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(STRIACC)

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

Transnational terrorism, as well as other forms of international crime, affects domestic, regional, and global stability. The magnitude, geographical dispersion, and unknown relationships between various transnational threats are such that no one department, agency, or staff has the sufficient resources or expertise to comprehend and respond to all requirements. As our challenges are expanding in size and scope, so too, must our interagency processes be flexible, adaptive, and efficient. To that end, we must develop a system that provides responsive interagency intelligence and information to the appropriate federal departments and agencies. The system must be standardized and enforceable within the federal bureaucracy so as to enhance unity of effort, yet must never impinge on the authority of elected or appointed officials. A responsive interagency system that is proficient in both deliberate and crisis action planning is the only method of bringing to leveraging all appropriate government assets necessary to engage the full depth and breadth of our national security threats.

The purpose of this research paper, then, is to provide an analysis of the interagency process at the strategic level—from the origins of its inefficiencies to the most recent recommendations regarding systemic improvements. Through historical analysis, this paper will demonstrate that the problems residing within the U.S. federal interagency system are not new, but rather, consistent throughout the timeframe examined. Consequently, recommendations applied to interagency inefficiencies must take into account many of the historical issues that have set the conditions for interagency coordination failures in the past.

## **Introduction**

In the wake of World War II—and the onslaught of Soviet expansionism—the President and the Congress were seeking processes through which other elements of governmental power, in addition to the military, could contribute to the attainment of strategic interests. Thus, the National Security Act of 1947 was born.<sup>i</sup> In enacting this legislation, Congress' intent was to “provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States, and to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of Government relating to national security.”<sup>ii</sup> But while the overarching objectives of the National Security Act of 1947 are relatively the same now, as they were then, that is, unified interagency operations, the conditions and scope under which the objectives were developed no longer exist. That is to say, the nature of conflict itself has evolved.

Transnational terrorism, as well as other forms of international crime, affects domestic, regional, and global stability. Translated, these threats to our security include, but are not limited to, the purchase and intended use of weapons of mass destruction, narco-trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, hard and soft piracy, cyber-warfare, economic as well as other types of espionage, smuggling, bio-terrorism, political assassination, insurgency, fundamental extremism, genocide, illegal immigration, illegal technology transfer, counterfeiting, chemical terrorism, and natural disasters.

The preceding is more than just a simple recognition of transnational threats. The underlying purpose of the list is to demonstrate the multitude of potential variables resulting from so many threats operating simultaneously against our interests. More to the point, we must not view these threats as separate components within a larger category, simply because they do not operate as separate components. In other words, these threats are not just transnational in nature—they are

*trans-networking*. As Stephen Humphreys observes, “...each of these problems has its own history, and, to a considerable degree, can be analyzed separately. But it is perfectly clear, that each is thoroughly implicated in all others and that no one of them can be solved in isolation.”<sup>iii</sup> Condoleezza Rice’s perspective is similar. “When you think about it,” she said, “they’re not only transnational, they’re transfunctional, and that means they cross all kinds of jurisdictional boundaries in the government...”<sup>iv</sup>

The magnitude, geographical dispersion, and unknown relationships between various transnational threats are such that no one department, agency, or staff has the sufficient resources or expertise to comprehend and respond to all requirements. As our challenges are expanding in size and scope, so too, must our interagency processes be flexible, adaptive, and efficient. To that end, we must develop a system that provides responsive interagency intelligence and information to the appropriate federal departments and agencies. The system must be standardized and enforceable within the federal bureaucracy so as to enhance unity of effort, yet must never impinge on the authority of elected or appointed officials. A responsive interagency system that is proficient in both deliberate and crisis action planning is the only method of bringing to bear all the appropriate government assets necessary to engage the full depth and breadth of our national security threats.

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interagency inefficiencies must take into account many of the historical issues that have set the conditions for interagency coordination failures in the past.

The structure of this research paper incorporates an historical background of interagency problems from 1947 to the present. It then provides an overview of previously attempted, and currently proposed, fixes to the problems. The paper offers a comparative analysis by evaluating three options for improving interagency unity of effort against six selected criteria. The paper then concludes with specific recommendations for improving strategic-level interagency coordination.

In the end, interagency coordination is about people and processes. Only by analyzing interagency problems in the combined context of people and processes can we begin to understand the depth and synthesis of the remedies required.

### **The Ongoing Genesis of the Problem**

This section provides a short history of the interagency process as it has developed over the past six decades. Specifically, it focuses on those elements within the federal government that have had the most impact on the efficiency of the interagency process at the strategic level. These elements include the President, his personal staff, and the various departments and agencies that make up the executive branch of government. Understanding the relationships among these elements is critical for conducting meaningful analysis and providing recommendations.

#### **Presidential Autonomy**

The current U.S. national security apparatus is founded upon the National Security Act of 1947. Since the act was passed into law, the interagency approach to national security problems has been executed through a formal process of identifying policy issues and questions,

formulating options, raising issues to appropriate levels for decisions, making decisions where appropriate, and overseeing the implementation of decisions throughout the executive departments.<sup>v</sup> At the presidential level, the interagency process takes the form of the National Security Council (NSC). As a product of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council's goal was to unify interagency approaches to national security issues. The National Security Act of 1947 also made the NSC responsible for the general direction and coordination of intelligence operations.<sup>vi</sup> The NSC's mandate included:

...advising the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security, so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security...other functions the President may direct for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the government relating to the national security...assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States...consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the government concerned with the national security...<sup>vii</sup>

According to statute, the National Security Council is at the apex of all other interagency groups.<sup>viii</sup> It is the governmental body with a common interest in all departments and agencies within the federal apparatus. Its principals include the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. Sitting in advisory positions are the Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>ix</sup>

Others may also sit in advisory positions, based upon presidential discretion. For example, President Clinton incorporated the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (otherwise known as the National Security Advisor), the assistant to the President for economic policy, and the Chief of Staff to the President.<sup>x</sup> Non-federally employed personnel such as private businessmen can also be incorporated into NSC meetings in the role of counselors.

With that said, the Council operates according to presidential preference. The NSC system “is at the mercy of particular presidents--to be used, reshaped, or ignored as they prefer.”<sup>xi</sup> In essence, the system has been left open to “each president’s personality, policy preferences, and operating style...”<sup>xii</sup> But, while the parameters have provided for presidential freedom, they have also allowed for the dynamics of internal power plays. As Amy Zegart points out, various presidents have designed the NSC system in different ways. Therefore, “its structure, operation, and power are always up for grabs.”<sup>xiii</sup>

If the NSC is viewed as the tip of the interagency iceberg, the NSC staff is that which falls immediately below the waterline. The bureaucratic depth of the NSC is supported by a substructure of interagency groups and by an NSC staff within the White House. A critical function of the NSC staff is to help guide federal departments and agencies in the understanding and prioritization of the President’s agenda.<sup>xiv</sup> Influential in every respect, the politically appointed NSC staff endeavors, when practical, to build consensus across the government for unified policy and action.

