

INTUITION:



Colonel Charles T. Rogers, British Army

The author endeavors to examine the relevance of intuition to decision making in the context of warfighting on the modern battlefield. He also attempts to analyze the current decision-making process to see if it provides the battlefield commander with the techniques to make quick, instinctive decisions.

There is no logical way to the discovery of these elemental laws. There is only the way of intuition, which is helped by a feeling for the order lying behind the appearance.

—Albert Einstein

IN 1812, during the Peninsular War in Spain, it was said that it took 14 days plus 2 hours for the Duke of Wellington to get decisions from London. The story goes on to add that if he had the benefits of modern communications, then the decision and transmission times would be reversed, with transmission taking a few hours and the decision time some two weeks. Although this story is totally apocryphal, it does emphasize the dilemma faced by modern decision makers. With current technology providing excellent and speedy communications, coupled

with the ability to provide accurate information, commanders should be in a position to give sound decisions quickly. However, this does not seem to be the case. The more information you give a commander, the more reluctant he is to make decisions. He either becomes overloaded or delays making a decision in the belief that if he waits he will receive the vital piece of information that tends never to come.

To handle this mass of information, we have developed analytical procedures to help sort the information and enable the commander to come to a decision. However, these procedures are in themselves time consuming if not handled with care. They demand increasing amounts of information and processing capability in an effort to impose certainty in war, which is never there.

This has led to the interesting situation where advances in technology are actually speeding up the actions and slowing down the decision making in any decision/action cycle. It is as if our military leaders have become prisoners of technology. This analytical approach to decision making seems to run contrary to the requirements of the modern battlefield and, in particular, the battlefield commander, who seems to require a quicker, more imaginative and instinctive approach to decision making. British Military Doctrine (BMD) reinforces this point when it says: "Decisions will often have to be made by a commander on the basis of his own judgment.

Such decisions cannot follow from careful analysis of the situation, weighing all the advantages and disadvantages of various alternative courses."¹ The British army has now officially accepted "Mission Command" as a part of its command doctrine and the US Army has now officially accepted "Battle Command" as part of its doctrine. However, there is a great danger that our decision-making procedures remain ponderous, producing commanders who are not able to take advantage of such a military philosophy. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's comments on British World War II commanders in the desert suggested that their failures were due to "Rigidly methodical techniques of command, over systematic issuing of orders down to the last detail, and poor adaptability to the changing course of battle."² It is perhaps arguable that Rommel's assessment is still pertinent today.

Intuition and Decision Making

Before looking at current military decision making, it is perhaps important to understand what intuition is, or perhaps is not. Only then can we judge its relevance and look at ways of developing it. Webster's Dictionary defines intuition as "the immediate knowing of something without the conscious use of reasoning." It has also been described as "instinct," "insight" or "hunch." The problems with such words as instinct or hunch is that they conjure images of intellectual dishonesty and sloppiness of thought reflecting a lack of objective analysis. It

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is, therefore, a difficult concept to sell in the light of a demand for certainty in decision making brought about by sophisticated techniques, computer calculations, analysis and wargaming, especially when the consequence of decisions deals in the ultimate reality of life or death to soldiers. It is perhaps of interest to note that businesses recognize the hunch factor and its importance in commercial activity but, at the same time, have difficulty in accepting it as it seems to lack scientific credibility.

In a recent article in the *Daily Telegraph*, Roland Gribben said that "many managers are trying to suppress the hunch factor because emphasis now is on making extensive use of computers and market analysis and scenario planning."³ The article advises leading managers not to reject hunches, but be prepared to ditch them if they find no supporting evidence. This is a very important point for the military commander and emphasizes the high-risk nature of intuitive decision making and the need to have some check to ensure that the decisions made are "safe." This safety check is either based on the experience, training and knowledge of the commander or the use of outside advice against which he can check the decisions he has made. The relationship between Sir Alan Brooke and Winston Churchill is always put forward as an ideal balance between the intuitive leadership of Churchill and the safety net provided by the pragmatic Brooke.



The commander of VII Corps, Frederick M. Franks Jr., confers with the 1st AD's commander, Paul E. Funk (left), and Colonel Don Holder, commander of the 2d ACR, about the possibility of moving forward VII Corps' assault, 1015, 24 February 1991. The Corps was on the march by 1430 with the 2d ACR already 10 km into Iraq.

