

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**FROM CONTAINMENT TO INTEGRATION:  
A GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

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## ABSTRACT

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As containment was the grand strategic response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union to U.S. interests, an innovative approach is again needed in response to the threat posed by radical Islamists who seek to replace the U.S.-led secular, democratic, global system with an Islamic world order using jihadist Islamic terrorism as a tactic to achieve that end. This paper presents an examination of and proposal for the formulation and implementation of a grand strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

In examining U.S. strategic objectives in going to war in Iraq, the paper illustrates how policies led inadvertently to a strategic construct that holds the potential for the formulation of a new grand strategy – a strategy of integration. The purpose is to expand upon the eventual justification for going to war and explore the validity, implications, and possible means of application of a new strategic security paradigm. The assessment suggests that a war of co-option entails a fundamental paradox that must be addressed through the exercise of cultural intelligence and the analysis and manipulation of cultural control measures appropriate to the cultural milieu, which is an integral element of a grand strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> century – a strategy of integration.



## FROM CONTAINMENT TO INTEGRATION: A GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

The latter half of the twentieth century was shaped by the U.S. grand strategy of containment as America and her allies waged a global campaign to limit communist expansion fostered by the Soviet Union. Just as containment was the grand strategic response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union to U.S. security, values, and influence in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, an innovative approach is again needed in response to the threat posed by radical Islamists who seek to replace the U.S.-led secular, democratic, global system with an Islamic world order using jihadist Islamic terrorism as a tactic to achieve that end. This paper presents an examination of and proposal for the formulation and implementation of a grand strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

I begin with the thesis that, as an element of the Global War on Terrorism, Operation Iraqi Freedom constitutes a new type of war – a war of co-option. Examining U.S. strategic objectives in going to war in Iraq, the paper illustrates how maneuvering to justify the war in the absence of evidence of weapons of mass destruction resulted in policies that led inadvertently to a strategic construct that holds the potential for the formulation of a new grand strategy – a strategy of integration. This paper neither defends nor criticizes the decision to go to war in Iraq.<sup>1</sup> Its purpose is to expand upon the eventual justification for going to war and explore the validity, implications, and possible means of application of a new strategic security paradigm. The assessment suggests that while a war of co-option can be an element in a strategy of integration, it entails a fundamental paradox that must be addressed through the exercise of cultural intelligence and the analysis and manipulation of cultural control measures appropriate to the cultural milieu, which is an integral element of a grand strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> century – a strategy of integration.

By integration, I mean a strategy that focuses all elements of national power towards the objective of motivating nations, groups, cultures, and even individuals, to adopt and internalize U.S. values or to view the support of U.S. objectives as being in their own interest. A grand strategy of inclusion is attractive in that it is fundamentally non-kinetic, and reduces points of cultural and ideological friction while increasing the number of nations that participate in the U.S. led global network of democratic economies. It also entails political and social engineering on a grand scale, the objective of which is nothing less than the transformation of a society into a functioning democracy that buys into and internalizes democratic values.

Formulation: A War of Co-option leads to a Strategy of Integration

On September 11, 2001, nineteen men executed a terror attack on the United States that killed nearly 3,000, compelled a re-evaluation of American ideas of security, and led to the evolution of a new strategy of war. The Bush administration defined the attack as an act of war and the U.S. response was to declare war not simply against the perpetrators of the attack, al Qaeda, but against terrorism world wide. In his address to the Congress and the American people on 20 September 2001, President Bush stated,

We will direct every resource at our command — every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war — to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.<sup>2</sup>

The first stage of the Global War on Terrorism constituted a classic war of annihilation, directly targeting al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that supported the organization. The response was predictable; prior to September 11, 2001, international terrorism was understood to be buttressed by state sponsorship – defeat the state, and you cut the terrorists' lifeline. Such an approach allowed war planners to stay within their comfort area of conducting war on the Westphalian model of nation states fighting nation states – attacking Afghanistan the nation rather than terrorism, the tactic. By defeating the Taliban militarily, the U.S. weakened al Qaeda, but did not destroy it – the terrorist threat posed by jihadist Islamic extremists remained. The time was right for members of the Bush administration, especially Paul Wolfowitz, to push for eliminating the root causes of Middle Eastern and jihadist Islamic terror by implementing the Wilsonian ideal of “making the world safe for democracy” by forcing democratic change in the Middle East as a means of spreading moral (democratic) values.<sup>3</sup> The administration's objective (end) became ensuring the security and prosperity of the U.S. by creating “a balance of power that favors human freedom”<sup>4</sup> by defending peace, preserving peace, and extending peace.<sup>5</sup> Policy focused on fostering democratic values among nations and societies under the belief that promotion of democracy enhances the security of the United States, if one accepts the Kantian premise that democracies do not go to war with each other. We can't kill all those who might use such tactics against U.S. interests, so we'll eliminate the underlying causes of jihadist Islamic terrorism by creating functioning democracies in the greater Middle East, beginning with Iraq<sup>6</sup>.

