

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE DOCTRINAL CHALLENGE OF WINNING THE PEACE AGAINST ROGUE STATES: HOW
LESSONS FROM POST-WORLD WAR II GERMANY MAY INFORM OPERATIONS AGAINST SADDAM
HUSSEIN'S IRAQ**

by

LTC Wally Z. Walters
U. S. Army

Professor Craig Nation Ph.D.
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC Wally Z. Walters

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The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) gave official recognition to what the terrorist attacks of 11 September made all too clear: the United States must develop new strategies to contend with weak, failed and rogue states. While the U.S. exhibited extraordinary military prowess in promptly defeating the Afghani Taliban, decisions about how to confront a rogue state such as Iraq depend on more than new calculations of U.S. resolve and military capability. The U.S. also must find a way to "win the peace," to replace rogue regimes with responsible governance after any military conflict ends. Frustrations in the 1990s demonstrate the growing gap that must be overcome between U.S. warfighting and peace operations doctrines. Post-World War II occupation experience provides insights for building a new doctrine that will be military, interagency and international in character. U.S. success in Germany resulted from carefully changing civil conditions rather than imposing stability, rushing to democracy or rushing to the exits. The U.S. military played a reluctant, but necessary leading role. The U.S. military needs to prepare to do so again, for unless the United States develops an effective plan to win the peace, it risks failure in overcoming the evils of rogue regimes.

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THE DOCTRINAL CHALLENGE OF WINNING THE PEACE AGAINST ROGUE STATES: HOW LESSONS FROM POST-WORLD WAR II GERMANY MAY INFORM OPERATIONS AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN'S IRAQ

The easy part is going to be, in a bizarre sense, taking Saddam out. The hard part is what you do after that.

—Senator Joseph R. Biden

America's military is making plans and nations are choosing sides as U.S. leaders debate whether and how to wage war against the state sponsors of terrorism, including the "axis of evil" of rogue states: Iraq, Iran and North Korea.¹ Among the "axis," Iraq looms as the primary target for military action due to its defiance of international inspections and its steady accumulation of weapons of mass destruction. The destructiveness of terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 ("9/11") and the quick initial success of the United States military in liberating Afghanistan from the Taliban combine to encourage action, but resolve is not enough. Success will require the right strategy, doctrine and capabilities. The prospects leave observers at home and abroad uneasy. As Senator Chuck Hegel notes, "What is the outcome? Do you, in fact, destroy Iraq to the point where you break it up, and you make it even more dangerous?"² Winning the war will not be enough. Can America win the peace after the fighting ends? How? How should winning the peace govern the waging of war?

History suggests only a qualified "yes" to whether America can win the peace. To do so, America may have to conquer Iraq, occupy it, and rebuilt its institutions from the bottom-up, as America did in Germany and Japan after World War II. Unfortunately, the gap between today's doctrines for warfighting and for peace operations make it more likely that America will fail to replace rogue regimes with responsible governance, even if America wins victory in war. To have the best chance to win the peace, America's Army will have to overcome its institutional aversion to military governance operations. If U.S. leaders are to have the option of regime change or occupation as called for in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), then the Army needs to quickly develop new doctrine for occupation, military governance and transition to nation-building. Theater war planners will also need to take the key issues into account.

Post-World War II experience in Germany provides valuable lessons upon which to build such a doctrine. The experience demonstrates how it can be efficiently and effectively developed and implemented. While such a doctrine would be interagency and international in character, the U.S. military will have to provide the leading role in its development – however reluctantly – in order to tie it to combat operations. The history also shows that while it is essential for the military to run operations initially, governance and nation-building can require remarkably few soldiers and can be quickly handed off to others.

THE POST COLD WAR STRUGGLE FOR A NEW GLOBAL EQUILIBRIUM

The Clausewitzian analysis is breaking down. It is true that war is an extension of policy – but only when waged by stable states. War is escaping from state control, and into the hands of bandits and anarchists. The great work of disarming tribes, sects, warlords and criminals – a principal achievement of monarchs of the 17th century and empires in the 19th – threatens to need doing all over again. Not many military establishments possess the skills, equipment and cultural ruthlessness necessary for the task.

—John Keegan

The year of miracles, 1989, did not usher in an “end of history.”³ Instead, the post Cold War era can now be recognized as a struggle for a new global equilibrium. The early success of collective security in the Persian Gulf War was deceptive, as President George H.W. Bush’s goal of a “new world order” was quickly overcome by “new world disorder” from the Horn of Africa to the Balkans and beyond. Benjamin Barber was more perceptive in identifying the dominant political developments of the 1990s – the simultaneous challenges of tribalism and globalism to sovereign democratic states.⁴ The terrorism of 11 September 2001 exhibited the acute consequences of these trends, successful attacks on the world’s leading state by xenophobic zealots exploiting society’s openness. Until “9/11”, the responses of leading states to these trends ranged from limited intervention to grudging acceptance, as societies pursued mutually contradictory motives for political autonomy, economic wealth, international approval and risk avoidance. Order has frayed, and with it, the underpinnings of safety and justice.

The terrorism of “9/11” is proving to be a catalyst for states to resist and react to the forces of disorder. While the U.S. takedown of the Afghani Taliban regime is the visible early result, the most important reaction is reinforcement of the power and responsibility of sovereign states to police and prevent transnational threats. Within the tradition of the Westphalian state system and by international law, states are obligated to contain or suppress terrorists, pirates, criminals and other illegitimate users of violence. Further, states may act in their own pre-emptive self-defense. Where globalization, tribalism, or despotism facilitate or harbor menacing dangers, it can be appropriate for other states to attack, defeat and root out dangerous threats, in coalition or unilaterally.

The rapid advance of technology is another major trend affecting the struggle for a new global equilibrium. Operation Enduring Freedom’s synergy of precision airpower and Special Forces in Afghanistan is only the latest demonstration of the unprecedented nature of U.S. military power first seen in Desert Storm. Coupled with the resolve of the American people after “9/11” the United States has unusual opportunity to defeat its enemies, even with only minimal

help from other states. However, while technology's advance has increased America's strength, it has also increased exposure to international threat as it increases access of despotic regimes and non-state actors to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Unless the United States and others act quickly, the proliferation and dispersion of WMD to rogue states and terrorists may be impossible to reverse without extraordinary casualties. During the Cold War era, deterrence was enough to prevent the use of WMD. Deterrence may not be sufficient in a future where rogue states and non-state actors may use secrecy and fanaticism to employ such weapons.

A MODEL OF STRATEGY, POLICY AND DOCTRINE

Without strategy there is only drift.

—Paul Kennedy and John Lewis Gaddis

Sovereign states exist in an anarchical international environment. The price of their sovereign freedom is insecurity. To gain advantage and protection from dangers, states can rely only on self-help. Where national interests do not directly clash, states can usually obtain cooperation from other states, often as the result of persuasion, bargaining or coercion.⁵ Strategy relates the objectives (policy ends), resources (means) and methods (ways, defined through doctrine) states employ to influence the actions of other states.⁶ Means may be categorized as military, political, informational or economic, and may be used in varying combinations to achieve particular ends.

In practice states are not unitary actors. They employ complex subordinate organizations such as the military. These organizations institutionalize strategy into action through the adoption of doctrine. Doctrine consists of fundamental principles, techniques and procedures, derived from prevailing beliefs (theories), strategic direction and previous experience. Doctrine provides the basis for organizing, resourcing, training and responding. Doctrine increases efficiency, by allowing concerted action by a large number of individuals, but may decrease effectiveness in particular instances because doctrine narrows the range of an organization's responses.⁷ The more grounded compliance with doctrine is in an organization's incentive structures and the more detailed the doctrine's procedures are, the greater the risk that it will be applied rigidly to circumstances that may not warrant it.

In enhancing and constraining a nation's strategic efforts to influence other states, doctrine acts as an "intermediary variable." Two other intermediary variables that affect the success of a nation's strategy are friction and resistance of other states to coercion.⁸ A simplified model of these concepts is at Figure 1. In the American military system, national leadership defines policy ends and allocates resources – the means. Theater commanders

manage implementation, employing ways chosen from doctrines developed by the military services. Consequently, doctrine or the absence of doctrine can constrict policy choices or trump policy execution.




FIGURE 1. DOCTRINE AS AN INTERMEDIARY VARIABLE

THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGY, POLICY AND DOCTRINE

Doctrine is nothing but the skin of truth set up and stuffed.

—Henry Ward Beecher

As the international environment or the means of statecraft change, a nation may find its strategy or its subordinate organizations’ efforts to be ineffective. The adaptation of policy and doctrine is not automatic. Evident failure and reassessment of the environment usually precede political decisions to alter policy. In the absence of failure and strong political or institutional leadership, organizations may cling stubbornly to doctrine long after it loses its usefulness, and resist developing doctrine needed for new circumstances. Rigorous study of the past is crucial to understanding and evaluating an Army’s doctrine.⁹ A brief review of the evolution of U.S. military doctrine during and after the Cold War illustrates these points and helps to explain today’s gap between warfighting and peace operations doctrine.

POLICIES AND DOCTRINES FOR COLD WAR WARFIGHTING AND PEACEKEEPING

The predominant U.S. military policies and doctrines of the Cold War appear at Table 1. Of course, the main strategic concern was the Soviet Union. With the advent of nuclear weapons, America chose to limit its strategic goals to deterrence and containment. As a result, during the late 1940s and 1950s, the U.S. military abandoned the doctrines and structures of decisive force that led to the successful conquest and occupation of Germany and Japan. Only in the 1980s would the U.S. Army again pursue an offensive doctrine, AirLand Battle, as it became clear from Arab-Israeli conflicts that the Soviet-type forces could be outfought. This doctrinal transformation was also the result of exceptional post-Vietnam conflict leadership.¹⁰

The development of policy and doctrine are not exclusively U.S. or military endeavors. Peace operations doctrine is rooted in the history of missions under the United Nations charter, and illustrates the incremental way in which policy and doctrine can emerge.

Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter has no reference to military forces for peacekeeping. Instead, these missions emerged ad hoc, as international diplomats sought to deal with situations that threatened “international peace and security.”¹¹ The first peacekeeping operation (PKO) began in Kashmir in 1948 and has yet to conclude. The Charter largely predetermined the limited nature of PKOs due to the contradictions among its mandates for peace, security, non-intervention in domestic affairs, and the need for unanimity among the great powers. The Kashmir mission and most subsequent PKOs helped avert immediate hostilities, but failed to resolve underlying disputes.¹²

POLICY OBJECT (ENDS)	STRATEGIC CONCEPT	RESOURCES (MEANS)	DOCTRINE (WAYS)
Contain Soviet Union	Nuclear Deterrence	Nuclear Forces	Mutually Assured Destruction
Bolster Allied States	Alliances	Forward Deployed Conventional Forces	Active Defense & Nation Assistance
Deny Other States to the Soviets	Bolster Local Military Forces Friendly to U.S.	A. Special Operations Forces B. Conventional Forces	A. Insurgency/ Counter-Insurgency B. Situation Specific Interventions
Stabilize 3d World Conflict Zones	Separate Combatants	U.N. PKO forces	Peacekeeping (U.N.)

TABLE 1. STRATEGIES AND DOCTRINES FOR U.S. COLD WAR WARFIGHTING AND PEACEKEEPING

Through experience, the U.N. and participating nations developed rudimentary doctrine for these operations consistent with low budgets – the deployment of small units and individuals to disputed borders with very restrictive rules of engagement, impartiality, and the presumption of evacuation if consent is lost from one of the major disputants. The earliest efforts were only as observer missions, but these led to larger “traditional peacekeeping” missions that could conduct limited self-defense in a border zone. As Ramesh Thakur notes, “the goal of peacekeeping units is not the creation of peace, but the containment of war so that others can search for peace in stable conditions.”¹³ These missions were passive, innocuous, and unthreatening.¹⁴ To avoid exacerbating Cold War tensions, the great powers paid higher assessments to the U.N. but left the task of deploying military units to others. One consequence was that neither the U.S. military nor other executive departments developed detailed doctrine for peacekeeping, but other nations and the U.N. did.

Given the prospects for Cold War escalation and violence, it is not surprising that the U.S. military did not maintain or undertake doctrine for occupation and nation-building. Instead, the U.S. focus was to promote stability, in order to avoid war while bolstering other states to prevent their falling under communist domination. What nation-assistance efforts that did occur took the forms of military aid, counter-insurgency and insurgency. Throughout the 1950s, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Cooperation Agency (forerunner of the Agency for International Development, AID) provided training to police and paramilitary forces in many regions. In 1962, the Kennedy Administration consolidated these programs within AID, although they did not fit well within AID's culture or larger organizational mission. In the wake of the Vietnam conflict, military leaders and the Congress became disillusioned with "nation-building," constabulary training and other aspects of counter-insurgency. Legislation in 1972 and 1973 effectively shut down the training programs.¹⁵ Congressional waivers in the 1980s allowed some of these training programs to be renewed, but generally for only limited purposes such as counter-drug support, counter-terrorism or covert aid to the Afghani Mujahedin.¹⁶

The exception to these trends was the 1983 invasion of Grenada, but this operation was too small, too brief and too unique to prompt development of a nation-building doctrine. For the U.S. military, the Cold War doctrinal legacy of peace operations would only include narrow conceptions of foreign humanitarian assistance, nation-assistance (military sales, grants and training), and support to counter-insurgencies and insurgencies.

DEVELOPMENT OF A DOCTRINAL GAP IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

The passing of the Cold War allowed the United States to employ its new offensively minded doctrine of decisive conventional force, testing it in Panama and then validating it in Desert Storm.¹⁷ Throughout the 1990s the U.S. military as an institution clung to this warfighting doctrine, even as the environment shifted and political leaders sought to use military forces to stop civil wars in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Labeled the "Powell Doctrine," it was the basis of civil-military dispute in the Clinton Administration, with the public generally backing the risk-adverse military's reluctance to use limited force, especially where no vital interest was clearly at stake.¹⁸ Following failure in Somalia the result was adaptation by the military – detailed study, adoption and adaptation of the United Nations' doctrine for peacekeeping and peace enforcement that emphasized force protection – combined with a continuing reluctance to use it.

The changed international environment is reflected in a new taxonomy of states for doctrine to address, as depicted in Table 2. The decisive force doctrine was readily adaptable to

deter, and if necessary, defeat “rogue” states – relatively closed states run by entrenched despotic regimes that refuse to cooperate with international norms – that might threaten international peace. Maintenance of forward presence persisted from the Cold War’s doctrine of forward forces, to sustain alliances and force projection basing even though there was no longer a need for forward defense in Germany or Japan. Budget stringency and military reluctance has limited the development of doctrine for weak, transition states to modest engagement exercises and partnering relationships. Doctrinal innovation for failed states did not begin until 1994, a consequence of the debacle in Somalia.

POLICY OBJECT (ENDS)	STRATEGIC CONCEPT	RESOURCES (MEANS)	DOCTRINE (WAYS)
Contain Rogue States	Conventional Deterrence/ Limited War	Conventional Forces & Strategic Lift	Major Regional Contingency Plans for Decisive Force & Quick Exit
Engage Weak States	Encourage Transition	Limited Exercises of Conventional Forces	Nation Assistance & Engagement
Prevent Humanitarian Tragedy in Failed States	Stability through Conflict Prevention or Low Cost Intervention	Coalitions (preferably with limited U.S. involvement)	Humanitarian Asst, Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations
Sustain Alliances	Maintain Relationships	Conventional Forces	Forward Presence

TABLE 2. U.S. WARFIGHTING AND PEACE OPERATIONS STRATEGIES AND DOCTRINES IN THE 1990S

Given the usefulness of working through coalitions to increase legitimacy and spread risks, it is not surprising that relief operations in Northern Iraq and Somalia built on the framework of coalition partners’ experiences in U.N. operations, while retaining U.S. military concerns for less restrictive rules of engagement (U.N. Chapter VII based operations) and prompt exits. In 1994, as Bosnia threatened to become “Serbo-Croatian for Vietnam” or “Serbo-Croatian for Somalia,” U.S. Army leaders reluctantly began a search for doctrine that would be militarily effective in failed states while continuing to resist pressures to directly participate in “nation-building.”

Somalia proved to be the catalyst for intellectual discussion and institutional change, such as the foundation of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, and U.S. support to overhaul the United Nations’ Department of Peacekeeping. The Army produced FM 100-23 Peace Operations in 1994. Three joint publications followed in quick succession in 1995 based on FM 100-23.¹⁹ By 1995, senior U.S. military leaders no longer argued that the military only existed to fight and win wars. There was reluctant acceptance of peace operations as a last resort,

although only as a collateral mission rather than a primary one.²⁰ Peacekeeping would not be added to Army unit Mission Essential Task Lists and would be deliberately trained only prior to operations. At the national level, policy development culminated in the classified 1995 Presidential Decision Directive 25 “On Reforming Multinational Peace Operations.” This development of new policy and doctrine for peace operations demonstrates how rapidly innovation can proceed with determined political and military leadership, prompted by circumstances and in light of historical experiences. Whether U.S. leaders learned the right lessons is less clear. The rejection of nation-building limits the available military doctrinal means to overwhelming victory (e.g., Haiti) or limited, tentative intervention (e.g., Bosnia), followed by frustratingly long periods of presence to avert renewed conflict, as diplomats find themselves without enough power or resources to build democracy over the objections of corrupt, self-interested local politicians pursuing narrower interests.

The new U.S. doctrine divides the spectrum of peace operations into peacekeeping and peace enforcement, based on the consent of the combatants, the U.N. Chapter of the mandate, and the willingness to employ lethal force.

[Peace operations] are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term settlement and are categorized as peacekeeping operations (PKO) or peace enforcement operations (PEO)...PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement....PEO are the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.²¹

In practice, the United Nations does not distinguish PKO and PEO as clearly. Some term the most robust U.N. PKOs as “Chapter VI & ½” operations or “2nd Generation Peacekeeping,” because they include active efforts to deliver humanitarian aid, demobilize belligerents, conduct elections and other “nation-building activities.”²² The U.S. military resists incorporating such tasks into its doctrine, and did not do so when the doctrine was updated in 2001, preferring to leave such activities to others.²³ In practice, in Bosnia and Kosovo, U.S. forces sometimes participate in these tasks, but do so beyond the procedural detail of U.S. doctrine. The U.S. military’s Joint Dictionary does not even have a definition for “nation-building,” as if to do so would give it operational significance.²⁴

The variance between U.S. military doctrine for warfighting and that for peace operations is striking. Joint warfighting doctrine envisions “full spectrum dominance” that rapidly seizes the initiative and conducts decisive offensive operations with overmatching force for early, favorable victory “gaining control over the adversary in the final stages of combat.”²⁵ The doctrine cautions

joint commanders that “there is a delicate balance between the desire for quick victory and termination on truly favorable terms,” and that “wars are successful only when political goals are achieved and these goals endure.”²⁶ Successful conclusion is “typically characterized by self-sustaining peace and the establishment of the rule of law,” but the doctrine provides no guidance how to achieve it other than to “allow transition to other instruments of national power.”²⁷ (Interestingly, the end of World War II in Europe is cited as an example of this transition, but the text does not address the amount or types of military involvement that were required to complete it.²⁸) In its essence, the warfighting doctrine is one of overwhelming, unlimited means for a non-negotiable end followed by a quick military exit.

While U.S. warfighting doctrine embraces the pursuit of near or total victory, its peace operations doctrine is one of limited means for limited objectives. It fails to address the conditions that successful employment of the warfighting doctrine brings about, and is not conceived as connected to it. Once a rogue state is defeated, diplomats are left with the inevitable nation-building and receive only the most limited support from a U.S. military eager to declare victory and exit. Not surprisingly, in the absence of overwhelming force, Iraqis, Somalis, Haitians, Serbs and others have failed to build responsible civil societies and have failed to comply with agreements in the aftermath of military interventions. In a world where the violence of tribalism could be contained these failings would not be a vital U.S. interest. In a world where terrorists and rogue states have global reach, failure in peace operations may become a vital threat to the America. To date, U.S. military doctrine does not provide adequately for peace operations to address the problems of rogue, weak or failed states.

CONFRONTING TERRORISTS AND ROGUE STATES

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise to the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we will save our country.