Major General Smith [1st (UK) AD] said he only once made an "instant decision" [in the Gulf War]. . . . Although this might suggest that decisions made by deep analysis are more the norm and the preferred and safer way of coming to decisions for the battlefield commander, this is arguably incorrect as the situation during the "100-hour" war did not require such instant or intuitive decisions to be made at division level. . . . The use of instinct or intuition in decision making is related to lack of information and time available and is more useful in battle command than in battle preparation.

Brooke wrote of Churchill: "Planned strategy was not his strong card. He preferred to work by intuition and by impulse. He was never any good at looking at all the implications of any course he favoured."⁴ Similarly, Adolf Hitler was an intuitive thinker, and the initial successes in France and the Russian Front showed a certain genius. However, his reluctance to listen to his generals was, in the end, his downfall, producing what B. H. Liddell Hart described as a "suicidal schism."⁵ Intuitive decision making is high risk and relies on a degree of rationality in the individual making the decision. This rationality, however, can be undermined by the stresses and strains of the battlefield, whether it is fear or lack of sleep. A stressed and tired mind and body can play havoc with the intuitive thinker's immediate comprehension of the reality of any situation. So the need for a "safety check" on intuitive decisions made by a military commander is vital as the environment in which these decisions are made places particular pres-

ures on the commander that are not necessarily present in the business community.

Gut feeling or intuitive beliefs stem from rapid thinking at the subconscious level. The left side of the brain, the seat of motion, music and art, is responsible for the sort of decision made "because it just feels right" rather than because it is logical. The right side of the brain is responsible for logical thought, mathematical analysis and language. So, intuitive decision making reflects the "art" rather than the "science" in command. It is also perhaps of interest that the left side of the brain is more dominant in women, and therefore, they could be deemed to be more intuitive than men. If this is the case, then it raises the interesting proposition that women might be better equipped to handle the complexities of the modern battlefield and maneuver warfare if intuition is the key to decision making.

Although intuitive decisions are hard to explain since they are based on some "inner wisdom" that something is plain "right," it is impor-

tant to try to understand how and why leaders come to make such decisions. Beverly Alimo-Metcalf, senior lecturer in organizational psychology at Leeds University, said that intuition is, in reality, often not spontaneous decisions at all, but the result of rapid thought.⁶ Although this is undoubtedly correct, it prompts the question, "thought based on what?" The answer to this question must be centered on knowledge and a wealth of past experiences. There is a fundamental link between training, experience and technological competence that provides the knowledge required to make intuitive decisions. Therefore, intuition is about sifting rapidly through your memory bank of past experiences in order to make decisions. You are, in fact, searching for familiar patterns and are not making decisions in a vacuum.

Command on the Modern Battlefield

In the British Army Field Manual—*Operations*, maneuver warfare is described as "the employment of forces through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy."⁷ It goes on to emphasize the importance of momentum, surprise and, above all, an attitude of mind. This attitude of mind is particularly important when looking at the activities of the commander. In the US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, maneuver is defined as "the movement of combat forces to gain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver—or threaten delivery of—direct and indirect fires. Maneuver is the means of positioning forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum, massed effects and moral dominance."⁸ In essence, maneuver warfare can be broken down into two components. First, the physical ability to move and apply force faster than the enemy, which in simple terms relates to equipment and technology, and second, on the speed of decision making. If all things are equal, then decision making relative to the enemy becomes all important.

This point is highlighted in BMD when it says: "At any level quick reaction will be para-

When nearly a half-million Chinese troops struck UN forces on 21 April 1950, General Van Fleet anticipated that they would only be able to maintain their offensive for about five or six days before losing momentum and had his troops fall back along a series of pre-planned phase lines. He also anticipated where the renewed communist assault would fall and shifted reserves into place before it opened on 30 April.



General James A. Van Fleet

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mount and there will always be the need to reach a timely decision in relation to an opponent's own decision action process."⁹ So it is vital that a commander make quick decisions in order to remain inside the enemy's decision loop; otherwise he has no chance of gaining or retaining the initiative.

So why is maneuver so important to the US and British armies today? Although risk is

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inherent in maneuver and warfighting, prudent risk taking provides the opportunity of gaining a "decisive victory" against a more numerous enemy with minimum casualties.¹⁰ We can no longer afford to fight a war of attrition—not only because of our reducing force sizes, but also because modern democracies will not accept high casualties. It follows from this that the commander must be unpredictable, imaginative and instinctive and must weigh the factor of surprise as critical to his plans.