I do not believe the Bush administration set out with a strategy of fighting a war of co-option immediately after 9/11. It appears the strategy evolved over time. Initially, the intent was to go after state sponsors of terrorism along with the terrorists, though Iraq was already in our sights. In interviews on National Public Radio on September 14, 2001 and on *Fox News with*

*Brit Hume* on September 13, 2001, Paul Wolfowitz asserted Saddam Hussein was “one of the most active sponsors of state terrorism”.<sup>7</sup> On 1 June, 2002 at a graduation speech delivered at West Point, the president unveiled his policy of preemption and hinted at a policy of regime change, stating,

We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.... We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.... And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.<sup>8</sup>

Just three weeks later, with Yasser Arafat refusing to act to combat Palestinian terrorism, the president called for new Palestinian leadership, asking the Palestinian people “to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror. I call upon them to build a practicing democracy, based on tolerance and liberty.”<sup>9</sup> The president was on record as citing democratization among an Arab population as a prescription against terrorism.

Three months later, preemption and democratization formally became elements of U.S. national strategy. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” issued September 2002, stated that

...we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right to self-defense by acting preemptively...” and that “to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”<sup>10</sup>

Concerning democratization, the document asserts that

America must stand firm for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property....If Palestinians embrace democracy, and the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state.<sup>11</sup>

In Iraq, the strategies of preemption and democratization in the Middle East as strategies for combating jihadist Islamic terrorism and ensuring American security, not only against terrorism but also the threat of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), would come together, melded by the strategy of regime change. In October 2002, President Bush viewed the likely possession of WMD by Iraq and the possibility that Hussein would provide such weapons to terrorists as a credible threat to the U.S. In a speech given to the Cincinnati Museum Center on 7 October 2002, the president stated that “confronting the threat posed by

Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror” and that “regime change in Iraq is the only certain means of removing a great danger to our nation”.<sup>12</sup>

On 19 March, 2003, President Bush announced to the nation the beginning of the war in Iraq.<sup>13</sup> Ostensibly, America went to war over weapons of mass destruction. However, In his 27 February 2003 speech to the American Enterprise Institute, President Bush asserted that

a liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America's interests in security, and America's belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq.... The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life.<sup>14</sup>

This approach became the declared policy of the U.S. when, in a 6 November, 2003 speech at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy given at the U. S. Chamber of Commerce in Washington, President Bush announced

the United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. This strategy requires the same persistence and energy and idealism we have shown before. And it will yield the same results. As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace. The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country.<sup>15</sup>

Operation Iraqi Freedom was not primarily about WMD. America launched a preemptive attack on a sovereign nation to effect regime change with the intent of creating a democratic Iraq. The strategy was proactive and idealistic in a Wilsonian sense – the primary threat to America was posed by jihadist Islamic terrorism, spawned and supported from the Middle East. It is impossible to kill all terrorists, but creating for the people of the Middle East the benefits of a democratic society could result in an end to terrorism at its source. We were not going to war to conquer Iraq, we were going to war to depose its leadership and create for the Iraqi people a society in which they would reap the benefits of living in a democracy with all the rights and opportunities that entails. As a force for good, America would co-opt the Iraqi people and create a model democracy in the heart of the Arab world. Integrating Iraq into the global community of democratic nations was the first step in a strategy to spread democracy throughout the region. In a certain sense, the very concept of initiating such a plan by prosecuting a war of co-option is inherently paradoxical, though not in the sense used by Luttwak.<sup>16</sup> Fighting a war of co-option, as in Iraq, means conducting military operations to defeat a nation's military and depose its leadership with the expectation that such action will set the conditions for the populace to adopt the attacker's social and political value system. There is, however, great value in a strategy that

focuses on “diminish[ing] the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit”<sup>17</sup> by improving the lives and conditions of people through the spread of democracy and integration into the global community of democratic nations.

