

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

DOING WINDOWS IN WANLAWEYAN?
YOUTH BULGES, CULTURE, AND GOVERNANCE
IN THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND STATES

by

Otto J. Rutt, LtCol, USMC

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

17 February 2006

[Cleared for public release]

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

Contents

Abstract	iv
List of Illustrations	v
Introduction	1
The Armed Conflict Debate	3
a. The Neo-Malthusians and Their Shortcomings	3
b. The Cultural Argument and Its Shortcomings	9
c. The Necessity of Good Governance	13
Analysis of Conflict Theory and Governance Quality	14
a. Youth Bulge Conflict versus Human Development as a Proxy of Governance	20
b. Youth Bulge Conflict versus Institutional Quality of Governance	24
c. Cultural Conflict versus Institutional Quality of Governance	26
d. Analytical Caveats	28
Bringing Governance to the Fore	29
a. Case Study: Youth Violence in France	29
b. Conflict and Economic Undercurrents	31
c. Governance Quality, Regime Type, and the CENTCOM AOR	33
CENTCOM Recommendations	38
a. High Quality Governance CENTCOM States	41
b. Medium Quality Governance CENTCOM States	42
c. Low Quality Governance CENTCOM States	48
Conclusion	50
Appendix	53
Appendix 1: Cross-section of Human Development, Youth Bulges and Conflict	53
Appendix 2: Recent Conflict Types	59
Appendix 3: Cross-section of Institutional Quality, Youth Bulges and Conflict	62
Appendix 4: Breakout of CENTCOM states	69
Bibliography	71

Abstract

The Afghanistan experience by itself, with the rise of the Taliban and al Qaeda, demonstrates that no state from the developed world was willing to do nation building. The armed conflicts that plague such lesser developed countries represent the nadir of disorder and their causes are intensely debated. The states within the United States' Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), such as Afghanistan, are under demographic, cultural, and political stress. Will the youth bulges, tribal disputes, or governmental malfeasance in these states precipitate armed conflict? This debate over the causes of armed conflict can be separated into three camps: the neo-Malthusian camp, the cultural camp, and, the governance camp. The neo-Malthusian camp argues that demographic stress leads to deprivation conflicts. The cultural camp argues that the tensions between ethnic or religious identities lead to conflict. The governance camp argues that the effectiveness of governing bodies will either succeed or fail at preventing armed conflict. This paper seeks to provide an analysis of these competing ideas and discuss their relative strengths. Research supports the good governance camp as predominant. Promoting good governance can be the basis of mutual security and threat reduction around the globe and especially within CENTCOM.

List of Illustrations

Figure 1: Henrik Urdal's Diagram of Youth Bulge Logic

Figure 2: Diagram of Youth Bulge Logic with Political and Economic Effects

Table 1: Cross Section of Human Development, Youth Bulges, and Conflict

Figure 3: Conventional Depiction of Conflicts Coincident with Youth Bulges

Figure 4: Youth Bulge Conflicts Relative to All States with Youth Bulges

Table 2: Cross Section of Institutional Quality, Youth Bulges, and Conflict

Table 3: Types of Conflict

Table 4: Cross Section of Institutional Quality and Ethnic Conflict

Figure 5: Human Development versus Regime Type

Figure 6: Institutional Quality versus Regime Type

Introduction

Following the expulsion of Soviet forces in 1989 the chief of the CIA's Afghan task force is attributed with coining the phrase, "superpowers don't do windows."¹ This phrase encapsulates why the US did not intervene in the ensuing tribal conflicts. Defense policy analyst, John Hillen turned that phrase into a strategic concept that decried "wasteful activism."² Wanlaweyn is just west of a city that is now synonymous for American and Western misapplied interventionism, Mogadishu. Be it Wanlaweyn in Somalia, or, Waziristan in the Pakistani-Aghani hinterland, remote global corners are now on the radar to stay. In a recent example, in Sankabar, a hamlet off the map in Ethiopia, the US Army installed a water pump to stave off a drought.³ The idea of whether to "do windows" or not seems a quaint, even distant, notion; yet, the debate continues with many proponents standing against involvement in populous far off lands embroiled in complex tribal conflicts.

"Doing windows" has another dimension not envisioned by the "superpowers don't do windows" proponents. Much earlier, in 1982, James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling authored the influential article, *Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety*⁴; its concept of removing the signs of community disorder led to innovative and effective approaches to reducing urban crime. The authors contend that disorder and crime are inextricably linked. Broken windows were one of the many visible signs of municipal neglect which became an implicit green light for criminals. In order to remove these symbols of disorder, police forces

¹ Jonathan Clarke, "Don't Keep U.S. Troops in Bosnia," *Los Angeles Times*, July 8, 1996.

² John Hillen, "Superpowers Don't Do Windows," *Orbis*, 00304387, Spring 1997, Vol. 41, Issue 2, 241-258.

³ Shashank Bengali, "Hearts and Minds," *Knight-Ridder Newspapers*, January 29, 2006.

⁴ James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety," *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 1982, Vol. 249, No. 3, 29-38.

concentrated on petty crimes such as graffiti and vandalism. The Broken Windows theory has been largely successful in the US, and can be seen as a vital part of good governance.

The Afghanistan experience by itself, with the rise of the Taliban and al Qaeda, demonstrates that nobody from the developed world was willing to “do windows.” Somalia remains a “broken window” and is just one of many examples. The armed conflicts that plague such countries represent the nadir of disorder and their causes are intensely debated. The states within the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), such as Afghanistan and Somalia, are under demographic, cultural, and political stress. Will the youth bulges, tribal disputes, or governmental malfeasance in these states precipitate armed conflict?

This debate over the causes of armed conflict can be more specifically classified into the following three camps: the neo-Malthusian camp, the cultural camp, and, the governance camp. The neo-Malthusian camp argues that demographic stress leads to deprivation conflicts. The cultural camp argues that the tensions between ethnic or religious identities lead to conflict. The governance camp argues that the effectiveness of governing bodies will either succeed or fail at preventing armed conflict. This paper seeks to provide an analysis of these competing ideas and discuss their relative strengths. Research supports the good governance camp as predominant. Governance properly executed can ameliorate or extinguish demographic stress, as well as class and culture conflicts. The Broken Window theory is a means to reducing local disorder and is not a panacea. It is also indicative of the level of governmental effort and effectiveness necessary to avoid the ills of failing states. Reducing local disorder is part of the larger strategic nation-building effort of “doing windows.” Exporting good governance is a daunting but achievable task; understanding how governments are good is essential to recognizing where

policies may be incomplete. In the 21st century, promoting good governance will be the basis of mutual security and threat reduction around the globe and especially within CENTCOM.

This main argument is divided into four chapters: the first chapter will present and debate each of the main theoretical camps; the second chapter will provide a statistical analysis of governance effects relative to youth bulge and cultural conflict; the third chapter highlights the dimensions of governance quality through a recent case study from violence in France, a discussion of economic undercurrents and analysis on the interaction of regime type; the fourth chapter focuses on recommendations for CENTCOM.

The Armed Conflict Debate

a. The Neo-Malthusians and Their Shortcomings

Thomas Malthus was an 18th century English clergyman who theorized in a seminal piece of economic science that populations outgrow the capacity to support themselves and thereafter distress and disaster ensue.⁵ His theory was soundly repudiated when the Industrial Revolution expanded societies' capacity and relieved population stress. Further on, developing societies also went through "demographic transition"⁶ whereby population growth rates slowed to replacement levels as income levels rose. Thus, as societies developed, the Malthusian theory in its original historical form was repudiated on two accounts: productive capacities increase and population growth rates decline.⁷ However, Malthusian thought has been resilient. Neo-Malthusian theory frequently finds its way into contemporary research wherever distress and conflict are argued to be coincident with a large population and scarcity.

⁵ Thomas Robert Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population: A View of its Past and Present Effects on Human Happiness; with an Inquiry into Our Prospects Respecting the Future Removal or Mitigation of the Evils which It Occasions*, sixth edition, (London: Pub. John Murray, 1826).

⁶ Oded Galor and David N. Weil, "Population, Technology, and Growth: From Malthusian Stagnation to the Demographic Transition and Beyond," *The American Economic Review*, September 2000, Vol. 90, No. 4, 806.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 806.

The current logic of neo-Malthusian thought holds that urban areas around the globe are over-populated with unemployed, poor, and disaffected young males who are ripe candidates for conflict. The term youth bulge wraps up all the negative aspects of population growth and urbanization in one term and is a virtual restatement of Malthus's theory. The negative consequences of a youth bulge are thought to be a host of ills, of which, armed conflict, civil war, and terrorism predominate. The state itself then comes under siege, threatening regional stability.

One contemporary work that overtly incorporates neo-Malthusian thought is Robert Kaplan's *Warrior Politics*.⁸ Kaplan is an avowed neo-Malthusian whose arguments have found an ear in the past at CENTCOM. He admits that Malthusian theory is wrong in its historical setting; yet, he holds that a race exists between population growth and capacity growth which still confounds modern society. Kaplan concludes that "for our ecosystem to survive and prosper, certain limits to growth should be observed; limits that Malthus was the first to recognize."⁹ Kaplan does not discuss the self-limiting effect of demographic transition. He mentions governmental malfeasance and ethnic tensions but in a contributory sense only, not as a prime source of failure. For Kaplan, if the aim is to avoid conflict, then population growth rates must be held in abeyance.

Another example of neo-Malthusian thought in modern research is Population Action International's *The Security Demographic*.¹⁰ The authors conclude that population stress is a direct cause of civil conflict. This work is a modern restatement of Malthus. The authors cite

⁸ Robert D. Kaplan, *Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos*, (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2002), 88-95. Kaplan met with then CENTCOM commander, Gen. Anthony Zinni, CENTCOM officers, and resident scholars; Kaplan parses here saying that they do not dispute the relevancy of such trends (p. 89).

⁹ *Ibid.*, 95.

¹⁰ Richard P. Cincotta, Robert Engelman, and Daniele Anastaion, *The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Population Action International, 2003).

four demographic stress factors. Number one is the youth bulge effect, followed by urban growth, then the scarcity of natural resources, and lastly the workforce depleting effects of HIV/AIDS. Like Kaplan, their contention has to do with the speed with which societies change. They contend that demographic stressors need to be controlled prior to free market reforms, otherwise uneven growth will cause conflict.

If one adheres to the conventional notions that highly dense urban areas filled with uneducated and unemployed youth are destined to cause civil conflict, then it is logical that policies stressing full-employment and population control are appropriate. For instance, in *The Security Demographic* (in which most CENTCOM states are recognized by the authors as *at risk*) the authors posit four recommendations:

1. Promote demographic transition, the progress of populations from high to low rates of birth and death.
2. Help make access to reproductive health services easier for refugees, civilians in post-conflict environments, and all military personnel.
3. Support improvements in the legal, educational and economic status of women.
4. Make demography part of the analysis.¹¹

These recommendations stress lowering the population as opposed to focusing directly on how these states might be failing at their governance tasks.

The foremost common thread in neo-Malthusian thought is the idea that populations grow to exceed the resources to support them, and that this condition is the primary cause of conflict. Populations are invariably and primarily seen as threats to stability. Populations are not seen as sources of labor, innovation, or political development. Another thread is that, in order to avoid distress, populations need to be contained. This leads to the idea that any policy that might contribute to population growth, such as economic expansion, will exacerbate the problem. The foundational implication of neo-Malthusian thought is that the human race cannot escape its

¹¹ Cincotta, Engelman, and Anastaion, 15-16.

primordial nature to over-procreate and kill. One does not have to believe in the perfectibility of man in order to counter these contentions

Neo-Malthusian thought is faulty for a number of reasons. Recent history possesses numerous examples of countries and cities that are bulging with unemployed disaffected youth; yet, the supposedly unavoidable or inextricably connected existential crises of rampant crime and armed conflict are absent. For example, the populations of China and India are projected to grow to 1.4 billion and almost 1.3 billion respectively by 2020¹²; yet, these rapidly urbanizing countries have been successful at keeping domestic stress in check in the face of both population growth and economic progress. In the original 18th century setting of Thomas Malthus the growth in productivity of the Industrial Revolution put to rest the idea that a society's productive capabilities are limited. In today's post-industrial world a society's productive capability is still not limited. Thomas Friedman's *The World is Flat*¹³ describes in detail how cities in China and India are exploiting technology to transition out of agrarian and industrial economies into modern competitive service economies. Thus, the argument is still weak in the contemporary world that population growth and urbanization will outstrip a society's carrying capacity.

Additionally, youth bulge as a determinant of crisis and conflict is also on shaky ground with regard to numbers, motivation, and mechanisms. Regarding numbers, it does not take a large centralized population to fill the ranks of insurgencies. That is, insurgencies are effective and viable even as small organizations. For example, one of Pakistan's most violent groups, the Sipah-i-Shaba (SSP), has about 5, 000 combatants.¹⁴ That is a relatively small number operating

¹² National Intelligence Council, *Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project*, NIC 2004-13, December 2004, 47.

¹³ Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*, (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), esp. 371-391.