To achieve this, a commander needs initiative or "command pull" based on intuition rather than "staff push," which is akin to the more analytical approach to command. Warfighting on today's battlefield is not compatible with this more analytical or scientific approach to decision making such as that practiced by Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, which has been described as being "characterized as one of tremendous attention to detail; cautious and attritionalist in nature."¹¹ However, the analytical or scientific approach to decision making associated with commanders such as Montgomery should not be dismissed as faulty—far from it. This kind of decision making has its place before the battle when time is not pressing and you are able to analyze problems exhaustively.

Decisions made by 1st (UK) Armored Division (AD) in the Gulf War were made in an analytical, if not mathematical, way using opera-

tional and critical path analysis. In a recent lecture to the Higher Command Staff Course, Major General Smith said he only once made an "instant decision" without the presence of his staff in the Gulf, and that was just after the breach when the corps commander wanted to push the 1st (US) Infantry Division to the north of 1st (UK) AD.¹² This decision took "about 5 minutes."

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For a commander to make intuitive decisions in a battle command situation, he must be in the "right" position on the battlefield. He will need to have a "feel" for the battle for his level of command and be able to assess the situation quickly. Inevitably, to achieve this, he will have to be as forward as his echelon of command requires to see and read the battle, and not at a command post where his clarity of vision will be impaired by a confusion of information. If he ties himself to a command post his decisions then will be slow and predictable, handing the initiative to the enemy. To quote from US Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-100-1, *Leadership and Command on the Battlefield*, on lessons learned from commanders during operations *Just Cause* and *Desert Storm*: "Information received at the command post may not be sufficient to paint an accurate tactical picture and valuable time could be lost trying to confirm the actual combat situation.



Eighth Army Commander Walton H. Walker, discussing operations with his staff and field commanders, 14 July 1950. With X Corps in Japan the sole recipient of the Korean-bound replacement stream from the United States, Walker's two severely understrength corps and the South Koreans formed a thin line called the Pusan Perimeter to halt the North Koreans. Walker concentrated most of his strength into large mobile reserves, and his use of short, quick counterattacks against penetrations kept the North Koreans off balance until X Corps landed at Inchon on 15 September.

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"friction of war." As William S. Lind says in his handbook on maneuver warfare, "you will not only accept confusion and disorder and operate successfully within it, through decentralization, you will also generate confusion and disorder."¹⁶ It is with this type of uncertainty that the analytical approach to command has difficulty. It craves for certainty that is not there in warfare, and this craving leads to a requirement for more information, which is in itself time consuming. In a confused situation, a commander needs what Carl von Clausewitz described as "the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would



Panzer Group-2 Commander Heinz Guderian (*center right*) discusses the ongoing problem of infantry and armor becoming dangerously separated with the commander of the 197th Infantry Division, Hermann Meyer (*right*), in late July 1941, roughly one month into the invasion of Russia.

“General von Mellenthin, at one point turned to the American [conference] participants to announce that . . . in Russia they normally had about five minutes to make such decisions.” He went on to say that it took another 10 minutes to issue the orders. . . . Although the comparison of 15 minutes to 2 1/2 to 5 hours looks staggering, it should be tempered by the fact that a modern US division equates in size to a World War II German corps and, of course, the modern battlefield is indeed more complex. However, that apart, even if the German generals took 30 minutes, the comparison does not look much better.

ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection.”¹⁷ What Clausewitz is defining is the quality labeled by the French as “*coup d’oeil*” or “intuition.”