I chose the term “integration” as used by Richard Haass<sup>18</sup> which dovetails well with the world view promoted by Thomas Barnett in which he divides the world between the integrated core and the non-integrating gap.<sup>19</sup> What I am proposing is no less than the exercise of statecraft supported by economic, informational, and military capabilities to manipulate others to support and further U.S. interests, or to transform their world view and value system to reflect ours. Integration is a strategy to address cultural and/or political resistance (or outright rejection) of globalization and the norms and values required for democratization and inclusion in the interconnected global economy. The point is, whether you subscribe to a view of the world divided by competency as portrayed by Thomas Friedman and Thomas Barnett<sup>20</sup> or a world divided by culture as portrayed by Samuel P. Huntington<sup>21</sup>, a strategy of integration addresses cultural resistance and frames plans to foster the motivation needed to modify perceptions and behavior and inculcate the desire to achieve the competency necessary to achieve integration.

#### Implementation: They Won't Come to the Party if They Can't Read the Invitation

A strategy of integration requires engagement in operations that require significant interaction with other cultures. In the military sphere, U.S. forces are increasingly operating alongside allied or coalition forces and interacting with local populations while conducting counter-insurgency and nation building operations. The Global War on Terrorism has imposed upon the U.S. military a new war-fighting paradigm. U.S. forces are generally held to conventional war-fighting standards while fighting an enemy conducting an unconventional war. At the same time, our military must conduct operations in a manner that does not turn the local populace against U.S. forces and operations while maintaining the support of our coalition partners, the international community, and the U.S. public.

Decision makers and policy planners must recognize that our forces and our nation are operating in a “theater” of war in which military operations should play a less significant role. Conflict is no longer industrial, it is political-cultural and the United States finds itself operating in a “theater” of produced by 24 hour news programming, satellite, and internet communications. The conflict is conducted as much in the media as on the battlefield – a point well understood by our adversaries. In his June 2005 letter, Ayman al-Zawahiri writes

I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.<sup>22</sup>

Performance violence such as beheadings and suicide bombings are played out on CNN and al Jazeera with the strategic goals of weakening the resolve of U.S. allies and the U.S. public while mobilizing elements of the Islamic world to garner funding, recruits, prominence and to promote anti-American and anti-western sentiment. Meanwhile, in western capitols, social and political considerations direct military decisions. In such an environment, cross cultural friction or misunderstanding can result in tactical, operational, and strategic failure.

Operating in a “theater” of war is often referred to as a battle for hearts and minds. This is a misunderstanding of the nature of the struggle. The battle is “of” hearts and minds, rather than “for” hearts and minds. In the minds of administration planners, our democratic values rest upon inalienable rights. Respect for these rights is advantageous to both individuals and society as a whole. Were we in the situation of the Iraqi people under Saddam - living under the thumb of a despot, susceptible to his every whim, living in fear of the midnight knock on the door – we would welcome with open arms those who would liberate us and extend to us the opportunities and benefits of a democratic way of life. This is a reasonable, logical argument – an appeal to the mind.

Our adversaries, such as al Qaeda, understand the culture and emotional mindset of the people. They speak to them in the language and poetic style of the Koran; they hearken back to the Golden Age of Islam and the Islamic empire of the Caliphate; they couch their message in terms of a philosophy of suffering to attain paradise and portray Islam as under attack by globalization and the pursuit of material happiness which equates to decadence. Theirs is a passionate, emotional argument based on an intimate understanding of the cultural values and norms of their audience – an appeal to the heart.

The error made by the Bush administration was not in choosing, consciously or not, a strategy of integration, but in attempting to achieve it via a war of co-option and to execute it under assumptions based on mirror imaging. As Americans we are culturally programmed to respond positively to western, democratic values and ideals. Iraqis are not Americans – their culture, value system, and world view are shaped, not by a Judeo-Christian, west European, democratic milieu, but by an Arab-Bedouin, Muslim, patriarchal, tribal-based society and history. In a battle of hearts and minds, we must be able to identify those for whom an appeal to the mind will be effective – a strategy of targeted integration. If the security threat to the U.S. is posed by radical, jihadist Islamists, then a first step is to identify and then target for influence

those moderate Arabs and Muslims who are willing to accommodate modernism and globalism. The objective is not to defeat or supplant Islam, nor is it to convert its adherents. In response to globalization and modernity, Islam in the main is in the early stages of a reformation. A grand strategy of integration would focus efforts on setting the conditions to enhance the process. In the earliest stages, the strategy should focus on those already receptive to the message such as the political leadership and educated middle class of Jordan; educated middle class Palestinian expatriates; and the political leadership and educated class of Tunisia.<sup>23</sup>

However, using Operation Iraqi Freedom as an example, a strategy of integration cannot succeed solely by fighting a war for the minds of the people, attempting to convince the Iraqi polity to accept and take ownership of a different political culture. To be successful, we must also understand their cultural environment and appeal to their hearts. An intimate understanding of Arabic and Arab-Muslim culture would indicate both a cultural tradition of trade and mercantilism as well as a cultural propensity for negotiation and a tradition of consensus building in decision making. This knowledge coupled with an understanding of the cultural meanings, attitudes, values, symbolic forms and language that motivates the culture, would enable the U.S. to formulate policies and programs to influence Arab populations to embrace the concepts of capitalism and the democratic process.