Apart from authorizing the NSC, Congress does not oversee the interagency process. While critical to effective government, the interagency process within the NSC, and at staff levels below the NSC, has never been codified into law. So, while every President has enjoyed the freedom to mold the NSC and NSC staff in his own likeness, others have seen the disconnect between the President and Congress as a potential fault. As Harold Koh notes, “When Congress enacted the National Security Act of 1947, its greatest error was its failure to address its own role in the national security system.”<sup>xv</sup> Still, Congress *can* influence interagency processes by holding hearings regarding historical events and specific participants involved in those events.<sup>xvi</sup>

Every new President, either directly or indirectly, influences who some of the personnel will be that will make up his NSC staff. In addition to “by name requests,” NSC staffers are made up of personnel “...detailed from the diplomatic corps, the intelligence community, the civil service, the military services, academia, and the private sector.”<sup>xvii</sup> The modern-day National Security Council staff consists of various geographic and functional component staffs, the two primary committees on the staff being the Principals Committee and the Deputies Committee. The Principals committee is essentially the National Security Council, without the President. The Deputies committee “includes assistant secretary level officials who monitor the work of the interagency policy formulation and articulation process, do crisis management, and, when necessary, push unresolved issues to the Principals for resolution.”<sup>xviii</sup>

Early on, the intent for the newly activated NSC staff had been one of low-visibility in presidential affairs. However, a dramatic evolution in the primacy of the staff occurred shortly after its establishment. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy reengineered NSC staffing processes “that differed radically” from that which was originally intended by the National Security Act.<sup>xix</sup> By late 1963, “...the locus of foreign policy-making had moved from the Cabinet to the White House...The President, his National Security Advisor, and the NSC staff had taken the lead in formulating policy, in negotiating with foreign governments, and in managing the daily affairs of state. *The rise of the informal NSC staff paralleled the decline of the formal, statutory National Security Council.*”<sup>xx</sup> In other words, the trend was that national security policies were “gravitating” closer to the sphere of presidential staff influence, and further away from Cabinet secretariats/secretariat staffs.

There is historical justification for this “gravitational pull,” however. While most presidents enter the Oval Office with one form of bias or another regarding the NSC and its associated staff,

geo-political events often sway them to centralize foreign policy planning and execution at their levels. That is to say, based on unforeseen events or poor interdepartmental coordination, presidential reactions have been to take personal control by increasing their direct influence on foreign policy matters while decreasing the influence of other executive branch departments and agencies.

Eisenhower centralized foreign policy because of disconnects between the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and other presidential appointees in the wake of the U-2 incident over Russia in 1960.<sup>xxi</sup> Kennedy centralized foreign policy based on disconnects between the State Department, CIA, and the military during the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961.<sup>xxii</sup> Carter took the controls on foreign policy based on disconnects within the military that resulted in the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 1979.<sup>xxiii</sup> And more recently, disconnects between U.S. intelligence agencies before 9/11, and flawed Iraqi pre-war intelligence, have resulted in greater centralization of decision-making processes in President George W. Bush's administration.<sup>xxiv</sup>

### **Interagency Rivalries**

While presidents have felt they were better able to manage the country's foreign policy affairs through centralization, there has also been a parallel history of negative impacts on the interagency process. As the President manages foreign policy through the NSC staff, the NSC staff, by default, rises in prominence. The trend has been for the NSC staff to then become an entity of federal power in its own right. David Rothkopf tells us that by "exerting its authority, the NSC staff may intimidate or override other interagency players. When this occurs, other interagency players may defer to NSC staff positions and judgments even though they have valuable contributions to make. Worse, still, the NSC staff may not consult them...[and] the

quality of options [offered to the President and/or National Security Council] can suffer as a result.”<sup>xxv</sup> The marginalization of the departments and agencies can lead to further idiosyncratic extremes. During several presidencies, the national security deliberation process was sometimes whickered down to levels that challenged the very intent of the National Security Council.

During the Nixon administration, President Nixon was notoriously secretive with his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger—to the virtual exclusion of all others on the National Security Council. But the “Nixon-Kissinger only” approach to China policymaking (vis-à-vis the Vietnam war) resulted in significant strategic disconnects. The Defense Department, CIA, Vice President, and State Department were all left out of the loop during a critical negotiating period with both the Chinese and the North Vietnamese.<sup>xxvi</sup> The impacts of this omission led to Secretary of State William Rogers and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird resisting cooperation within an NSC system in which they played “second fiddle” to Henry Kissinger.<sup>xxvii</sup>

During the Carter administration, Secretary of State Vance “was unhappy and asserted that he had not been consulted...” during certain interagency studies. The findings of the studies led to divisions and resulted in the most bitter rivalries in executive branch history—ultimately leading to Vance’s resignation.<sup>xxviii</sup>

During the Clinton administration, the CIA and Department of Defense (DoD) felt more and more disconnected from the Oval Office as time went on. “Once again,” Rothkopf reports, “an informal group close to the President was in the driver’s seat, and many of those in the administration with the most foreign policy experience were reportedly frustrated in their attempts to be heard.”<sup>xxix</sup>

As for the current Bush administration, many see Vice President Dick Cheney as the most powerful and influential Vice President in the history of the country, many times trumping the

rest of the NSC. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, another strong personality, has been accused of dealing directly with the President and simply bypassing the NSC process.<sup>xxx</sup>

The history of presidential administrations is replete with personality conflicts and interagency rivalries that have ebbed and flowed with departmental power and influence. “The reality” David Rothkopf writes, “is that we see it often—Kissinger vs. Rogers, Kissinger vs. Schlesinger, Kissinger vs. Rumsfeld, Vance vs. Brzezinski, Shultz vs. Weinberger, Lake vs. Holbrooke, and Powell vs. Rumsfeld.”<sup>xxxii</sup> All these personality conflicts, in one way or another, negatively impacted interagency information flow and planning coordination.

Consequently, inter-departmental and agency rivalries develop in reaction to the rise of the NSC and NSC staff. As Secretary of State under President Truman, George Marshall understood the ramifications of the NSC when he viewed it as an infringement on the constitutionally designated authority of both the President and the State Department.<sup>xxxiii</sup> Marshall was right in that the centralization of foreign policy at the presidential level has impacted the State Department over the years more than any other federal entity. Marshall’s assistant Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was even more adamant, and was seen to be on the move to “castrate the effectiveness” of the NSC early in its development.<sup>xxxiii</sup> Thus, the record shows that interagency rivalries developed as soon as the NSC and NSC staff appeared on the political stage.