—Abraham Lincoln

Doctrine and military operations respond not only to practice and to leadership, but also to events that change theoretical notions of what is necessary and what possible. The terrorism of “9/11” overturned the strategic landscape. The attacks made it necessary for America to respond with warfighting and military operations other than war, and made public support possible, despite risks of casualties and protracted, difficult operations. The attacks also created the political will to consider far-reaching changes in doctrine. As President Bush noted to the Congress, “this will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with decisive liberation of

territory and swift conclusion....Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen.”²⁹ Defense Secretary Rumsfeld amplified the willingness to break from the past,

This will be a war like none our nation has faced....This war will not necessarily be one in which we pore over military targets and mass forces to seize those targets. Instead, military forces will likely be one of many tools we use to stop individuals, groups and countries that engage in terrorism...There may not be as many beachheads stormed as opportunities denied. Forget about ‘exit strategies’; we’re looking at a sustained engagement that carries no deadlines. We have no fixed rules about how to deploy our troops; we’ll instead establish guidelines to determine whether military force is the best way to achieve a given objective.³⁰

By odd coincidence, the Joint Chiefs published an updated *Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations* on 10 September 2001. It should win history’s prize as the doctrinal manual with the shortest authoritative shelf life.

The 2001 QDR provides the first comprehensive reappraisal of U.S. strategy. Its assessment of the environment recognizes trends that were not emphasized strongly in earlier strategy documents: diminishing protection afforded by geographic distance, increasing challenge and threats emanating from the territories of weak and failing states, diffusion of power and military capabilities to non-state actors, increasing proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and enhanced high explosive (CBRNE) weapons and ballistic missiles, and increasing potential for miscalculation and surprise.³¹ Together, these trends called for a “capabilities-based” approach to U.S. strategy – “one that focuses more on how an adversary might fight than who the adversary might be and where a war might occur” – with enough forces to swiftly defeat adversaries in two overlapping major conflicts and with “the option to call for decisive victory in one of those conflicts – including the possibility of regime change and occupation.”³² The QDR does not include reference to PKOs or PEOs except to note the need for “smaller-scale contingency operations in peacetime [that] in effect, become part of the U.S. forward deterrent posture.”³³

However, as with supertankers, changing the strategic doctrine of a superpower does not occur overnight. The QDR was modest in many areas and reflected the underlying aversion of to peace operations that Candidate Bush expressed in the 2000 campaign, “I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation-building.”³⁴ The QDR accepted the current force structure, despite the changed environment. The force-sizing construct evolved only modestly from the previous “two Major Regional Contingency (MRC)” construct. The QDR does not

resolve the doctrinal mismatch between warfighting and peace operations, even though it mentions occupation. The Defense Department continues to seek to withdraw or reduce forces from peace operations in Bosnia and the Sinai, and does not provide a new strategic basis for operations in weak and failed states.

The willingness of the President and the Secretary of Defense to go beyond the military's doctrinal comfort was more evident in the surprisingly quick overthrow of the Afghani Taliban. The success was achieved over doctrinal based objections of the Army and Air Force, by marrying strategic precision bombing with special operations teams tied to local warlords, to the exclusion of heavy conventional ground forces. Nevertheless, once the Afghani government fled the problem of constructing a new government and civil society met a U.S. unwillingness to use forces in assisting governance and building new institutions. In conformance with existing doctrine, the U.S. military backed an international Chapter VI U.N. PKO while trying to limit its own commitment, looking for others to primarily fill the needs of nation-building.

As the U.S. prepares for the prospect of decisively defeating and occupying Iraq, the problems of nation-building will be of increasing concern. As Leon Fuerth, formerly National Security Advisor for Vice President Al Gore, noted, "Success would not be a military dictatorship but an honest-to-God democracy in a state that is federalized, so it provides the means to accommodate the three major groups, Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites....The problem with the administration is that it wants to hand it off to somebody once the fighting is done and scram."³⁵ Post-World War II experience demonstrates why U.S. military involvement in nation-building may be necessary and capable of success, if doctrine and warplanning takes winning the peace into account.

INSIGHTS FROM THE REMAKING OF GERMANY

The responsibility of great states is to serve and not to dominate the world.

—Harry Truman

The end of World War II presented different circumstances than a hypothetical attack on Iraq would provide today. Nonetheless, there are also some important similarities. The allies vanquished enemy field armies but still had to secure hostile populations amidst broken civil and physical infrastructure. The U.S. zones in Germany were about the size of Kentucky, with about 19 million people. Today's Iraq has 23 million people and is larger in size, but much of the country is lightly populated. The Nazis thoroughly controlled every institution and organization in Germany, much as the Ba'ath party does today in Iraq. As with Nazi Germany, the absence of broad-based opposition groups and democratic traditions in Iraq leaves little alternative to

remaking the country if it is to be kept intact and if a return to criminal dictatorship is to be avoided. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement have little prospect of preventing civil war and warlordism.

GENERAL HISTORY

Some dispute continues today on how well the United States served its interests and those of others in governing postwar Germany. In hindsight, Germany's economy, democratic politics and peaceful relationships with its neighbors give the impression of clear success. However, almost all observers agree these results did not occur overnight and that some fundamental mistakes were made which delayed the return to full sovereignty until May 5, 1955, three days short of the tenth anniversary of the war's end. Winning the peace in Germany is best understood as having seven phases: the development of doctrine, policy formulation, planning, conquest and takeover, occupation, nation-building, and transition to self-governance. The phases were overlapping, and their main efforts competed with each other to an extent. The U.S. Army reluctantly led the early phases but quickly handed off almost all tasks to civilians by the end of the occupation phase. From takeover to self-governance was a steady transfer of responsibility not only to civilian agencies, but also to the Germans themselves.

Overall, the most important factors that contributed to remaking Germany from enemy into a strong ally were the U.S. Army's foresight to prepare, and the wisdom of its reluctant military government leaders who assisted rather than impeded German development of responsible self-governance. Military governance tipped the balance toward a German democratic federalism and succeeded generally by pursuing its own irrelevancy. The process was largely complete locally by the beginning of 1946, and by 1948 the Germans essentially governed themselves under passive American oversight.³⁶ Among America's bureaucratic institutions, only the U.S. Army had the capability to accomplish the huge early tasks and the institutional will to give up its unwelcome powers rather than pursue stability as an enduring overlord.

DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT FROM THE BOTTOM UP

Doctrine for military governance emerged within the U.S. Army from the bottom up. Two years after the First World War ended, Colonel Irwin L. Hunt returned from duty as Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Third Army, in the German Rhineland, and stated in his report to the War Department that the objective of future occupations ought to be to make friends of former enemies.³⁷ Civil affairs doctrine was then set aside until 1934, shortly after the Army organized the Civilian Conservation Corps at the instruction of President Roosevelt and Chief of Staff

Douglas MacArthur. Hunt's report and the Depression experiences became the basis for the July 1940 edition of FM 27-5, the War Department field manual on military government.³⁸

The manual would be put to use by a small military government division created in July 1942 in the provost marshal general's office to plan training and to create a School of Military Government at the University of Virginia, under Brigadier General Cornelius Wickersham. The school nearly died in October, when President Roosevelt made clear at a Cabinet meeting that occupation was to be a State Department matter. Secretary of War Henry Stimson avoided the issue, fearing he might precipitate a decision to force the Army out of military government despite Army doctrine that the theater commander had to be the military governor until hostilities ended. In November 1942, Roosevelt gave the State Department the assignment to plan occupation. While the State Department set up an Office of Foreign Territories, it accomplished little and soon dissolved, as it was helpless without military support in North Africa. Roosevelt tried again to use civilians, creating a Foreign Economic Administration in the Office of Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President, but this failed in utter confusion. On 10 November 1943, Roosevelt gave the primary role to the War Department. Fortunately, the Army itself had already taken on the task. It was training hundreds of officers per month and augmenting them with direct commissions of civilian lawyers.³⁹ They would be needed.

The primary doctrinal text for the officers who ran the occupation was the December 1943 revision of FM 27-5, drawn ultimately from Hunt's report, and taught by the school run by General Wickersham.⁴⁰ The manual distinguished civil affairs as occupation operations in liberated countries from those in conquered countries, which were designated military government. The distinction was important, and involved very different doctrine. After conquest, drastic changes in laws and concepts of government would be required to eliminate totalitarian political, economic and social systems while preserving some semblance of government.⁴¹ This manual dropped the reference to making friends, but set as objectives "to minimize belligerency, obtain cooperation, and achieve favorable influence on the present and future attitude toward the United States and its allies." This would ultimately be the underlying consistency of U.S. occupation policy, moderating political leaders' directions for a harsh victors' peace.⁴²

That the doctrine would overcome policy later was not because of disobedience or slavish adherence to it. Rather, much of the senior policymaking would take place too late, long after training had to be done and handbooks developed for use in the field. In late August 1944, President Roosevelt would order draft handbooks withdrawn because they were not harsh enough, but the thrust of the doctrine was already set.⁴³ Later, occupation leaders such as the

Commanding General Lucius Clay would see the futility of a harsh peace and fight to have policy changed to match doctrine.

POLICYMAKING FROM THE TOP DOWN

I'm turning over to you a sacred trust and I want you to bear that in mind every day and every hour you preside over this military government and civil affairs venture....we have a great asset and that is that our people, our countrymen, do not distrust us and do not fear us....They don't harbor any ideas that we intent to alter the government of the country or the nature of this government in any way....I don't want you to do anything, and I don't want to permit the enormous corps of military governors that you are in the process of training and that you are going to dispatch all over the world, to damage this high regard in which the professional soldiers of the Army are held by our people, and it could happen, it could happen, Hilldring, if you don't understand what you are about.

—George C. Marshall

The development of occupation policy cannot claim an honored spot in U.S. history. It proceeded too haphazardly, with inadequate coordination, and led to disastrous conclusions.