¹⁴ Christine C. Fair, *Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), 110. The Sipah-i-Sahaba (SSP) in Pakistan has an estimated 3,000-6,000 members. [The population of Pakistan is 161 million. (from *The Security Demographic*, p. 100)]

within the numerous million-plus cities in that populous country. These groups simply do not need to mobilize large numbers of so-called disaffected youth. Thus, it is unclear whether having excessive numbers of such youth actually worsens the issue. With regard to the motives of individual terrorists and insurgents, it is not at all clear that employment or education decrease the likelihood of joining these groups. Usama bin Laden and Mohammed Atta are the archetypal examples of the educated terrorist. Also, given the psychological incentives and foreign funding of insurgency organizations, it is equally unclear that an insurgency member would put down his rocket-propelled grenade the day he found gainful employment. For example, Pakistan's unemployment rate from 1989 to 2004 ranged from five to seven percent¹⁵, which clearly is not excessive. Additionally, disaffection is often cited as a primary mechanism that incites conflict, but this should provoke skepticism. Given the sketchy logic that being poor, unemployed, and uneducated leads to a disaffected condition susceptible to extremist acts, and given the small numbers of personnel required to get into the insurgency business, this would imply a lot more violence in the world. The fact that CENTCOM states have a youth bulge demographic is undeniable; the numbers are clear. The implications, though, of that youth bulge are continually misread which in turn leads to misplaced policy.

Popular works such as *Warrior Politics* and *The Security Demographic* endorse controlling population growth and promulgating demographic transition. But, demographic transition presupposes economic development and rising incomes; these in turn are both heavily dependent upon good governance, and not dependent upon population control. Failing states will not achieve demographic transition. Full-employment efforts, through either domestic policy or international aid, without regime transformation do additional harm by perpetuating

¹⁵ Shahruckh Rafi Khan, *Pakistan's Economy under the Military Government (1999-2004): Has There Been Real Progress?* [Paper, conference on "The Economics and Politics of Pakistan's Development," organized by The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University, November 8, 2004], 19.

bad governance. International aid efforts depend upon governmental expenditures and oversight. As such, aid requires time to work and a government committed to the success of these efforts. Unfortunately, aid until recently has had little success at holding governments accountable. Aid without accountability entrenches existing bad governance practices.

It is important to understand the shortcomings of neo-Malthusian arguments because of their negative effect on policy. Neo-Malthusian thought focuses on the demographic aspects of societal stress. This shifts focus away from the institutional causes that lead to armed conflict. Population stress gets attention, as opposed to the mechanisms that push stress into conflict, such as the ill effects of kleptocratic, repressive, and failing regimes. This is very much akin to treating the symptoms and not the disease. This may lead to inconsequential or even adverse policies. Additionally, demographics can be irrelevant, as in some cultural conflicts, such as the fighting between Serbs and Croats.¹⁶ Neo-Malthusian theory, though, finds its way into statements of popular authors, such as these examples:

“...wallers, or underemployed young men...disfranchised urban youth are prime recruits for terrorist groups.”¹⁷

“(A) youth bulge...in combination with urbanization, lack of education and high unemployment, is usually a recipe for social unrest.”¹⁸

Such statements contain the essence of Malthusian theory; a society is outstripping its capacity. The statements above beg the questions: Why aren't the numerous disenfranchised urban youth prime recruits for moderate political groups? And, will universal education and full employment reduce the threat of armed conflict? Employment and education can reduce grievances, but this effect is dependent upon opportunity. Indeed, the educated can be as aggrieved as the

¹⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 261.

¹⁷ Thomas P.M Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*, (New York, NY: The Berkely Publishing Group, 2004), 291. It is anomalous that Barnett's work, which I clearly push into the good governance camp, contains a slice of neo-Malthusian thought.

¹⁸ Shephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004), 233.

uneducated.¹⁹ Good governance is the necessary and sufficient condition to ensure access to economic opportunity and political voice. Good governance must provide the security and legal foundation first in order to foster commercial enterprise and human development. These are important issues for the CENTCOM AOR because of the complexity and scope of possible responses to the problems facing its twenty-seven component states.

Thomas Malthus's work was an exceptional piece of economic thought in its time; however, the conditions for the repudiation of his theory are still in existence. Increases in productivity and human capital solved the Malthusian trap; investments in these areas continue unabated. Unfortunately, where Malthusian conditions exist today, governments have been the impediment to investing in productivity or human capital. Similarly, where cultural conflict occurs today, governments have either been complicit or negligent.

b. The Cultural Argument and Its Shortcomings

The logic of overcrowding and resource scarcity causing conflict carries a lot of appeal because these are experiences to which everyone can relate; squatters infringing upon property rights, or, ghettoized poverty-stricken urban areas, or, newsreel footage of famine refugees are universally recognized as stressful scenarios that lead to drastic or opportunistic behavior. An equally appealing theory is that of culture causing conflict. Prejudice against the "other" or the "outsider" is a universal experience. Everyone knows of, recognizes in themselves, or, has experienced first hand an association to a cultural group and a fear or threat from a different group. The very nature of being different can be easily understood as causing competition, tension, and conflict.

¹⁹ Henrik Urdal, *The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950-2000*, *The World Bank Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction*, Paper No. 14, July 2004, 3-4.

Samuel Huntington²⁰ is the leading theorist who has popularly established the idea that culture is now a separate and primary force that contributes to armed conflict around the globe. Culture contributes to conflict due to the severe frictions that exist between competing civilizations. Cultural conflict can occur independently of governance effectiveness and resource scarcity. But, Huntington also states that cultural conflict depends to a significant degree upon the mobilization of a youth bulge, especially within the Islamic world.²¹ Huntington thus cites culture as the prime motivation, and demography as the means to exploit cultural friction. Cultural friction, additionally, often aggravates bad governance and exacerbates scarcity.

Daniel Pipes, an Islamic specialist, is another example of a theorist whose voluminous work is deeply enmeshed with investigating cultural causes of competition and conflict. Pipes, who founded the think tank Middle East Forum and publishes the *Middle East Quarterly*, states that the culture of radical Islamist fundamentalism has declared war; their enemies are the regimes in the Muslim Holy Land viewed as apostasy and their infidel supporters in the West.²² Thus, it is the culture of radical Islamism that seeks through armed conflict to reverse the integrative effects of the globalizing world. Pipes is an example of an author who specifically seeks to answer conflict issues by investigating cultural phenomenon; in Pipes's case, his focus is the Middle East which contains many of the CENTCOM states.

Huntington is pessimistic about the palliative possibilities of interactions between differing cultures; civilizations are power centers that compete more than they cooperate. As

²⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

²¹ *Ibid.*, 102-121.

²² Janet Tassel, "Militant about 'Islamism:' Daniel Pipes wages 'hand-to-hand' combat with a 'totalitarian ideology,'" *Harvard Magazine*, January-February, 2005, 38-47

such, civilizational competition risks armed conflict with the inevitable power shifts that occur.²³

Pipes is more optimistic; he welcomes cooperation between cultures:

“Islamism is a scourge, a global affliction whose victims include peoples of all religions, [but] Muslims are the main casualties....Moderate Muslims who wish to live modern lives, unencumbered by burqas, fatwas, and violent versions of jihad, are on the defensive and atomized. They must be helped: celebrated by governments, publicized in the media, given grants by foundations.”²⁴

Both though recognize the incendiary realities when radical ideas are uncontrolled. Such conflict though is not destiny; indeed it may be better to accentuate culture than to deny it. The idea of cultural differences being an asset, and other counters to cultural conflict, is the subject of the next section.

Culture, like population, is often overlooked as a resource, and is instead primarily viewed as a source of friction. There are three main criticisms of globalization: it is insensitive to cultural differences; it exploits poverty stricken masses; or, it is Western economic imperialism. But, when states find themselves unable to compete in commerce through service, manufacturing, or commodities industries, they will necessarily have to add value through their distinctive cultures. Thereby, societies may add value by being different; instead of friction, culture becomes value. For instance, interconnectedness can raise the value of Arabic literature, or, sub-Saharan tribal art, or, Chinese calligraphy, or, Hindu statuary. Obviously, these are single examples of infinite possibilities and much commerce already exists in these areas. Tourism, one of the largest global industries, is another example of inter- and intra-cultural opportunities that are to date relatively unexploited. But, the point is that unique cultures provide as much potential for value as they do for conflict. While these opportunities may not lessen some intense intra-cultural conflicts, they may lessen many conflicts between cultures.

²³ Huntington, 312-313.

²⁴ Tassel, 41.

Intense religious conflicts, such as the Sunni-Shia conflict throughout the Islamic world or the Catholic-Protestant conflict in Northern Ireland, depend upon ecumenical dialogue for relief. In contrast, inter-cultural frictions, such as that between the Western and Arab worlds, can be lessened when cultural differences are sources of value. It is clear that Huntington finds the value-added part of cultural differences to be outweighed by the frictional aspects. Pipes though would be more inclined to leverage culture. Thus, just as there are contrasting opinions between two leading civilization theorists as to the solubility of cultural animosities, popular opinion is similarly divided between an irrevocable pessimism, and a qualified but determined optimism.

Cultural conflicts internal to a state can be assuaged in one of two ways: through the protection of minority political rights or through the prevention of conflict by physical security. Legislating minority rights and ensuring universal access to the political process lessens a source of conflict between societal groups. Providing physical security through an effective constabulary also lessens the opportunity for conflict. Both involve a robust government that is effective at providing those political goods, access and security. Let there be no doubt as to the difficulty in providing those goods, but also, there can be no doubt that several states have successfully quelled internecine conflict. The Catholic and Protestant conflict in Northern Ireland is an example of a severe cultural conflict that was contained first by security and later through security and political action. Saddam Hussein offers an example of effective security through repression in quelling (as well as exploiting) the Sunni-Shia conflict in Iraq. Securing minority rights can lessen this conflict in the new Iraq; the political process is making significant gains.

Governance is the common theme to reducing the threats of deprivation conflict or cultural conflict; this is the subject of the next section.

c. The Necessity of Good Governance

Governments are effective and legitimate when they successfully perform the numerous tasks that constitute political goods. Defining good governance though is not an easy task. Robert Rotberg is a proponent for strengthening governance; he strongly argues for not only identifying but quantifying governance quality. His list of political goods includes:²⁵

1. security;
2. rule of law;
3. access to politics and the political process;
4. medical and health care;
5. schools and educational instruction;
6. roads, railways, harbors, and airports—the physical arteries of commerce;
7. communications networks;
8. a money and banking system, usually presided over by a central bank and facilitated by a nationally or regionally created currency;
9. a beneficent fiscal and institutional context within which citizens can pursue personal entrepreneurial goals and potentially prosper;
10. a political and social atmosphere conducive to the emergence and sustainability of civil society;
11. and, a fully articulated system for regulating access to the environmental commons.

The choices that governments make in delivering political goods determine whether or not their countries fall prey to conditions that get characterized as Malthusian. A famine coincident with a civil war is an example where Malthusian thought usually focuses on the symptom (over-population) and not the disease (failed government). It becomes apparent that security is only the first step to providing the critical mass of political goods necessary for a state to become a productive member of the international community.

Good governance can counter the negative forces of demographic stress. Good governance is the foundation that reverses the possibilities of Malthusian crisis. Disenfranchised youth become franchised through access to opportunity and access to the political process. Neo-

²⁵ Robert I. Rotberg, Strengthening Governance: Ranking Countries Would Help, *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2004-5, 28:1, 71-81.

Malthusians posit that economic opportunity is limited and that the masses are inherently combative. Enterprise, employment, and education though rise through pro-growth policies and social investments. These priorities are secondary to neo-Malthusians. When states climb in human development and institutional quality the risk of armed conflict subsides. History is replete with examples of what works and what doesn't work. Barnett's *The Pentagon's New Map* and Friedman's *The World is Flat* illustrate numerous examples where policies that foster progress are not threatened by supposedly excessive population.²⁶ An underappreciated aspect of an urbanized population is that governance is more immediate through direct lines of communication. Security, justice, opportunity, and social investment can all be aided by having a readily available population resource. Supplying political goods can transform an urbanized population from a threat into a resource. When populations become resources instead of threats, the risk of armed conflict is lowered. The investigation will now proceed with an in-depth analysis of research and data on conflicts and their interplay with governance quality, population, and culture.

Analysis of Conflict Theory and Governance Quality

To summarize, the three competing theories in this paper that seek to explain the foundation of contemporary armed conflict are:

1. Neo-Malthusian theory which argues that demographic stress inherently exceeds the capabilities of a state to reduce conflict,
2. Cultural conflict theory which argues that historical group identities exist that pit aggrieved groups against one another, and,
3. Good governance theory which argues that effective and legitimate government can directly prevent conflict, or, lessen the reasons for conflict.

²⁶ Barnett's section, "The Military-Market Link" (193-205), and Friedman's chapter, "The Virgin of Guadalupe" (309-336), discuss growth strategies for lesser developed countries that do not include population control efforts.


The overarching structure of the following analysis will be to examine if qualitative governance effects can be imputed within all states in recent history with regard to the incidence of armed conflict. The analysis first discusses how researchers have approached neo-Malthusian theory and how it can be understood for states as they exist today. The purpose of this preliminary discussion is to establish how states today can be considered to be in one of three phases of development: Malthusian, transitional, or modern. The analysis then uses a statistical approach. States are divided into high, medium, and low governance quality categories; also, two measures of quality are used, human development and institutional quality. Governance quality is then examined in two ways; in the first case, governance is compared against both youth bulges and total conflicts; in the second case, governance is compared cultural conflicts.

A significant challenge to isolating these effects is the fact that only demography lends itself readily to numerical data. Youth bulges are easily identifiable; good governance and cultural friction are harder to quantify. This may explain the resiliency of Malthusian thought in that correlations of population density and conflict are easily measured but the means to escape the Malthusian trap are harder to isolate. It is easy to recognize a large youth cohort and armed conflict, but it is more difficult to analyze the change over time that captures the essence of technological progress and demographic transition. The concept of youth bulge violence is immediate, visceral, and easily understood. Cultural issues are less obvious, deep seated, and only understood with difficulty. Governance, though, is the most complex because it involves the long list of political goods, a durable openness to progress and generational investments in human capital.