### **Organizational Cultures**

Beyond the personality conflicts and interagency rivalries that exist within the interagency process, there are self-inflicted cultural wounds within the departments and agencies. These organizational idiosyncrasies further handicap inter and intra-departmental coordination processes, ultimately affecting government-wide unity of effort. Consider, for example, the State Department. As Frank Carlucci writes, “The department’s professional culture is predisposed

against public outreach and engagement, thus undercutting its effectiveness at public diplomacy and undermining its coordination not only with Congress, but also with other agencies of the U.S. government.”<sup>xxxiv</sup>

In response, an aggressive NSC staff will fill perceived State Department voids in the foreign policy process. The situation then exists where multiple elements of government are working issues either redundantly, or, at cross-purposes. Carlucci continues, “An unclear and often overlapping distribution of foreign policy responsibilities and authorities among government agencies and departments—particularly between the Department of State and the President’s National Security Advisor—has undercut coordination of policy development and execution. This has been especially evident when the President has not given the Secretary of State principal responsibility for the implementation of foreign policy.”<sup>xxxv</sup> In the wake of 9/11, the State Department’s influence decreased even further “as the nation and its dominant leaders had little patience for the compromise and delays of diplomacy and as foreign policy itself became militarized.”<sup>xxxvi</sup>

The CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) offer other examples of organizational culture crimping the interagency process. The 9/11 Commission Report put it simply when it stated, “Information was not shared...analysis was not pooled.”<sup>xxxvii</sup> The CIA and FBI “were unwilling...to exchange information quickly and effectively...” between their organizations. The CIA did not pass on identified terrorist information to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the FBI.<sup>xxxviii</sup> And because the CIA and FBI “lacked a...cooperative, analytical and operational effort, they were not well configured to detect and counter a threat like that posed on September 11...”<sup>xxxix</sup>

Finally, in the wake of the war in Iraq, the Department of Defense has been cited for creating its war plans in a vacuum. It planned operations separately from the State Department and developed intelligence that contradicted certain CIA analyst's opinions that there were no links between Iraq and the al-Qaeda terrorist network.

### **Attempts to Standardize Interagency Coordination**

Given the history of personalities and organizations, it should also be remembered that presidents and congresses do not work in a vacuum. To be fair, most have recognized and understood the disconnects in the interagency process, and, to their credit, have attempted to improve the process. This section provides a short historical background citing recent efforts by presidents and Congress to fix the interagency system.

#### **Presidential Efforts**

With the intent of standardizing interagency processes, President George H. W. Bush's National Security Directive-1 (NSD-1) established specific authorities for the National Security Council's Principal's Committee and Deputy's Committee. It created the first functional and regional working groups. The idea behind this new NSC staff structure was to "push decisions down and allow the system to work issues as much as possible at the lower levels, while elevating decisions to the Principals' level later in the process."<sup>x1</sup> Theoretically, this would promote the vetting of details at lower levels so that rapid decisions could be made at the top.

During the Clinton administration, the interagency process for developing and implementing foreign policy was described in Presidential Decision Directive-2 (PDD-2), *Organization of the National Security Council*. PDD-2 expanded the NSC membership beyond that mandated by law. This expansion was based on Clinton's concept of a link between national security, economic, and domestic political matters. As a result, Clinton's NSC was to be the principal

means for coordinating executive departments and agencies in the development and implementation of national security policy.<sup>xli</sup>

Another key aspect of PDD-2 was the development of the Interagency Working Groups. IWGs were a refinement of the functional and geographic working groups designed in President Bush's NSD-1. This aspect reinforced the concept of a lead federal agency and established guidelines for NSC/IWG operations. These guidelines also included what departments and/or agencies would participate in given interagency activities.<sup>xlii</sup> But because the new Clinton administration lacked some of the sophisticated know-how in establishing strategically-focused staffs, much of the foreign policy process appeared to be *ad hoc*.<sup>xliii</sup> PDD-2 described an interagency process, but the supporting committees did not reflect the intent.<sup>xliv</sup> As a result, the implementation of PDD-2 suffered.

The Clinton administration then approached interagency operations on two fronts—the domestic and the international. These efforts resulted in PDD-39 and PDD-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. PDD-39 was the first time any administration had attempted to centralize control over domestic counterterrorism activities. It acknowledged the type of opponent who recognizes American military superiority, and, as a result, attacks the nation asymmetrically with unconventional means. For the first time, a document was on the street that directed certain government agencies to conduct consequence management. It addressed public health in the wake of a possible mass disaster by including the Department of Health and Human Services under the national security umbrella. It was also the first directive to bring together all relevant agencies for a budget review to see what monies were being allocated to the different departments and agencies.<sup>xlv</sup>

On an international front, PDD-56 mandated reforms in the political-military planning process for overseas operations. Signed in May 1997, the goal of PDD-56 was to institutionalize procedures for the interagency to follow during crisis action planning. In a departure from previous approaches to interagency processes, PDD-56 sought to involve all potential assets *of* the U.S. government—and *outside* the government—that might be brought to bear on a complex contingency in a foreign land.<sup>xlvi</sup> Armed with lessons learned from contingency operations in the first half of the 1990s, the administration’s mindset was that interagency planning can make or break an operation.<sup>xlvii</sup> PDD-56 addressed the interagency framework by directing that crisis action planning would generate

- an executive committee chaired by the assistant secretaries
- an integrated, interagency political-military implementation plan
- an interagency rehearsal
- an interagency after-action review
- training<sup>xlviii</sup>

As a result, PDD-56 became the baseline planning mechanism for, or incorporated into, ongoing operations in eastern Slovenia, Bosnia, Hurricane Mitch in Central America, the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, and the Balkans contingency.<sup>xlix</sup>

Yet, by 1999, PDD-56’s influence was seen as waning. In March of that year, a review of interagency processes concluded that “PDD-56 is intended to be applied as an integrated package of complementary mechanisms and tools...since its issuance in 1997, PDD-56 has not been applied as intended. Three major issues must be addressed to improve the utility of PDD-56.”<sup>1</sup> The report recommended increased authority and leadership for promoting PDD-56, more flexible and less detailed political-military planning, and dedicated training resources and greater outreach.<sup>li</sup>

In her analysis of the report, Gabriel Marcella notes, “Imbedded in the three recommendations are the recurring problems of the interagency need for decisive authority.”<sup>lii</sup> Contrasting departmental and agency approaches, in addition to divergent institutional cultures (particularly diplomatic versus military), fosters a “nobody in charge” planning environment.<sup>liii</sup>

The report to the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century attributed the lack of government inertia towards interagency cohesiveness to two things. First, though planning may be a core competency for DoD, it is not for other departments and agencies that are untrained or under-resourced for in-depth planning. Second, personnel are not familiar with planning processes outside of their departments and agencies. This is especially the case where the process is seen as incompatible with organizational values.<sup>liv</sup>

The Bush administration’s efforts towards improved interagency cohesiveness were addressed in NSPD-1. The purpose of this NSPD was to improve shortfalls in the interagency structure. However, no procedural directive followed the NSPD, “...resulting in a situation where there was form but little management application...to effect realistic planning.”<sup>lv</sup> An attempt was made to recover from the oversight, but, due to lack of support, the revised NSPD (otherwise known as NSPD-XX) was shelved.

