



Counterproliferation at Ten

*Transforming the Fight Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction*

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A Look Into the Future

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Excerpt From ADM Fargo's Congressional Testimony, 6/03

- “CBRNE defense is a significant concern in the Pacific theater, and a *potential showstopper* for U.S. military operations, causing *significant operational risk to Major War OPLAN execution.*”
- “CBRNE is a *critical operating condition* and potentially the greatest theater threat I face, affecting everyone, everywhere, including our allies and the homeland.”
- “Aircraft exposure on the Korean Peninsula or an attack on a few strategic choke points, including Guam and key Japanese air and seaports, *could stop U.S. force flows and other critical support operations.*”
- “Significant differences exist between what we would like to achieve against CBRNE threats and our actual capabilities.”

What Is Needed In Countering Proliferation?

- Improved planning
- Protection (especially against surprise)
- Consequence management
- Integrated coalition approach

My perceptions

Improved Planning

- **Better intelligence on the threat**
 - **Types, quantities, locations, strategy, transfers**
 - **Risk management across the uncertainties**
 - **“Learning” once attacks begin**
- **Don't treat CBW as a conventional plan overlay**
 - **Need branches for breakpoints, changes to avoid them**
 - **Example: D-Day timing, character likely changes**
- **Develop better tools**
 - **To better predict impacts (PMESII)**
 - **For real-time assessment and planning**
- **Exercise the threat**
 - **Can't always be done on a non-interference basis**

Protection (Especially Against Surprise)

- Enhance detection
 - Need rapid, standoff detection
 - BW use likely key to strategic warning
- CBW force protection conditions
 - Adjust protections with threat changes
 - Need force protection CONOPs
 - Evolution of CONOPs when war begins, BW used
- Protections with low operational degradations (especially during peacetime, at higher BW FPCON)
 - Collective protection
 - Expedient individual protection
 - Vaccinations

Consequence Management

- **Real-time response planning**
 - **Estimating requirements early after an attack**
- **Will retrograde be possible? Who?**
- **Medical care (Who beyond active duty?)**
 - **Need prophylaxis and treatment guidelines**
 - **Example: Need OTUSF vaccination policy adjusted, expanded?**
 - **Need approaches to mass casualty treatment**
 - **Enhancing medical care without retrograde?**
 - **Addressing psychological casualties**
- **Decontamination standards and procedures**
- **Handling human remains**

Coalition Efforts

- The U.S. and its regional allies need an integrated approach to countering proliferation
 - Need standardized threat perception
 - Need better information sharing, including threat effects
 - Need standardized equipment, concepts of operation, and policies
 - Set the example with U.S. forces
 - Remove many U.S. disclosure, technology transfer limits
 - Little planning for civil defense
 - Adjust the role of the military (e.g., “full dimensional protection” of whom?)