One author whose work both confirms and refutes the connection of youth bulges to armed conflict is Henrik Urdal. His work, *The Devil in the Demographics*, concludes that youth

bulges are significantly related to armed conflict for the Cold War period, but not related for the post-Cold War period.²⁷ His model below (taken from *The Devil in the Demographics*) is representative of youth bulge logic:

Figure 1: Henrik Urdal’s Diagram of Youth Bulge Logic



Urdal does incorporate the effects of regime type, describing how entrenched autocracies and mature democracies are relatively conflict free and he also measures levels of economic opportunities. But, missing from his analysis are discussions of government effectiveness. As Urdal states:

“Population growth and a young age structure can be both a blessing and a curse. In a more optimistic perspective than the theoretical framework offered in this study, youth bulges can be regarded as an increased supply of labor that can boost an economy. This could further be expected to reduce conflict propensity. I do not dismiss this possibility, but structural aspects of the economy will probably determine the magnitude of this indirect effect.”

Urdal’s discussion of the interplay of labor supply and market structure is clearly a statement of the necessity to consider political goods, such as listed by Rotberg. The figure below shows Urdal’s model which is modified²⁸ to include employment opportunities and political mobilization. As such, it shows a more advanced example that would capture some of the effects of good governance:

²⁷ Urdal, 3, 16.

²⁸ Urdal’s model is modified by the author.

Figure 2: Diagram of Youth Bulge Logic with Political and Economic Effects



The difficulty in understanding the relationship between population and conflict over time has to do with the difficulty in measuring the effects of good governance and the transitory phase by which states begin to enter demographic transition. States today (as they have in history; as I will discuss below) can be seen as being in one of three phases in their development: Malthusian, transitional, or modern.

In the Malthusian phase, states are trapped due to governmental incapacity or malfeasance. They have yet to enter demographic transition, therefore their population and growth does possess the cyclic characteristics of expansion and distress as described by Malthus. Their populations rise quickly with technological progress, but the state does not take the necessary steps to break the boom and bust Malthusian cycle. Breaking into the transitional phase requires investing in human capital, which in turn requires long term good governance.

In the transitional phase, states are sufficiently effective in delivering political goods to raise the returns to human capital. These states then enter demographic transition; incomes rise and population growth rates begin to slow. In the later half of the 20th century, many states were not only transitioning in terms of technological progress and government effectiveness, but were

also transitioning in terms of regime type as well. Democracy was resurgent in the post-World War II years, but states not wholly democratic or autocratic are more prone to political turmoil. As such, the rise of democracy came with a vulnerability to conflict. Thus, a state can be in the beginning stages of demographic transition and the intermediary stages of political change. Armed conflict can now have two sources: Malthusian-like deprivation conflict due to governmental malfeasance, or, political conflict due to the vulnerability of regimes between autocracy and democracy. Cultural conflicts reflect competing political groups within states with ineffective or transitioning governments.

States in the modern phase have emerged out of demographic transition and thus do not experience Malthusian stress. These states are predominantly democratic, highly capable of delivering political goods, have rising incomes, and steady (or falling) populations. Modern states though are not completely exempt from cultural friction but the incidence on armed conflict is lower than states in other phases due to relative levels of development and the abilities to assuage conflict.

Oded Galor and David Weil have described how these phases have occurred over time in historical terms.²⁹ They describe the process of economic development as: the “Malthusian Regime,” the “Post-Malthusian” regime, and the “Modern Growth Regime.” The difference between the phases described by Galor and Weil, and the phases that I list is the idea of placement in time. Galor and Weil describe these phases as part of European economic history. For an idea of the length of time it took history to get to the Modern Growth Regime, it took Western Europe over 1400 years to get well into demographic transition. My contention is that these phases exist simultaneously throughout the world today, and that this dynamic is complicated by the additional phenomenon of political regime change (i.e., the growth of

²⁹ Galor and Weil, 806.

democracy in the last half of the 20th century³⁰). Thus, lesser developed states have Malthusian characteristics. Transition states look like Malthusian states due to the mixed nature of demographic transition possibly combined with political upheaval. These states today (as opposed to the rise of Western Europe) though have the overwhelming advantage of having global neighbors well into the modern state. Modern states are free to export to lesser developed states every capability that took them a millennium to attain. Something is holding these states back in history. Bad governance is the most likely suspect.

To summarize for the sections that follow: states in the Malthusian phase are ineffective and mostly autocratic; states in the transitional phase are moderately effective and may be either autocratic, democratic, or somewhere in between; states in the modern phase are effective and mostly democratic.

In order to gauge the relationship between governance and conflict, two data sources will be utilized. The first source is used as a proxy for good governance; the United Nations' *Human Development Index*.³¹ The report ranks 177 countries based upon the measured statistics of life expectancy, literacy, education, and GDP. The index carries the objective weight of history in the sense that a state's ranking reflects the results of the respective government's quantitative effect on its population. For example, life expectancy is a scientifically measured physical effect with an assumed relationship to governmental effectiveness. The other data source is the World Bank survey on governance.³² The survey ranks 203 countries based upon six different categories: political stability, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory

³⁰ Carles Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 66-71.

³¹ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2005*, September 7, 2005, <http://hdr.undp.org/>. Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia, and Somalia are not included in the report; these countries were assumed to be in the low human development group, have a youth bulge, and have a recent conflict.

³² The World Bank Group, *Public Governance Sector: Indicators of Governance and Institutional Quality*, May, 2005, <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/indicators.htm>.

quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. While this data source is not a proxy and seeks to measure governance directly, it is a large survey of qualitative perceptions; as such its data, however large, is ultimately subjective.³³ For example, rule of law is a perceived condition that is directly attributable to governmental effectiveness. The next section provides the analysis of human development as a grade of governmental effects compared to all conflicts with analysis of youth bulge effects.

a. Youth Bulge Conflict versus Human Development as a Proxy of Governance

The Security Demographic portrays the youth bulge phenomenon as the most serious cause of stress; the authors cite the association of young people and violence as “among the best documented in the literature on population and conflict.”³⁴ This picture though is incomplete. The following analysis seeks to examine the relationship between demography, conflict, and governance across all countries as opposed to narrowing the focus on where conflict occurs and then examining demographic effects. It is important to look at not only where conflict occurs, it is equally important to look where conflict does not occur.

Initially, the neo-Malthusian argument appears to be robust. When the incidence of demographic stress from the data in *The Security Demographic*, is compared to the levels of human development from the data in the UN report, there is a clear relationship; as demographic stress increases human development decreases. The twenty-five most demographically stressed countries³⁵ are also at the bottom of human development³⁶. From a Malthusian perspective, this

³³ World Bank: “These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 different organizations.”
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4.html>

³⁴ Cincotta, et al., 42. Youth bulges, the proportion of young adults 15-29 years old to all adults, above 40% are cited as high demographic stress conditions.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 74.

³⁶ UNHDR, 139-142.

is to be expected: excess population theoretically retards progress. But from a different perspective, if human development is viewed as an indicator of governance quality (as shown in Appendix 1), we find that as governance quality improves both demographic stress and the incidence of armed conflict decline:

Table 1: Cross Section of Human Development, Youth Bulges, and Conflict

High Human Development Countries (effective governments)

57	total states		
3	states with a youth bulge	5%	youth bulge percentage
3	states with recent conflict	5%	conflict percentage
0	coincidences of youth bulges and conflict	0%	coincidence percentage

Medium Human Development Countries (moderately effective governments)


88	total states		
61	states with a youth bulge	68%	youth bulge percentage
25	states with recent conflict	28%	conflict percentage
14	coincidences of youth bulges and conflict	56%	coincidence percentage

Low Human Development Countries (ineffective governments)

36	total states		
36	states with a youth bulge	100%	youth bulge percentage
19	states with recent conflict	53%	conflict percentage
19	coincidences of youth bulges and conflict	100%	coincidence percentage

If you merely look at the totals in this basic analysis, the data appear to bear out the youth bulge conflict logic: globally, a majority of countries have youth bulges within their borders (55% of the total countries), and, of the total 48 recent conflicts since 1995, 33 occurred in the presence of a youth bulge (69%). Figure 3 shows how looking at only where armed conflict has occurred and then examining the demographic circumstances might lead to the conclusion that youth bulges were a dominant characteristic of organized violence.


Figure 3: Conventional Depiction of Conflicts Coincident with Youth Bulges



But once you factor in governmental effects (by examining the data from low human development to medium human development), the youth bulge effect drops significantly: the incidence of conflict drops almost in half (46%), and, the coincidence of a conflict which occurred in the presence of a youth bulge also drops (44%). If you consider low human development versus the combined group of medium and high development (that is, comparing ineffective government versus effective government), then the incidence of conflict drops from 53% to 20% (a 62% drop). The incidence of conflict with a youth bulge drops from 100% (19 conflicts, all of which were in the presence of a youth bulge) to 48% (29 conflicts, only 14 of which were in the presence of a youth bulge).

Additionally relevant to the discussion of demography, the youth bulge phenomenon is predominant throughout the low and medium human development groups (77%), yet virtually absent within the high development group (5%). Thus, if the youth bulge logic of conflict were more robust we would expect a considerably higher amount of organized violence. Yet, of the countries with youth bulges, only a minority had recent conflicts (only 33 conflicts among 99 youth bulge countries; 35%). Figure 4 depicts this minority relationship and shows the possible magnitude of governance effects.

Figure 4: Youth Bulge Conflicts Relative to All States with Youth Bulges



If the youth bulge dynamic to armed conflict is robust then some other force is dominating that effect in the majority of countries. Data from Table 1 indicates that governance quality is correlated with reducing demographic stress and armed conflict; thus, governance effects appear to dominate the youth bulge effect.

An examination of the criteria on which the UN human development report is based supports using it as a proxy of governance quality:

1. Life expectancy at birth
2. Adult literacy rate
3. Combined gross enrollment for primary, secondary, and tertiary schools
4. GDP per capita
5. Overall life expectancy
6. Overall education
7. Total GDP

Health, education, and economic growth are the dominant themes. It is apparent that government plays a role in fostering improvements in these areas. This paper assumes there is a strong correlation with the quality of a government and the living standards of its population. The validity of the assumption rests upon the strength or weakness of that correlation.³⁷ Galor

³⁷ A statistical analysis shows that a state's human development ranking is correlated to its institutional quality ranking (0.78). In seventy-five percent (75%) of the states the difference between human development and institutional quality is within twenty-two percent (22%). This paper though seeks to offer a choice among two

and Weil cite that the key to breaking out of post-Malthusian growth and into demographic transition is raising the returns to investments in human capital.³⁸ Human capital and human development are conceptually highly related. Raising the aggregate human development or human capital of a state is consistent with good governance practices and is not consistent with limits to population growth.

The next section removes the assumption that human development reflects governance quality. The World Bank survey directly measures governance quality (Appendix 3). Thus, the data provides the analysis of institutional rankings as a grade of governmental effects compared to all conflicts and specific youth bulge effects.

b. Youth Bulge Conflict versus Institutional Quality of Governance

The analysis of the institutional quality data follows the same method as the human development data; the interplay of youth bulges and conflict are gauged relative to the quality of governance. The World Bank data represents the qualitative rankings of the effectiveness of a state to deliver political goods; that quality ranking is displayed relative to the incidence of youth bulges, armed conflicts, and the coincidence of the two phenomena. Even though the UN report and the World Bank survey measure different data for unique purposes, the analysis below produces similar results. As governance quality increases, the incidence of youth bulges decrease, the incidence of conflict decreases, and the coincidence of the two also decreases.

different approaches to measuring governance, as opposed to proving the validity of human development as a proxy for governance quality.

³⁸ Galor and Weil, 810.

Table 2: Cross Section of Institutional Quality, Youth Bulges, and Conflict

High Institutional Quality Countries (effective governments)

68	total states		
5	states with a youth bulge	7%	youth bulge percentage
3	states with recent conflict	4%	conflict percentage
0	coincidences of youth bulges and conflict	0%	coincidence percentage

Medium Institutional Quality Countries (moderately effective governments)

102	total states		
66	states with a youth bulge	65%	youth bulge percentage
33	states with recent conflict	32%	conflict percentage
18	coincidences of youth bulges and conflict	55%	coincidence percentage

Low Institutional Quality Countries (ineffective governments)

33	total states		
30	states with a youth bulge	91%	youth bulge percentage
16	states with recent conflict	48%	conflict percentage
16	coincidences of youth bulges and conflict	100%	coincidence percentage

In a similar manner as the human development analysis, the youth bulge logic appears to be operational: half of the states have youth bulges, and, of the total 52 recent conflicts³⁹, 34 occurred in the presence of a youth bulge (65%). However, once governmental effects are factored in (by examining data from low to medium institutional quality), the youth bulge effect drops significantly: the incidence of conflict drops by a third (33%), and, the coincidence of a conflict which occurred in the presence of a youth bulge also drops by a large amount (45%). Comparing low institutional quality versus the combined group of medium and high institutional quality (that is, comparing ineffective government versus effective government), the incidence of conflict drops from 48% to 21% (a 56% drop). The coincidence of a conflict and a youth bulge again drops from 100% (16 conflicts, all of which were in the presence of a youth bulge) to 50% (36 conflicts, 18 of which were in the presence of a youth bulge). Similarly relevant, the youth

³⁹ The difference in databases leads to a difference in total recent conflicts. The human development data consists of 177 countries and 48 recent conflicts. The institutional data consists of 203 countries and 52 recent conflicts.

bulge phenomenon is predominant throughout the low and medium institutional quality groups (67%), yet virtually absent within the high institutional quality group (7%). Therefore again, if the youth bulge logic of conflict were more robust we might expect a considerably higher amount of organized violence. Yet, of the countries with youth bulges, only a minority had recent conflicts (only 34 conflicts among 101 youth bulge countries; 34%).