With that said, President George W. Bush did sign into law the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act*. The primary thrust of this act is to integrate the intelligence feeds and analysis of 15 separate intelligence agencies across the federal government.<sup>lvi</sup> To execute the process of tasking federal intelligence sources, and consolidating intelligence at the top, the act created the position of Director of National Intelligence.<sup>lvii</sup> However, some shortcomings of the act have been addressed by former Secretary of State Colin Powell. First, Powell points out that the consolidation of intelligence at the top of a hierarchy such as the DNI’s office does not

guarantee that State (or any federal department or agency) will get timely intelligence. Second, the intelligence community, with its overarching emphasis on terrorism, will be directed to focus on “worst case” scenarios. Powell’s argument is that different departments may require intelligence efforts to focus on “most likely” scenarios. As a result, he believes that intelligence needs to be tailored to specific requirements at departmental levels, versus all-encompassing national levels. Lastly, Powell argues that the consolidation of intelligence at the top will affect competitive analysis. Therefore, federal departments (where the expertise resides) should be allowed to enter into the larger analytical process versus higher level analysis only.<sup>lviii</sup>

### **Congressional Efforts**

After the U.S. entered both Afghanistan and Iraq without adequate political-military plans, the Congress took action and passed HR 4058, *Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004*. HR 4058 suggests the creation of a National Interagency Contingency Coordinating Group. This group would be a national-level planning and coordination group for post-conflict operations. When activated, the NIACCG would be chaired by the National Security Council and consist of representatives from the departments that are critical to specific missions such as Defense, State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture. When planning begins for major combat, the NIACCG would be responsible for providing strategic guidance and coordinating planning among the departments involved in post-conflict operations.<sup>lix</sup> As of February 2006, no NIACCG had been established.

### **Facts and Assumptions Pertaining to Interagency Unity of Effort**

Interagency inefficiencies since 1947 have had their roots in the confluence of executive privilege, personality conflicts, and organizational cultures. History has shown that the mix of people, organizations, and power, when not functioning in concert, can severely impact the

interagency process and hamper unity of effort. Before addressing recommendations for improving the interagency process, facts and assumptions relevant to the problem can be derived from the preceding historical analysis.

## **Facts:**

### **Congressional**

- Congress does not mandate who will be on the NSC staff, nor how the NSC process will be conducted.
- Congress has never mandated how presidents will “fix” their NSC staffs in the wake of foreign policy failure.

### **Executive Branch**

- Centralization of foreign policy planning and coordination (at the presidential level) has occurred as a result of strategic interagency failures.
- All incoming presidents have changed the prior administration’s NSC and NSC staff processes in an effort to improve the interagency coordination process.
- There are no executive branch mechanisms in place to ensure institutional memory during presidential administration or senior cabinet-level member turnover.
- Presidents influence the interagency process through decision directives that are meant to be permanent in nature but are usually discarded shortly after presidential turnover.
- No physical entity within the executive branch ensures information flow and planning coordination with all federal departments and agencies on a routine basis.

### **Interagency**

- The Director of National Intelligence has responsibility for collecting and analyzing information from the fifteen intelligence agencies within the federal government.
- Inter-departmental jealousies and turf wars have resulted from the loss or gain of power in every presidential administration since 1947.
- The federal departments and agencies do not have standardized inter-governmental planning processes.

### **NIACCG**

- The purpose of the proposed NIACCG is to focus on contingency planning in foreign lands.
- The proposed NIACCG does not change the potential dynamics of personality conflict and organizational culture issues (as discussed in Chapter 1).
- The proposed NIACCG coordinates some elements of the federal department infrastructure.

- The proposed NIACCG will be influenced by the NSC chair.

### **Assumptions:**

- The nature of transnational terrorism as described in the Introduction to this research paper will remain the same for the foreseeable future.
- All federal departments and agencies are potential contributors in determining and confronting transnational terrorism.
- Congress will not interfere with the presidential prerogative of running the NSC and NSC staff according to personal preference.
- Presidents will maintain the authority to manage NSCs and NSC staffs as they prefer.
- Standardization in interdepartmental information flow and planning is needed.
- For standardization to occur, interagency coordination training must be conducted on a consistent basis.
- Based on the nature of the threat (as described in the Introduction), all federal departments and agencies are potential contributors to national security.
- Unless approved and enforced by congressional legislation, all presidential directives focused on improving interagency operations will be temporary.

### **Courses of Action**

This section addresses proposals to improving interagency efficiencies. Three courses of action (COAs) are described and analyzed. The authors cited in the following paragraphs represent only a fraction of those students of government interested in improving interagency efficiencies. They are, nevertheless, representative of the approaches the vast majority of writers take. In the end, many find themselves recommending changes to presidential staff roles, adding bureaucratic layers in between the President and other departments and agencies within the executive branch, or advocating consistent lead agency primacy to a particular department.

The first course of action is the NSC Hybrid. This COA assimilates the concepts of those advocates who support structural changes to the NSC such as a new Secretary General for National Security, an Executive Branch Governing Board, a Department for National Security, or a National Interagency Contingency Coordination Group. These structures would then oversee other specific departments and agencies on the NSC, and be responsible for budgeting specific interagency activities. For the most part, these structural changes are legislated as part

of a new National Security Act. Additional aspects of the COA include redefining the role of the National Security Advisor and developing a Goldwater-Nichols type personnel system to man the new structural entities.

The second course of action posits the State Department as the lead agency for all foreign policy development, implementation, and budgeting oversight.

The third course of action establishes a bureaucratic entity known as the Strategic Interagency Coordination Center (STRIACC). This entity supports lead agencies by requesting and ensuring information flow relative to all interagency-focused plans.

### **COA 1 (NSC Hybrid)**

**Description.** Robert D. Steele sees three major federal departments dealing with national security—Defense, State, and Justice. He believes that there is no element on the National Security Council that has the necessary resources to marshal a mix of private and government sector capabilities “through which to achieve deep historical and cultural understandings” on national security issues.<sup>lx</sup> His recommendations include establishing the position of a congressionally approved Secretary General for National Security. Moreover, he would then place this Secretary General in charge of policy and resources over the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice.<sup>lxi</sup> The staff structure supporting the Secretary General’s office would be the baseline for institutional memory. Steele also suggests that whoever occupies the State Cabinet position be dual-hatted as the Secretary General for National Security.<sup>lxii</sup>

In a similar vein, Martin J. Gorman and Alexander Krongard recommend the passage of a 2005 National Security Act. The new Act would redefine the role of the National Security Advisor. The “...National Security Advisor should concentrate on providing separate and

independent advice to the President,”<sup>lxiii</sup> and relinquish the requirement to act as honest broker for the remainder of the NSC.

