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Terrorism Today**Chapter 1****The Face of Terrorism Today**

America is at War...the grave challenge we face – the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001.

President George W. Bush
The National Security Strategy
of the United States of America
March 2006

Terrorist acts or the threat of terrorism have been in existence for thousands of years. Despite a history longer than the modern nation-state, the use of terror by governments and those that contest their power appears poorly understood. When terror is applied to acts and actors in the real world of today, meaning and intent can point in many directions. Part of this dilemma is due to use of terror tactics by actors at all levels of social and political interaction. Is the “Unabomber”²⁸ with his solo campaign of terror a criminal, terrorist, or revolutionary? How does a Timothy McVeigh²⁹ differ from a Theodore Kaczynski? Can either of them be compared to a revolutionary government who coined the word terrorism by instituting systematic state terror against its population in the 1790s? What differs in radicalized American-based Islamic terrorists with no direct links to transnational networks such as al-Qaida?³⁰ How does a domestic or “home grown” terrorist differ from an insurgent in Iraq or Afghanistan or other regions of the world? What is the face of terrorism today?



Figure 1-1. **The Faces of Terrorism Today**

²⁸ “The Unibomber Manifesto,” available from <http://www.ed.brocku.ca/~rahul/Misc/unibomber.html>; Internet; accessed 30 May 2007.

²⁹ “Murrah Federal Building Bombing,” US Army TRADOC, TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1, *Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terror*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity-Threats, 10 August 2006; available from <https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil>; US Army Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS); accessed 30 May 2007. US Army Knowledge Online (AKO) password required to access.

³⁰ “FBI Warns of growing Terrorist Threat from American-Based Islamic Extremists,” available from <http://news.rgp.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070513/NEWS18/705130372>; Internet; accessed 18 May 2007.

"Terrorism is theatre."³¹ Terrorism, like a theatrical play, can be viewed as a deliberate presentation to a large audience in order to gain attention, spotlight a particular message, and seek a response favorable to the actor. The purpose of such actions can have sinister impact on national, regional, and global populations. Global communications provide a stage for near instantaneous media exploitation. Anxiety can increase as random or deliberate acts of terror often target civilians as victims. Similar to a play, the objective of the experience is to affect the feelings and attitudes of the audience.

Section I: What is Terrorism

Terrorism has been described as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable action. Definition may depend on whose point of view is being represented. Terrorism has often been an effective tactic for the weaker side in a conflict. As an asymmetric form of conflict, terrorism projects coercive power with many of the advantages of military force at a fraction of the cost to the terrorist. Terrorism is a means -- a method -- to an objective.

Defining Terrorism



The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) approved definition of terrorism is: "The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological."³² For the purposes of this document, this will be the standard definition. However, this is one of many definitions. One researcher did a review of writings on terrorism and found 109 different definitions.³³ A sampling of definitions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of State (DOS) illustrate the different perspectives of categorizing and analyzing terrorism.

The FBI uses this: "Terrorism is the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."³⁴ The U.S. Department of State uses the definition contained in Title 22 U.S.C. Section 2656f(d). According to this section, "terrorism" means "premeditated politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents."³⁵ The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) uses this Title 22 definition of terrorism also in its annual reports of



³¹ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 38. This is a statement that is quoted often to spotlight the intention of terror to gain attention, to arouse, and to cause reaction.

³² FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, 5 December 1990; and Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001, as amended through 13 June 2007.

³³ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 39.

³⁴ Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 0.85, *Judicial Administration*, (Washington, D.C., July 2001).

³⁵ Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001* (Washington, D.C., May 2002), xvi.



terrorism incidents around the world.³⁶ These definitions stress the respective institutional concerns of the organizations using them. The FBI concentrates on the unlawful aspect in keeping with its law enforcement mission. The Department of State concerns itself with politically motivated actions by sub-national or clandestine actors as functions affect international relations and diplomacy. Terrorism is "...fundamentally political so the political significance of major events is vital to determining meaningful responses."³⁷



Outside the United States Government, there are greater variations in what features of terrorism are emphasized in definitions. One comment used often is, "One state's terrorist is another state's freedom fighter."³⁸ There is clearly a wide array of definitions for terrorism. Despite this, several common elements may assist in defining terrorism: political, psychological, violent, dynamic, and deliberate. The United Nations produced this description in 1992; "An anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by semi-clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets." The UN has no internationally-agreed definition of terrorism. Yet in September 2006, the United Nations and its Member States demonstrated signs of collective progress in agreement to a global strategy to counter terrorism.³⁹



Vectors of Action

A way to frame terrorism in the context of a contemporary operational environment is to consider vectors of political, psychological, violent, and deliberate action.

Political. A U.S. State Department official summarized, "The ultimate goals of terrorism are political...Politically motivated terrorism invariably involves a deeply held grievance over some form of injustice. The injustice may be social or economic, but it is nonetheless blamed on a political authority."⁴⁰

³⁶ National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), *Reports on Terrorism Incidents - 2006*, 30 April 2007, 2; available from <http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/Patterns-of-global-terrorism.asp>; Internet; accessed 2 May 2007.