Stimson and Chief of Staff Marshall took on the task with reluctance. Stimson explained to the Chief of Civil Affairs, Major General John Hilldring, that he did not want the Army to have anything to do with making policy. Marshall added, "Your mission is to start planning from the day you go into business, how you're going to get out of it as fast as possible...we have never regarded it as part of the proper duty of the military to govern." This attitude led to conservatism by the Pentagon military planners, including skepticism about reform and reeducation, and almost complete unwillingness to work with the State Department and other agencies on policy, insisting that managing the occupation was purely a military matter without need for interdepartmental committees.⁴⁴ Paradoxically, this effort to resist "mission creep" left it to the Army to command the entire scope of the conquest and occupation phases and left it without a coordinated plan for handoff to other Departments. For liberated countries this made sense since field commanders wanted quick, uncomplicated handoffs to allies. For a conquered Germany, it would mean that field commanders could fulfill Marshall's intent only by divesting authority where possible to the Germans.

Another consequence of Stimson's and Marshall's guidance was leaving the initiative to others to define occupation policy goals. High level discussions started late, for President Roosevelt was uneasy, "I dislike making plans for a country we do not yet occupy."⁴⁵ Nonetheless, Allied politics and theater planning requirements prompted action to determine the geography of occupation. Roosevelt would be the final, and largely independent, American arbiter of occupation policy, starting at the Teheran Conference in November 1943, accepting

Stalin's proposals that Germany should be dismembered after an unconditional surrender.⁴⁶ Ten months later, Secretary of State Cordell Hull bitterly complained about being undercut by Roosevelt's unilateral and unannounced decision, "I have never been permitted to see the minutes of the Teheran Conference." At the Moscow Conference in October 1943, Hull had sought to organize a more liberal post war world with a unified Germany.⁴⁷ Roosevelt preferred the pliant War Department to his own State Department in imposing his victor's justice.

In September 1944, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau took the initiative to fill the void created by Roosevelt, proposing what would become the harsh "Morgenthau Plan," ultimately Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive JCS 1067. It was really Roosevelt's policy and reflected his prejudices, "We have to be tough with Germany and I mean the German people not just the Nazis. We either have to castrate the German people or you have to treat them in a manner so they can't just go on reproducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past...(The Germans should be allowed) simply a subsistence level of food." Churchill objected and Stimson believed that this approach would be "a crime against civilization itself" but Roosevelt was not deterred.⁴⁸ A Jewish son of a Romanian immigrant grocer and later military hero of Israel, Colonel David Marcus of the Civil Affairs Division, dictated the basic directive of JCS 1067, very close to Morgenthau's position. Stimson was busy with the Pacific War and left the issue to his deputy, John McCloy, who was as eager as Morgenthau to crush Nazism.⁴⁹

A very ill Roosevelt made the final policy choices at the Yalta Conference of February 1945, agreeing to Stalin's proposal that Germany would give up 40% of its lands, endure permanent dismemberment following ten years of occupation, and suffer \$20 billion in reparations, 50% of which would go to the Soviet Union. Stalin agreed to Roosevelt's desire to give France an occupation zone "out of kindness," although it was to come from land allocated to the British and Americans. Roosevelt remarked to Stalin that "he was more bloodthirsty in regard to the Germans than he had been a year ago, and he hoped that Marshal Stalin would again propose a toast [as he had at the Teheran Conference] to the execution of 50,000 officers of the German Army."⁵⁰

Roosevelt's final contribution undercut his intent. In the last official act of his life, he changed his mind from naming John McCloy to head the occupation to naming Army Major General Lucius Clay, at the sponsorship of Clay's boss, Assistant to the President James Brynes. Not wanting the job, McCloy concurred, believing the task would demand the nation's best military strategic logistician, the engineer Clay. Clay was still hoping for a combat assignment and expected the job to last only a few months. Therefore, while he was given a copy of the draft JCS 1067 to read on the plane, he did not do so until significantly later.⁵¹

Harry Truman would sign the final, eighth version of JCS 1067 on 10 May 1945. It would remain in effect until July 1947. Interdepartmental review moderated this final version but it retained much of the original harshness. Truman privately thought revenge was a bad idea, but he signed anyway, after being falsely informed by Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew, that German light industry would be destroyed only in exceptional cases. The language of bureaucratic compromise was imprecise enough to allow Truman to miss its worst implications and would allow General Clay to ignore its intent in favor of doctrine and more moderate theater plans.⁵²

THEATER PLANNING

The Supreme Commander wishes to lay special stress on the military nature of the occupation. –SHAEF Memo, 13 Aug 44

While President Roosevelt was still uneasy about defining occupation policy in late 1944, military leaders in the theater were already anxious to develop contingency plans in mid-1943. In spring and summer of 1943, many Allied leaders believed that Germany was reaching the breaking point. On 23 May 1943, Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander (Designate) (COSSAC), British Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan, instructed his staff to plan for the possibility of sudden German collapse and surrender, designated Operation Plan RANKIN. The planners started with a clean slate and received no high level guidance, except for the January 1943 decision by Roosevelt and Churchill to pursue unconditional surrender. In August 1943, these leaders and the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved Morgan's initial efforts.⁵³

RANKIN Plan Case "C" remained the primary occupation plan until late 1944. The plan addressed only military operations to accomplish an occupation. It did not consider how to hand off governance to other authorities or how long military governance would be required. At the time, the British Foreign Office officials anticipated the Allies would occupy Germany for two years.⁵⁴ The operation would involve 39 divisions acting in three sequential phases: seizure of air bases in France, occupation of a Rhine barrier zone to demilitarize returning German forces, and then, military occupation of Germany itself.⁵⁵ General Morgan made repeated requests for policy guidance and for a means to collaborate with the Soviet Union.

At the November 1943 Teheran Conference, the Allied powers agreed to establish a European Advisory Commission (EAC) in London to make recommendations on "European questions connected with the termination of hostilities." Roosevelt assigned John G. Winant, U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, as his representative on the EAC, but gave him no guidance and refused to give the EAC any authority to resolve policy. Brigadier General Wickersham was

Winant's military advisor. Both sought a more lenient occupation, but Roosevelt trumped them by backing the Morgenthau plan directly to Churchill and Stalin. Until late 1944, EAC discussions were infrequent, and focused primarily on delineating occupation zones among the Allies, with little attention to the character or length of occupation. American failure to achieve coordination of political, military and allied policy was to haunt the United States for years, especially in the 1948 Berlin crisis, and ultimately in the division of Germany until 1991.⁵⁶

Military leaders could not wait. On 16 January 1944, General Eisenhower assumed command of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), which absorbed General Morgan and his COSSAC staff. One of the first issues for SHAEF would be the deficiencies of the RANKIN plan, as noted in a memorandum dated 14 January 1944, by British Major General C.A. West, COSSAC deputy operations officer, "We cannot wait for policy to be laid down by the United Nations. It is essential we should prepare now, as a matter of urgency, papers on all these problems." Days after this memorandum, U.S. Army Colonel T.N. Grazebrook formed a Posthostilities Planning Subsection in the SHAEF G-3 Plans Division. This staff group was only charged with doing studies to facilitate military planning. However, due to the policy paralysis in Washington and in the EAC in London, Colonel Grazebrook's staff became the planning nucleus for U.S. and British occupation for the rest of the war by default.⁵⁷

The initial product of the SHAEF staffwork under Colonel Grazebrook was a series of detailed administrative memorandums addressing General West's concerns on topics ranging from disarmament to martial law to transport. Colonel Grazebrook was remarkably successful in the spring of 1944 in persuading the rest of the SHAEF staff to support the work with additional studies, despite preoccupation with the forthcoming OVERLORD invasion. By June over seventy studies were completed along with a draft *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*.⁵⁸

In May 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff sent Eisenhower a directive, CCS 551, "Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender." This directive formally gave Eisenhower a military governance mission, but added little in policy to that already anticipated by Colonel Grazebrook and the SHAEF staff.⁵⁹ Upon receiving the directive, General Morgan, General West, Colonel Grazebrook and others met to consider its implications and the continuing absence of policy beyond surrender, noting "We should accordingly take steps to determine whether in fact the Supreme Commander is to be responsible for the primary occupation of Western Germany, or whether some other authority is to have this responsibility."⁶⁰ When the staff of the Combined Chiefs failed to provide an adequate answer the SHAEF G-3, Major General H.R. "Pinky" Bull, sent back a memorandum taking on these

responsibilities: "It is assumed that the Supreme Commander must be prepared to initiate the occupation....and furthermore that his responsibilities may be extended to cover an indeterminate period thereafter."⁶¹ Simultaneously, General Bull rejected detailed planning beyond initial stages, "I strongly feel that the lack of coordination in the Supreme Headquarters staff on posthostilities planning beyond purely military requirements will continue in spite of our desires until political directives are received or improvised....work on (1) governing the German people, (2) perfecting their economic future, (3) controlling their educational system, etc., is not part of the Supreme Headquarters staff functions now."⁶²

Planning efforts would continue till the end of the war, but the basic framework was resolved by the end of summer 1944. Organizations would change, but the same planners were in charge. Eisenhower would direct that planning continue to remain under SHAEF, instead of using national elements for the separate U.S. and British zones.⁶³ At Colonel Grazebrook's suggestion, Eisenhower named General Morgan as the sole point of contact for SHAEF occupation planning, with Colonel Grazebrook's subsection as Morgan's personal staff, and further assisted by SHAEF G-5. Morgan accepted Grazebrook's proposed charter "to survey the whole problem of the occupation of Germany, taking into account the political and economic as well as the purely military factors."⁶⁴ Under Colonel Grazebrook's staff supervision, the RANKIN plan was revised into the operation that would ultimately be executed, Operation ECLIPSE. Several iterations of command and control for military governance would be put into place under SHAEF, including a United States Control Council under Brigadier General Cornelius Wickersham. A division of labor was arranged under which the SHAEF staff prepared directives on military government while Wickersham's U.S. Control Council prepared functional manuals.⁶⁵ Based on the doctrine of FM 27-5, the views of these planners would carry as much weight as policy from Washington. Roosevelt directed that their draft handbook be scrapped, but it was not, since it was already printed. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to its issuance, provided a short notice was added that no immediate economic rehabilitation would be done short of military necessity, and that no Nazis would be retained in office.⁶⁶ Doctrine encoded into manuals, plans and handbooks prevailed over the inadequacies of policy.

CONQUEST AND TAKEOVER

There would be much to fault in the policy confusion of the occupation, but the military's conduct of conquest and takeover were brilliant in conception and execution. The ECLIPSE plan proved to be highly innovative, thorough and effectively decentralized using the SHAEF

Handbook for Military Government and a companion *Handbook for Military Occupation*. The operation is a model that may inform doctrinal development for taking over rogue states today.