Although in the case of Iraq a war is being fought to set the conditions for this transformation, in planning a strategy of integration, actual combat operations are less important than setting the conditions to prepare the population for engagement with the U.S. Plans and programs should be in place to win the peace and minimize to the greatest extent possible the rise of an insurgency. The strategy for accomplishing the pre – and post-hostilities phases cannot be based on the assumption that we are happiest with our way of life, so they will be as well. Our value judgments are grounded in our culture and any planning must begin with an intimate understanding of the target's culture or cultures.<sup>24</sup> This is of particular importance both in Iraq and throughout the greater Middle East where most, if not all, political and social dialogue is couched in Islamic terms, underscoring the primacy of place held by religion and culture. Key to executing a strategy of integration is an intimate understanding of cultural norms and motivators.

It is worthwhile to take a moment to examine culture and why it is so important to this strategy. Most definitions of culture refer to behavior, norms, and values. For example, Peter Burke defines culture as “a system of shared meanings, attitudes, and values, and the symbolic forms (performances, artifacts) in which they are expressed or embodied.”<sup>25</sup> According to John Kotter, “culture refers to norms of behavior and shared values among a

group of people”.<sup>26</sup> Culture and cultural understanding are important because values frame how a people perceives the world – what is right and wrong, what is good or bad; norms establish behavior based on values and perceptions in a given situation. An understanding of culture is key for soldiers on the ground, those crafting messages, and planners and leaders in policy formulation and decision-making positions, permitting them to understand and anticipate how actions will be perceived by the target populace, how that population will likely act in a given situation, and perhaps more importantly, how our actions can effect local behavior and exercise control.

Culture must be treated as the key strategic and operating environment and diplomats, soldiers, and leaders need the information required to operate within that environment. A detailed and, if possible standardized, cultural analysis is needed to serve as the foundation for constructing a plan of action for transforming the target culture and society. As Kotter has noted, “culture is not something that you manipulate easily...Culture changes only after you have successfully altered people’s actions, after the new behavior produces some group benefit for a period of time, and after people see the connection between the new actions and the performance improvement.”<sup>27</sup> An analytical framework, such as the model I present below, is required to provide the cultural understanding and information necessary to formulate and put into effect plans and operations that will motivate a target population to alter its actions and beliefs.

Social science can provide a framework for identifying and understanding cultural control measures, and provide the planner with the ability to design means to manipulate actions which, in turn, can eventually transform societal norms. Whether operating tactically or planning strategically in support of national security goals, soldiers and leaders need to understand how actions will be perceived and how the perceptions and actions of the local populace can be influenced in support of U.S. interests. As stated above, culture informs perception and motivates action.

Following is an example of a standardized analytical scheme that focuses on cultural control measures.<sup>28</sup> The scheme is a modification of a method developed by Richard Cottam to explore the impact of nationalism on state capabilities.<sup>29</sup> Cottam’s work in turn builds on the work of Amitai Etzioni in assessing control in complex organizations.<sup>30</sup> The cultural control measures to be addressed are coercion, utilitarian, normative habitual and normative active measures.

Coercion refers to the use or threat of force to compel compliance. The utilitarian control measure focuses on meeting the needs and, to a degree, the desires of a given group. The final two control measures are more difficult to grasp as they possess a strong symbolic component. The importance of symbols and symbolism in understanding and motivating a people cannot be underestimated. As Mary Jo Hatch has noted, "humans can engage in the socially constructed aspects of organizational life because they make, use, and interpret symbols and because they are sensitive to the interpretations made by others."<sup>31</sup>

Normative habitual measures refer to the willing, and generally unconscious acceptance, of authority, concepts, principles, initiatives, practices, ideas, etc., because they fit within the culturally accepted norms and values of the society. Normative habitual control and motivation is often (though not always) exercised through the use and manipulation of symbols that are easily recognized by the population and provoke an emotional response. Normative active measures refer to the attempt to alter existing norms and values or to introduce new norms and values as a way of modifying or controlling behavior through either the introduction of new concepts and symbols or fostering a new interpretation of familiar ones.