In addition, Gorman and Krongard recommend that the national security structure should be rebuilt with “a permanent executive or governing board, comprised of senior leadership from the departments and agencies...” in the executive branch.<sup>lxiv</sup> This board would provide the continuity needed to ensure institutional memory was not lost between and during presidential administrations. Similar to how the service chiefs sit on the JCS while retaining their service roles, “The board would allow for better policy formulation and strategy implementation by the executive branch...”<sup>lxv</sup> Theoretically, this would negate the conflict the National Security Advisor has when dual-hatted as an advisor to the President and honest-broker for others on the NSC. Gorman and Krongard also write that, at lower levels, the government should create joint-interagency focused organizations staffed by personnel from other government agencies and departments. Personnel would then rotate between their home organizations and the newly developed interagency bodies that resulted from the establishment of an interagency executive board.<sup>lxvi</sup>

Like Steele, Gorman and Krongard, author William A. Navas, Jr. argues that a new National Security Act should be passed establishing a Department of National Security. Similar in some ways to Steele’s construct, Navas’ new Department differs in that it includes DoD, State, CIA, Justice, Energy, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Additionally, Navas argues that since the NSC has taken so many forms over the past 50 years, “serious consideration should be given to the development of a new set of principles for the organization and functions of the NSC and the NSC staff.”<sup>lxvii</sup> He suggests that a Goldwater-Nichols type personnel policy

be introduced “...in order to avoid the inevitable parochialism and careerism associated with the current system of staffing NSC positions.”<sup>lxviii</sup>

Lastly, the idea of a National Interagency Contingency Coordinating Group (NIACCG) (as previously addressed in this paper) is incorporated into this COA. This entity follows other COA trends of attaching an overarching hierarchy to the NSC, thus constituting an NSC hybrid.

**Analysis.** There are benefits to this course of action. It modifies the NSC by incorporating an overarching hierarchy that establishes oversight of several disparate departments and agencies. As a result, continuity and institutional memory would improve and increase interagency efficiencies during presidential and other senior cabinet-level personnel turnovers. The development of a new overarching hierarchy position on the NSC also provides tasking authority to that new position. Budgeting of certain national security-related departments would be developed and tracked with greater efficiency.

Unfortunately, this COA has some drawbacks. First, while the NSC principals are mandated by Congress, there are no restrictions on the number of additional specialists and advisors the president can incorporate into NSC meetings. The president also has the same power over the NSC staff. Eisenhower’s NSC staff composition, for example, was about one-third military, one-third detailees from other government agencies, and one-third from outside the government.<sup>lxix</sup> Therefore, when Steele argues that a Secretary General for National Security is necessary because no one on the NSC has the power to marshal resources, he is in error. The President has this power. However, a Secretary General for National Security would alleviate continuous presidential responsibility to pull groups of specialists together.

Second, it is difficult to agree with Steele’s assumption that one Cabinet-level official overseeing the policy and resource issues of other cabinet-level officials, that is, State oversight

of DoD and Justice, would not result in the “turf wars” and personal balking that history has shown to be the case. In other words, nothing in his argument prevents the jealousies and rivalries from continuing to occur—other than, in the construct as Steele lays it out, there is one more element between the cabinet-level secretaries and the President.

In responding to Gorman and Krongard’s redefinition of the National Security Advisor’s role, it is an absolute presidential prerogative to define the role of the National Security Advisor. The NSA is part of the President’s personal staff. As such, the NSA advises the President if, when, and how the President desires. All presidents have understood the requirements to hear all perspectives, but history has shown that they also have their personal preferences. This preference, rightly or wrongly, has usually been based on those insights that generally agree with the President’s own line of thought. Telling the President what the role of his NSA should be is presumptuous.

Others would also disagree with Gorman and Krongard’s recommendation that the National Security Advisor’s role should be to provide separate and independent advice to the President. In the early years of the NSC, the role of the National Security Advisor was titled the “Executive Director.” Rear Admiral Sidney Souers was the first to fill the role. Upon his departure, he wrote to President Truman that the Executive Director’s role “...is not to sell the President an idea with which he [the Executive Director] is in sympathy, but rather to ensure that the views of all interested departments and agencies are reflected.”<sup>lxx</sup> Moreover, there are those who contend that Condoleeza Rice mismanaged the NSC and did not prepare President Bush for the foreign policy upheaval that has taken place since 9/11. Based on her closeness to the President, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage accused Rice’s NSC of being dysfunctional and not performing its traditional role as adjudicator among agencies.<sup>lxxi</sup>

There is also a problem regarding Gorman and Krongard's establishment of an executive branch governing board. First, their idea has certain parallels to the old Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) established during the Eisenhower administration. Like Gorman and Krongard's governing board, the charter of the old OCB was to "assist in coordinating execution and operations plans ...assigned to more than one agency."<sup>lxxii</sup> And similar to the OCB composition, Gorman and Krongard recommend that the executive branch governing board be staffed with high ranking personnel from other departments and agencies.<sup>lxxiii</sup> This would certainly support continuity of interagency processes between and during presidential administrations. However, as Eisenhower noted, since temporary appointees to the OCB came from departments and agencies (and would one day return to those same departments and agencies), they "...had an incentive to hew to their particular agency line in their dealings at the OCB."<sup>lxxiv</sup> In other words, creating a new layer of bureaucracy did not eliminate the baggage of parochialism that arrived with personnel coming in from other departments or agencies.

Beyond that, legal issues (although not the focus of this paper) may surround the establishment of a governing board. Again, during the Eisenhower administration, Attorney General Herbert Brownell convinced the President that the OCB "violated the statutes establishing the departments and agencies by placing the OCB in between them and the President."<sup>lxxv</sup> A new Department of National Security, as William Navas suggests, would certainly improve the institutional memory of some interagency activities. However, the same concern exists, as stated above, regarding functions of the NSC and NSC staff—namely, the diminishment of presidential prerogative. Also, as stated before, rotation of personnel throughout the NSC staff, or any newly developed staff beneath or parallel to the NSC staff, does not guarantee that parochial attitudes will not arrive with the incoming personnel. Labeling a

personnel requirement to fill interagency slots something similar to a Goldwater-Nichols type act does not negate the inter-departmental baggage with which these people arrive, and is tantamount to saying that military personnel filling joint slots will not carry service prejudices into their new positions. That simply is not the case.

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## **COA 2 (State Department)**

**Description.** Taking a somewhat different approach, the head of a recent State Department Reform Task Force, Frank Carlucci, argues that the primacy of the State Department should be reestablished as the interagency lead vis-à-vis all foreign policy development, implementation, and budgeting. Further, the Secretary of State should be the principal advisor to the President on all foreign affairs, not the National Security Advisor. For this to happen, Carlucci counts on the President to establish a mandate that reinforces State's foreign policy role. Elements of this mandate would be an interagency process headed by State. The President would engage the public and Congress on this matter, and "underscore to U.S. government agencies that their performance will, in large part, be measured by how enthusiastically they fulfill the reform initiatives."<sup>lxxvi</sup>

From a coordination of foreign policy perspective, Carlucci's argument invokes the historical greatness of the State Department.<sup>lxxvii</sup> It provides for a single federal entity to be in charge of foreign policy development and implementation, as well as continuity and institutional memory during presidential administration or Secretary of State turnovers.

**Analysis.** One positive aspect of this COA is that it provides for lead agency consistency in all foreign policy matters. As such, it would give State oversight of several disparate departments and agencies that are also consistently associated with foreign policy development

and implementation. Theoretically, this would also provide State with tasking authority. As a result, continuity and institutional memory would improve and increase interagency efficiencies during presidential and other senior Cabinet-level personnel turnovers. As the lead agency for foreign policy, State would have tasking authority over those departments and agencies attached to it for specific interagency operations. Budgeting, vis-à-vis those departments and agencies, would also be developed and tracked with greater efficiency.