Theater planning came none too soon. On 11 September 1944, U.S. troops entered Germany. The first military governance arrived right behind the combat troops, on 15 September, as civil affairs detachment D8B1 set itself up in Roetgen, near Aachen.⁶⁷ From then until June 1946 the U.S. Army would have the leading role in governing Southern Germany. Winter and the Battle of the Bulge prevented capture of much more territory until the Siegfried Line was cracked in March 1945.⁶⁸ From then on, the forces raced across Germany. The U.S. First and Ninth Armies completed a double envelopment of the Ruhr on 1 April. On 11 April the Ninth Army reached the Elbe River two hundred miles further inland. There was little that German forces could do in opposition. The German high command was non-existent for practical purposes, and most German units had no fuel. There was no coherent defense.⁶⁹ These operations of conquest were military in nature. U.S. units maintained their mass, oriented on the enemy and bypassed most civil communities in the rush for strategic objectives.

“A” day for Operation ECLIPSE was 8 May 1945, the day the Germans unconditionally surrendered. The U.S. Army immediately dispersed its mobile combat elements, sending out small detachments into every town all over the U.S. occupation zone in Southern Germany to effect the takeover. The experience of U.S. Army Major Robert Coughlin on 9 May was typical as he took over Babenhausen, a small town four miles from Anschaffenburg. He moved cautiously into town with nine vehicles and twenty-nine men soon after General Eisenhower’s Proclamation Number 1 was broadcast by radio across the country. This was something none of them had ever done before, entering a town without the immediate overwatch of tanks and other soldiers. He confronted the mayor with demands: to produce a list of all local German soldiers and party members, to collect and turnover all military and civilian firearms, and to identify housing for U.S. troops. Coughlin ordered the immobilization of the population and imposed curfew after dark. He threatened the death penalty for those who resisted and he had the authority to replace the mayor if directives were not carried out. Coughlin then sent out squads to copy his actions in the smaller surrounding communities. The next day, Coughlin’s armor battalion arrived in force.⁷⁰ In Babenhausen and in virtually every other German community, there was rarely even token resistance.

Coughlin’s takeover of Babenhausen, and the simultaneous takeover of innumerable other communities, was the product of SHAEF’s careful planning, along with more in depth orders through subordinate commands. The key was two pocket-size handbooks. The *Handbook for Military Occupation* was issued down to every battalion. It provided a single-

source for every issue such units might encounter, including plans for establishing governance, disarming the Wehrmacht and police, handling Allied prisoners and displaced persons, controlling German telecommunications, conducting intelligence and understanding their authorities.⁷¹

Higher level commands, civil affairs staffs and the 150 civil affairs detachments received more detailed instructions from the companion *Handbook for Military Government*. This handbook included the plan for occupation, initial proclamations, laws and ordinances and numerous functional chapters, including: civil administration, eradication of Nazism, finance and property control, legal, public health, labor, education and religious affairs, food distribution, industry, communications, and transportation. The manual's four-page checklist was the basis for Coughlin's actions and those of hundreds like him.⁷² The handbooks could trace their lineage back to Grazebrook's administrative memorandums, to Wickersham's school, to FM 27-5, and to Colonel Hunt's report on World War I occupation. Operation ECLIPSE was an unprecedented success for American ingenuity in using forces.

The essence of the takeover was the rapid, synchronized establishment of U.S. authority over every town and institution of Germany in a few days. Every available unit of every type contributed to the speed of takeover, building a momentum that assured takeover was complete before organized resistance could emerge. The takeover was effected through demands on local officials, bypassing or dismissing those who would not immediately cooperate. The Army considered senior officials and organizations to be compromised by Nazism. These were ignored, purged through arrests, or simply seized by allied civil affairs specialists who took over command of central and regional ministries and essential services. The first demands were crucial to establishing the environment for occupation governance: gain the compliance of local officials, disarm and immobilize the population, identify the party officials and soldiers who might resist, take control of all communications, seize records, locate enemy forces throughout the country, prepare to isolate and overcome any resistance. Momentarily, the conquering officers held absolute power to dismiss or arrest anyone, to impose the pre-established proclamations and ordinances, and if necessary, to use deadly force to quash resistance. Because of the strength of this authority, few had to do more than threaten in order to gain compliance.

Over the coming weeks takeover would give way to the more time consuming tasks of occupation, establishing new authorities from the bottom-up, administering the devastated country, and purging Germany of Nazism and weapons. That the occupation succeeded quickly and without many incidents was the consequence of achieving formal surrender of the German military high command, immediately followed up by ECLIPSE's decisive takeover operations.

OCCUPATION

The prime objective of United States policy is to achieve the demilitarization and democratization of Germany to the end that Germany may ultimately take its place in the community of peaceful and law-abiding nations. —US Dept of State, August 47

While takeover was characterized by decentralized action by units of all types performing common tasks occupation was characterized by increasingly specialized tasks performed by specially trained units and individuals. In larger communities military government detachments took charge of relations with the civil population as soon as possible while working under the authority and command of combat commanders. Unit G-5 staffs were often the first military government agency to arrive in major communities. Tactical troops posted proclamations, seized records, took control of refugees, established security patrols, and provided the muscle to compel disarmament of enemy regular and Home Guard troop formations. Counter-intelligence Corps specialists led , starting with the rapid arrest of all party officials over the military equivalent of major that could be found. East of the Rhine, most local police and other public officials were found at their posts, along with most public and Nazi Party records intact. The records were useful in checking identities and establishing clearance for police and local officials who would continue to do the work of interfacing with the general population. With closer contact with American troops, many Germans even began to volunteer assistance to the early occupation activities.⁷³

Beyond maintaining security, the major non-combat activity was to care for millions of displaced persons. They were instructed to stand fast until military authorities could organize their movements. Each field army dealt with the problems differently but accomplished the maintenance of law and order, the provision of housing, the supply of food and clothing, registration and repatriation. Additional assistance to units was provided through liaison officers and United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Assistance teams who organized assembly centers. Tactical troops also found themselves contributing to public health efforts for refugees and the general populace as there was a lack of German doctors and hospital facilities. Engineers and other specialists helped to restore public works and utilities to the extent necessary for military operations and the prevention of disease and disorder.⁷⁴

Disarming over four million enemy forces also took much attention. Once ECLIPSE conditions were declared these forces could be treated as disarmed rather than as prisoners of war, allowing less stringent international law provisions to take effect about their feeding and care, and permitting their labor to remove minefields and to destroy poisonous weaponry. Taking charge of enemy military and civil transportation proceeded alongside disarmament,

gradually giving way to the requirements of the civil economy from militarily essential tasks. Signal and intelligence troops were also involved in the rapid seizure and use of German military and civil communications.⁷⁵

Establishing secure conditions was easier than the task of rebuilding institutions from the bottom up. The Germans were remarkably docile, relieved the war was over, although the U.S. Army was prepared and ready to confront the “incurable *Herrenvolk*” they expected. Demilitarization was not a great problem. was harder, since military government was charged with seeing that the Germans themselves maintained public services, economic controls and rationing, and virtually all public officials were suspect.⁷⁶ Over time, military government officials found enough competent replacements, often from among local businessmen, schoolteachers and priests. The Counter-Intelligence Corps did follow-up screening where needed.⁷⁷ Over time the vetting process would include over twelve million questionnaires, *Fragebogen*, with 131 questions to which every German over eighteen had to respond. The American occupation officials were much more intense in this effort than French, British or Russian counterparts. Americans tried 169,282 Germans, the French 17,353, the British 2,296 and the Russians 18,328.⁷⁸

There were innumerable other specialized tasks in the occupation, mostly guided by the *Handbook on Military Government*, and each with their own story of techniques and varying success that offer lessons. For example, the Allies were slow to provide relief and food to the general population, in part because Roosevelt’s policies inhibited relief planning. Military officials feared disease and disorder, and the prospect of the Germans becoming a permanent burden on U.S. taxpayers. They began importing wheat. Another policy, non-fraternization, was also found too restrictive and was redefined into oblivion.⁷⁹ Another aspect of occupation policy proved much more successful, the using of German military *Wehrkreise* (military districts) commands for disarming military units and Home Guards. JCS 1067 played a very limited role, as SHAEF, a combined headquarters, could not issue it as a directive, since the British non-concurred, and since few outside SHAEF were shown the classified document.⁸⁰

A little remembered story is of how fast the occupation transitioned from alliance military units to U.S. military governance. Upon his arrival in Europe on 18 April 1945, General Lucius Clay assumed duties as Deputy Military Governor, SHAEF, Deputy Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (EUTOUSA), and as Commanding General, U.S. Group, Control Council (succeeding General Wickersham in this latter role). Clay led the occupation, as Supreme Commander Eisenhower had no enthusiasm for the task and quickly went on vacation for a month of victory tours and golf.⁸¹ ETOUSA became the transitional

authority as SHAEF gave up responsibilities for governance in favor of national zones, and numerous transitions and redesignations took place among the field forces, which were actively engaged in shipping out troops to the Far East and in demobilization. On 31 August 1945 territorially based commands of military districts and military government detachments took over responsibilities from tactical units and the SHAEF Civil Military Affairs Division, although senior commanders were usually dual-hatted. On 1 January 1946 military government was completely centralized under General Clay as Commanding General, Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone (OMGUS), and severed from the field forces.⁸² The victorious army was gone anyway. The redeployment program was terminated the next day having sent back over three million troops since 12 May 1945.⁸³ Although no one at that time used the distinction, the occupation gave way at this time to nation-building.

NATION-BUILDING AND TRANSITION: THE MILITARY ROLE FADES AWAY

The towering sovereignty and affluence of West Germany today are a monument to the American people; for the Army, this monument carries more meaning and more true glory that is represented by any of the 143 battle streamers that flutter so bravely on the Army flag paraded now with German comrade-in-arms. For West Germany today stands as living proof that an army serving a free and enlightened people need not be a force for destruction, but can be used as a force of construction, an instrument of good rather than evil.