Having examined conflict in general and youth bulge conflict in particular from the two dimensions of human development and institutional quality, the investigation will now examine cultural conflict (a subset of conflict in general) from the institutional dimension.

c. Cultural Conflict versus Institutional Quality of Governance

With regard to the cultural nature of conflict, Appendix 2 contains data on the types of conflicts from 1995 to 2002 as listed in the *Peace and Conflict 2003* survey. The survey classifies a total of fifty-seven conflicts as ethnic, political, or international. These are the same conflicts used for analysis in the previous sections except that in this section the conflicts are now divided into subsets in order to analyze those conflicts of a cultural nature.

Table 3: Types of Conflicts

Political	Political and Ethnic	Ethnic	International
16	7	32	2
28%	12%	56%	4%
	Combined (Political and Ethnic, or, Ethnic)		
	39		
	68%		

Using ethnic conflicts as an indication of cultural conflict, culture is a predominant aspect of recent conflicts: either solely ethnic conflicts (56%), or, a combination of ethnic and/or political conflicts (68%) are in the majority. But, as we have seen earlier, as governance improves, more political goods are ensured and the incidence of conflict recedes. In the previous development

and institutional analyses it was shown that the incidence of all conflict recedes as governance quality improves regardless of the type of conflict. Thus, even though culture, the like youth bulge effect, is a highly visible aspect to conflicts, neither youth bulges nor cultural friction are major causes of conflict as governance improves. As governance improves, conflict recedes. In Table 3, ethnic conflicts are broken down for analysis against governmental institutional quality.

Table 4: Cross Section of Institutional Quality and Ethnic Conflict⁴⁰

Ethnic Conflict in High Institutional Quality Countries

59	total states		
53	multi-cultural states	5.1%	overall conflict percentage
3	states with a recent conflict	1.9%	ethnic conflict percentage
1	ethnic conflict in a multi-cultural state	37.1%	ethnic to all conflict percentage

Ethnic Conflict in Medium Institutional Quality Countries

89	total states		
83	multi-cultural states	37.1%	overall conflict percentage
33	states with a recent conflict	26.5%	ethnic conflict percentage
22	ethnic conflicts in a multi-cultural state	71.5%	ethnic to all conflict percentage

Ethnic Conflict in Low Institutional Quality Countries

30	total states		
30	multi-cultural states	53.3%	overall conflict percentage
16	states with a recent conflict	40.0%	ethnic conflict percentage
12	ethnic conflicts in a multi-cultural state	75.0%	ethnic to all conflict percentage

In a parallel fashion to the youth bulge analysis, there is a drop in the incidence of ethnic conflict as governmental quality improves; the incidence of ethnic conflict drops from 40.0% to 26.5% to 1.9%. Of note, the proportion of ethnic conflict as a subset of overall conflict remains constant from low to medium institutional quality (75.0% to 71.5%), but drops in the high institutional quality governments (37.1%). This indicates that a threshold of quality may exist above which

⁴⁰ Andre Heritage, chief ed., *Essential Atlas of the World*, (New York, NY: Dorling Publishing, rev. 2003), 167-256. A state was deemed multi-cultural if it possessed either less than 90% one ethnicity or less than 90% one religion.

governments possess the capability to deter cultural animosities from reaching the condition of armed conflict. A cursory examination of the data would place that threshold almost at the halfway point between high and low institutional quality states; Turkey and Brazil are examples of populous states just above this middle ground without recent cultural conflict; Peru, the Philippines, and Egypt are examples just below this level with recent cultural conflict.

d. Analytical Caveats

The data above do not contain the entire universe of conflicts; the conflicts used for analysis (those cited in the *Peace and Conflict 2003* survey) are identifiable and organized. Criminal violence and terrorism (such as the violence committed in the Sunni-Shia conflict, or, by the former Soviet Union mafia, or, by a government itself against its people) are often under the radar. Another possible limitation might arise from the use of the *Human Development Index* as a proxy for government effectiveness. Missing from the index are parameters estimating freedom and human rights (although the UN *Human Development Report* does cover these issues in other parts of the report). For example, it is possibly too strong to assume that the effects of repression get observed through life expectancy. Security parameters are also missing from the index, and these effects must be assumed into GDP indices. Youth bulge metrics from *The Security Demographic* also are somewhat arbitrary; the 40% demarcation puts India just under the youth bulge (39.7%), and, puts Mexico just over (41.2%). In contrast, Huntington uses a 15-24 year old cohort and a 20% cutoff to define youth bulges.⁴¹ Both sources use a percentage of the youth cohort to total adult population and not to total population. Thus, differences on the size and makeup of youth bulges are a matter for debate. While there are no ideal resources in these popularly contested issues, all the data chosen reflect objective and diverse institutional

⁴¹ Huntington, 102-121.

research that, I believe, capture the mainstream logic of the debate. When presented in a methodology that uses a global view of governance, culture, and demographics, the data appears to be converging on the same conclusion; governance quality is the predominant factor relative to the incidence of armed conflict.

A recent case study will demonstrate the complexities involved in trying to categorize and analyze the causes of conflict. Yet, what should come to the fore in the following section is an appreciation of how the perception of cultural and demographic effects can eclipse the reality of governance effects.

Bringing Governance to the Fore

a. Case Study: Youth Violence in France

The recent youth upheaval in France offers a particularly illuminating case study of the interplay of demographics, culture, and government policy. Over a couple of weeks in the fall of 2005, youth violence escalated dramatically and spread from one northern suburb of Paris across the country. As recorded by *The Economist*, more than 6000 vehicles were set ablaze in over 300 cities, over 1500 people have been arrested, and one man has died.⁴² This episode bears all the qualities of youth bulge violence and cultural conflict; a disaffected minority youth cohort is frustrated by the larger society and resorts to violence. Youth unemployment amid the “sensitive urban zones” is estimated at 40%⁴³ which is another symptom of the youth bulge effect. The cultural aspects also appear to be present given that the wellspring of violence emanates from ethnic ghettos which are predominantly Muslim. Yet, France is clearly not an

⁴² “Special Report: An Underclass Rebellion – France’s Riots,” *The Economist* (London: Nov 12, 2005, Vol. 377, Iss. 8452), 25.

⁴³ *The Economist*, Vol. 377, Iss. 8452, 25.

at-risk youth bulge country (23.4% youth⁴⁴). That this is occurring in a high human development country would appear to contradict the ability of good governance to effectively assuage youth bulge grievances and cultural friction. Upon closer examination though, the opposite becomes more apparent; failure of government policy is the primary reason for disaffection. Poor government policies towards opportunity and culture contributed to an aggrieved youth cohort. Without a political voice, that cohort lashed out in violence. *The Economist* cites two factors:

“First, the mass unemployment that persists in a welfare system supposedly glued together by ‘social solidarity’. Second, the ethnic ghettos that have formed in a country that prides itself on colour-blind equality.”⁴⁵

Yet, it is precisely these failures that indicate the necessity of equitable and effective government policy. The details of the failure are important to understanding the effect of poor policies. Not only is youth unemployment a persistent problem, it is exacerbated by under-employment. When and if a job is available, 70-80% of all new jobs are temporary or part-time due to employer reluctance to create full-time permanent positions which are protected by law.⁴⁶ Thus, disaffection is not caused by the fact that there is an overabundance of youth; disaffection is caused by poor government policy inordinately and adversely affecting minority youth. This is further compounded by a lack of political voice; there are no domestic minority representatives in parliament.⁴⁷ Thus, in this example from France, we can see that the youth bulge violence theory is negated, the cultural friction theory of violence is weak, but the governance theory is strong. Muslim violence in France demonstrates the difficulties inherent in democracies; yet, the

⁴⁴ Cincotta, et al., 98.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 25.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 25.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 26.

case study is a stronger argument for effective government than population control or cultural manipulation.

Economics is an important factor in the French example given the skewed competition for full-time jobs. Economic incentive may also play a significant role in the underlying causes of conflicts or perpetuating conflicts. The next section discusses the role of economics that may be hidden in cultural and deprivation conflicts

b. Conflict and Economic Undercurrents

Economic oversight is clearly the domain of governance. Paul Collier's *Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective*⁴⁸ reveals insights that are contrary to conventional theory. Investigating large-scale civil conflicts since 1965, Collier sought to explain group grievances and inter-group hatred. He concluded that opportunistic behavior appeared to be the central cause of civil conflict: "Conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance."⁴⁹ More specifically:

"The grievance theory of conflict finds surprisingly little empirical support. Inequality does not seem to matter, whereas political repression and ethnic and religious divisions have precisely the opposite of the predicted effects."⁵⁰

From his results, Collier finds greed more important than grievance. More conventionally, though, Collier does assert that a youth bulge is a necessary element for conflict in addition to governmental malfeasance. Thus, while Collier is sympathetic to a youth bulge phenomenon in conflict, he is most emphatic about the opportunistic incentives of small groups to exploit their position regardless of macro consequences. In this way he is citing bad governance as more pronounced. Regarding cultural friction, contrary to conventional thinking he concludes that

⁴⁸ Paul Collier, "Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective," in *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, ed. by Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000), 91-112.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 91.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 98.

conflict recedes as heterogeneity increases. Cultural conflict is merely distraction, or a front for motivation. Collier's prescriptions though speak to the good governance camp. Increasing education, enhancing economic diversification and increasing the capacity to absorb aid are Collier's foremost suggestions. Thus, Collier finds economic incentive as the unspoken undercurrent in which bad governance fosters exploitive actions on the parts of small groups who incite or prolong conflict; multiculturalism has no bearing but willing youths are necessary.

Collier's most unconventional finding that counters cultural and Malthusian positions is that transitions to democratic governance are not only desirable but also should be accomplished with great alacrity.⁵¹ The position that democracy should only come in slow steps is held by the cultural camp that believes non-Western societies are resistant or less suited to democratic governance. Neo-Malthusians find quick transitions to democracy as too unsettling and ultimately too risky to fathom. Collier, on the other hand, while agreeing that semi-democratic governments are more prone to conflict than either fully autocratic or fully democratic governments, concludes, because the risks incurred during transition are so short lived and the benefits once transitioned so large, that slow transitions to democracy only needlessly extend misery. This is an important finding that is not readily accepted in the international community. Thus, the issue of "when to transition" is answered by "as soon as possible." The implication is that the idealism of espousing democracy is more realistic than normally perceived.

The following section will build upon this issue as the analysis moves to investigate the relationship of governance quality and regime type; it will also discuss how CENTCOM states relate to this discussion of quality and democracy.

⁵¹ Ibid., 108.

c. Governance Quality, Regime Type, and the CENTCOM AOR

The following figures reveal how democracy becomes the dominant regime type as human development or institutional quality improves. Modern phase states are predominantly democratic and high governance quality (upper left box). Transitional phase states are split among the moderate quality boxes but appear to be polarizing into either democracy or autocracy. Malthusian phase states are predominantly undemocratic and low governance quality. The CENTCOM AOR is particularly challenged. Data in Appendices 3 and 4 incorporated in the below figures show that CENTCOM states are predominantly medium and low human development states, medium and low institutional quality states, autocratic, have youth bulges, have experienced recent or ongoing conflict, and, at the bottom of the list, are challenged by a confluence of several societal stressors (located within the circled areas, although not exclusively for the larger circles).

Figure 5:⁵² Human Development versus Regime Type

⁵² Figure 3 and Figure 4 utilize a total of 146 states from the *Polity IV* data which is the smallest of the three data sets (vice 177 states in the United Nations data, and 203 states in the World Bank data). Ten is the highest democratic score; negative ten is the lowest autocratic score. Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagers, *Polity IV Country Reports 2003* (University of Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2003), <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/report.htm#naf>.





Figure 6:⁵³ Institutional Quality versus Regime Type



From an institutional perspective CENTCOM states' performance drops relative to global standings; CENTCOM is almost entirely in the bottom right two areas, autocratic and ineffective. Iran is a conspicuous transitional state of medium human development; and Kenya is the lone democratic but also low human development outlier.

The World Bank category of governance that has the most impact on a state's institutional ranking is voice and accountability. Thus, even though it is not clear whether institutional quality or human development is more influential on relative governance performance, the most effective way for low and medium quality states to climb institutionally is to raise voice and accountability standards. This supports Collier's notion of faster regime changes to democracy. Again, with the notable exceptions of Kenya, Iran, Djibouti, and Ethiopia, all the other CENTCOM states are firmly autocratic.

⁵³ Figure 4 utilizes a composite score from the World Bank data which excludes the Voice and Accountability category in order to avoid autocorrelation with Polity IV data on democracy versus autocracy.

CENTCOM also only has three states in the middle ground between autocracy and democracy: two low human development states, Ethiopia and Djibouti, and, one medium human development state, Iran. Ethiopia and Djibouti are in similar straits as Kenya in that they are rising quickly towards democracy and face the same structural challenges. Iran, on the other hand, has been stuck in place since the late 1990's. Three medium human development states are close to the middle ground, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; yet, all three also show no trend either towards fully democratic or autocratic. The remaining CENTCOM states are firmly autocratic. Also, one third of the medium development states are slipping or stagnant in human development: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. It seems that the lowest states on the scale have the most to gain with four of five being anocratic or democratic; only Eritrea is firmly autocratic. The states with medium human development and moderately effective governments may be under the influence of the dynamic of a "time-consistency problem" as described by Collier⁵⁴: many promises are made to motivate popular support for regime change; once regime change is effected, the new regime has an incentive to not deliver; people generally realize this and become unwilling to change.

