

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**IRREGULAR WARFARE:
IMPACT ON FUTURE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Current feedback from ongoing operations within Afghanistan and Iraq demands that the United States Army must take near term action in order to enhance the war fighting ability of its officer corps to operate effectively in an irregular warfare environment. The utility of a decisive war between nation states continues to decline and will eventually reach critical mass based upon the extreme imbalance of military power and a U.S. monopoly. While the likelihood of a major conflict decreases, conflict itself promises to increase over the next 25 years with threats that are more diffuse, harder to anticipate and more difficult to neutralize than ever before. Based upon this new and emerging threat, we must retool our Professional Military Education (PME) Institutions in order to produce officers better prepared to deal with both conventional and irregular warfare. These identified skill sets assist in future training and professional development strategies of junior officers while aiding in the prioritization of resources for officer education. It's critical that we train and maintain a balanced officer corps with a culture that is capable and prepared to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of operations.

IRREGULAR WARFARE: IMPACT ON FUTURE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

Current feedback from ongoing operations within Afghanistan and Iraq demands that the United States Army must take near term action to enhance the professional development of its officer corps to operate effectively in an irregular warfare environment.

The utility of a decisive war between nation states continues to decline and will eventually reach critical mass based upon the extreme imbalance of military power and United States Hegemony.¹ For the foreseeable future, we should expect to remain involved in irregular operations across the globe, ranging from guerilla warfare to low-intensity conflict. Thomas Barnett states that *"Our future enemy is characterized less by a direct threat to our way of life than sheer rejection of it. The Soviets were really out to get us, whereas the antiglobalization forces - represented in their most violent form by Al Qaeda - don't seek our historical destruction so much as a sort of permanent civilizational apartheid."*² Today, we face little danger from a direct military assault from an opposing state, however future challenges include; terrorist acts, transnational crime and other asymmetric threats.³ While the likelihood of major conflict decreases, conflict itself promises to increase over the next 25 years with threats that are more diffuse, harder to anticipate and more difficult to neutralize than ever before.⁴ Based upon this new and emerging threat, we must retool our Professional Military Education (PME) Institutions in order to produce officers better prepared to deal with both conventional and irregular warfare.

General Peter Pace, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, is focusing The Joint Staff on the current operational environment and ever changing nature of the Global War on Terrorism. Based upon his view of the future, his thoughts highlight our probable continued participation in unconventional type operations. He addresses his concerns to the Joint Staff in his October 2005 guidance that states

This Global War on Terrorism - - a war of long duration- - differs in many ways from that which most of us have spent our time in service preparing. Our focus in this fight is not on kinetic effect against a massed enemy, but increasingly on the search for individuals and small cells of terrorists. Our opponents are ruthless and elusive but they are also vulnerable... Our proper emphasis is on the war on Terrorism but we must remain prepared to conduct the full range of military options...⁵

This paper will identify critical leader skills or competencies based upon irregular warfare doctrine, historical examples and emerging lessons learned from ongoing operations in our Nation's Global War on Terror. Based upon this information and the emerging threat, we must expose our conventional officers to the following three knowledge areas; police type actions,

foreign internal defense⁶ and joint/interagency operations⁷ and four critical skills; cross cultural awareness,⁸ civil military operations,⁹ intelligence operations,¹⁰ and information/psychological operations.¹¹

These identified skill sets assist in future training and professional development strategies of junior officers while aiding in the prioritization of resources for professional military education. It's critical that we train and maintain a balanced officer corps with a culture that is capable and prepared to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of operations in accordance with the Chairman's guidance. Future training strategies must include initiatives that enhance our capacity to leverage allied and interagency partners. Nontraditional methods focused on breaking paradigms for existing professional development include refinement of pre-commissioning goals, officer education and training at organization levels.

Background

Since the Treaty of Westphalia, traditional nation-states fight wars to achieve political objectives. As we look at our ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of our nations "War on Terrorism" new "non-traditional players" have entered into the equation. A majority of future conflicts will arise between the U.S. and these "non-traditional players" using irregular and asymmetric ways and means, defining the nature of conflict for some time to come.¹²

Whatever definition or moniker we attach, Political Violence, Terrorism, Insurgency, Military Operations Other than War, Low Intensity Conflict or Peoples War, one fundamental difference separates irregular and conventional warfare, conventional warfare is generally more symmetric in equipment, training and doctrine, while in an irregular war adversaries are usually asymmetric in capabilities. The irregular opponent is normally the weaker side and is often a sub state group attempting to bring about some type of political change. Irregular warfare often includes the mobilization of a significant proportion of the population to support the insurgent movement.¹³

A huge paradigm shift is required if we expect conventional forces to operate effectively within an irregular warfare environment. Historically, a crucial element of success in this type of environment is the ability of leaders and forces to think unconventionally while operating in a decentralized manner away from traditional command and control headquarters. The Department of the Army's Counterinsurgency handbook addresses this critical leadership issue and states:

The complexities of counterinsurgency operations place a premium on informed and trained leadership and independent operations. These conditions demand more leader expertise and the ability to operate independently at lower command

levels than do higher levels of conflict. The leader applies skill, imagination and flexibility. He effectively leads his troops and helps them understand the problems of counterterrorist operations. He must be willing to reorganize his assets to better accomplish his mission.¹⁴

The ability of leaders to act quickly utilizing multipurpose forces without extensive preparation is a necessity in defeating an asymmetric enemy. No matter how powerful or technologically advanced an army becomes, trained infantrymen or special operations units successfully carry out irregular warfare at a very low-tech level.¹⁵

Michael O'Hanlon states "Human skills remain very important in war...The basic infantry skills, foreign language abilities, competence and care in using maintenance and equipment, and physical and mental toughness of American troops contributed to victory every bit as much as did high tech weaponry."¹⁶

Brigadier General Jack Pershing understood the value of decentralized operations. His personal experience as a captain fighting during the Philippine Insurrection was instrumental in designing his strategy when he returned to the island as a military governor in 1909. He applied his previous lessons learned and scattered small detachments of Soldiers throughout the country to maintain a peaceful coexistence between the tribes. He realized that to influence the people or win their hearts and minds, there had to be contact between them and his Soldiers.¹⁷

Similarly, Captain Randolph Marcy published the "The Prairie Traveler," considered by many to be the single most important work on how to operate, live and fight on the American plains. The chapters concerning pacification based upon his experiences as well as the French and Turkish experiences conducting pacification operations in North Africa. His salient point remains valid today, "He urges Soldiers and leaders to be adaptive by coupling conventional discipline with the self reliance and individuality to defeat the insurgent."¹⁸