An in-depth analysis of the cultural control measures of a given group will provide the data necessary for understanding how that culture perceives reality and how it is likely to respond to given stimuli. For example, a detailed analysis of coercion will not only indicate the level of importance of coercive measures in the culture, it will describe and explain the target groups' attitudes toward conflict. Do the people respect strength? Do they respond to force respectfully or do they resist? What forms, means, and applications of force are acceptable? What forms of coercion are acceptable from a member of the culture but are actively resisted if used by outsiders and why? If strength and force are respected; from whom? Will a member of the culture respect the strength of a male but dismiss a woman? Will placing a male under the control or authority of a woman break his will or strengthen his resolve to resist?

Such analytical depth is also possible with the other three cultural control measures. Analysis of utilitarian measures will identify what is valued at different levels and among different members of the society and culture, addressing such issues as popular views concerning charity, what is perceived as charity, the emotional response to receiving charity (especially from "outsiders"), the importance of power sharing and political empowerment.

The normative habitual measure identifies how the culture views and interprets reality. It covers how the society communicates – how messages are conveyed and received, the meaning and interpretation of words, symbols, and concepts and the value judgments that accompany them. Normative habitual analysis addresses broad concepts such as religion, nationalism, and clan and tribal affiliation. The normative active analysis is closely tied to the normative habitual. It identifies how a culture deals with the introduction of new concepts, values, and ideas, how receptive or resistant it is to change, and the manner in which the presentation of new concepts or interpretations is most likely to be accepted or rejected. The combined analysis of normative habitual and normative active control measures can predict how accepted norms and values can be presented in a manner that motivates the modification of behavior or the introduction of a new behavior while minimizing resistance.

The above description of cultural control measure analysis is by no means all inclusive. It does, however, illustrate the extent to which a cultural analytical framework can provide a detailed and intimate understanding of a target population. Such an approach has many benefits. First, it provides a common vocabulary that can be used in the context of any culture. This means that in the case of the soldier on the ground, a basic grounding in generic cultural literacy is sufficient – details can be provided as needed as part of the soldiers' pre-deployment training, obviating the need to train soldiers and leaders in depth in multiple cultures.

Secondly, such an analytical framework allows information provided to be tailored to the level of need of the user. A soldier can be provided basic "how to behave" and "what to avoid" information for use on the ground. A strategic level decision maker or planner can be provided information and guidance necessary to formulate policies and strategies that are likely to succeed while avoiding those that will likely result in rejection and opposition. This suggests that there is value in conducting cultural control measure analysis not only on potential adversaries or the cultures of areas in which our forces are likely to operate, but on potential allies and coalition partners as well. Such a level of understanding can prescribe methods of dealing with and crafting messages for key members of the international community to build support for U.S. policies and positions.

Cultural control measure analysis has the additional benefit of flexibility in application. It allows for the analysis of multiple cultures or sub-cultures as opposed to a specific nation. For example, different control measures apply to Sunnis, Shi'as, and Kurds

in Iraq. The same can be said of Israel where different analyses can be done for Jews (Sephardic, Ashkenazi, and Russian would be treated individually as sub-cultures), Israeli Arabs, and Palestinians. Such an approach prevents the mistake of looking at a nation as a homogeneous culture.<sup>32</sup>

Finally, once the cultural control measures are understood, they can be rank ordered to provide an indication of the stability of the system. For example, a control scheme that relies primarily on normative habitual and utilitarian measures while minimizing coercive and normative active measures indicates a stable, traditional system that is difficult to overturn. It is also possible to identify different schemes within a state. For example, the control scheme applied to Jews in Israel is stable, relying primarily on normative habitual and utilitarian schemes, though less so for recent Russian immigrants. The control scheme applied to Israeli Arabs suggests a normative habitual disconnect, as Arabic cultural norms, values and symbols, whether Muslim or Christian, differ from Jewish. And, while there is a significant utilitarian component, it is less than that afforded Jewish citizens. Finally, the control scheme applied to Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank is heavily reliant on coercion with only basic utilitarian means applied. In the case of the Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority, the issues being pressed upon them focus on normative active measures, while Hamas stresses normative habitual and utilitarian methods. A detailed understanding of cultural control measures tied to stability can prove invaluable in planning post conflict stability and nation-building policies and operations.

There is potential for great benefit along the entire tactical-operational-strategic spectrum in utilizing a cultural control measure analytical framework as a means of producing cultural awareness and intelligence to enhance the effectiveness of national policy. However, there is also a danger that poor or incomplete analysis will either misinterpret information or miss something entirely. For this reason, it is not appropriate for any single agency or organization, such as the military, to be responsible for the conduct of cultural control measures analysis. Nor, as some have argued, is it appropriate to have "redundant analytic capabilities in our intelligence community" with "competing organizations that report to different bosses in the federal government".<sup>33</sup> At a time when all instruments of national power must be synchronized to achieve national security objectives coupled with limited resources, what is required is a synergistic effect achieved by bringing together multiple analytical perspectives.