Of note, the only democratic state within CENTCOM as denoted in the *Polity IV*⁵⁵ survey is Kenya; a low human development state that faces a multitude of demographic and structural challenges to include a negative human development trend. After ethnic conflict in the early 1990's, Kenya has climbed steadily, achieving full democracy only recently. Its slide in human development appears to contradict Collier's claim of the benefits of a quick transition through the intermediate stages to democracy, but it may be too early to make that conclusion; Kenya only recently and very quickly blew through the transitional middle ground between autocracy

⁵⁴ Collier, 99.

⁵⁵ Marshall and Jagers, *Polity IV Country Reports 2003*.

and democracy. Kenya also faces the confluence of youth bulges, rapid urbanization, deteriorating cropland, scarcity of water resources, and a high working age adult death rate. Thus, Kenya may be the most challenging test case for democracy to affect good governance quickly within CENTCOM; yet, compared against the global data, Kenya may be one of the best opportunities among low quality governments.

Globally, the highest states in either human development or institutional quality are also the least susceptible to conflict. If the goal is to reduce conflict through raising the quality of governance, then the issue becomes choosing how to affect quality improvement; should states choose either human development or institutional quality as the first priority, or should a simultaneous approach be used? Conceptually, the elements of institutional change may be more malleable with a quicker payoff than first raising human development which may require a generation of time. For example, the effects of using the Broken Window theory are more immediate than investments in education. The most important element of institutional change though is voice and accountability; it appears to be the necessary condition for progress. There are forty-eight autocratic states world-wide, twenty within CENTCOM; these states lack the most critical tools to better governance, a free press and regular elections. The importance of accountability is also supported in the article *Are You Being Served?* which points to two mechanisms: free and regular elections, and, citizen information:

“How well any government functions hinges on how good citizens are at making their politicians accountable for their actions. ... The presence of a well-informed electorate in a democratic setting explains between one-half and two-thirds of the variance in the levels of governmental performance and corruption.”⁵⁶

This brings the issue back to political mobilization. Lacking institutional means of voice, populations have no other choice than to align where able. Thus, cultural and demographic

⁵⁶ Alicia Adsera, Charles Boix, Mark Payne, “Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government,” *The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 445.

groups offer mobilization opportunities to disenfranchised individuals who are otherwise denied. In the new era of the “super-empowered individual”⁵⁷ and “fourth generation warfare”⁵⁸ (adaptive insurgency) even the smallest of groups will need to be policed and enfranchised.

Voice and accountability stands out as a critical component for raising governance quality; yet, a balanced and complete approach to governance will be required to affect any peaceful transformation or to maintain any lasting improvements. The following section will discuss the general framework for governance improvements and particular recommendations for high, medium, and low governance quality CENTCOM states.

CENTCOM Recommendations

Up to this point a very complex picture has been painted; “doing windows” appears to be an impossible task when states are challenged simultaneously in so many categories. Yet, the results of not “doing windows” are too costly to endure, as evidenced by the fate of Afghanistan in the 1990’s. A more positive stance is that, given the relationship of governance quality and democratic governance, the resurgence of democracy is global evidence that the majority of states are in fact making the effort. The three frameworks of governance discussed so far (Rotberg’s list of political goods, the UN’s list of human development metrics, and, the World Bank’s list of governmental qualities) bear commonalities that can be distilled to show a clearer picture of good governance tasks. The following list is an admixture of those commonalities:

1. Security;
2. Rule of Law, and the control of corruption;
3. Political Stability;
4. Voice and Accountability; access to politics and the political process;
5. Medical and Health Care; to increase life expectancy at birth and overall life expectancy

⁵⁷ Friedman, 55.

⁵⁸ Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and The Stone* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 207.

6. Education; to raise the combined total school enrollment, adult literacy rate, and overall education levels;
7. Physical infrastructure; the roads, railways, harbors, and airports—the arteries of commerce, to include communications networks;
8. Economic infrastructure; a monetary system, and, a beneficent fiscal and institutional context that raises GDP per capita;
9. Governmental Effectiveness; a political and social atmosphere conducive to the emergence and sustainability of civil society;
10. and, Regulatory Quality; a fully articulated system for regulating access to the environmental and economic commons.

These requirements are conceptually interdependent; in higher quality governments they are mutually reinforcing; in lower quality governments they are much more difficult to synthesize; also, concentrating on one area will be ineffective without ensuring the others. When analyzing CENTCOM states, this list is instructive to indicate present and future problem areas. Globally, high quality governance states have solved the synthesis issue and they possess two striking outcomes, democratic forms of government and an absence of conflict. The high quality states are not only models; they are also resources for medium and low quality states.

The US and CENTCOM need to leverage the wellspring of international support that exists for democratic efforts. One popular thought among world opinion is that democracy is a form of American imperialism. But, total European resources devoted to democracy promotion exceed US budgets in this area.⁵⁹ Shifting media attention to international groups will greatly reduce the resistance to affecting political transformation. One such group is the Human Security Centre; their message is that pressures to democratize are usually internally generated and impossible to ignore.⁶⁰ Nobel laureate social economist Amartya Sen in *Democracy as a Universal Value* states:

⁵⁹ Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse, “One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law” as cited in Michael McFaul, “Democracy Promotion as a World Value,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2004-05, 28:1, 156.

⁶⁰ Human Security Centre, *Democratic Institutions: Governance and Civil War*, Workshop Report, Bellagio, Italy, 7-9 June 2004 (LIU Institute for Global Issues: The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada), 2.

“I have argued that this case (for democracy) is indeed strong and not regionally contingent. The force of the claim that democracy is a universal value lies, ultimately, in that strength. That is where the debate belongs. It cannot be disposed of by imagined cultural taboos or assumed civilizational predispositions imposed by our various pasts.”⁶¹

Thus, Amartya Sen opposes the notion that there are natural and intractable reasons not to pursue democracy within CENTCOM states. The recent Hamas political victory is a dramatic example of how the democratic process will place the onus of legitimacy on militant political parties.

Voice and accountability impress the onus of legitimacy on all political parties; the West should not shy away from pressing voice and accountability standards where they are lacking.

Information and scrutiny will force previously violent groups to either secure legitimacy or lose political power. In this discussion of the priority to raise governance quality, the US is far from alone; this fact needs to be emphasized and leveraged in pressing for the advancement of democracy.

Even while the US is trying to gain its own inter-agency synergy, the developed world also possesses a multitude of resources and institutional effort that would benefit from an understanding of the synergistic effects of governance quality commonalities. If the assumption holds that overall progress cannot be achieved piecemeal among the governance commonalities listed above, then a holistic approach will be the most effective. This does not mean that one agency oversees all areas; it does denote that all areas need to be addressed in a balanced and coordinated fashion in each state. The following sections seek to highlight some of the central issues for each quality category.

⁶¹ Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” *Journal of Democracy*, July 1999, 10.3, 16.

a. High Quality Governance CENTCOM States

By human development or institutional quality standards, there are six high quality states in CENTCOM: Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Seychelles. All are solidly autocratic. An assumption may be that their small size eases the command delivery of most political goods, and militates against the probability of coordinated armed conflict. Of course, by partnering with the US out of necessity or by design, these states have secured their borders. While certainly not absent from threat, they are far from failing.

Mostly secure and least problematic of the CENTCOM states, they are strategic assets but of limited value. Their autocratic governments, small size, and limited capability do not aid a regional transformation in any overt way. Their models cannot be transposed into the larger or resource challenged CENTCOM states; also, they are neither regionally powerful enough nor inclined to become active parties to directly influencing the more troubled CENTCOM states. Thus, by providing an acceptable level of political goods and by connecting to the West, these states have beneficially leveraged their strategic positions. This stable situation though can be upset with political change, most applicably at the instance of a death of the head of state. Transfer of authority will open the potential for failure and the rise of political action. This is where the heretofore subdued issue of voice and accountability will come to the fore. The West, the US, and CENTCOM should advocate the peaceful use of the political process vice political repression. The opportunities for change in these states will arise; advocating the growth of political institutions early on will reduce to opportunity for militancy.

The issue of succession is obviously not solely an issue for high quality governance CENTCOM states, but these states highlight the perceived tradeoff of stability and freedom. Assisting the development of the institutions for voice and accountability in these states may

provide the models necessary to ease transformation in the medium and low quality states. The medium quality governance CENTCOM states highlight the more troubling and deeply divisive issue of radicalism.

b. Medium Quality Governance CENTCOM States

The medium quality governance CENTCOM states are highly heterogeneous; fifteen states are in this middle ground in either human or institutional quality dimensions. Each state will clearly have to be dealt with in accordance to its unique circumstance; for instance, Iran and Lebanon possess particularly unique problems. But, four points warrant emphasis; the Broken Window theory aspect of “doing windows,” the necessity to reduce the exploitative power of incumbents, the gains to governance quality from voice and accountability, and using political mobilization to separate radical groups from moderate ones.

On the first point, crime and disorder are ills that vex the delivery of many political goods and set the stage for organized violence. Aiding CENTCOM states in crime reduction will positively set the stage for progress; this effort is in place in some states and should be expanded to the extent possible. Executing the “Broken Window” theory in CENTCOM states will not be possible without first reforming constabulary forces. For instance in Pakistan, police officers are poorly trained, have low educational attainment, and are compensated on par with Pakistani unskilled labor.⁶² These aspects, among other structural challenges, are clearly antithetical to making permanent security gains. Gordon Peake in *Power Sharing in a Police Car: Kosovo and Macedonia* cites four key issues to improving the ability of police to maintain order within multi-ethnic post-conflict states:

“One of the most important structural changes required to make community policing effective is decentralization....The second most pressing need is the development of codes of conduct and a mechanism for reporting public complaints about the police....A

⁶² Fair, 118.

third issue is clarity in career recruitment and promotion structures....The fourth point – which should be considered in light of the third – involves redressing the ethnic imbalance at all stages and levels of the force.”⁶³

Because security is such a pressing requirement that is necessary to laying the foundation for many other institutional reforms, police forces within CENTCOM states should be examined for their effectiveness and capabilities, and then should be abetted in making those changes that will enable a “Broken Window” police campaign.

On the second point, incumbents represent the vested interests that impede progress often under the guise of protecting the powerless. “Doing windows” by outside countries becomes a necessary input in order to reduce the capability of incumbents to retard or crush reform. Two University of Chicago economists, Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales, cite this necessity of transnational influence on leveling economic power:

“Democratization may not be sufficient. Even in a democracy, incumbents can have their way, relying on the tendency of the general public to be apathetic toward political action. A free press, active political participation, and competitive political parties help mitigate this, but what ultimately keeps a new set of incumbents from capturing a country’s economic policies is competitive pressure from outside a country’s political borders.”⁶⁴

Rajan and Zingales presuppose democracy as the necessary condition for financial reform, and clearly CENTCOM states on the whole are far from liberalism, but the principle still has merit. Economic power is often political power. Without increasing political and economic competition, incumbents are more strongly entrenched and the vicious cycle of governmental malfeasance and economic exploitation continue. The elites within CENTCOM states should be examined as to whether their influence is progressive or regressive; it will be necessary to determine if a dominant minority profits equitably or opportunistically.

⁶³ Gordon Peake, “Power Sharing in a Police Car: Kosovo and Macedonia,” in *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies*, ed. by Sid Noel, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 135-136.

⁶⁴ Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales, *Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: Unleashing the Power of Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity* (New York, NY: Crown Business, 2003), 15-16.

The third point, increasing voice and accountability standards, has the effect of identifying the groups with political grievance and offering an alternative to political violence. Raising the flow of information and dialogue brings political groups to both national and international scrutiny. Ultimately, an informed citizenry with access to elections raises governance quality.

An important point needs to be made with regard to voting and elections. The value of elections is a hotly debated issue. The most vociferous opponents of accelerating elections in transitional states claim that elections do not define democracy and that it is foolhardy and counter-productive to rush into holding elections. This is a big mistake that completely overlooks the pacifying effect of voting. Taylor Branch, Pulitzer Prize winning chronicler of the Civil Rights Movement in the US, describes how Martin Luther King innovatively used the connection of democracy, elections, and nonviolence:

“He pictured democracy itself as a political form of nonviolence, merged and refined in history’s slow rise from primitive conquest toward the established vote.”⁶⁵

Political voice and voting are alternatives to armed conflict. Branch elaborates on the equivalence of voting and non-violent protest:

“I mean this almost by definition, as every ballot represents an institutionalized commitment to resolve political issues by nonviolent methods rather than the default methods of conquest.”⁶⁶

Politics without voting is, by necessity, violent. Waiting for institutional development is self-defeating; “slow-go” democracy is “no-go” democracy. States will have to practice the voting experience; external guidance, supervision, and monitoring will be a strong requirement of

⁶⁵ Taylor Branch, *At Canaan’s Edge: America in the King Years, 1965-68*, (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 225-226.

⁶⁶ Taylor Branch, info@taylorbranch.com [personal e-mail], accessed February 12, 2006.

“doing windows.” Critics often cite one-man one-party elections as the rationale for “slow-go” transition; this criticism plays into the hands of the incumbents.

Exploiting information technology for information campaigns in CENTCOM states should be another effort that is promulgated to the greatest extent possible. Dialogue forces all political groups to state their claims, make their case, and establish their identity. As such, the most pressing case calls for separating moderate Islamic parties from radical Islamist militants; this brings the discussion to the final point.

