SAC Development, pp 52-56.

Saunders, Homer L. Tactical Air Operations in Retrospect and Prospect. Air University Quarterly Review 4:38-46 Spring 1951.
"The experience of the Korean war assures us that the basic doctrine of tactical air warfare has not changed. The jet plane has proved to be the most suitable all around weapon for the mission; the system of centralized control is still valid; tactical air operations will best serve everyone concerned under Air Force command in cooperation with ground command."

Simpson, Albert F. Tactical Air Doctrine: Tunisia and Korea. Air University Quarterly Review 4:4-20 Summer 1951.
"The air war which followed --(the Korean War)--has been in many ways a curious one. In some respects the combat operations of the USAF were duplications of those of the AAF in World War II. ... In other respects the air war was quite unlike that of 1942-1945.
"In its handling of tactical operations the USAF did a top-flight job... Nevertheless during the early stages of the Korean conflict there developed in certain non-USAF quarters a movement toward returning tactical air operations to the pre-1943 system of Army control and of parceling out air power to individual ground units. The most notable examples of this movement occurred during the Inchon and Wonsan operations."

Sleeper, Raymond S. Korean Targets for Medium Bombardment. Air University Quarterly Review 4:18-31 Spring 1951.
"Under such conditions of air warfare, where strategic targets are denied the Air Force and where interdiction targets have also largely been denied, some observers and analysts have found the Air Force inadequate and have proposed assignments of ground-support air to ground force units. These are misleading and dangerous conclusions to draw from the operations in Korea."

Smith, Dale O. and Barker, John DeF. Air Power Indivisible. Air University Quarterly Review 4:4-18 Fall 1950.
"...United States Air Force doctrine from its inception has stressed the use of air as a national force capable of performing innumerable strategic missions. Air power has been organized with some specialization, but the long-range objectives have not been prostituted by the need for this specialization."

Terry, Michael R. Formulation of Aerospace Doctrine From 1955 to 1959. Air Power History 38:47-54 Spring 1991.
"During the formative years of 'aerospace doctrine,' Air Force leaders postulated an institutional bias for strategic bombardment by manned aircraft. The introduction of ballistic missile technology challenged the 'essence' of the Air Force both externally, from other services seeking to expand their missions at the expense of the autonomy of the Air Force, and internally, by the threat to the instrumental role of the manned bomber in defining Air Force strategy ... Air Force leadership's reluctance to change their doctrine from 1955 to 1959 demonstrated how their rigid beliefs could affect the direction of technological change and disrupt the integral relationship between doctrine and weapons."

Tormoen, George E. "Political Air Superiority" in the Korean Conflict. Air University Quarterly Review 6:78-84 Winter 1953-1954.
"Control of the air enabled airpower to capitalize on the fluid ground situation which existed in Korea during the first six months of the war. This war of maneuver was ideal for employment of air forces in interdiction and close-support roles, and the USAF was able further to establish its claims of the tremendous capabilities and flexibility of air power. This is borne out by the statements of ground commanders."

Weyland, Otto P. The Air Campaign in Korea. Air University Quarterly Review 6:2-28 Fall 1953.
"...the Korean War has been a very complex one. It has been a laboratory study of limited military action in the support of a very difficult political situation. Furthermore it has provided the air forces in particular with an opportunity to develop concepts of employment beyond the World War II concepts of tactical and strategic operations."
In summation General Weyland declares that clear-cut war objectives, the threats posed by the enemy, and the opportunities to exploit our capabilities must inspire strategy and govern employment of forces.

White, Thomas D. The Current Concept of American Military Strength--Its Meaning and Challenge to the U.S. Air Force. Air University Quarterly Review 7:2-14 Spring 1954.
"In the development of superior air leadership the educative process cannot treat air doctrine as a set of abstract principles to be learned by rote like mathematical formulas and dutifully filed away for future reference. Air doctrine is made up not of abstractions but of dynamic, living truths forged in the heat of combat and tested in the crucible of war."

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