Paralysis by Analysis in Military Decision Making

So far we have outlined two basic methods of decision making. On the one hand, we have decisions based on an exhaustive analysis of factors. On the other hand, we have intuition, which emphasizes decisions based on the ability of a commander to rapidly process information gained from knowledge and experience. With technology providing an endless flow of infor-

mation on the modern battlefield, it would be logical to suggest that analysis would be the stronger form of decision making. However, the demand for “certainty” on the battlefield leads to a demand for more information, much of which will be incorrect and indeed misleading. The danger with this process is that commanders believe they never have sufficient information to make a decision, and so they either delay their decision or reach a situation when they never make a decision. John Adair suggests this is a state of “paralysis by analysis” that is a common failing in leaders who have not learned to be decisive.¹⁸ So, the more information that is available, the more time is needed to process it and the

more difficult it becomes to distinguish incorrect, unimportant or misleading information. Martin Van Creveld concluded that there was no way out of this dilemma except "relying no less on intuitive judgment than on rational calculation."¹⁹

To overcome the complications of decision making on the modern battlefield, most armies have introduced procedures and techniques to help the decision maker. However, these procedures have not speeded up decision making. Quite to the contrary, they tend to slow down the whole process and are not compatible with the requirements of warfighting, which demands speed of decision making as well as speed of action. As Captain Kevin B. Smith so aptly observed in his article on combat information flow, "We must speed up our OODA [observation-orientation-decision-action] loop . . . otherwise, we will still be in the huddle when the other team kicks the ball into our goal."²⁰

In a research opinion paper, "Decision Making Theory Applied to the Conditions of Ground Combat," produced for the Army in 1990, it was found that the time it took US division commanders to issue orders after mission receipt was on average 2 1/2 hours, with the maximum being 5 hours. In 1980, BDM Corporation in the United States hosted a conference on tactical warfare.²¹ As part of the conference, two retired German generals from World War II, Hermann Balck and Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, were invited to develop a plan for the use of a US division in defense in the NATO context against a Soviet enemy. The report from the conference states that the two generals accepted the challenge and goes on to say: "General von Mellenthin, at one point turned to the American participants to announce that they would not take long. He observed that in Russia they normally had about five minutes to make such decisions." He went on to say that it took another 10 minutes to issue the orders.

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more complex. However, that apart, even if the German generals took 30 minutes, the comparison does not look much better. When asked how they went about making such decisions, the two German generals used the word "*fingerspitzengefühl*," which means "fingertip feeling." The BDM report amplifies this phrase by saying it is "an instinctive sixth sense for ground and tactics in the art of war." This fingertip feeling or instinctive sixth sense seems to reflect the meaning and spirit of intuition in military decision making, and thus we can perhaps add yet another German term to the ever-increasing number that seems to pervade current military doctrinal thinking.

It is perhaps of interest to note that the two German generals, while considering the problem given to them, made no attempt to analyze time. Under the Army's orders process and British command procedures, great emphasis is put on the requirement to divide time available on the basis of the one-third to two-thirds rule. Time available is taken as a prerequisite before a commander starts the command estimate process. Time, under this procedure seems to suggest that you "have time" and that time is somehow finite. This, however, runs contrary to the spirit

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In a battlefield command situation, you do not have time, and both Balck and von Mellenthin were well aware of this and therefore made their decision using intuition or, as they would describe it, “fingertip feeling.” However, this problem with time is very much related to command in battle. Its importance is less in the preparatory phase of any campaign when there might be time to “tee” up the battle. So the use of intuitive decision making has its strength in battle command once hostilities have started and not necessarily in battle preparation where a more analytical approach might be dominant and more appropriate in helping the commander understand the problems facing him.

The Orders Process

Having looked at decision making in general, we should now focus on the current Army orders process and the British command procedures in more detail. If the commander follows established procedure, he will receive his orders and mission, analyze the mission, go through the estimate process and come up with options before reaching his action/decision point. As already described, this process is time consuming and involves an exhaustive study of factors.

It also relies on information and intelligence that might be incomplete or incorrect. As Clausewitz pointed out: “Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain.”²² So even if a decision is reached through detailed analysis of factors, the soundness of that decision will rely on the correctness and completeness of information. In the end, as Michael I. Handel says in *Masters of War*, “it is impossible to weigh *all* of the relevant factors for even the simplest decisions in war, it is the military leader’s intuition (his *coup d’oeil*) that must ultimately guide him in effective decision-making.”²³

As the estimate process involves the application of logic to known factors, the end result must be “mathematically predictable.” It therefore does not produce bold and imaginative decisions but safe ones that lack any element of surprise, making the process more akin to “positional” or “attritional” warfare rather than maneuver warfare. An example from the Italian Campaign in World War II will serve to prove that point. In the summer of 1943, the Allies were planning for the invasion of mainland Italy. One of the key factors in the planning was the use of air power. The Allies decided, quite logically, that they should make maximum use of their obvious air superiority and any landing must be in the range of their air cover. On the other side of the fence, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring was using the same logic to reach exactly the same predictable conclusion. As Kesselring remarked: “As a result, it was always possible for me, despite inadequate means of reconnaissance and scanty reports, to foresee the next strategic or tactical move of my opponents.”²⁴ The net outcome of this was the near disastrous battle on the beaches of Salerno.