In order to discuss the tool of political mobilization, it is first necessary to discuss the specific ideas that separate radicalism and moderation. Daniel Pipes proposes to demarcate the ideas that separate radical Islamists from moderates by pinpointing the issues and causes of violence. Pipes lists a series of about twenty questions on the subjects of violence, modernity, secularism, Islamic pluralism, self-criticism, defense against militant Islam, and, transforming the West.⁶⁷ For instance:

“Do you condone or condemn the Palestinians, Chechens, and Kashmiris who give up their lives to kill enemy civilians?”

“Is *takfir* (condemning fellow Muslims with whom one has disagreements as unbelievers) an acceptable practice?”

From these questions Pipes draws the fence between radical and mainstream. The culture of fundamentalism accepts violence to achieve its political ends; it denies modernity, secularism, pluralism, and even criticism from within the Islamic world. The culture of mainstream Islam embraces that which the militant element denies. Because Pipes maintains that moderate Islam is the solution⁶⁸, it is critical to identify, ally with, and mobilize the mainstream. These questions highlight the cultural and contextual sentiments which can delineate the radical and moderate segments of the general populations within CENTCOM states. Additionally, these questions

⁶⁷ Tassel, 41.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 38.

show how differences in thought cause the tension that leads to armed conflict. Thus, Pipes demonstrates that, in order to properly address such violence at its source, cultural groups that accept violence need to be precisely identified. Concomitantly, moderate groups must be given opportunity to voice their identities and objectives.

Mobilizing the mainstream becomes the means to increase voice and accountability. Unionism has been a historical tool in the developed world for this type of political mobilization. Labor unions have a history of radicalism but they have also been much more effective at leveraging the political process. As such, labor unions, as models of societal and economic organization, have had both positive and negative effects. On the positive side, unions essentially provide political goods that improve long term viability for both employer and employee. On the negative side, unions have the capability to exploit monopolistic practices that favor small groups and disadvantage the majority. Thus, unions are analogous to demographic or cultural groups, and governments are analogous to employers. Where political goods are extant, productivity increases. Where exploitation occurs (from either side), the majority is harmed. Richard Freeman and James Medoff's authoritative work *What Do Unions Do?* from 1984 summarizes:

“Our analysis shows that unions are associated with greater efficiency, and contribute to, rather than detract from economic and political freedom. This is not to deny the negative monopoly effects of unions. They exist. They are undesirable. But they are not the only ways in which unions affect society. Our analysis indicates that, in fact, focusing on them leads to an inaccurate representation of what unions do. In the United States in the period we studied, the voice/response face of unions dominates the monopoly face, though we stress that an accurate portrait must show both sides.”⁶⁹

In the same way that unions beneficially organize laborers, so too governments can equally beneficially (analogously) organize youth bulges and/or cultural groups. The French case study

⁶⁹ Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, *What Do Unions Do?* (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1984), 19-20.

shows a high human development country with a long tradition of labor organization, but it also shows a negative impact of organization and the nexus of demography, culture, and policy when one group is squeezed out. The French government did not adequately enfranchise Muslim youths seeking redress or opportunity. Paul Collier's concept of small opportunistic groups choosing monopolistic profits (in a combination of economic and political gains) regardless of societal costs is an example of exploitive governmental behavior. Entrenched incumbents leverage animosity in order to maintain their advantageous position. Mobilization through unions offers laborers access to the political process as an alternative to radicalism; it also requires a public communication of identity and objectives as the price of that access. This becomes the means by which radical groups are separated from moderate groups.

Freeman and Medoff use the terms "collective voice" and "institutional response" to describe the interface of unions and management⁷⁰; the terms demonstrate how labor's political goods are critical to fostering equitable work relationships. In the same fashion, political goods are necessary for removing exploitive circumstance or opportunistic behavior. Thus, the voice and response capability of a government will determine the extent to which youth bulges or cultural stress becomes either an asset towards progress or a potential for conflict. The middle quality governance CENTCOM states are particularly weak in institutional quality. Mobilization along the lines of the unionism model possesses the potential to raise the institutional quality of governance and increase economic activity as well as identify and isolate radical groups.

Ultimately, the four points discussed as recommendations for the medium governance quality CENTCOM states are essential nation-building tasks. The Broken Window theory aspect of "doing windows" is necessary to providing the foremost political good, security. The necessity to reduce the exploitative power of incumbents is necessary to fostering a beneficial

⁷⁰ Ibid., 7-11.

political and economic infrastructure. The gains to governance quality from voice and accountability are necessary to speed the process. Political mobilization along a unionism model may isolate and weaken radical groups while raising and empowering moderate ones. These are four necessary concepts for instituting a beneficial governance cycle.

Radicalism though has found other sanctuaries in failed or failing states. Understanding how and why these states are failing will be critical to finding the appropriate balanced approach. The low quality governance states provide the most visible contrast between the developed and developing world. Because these states have so many challenges the connection to the developed world determines the extent to which they can face those challenges. The following section discusses this connection.

c. Low Quality Governance CENTCOM States

There are six low quality governance CENTCOM states; Yemen, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The last two, Afghanistan and Iraq, have experienced their convulsion of regime change and are now nascent democracies. Somalia remains a definitive failed state; its “broken window” repair bill will again be coming due. Eritrea is deeply autocratic; Ethiopia, on the other hand, has pushed into the middle regime ground between autocracy and democracy, and our “doing windows” effort there was noted in the introduction. Yemen also is the focus of US effort to bolster its security. These countries with the least effective governments offer opportunities for both positive influence from the developed world and negative exploitation from radical groups. Time may not be on the side of radicalism if positive institutional change can get on solid footing.

Interestingly, US domestic policy may greatly affect these countries in a positive way. One issue that CENTCOM and EUCOM (U.S. European Command) should take up with regard

to the plight of all sub-Saharan Africa is government subsidies to US farmers; these subsidies squeeze African agricultural products out of US markets. The economists, Rajan and Zingales, claim that US domestic farm subsidies do considerable harm to those countries that would benefit from competition in international markets:

“(US domestic subsidies) inevitably enrage developing countries which would willingly forgo **all** the foreign aid developed countries offer if the developed world would reduce the extent to which it pampers its domestic agricultural sectors.”⁷¹ (Emphasis added.)

While economic growth is only one of the governance priorities, the economies of these worse off countries may be the most pressing aspect to their recoveries. These countries cannot compete industrially; by not leveling the playing field in agricultural markets, the developed world has institutionalized many states as perennial aid recipients.

While it may be trite to say that the strategic importance of these states can no longer be ignored, it is important to stress a balanced approach to improving all the governance quality commonalities. Expanding the overall US influence for progress within these states will be essential to these states climbing out of the governance hole. If one area, such as internal security or economic growth, becomes a means to begin a transformational collaboration, then that area should be leveraged to introduce balanced steps in the other areas in order to advance the whole.

Enhancing collaboration and expanding the depth and breadth of effort will be the dominant theme to achieving governance quality improvement. It holds the promise of easing the complex balance required when attempting to improve all the governance tasks listed at the beginning of this section.

⁷¹ Rajan and Zingales, 282.

Conclusion

In a presentation on January 30th, 2006, Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, the US Marine general who commanded military victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, proposed that in localities of concern around the globe aiding infrastructure may be a more effective means to peace than combat hardware; to paraphrase, “putting a sewer system in a village may be more important than M-16s or M-1s.”⁷² The fact that superpowers are “doing windows” and will be required to “do windows” for the foreseeable future is undeniable. Strategic nation-building holds the promise of producing stable and responsible states with a reduced instance of armed conflict. Because conflict reduction is a primary security concern it is essential to understand how conflicts arise. This paper investigated the three prevailing theories of the causes of conflict: the neo-Malthusian theory, the cultural theory, and the governance theory. The governance theory was shown to be the most predominant; good governance quells violence and leads to progress; bad governance abets violence and denies progress.

The Malthusian dynamic is an anachronism, or should be. The analysis presented reveals that the youth bulge effect as a cause of conflict is weak; recent conflicts occurred in only a minority of those states that have youth bulges. The cultural dynamic is equally a high visibility issue; but, it too is also on shaky ground. Cultural tensions are endemic; yet, recent cultural armed conflict occurred in only a minority of states. There is a critical element missing in the neo-Malthusian and cultural camps, the effect of governance.

The analysis shows governance to be the most critical element of determining the propensity of armed conflict. As governance quality improves both effects (the youth bulge effect and the cultural effect) recede despite the continued presence of both demographic and

⁷² LtGen James N. Mattis USMC, lecture at the USAF Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, AL, Jan. 30, 2006.

cultural stress in the states examined. As governance quality deteriorates, the probability of conflict increases. The case study of Muslim youth violence in France demonstrated how cultural and demographic factors take center stage while governmental policy errors get less scrutiny. The case study, though, also demonstrated the complexity and the necessity of delivering political goods. Ultimately, the quality of governance of any particular regime, not its ethnic culture nor its age demography, determines its stability and development.

Examining governance quality through the lenses of human development and institutional quality revealed the requirements to improving governance. The requirement most responsible for quality is voice and accountability; this concept pulls the investigation into examining regime types. The fact that there are no large high quality autocratic states leads to the conclusion that populous transitional states or autocratic states either divide or democratize. Partitioning in the name of maintaining autocracy is counterproductive because it places a lid on progress; high quality states are predominantly democratic regardless of size. Autocracy appears to only be a viable choice for small resource rich states. Thus, the resurgence of democratic principles is well founded as part of a balanced effort on the part of developed nations to increase governance quality globally.

CENTCOM faces some of the deepest challenges on the globe with regard to affecting positive changes within its overwhelmingly autocratic states. This investigation should inform that complexity. In *Superpowers Don't Do Windows*, John Hillen includes an instructive quote from management guru Peter Drucker:

“Effective leaders delegate a good many things; they have to or they drown in trivia. But they do not delegate the one thing that only they can do with excellence, the one thing that will make a difference, the one thing that will set standards, the one thing they want to be remembered for. They do it.”⁷³

⁷³ Peter Drucker, “Not Enough Generals Were Killed,” *Forbes ASAP*, Apr. 8, 1996, 104.

Hillen used this quote to make the case that the US should only intervene when required to be the decisive capability and stay out of the minutiae. The US though does not just have one unique capability; the US possesses several unique capabilities and centers of excellence. The US can and does set many standards, but the US may be even more effective when collaborating on standards. The US and CENTCOM should collaborate to the greatest extent possible with like-minded organizations on governance standards. Conventional logic would dictate that “doing windows” in Wanlaweyn to be an entangling trifle with ominous potential, but the reality of global catastrophic threats dictates otherwise. “Fixing broken windows” in Somalia will indeed be a memorable achievement.

APPENDIX

Appendix 1: Cross-section of Human Development, Youth Bulges and Conflict

The list below is the United Nations' *Human Development Index* (HDI) rankings for 177 countries as of 2003.⁷⁴ As stated in the body of the paper, HDI rankings will be used as a proxy of good governance. The high, medium or low level of human development groupings are part of the index. Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia, and Somalia are not included in the UN report; these countries were assumed to be in the low human development group, have a youth bulge, and have a recent conflict. North Korea is a conspicuous outlier: it is absent from the HDI, is an apparent low human development country, does not have a youth bulge (30.7), and has not had a recent conflict. North Korea is also left out of analysis here and is assumed to be neutral to the demographic debate (clearly, though, an example of bad governance).

The highlighted states (*) are those listed in the *Peace and Conflict 2003* global survey⁷⁵: per their taxonomy, conflicts are listed as ongoing, sporadic, or, suspended and repressed (I have noted the suspended or repressed conflicts as “recent conflict,” or, as “conflict ended” with the end date of hostilities). The highlighted states with conflicts date back to 1995; that is, recent conflicts were chosen to capture the contemporaneous nature of these effects. It is also important to note that this survey was completed prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

From *The Security Demographic*⁷⁶, I have highlighted all the states with a youth bulge (‡). The authors define youth bulge as the percentage of young adults between 15 and 29 years of age that constitute a greater than 40% proportion of the total adult population (15+). Also, I have boxed in states that the authors list as countries that are assessed with very high levels of demographic risk of civil conflict. This is a confluence of youth bulges, urbanization, cropland availability, water resources, and, working age adult death.

High Human Development

- 1 Norway
- 2 Iceland
- 3 Australia
- 4 Luxembourg
- 5 Canada
- 6 Sweden
- 7 Switzerland
- 8 Ireland

⁷⁴ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2005*, September 7, 2005, <http://hdr.undp.org/>, 219-222.

⁷⁵ Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy* (Center for International Development & Conflict Management: University of Maryland, College Park, 2003), 51-56.

⁷⁶ Richard P. Cincotta, Robert Engelman, and Daniele Anastaion, *The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Population Action International, 2003), 74, 96-101.