—Franklin M. Davis

The nation-building phase lasted from the beginning of 1946 until the end of September 1949, when, in a three week period, General Clay gave up responsibility to John J. McCloy, the first German parliament since 1933 met, the German Federal Republic was proclaimed, OMGUS became the Office of the U.S. High Commission for Germany and the Berlin Airlift ended. The accomplishments and difficulties of this phase are their own large story, but mostly removed from military issues that would involve occupation of a rogue state such as Iraq. The main themes of the nation-building phase were the breakdown of alliance relations with the Soviets, the shift from a vindictive peace to a generous helping hand of the Marshall plan, the financial and economic recovery of Germany, and the Berlin blockade as part of opening the Cold War. These will not be detailed here, although several sub-themes deserve highlighting.

As Figure 2 shows, the number of U.S. military personnel involved in military government fell quickly after September 1945. A year later it was under 3,000; by mid-1948 it was 301; by Clay's departure it was only 26.⁸⁴ The burden of governance was shifted quickly to U.S. civilians and to the Germans. While Clay retained absolute judicial, executive and legislative powers, he rarely exercised them after 1945 as more German officials were selected

and cleared, to include by elections starting in January 1946 that reestablished local governance. Two and three-man U.S. officer liaison teams remained to observe the work of German officials. Institution building in the American zone from the bottom-up worked, and worked quickly, faster than in the other occupied zones. The Germans even ran much of the de-Nazification program.⁸⁵ After 1945, the U.S. Army ran Germany in name and in law, but not in fact in local communities.

U.S. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN MILITARY GOVERNMENT POSITIONS IN GERMANY, 1945 – 1949




FIGURE 2. DRAWDOWN OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL.

President Truman felt “the military should not have governmental responsibilities beyond the requirements of military operations” but no civilian agency was ready to take over, due to the inadequate wartime interagency policy coordination.⁸⁶ Clay was eager to get the military out, “We had to establish military government units, take over from the tactical troops. The tactical troops did not want to give up, because as long as they were in charge they could commandeer houses, and whatever they wanted, and they liked the sense of power.”⁸⁷ When Clay created OMGUS, he meant the word military to be vestigial, telling McCloy his object was a civilian

operation.⁸⁸ In 1945 and 1946, Eisenhower and Clay repeatedly sought to transfer control of the occupation to the State Department, pursuing change through Marshall and going directly to Truman. Secretaries of State Byrnes blocked the moves, parrying that the State Department lacked the operational experience of the Army and could not handle the job. In consolation, Byrnes promised to support Army requests to Congress for the funds to fulfill the occupation's political purposes.⁸⁹ Policy making in Washington did eventually shift to the State Department, largely because former General John Hilldring took over the newly created post of Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas in 1946, and General Marshall became Secretary of State in 1947.⁹⁰ Nevertheless, Clay reluctantly remained in Germany.

It was fortunate that Clay remained, as he was the primary person responsible for overturning JCS 1067, for the rapid shift to German local leadership without an extended political reeducation period, for the recovery and integration of the economy, for confronting the Soviets and for steering Germany through the shoals of the emerging Cold War.⁹¹ Following disputes with Eisenhower's replacement, General Joseph McNarney, Clay succeeded him as commander-in-chief and military governor in 1947. The reunification of the two roles in 1947 was important in the management of the Army and in facing the Berlin crisis. Clay also inspired the military to place a significant role in promoting German civil society beyond politics and administration. He started various programs such as the Program of Army Assistance to German Youth to build friendly ties between U.S. forces and the German public.⁹²

Clay exemplified the central virtues that led to U.S. success in changing Germany from defeated enemy to rising ally. He committed the occupation to being just, humane and with consideration for the welfare of the population. He sought to fulfill both American and German interests, promoting stability and security, while allowing the Germans to cultivate their own democratic beginning.⁹³ OMGUS affected the timing of the recreation of the West German government more than its substance. The capacity of the Germans to control their own bureaucracy and people was vastly greater than that of the occupying army. Clay insured the occupation proceeded from American ideals of freedom and democracy. The occupation worked when and where it allowed the Germans to govern themselves responsibly.⁹⁴

Army doctrine and wartime occupation planning proved increasingly less important to the nation-building phase, as new and unanticipated civil problems presented themselves that Clay and his largely civilian OMGUS staff had to solve independently. Nevertheless, the doctrine and planning had provided a solid base for the effort and for the education, training and attitudes of the military officers who remained. Over time, the military's predominate role returned to that of its primary purposes, this time in assuring the defense of Germany against Soviet pressure.

The Army did have some serious other problems, largely unrelated to occupation governance. The intoxication of victory, speed of demobilization and unprofessionalism of some prompted significant indiscipline, crime and reduced readiness. Crime peaked at 11.1 per each ten thousand men in January 1946 as leaders reasserted themselves and the Criminal Investigation Division received greater authority.⁹⁵ In accordance with plans initiated by Eisenhower to raise professionalism while holding down manpower levels, many tactical units were reorganized in constabulary brigades, regiments and squadrons in 1946, under the stern command of disciplinarian Major General Ernest Harmon. The Constabulary played a large part in restoring good order and in improving relations with the Germans. It fulfilled the essential military internal security task of occupied Germany, augmenting rather than supplanting OMGUS or German civil authorities.⁹⁶

Transition to full German sovereignty would take place under McCloy from late 1949 through 1955. For the U.S. military this period would include abandoning the Constabulary in 1950 in favor of a Cold War structure, the establishment of NATO structures, and steps toward integrating Germany into the Western alliance. Military governance gave way to civil affairs.

DOCTRINE WITHERS AWAY

Changes in field manuals since the 1940s demonstrate that the doctrine of military government did not fall away all at once. It faded away with changing priorities over time.

As Germany's occupation gave way to nation-building the plans, checklists and handbooks became increasingly irrelevant, and the specific techniques of conquest and takeover were lost from view. What remained as doctrine was the wartime *FM 27-5*.

Soviet possession of nuclear weapons in the Cold War suggested that there would be fewer total victories that would result in occupations. In 1954, Army *FM 41-15* on civil affairs and military government units augmented the joint Army and Navy *FM 27-5* on Military Governance. Authorizations supplanted methods in importance, as the focus shifted toward bureaucratic concerns about composition of units, not how they would be employed.⁹⁷ *FM 27-5* remained in effect until it was replaced by joint service *FM 41-5 Joint Manual of Civil Affairs/Military Government* in 1958. This manual had detailed listing of functions drawn from World War II experience but merged discussion of civil affairs with military government wherever possible. It did not include a section on conquest and takeover. The manual did have a good section on military government courts.⁹⁸

Separate treatment essentially ended when Army *FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations* superseded the manuals of the 1950s in 1962. Military government was no longer its own

domain, but defined only as a “form of administration.” Interestingly, the manual did have example ordinances for occupied territories.⁹⁹ The 1969 version of *FM 41-10* kept the ordinances but changed the definition of military governance to include liberated territories in accord with many NATO agreements.¹⁰⁰ Both these manuals had more pages, but less content for field use, and were no longer pocket-sized.

By 2000, *FM 41-10*'s evolution dropped all reference to military government, except for two pages on “Civil Administration in Occupied Territories” that identify the goal as creating effective civil government that does not threaten future peace and stability. The pages only provide definitions. They do not include a list of included subject or techniques. Example ordinances and NATO agreements are also gone.¹⁰¹ The most recent doctrine is *JP 3-57 Joint Doctrine on Civil-Military Operations*, published by the Joint Chiefs on 8 February 2001. It includes only one paragraph on civil administration in hostile or occupied territory, making note that international law contains some provisions for it.¹⁰² The detailed doctrine of military governance is gone. It will have to be rediscovered or reinvented if the United States is to occupy hostile territory again.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR OCCUPYING IRAQ

Toppling Saddam Hussein would be the easy task. Creating a stable, pro-Western Iraq would be the difficult job. So before the administration sets off on a march to Baghdad, it needs to have a plan to win the peace as well as one to win the war.

—Ivo H. Daadler & James M. Lindsay

Experience in post-World War II Germany offers numerous lessons for using U.S. power to convert a deadly enemy into an ally after a war. These lessons offer the United States a strategic alternative to contemporary peace operations that may be insufficient to root out weapons of mass destruction and change regime behaviors. However, to have this alternative, the U.S. military will have to embrace and study the details of these lessons and develop doctrine before the fighting starts, so that military operations will end with the conditions and plans that allow for winning the peace.

As the United States considers its strategic choices on rogue states such as Iraq all the options present risks and hardships. To pursue negotiations and containment is to hope that long-term change will occur while rogue states are deterred from proliferating or using weapons of mass destruction. In some cases this will be the right choice, as it was for dealing with the Soviet Union. Where regime change is required instead, it might be achieved through a *coup d'main*, a limited victory, or a decisive victory. Coups and limited victories may change leaders but rarely lead to fundamental alteration of a state. Peace operations and nation-building from

the top-down is more prone to chaos or frustrations, as in Somalia, Bosnia, or Haiti in the 1990s. Failure to disarm the regime or contending factions provides power to those who would thwart democratization. Creating decisive revolutionary victory from within that leads to political change is possible, but especially difficult in police states and is as likely to lead to chaos. Decisive victory in battle as in World War II is more sure but more costly.

Such a victory may be necessary to remake the state from the outside, but is insufficient without a wise occupation. Experience in Germany offers considerations how to achieve it:

1. The development of doctrine, policy and plans should be pursued early and with the end in view that the goal of war is not to permanently oppress another people, but to liberate them from an evil system and to replace that system with a more peaceful and democratic one. The policy on Germany lacked interagency and allied coordination and was too harsh. The “better angels of our nature” were in the doctrine and plans that overcame policy shortcomings. Better policy would have provided for the humanitarian and economic recovery of Germany much more quickly.

2. There is a mass of specific details in the techniques of successful occupation. Many of these are non-military, but require military involvement. An interagency approach is important with clarity of command through the various stages of occupation. A single sovereign authority during occupation, with or without some legitimizing international mandate, will help avert long-term divisions between allies as occurred in Germany and will make for more coherent action. Given U.S. power today, the U.S. has more interest in having objectives determine the nature of the coalition than having the contributions of the coalition limit objectives.

By contrast with today’s peace operations, within their German zones the allies had clear command. The use of Civil-Military Operations Centers and other partnerships may bring in more organizations, but dilutes the authority and action within zones. Current doctrine needs review, even though it may offer insights, resources and techniques not available in the aftermath of World War II.