However, to dismiss the estimate process as valueless and irrelevant to intuitive decision-making is obviously wrong. Apart from anything else, there is always an element of analysis in the application of intuition. Where intuition is important as a decision-making process is in actual “battlefighting” as compared to “battle preparation.” The estimate process is equally

Soldiers from the 36th ID advance cautiously off Salerno's Red Beach in the vicinity of Paestum, 9 September 1943. Bottled up on the beachhead and nearly thrown back into the sea, Allied casualties at Salerno eventually topped 9,000 men.



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critical in battle preparation as it provides the commander understanding of the facts and problems facing him. It also allows him to clarify his intelligence, logistics and staff requirements. In essence, the estimate is a staff tool rather than a decision-making tool, and its importance as such should not be underestimated. However, if the pillar of generalship, as described by J. F. C. Fuller, is “To do something that the enemy does not expect, is not prepared for, something which will surprise him and disarm him mentally,” then we require originality, not conventionality in decision making, and this is not provided by the adherence to a logical and predictable process.²⁵ So how should the estimate process dovetail into the requirement of intuitive decision making?

Once a commander has received his orders and mission, he will use intuition to decide on his plan. This will be a rapid process that will be based on his experience and knowledge, emphasizing the effect he wants to have on the enemy and his design for battle to achieve that

effect—in other words, his “intent.”

In reality, most commanders formulate a plan based on one or two options very soon after receiving orders. In a battle command situation, commanders will make decisions without recourse to their superiors but within the framework provided by their superiors’ “mission command/commander’s intent.” If time allows, the commander will then use his staff or subordinates as a “safety” check. The staff will not present the commander with “options” but indicate difficulties and ways of overcoming those difficulties. The estimate, which should be continually updated by the staff, provides the basis for the safety checks and should not be used by the commander to actually make decisions. It is important at all stages that commanders are not bombarded with information but have sufficient knowledge themselves to ask the right questions of their staff. This will lead to command pull as opposed to staff push, which is more associated with the conventional use of the estimate process. The other important side to the estimate

Generals Clarence R. Huebner (*left*) and Terry de la Mesa Allen of the 1st ID at Huebner's assumption of command, Sicily, 8 August 1943. Later, in northwest Europe, Allen commanded the 104th ID while Huebner led 1 ID, then V Corps.



A Combat Studies Institute report on successful US division commanders in the last war revealed that "The primary duties of these officers in war, were as leaders, teachers and students. For the most part they were not hidden away on high level staffs." This means they spent more time with troops and dealing with war-fighting than the average officer, allowing them the opportunity of practicing, as well as studying warfighting doctrine.

process is that it adds to the bank of knowledge and understanding on which the commander will base his intuitive decisions.

Training the Intuitive Thinker


Our armies must produce commanders with an intuitive sixth sense that guides their decision making on the modern battlefield. We cannot allow battlefield commanders with an "attritionalist" attitude, relying totally on material superiority and unimaginative in approach, to lead our soldiers into combat on the modern battlefield. Our future victories must come from units led by intuitive, quick decision-making commanders capable of grasping the tactical situation at a glance and maneuvering forces to defeat the enemy.

The problem with developing intuition among our leaders lies in peacetime soldiering, which demands, quite understandably, the disciplines of analysis and attention to detail and does not encourage or accept decisions made by intuition. In that environment, intuition is not trusted and, therefore, not developed as a decision-making technique. The end result was well described by Archduke Albert when he said, "There are plenty of small-minded men who, in time of peace, excel in detail, are inexorable in matters of equipment and drill . . . and when war arises the small minds, worn out by attention to trifles, are incapable of effort, and fail miserably."²⁶ This is obviously an unfair judgment. However, we are left with the problem of identifying and encouraging future battlefield commanders.