Consider the now famous picture captured by news media around the world, of Special Forces Soldiers attacking Mazar-i-Sharif on horseback and ultimately leading the defeat and downfall of the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan. It's this type of leadership that we must instill in our conventional officers if we expect to maintain our unchallenged hegemony and ability to fight and defeat future asymmetric enemies. Certainly those tremendous NCOs and officers never studied cavalry operations in their Non Commissioned Officer or Officer Basic Courses. These junior leaders demonstrated an uncanny ability to improvise and overcome within their environments. Their circumstances dictated that they learn on the fly and adapt their traditional way of fighting.¹⁹

We should expect resources, especially time and money, to remain in short supply, and we must therefore be realistic in our expectations of future professional development. By prioritizing the skills and competencies required we can assist in balancing these limited resources. It's critical to remember that while training to operate within an irregular environment we must never forget our requirement to operate across the full spectrum of operations including high intensity and conventional operations.

We should consider breaking down this future professional development into two separate focus areas, competencies that our junior officer must be knowledgeable in, (exposed to and having a general understanding of) and more importantly the skill sets, (requiring a level of proficiency) that are critical to successful employment within an irregular environment.

Knowledge Areas

Merriam-Webster defines knowledge as "the fact or condition of knowing something with familiarity gained through experience or association or the acquaintance with or understanding of a science, art, or technique."²⁰ Future training must expose our officer corps to the following tasks ensuring they at least have a rudimentary understanding of their operations. Consider completing this training and exposure as part of an officer's professional development upon arrival at the unit and enhanced by practical opportunities at our Combat Training Centers in conjunction with a Mission Rehearsal and other training exercises. These tasks include, but not limited to

Police Actions

- Linkage Diagrams / Network Analysis
- Sensitive Site Exploitation / Evidence Collection²¹
- Low Level Source Development²²

Foreign Internal Defense

- Security Assistance²³
- Training of Indigenous Forces²⁴

Interagency and Multinational Operations

- Joint²⁵
- Other Government Agencies (OGA)²⁶
- Non-Government Organization (NGO)
- Multinational²⁷

Police Actions

Soldiers are continuing to operate in increasingly complex environments with an amplified emphasis on the rule of law. While operating in this irregular environment, many of our young leaders find themselves operating in a manner similar to a police detective in a major city, focused on identifying and mapping a mafia crime family. More and more, they find themselves collecting evidence and sworn statements, conducting link analysis and running low level sources to develop actionable intelligence. Low level source operations will be discussed in detail later in this paper. Frequently, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, noncommissioned officers and leaders at all levels are testifying in Baghdad during civil proceedings.

Discussed in earlier paragraphs was the introduction of non traditional actors onto the international stage including transnational crime groups that are impacting on the operational environment. These non-traditional actors, unhindered by state boundaries are capable of effortlessly moving across traditional nation state boundaries tending to operate along the seams, drastically increasing the difficulty in tracking and targeting. Organized crime threatens military operations because it attempts to control illicit and legitimate activities among political, economic and informational systems to establish power. These criminals are similar to terrorists and insurgent organizations by using violence to achieve their ends, although terrorists and insurgents are motivated by ideology vice greed. Terrorists and insurgents tend to gravitate towards organized criminals because of the infrastructure, communications network, and transportation capabilities they provide.²⁸

This structure for organized crime, terrorists and insurgent groups provide an Achilles Heel for these type organizations exposing them to link analysis efforts.²⁹ Effective link analysis, similar to identifying key figures and relationships within a mafia family, coupled with an aggressive targeting process enhances our ability to target people, patterns and methodologies to achieve desired effects. Successful efforts in this arena tend to drive these elements underground causing increased difficulty to capture and identify with conventional sensors and sources, thereby requiring the capability to develop and run low level sources.

Understanding network centric organizations, including terrorist groups or insurgent forces, and their modes of operation provide increased opportunities to develop actionable intelligence that enhance kinetic and non-kinetic targeting.

Operations are becoming increasingly more responsive to the rule of law and as a result are gravitating towards an investigative nature. There is an expectation that our forces will extend some level of due process to local citizens while operating within an area, thereby

requiring a more detailed and complete case as we transition the detainee through legal systems.³⁰

Recent experiences in both Afghanistan and Iraq highlight the importance of collecting evidence and detailed sworn statements from Soldiers, witnesses and subjects. Cordon and Searches, cache recovery and detainment of High Value Targets are increasingly being treated as crime scenes / Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) to capture forensic evidence and determine threat tactics, capabilities and more importantly culpability.

As coalition forces moved north into the heart of Iraq, they continuously conducted Sensitive Site Exploitations to support the elimination of Iraqi WMD, regime change, and the destruction of terrorist networks... These operations consisted of selectively seizing and searching facilities associated with Iraqi WMD programs and other points of interest. The purpose was to collect intelligence or WMD samples for analysis and, if necessary, secure sites until final disposition could be determined. While most sensitive sites were associated with WMD, a significant number included known terrorist camps, universities, and government-sponsored commercial ventures, locations associated with individuals involved in terrorist activities, infrastructure that supported terrorist activities, presidential palaces, command centers, and headquarters.³¹

Increased emphasis on the rule of law and the likelihood that conventional units will remain involved within more complex environments than Iraq and Afghanistan demand that professional development and future training efforts focus on creating an inherent ability to collect information and run sources with an increased understanding of how to identify and template network centric organizations. Leaders at all levels must understand the basics of the investigative process including evidence preservation, forensic analysis and stringent chain of custody requirements. Training leaders for the multitude of administrative tasks associated with these operations can be overwhelming and time consuming if not planned for prior to deployment.

Leaders must quickly transition to and become comfortable using "Low Tech" methods to track and target asymmetric enemies. Thomas Barnett relays the story of a Navy Captain in the Middle East who utilized a low tech "neural network" to target Al Qaeda operatives whom he believed might have been using high-speed boats to escape from Southwest Asia into the Horn of Africa. Even with all the Navy technology at his disposal, he was still unable or unwilling to stop every small craft or determine which of these fast movers needed targeting. Operating with a serious handicap on a ship designed to fight another nation's navy; he was tracking individuals and conducting "warfare" in the middle of "peace". As Barnett tells the story, the Navy Captain quickly transitioned to stopping any old craft in order to talk with local fishermen and gain situational awareness. He quickly became a known commodity and shifted from

“warrior to a cop walking the beat”. Eventually, he learned to separate background noise from substantive events. One day, he was tracking numerous high-speed vessels heading towards the East African Coastline and after consultation with his neural network, was able to quickly determine it was a certain class of fishermen who conducted this annual pilgrimage in search of a delicacy available only at that specific time of the year.³² Our leaders must borrow a page from this Naval Officer and develop and utilize low tech methods to accomplish their mission.