3. The methods of quick takeover, disarmament, de-Nazification, indirect rule and institutional establishment from the bottom-up were keys to success in the occupation. Conflict termination and post-conflict activities need to be an integral part of operational military planning. Even if U.S. occupation is not the objective, it may necessary from sudden collapse as postulated in the RANKIN plan. Methods deserve careful study in any plans to take down Iraq, since the war plan will largely predetermine the possibilities of the peace. Outside émigré groups can be useful, but solely empowering them is likely to prove a poor substitute for using

military power and governance to change a state. Guided constitutionalism at the top level came after institution building at local levels in Germany, not the reverse.

4. Completing regime change and democratization in Iraq is likely to be quicker and less costly than in Germany. We now have historical cases to draw on in Germany, Japan and Austria. Defeating Iraq would not require the same level of collateral destruction, would not include a destroyed world economy, and would not involve as much hatred between peoples. As in Germany, economic success will occur by liberating local resources through trade, not long-term aid. Iraq's oil resources would enable this, as would the support of the broader international community.

5. The role of occupation combat forces is important, but very limited after victory. Germany demonstrates that gradual, but prompt transition to civilian administration is possible. After disarmament, the primary military roles are to handle domestic emergencies and external defense. These can be done with far fewer forces than are needed for victory in battle. Done right, the occupation does not have to be lasting. Peace operations in Bosnia have already lasted over two years longer than they did in Germany, but with far lesser results. This is not surprising since they focus on stability in Bosnia, and focused on change in Germany. With appropriate leadership, the excesses and indiscipline of the occupation Army in Germany could be readily avoided in Iraq.

CONTRASTING GERMANY AND IRAQ

The policy of my government is to remove Saddam and that all options are on the table. —George W. Bush, 6 April 2002

At the time of this writing, U.S. press sources suggest the United States is actively considering four basic options to deal with Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction: “aggressive containment” focused on verifiable compliance with a renewed inspection regime, a CIA sponsored coup of Saddam, use of U.S. airpower and special forces to augment Iraqi opposition among Kurds and Shiites to oust Ba’ath party rule, and a U.S.-led coalition of up to 250,000 combat troops to conquer Iraq militarily.¹⁰³ These options are mostly mutually exclusive, and differ greatly in prospects for success, costs in resources, and consequences that may follow. With thorough planning and a willingness to adopt doctrines for occupation based on post-World War II experience in Germany, U.S.-led military conquest promises the surest path to success in war and the peace that follows, but presents the highest obvious costs. Planning must embrace not only the rediscovery of occupation doctrine, but also carefully consider the contrasts of war today against the Iraqi regime versus that against the Nazis.

There are important similarities. The Ba'ath party hold on power is similar to that of the Nazis at the end of World War II. Every civil and military institution is penetrated. Terror compels loyalty but fanatical support of the regime is not apparently widespread or deeply held among the people or even most officials. The population is generally educated, but not as nationalistic as once feared. Reports from émigrés and other sources suggest Iraqi public weariness with the regime if fear can be lifted. Nevertheless, as with the Nazi *Gestapo* and *Wehrmacht*, the Republican Guard and Saddam's bodyguards are much more formidable opponents than the Taliban. They possess some weapons of mass destruction. They have ruthlessly foiled numerous assassination and coup attempts by the CIA, by opposition groups and by internal opponents, chilling the prospects that small efforts will ignite regime change. A characteristic Saddam security tactic: in the middle of the night one bodyguard squad wakes another, puts guns to their heads and whispers, "It's a coup, brother. Are you with us?" Any guard who says yes gets a bullet to the brain.¹⁰⁴ The opposition is also no Northern Alliance. It is no wonder former CINCCENT General Anthony Zinni described plans to use surrogates as risking a "Bay of Goats."¹⁰⁵

In at least three ways war against Iraq is fundamentally different than against Nazi Germany. Iraq is a Muslim country. It is divided among more distinct factions: 60 per cent Shiites, 20 per cent Sunnis, and 15 per cent Kurds. The United States does not yet have a grand coalition for regime change. Study is needed to evaluate how much these factors will matter, but some uncertainty will persist. In 1991 experts erred in thinking the Iraqi Army acquired skill from the Iran-Iraq war rather than a dominant exhaustion. In 2001 many experts erred in believing the Arab "street" would revolt against the West if America attacked the Taliban. Carefully defining operations to emphasize the eventual liberation and liberalization of Iraq could offer hope to those Iraqis who might otherwise resist U.S take down of the regime. Military operations should take advantage of Iraq's factions to rally Iraqis against Hussein, but also plan on reassuring Iraq's neighbors by not giving the factions unrestrained initiative. As Jordan's King Abdullah II notes, "The potential fragmentation of Iraq, the potential nightmare of a civil war as a result of an American strike, is something I don't think the region can handle."¹⁰⁶

As a *Washington Post* editorial noted in response,

The hardest part of building a coalition for change in Iraq is forging a possible vision of what kind of government might replace Saddam Hussein and how such a government would be put together....a vision of Iraq as a state that is united, but respectful of minorities, and pledged to peace with its neighbors. It can build confidence in the likelihood of that outcome by fully developing and embracing a post-Saddam scheme of reconstruction, peacekeeping, and – yes – nation-building....If the Bush administration would commit itself to not just destroying

rogue regimes but to a long-term effort to help build better ones, winning support in the Middle East might turn out to be relatively easy – even if some leaders never say so in public.¹⁰⁷

Henry Kissinger suggests that if the overthrow of Saddam Hussein is to be seriously considered, there are three prerequisites: (a) development of a military plan that is quick and decisive, (b) some prior agreement on what structure replaces Hussein, (c) support or acquiescence of key countries needed to implement the military plan.¹⁰⁸ Secretary Rumsfeld was properly cautious of forging ahead when he talked in December 2001 about the U.S. role in Afghanistan,

Nation-building does not have a brilliant record across the globe. It's a very hard thing to do. It's a hard thing for the people in a country to make a nation work well,...and it's even harder for foreigners, strangers, to go into a country and think that they know what the template, what the model ought to be for that country.¹⁰⁹

Nevertheless, as Stephen Ambrose notes, sooner or later, wars must give way to politics. The examples of Germany, Japan, and South Korea show there is hope. When Eisenhower took up duties as commander of the occupation, he told his staff that success or failure “can only be judged fifty years from now. If by then Germany has a stable and flourishing democracy, we will have succeeded.”¹¹⁰ Occupation and rebuilding of the state may be difficult and even hazardous, but it can be done. Its best virtue may be only in being better than any of the other poor choices.

CONCLUSION: A WAY AHEAD

Modern wars are not internecine wars, in which the killing of the enemy is the object. The destruction of the enemy in modern war, and, indeed, modern war itself, are means to obtain that object of the belligerent which lies beyond the war.

—General Orders Number 100, U.S. Army, 24 April 1863

The U.S. military may be capable of defeating Iraq or other rogue states in war, with or without the assistance of allies. It is less clear that the U.S. can win the peace after war, if it limits its wartime objectives, empowers others with the initiative, or fails to act now to develop the doctrine which would be necessary for success. If the United States is serious in its QDR about having the ability to defeat, occupy and remake regimes it should designate an appropriate group of military and interagency officers to develop new doctrine, beginning with close study of post-World War II occupation of Germany. If the United States is determined to overthrow Iraq or other rogue states, there is little time to lose to start closing the doctrinal gap.

WORD COUNT = 13,352

ENDNOTES

¹ George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address," 29 January 2002.

² Chuck Hegel, U.S. Senate, cited in Todd S. Purdum, "Now What?" *The New York Times*, 17 February 2002, p. 6.

³ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History* (Washington, D.C.: National Affairs, Inc., 1989). Fukuyama did not proclaim an end to violence. Rather, he observed the world's peoples universally recognized legitimate governance only in the form of liberalism – sovereign nation-states with popularly elected legislatures – and that competitors such as dictatorship, empire and theocracy would now fade away. Fukuyama recognized the threat of Islamic fundamentalism as a footnote.

⁴ Benjamin R. Barber, "Jihad vs. McWorld," *The Atlantic* 269, no. 3 (March 1992): 53-62.

⁵ Summarized from Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 112-113, 118.

⁶ Robert H. Dorff, "A Primer in Strategy Development," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001), 11.

⁷ A good primer into the nature and consequences of organizational behavior is Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: HarperCollins, 1971), 67-100. The tradeoff of efficiency and effectiveness is described on p. 83. Allison uses the terms rules, standard operating procedures, programs and repertoires to describe an 'organizational process paradigm' rather than the term doctrine.

⁸ Unlike doctrine, the effects of friction and resistance are mostly to make a nation's strategic effort more difficult. Friction is described in Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, rev. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 119-121.

⁹ Paul Hebert, *Deciding What Has To Be Done: General William F. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 107.

¹⁰ This doctrinal transformation is the subject of James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995).

¹¹ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, "Chapter VI Pacific Settlement of Disputes" (1945), articles 33-38.

¹² A good example is the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) begun in 1964 and restructured in 1974 following Turkish intervention. U.N. forces lacked sufficient military power to compel the warring parties to submit to an imposed common government. The

restructured mandate positioned forces between the parties along the “Green Line,” in essence ratifying the existing separation rather than trying to change it. See Christine M. Cervenak, “Lessons of the Past: Experiences in Peace Operations,” in *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press), 43-44.

¹³ Ramesh Thakur, “U.N. Peacekeeping in the New World Disorder,” in *A Crisis of Expectations: U.N. Peacekeeping in the 1990s*, ed. Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1995), 8.

¹⁴ A detailed listing of missions and the evolution of traditional PKO doctrine are described in John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of U.N. Operations*, 2nd ed., (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), 18-25.

¹⁵ Summarized from William Rosenau, “Peace Operations, Emergency Law Enforcement and Constabulary Forces,” in *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy*, 117-119.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 120.

¹⁷ F.G. Hoffman, *Decisive Force: The New American Way of War* (Westport: Praeger, 1996), 99-101.

¹⁸ Gary T. Dempsey and Roger W. Fontaine, *Fool’s Errand: America’s Recent Encounters with Nation-Building* (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2001), 168.

¹⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1995), Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 April 1995), Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995).