## Recommendations

I propose the creation of multi-agency cultural red cells to support a strategy of integration by developing cultural intelligence using a cultural control measure analytical framework. While limited efforts are being made to bring together multiple agency expertise<sup>34</sup>, intelligence agencies continue to operate independently, each with its specific focus. The current fast-paced environment requires efforts refocused from concentrating on political intelligence to cultural intelligence that can address not only what is happening, but why it is happening and what that means for U.S. interests and policies. The need for detailed, in depth cultural understanding means that such efforts cannot be thrown together on an ad hoc basis. What is needed is the establishment of culture red cells, each focused on a specific culture or cultural group. Each cell should comprise a cross-disciplined team acting as a collaborative group that can provide cultural and systems intelligence to planners and operators at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Cells should be composed of representatives from agencies such as DIA, CIA, State INR, USAID, Department of Energy, Justice, and others as necessary. It is imperative that cell members know the language and have spent time living in the culture, which argues for assigning personnel who have served as attaches, political officers, consular personnel, etc. It is also essential to recruit personnel who have served overseas in non-governmental agencies as well as academicians with in-region experience.

The value in creating cultural red cells with personnel from multiple agencies is that the group members, while working together to create a detailed cultural control measures analytical framework, represent their different agencies' perspectives and backgrounds, thus addressing all instruments of national power, providing a more holistic and balanced analysis, and acting as an intellectual and analytical check on one another. This would ensure that the analysis of a specific culture would not focus solely on a military, economic, or political interpretation. Such an approach would not only combat group think, it would allow for multiple perspectives in analysis resulting in a synergistic effect that supports the application of U.S. diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power on the target's political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information systems.

As the representatives of these cells will come from multiple agencies, they should be created and managed under the control and direction of the Director of National Intelligence, with each cell conducting analysis and providing products tailored to users at all levels – tactical, operational, and strategic – across the diplomatic, informational, military,

and economic instruments of national power (DIME). It is, however, obviously unrealistic to create permanent, standing red cells for all cultures on earth. It is, therefore, advisable to identify those cultures with which we are currently or most likely to come into contact, either as adversaries or as allies and coalition partners.<sup>35</sup> There is also value in creating generic cells to cover over-arching cultures such as “Arab” or “Muslim”. The National Intelligence Directorate should establish and maintain a database of personnel with the requisite language, educational, and foreign service experience to serve as members of cultural red cells for low density or low likelihood cultures. These personnel could form a reserve cadre of analysts who would be assigned to cells that would collaborate via Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) chat rooms and scheduled internet or secure video conferences. When required, they could be brought together to form an active cell under the Directorate of National Intelligence.

The moral and ethical acceptability of a strategy of integration should also be addressed. A grand strategy of integration is acceptable as much for the benefits it holds for the peoples of the non-integrated gap as for the security of the U.S. While democratization in the greater Middle East and eventually the entire non-integrated world would enhance U.S. security under the Kantian rubric, current conditions for much of the populations of those areas is more Hobbesian – short and brutal – in comparison to life in the modernized west. Some writers have made a compelling argument that Arab civilization is in danger of impending collapse.<sup>36</sup> A U.S. strategy of cooption would result in a significant improvement in the quality of life of the peoples of the greater Middle East and much of the rest of the undeveloped/developing world. One single example – Isobel Coleman has demonstrated the positive effects of embracing women’s rights, showing that “focusing on women is often the best way to reduce birth rates and child mortality; improve health, nutrition, and education; stem the spread of HIV/AIDS; build robust and self-sustaining community organizations; and encourage grassroots democracy.”<sup>37</sup> It must be an explicit tenet of a grand strategy on integration that the U.S. does not seek to achieve cultural assimilation – a message that must be intertwined in all manners of engagement. It is also imperative that the U.S. understand and accept that democracies that develop in the greater Middle East and elsewhere will not be democracies that Thomas Jefferson would necessarily recognize, and that is ok. When peoples take possession of democratic ideals, they will make them uniquely their own. A strategy of integration should strive to foster not just the adoption of democratic values, but a melding of democratic values with existing cultural norms.