However, implementing this COA would require overcoming several obstacles. Based on the propensity of presidents to centralize foreign policy, the issue for Carlucci may be getting the President on board to support the reemergence of State as a foreign policy lead. History has shown the President to take advantage of his prerogative to manage foreign policy from the top, especially during times of crisis. Beyond that, there is no guarantee that State's lead in foreign policy ensures that other federal departments and agencies would support the concept, even if the President did support it. Such was the case with the failed NSPD XX. Finally, this COA focuses on strengthening interagency activities related to foreign policy only, versus foreign and domestic policy. Based on the networking potential of terrorists and other transnational threats, lead agencies will have to cross-fertilize information on both domestic and foreign policy issues simultaneously.

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### **COA 3 (STRIACC)**

**Description.** An alternative approach to improving interagency unity of effort would be the establishment of a Strategic Interagency Coordination Center (STRIACC). This entity would not be an element of, or attached to, the National Security Council. It would be mandated by Congress as a coordination center for inter-departmental information and intelligence flow in

support of lead agency planning only. This entity would be seen as a strategic mechanism for requesting and moving information and intelligence trans-departmentally in a standardized manner.


This STRIACC's charter would include the establishment and standardization of information and intelligence flow and planning coordination across all federal departments and agencies. It would operate continuously and ensure that all deliberate and crisis action plans generated within the federal government were coordinated with all interagency elements associated with the plan. It would have tasking authority only in that it could demand inter-departmental information and intelligence flow and/or input into ongoing plans (in support of a lead agency). The STRIACC would be manned by civilians cleared for the level of security required, instead of detailees from other federal departments and agencies. It would not manage budgets because it would not have operational oversight over any other federal departments or agencies. To the extent possible, the STRIACC would be apolitical in nature and design.

The diagram in Figure 1 shows the movement of information with the STRIACC as the hub of the interagency planning support construct. Interagency movement of intelligence as stipulated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act is not affected by the STRIACC. However, all requests for information and intelligence by a lead agency, or planning coordination requirements directed by a lead agency, would be executed through the STRIACC.

**Analysis.** This COA provides for a common national security planning structure that establishes, standardizes, and enforces information and intelligence flow, planning standards, and coordination. Based on congressional mandate, this entity would establish the baseline standards through the reception and institutionalization of PDDs, NSPDs, and congressional input. Thus, it would not infringe upon presidential prerogative or NSC staff turf and would even reinforce

presidential directives currently in place. Therefore, no increased inter-departmental or agency rivalries would occur. Hiring from outside any established department or agency would also reinforce the elimination of organizational baggage that historically accompanies detailees. It would force the elimination of organizational cultural walls that hamper interagency information and intelligence flow, planning, and coordination. This would be especially advantageous during times of crisis action planning such as the near immediate requirements for unified pro-active or reactive global information operations. It would also improve planning cohesiveness as separate departments and agencies plan their operations in support of various national-level strategies. For example, DoD's effects-based planning will only be truly *strategically* effective if it is aligned with all other elements of national power. Finally, the construct allows departments and agencies to work plans that have roots in both domestic and foreign policies, for example, the Department of Homeland Security and DoD's USNORTHCOM.

A drawback to this COA is that it does not oversee budgets, as it is a coordination entity only. Therefore, it does not provide for the identification of financial expenditure redundancies.



**Figure 1**

Interagency Information and Intelligence Flow and Planning Coordination Construct

Squares = the primary federal department or agency

Circles = intelligence sections within the primary departments. Agencies with the primary mission of intelligence do not have separate intelligence sections.

Green lines = new DNI structure as stipulated in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (appears as thin lines in black and white version)

Red lines = required STRIACC channels for information and intelligence flow in support of lead agency planning (appears as thick lines in black and white version)

Dotted line = congressional oversight

## Comparative Analysis

This section compares the courses of action against a common set of evaluation criteria. It first defines the evaluation criteria that will be used in assessing the strength and weakness of each COA and then provides a comparison matrix to determine the best course of action.

### Evaluation Criteria

**Standardization.** Standardization is defined as the parameters within a fixed process through which all federal departments and agencies request information and build plans. By implication, it also includes a degree of institutional memory and continuity associated with interagency information and intelligence flow and planning. The greater the amount of standardization, the greater the advantage because less institutional memory is lost and interagency processes become more efficient. Less standardization is a disadvantage.

**Presidential Autonomy.** This criterion encompasses the President's freedom to operate as he prefers, as in the current system. The same amount of freedom that the President currently enjoys is an advantage because there is less bureaucracy between the President and the various departments or agencies with which he wants to deal directly. Autonomy allows for presidential guidance directly to the cabinet secretaries or agency directors. Again, history has shown that the President will consolidate foreign policy development at his level during times of crisis (such as the Cuban missile crisis). Less freedom is a disadvantage because there is more bureaucracy between the President and cabinet members.

**Interagency Rivalries.** Rivalries are the departmental or agency "turf wars" that result with the ebb and flow of departmental/agency influence. Because they can handicap interagency processes, fewer interagency rivalries are an advantage. An increase in interagency rivalries is a

disadvantage because the threat's capabilities transit the boundaries currently established and reinforced by interagency rivalries.

**Organizational Cultures.** This criterion refers to the organizational cultural mindset within separate departments and agencies that discourages interagency activities based on traditional historical practices or intra-departmental standard operating procedures. Less organizational cultural conflict is an advantage because it promotes interagency coordination. More organizational cultural conflict is a disadvantage.

**Information & Intelligence Coordination.** The capability to ensure planners and executors have the intelligence they need to plan is the essence of intelligence coordination. The greater the focused information and intelligence pooling capability, the greater the advantage. Less capability is a disadvantage.

**Budgeting.** For this research paper, budgeting is defined as the oversight that ensures funding is based on de-conflicted requirements by departments and agencies associated with national security. Budgeting involves testimony before Congress to justify policy goals, request funding, and reduce redundancies. More oversight ensures less redundancy and is, therefore, an advantage. Less oversight is a disadvantage.

Figure 2 shows a comparison matrix that assesses the different courses of action according to the evaluation criteria. The methodology assigns a qualitative value to the best course of action vis-à-vis the criteria. 1 is best. 2 is second best. 3 is last.

	Standardization	Presidential Autonomy	Interagency Rivalries	Organizational Cultures	Information & Intelligence Coordination	Budgeting	Totals
<b>COA 1</b> NSC Hybrid	2	3	2	2.5	2	1	12.5
<b>COA 2</b> State	3	2	3	2.5	3	2	15.5
<b>COA 3</b> STRIACC	1	1	1	1	1	3	8

\* Least is Best

Figure 2

### Matrix Reconciliation

**Standardization.** COA 3 is given the best score because the STRIACC establishes and enforces a standardized process of information and intelligence flow across all departments and agencies in the federal government. It also ensures the greatest amount of continuity and institutional memory during presidential administration or senior cabinet member turnover. COA 1 receives the second best score because standardization can only be applied to *some*

agencies that are consistently under the new overarching hierarchy attached to the NSC. COA 2 receives the lowest score because standardization would be inconsistent, with no habitually attached departments and agencies. Also, COA 2 allows for different standardization perspectives after senior cabinet member turnover.