9 Belgium
* 10 United States, Sporadic Conflict
11 Japan
12 Netherlands
13 Finland
14 Denmark
* 15 United Kingdom, Sporadic Conflict
16 France
17 Austria
18 Italy
19 New Zealand
20 Germany
21 Spain
22 Hong Kong, China (SAR)
* 23 Israel, Ongoing Conflict
24 Greece
25 Singapore
26 Slovenia
27 Portugal
28 Korea, Rep. of
29 Cyprus
30 Barbados
31 Czech Republic
32 Malta
‡ 33 Brunei Darussalam
34 Argentina
35 Hungary
36 Poland
37 Chile
38 Estonia
39 Lithuania
40 Qatar
41 United Arab Emirates
42 Slovakia
43 Bahrain
44 Kuwait
* 45 Croatia, Conflict Ended ('96)
46 Uruguay
47 Costa Rica
48 Latvia
49 Saint Kitts and Nevis
50 Bahamas
51 Seychelles
52 Cuba
‡ 53 Mexico
‡ 54 Tonga

55 Bulgaria
56 Panama
57 Trinidad and Tobago

Medium Human Development

- ‡ 58 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
- 59 Macedonia
- 60 Antigua and Barbuda
- 61 Malaysia
- * 62 Russian Federation, Ongoing Conflict
- 63 Brazil
- 64 Romania
- 65 Mauritius
- 66 Grenada
- 67 Belarus
- * 68 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Conflict Ended ('96)
- * 69 Colombia, Ongoing Conflict
- 70 Dominica
- ‡ 71 Oman
- * 72 Albania, Conflict Ended ('97)
- 73 Thailand
- ‡ 74 Samoa (Western)
- ‡ 75 Venezuela
- ‡ 76 Saint Lucia
- ‡ 77 Saudi Arabia
- 78 Ukraine
- ‡* 79 Peru, Conflict Ended ('97)
- 80 Kazakhstan
- 81 Lebanon
- ‡ 82 Ecuador
- 83 Armenia
- ‡* 84 Philippines, Ongoing Conflict
- * 85 China, Conflict Ended ('97)
- ‡ 86 Suriname
- ‡ 87 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
- ‡ 88 Paraguay
- ‡ 89 Tunisia
- ‡ 90 Jordan
- ‡ 91 Belize
- 92 Fiji
- * 93 Sri Lanka, Recent Conflict
- * 94 Turkey, Recent Conflict
- ‡ 95 Dominican Republic
- ‡ 96 Maldives
- ‡ 97 Turkmenistan
- 98 Jamaica
- ‡ 99 Iran, Islamic Rep. of
- * 100 Georgia, Conflict Ended ('98)

*	101 Azerbaijan, Conflict Ended ('97)
†*	102 Occupied Palestinian Territories, Ongoing Conflict
†*	103 Algeria, Ongoing Conflict
†	104 El Salvador
†	105 Cape Verde
†	106 Syrian Arab Republic
†	107 Guyana
†	108 Viet Nam
†	109 Kyrgyzstan
*	110 Indonesia, Sporadic Conflict
†	111 Uzbekistan
†	112 Nicaragua
†	113 Bolivia
†	114 Mongolia
*	115 Moldova, Rep. of, Conflict Ended ('97)
†	116 Honduras
†*	117 Guatemala, Conflict Ended ('96)
†	118 Vanuatu
†*	119 Egypt, Conflict Ended ('99)
†	120 South Africa
†	121 Equatorial Guinea
†*	122 Tajikistan, Conflict Ended ('97)
†	123 Gabon
†	124 Morocco
†	125 Namibia
†	126 São Tomé and Príncipe
*	127 India, Ongoing Conflict
†	128 Solomon Islands
†*	129 Myanmar, Sporadic Conflict
†	130 Cambodia, Conflict Ended ('98)
†	131 Botswana
†*	132 Comoros, Recent Conflict
†	133 Lao People's Dem. Rep.
†	134 Bhutan
†*	135 Pakistan, Conflict Ended ('98)
†*	136 Nepal, Ongoing Conflict
†*	137 Papua New Guinea, Recent Conflict ('98)
†	138 Ghana
†*	139 Bangladesh, Conflict Ended ('97)
†	140 Timor-Leste, Recent Conflict ('02)
†*	141 Sudan, Ongoing Conflict
†	142 Congo
†	143 Togo
†*	144 Uganda, Sporadic Conflict
†	145 Zimbabwe

Low Human Development

‡	146 Madagascar
‡	147 Swaziland
‡	148 Cameroon
‡*	149 Lesotho, Conflict Ended ('98)
‡	150 Djibouti
‡	151 Yemen
‡	152 Mauritania
‡	153 Haiti
‡	154 Kenya
‡	155 Gambia
‡*	156 Guinea, Conflict Ended ('99)
‡*	157 Senegal, Recent Conflict
‡*	158 Nigeria, Sporadic Conflict
‡*	159 Rwanda, Recent Conflict
‡*	160 Angola, Recent Conflict
‡*	161 Eritrea, Conflict Ended ('00)
‡	162 Benin
‡*	163 Côte d'Ivoire, Ongoing Conflict
‡	164 Tanzania, U. Rep. of
‡	165 Malawi
‡	166 Zambia
‡*	167 Congo, Dem. Rep. of the, Ongoing Conflict
‡	168 Mozambique
‡*	169 Burundi, Ongoing Conflict
‡*	170 Ethiopia, Conflict Ended ('00)
‡	171 Central African Republic
‡	172 Guinea-Bissau
‡*	173 Chad, Recent Conflict
‡	174 Mali
‡	175 Burkina Faso
‡*	176 Sierra Leone, Recent Conflict
‡*	177 Niger, Conflict Ended ('97)

Appendix 2: Recent Conflict Types

The conflicts below are classified by the authors of the *Peace and Conflict 2003* global survey.⁷⁷ The survey dates these conflicts from 1995 to the end of 2002. In comparing the types of conflicts I counted all conflicts; as opposed to Appendix 1, where I counted states only (thereby not counting states twice). In this instance, in order to get the relative sizes of the different types of conflicts, states may be counted twice. Thus, in Appendix 1 there are 48 states that had experienced conflict, but in Appendix 2 there are a total of 57 separate conflicts.

Suspended or Repressed Conflicts

Political wars (5):

1. Albania (1997);
2. Cambodia (1998);
3. Guinea-Bissau (1999);
4. Lesotho (1998);
5. Tajikistan (1997).

Ethnic wars (10):

1. Azerbaijan, Armenians (1997);
2. Bangladesh, Chittagong Hill Tribes (1997);
3. Bosnia, Croats, Muslims, Serbs (1996);
4. Croatia, Serbs (1995);
5. Georgia, Abkhazians (1998);
6. Iraq, Kurds (1996);
7. Moldova, Trans-Dneister Slavs (1997);
8. Niger, Tuaregs (1997);
9. Papua New Guinea, Bougainvilleans (1998);
10. Yugoslavia, Albanians (1999).

The suspension of the ethnic conflict in:

1. East Timor (Indonesia) resulted in that region's independence in May 2002.

One of the suspended conflicts had both political and ethnic war (1) qualities:

1. Guatemala, Mayans (1996).

One conflict had interstate and ethnic war (1) qualities:

1. Eritrea-Ethiopia, Oromo (2000).

The political and ethnic war (1) in:

⁷⁷ Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy* (Center for International Development & Conflict Management: University of Maryland, College Park, 2003), 51-56.

1. Peru (indigenous peoples, 1997) which should now be considered “suspended” since that country’s return to electoral democracy in early 2002.

The conflicts that continue to be repressed is the political war (1) in:

1. Egypt (Islamicists; 1999), and,

And, the ethnic wars (3) in:

1. China, Uighers (1997);
2. Iraq, Shi’as (1998);
3. Pakistan, Sindhis and Muhajirs (1998).

Fighting suspended or repressed since *Peace and Conflict 2001*

- | | |
|-----------------|---|
| 1. Angola | Political (suspended, March 2002) |
| 2. Chad | Political / Ethnic (Toubou) (suspended, January 2002) |
| 3. Comoros | Political (suspended / tenuous, December 2001) |
| 4. Indonesia | Communal (Dayaks-Madurese) (suspended, March 2001) |
| 5. Rwanda | Ethnic (Hutu) (repressed, July 2001) |
| 6. Senegal | Ethnic (Casamance) (suspended, December 1999) |
| 7. Sierra Leone | Political / Ethnic (Mandingo) (suspended, May 2001) |
| 8. Sri Lanka | Ethnic (Tamils) (suspended / tenuous, February 2002) |
| 9. Turkey | Ethnic (Kurds) (suspended, September 1999) |

Sporadic Societal Armed Conflicts

- | | |
|----------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1. India | Ethnic / Communal |
| 2. Indonesia | Ethnic (Aceh) |
| 3. Iraq | International (US and UK) |
| 4. Philippines | Political |
| 5. Somalia | Political |
| 6. Uganda | Political / Ethnic (Langi and Acholi) |

Changed to Sporadic since *Peace and Conflict 2001*

- | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Afghanistan | Political / Ethnic (non-Pushtuns) |
| 2. Congo-Brazzaville | Political |
| 3. India | Communal (Hindus-Muslims) |
| 4. Indonesia | Communal (Muslims-Christians) |
| 5. Myanmar | Ethnic (Non-Burmans) |
| 6. Nigeria | Communal |
| 7. United States | International (al Qaeda) |

Ongoing Societal Armed Conflicts

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Algeria | Political |
| 2. Burundi | Ethnic (Hutu) |
| 3. Colombia | Political |
| 4. Congo-Kinshasa | Political / Ethnic / International |
| 5. India | Ethnic (Kashmiris) |
| 6. Israel/Palestine | Ethnic (Palestinians) |
| 7. Ivory Coast | Political |
| 8. Liberia | Political |
| 9. Nepal | Political |
| 10. Philippines | Ethnic (Moro) |
| 11. Russia | Ethnic (Chechens) |
| 12. Sudan | Ethnic (southern Africans) |

Appendix 3: Cross-section of Institutional Quality, Youth Bulges and Conflict

The Polity IV score is added in the first column to indicate regime type. The Human Development Index rank and its accompanying percentage rank are added in the second and third column to display the relationship between human development quality and institutional quality. The fourth column is a composite rank of the 203 states excluding the Political Stability the category. The Political Stability category is excluded in order to avoid any connection between political stability and armed conflict. The World Bank data does not contain any composite scores; the composite score without Political Stability was calculated as an average of the five remaining categories: Voice and Accountability, Governmental Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, and Control of Corruption. Voice and Accountability was the category that had the greatest impact on a state's overall composite score utilizing all six categories. The ranking of all the states according to its Voice and Accountability category only is added in column six. The states are divided into High, Medium, and Low Institutional Quality categories along the same lines as the United Nations data. The first third represents high. The second half represents medium. The last sixth represents low.

High Institutional Quality States

Polity IV score	HDI		World Bank Rank (w/o Pol Stab)	Country	Total Rank v/a	Conflict y/n	Youth Bulge y/n
	rank	rank					
10	13	93%	1	FINLAND	4		
	2	99%	2	ICELAND	8		
10	14	92%	3	DENMARK	1		
	4	98%	4	LUXEMBOURG	10		
10	19	89%	5	NEW ZEALAND	7		
10	7	96%	6	SWITZERLAND	6		
10	6	97%	7	SWEDEN	3		
10	12	93%	8	NETHERLANDS	5		
10	1	99%	9	NORWAY	2		
10	3	98%	10	AUSTRALIA	9		
10	5	97%	11	CANADA	11		
				UNITED			
10	15	92%	12	KINGDOM	13	x	
10	17	90%	13	AUSTRIA	19		
-2	25	86%	14	SINGAPORE	113		
10	10	94%	15	UNITED STATES	22	x	
10	8	95%	16	IRELAND	16		

10	20	89%	17	GERMANY	12	
			18	LIECHTENSTEIN	17	
10	9	95%	19	BELGIUM	14	
9	37	79%	20	CHILE	34	
	22	88%	21	HONG KONG	96	
			22	ANDORRA	21	
9	16	91%	23	FRANCE	20	
10	21	88%	24	SPAIN	23	
	32	82%	25	MALTA	18	
	50	72%	26	BAHAMAS	26	
10	11	94%	27	JAPAN	43	
10	27	85%	28	PORTUGAL	15	
			29	MACAO	100	
6	38	79%	30	ESTONIA	29	
				CAYMAN		
			31	ISLANDS	57	
			32	BERMUDA	42	
	30	83%	33	BARBADOS	24	
10	26	85%	34	SLOVENIA	31	
10	29	84%	35	CYPRUS	40	
			36	REUNION	36	
			37	TAIWAN	48	
			38	ARUBA	66	
10	35	80%	39	HUNGARY	25	
				VIRGIN		
			40	ISLANDS (U.S.)	65	
			41	PUERTO RICO	38	
			42	ANGUILLA	59	
9	131	26%	43	BOTSWANA	61	x
10	18	90%	44	ITALY	35	
			45	MARTINIQUE	63	
				NETHERLANDS		
			46	ANTILLES	81	
10	24	86%	47	GREECE	52	
				SLOVAK		
9	42	76%	48	REPUBLIC	33	
10	39	78%	49	LITHUANIA	45	
10	23	87%	50	ISRAEL	79	x
				CZECH		
10	31	82%	51	REPUBLIC	37	
10	47	73%	52	COSTA RICA	32	

				ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	76	
	60	66%	53			
8	48	73%	54	LATVIA	46	
				UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	158	
-8	41	77%	55			
8	28	84%	56	KOREA, SOUTH	60	
10	65	63%	57	MAURITIUS	50	
10	36	80%	58	POLAND	30	
	70	60%	59	DOMINICA	28	
			60	GUAM	73	
9	120	32%	61	SOUTH AFRICA	54	x
				ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	47	x
10	87	51%	62			
	46	74%	63	URUGUAY	41	
	76	57%	64	ST. LUCIA	44	x
			65	FRENCH GUIANA	82	
	66	63%	66	GRENADA	55	
-7	43	76%	67	BAHRAIN	146	
-8	71	60%	68	OMAN	153	x