## Summary

Conflict is now political-cultural and played out in a “theater” of war. In the post 9/11 world, it is no use talking about “solutions”, which is a mechanical concept. We must turn to trend creation, a long term concept which requires a grand strategy to affect. A grand strategy of integration is at its core non-kinetic. This is not to suggest that the military element of power will cease to be relevant. Far from it, as the recent war in Iraq illustrates. Operation Iraqi Freedom should be understood as a war of co-option, undertaken to create an Iraq that is an “inclusive democratic state” which is “in our own national interest”.<sup>38</sup> However, if properly executed, a strategy of integration will serve to identify high value targets by culture that are primarily symbolic as opposed to solely physical. The intent of integration, which is to manipulate attitudes and inculcate values that lead to democratization and inclusion in a global economy, is a strategy to obviate the need for kinetic operations in the long term, while in the short term guiding counter-insurgency campaigns. A grand strategy of integration thus puts war in context as an element (hopefully an element of last resort) of national power, rather than an end in itself.

A strategy of integration will require not only the acquiescence of the target population, but the long-term support of the American public and the buy in of America's allies and coalition partners. Strategic thinkers and planners will have to craft their strategy for the long term, targeting various audiences of differing cultural motivations and world views. To attempt such an ambitious endeavor, a grand strategy of integration requires a dynamic, culturally specific multi-agency campaign plan and is critically dependent upon the coordinated application of all elements of national power. The military cannot operate in a vacuum, absent the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power. In the current political-cultural environment, it is a mistake to focus solely on the actions of the military on the ground, and it is a waste of resources to maintain redundant but disconnected analytic capabilities in our intelligence community. The creation of cultural red cells focused on conducting cultural control measures analysis is a means to provide the planners, operators, and decision makers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels with the tools and information needed to be culturally adept.

The grand strategy of containment guided U.S. policy and engagement towards the USSR while maintaining global relevance for 40 years. A grand strategy of integration will likely take at least a generation or two to effect the cultural adaptation necessary to serve as midwife to an Islamic reformation as a means of combating jihadist terrorism, while providing the global scope to bring about the democratic transformation necessary to integrate developing countries

into the modern, global economy. As a grand strategy, integration is suitable as its focus is the transformation of societies into functioning democracies that share our values, enhancing U.S. national security. A grand strategy of integration is feasible as it does not require the commitment of additional resources, but focuses on a reorganization of existing intelligence resources to better support and coordinate the formulation of policy and the ongoing engagement efforts of all elements of national power. A grand strategy of integration is acceptable both from a self-interest perspective, as it serves the goal of enhancing and securing U.S. security; and from a moral perspective as it enhances the security and quality of life of the populations of developing and emergent nations without requiring them to pay the unacceptable price of cultural assimilation.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> However, Operation Iraqi Freedom will serve as a case study for much of my analysis.

<sup>2</sup> George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People" (speech presented to the Congress at the United States Capitol and televised live by numerous television networks, 20 September 2001), The White House Office of the Press Secretary; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>. Internet; accessed 14 September 2005.

<sup>3</sup> James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans. The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 134-6.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, iii.

<sup>5</sup> George W. Bush, "Graduation Speech at West Point" (speech presented to the graduating class of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, 1 June, 2002), The White House Office of the Press Secretary; available from : <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>. Internet; accessed 17 September 2005. In this speech, the President stated "We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent."

<sup>6</sup> Under the theory that democracies do not go to war with each other, an assertion first made by Immanuel Kant and echoed by President Bush; George W. Bush, "President Holds Press Conference", (presidential press conference held at the Dwight DC Eisenhower Executive Office Building, 20 December 2004) The White House Office of the Press Secretary; available from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/20041220-3.html>. Internet; accessed 8 November 2005. The validity of this is assertion is questionable. See for example, F. Gregory Gause III, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?", *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 2005): 62-76.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 301.

<sup>8</sup> George W. Bush, "Graduation Speech at West Point".

<sup>9</sup> George W. Bush, "President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership" (televised speech delivered from the Rose Garden on 24 June, 2002), The White House Office of the Press Secretary; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html>. Internet; accessed 17 September 2005.

<sup>10</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), 6, 15.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 3, 9.

<sup>12</sup> George W. Bush, "President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat" (speech presented to the Cincinnati Museum Center - Cincinnati Union Terminal, Cincinnati, Ohio on 7 October 2002), The White House Office of the Press Secretary; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html>. Internet; accessed 11 September 2005.

<sup>13</sup> George W. Bush, "President Bush Addresses the Nation" (televised speech announcing the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom broadcast at 10:16 P.M. EST, 19 March 2003), The White House Office of the Press Secretary; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html>. Internet; accessed 12 September 2005.