**Presidential Autonomy.** COA 3 is given the best score because it affects the President's current relationship with the NSC and NSC staff process the least. COA 1 scores second best because of the proximity of the new overarching hierarchy to the president and the NSC. COA 2 scores lowest because foreign policy operations are furthest from presidential influence.

**Interagency Rivalries.** COA 3 is given the best score because this COA does not increase the potential for departmental or agency turf wars by increasing the power of one agency over another (or others), and eliminates cross-organizational concerns accompanying detailed personnel from other departments or agencies. COA 2 scores second best because interagency rivalries will *increase* when the State Department has lead agency designation. COA 1 establishes the primacy of one department over others, and, historically, this can lead to interagency rivalries.

**Organizational Cultures.** COA 3 scores best because this COA tasks (by congressional mandate) all departments and agencies to provide information to the STRIACC (which will then move the information forward to the appropriate department or agency). COAs 1 and 2 allow their hierarchies to task only some of the other federal departments or agencies.

**Information & Intelligence Coordination.** COA 3 scores best because it tasks the Director of National Intelligence as well as all federal departments and agencies to provide intelligence to a lead agency as required. COA1 scores second best because of proximity to the NSC staff and the DNI. COA 2 scores last because of its limited authority and scope.

**Budgeting.** COA 1 scores best because an overarching organization controls funding and can reduce redundancies. COA 2 has some oversight, but because of the temporary nature of the relationships between supporting agencies and the lead agency, its oversight is limited. COA 3 has no budget oversight.

## **Recommendations**

Based on the comparison matrix, COA 3 is the recommended course of action. This COA establishes a Strategic Interagency Coordination Center (STRIACC). This recommendation will enable the U.S. federal government to counter transnational threats more effectively because information and intelligence will flow trans-departmentally in a timely, standardized manner. Further, problems that have historically hampered the interagency process are eliminated. To implement COA 3, the following congressional actions and changes to the National Security Act of 1947 are necessary.

First, Congress must mandate the creation of the Strategic Interagency Coordination Center. The STRIACC charter would include establishing universal and standardized procedures for interagency information flow, intelligence, and planning. These procedures would include, at a minimum, department/agency planning alerts and notifications, information and intelligence flow formats, timelines, degree of planning content, planning deconfliction methodology, interagency planning performance standards, planning deficiency notifications, in-process reviews, plans dissemination processes, and relief from taskings. Specifically, the STRIACC would be responsible for:

- Establishing data bases/archives for presidential/congressional interagency directives.
- Receiving all executive, legislative, and judicial directives focused on interagency information and intelligence flow and planning.

- Ensuring all federal departments and agencies are updated with executive, legislative, and judicial directives.
- Ensuring government-wide dissemination of lead agency authority and intent.
- Ensuring government-wide comprehension of tasking requirements.
- Building continuity and institutional memory through interagency planning and information flow lessons learned.
- Coordinating (for the lead agency) short-term, long-term, and crisis action planning information and intelligence flow.
- Ensuring the lead agency receives all supporting department and agency information, intelligence, and plans.
- Conducting interagency training through information and intelligence flow and planning exercises.
- Conducting yearly reviews of interagency information and intelligence flow and planning operations in preparation for annual congressional review.
- Notifying the appropriate executive and/or legislative branch elements when violations of the mandate occur.

Second, Congress must decree that any federal department or agency receiving an executive or legislative directive from the STRIACC would be required to establish that directive as standing operational procedure until overridden by another directive from the STRIACC. Finally, Congress must enforce the STRIACC's mandate with yearly reviews of interagency information flow, planning standards, and training requirements set forth in executive and legislative directives.

In addition to the above recommendations pertaining to the STRIACC, the following modifications to the National Security Act of 1947 are suggested. First, the definitions in Section 3, [50 U.S.C. 401a] (4) of the National Security Act of 1947 should be amended as follows: Redefine the term "Intelligence Community" to include all intelligence elements (versus agencies) that fall within the purview of the Director of National Intelligence.

Second, the definition of the term “Joint” needs to be introduced into Section 3, [50 U.S.C. 401a] of the National Security Act of 1947, and redefined as follows: “Joint is that which “Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more *federal departments or agencies* participate.”<sup>lxxviii</sup> Furthermore, Titles II and III need to be modified. Section 201 of title II should include a “Definitions” paragraph to reinforce understanding of the term “Joint” as re-defined above. Title III, (Miscellaneous) Funding of Intelligence Activities, (4) (2) (e) (1), needs to include the specified intelligence gathering elements within specific federal departments or agencies that are networked within the larger national intelligence structure.

In addition, all sections (where appropriate) of the National Security Act of 1947 need to recognize the newly established Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Lastly, all sections of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act and all DoD publications need to redefine the term “Joint” as recommended above.<sup>lxxix</sup>

Interagency unity of effort is critical if the United States is to adapt to an evolving transnational, trans-networking threat. The proposed Strategic Interagency Coordination Center is an element of government that would ensure the movement of intelligence and information across the entire federal apparatus—resulting in timely, relevant, and comprehensive plans.

## Endnotes

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<sup>i</sup> John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys*, (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991), 29.

<sup>ii</sup> The National Security Act of 1947, Sec. 2. [50 U.S.C. 401].

<sup>iii</sup> Stephen R. Humphreys, Stephen R. *Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age*, (University of California Press, 1999), 261. As quoted by Martin Gorman and Alexander Krongard in their article *A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government: Institutionalizing the Interagency Process*, *Joint Force Quarterly*, 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter Issue, 2005, 52-53.

<sup>iv</sup> David Rothkopf, *Running The World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power* (New York: Perseus Books, 2005), 405.

<sup>v</sup> Gabriel Marcella, "National Security and the Interagency Process: Forward into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century", in *Organizing for National Security*, Douglas T. Stuart ed., (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2000), 171.

<sup>vi</sup> John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys*, 30.

<sup>vii</sup> As reprinted by Gabriel Marcella, *National Security and the Interagency Process: Forward into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, as printed in the Strategic Studies Institute book, *Organizing for National Security*, Stuart, Douglas T. ed, November 2000, 166.

<sup>viii</sup> See National Security Council statutes.

<sup>ix</sup> Changed from the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as a result of the 9/11 Commission.

<sup>x</sup> Booz-Allen & Hamilton, *Road Map for National Security*, United States Commission on National Security, 15 April 2001, Section II, 7.

<sup>xi</sup> I.M. Destler, as quoted by Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), 88-89.