Foreign Internal Defense

Numerous examples throughout history highlight the importance of security operations coupled with government action addressing the social or political issue (causing initial instability) to defeat insurgencies. Malaya and Algeria are two recent examples highlighting the importance of security operations. Popular support begins with safety before good will or civic actions begin to achieve desired results. These two examples show that the proven ability of the government to protect the population defeat insurgent propaganda and good works.³³

Britain's successful efforts in defeating the Malay insurgency were a direct result of their balanced approach to defeating the insurgents; including the integration of civil administration, armed forces and police. Their efforts focused on using civic action forces to hold areas previously cleared by the military, thereby leading to increased physical and physiological separation of insurgent forces. Conversely, U.S. efforts in Vietnam failed miserably because of our inability to secure strategic hamlets from the insurgent population.³⁴

As soon as a feeling of security began to pervade the countryside, people in Malaysia and Algeria began feeding the government forces critical information concerning the insurgents, eventually leading to actionable intelligence.³⁵

Because of their understanding of language and culture, local forces tend to have a much better understanding of internal politics, local leadership and often grasp inconsistencies and nuances overlooked by U.S. forces.

Foreign Internal Defense is a core task for our uniquely qualified Special Forces Soldiers; however, increased operational requirements and the decentralized nature of operations have drastically impacted the ability of our Special Forces to meet existing and projected future mission requirements. Michael Vickers, Director of Strategic Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recently testified before Congress highlighting the shortage of Special Forces capacity is resulting in increased operational risk.³⁶ We must consider the capacity and capability of our conventional forces to empower legitimate government security forces through training and combined operations.

Marine Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) in Vietnam highlight the potential of conventional forces operating in conjunction with local forces. Lieutenant General Krulak integrated Marine rifle squads into Vietnamese regional Forces Platoons. These forces lived together in villages focusing on pacification while regular Marine battalions divided their operations between patrolling and civic programs. LTG Krulak, in contrast to GEN Westmorland's focus on body count, believed that safer roads and more secure hamlets were better measurements of success. Krulak argued that VC body counts were meaningless if accompanied by devastation and lack of security to friendly areas.³⁷

During 1967 the number of villages controlled by communists increased drastically with the exception of one small area where the Marine CAPs were operating. These CAPs were judged as one of the most successful American projects during the Vietnam conflict.³⁸

A more recent example was the successful efforts of a Long Range Surveillance detachment (LRSD) while training Iraqi Border Guards in support of overall security. This detachment was responsible for about 600 kilometers of rocky border with 12 main crossing points. In addition to improving overall security, their efforts focused on guerillas that had been crossing through Kurdish areas to conduct attacks against coalition forces in the south. This unit supervised and assisted the local political leadership as they recruited, equipped, armed and trained the new border guards.³⁹

The young LRSD Soldiers, already used to operating in a decentralized manner, developed a critical train the trainer program of instruction focused on integrating new recruits and preparing them for their new duties. Highlights of their program include: laws and penalties, ROE, vehicle and individual search, detect/react to IED, crossing point operations and QRF procedures.⁴⁰

These young Soldiers and leaders heroic efforts which included spot checks to ensure quality control were instrumental in legitimizing government forces, significantly increasing area coverage with limited U.S. forces and highlighted the capability of conventional forces to train local forces and conduct successful combined operations.

Often a perceived or actual lack of security coupled with ineffective local security forces involvement present challenges to conventional forces operating against asymmetric enemies. Conventional leadership must redefine the existing rubric while recognizing that a shortage of Special Forces exist and demonstrate willingness to operate with and train indigenous forces. These forces, having a vested interest in the survival of their country, must be trained, resourced and supported in order to develop a viable exit strategy for U.S. military forces.

The Department of Defense sponsored Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) draft Irregular Warfare Study reports “a need for changed approaches to Irregular Warfare.”⁴¹ The QDR noted that of the 127 pacification efforts in Iraq from May 2003 to May 2005, most were reactive to insurgent activity, seeking to hunt down insurgents. Only 6 percent specifically focused on creating a secure environment for the population.⁴² The QDR specifically highlighted that U.S. forces were isolated from the population they were required to support: “They live in camps away from the population and most face-to-face (F2F) contact.”⁴³ The exception to this rule was foot patrols which focused on gathering HUMINT.

Conventional forces must understand and practice two skills not normally associated with their conventional warfighting mission: first, they must be able to see actions and issues from the domestic population’s perspective; secondly, they must understand the impact of force or kinetic operations on the population while appreciating the fact that excessive force (even justified) can severely undermine popular support.⁴⁴

Interagency / Joint / Multinational Operations

While the current operational environment remains volatile and uncertain, the future irregular warfare environment promises to increase exponentially in complexity and ambiguity. Leaders at all levels should expect to find themselves coordinating and interacting with a multitude of players previously never even seen or considered on the battlefield.

The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 not only increased unity of effort and brought “jointness” to military operations; it has improved overall efficiency across a wide spectrum of military operations. However, these same traits have not characterized interagency operations. Interagency challenges within Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the fact that the problem is severe enough to require organizational change.⁴⁵

The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era: Phase 1 Report released on March 18, 2004 brought to light and identified a lack of unity in strategy development, planning, and conduct of interagency operations. Ongoing operations in OIF and OEF highlight the importance of post conflict Security Stability Transition Reconstruction efforts required to achieve ultimate success. Critical to this success is how well the Department of Defense integrates with other government agencies and coalition partners.⁴⁶

Based upon the nature of irregular warfare, we must consider interagency partners as equals in bringing a host of non traditional combat multipliers to assist in defeating enemy forces and ideals. Operation Enduring Freedom provided the best opportunity in recent memory to fight together with these other government agencies.