<sup>14</sup> Bush, "Freedom and the Future"

<sup>15</sup> George W. Bush, "President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East" (Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington D.C., delivered 6 November 2003), The White House Office of the Press Secretary; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html>. Internet; accessed 17 September 2005.

<sup>16</sup> See Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001) in which Luttwak postulates that all strategy is paradoxical in that what works today will not work tomorrow because the enemy learns from your success and his failures.

<sup>17</sup> George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2003), 22.

<sup>18</sup> Richard N. Haass, "Is There a Doctrine in the House?," *The New York Times*, 8 November 2005, Late Edition - Final, Section A, Page 27.

<sup>19</sup> See Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map* (New York: Berkley Books, 2004).

<sup>20</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Anchor Books, 1999) and Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map*.

<sup>21</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

<sup>22</sup> Ayman al-Zawahiri, letter written to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, broadcast 18 June 2005 (11 Jumadi I, 1426h), available from [http://www.dni.gov/release\\_letter\\_101105.html](http://www.dni.gov/release_letter_101105.html). Internet accessed 9 December 2005.

<sup>23</sup> As well as continued engagement in Iraq. This presents a special and especially challenging case, as our war to effect regime change without first putting in place a campaign plan to effectively co-opt the post-Saddam population has spawned a local insurgency, brought to the surface sectarian violence, and served as a rallying point for foreign terrorists. As part of an integrated campaign, countries like Turkey would also be targeted for influence and to play an influential role. Finally, achieving resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is also a key issue.

<sup>24</sup> For example, it is not sufficient to define an “Iraqi” culture. It is necessary to examine Sunni Arab, Shi’ia Arab, and Kurdish cultures as well as the cultural interactions between the groups.

<sup>25</sup> Peter Burke, *Popular Culture in Modern Europe*; (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1994), x.

<sup>26</sup> John P. Kotter, *Leading Change*; Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 148.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 156.

<sup>28</sup> While many will be uncomfortable with the word ‘control’, I do not see this as a serious issue. The term “control system” is one used in the social science literature. More importantly is an understanding of what is meant by the term. While individuals possess free will and the ability to act as they choose, cultural mores and values frame how a people perceive the world – what is right and wrong, what is good or bad; which inform the norms that establish behavior based on values and perceptions in a given situation. The culture also establishes methods for dealing with those that refuse to conform their behavior to the culturally established norms, ranging from censure or ostracization to death. In a real sense, culture acts to “control” the behavior of the members of that culture. To effect integration, the U.S. must effectively use all instruments of national power to manipulate the target, be it a nation, a culture, or a political leader, to adopt and support U.S. values. This requires a detailed understanding of how best to craft the message, what actions will result in the desired reactions – in effect, which buttons to push, when, and how. The understanding of cultural control measures serves to enhance the process of inclusion while minimizing or even avoiding culture shock during the process.

<sup>29</sup> Richard Cottam and Gerard Gallucci, *The Rehabilitation of Power in International Relations: A Working Paper*; (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Relations, University of Pittsburgh, 1978).

<sup>30</sup> Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations*; (New York: Free Press, 1961).

<sup>31</sup> Mary Jo Hatch, *Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives*; (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 218.

<sup>32</sup> See, for example, Jennifer J. Deal and Don W. Price, *Developing Cultural Adaptability*; (Greensboro, Center for Creative Leadership, 2003), which purports to be a manual for developing cultural adaptability then throughout discusses nations rather than cultures.

<sup>33</sup> John J. Hamre, "Intel Plus 'Group Think' Equaled Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq", *Aviation Week and Space Technology*., September 22, 2003, 66.

<sup>34</sup> For example, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) initiative to establish a University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort Leavenworth to train Red teams and the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at the Combatant Commands. However, both are military initiatives and as Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster notes in his article "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations", *Military Review*, (November-December 2005): 2-15, the military tends to take a head-on, kinetic approach to problem solving while suffering from inadvertent cultural insensitivity.

<sup>35</sup> What McFarland refers to as "high-probability cultures" and "key regional powers". See Maxie McFarland, "Military Cultural Education", *Military Review*, (March/April 2005): 62-9, pp. 65 and 67.

<sup>36</sup> See specifically James G. Lacey, "The Impending Collapse of Arab Civilization," *Proceedings* (September 2005): 24-7. Also Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam* (New York: Random House, 2003).

<sup>37</sup> Isobel Coleman, "The Payoff From Women's Rights" *Foreign Affairs* 83 (May/June 2004), 80.

<sup>38</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* (Washington, DC: The White House, November 2005), 3-4.