There are basically two approaches to this. Either we identify future commanders early and encourage a separately structured career with the emphasis on developing intuitive skills, such as proposed by Major Jose Picart in his article on "Expert Warfighters with Battlefield Vision" or we accept the current system and encourage an intuitive approach to decision making.²⁷ The problem with the first solution is that it presupposes that we can identify "expert warfighters" in the first place and that we have a large and flexible enough army to allow such an approach. Obviously this is not an option open to either the US or British army. So what we are left with is the requirement to develop intuitive leaders.

As intuition relies on knowledge, it follows that we must expose commanders to a quantity

OPFOR vehicles at the NTC modified to resemble Soviet-built BMP mechanized infantry combat vehicles equipped with AT-3 Sagger missiles.



With the demand for cost effectiveness in training (and therefore assessment), there is an increasing danger that the balance will focus on “testing.” Unfortunately, any “testing” environment tends to encourage safe and unimaginative solutions and an attitude of mind that emphasizes “not getting it wrong” rather than “trying to get it right.” You can see this happening at facilities such as the US Army National Training Center, which in many ways provides an excellent forum for assessing commanders under stress. However, it is seen as the ultimate test.

and variety of situations which allow him to build up a bank of background knowledge. These situations are governed by the types of assignments the officer has and the types of experiences he is exposed to within those assignments. A Combat Studies Institute report on successful US division commanders in the last war revealed that “The primary duties of these officers in war, were as leaders, teachers and students. For the most part they were not hidden away on high level staffs.”²⁸ This means they spent more time with troops and dealing with warfighting than the average officer, allowing them the opportunity of practicing, as well as studying warfighting doctrine. Time with troops and teaching at military schools are the crucial jobs in the development of our future battlefield commanders.

Unfortunately, there is no substitute for combat experience in the educational process, and whatever we do short of that is simulated and second best. Our armies can train and develop intuitive decision-making commanders, to a

large extent, through command post exercises and simulations. However, at some point, commanders will have to lead and maneuver soldiers on the training battlefield if we expect to develop intuition in our leaders. It is important in training to develop situations that allow individuals to make intuitive decisions, which means experimentation and tolerating mistakes. However, it should be remembered that learning from mistakes is more effective than learning from success, and so experimentation with ideas should be encouraged, and officers should not be penalized for honest mistakes.

This leads to the balance of “teaching” to “testing.” With the demand for cost effectiveness in training (and therefore assessment), there is an increasing danger that the balance will focus on “testing.” Unfortunately, any “testing” environment tends to encourage safe and unimaginative solutions and an attitude of mind that emphasizes “not getting it wrong” rather than “trying to get it right.” You can see this happening at

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Commanders must be technologically competent with their weapon systems and their equipment. They must know the capabilities, limitations and most effective means of employment for every system they control. This is an absolute requirement for the intuitive decision-making commander.

Finally, we must ensure that we give our commanders the correct experiences so they can make decisions on the battlefield. There is an increasing tendency in peacetime to focus on procedures that are quantifiable and easily measured. To develop intuition, we need to concentrate on warfighting with emphasis on uncertainty and speed of thought.

Although intuition is difficult to explain and quantify, it is not a product of genetics or some mysterious, unexplainable mental ability. Intuition is the product of a well-organized body of experience and knowledge that can be rapidly processed to make quick decisions. This speed of decision making is obviously vital for the successful prosecution of warfighting where the

decision cycle is time competitive. Its use as a decision-making technique is more pronounced in the area of battle command and, therefore, at the tactical level of command with speed and surprise being the critical ingredients. However, there is a danger. Any decisions made by intuition are the product of an individual and are subject to that individual's rationality. There is thus a need for some kind of safety check in the process to avoid "the suicidal schism" associated with intuitive leaders such as Hitler.

However, in the final analysis, it seems that in peacetime we tie ourselves to decision making by procedures which stifle intuitive decisions on the battlefield. This encourages commanders to be predictable, slow and laborious in their decision making. If we wish to succeed in maneuver warfare, then we must train and educate our officers in intuitive thought that emphasizes the "art" in command rather than the "science." We must not use procedures as decision-making tools but more as staff checks. Officers should spend as much time as possible with troops and in the teaching and training environment. Finally, we should encourage responsibility without overbearing supervision, remembering that an honest mistake is a lesson well learned. **MR**

NOTES

1. Design for Military Operations, *The British Military Doctrine (BMD)*, 43.
2. B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Rommel Papers* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953).
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