Arguably, the lack of a robust theater, coupled with the daunting terrain, vast distances, and the unique challenges of the enemy and coalition forces created conditions that forced separate services and other government agencies to cooperate and integrate in ways never previously thought possible or practicable. With minimal guidance or directives from their bureaucracies, the various forces and agencies in theatre synchronized their operations out of necessity and a sense of urgency and outrage. And while the joint targeting effort was...the results were stunning and provided the nation's first clear glimpse of the power and capabilities of a truly joint, combined interagency task force.⁴⁷

As an Army we have made huge strides in the combined and joint arena, although we must continue to train together and look for opportunities to refine our interoperability and C2 relationships to gain a better appreciation of each other capabilities. BG Mick Bednarek, Commander Joint Readiness Training Center, is updating existing mission statements while simultaneously trying to revamp the collective thought process of his Observer Controllers in order to effect change and maintain relevancy in future training. He argues that "Joint Task Force commanders must be capable of coordinating, integrating and cooperating with other U.S. Government agencies, such as the U.S. Department of State, the CIA, the U.S. Agency for International Development, or the FBI."⁴⁸

BG Bednarek's statement is pertinent, however, leaders at all levels must be prepared to work with and integrate the unique capabilities of these other government agencies. Experiences in Afghanistan of Soldiers and Marines working with a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) composed of many non traditional combat multipliers and Other Government Agencies (OGA) is neither unique nor unusual. Soldiers and leaders throughout OEF and OIF are conducting these type operations on a daily basis.

Throughout the history of our Armed Forces, our leaders have understood the importance of and looked for opportunities to leverage coalition partners to improve capability, fill gaps or niches and gain legitimacy on the world stage. These operations require a cultural appreciation of our partners, understanding of capabilities and the patience/willingness to work through issues. The Joint Operating Concept for Stability Operations dated September 2004 highlights the importance of this concept;

Future military operations will be joint campaigns that will include multiagency, multinational, and multilateral partners to achieve mission success. Stability operations are no exception. Truly integrated, multiagency planning, preparation, and execution are hallmarks of future stability operations. The challenges that the United States and our allies and friends face in the future in conducting stability operations involve a complex mix of global dangers, problematic nation-states, and illegal transnational organizations. These challenges threaten the national interests of many nations, not just the United States, and are more complex than any one nation can solve. Solutions require the contributions of

multiple nations and agencies—military and non-military, governmental and non-governmental. The requirement is clear: develop the ability to plan, coordinate, and execute multiagency actions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.⁴⁹

The number of Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) registered with the United Nations has increased drastically since the early 1950's when only 41 consultative groups were initially recognized. Today, more than 1500 types of registered groups exist with an additional indeterminate number working throughout the world.⁵⁰ NGOs have become commonplace on the battlefield and are forcing leaders and policy makers at all levels to pay heed. Tactical and operational leaders should look for opportunities to integrate and capitalize on these organizations through liaison and civil-military processes. These NGOs often are able to accomplish what governments are unwilling or unable to do and a wise leader looking to maximize efficiencies and distribute resources throughout an area of operations should look to work with the organizations in a non-threatening participative manner. These organizations can often fill niches, provided they maintain their neutrality and operate within a secure environment.

Although NGOs can often fill niches, they often shy away from interaction with military forces and desire to maintain the appearance and perception of neutrality. Coordination is most effective and usually accomplished through a great deal of work and personal effort on the part of commanders and civil affairs officers. Command and Control of NGOs usually amounts to a coordination effort on both sides, requiring situational awareness and battle tracking usually through a Civil Military Operations center (CMOC). Often military forces resources are required to extricate these organizations when they stray into unfriendly territory and circumstances.

With increased OPTEMPO and budget constraints military leaders must look to coalition partners and other interagency sources in order to leverage their unique capabilities. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) broadly describes how future joint forces are expected to operate in 2012-2025 in support of strategic objectives. It applies to operations around the globe and envisions joint operations conducted in conjunction with coalition military partners and other governmental and nongovernmental agencies. It's inherent that leaders throughout the entire chain of command are trained and capable of leading forces within a multi-service, multi-agency and multinational environment.⁵¹

Skills or Competencies

The second area of discussion includes the recommended skill sets or competencies required for our officers to sustain operations within the irregular warfare arena. Webster defines skills as the "ability to use one's knowledge effectively and readily in execution or

performance or the dexterity or coordination especially in the execution of learned physical tasks, a learned power of doing something competently: a developed aptitude or ability.”⁵²

We must take drastic non doctrinal approaches to the professional development of our officer corps. To borrow from the old cliché “we must teach these leaders how to think and not what to think!” Cadets or Officer Candidates must enroll in more liberal Bachelor of Arts degrees requiring language training during their pre-commissioning years. Studies in language, political science or other similar disciplines provide great examples to build on the foundations of global awareness and cultural awareness. We should consider what tasks can be completed as part of the pre-commissioning process, basic courses and unit training. Future leaders must be competent and have a practical understanding in the following tasks. Many of the sub-tasks identified below apply to multiple tasks.

Cross Cultural Awareness / Language Training

- Local / Tribal Relationships
- Political Sensitivities
- Relationship Building⁵³ / Source Development
- Negotiations⁵⁴

Civil Military Operations

- Cultural Awareness
- Civic Actions⁵⁵
- Governance⁵⁶
- Relationship Building
- Contracting / Host Nation Support

Intelligence Operations

- Link Analysis / Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield⁵⁷
- Low Level Source Operations⁵⁸
- Situational Awareness⁵⁹ / Reconnaissance Operations⁶⁰
- Interrogation Operations⁶¹

Information / Psychological Operations

- Ability to Exploit Friendly Success
- Marginalize Friendly Failures
- Capitalize on Enemy Mistakes
- Marginalize Enemy Successes

Cross Cultural Awareness and Communication

Conventional forces have not fared very well throughout history when operating in regions where indigenous cultures significantly differ from their own. Two issues arise during these types of conflicts; Soldiers will inadvertently or blatantly commit publicized acts of grievous cultural ignorance that erodes legitimacy and credibility, while planning staffs often develop faulty analyses and estimates that violate cultural and societal norms.⁶²

Looking at a future of small irregular warfare with asymmetric threats, we must recognize that cultural awareness has taken on increased importance and impacts on almost all operations and elements of power. In addition to understanding local culture and customs within the local operating environment, leaders must be aware of similar considerations of our coalition partners. Leadership at all levels must recognize and understand cultural bias while simultaneously working to understand and appreciate the global environment that we operate within.

It's almost impossible to predict where our next conflict will occur and it would be ludicrous to expect anyone to become a cultural expert in all potential environments. As mentioned earlier we must look for opportunities to train leaders and increase their cultural sensitivities and its impact on operations across the globe. Pre-commissioning sources must reinforce these ideas by requiring language training and additional classes in politics, International Relations and other areas that enhance these skills and reinforce cultural sensitivity. Additionally, we must look for training opportunities during pre-commissioning summer sessions that include cultural immersion opportunities for cadets.