<sup>xii</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>xiii</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>xiv</sup> The National Security Strategy is one example of a successful interagency effort. It is developed through an interagency process with the goal of providing a common language tool that gives coherence to strategic policy. But the interagency process ensures that the NSS is more than just a strategic document--it is also political "...because it is designed to enhance presidential authority in order to mobilize the nation." The staff not only coordinates the development and implementation of policy, it also "...brokers interagency agreements" and provides "...strategy recommendations directly to the National Security Advisor." See Gabriel Marcella, *National Security and the Interagency Process: Forward into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, as printed in the Strategic Studies Institute book, *Organizing for National Security*, Stuart, Douglas T. ed, November 2000, 176.

<sup>xv</sup> Harold Koh, *The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 166.

<sup>xvi</sup> Booz-Allen & Hamilton, *Road Map for National Security*, United States Commission on National Security, 15 April 2001, Section II, 11.

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- <sup>xvii</sup> Gabriel Marcella, *National Security and the Interagency Process: Forward into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 167.
- <sup>xviii</sup> *Ibid.*, 168.
- <sup>xix</sup> Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC*, 76.
- <sup>xx</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>xxi</sup> John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys*, 61-91.
- <sup>xxii</sup> *Ibid.*, 99-132.
- <sup>xxiii</sup> *Ibid.*, 442-444.
- <sup>xxiv</sup> See 9/11 Commission Report.
- <sup>xxv</sup> David Rothkopf, *Running The World*, 3.
- <sup>xxvi</sup> John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys*, 328-335.
- <sup>xxvii</sup> Rothkopf interview with Kissinger, 27 May 2004, David Rothkopf, *Running The World*.
- <sup>xxviii</sup> David Rothkopf, *Running The World*, 168.
- <sup>xxix</sup> *Ibid.*, 327.
- <sup>xxx</sup> David Rothkopf, *Running The World*, as reprinted in the Air War College Student Guide *National Security and Decision Making AY 06*.
- <sup>xxxi</sup> David Rothkopf, *Running The World*, 194.
- <sup>xxxii</sup> George Marshall, *Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol. 1, National Security Policy*, (Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 7 Feb, 1947), 712-713.
- <sup>xxxiii</sup> John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys*, 30.
- <sup>xxxiv</sup> Frank C. Carlucci, *State Department Reform: Task Force Report*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2001), 2.
- <sup>xxxv</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>xxxvi</sup> David Rothkopf, *Running The World*, 436.
- <sup>xxxvii</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 2004, 353.
- <sup>xxxviii</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.
- <sup>xxxix</sup> *Ibid.*, 263.
- <sup>xl</sup> Booz-Allen & Hamilton, *Road Map for National Security*, Section II, 5.
- <sup>xli</sup> President William Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive-2, (Washington DC: The White House) 1.
- <sup>xlii</sup> Booz-Allen & Hamilton, *Road Map for National Security*, Section II, p. 9

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<sup>xliii</sup> Booz-Allen & Hamilton, *Road Map for National Security*, Section II, 35. See also the Clinton analysis section in David Gergen's *Eyewitness to Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 251-342. Gergen points out the difficulty Clinton had as he adjusted from a state-governorship focus to a national-level focus.

<sup>xliv</sup> Booz-Allen & Hamilton, *Road Map for National Security*, Section II, 19.

<sup>xlv</sup> Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror*, (New York: Random House, 2003) 230.

<sup>xlvi</sup> Booz-Allen & Hamilton, *Road Map for National Security*, Section II, 37-38.

<sup>xlvii</sup> Problematic interventions in the early 1990s included Panama (1989-90), Somalia (1992-94), and Haiti (1994-95). In Somalia, for example, the political-military plan was so disjointed, that military forces were actually withdrawing while the political mandate was growing. See Binnendijk, Hans and Stuart Johnson, *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University Press, 2004), 20.

<sup>xlviii</sup> Gabriel Marcella, *National Security and the Interagency Process*, 180.

<sup>xlix</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>l</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>li</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>lii</sup> *Ibid.*, 181.

<sup>liii</sup> This point of “nobody in charge” is worth reinforcing because there is more to this than a “lead agency” fix. Lead agencies are designated as overall in charge in any given endeavor. But while one department may be given the lead, the organizational mindsets of the other departments or agencies may be completely disjointed from the lead agency in how they see the problem to begin with. The Department of Defense, for example, has a very set process to planning and executing operations. DoD develops Joint plans that are further refined throughout the department and geographical combatant commands. The effort, whether it has worked all the time or not, is to approach missions with a “soup to nuts” mindset. DoD deploys forces, fights wars, occupies nations, and redeploys forces.

<sup>liv</sup> Booz-Allen & Hamilton, *Road Map for National Security*, Section II, 56.

<sup>lv</sup> Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, (Washington, D.C: National Defense University Press, 2004), 109.

<sup>lvi</sup> Intelligence agencies/departmental intelligence sections consolidated within the new national intelligence directorate include the Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, CIA, Coast Guard, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, State Department, Department of Treasury, Department of Justice, the U.S. Marines, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, and the Navy.

<sup>lvii</sup> See President Bush speech referencing Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 17 December 04

<sup>lviii</sup> Secretary Powell's remarks before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 13 September 04

<sup>lix</sup> Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, (Washington, D.C: National Defense University Press, 2004), 110.

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<sup>lx</sup> Robert D. Steele, *Presidential Leadership and Nation Security Policymaking*, as printed in the Strategic Studies Institute book, *Organizing for National Security*, Stuart, Douglas T. ed., November, 2000, 253.

<sup>lxi</sup> *Ibid.*, 254-255.

<sup>lxii</sup> *Ibid.*, 262.

<sup>lxiii</sup> Martin J. Gorman and Alexander Krongard, *Institutionalizing the Interagency Process*, as reprinted in *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 39, 2005, 55.

<sup>lxiv</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>lxv</sup> *Ibid.*, 55.

<sup>lxvi</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>lxvii</sup> William A. Navas, Jr., *The National Security Act of 2002*, as printed in the Strategic Studies Institute book, *Organizing for National Security*, Stuart, Douglas T. ed, November, 2000, 241.

<sup>lxviii</sup> *Ibid.*, 242.

<sup>lxix</sup> John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991), 564.

<sup>lxx</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>lxxi</sup> David Rothkopf, *Running The World*, 436.

<sup>lxxii</sup> John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys*, 64.

<sup>lxxiii</sup> Martin J. Gorman and Alexander Krongard, *Institutionalizing the Interagency Process*, 55.

<sup>lxxiv</sup> John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys*, 64-65.

<sup>lxxv</sup> *Ibid.*, 64.

<sup>lxxvi</sup> Frank C. Carlucci, *State Department Reform: Task Force Report* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2001), 54.

<sup>lxxvii</sup> Carlucci also sees the State Department requirement to change its introverted organizational culture.

<sup>lxxviii</sup> This is a modification of the current term “joint”, defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as “Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.

<sup>lxxix</sup> In some cases, the current use of the term “Joint” would not be adjustable to the new, interagency definition. For example, the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee would have to be adjusted to read--the DoD Requirements Oversight Committee; the Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessments would have to be adjusted to read DoD Warfare Capabilities Assessments.

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