Medium Institutional Quality States

				ST. KITTS AND NEVIS	58	
	49	72%	69			
			70	AMERICAN SAMOA	83	
3	61	66%	71	MALAYSIA	126	
	74	58%	72	SAMOA	62	x
				TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	75	
10	57	68%	73			
6	125	29%	74	NAMIBIA	77	x
	91	49%	75	BELIZE	51	x
-7	44	75%	76	KUWAIT	133	
	33	81%	77	BRUNEI	167	x
	105	41%	78	CAPE VERDE	56	x
-10	40	77%	79	QATAR	148	
9	55	69%	80	BULGARIA	69	
7	45	75%	81	CROATIA	78	x
			82	TUVALU	49	
			83	MICRONESIA	39	x
9	56	68%	84	PANAMA	71	

8	53	70%	85	MEXICO	86		x
-2	90	49%	86	JORDAN	143		x
9	73	59%	87	THAILAND	95		
8	63	64%	88	BRAZIL	88		
			89	KIRIBATI	53		
9	98	45%	90	JAMAICA	72		
	86	51%	91	SURINAME	68		x
7	104	41%	92	EL SALVADOR	93		x
10	114	36%	93	MONGOLIA	80		x
-4	89	50%	94	TUNISIA	165		x
8	64	64%	95	ROMANIA	85		
-8	134	24%	96	BHUTAN	173		x
8	149	16%	97	LESOTHO	90	x	x
6	138	22%	98	GHANA	84		x
6	93	47%	99	SRI LANKA	118	x	
7	94	47%	100	TURKEY	117	x	
6	107	40%	101	GUYANA	67		x
7	146	18%	102	MADAGASCAR	102		x
9	127	28%	103	INDIA	92	x	
				MARSHALL			
			104	ISLANDS	27		
8	157	11%	105	SENEGAL	97	x	x
			106	VANUATU	64		x
-6	124	30%	107	MOROCCO	136		x
	96	46%	108	MALDIVES	162		x
6	174	2%	109	MALI	87		x
5	92	48%	110	FIJI	98		x
9	59	67%	111	MACEDONIA	107		
6	162	8%	112	BENIN	89		x
9	79	55%	113	PERU	110	x	x
8	84	53%	114	PHILIPPINES	105	x	x
				DOMINICAN			
8	95	46%	115	REPUBLIC	91		x
-6	152	14%	116	MAURITANIA	171		x
7	69	61%	117	COLOMBIA	132	x	
-10	77	56%	118	SAUDI ARABIA	191		x
	51	71%	119	SEYCHELLES	111		
8	112	37%	120	NICARAGUA	103		x
8	34	81%	121	ARGENTINA	74		
7	72	59%	122	ALBANIA	104	x	
8	113	36%	123	BOLIVIA	106		x

			124	SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO	99	x	
				SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	70		x
-6	126	29%	125	EGYPT	160	x	x
5	119	33%	126	ARMENIA	142	x	
0	83	53%	127	BURKINA FASO	127		x
-5	175	1%	128	GAMBIA	137		x
6	155	12%	129	MOZAMBIQUE	114		x
6	168	5%	130	TIMOR, EAST	94	x	x
	140	21%	131	TONGA	124		x
	54	69%	132	TANZANIA	123		x
2	164	7%	133	HONDURAS	108		x
7	116	34%	134	LEBANON	149		
	81	54%	135	UGANDA	140	x	x
-4	144	19%	136	BOSNIA- HERZEGOVINA	115	x	
	68	62%	137	GABON	145		x
-4	123	31%	138	CHINA	188	x	
-7	85	52%	139	RUSSIA	150	x	
7	62	65%	140	ZAMBIA	125		x
1	166	6%	141	MALAWI	135		x
6	165	7%	142	INDONESIA	129	x	
7	110	38%	143	GUATEMALA	128	x	x
8	117	34%	144	ECUADOR	119		x
6	82	54%	145	MOLDOVA	131	x	
8	115	35%	146	RWANDA	164	x	x
-3	159	10%	147	NIGER	112	x	x
4	177	0%	148	PAPUA NEW GUINEA	109	x	x
10	137	23%	149	KENYA	122		x
8	154	13%	150	UKRAINE	138		
7	78	56%	151	ALGERIA	154	x	x
-3	103	42%	152	GEORGIA	121	x	
5	100	44%	153	VIETNAM	186		x
-7	108	39%	154	KYRGYZ REPUBLIC	161		x
-3	109	38%	155	NEPAL	157	x	x
-6	136	23%	156	DJIBOUTI	151		x
2	150	15%	157	CAMBODIA	152	x	x
2	130	27%	158	PARAGUAY	120		x
8	88	50%	159	AZERBAIJAN	155	x	
-7	101	43%	160				

-4	148	16%	161	CAMEROON	172		x
-9	147	17%	162	SWAZILAND	182		x
6	139	21%	163	BANGLADESH	144	x	x
-5	135	24%	164	PAKISTAN	179	x	x
-1	172	3%	165	GUINEA-BISSAU	139	x	x
6	75	58%	166	VENEZUELA	130		x
3	99	44%	167	IRAN	181		x
-7	106	40%	168	SYRIA	195		x
-6	80	55%	169	KAZAKHSTAN	175		
5	176	1%	170	SIERRA LEONE	134	x	x

Low Institutional Quality States

-2	151	15%	171	YEMEN	156		x
4	132	25%	172	COMOROS	116	x	x
	102	42%	173	WEST BANK	178	x	x
-1	156	12%	174	GUINEA	169	x	x
1	170	4%	175	ETHIOPIA	166	x	x
-2	143	19%	176	TOGO	176		x
	142	20%	177	CONGO	147		x
4	158	11%	178	NIGERIA	141	x	x
	128	28%	179	SOLOMON ISLANDS	101		x
-2	173	2%	180	CHAD	163	x	x
-7	58	67%	181	LIBYA	197		x
-3	122	31%	182	TAJIKISTAN	168	x	x
-7	161	9%	183	ERITREA	201	x	x
-7	52	71%	184	CUBA	199		
-3	160	10%	185	ANGOLA	159	x	x
	163	8%	186	IVORY COAST	183	x	x
-7	133	25%	187	LAOS	189		x
	169	5%	188	BURUNDI	170	x	x
	67	62%	189	BELARUS	187		
-5	121	32%	190	EQUATORIAL GUINEA	194		x
				CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	174		x
-1	171	3%	191				
-6	141	20%	192	SUDAN	198	x	x
-7	145	18%	193	ZIMBABWE	184		x
-9	111	37%	194	UZBEKISTAN	196		x
			195	LIBERIA	177		x
-2	153	14%	196	HAITI	185		x

			197	AFGHANISTAN	180		x
				Congo, Dem. Rep.			
	167	6%	198	(Zaire)	192	x	x
-9	97	45%	199	TURKMENISTAN	200		x
			200	KOREA, NORTH	202		
			201	IRAQ	193	x	x
7	129	27%	202	MYANMAR	203	x	x
			203	SOMALIA	190	x	x

Appendix 4: Breakout of CENTCOM states

The CENTCOM states are listed on the left with regard to their ranking in the UN's human development index. Their respective score is listed in the next column; its trend, if negative (↓) or stagnant (←), is also annotated. The third column indicates its score from 1990 (unless otherwise noted). As noted earlier: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia are not included in the UN report.

Monty Marshall and Keith Jagers' *Polity IV*⁷⁸ scores reveal regime types on a scale where below zero is autocratic, and above eight is fully democratic (with anocracies in between). The scores for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia are -66, -66, and -77, respectively (-66 is "foreign domination", -77 is "interregnum").

High Human Development

HDI Rank (2003)	HDI Value (2003) (↓ or ← trend noted)	HDI Value (1990*) (*otherwise noted)	Polity IV score (2003)
High human development avg	0.895		
40 Qatar	0.849	0.833 (2002)	-10
41 United Arab Emirates	0.849	0.805	-08
43 Bahrain	0.846	0.808	-07
44 Kuwait	0.844	0.810 (1995)	-07
51 Seychelles	0.821 ↓	0.853 (2002)	..

⁷⁸ Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagers, *Polity IV Country Reports 2003* (University of Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2003), <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/report.htm#naf>.

Medium Human Development

HDI Rank (2003)	HDI Value (2003) (↓ or ← trend noted)	HDI Value (1990*) (*otherwise noted)	Polity IV score (2003)
‡ 71 Oman	0.781	0.696	-08
‡ 77 Saudi Arabia	0.772	0.707	-10
80 Kazakhstan	0.761 ↓	0.767	-06
81 Lebanon	0.759	0.673	-66
‡ 90 Jordan	0.753	0.682	-02
‡ 97 Turkmenistan	0.738 ↓	0.752 (2002)	-09
‡ 99 Iran, Islamic Rep. of	0.736	0.649	+03
‡ 106 Syrian Arab Republic	0.721	0.635	-07
Medium human development avg 0.718			
‡ 109 Kyrgyzstan	0.702 ←	0.701	-03
‡ 111 Uzbekistan	0.697 ←	0.687 (1995)	-09
‡ 119 Egypt	0.659	0.577	-06
‡* 122 Tajikistan, Conflict ('97)	0.652 ↓	0.719	-03
‡ 135 Pakistan	0.527	0.444	-05
‡* 141 Sudan, Ongoing Conflict	0.512	0.427	-06

Low Human Development

HDI Rank (2003)	HDI Value (2003) (↓ or ← trend noted)	HDI Value (1990*) (*otherwise noted)	Polity IV score (2003)
‡ 150 Djibouti	0.495	0.450 (1995)	+02
‡ 151 Yemen	0.489	0.392	-02
Low human development avg 0.486			
‡ 154 Kenya	0.470 ↓	0.540	+08
‡* 161 Eritrea, Conflict ('00)	0.444	0.410 (1995)	-07
‡* 170 Ethiopia, Conflict ('00)	0.367	0.305	+01

Bibliography

- Adsera, Alicia, Charles Boix, and Mark Payne. "Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government." *The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*. Vol. 19, No. 2.
- Branch, Taylor. *At Canaan's Edge: America in the King Years, 1965-68*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2006.
- Barnett, Thomas P.M. *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*. New York, NY: The Berkely Publishing Group, 2004.
- Bengali, Shashank. "Hearts and Minds." *Knight-Ridder Newspapers*, January 29, 2006.
- Boix, Charles. *Democracy and Redistribution*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Borzel, Tanja, and Thomas Risse. "One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law." In Michael McFaul, "Democracy Promotion as a World Value," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2004-05, 28:1.
- Cincotta, Richard P., Robert Engelman, and Daniele Anastaion. *The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War*. Washington, D.C.: Population Action International, 2003.
- Clarke, Jonathan. "Don't Keep U.S. Troops in Bosnia." *Los Angeles Times*, July 8, 1996.
- Cohen, Stephen P. *The Idea of Pakistan*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004.
- Collier, Paul. "Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective." In *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. Edited by Mats Berdal and David M. Malone. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000.
- Drucker, Peter. "Not Enough Generals Were Killed." *Forbes ASAP*, Apr. 8, 1996.
- "Special Report: An Underclass Rebellion – France's Riots." *The Economist*. London: Nov 12, 2005, Vol. 377, Iss. 8452.
- Fair, Christine C. *Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004.
- Freeman, Richard B., and James L. Medoff. *What Do Unions Do?* New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1984.
- Friedman, Thomas L. *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.

- Galor, Oded, and David N. Weil. "Population, Technology, and Growth: From Malthusian Stagnation to the Demographic Transition and Beyond." *The American Economic Review*. September 2000, Vol. 90, No. 4.
- Hammes, Thomas X. *The Sling and The Stone*. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004.
- Heritage, Andre, chief editor. *Essential Atlas of the World*. New York, NY: Dorling Publishing, rev. 2003.
- Hillen, John. "Superpowers Don't Do Windows." *Orbis*, 00304387, Spring 1997, Vol. 41, Issue 2.
- Human Security Centre. *Democratic Institutions: Governance and Civil War*, Workshop Report, Bellagio, Italy, 7-9 June 2004. LIU Institute for Global Issues: The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1996.
- Kaplan, Robert D. *Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos*. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2002.
- Khan, Shahrukh Rafi. *Pakistan's Economy under the Military Government (1999-2004): Has There Been Real Progress?* Paper, conference on "The Economics and Politics of Pakistan's Development," organized by The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University, November 8, 2004.
- Malthus, Thomas Robert. *An Essay on the Principle of Population: A View of its Past and Present Effects on Human Happiness; with an Inquiry into Our Prospects Respecting the Future Removal or Mitigation of the Evils which It Occasions*. London: Pub. John Murray, 1826, sixth edition.
- Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jagers. *Polity IV Country Reports 2003*. University of Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2003. <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/report.htm#naf>.
- National Intelligence Council. *Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project*. NIC 2004-13, December 2004.
- Peake, Gordon. "Power Sharing in a Police Car: Kosovo and Macedonia." In *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies*. Edited by Noel, Sid. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005.

- Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales. *Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: Unleashing the Power of Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity*. New York, NY: Crown Business, 2003.
- Rotberg, Robert I. "Strengthening Governance: Ranking Countries Would Help." *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2004-5, 28:1.
- Sen, Amartya. "Democracy as a Universal Value." *Journal of Democracy*, July 1999, 10.3.
- Tassel, Janet. "Militant about 'Islamism:' Daniel Pipes wages 'hand-to-hand' combat with a 'totalitarian ideology.'" *Harvard Magazine*, January-February, 2005.
- United Nations Development Programme. *Human Development Report 2005, September 7, 2005*. <http://hdr.undp.org/>.
- Urdal, Henrik. "The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950-2000." *The World Bank Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction*, Paper No. 14, July 2004.
- Wilson, James Q., and George L. Kelling. "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety." *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 1982, Vol. 249, No. 3.
- The World Bank Group. *Public Governance Sector: Indicators of Governance and Institutional Quality*, May, 2005. <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/indicators.htm>.