For over more than twenty years, professional geographers and anthropologists have warned that Americans know too little about the world we live in. Today, many states no longer require geography or anthropology as High School graduation requirements; in fact university social science majors are not specifically required to study other cultures. Most private citizens and even our elected leaders hold a very parochial view of the world and are usually very insensitive to the cultural values that motivate people from other countries or regions.⁶³

There is potential for conflict, whenever people from different cultures come in contact, easily overlooked in a non threatening environment, however, in times of increased stress or war the potential for misunderstanding is exacerbated and often ends in violence or loss of life. Leaders must develop cultural sensitivities that make it possible for them to understand how to avoid unnecessarily offending someone. Additionally, they must achieve a level of sophistication that makes it possible to read and predict the reactions of the people they interact

with.⁶⁴ Consider the confusion at a checkpoint operation in Iraq where the American gesture for stop is the straight arm with palm out, while that means welcome in Iraq.

Although we won every major engagement in Vietnam, it still remains a political albatross for the United States. The biggest contributor to our failure at both the tactical and strategic level was our inability to understand the environment and our inability to adapt to the realities of the situation. Sun Tzu's states that "*Just as water adapts itself to the conformation of the ground, so in war must one must be flexible; he must often adapt his tactics to the enemy situation.*"⁶⁵ America's unwillingness to look inward and recognize our bias coupled with the failure to seek additional knowledge of the Vietnamese culture and the motivations of a dedicated enemy led to policies and actions that never addressed the actual problem, only problems we wanted to see. Our response to this new unconventional threat was entirely conventional; we fought the war American-style rather than adapting to the nature of our environment.⁶⁶

Iraq's complex environment has challenged leaders at all levels throughout the country and reinforced the value of understanding cultural impacts. Interviews with recent returnees stress the need for improvement in language as well as political, ideological and cultural training. We must bypass the simplistic strategy of "not showing feet" or "do not use your left hand" usually found in pre-deployment briefings. Future cultural awareness training must focus on religion, political structures, modes of production and their influence on a given region. Failing to understand the role and impact of tribalism has lead to a disproportionate empowerment of some tribes while totally ignoring others. Iraq has shown us that commanders on the ground will be unsuccessful without understanding that tribes and religious institutions can be direct competition with each other and produce multiple forms of authority within a region.⁶⁷

Marines have been fighting "Small Wars" throughout their history and have readily embraced and accepted the importance of cultural awareness and understanding. Most recently they created a Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, whose entire focus is on cultural awareness and its operational impacts. Their efforts are targeted at incoming lieutenants who learn and operate under the philosophy that "Navigating Cultural and Human Terrain is just as important as navigating geographical terrain."⁶⁸

The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) focused their efforts on understanding the complex operational environment, using it to their advantage during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Considerations of local farmers, interrelationships among tribal elements and the insurgent / criminal connection affected daily operations. Criminal and Insurgent activities followed tribal

patterns and through interactions with the local population elements of the 15th MEU began understanding these local nuances. With this newfound understanding and a willingness to adjust their operations based upon this knowledge, Marine operations began yielding much better results. This improved knowledge enhanced their targeting process, broke the cultural paradigm and focused efforts on kinetic or non-kinetic attacks, patterns of behavior, insurgent activity and physical considerations of the terrain.⁶⁹

It now becomes reasonably clear that leaders at all levels must understand the motivations, goals and beliefs of those we are fighting and seek to liberate! This knowledge and understanding promotes easier targeting of insurgent / criminal activity while enhancing our efforts to win the hearts and minds of the people in the region.⁷⁰

Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) and Basic Branch training provide tremendous opportunities to lay the foundation and basic concepts of cultural awareness. Additionally, the Army is pursuing additional cultural awareness training for all forces.⁷¹

Negotiations or meetings between U.S. forces and local populations are occurring in untold numbers on a daily basis throughout the world. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq highlight the fact that leaders at all levels are conducting meetings with coalition partners, local leaders, non-governmental organizations and other U.S. government agencies.⁷²

Based upon recent lessons learned, from our ongoing operations, four elements appear as constant from our leaders:

- The purpose of the negotiation/meeting is for the U.S. military to get something from the other party(ies) or for them to get something from us.
- We are not trying to create another America; we want to establish and support a just government that is responsive to and representative of its population.
- The cultures of the other parties (goals, how they do business how they see us and our goals, how they achieve consensus in their organizations) are different from that of a member of the U.S. military.
- As an institution, we do not train our personnel on how to approach, structure and conduct meetings and negotiations with groups outside our military culture.⁷³

Negotiations, like cultural awareness cut across the skill sets listed above. Addressing it under any other heading would be very easy; however, an understanding of an opposing culture is crucial if expecting to achieve favorable results during negotiations.

Consider cultural norms while operating in a rural setting or Middle Eastern environment. Most Americans Soldiers are conscious of the value of time and the inability to recover it once its lost. We tend to become impatient and more directive in order to get at the heart of the issue

of goal. Conversely, many cultures are less preoccupied with a sense of time and the rules of decorum and social interaction precede and dominate the conduct of business. Alien to most Americans is the fact that many cultures conduct the heart of the meeting following the proper discussion of personal matters or small talk.⁷⁴

For example, in Iraq where the rule of law is very weak, people rely on personal relationships to encourage participants within the negotiation to implement agreed upon solutions. The development of these personal relationships takes time to develop the trust required to conduct successful negotiations. Because of the importance of honor and trust, it's critical that leaders look for opportunities to implement "win-win" situations, while remembering that a real or perceived front to honor may cause an Iraqi to become uncooperative.⁷⁵

Commanders must consider and treat negotiations/meetings as they would any other mission. Although not always possible, leaders must look for the opportunity to develop a strategy, conduct a hasty war game, and rehearsal prior to entering into any negotiation.

Leaders who are ignorant of language, culture and customs of the local environment enter a "cultural minefield".⁷⁶ In an irregular warfare environment, the importance of cross cultural awareness cannot be overstated and it must be the number one priority for leader development, resourcing, and training. Understanding culture and its impact on the operational environment and the global community and coalition partners, enhances legitimacy and provides increased opportunities to leverage and exploit success.⁷⁷

Civil Military Operations

History and emerging lessons learned from the ongoing War on Terrorism highlight the importance of incorporating humanitarian and other civil military operations as part of a coordinated effort to defeat insurgent forces. Consider the statement by Ambassador Robert W. Kromer (former director of CORDS program in South Vietnam) "*The U.S. effort in Vietnam failed largely because it could not sufficiently revamp or adequately substitute Vietnamese leadership, administration, and armed forces inadequate to the task...*"⁷⁸ Kromer's comments highlight the importance of restoring infrastructure and legitimate institutions within the host nation.

Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson commissioned The Program for The Pacification and Long Term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN) in 1965. It was a focus group formed to study army efforts in Vietnam. Led by General Creighton Abrams, the commission identified new courses of action for the U.S. and its allies. PROVN recommendations included refocusing U.S. efforts from killing Viet Cong to winning the popular support for the Vietnamese Government. To quote the commission and highlight the importance of civil-military efforts:

'Victory' can only be achieved through bringing the individual Vietnamese, typically a rural peasant, to support willingly the Government of Vietnam. The critical actions are those that occur at the village, district and provincial levels. This is where the war must be fought; this is where the war and the object which lies behind it must be won.⁷⁹

U.S. Leadership had finally identified the solution to winning the war and began developing an integrated plan for achieving our objectives in Vietnam. Unfortunately, identifying these solutions came too late in the game and the American Public, our Center of Gravity, tired of casualties and abandoned hope and support for the war.

The CORDS program was established in 1967 to de-conflict efforts and establish priorities between U.S. military forces and interagency partners. Prior to its creation, Americans involved in Vietnam viewed pacification efforts based upon which government agency they worked for; either civil or military but not as a joint civil-military process. As expected, military leaders and some civilians fostered a belief that security was required before economic, political and social development could proceed, people must feel safe and secure prior to the government earning their loyalty. Conversely, most civilians clung to the belief that economic, political and social development enhanced political allegiance and would bring military success, because an insurgency without popular support would wither on the vine.⁸⁰

This dichotomy reflected an even more basic problem for the American approach to the war. The U.S. had failed to identify whether to fight the war primarily as a military effort or a political struggle? Although the U.S. government never formally resolved the question, our emphasis and resourcing efforts favored a military solution.⁸¹ A continued lack of coordination at the interagency and military levels affected pacification efforts throughout the war. The interagency battles and jurisdictional disputes from Washington D.C. magnified themselves in South Vietnam by representatives and agencies that looked for guidance from home offices instead of the ambassador.⁸²

The Malayan counterinsurgency program gained momentum following the removal of communists from the labor movement. The strengthening of public moral and winning the hearts and minds involved the people directly in the struggle. The authorities urged them to join legal organizations as a means of expressing indignation against communist activities. Additionally, political leaders developed working relationships with British Armed Forces improving day-to-day coordination between civic leaders and the military authorities. These actions fostered a sense of involvement and allowed the feeling of shared policy formulation.⁸³

Coalition Forces and maneuver units within Iraq are inherently responsible for the law and order and administration within their assigned areas. Commanders at all levels are realizing

that Civil-military operations (CMO) provide a visible “concrete” and invaluable linkage to the population to secure support for achieving operational and strategic objectives. CMO are a critical element to establishing a safe and secure environment and eventual transition to a self sustaining administration.⁸⁴

Critical to our efforts in this area is coordination with, continued empowerment of and transition to local and national Iraqi governance. Commanders cannot be successful within this environment without understanding the relationship of religious and tribal institutions to the secular forms of government valued by democracies, again highlighting how cultural awareness cuts a large swath through all operations. Maneuver commanders are finding themselves running Iraq without the benefit of previous training and are finding themselves deficient in the complexities and nuances in this area.⁸⁵

According to an early U.S. Special Forces Field Manual 23-20, civic action programs strive to:

- Contribute to the betterment of the lives of the local population.
- Gain the support, loyalty and respect of the people for the government and contribute, in some measure, to national development.⁸⁶

The advantage of having Soldiers and leaders involved with civic action programs within assigned areas of responsibility enables them to develop ties, build relationships and gain a sense of responsibility to the local community, thereby, countering anti-government propaganda and enhancing opportunities for development of potential intelligence sources.⁸⁷

Reconstruction efforts are a critical element to an effective CMO program and the basic knowledge of contracting enhances a commander’s capability in this arena. Consider our efforts in Iraq, where reconstruction and administration efforts exceed the capabilities of civil affairs and Coalition Provisional Authority forces. Once again demonstrating the importance of conducting integrated, yet decentralized efforts. These types of reconstruction efforts far exceed the capabilities of a certified contracting officer at division level working in a base camp, reinforcing the requirement for commanders to execute this type mission with resources available on hand.⁸⁸

Unfortunately numerous examples from Iraq call attention to our flaws in this arena. Too often contractors failed to meet customer expectations and completion dates for projects impacting on operations. Written contracts failed to define the scope of work, construction standards or delivery dates. Limited contracting specialists severely affected commanders’ access to this specialized resource. Limited training in cultural awareness, negotiations and scope of work enhances a commander’s capability to operate effectively within this field.

The nature of our operations has literally reinforced existing doctrine that civil-military operations remain a commander's responsibility and are most effective when integrated with other operations and the unit's targeting process. Commanders no longer have the luxury of delegating their CMO program to a Civil Affairs officer.

Intelligence

To quote a returning commander from the 3rd Infantry Division *"I had perfect situational awareness. What I lacked was cultural awareness. I knew where every tank was dug in on the outskirts of Tallil. Only problem was my Soldiers had to fight fanatics charging on foot or in pickups and firing AK-47s and Rifle Propelled Grenades. Great tactical intelligence, Wrong enemy."*⁸⁹

The nature of warfare is changing and our intelligence community is struggling to keep up with this huge paradigm shift. LTG Keith Alexander, deputy chief of staff for Army intelligence, noted this colossal change and commented *"We are no longer looking for an armored division. We're looking for people – people who want to kill us, people who want to change things in their world and see us as the enemy. That war and problem set that we have is far different intelligence problem set than what we had going into the Cold War with the Soviets."*⁹⁰

The United States lacks the manpower, budget and will to develop human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities in developing countries which are potentially all future sources of instability or conflict.⁹¹ Intelligence must drive operations and it is far too important to leave to a Military Intelligence staff officer, commanders must be intimately involved in developing information leading to actionable intelligence and understanding its impact on the operational environment.