²⁰ George T. Raach, “Military Perspectives on Peace Operations,” in *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy*, 84.

²¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 September 2001), V-12.

²² Hillen, *Blue Helmets*, 25-26.

²³ JCS, *JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations* (10 September 2001), V-5.

²⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, “Doctrine” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff).

²⁵ JCS, *JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations* (10 September 2001), III-19 to III-25.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, III-24 to III-25.

²⁷ Ibid., III-21, III-24

²⁸ Ibid., III-24.

²⁹ George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People" (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 20, 2001).

³⁰ Donald H. Rumsfeld, "A New Kind of War," *The New York Times*, 27 September 2001, p. 25.

³¹ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), 3-7.

³² Ibid., 14, 17.

³³ Ibid., 21.

³⁴ Election 2000 Presidential Debate Transcript, October 11, 2000, cited in Dempsey and Fontaine, *Fool's Errand*, p. 160.

³⁵ Leon Fuerth, cited in Purdum, "Now What?" p. 6.

³⁶ Edward N. Peterson, *The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory* (Detroit: Wayne State, 1977), 351-2.

³⁷ Irwin L. Hunt, *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920* (Washington D.C.: 1942), 88, cited in Earl F. Ziemke, "The Formulation and Initial Implementation of U.S. Occupation Policy in Germany," in *U.S. Occupation in Europe after World War II* ed. Hans A. Schmitt (Lawrence: Regents Press, 1978), 42.

³⁸ Ibid. Hunt's report would also be used by SHAEF planners in Europe in 1944, according to Oliver J. Fredricksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany 1945-1953* (Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 1953), 2.

³⁹ Peterson, *Retreat to Victory*, 31-33.

⁴⁰ War Department, *Army-Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs, FM 27-5* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. War Department, 1943), as cited in Ziemke, "Occupation Policy" in Schmitt, 42.

⁴¹ Franklin M. Davis, Jr., *Come as a Conqueror: The U.S. Army's Occupation of Germany* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 25-26.

⁴² Ziemke, "Occupation Policy," in Schmitt, 42.

⁴³ Ibid., 29.

⁴⁴ Peterson, *Retreat to Victory*, 33-34. The Chief of Civil Affairs, Major General John Hilldring, blamed the obstructionism on the confusion of higher authorities. The bitter and troublesome controversy was never resolved.

⁴⁵ Franklin Roosevelt, October 20, 1944, cited in Davis, *Come as a Conqueror*, 19.

⁴⁶ Richard L. Merritt, *Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945-1949* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 52-53.

⁴⁷ Hull left the Moscow Conference believing he had triumphed in establishing the basis for a liberal post war order that would not repeat the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles. He received a tumultuous ovation when he returned to Washington and became the first Secretary of State invited to address a Joint Session of Congress. Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (New York: Doubleday, 1964), 208-209. Hull's bitterness and ignorance of Roosevelt's doings is described in Peterson, *Retreat to Victory*, 38.

⁴⁸ Peterson, 38.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁵⁰ Detailed in Charles L. Mee, Jr., *Playing God: Seven Fateful Moments When Great Men Met to Change the World* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1993), 179-196. See also Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Protocol on the Proceedings of the Crimea (Yalta) Conference, February 11, 1945," *Documents on Germany, 1944-1961*, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., December 1961, 8-10.

⁵¹ Jean Edward Smith, *Lucius D. Clay: An American Life* (New York: Henry Holt, 1990), 209-220.

⁵² Peterson, *Retreat to Victory*, 42. The text of JCS 1067/8 is reproduced in James P. Warburg, *Germany – Bridge or Battleground* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), 278-302.

⁵³ Office of the Chief Historian, U.S. European Command, *Planning for the Occupation of Germany, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46* (Frankfurt: U.S. European Command, 1947), 8-11. Hereafter, *Planning Occupation*.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 16, citing "Aide-Memoir Handed to the United States and Soviet Ambassadors on the 2d July 1943 as a result of WP (43) 217."

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 18-19.

⁵⁶ The details of discussions on the division of Germany into zones, the failure of U.S. leaders to anticipate the permanent divisions of Germany, and the failure of U.S. military leaders to overcome political resistance to getting formal commitments from the Soviets for access to Berlin, are recounted in Davis, *Come as a Conqueror*, 31-34, 70-89.

⁵⁷ *Planning Occupation*, 31.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 36-43.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 44-47.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, quoting General Morgan, 50.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 57. Emphasis in the original.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 74., citing Cable FWD-13854 (SCAF 68), 5 Sep 44, to CCS.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 82-83., citing Memo, SHAEF, G-3 Div (Main), 21 Oct 44, file SHAEF/21540/5/PHP/GCT/388.3-7, subj: "Coordination of Planning for the Occupation of Germany."

⁶⁵ Fredricksen, *American Military Occupation of Germany 1945-1953*, 2.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 75-76.

⁶⁷ Earl F. Ziemke, "Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany," in *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952* ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 52.

⁶⁸ Fredricksen, *American Military Occupation of Germany 1945-1953*, 5.

⁶⁹ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower, Volume I: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1983), 396.

⁷⁰ Davis, *Come as a Conqueror*, 3-18.

⁷¹ Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, *Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of Germany* (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, December 1944). Originally classified SECRET, the handbook was declassified in 1985.

⁷² Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, *Handbook for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender* (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, December 1944). Originally RESTRICTED, the handbook was later declassified (date unknown). The checklist appears in Chapter XVIII, paragraphs 1250-1261.

⁷³ Summarized from Fredricksen, 6-10.

⁷⁴ Summarized from *Ibid.*, 11.

⁷⁵ Summarized from *Ibid.*, 11-13.

⁷⁶ Ziemke, "Improvising Stability," 57.

⁷⁷ F.S.V. Donnison, *Civil Affairs and Military Government North-West Europe 1944-1946* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1961), 207-208.

⁷⁸ Eugene Davidson, *The Death & Life of Germany: An Account of the American Occupation* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1959), 127-129.

⁷⁹ Ziemke, "Formulation and Initial Implementation of U.S. Occupation Policy in Germany," 33-34.

⁸⁰ Ziemke, "Improvising Stability," 58.

⁸¹ Peterson, *Retreat to Victory*, 55.

⁸² Summarized from Fredericksen, 14-31.

⁸³ Davidson, *Come as a Conqueror*, 252.

⁸⁴ Graph from Fredericksen, 33.

⁸⁵ Ziemke, "Formulation and Initial Implementation of U.S. Occupation Policy in Germany," 35-36.

⁸⁶ Ziemke, "Improvising Stability," 59.

⁸⁷ Lucius Clay, "Proconsul of a People, by Another People, for Both Peoples," in *Americans as Proconsuls*, ed. Wolfe, 107.

⁸⁸ Ziemke, "Improvising Stability," 64.

⁸⁹ John Gimbel, "Governing the American Zone in Germany," in *Americans as Proconsuls*, ed. Wolfe, 95-99.

⁹⁰ Policy making procedures after 1946 are extensively and well detailed in Department of State, *American Policy in Occupied Areas* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946).

⁹¹ The nation-building period and Clay's role are detailed in many sources. Best among them are Clay's memoirs and that of his political advisor, Robert Murphy. See Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* and Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (New York: Doubleday, 1950).

⁹² Fredericksen, 129-139.

⁹³ Verena Botzenhart-Viehe, "The German Reaction to the American Occupation, 1944-1947" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1980), x.

⁹⁴ Peterson, *Retreat to Victory*, 9-10.

⁹⁵ Fredricksen, 111.

⁹⁶ Detailed in Davis, *Come a Conqueror*, 162-174.

⁹⁷ Department of the Army, *FM 41-15 Civil Affairs Military Government Units* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1954).

⁹⁸ Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, *FM 41-5 Joint Manual of Civil Affairs/Military Government* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1958).

⁹⁹ Department of the Army, *FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1962), paragraph 2g, p. 5.

¹⁰⁰ Department of the Army, *FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1969).

¹⁰¹ Department of the Army, *FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2000), 2-30 to 2-32.

¹⁰² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-57 Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 February 2001), I-18.

¹⁰³ Compiled from numerous public sources. See Seymour M. Hersh, "The Iraq Hawks: Can Their Plan Work?" *The New Yorker* 77, no. 41 (24 - 31 December 2001): 58-62, Seymour M. Hersh, "The Debate Within: The Objective is Clear – Topple Saddam. But how?" *The New Yorker* 78, no. 3 (11 March 2002): 34-39, Edward N. Luttwak, "This Time, Finish the Job," *Los Angeles Times* (3 March 2002), p. M5, and Kamal Ahmed, Jason Burke and Peter Beaumont, "Bush wants 25,000 UK Iraq Force," *The Observer* (10 March 2002), p. 1. Two variants of possibilities exist using opposition groups, working through the Iraqi National Congress or the Iraqi National Accord, neither with very good prospects of success. See Mark Matthews and Tom Bowman, "U.S. Has No Easy Options in Iraq," *Baltimore Sun* (25 February 2002), p. 1., and David Ignatius, "Self-Help Strategy for Iraq," *Washington Post* (1 March 2002), p. 25.

¹⁰⁴ Bill Keller, "Springtime for Saddam," *The New York Times* (6 April 2002); available from <<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/06/opinion/06KELL.html>> Internet. Accessed 6 April 2002.

¹⁰⁵ Former Commander-in-Chief, Central Command, General Anthony Zinni, cited in Jack Kelly, "Toppling Saddam Would Just be a Start," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* (3 March 2002), p. 15.

¹⁰⁶ King Abdullah II of Jordan, cited in Robin Wright, "Jordan's King Sees Pitfalls in a Strike on Iraq," *Los Angeles Times* (17 March 2002), p. 1.

¹⁰⁷ Editorial, "A Coalition for Iraq," *The Washington Post* (24 March 2002), p. B6.

¹⁰⁸ Henry A. Kissinger, "Phase II and Iraq," *The Washington Post* (13 January 2002), p. B07.

¹⁰⁹ Donald E. Rumsfeld, cited in Joyce Howard Price, "Rumsfeld Opposed to Any U.S. Role in Nation Building," *Washington Times* (2 December 2001), p. 5.

¹¹⁰ Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Master (Nation) Builder," *National Review* (11 March 2002): 30-32.

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