Based upon this information, it becomes imperative that commanders understand the importance of establishing basic HUMINT capabilities within conventional units. During irregular operations, they must work to establish credibility and build relationships with the local population who are a major source of intelligence.⁹²

Field Manual 31-16 states that *"Success in Counterterrorist operations almost invariably goes to the force which receives timely information from the local population."*⁹³ The key to collecting and sorting out friend from foe on the irregular battlefield is using all available assets on the ground as intelligence operatives. Finding terrorist cells or individuals requires more assets on the ground as opposed to advanced technologies.

A recently emerging term "social intelligence" implies an in depth knowledge of local customs and culture. The military's ultimate goal is to turn every Soldier into a battlefield sensor

capable of working within both the intelligence community and the community associated with their area of operation, thereby increasing our HUMINT capability.⁹⁴

Consider the army's efforts and historical lessons learned during the transformation of the Interim Brigade Combat Team Recon Surveillance Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadrons. It became readily apparent that junior leaders required additional training in the proper employment of tactical HUMINT teams since they frequently missed critical opportunities to gather intelligence/HUMINT at the tactical level.⁹⁵

Discussed in an earlier section was a detective type role Soldiers and leaders play while operating within an irregular environment to identify terrorist elements or enemy factions. HUMINT or "low level source operations", defined as the use of non-unit personnel or assets to provide information of value to the unit, take on increased importance. Leaders must be familiar with and able to apply the basics of tactical questioning, an abbreviated form of interrogation or debriefing. Building upon long term relationship development, effective interpersonal skills, culture awareness, negotiation and dialogue and basic interviewing skills leaders and Soldiers at all levels become collectors enhancing situational awareness and the intelligence picture.⁹⁶

Consider units in Iraq who are conducting cordon and search operations and the value provided by Soldiers on the ground with increased situational awareness. These operations focused on capturing and detaining non-compliant people and the seizure of weapon and arms caches, based upon actionable intelligence gained from within the Iraqi population. This intelligence was often time sensitive requiring quick action. Commanders had limited time to validate information and needed to develop a relationship of trust with informants.

A unique challenge confronts military forces in future warfare, although we maintain the technical capability to hit and destroy any target on the planet, we are inherently weakest in the areas of intelligence collection and interrogation which is required for target identification. As stated earlier, asymmetric enemies and terrorists don't operate on tanks or warships that are readily identifiable and vulnerable to our technological advantages, they lurk in the shadows and hide among the population to emerge briefly and set off Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) or launch rockets. Finding and defeating these types of enemies requires getting inside their minds and decision cycles. Smart, culturally savvy leaders proficient in intelligence collection and interrogation are precisely what the Army requires and should demand from institutional training and pre-commissioning sources.⁹⁷ To meet these growing needs we must assess and train junior leaders in foreign area studies or other programs that highlight culture, political systems and social structure as part of pre-commissioning studies.⁹⁸

Information / Psychological Operations

Information is at the very heart of many stability operations. In fact, IO may be designated as the main effort during certain phases of an operation. These operations are often sensitive and politically charged where perception and public support may be centers of gravity. In stability operations, IO may be the most critical and acceptable means of achieving stated objectives consistent with the ROE.⁹⁹

Large scale military operations seldom win insurgencies, instead a combination of military and political actions have been the keys to victory. Political leverage derives from effective psychological operations or Information Operations (IO).¹⁰⁰ Effective uses of these types of operations convince the local population to support the government, identify insurgent or guerilla forces and separate them from the population. Additionally, counterinsurgent forces hope that these type operations would convince segments of the population to actively support counterinsurgent efforts and less committed insurgents to capitulate and turn themselves in.¹⁰¹

British forces in Malaysia effectively conducted an extremely effective psychological operations campaign when communist guerillas began slashing rubber trees, which a large portion of the population depended on for their livelihood. Their efforts resulted in overwhelming numbers of Malaysians turning against their brothers who'd drastically impacted their quality of life.¹⁰²

Compare British efforts in Malaysia to the French's unsuccessful attempts to defeat insurgents in Algeria. Successful cordon & search operations by both armies crippled insurgent support organizations with intelligence being the focal point of the operation. British forces' use of psychological operations coupled with monetary rewards was ultimately more successful than the French "tough methods," involving military force. British efforts were more in line with the rule of law and sustained external scrutiny, while French methods, although effective in the short term, were unable to withstand public scrutiny and brought condemnation from the international community.¹⁰³

Information Operations, usually treated as a strategic or operational requirement, is increasing in complexity. Corps or Divisions develop centralized plans and themes while brigades executed in a decentralized manner at the tactical or local level.¹⁰⁴ Recent planning efforts highlight that IO involves much more than regurgitating a simple command message or distribution of pamphlets to the local community. Current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq demand that Information Operations be tailored to local leaders and individual communities while remaining nested with higher echelon goals. Increasingly, commanders are finding

resource shortfalls in this arena and are conducting information operations within existing capabilities to achieve tactical objectives.¹⁰⁵

The conduct of IO in modern times, given the ubiquity, immediate translatability, and transferability of information into tactical, operational, and strategic advantages requires levels of understanding, resourcing, preparation, and sophistication on the part of conventional force leaders and planners to assure dominance over irregular adversaries.

The ubiquitous nature of media on the battlefield compresses the entire architecture of warfare. The ability to transmit significant events in real time has provided the media and our enemies opportunities to exploit actions either favorable or unfavorable to our cause immediately. A little cited characteristic of Special Operations is "The execution of small unit tactical operations for strategic effect." During the conduct of irregular warfare, a greater number of conventional forces take on this character. A characteristic of good IO is that every message contributes to achieving an objective(s) be it tactical, operational, strategic, or a combination of all three. The correct message presented to the correct target audience by a tactical unit i.e., a tactical PSYOP loudspeaker team, can result in Regime change. Young Soldiers and leaders throughout the Army are quickly discovering they must mix kinetic and non-kinetic operations to accomplish mission objectives.

Physical actions speak much louder than words and leaders everywhere must understand the impact that their actions have on on-going and future operations. Consider the following scenario where a Special Forces Operational Detachment-A (SFODA) had been operating within the Khost / Gardez region of Afghanistan. During a routine search, members of the SFODA arrived at the home of a male villager; they knocked, explained what they were searching for and allowed female family members to move into a room out of sight of the SF Soldiers in accordance with local customs. After the search, the villager invited the operators in for tea and conversation. The Special Forces Soldiers departed the house leaving the inhabitants with their pride and dignity. The Soldiers watched in frustration having been too late to stop a conventional unit from kicking in the door of this same house and forcibly conducting a search. The Soldiers slammed the elderly man to ground while attempting to frisk female family members. The man was humiliated and the females were furious. The conventional unit considered this operation a resounding success; however, according to SF sources the local population and leaders consider it a resounding failure. The primary target of this operation was an al-Qaeda financier operating within the area. The conventional unit's cultural ignorance was instrumental in ruining the SF rapport with local villagers who apparently had tipped off the financier who escaped capture.¹⁰⁶

Mao Tse-Tung understood the impact of insurgent operations against local populations and would have severely punished the leaders of the conventional unit mentioned above. He stated that:

Special attention must be focused on the alliance with the middle peasants who will be the broadest basic masses in rural soviets after the revolution. All our treatments and policies must win their approval and support. Every decision of the poor peasant corps and the soviet must have the support of the middle peasantry, secured through a village or residence meeting. All the voices of the middle peasant masses must be heard with care, and any attempt to encroach upon the interests of the middle peasantry must be severely dealt with".¹⁰⁷

F2F engagements are critical actions undertaken by small unit leaders multiple times throughout the day. Arguably it is one of the most critical components of an effective IO campaign. Understanding culture and perceptions created by leader actions increase effectiveness for junior leaders conducting F2F engagements. A few of these factors include long barrel vs. short barrel weapons, weapons posture, battle rattle, helmets and size of convoy or number of personnel accompanying you to meeting with local leaders.¹⁰⁸

Leaders must look for non-traditional or out "Out of the Box" type opportunities to get the command message out. Unit commanders have used Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to establish newspapers, radio and television stations within local areas to tailor messages supportive of coalition forces and objectives. These media provide immediate response for commanders to highlight friendly success and insurgent failures. Smart leaders look for opportunities to exploit insurgent mistakes. Recent examples include efforts to discredit insurgents following suicide attacks that kill non-combatant women and children.

Leaders and Soldiers throughout the army spend a great deal of time practicing battle drills and honing kinetic capabilities in order to maintain proficiency in patrolling, call for fire and other related battle tasks. We must look for opportunities to train and familiarize leaders with the elements of IO and the basic principles of offensive and defensive IO while training staffs on the importance of incorporating non-lethal operations into the targeting process.¹⁰⁹ Institutionally, the requirement is to prepare the force (educate and train) to deal with information operations recognizing the inherent challenges and opportunities associated with developing a seamless IO campaign that facilitates planning and action from the corner of Pennsylvania and Executive Avenues in Washington, D.C. to a street corner in "no man's land."

Conclusion

As a nation we should expect and prepare to remain involved in irregular warfare. Our 2005 National Defense Strategy highlights the potential and importance of remaining prepared to operate against asymmetric enemies;

The U.S. military predominates in the world in traditional forms of warfare. Potential adversaries accordingly shift away from challenging the United States through traditional action and adopt asymmetric capabilities and methods. An array of traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive capabilities and methods threaten U.S. interests. Increasingly, sophisticated irregular methods -- terrorism and insurgency -- challenge U.S. security interests.¹¹⁰

Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05 drastically redefined mission priorities for U.S. military forces. Recognizing that Stability Operations have grown into a core U.S. mission with increased importance, it outlines a requirement for military forces to be prepared to conduct or support them. It now requires the services to give priority to planning, organizations, training and resourcing on equal footing with conventional missions.¹¹¹

Numerous historical examples and our ongoing operations in support of the nation's Global War on Terrorism show that good junior officers, commanded by leaders who are tactically flexible and willing to think in an unorthodox manner are the critical ingredients for exploitation and success in an irregular environment. It's critical that leaders at all levels study previous historical irregular warfare examples while capturing and integrating lessons learned. Successful leaders demonstrate a willingness to learn from ongoing successes and failures. Our efforts in irregular war must focus on winning over the local population without losing sight of political and military objectives.¹¹²

Future professional development should incorporate knowledge areas such as police actions, foreign internal defense and interagency/joint/coalition operations. Skill sets or competencies must include cultural awareness, civil military operations, intelligence, and information operations.

Cultural awareness and understanding must be our number one priority for future training and resource allocation. Pre-commissioning Sources must require language training and exposure to other classes in politics, international relations, or other areas that reinforce cultural sensitivity. Cultural immersion opportunities during summer programs can lay the appropriate foundation and reinforce cultural sensitivities required to operate within the complex irregular environment.

The conventional officer of the future must train and establish a level of proficiency that enhances his leadership capabilities within an irregular warfare environment. They must be

capable of integrating “low tech” operations into the kinetic and non kinetic targeting and tracking process which includes an understanding of how to interrogate and run low level sources.

Understanding operational impacts and their effects on civilian populations while gaining an appreciation for second and third order effects is a critical component to mission accomplishment in the “winning the hearts and mind campaign”. Based upon a shortage of Special Operations Forces, U.S. conventional forces must be prepared to operate with and train local indigenous forces in order to provide security and lead to an appropriate transition to Phase IV operations.

Since the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, military forces have improved drastically in the Joint Operations Arena. We should consider the same level of effort and an institutional paradigm shift focused on improving interagency and multinational operations. A basic understanding of NGOs and their culture enhances opportunities to leverage the resources they provide and fill critical niches.

The importance of Civil Military Operations must not be overlooked or overstated. Throughout our history, we often only paid lip service to the critically of this line of operation and subsequently floundered in environments that significantly differ from our own culture. Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the critically of this mission as our forces are conducting Security Stability Transition Reconstruction efforts. Civic action programs and reconstruction efforts are enhanced when conducted by soldiers operating with an understanding of the area of operations.

Since the U.S. lacks the required budget and manpower required to develop HUMINT networks across the globe, conventional officers must understand the importance of establishing HUMINT capabilities within our forces. The ability to conduct field interrogations and run low level sources provides increased opportunities to develop actionable intelligence.

Information Operations remains at the very heart of SSTR operations and leaders at all levels must be capable of understanding higher mission intent while tailoring and utilizing IO messages to the local or regional level. We must look for opportunities to familiarize and train leaders at all levels on the offensive and defensive principals of IO while training staffs to incorporate it into the targeting process.

We have a limited window of opportunity to capitalize on the Army's transformation efforts while capturing lessons learned to refocus the professional development for our conventional officers. We must look to borrow a page from Special Forces leader development while maintaining our conventional capabilities. The conventional officer corps has demonstrated the

uncanny ability to adapt and learn during operations, albeit sometimes with a steep learning curve. Adjustment of future professional development allows us the opportunity to enter future conflicts more prepared at a higher state of readiness.

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