³⁷ Department of State, *Country Reports on terrorism 2006*, April 2007, 11; available from <http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/Patterns-of-global-terrorism.asp>; Internet; accessed 2 May 2007.

³⁸ United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, "Definitions of Terrorism," available from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html; Internet; accessed 31 May 2007.

³⁹ United Nations, "United Nations General Assembly Adopts Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy," available from <http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.html>; Internet; accessed 31 May 2007. This citation provides the full text resolution and UN plan of action.

⁴⁰ David E. Long, *The Anatomy of Terrorism* (New York: THE FREE PRESS, A Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1990), 4 and 5.

Psychological. Terrorist acts intend to cause a negative psychological effect on a target. Acts may be aimed at a target audience other than the actual victims of the terrorism. The intended target audience of terrorism may be a population as a whole or some selected portion of a society such as an ethnic minority or decisionmakers in a society's political, social, or military population.

Violent. Violence intends to produce a desired physical effect and can contribute to a psychological effect of fear or anxiety. Threats may be effective for a period of time, but usually require complementary physical terrorism action to achieve the degree of desired psychological effect.

Deliberate. Terrorism is purposeful. Victim or target selection can appear random or unprovoked, but analysis of events will usually identify that a target and the impact from attacking a target was premeditated in conjunction with a terrorist objective.

Section II: Objectives

Objective: A standard military definition of *objective* is – “The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable aims which every military operation should be directed towards.”⁴¹

Terrorist objectives refer to the intended result of individual acts or groups and series of actions at the tactical or operational levels of war. Terrorist networks may apply tactical and operational outcomes to enhance achievement of strategic terrorist aims. U.S. military forces will always have some degree of vulnerability to terrorist operations. Terrorism is a specific and pervasive risk for U.S. military forces. For example, al-Qaida has specifically identified military targets as one of its major priorities.⁴² Factors contributing to a danger of attack on military forces are:

- Exposure increases as units and individuals are forward deployed and internationally based. Increases in the operations tempo, the number of overseas deployments, and periodic surge requirements into an operational area raise the opportunity that U.S. forces will operate in areas that are more accessible to terrorist groups than the U.S. Homeland or other established overseas bases.
- Symbolic value of successful attacks against military targets has often been a consideration in terrorist planning. Terrorist groups recognize that even relatively small losses of military forces from terrorist attacks receive extensive international media coverage and can diminish popular and political support for military operations and sponsoring governments.⁴³

⁴¹ Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001, as amended through 13 June 2007.

⁴² Ben Venzke and Aimee Ibrahim, *The al-Qaeda Threat: An Analytical Guide to al-Qaeda's Tactics and Targets* (Alexandria: Tempest Publishing, LLC, 2003), 76.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 77.

- Extremist Islamic dogma fuels turmoil in many regions of the world. This turmoil incites disenfranchised groups of a population to provide recruits and followers that have been desensitized to violence, who seek purpose and meaning in their lives, and want to escape from a despairing environment. After reading or hearing the works of people such as Mawdudi, Qutb, and Faraj, and other theological interpretations of various schools and Muslim clerics, concepts of violence and religion as a supposed support of terror should not appear surprising.⁴⁴ As noted in *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, “The dispersion all over the world, after 1992, of the jihadist-salafists formerly concentrated in Kabul [Afghanistan] and Peshawar [Pakistan], more than anything else, explains the sudden, lightning expansion of radical Islamism in Muslim countries and the West.”⁴⁵

Section III: Terrorism and Insurgency

Terrorism is a violent act outside the normal bounds of civil law and conventional military conduct. Terrorism is often linked to an insurgency or guerrilla warfare, but is not necessarily a tactic or technique required of an insurgency or guerrilla campaign. Insurgency and guerilla warfare can overlap in execution. Although these forms of conflict may often have similar goals,⁴⁶ differences exist among insurgency, guerilla warfare, and terrorism. An insurgency is a political effort with a specific aim to overthrow a constituted government. Guerrilla warfare is military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. An insurgency and guerrilla warfare can use terrorism as a means to shape an environment.⁴⁷ Adapting to counter superior military forces or technological capabilities, an insurgent or guerrilla can create conditions that persuade or coerce a target audience to directly or indirectly support an insurgent or guerrilla agenda.

Insurgency:

(JP 1-02) (NATO)

An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.

Guerrilla Warfare:

(JP1-02) (NATO)

Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

While some insurgencies and guerilla campaigns use terror and some conflicts have displayed a predominant use of terrorism against a target population, other examples of conflict renounced the use of terror. The deliberate choice to use terrorism considers its

⁴⁴ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 81-82.

⁴⁵ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press): 299.

⁴⁶ *International Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, 1997 ed., s.v. “Theories of Insurgency and Terrorism: Introduction.”

⁴⁷ Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006), 1-3.

effectiveness in inspiring further resistance, destroying government efficiency, and mobilizing support.⁴⁸ These objectives usually relate directly to a form of political power.

Related Definitions

Terrorist: (JP 1-02)

An individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result.

Counterterrorism: (JP 1-02)

Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

Antiterrorism: (JP 1-02)

Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces.

The goal of an insurgency is to challenge the existing government for control of all or a portion of its territory, or force political concessions in sharing political power. The key element in insurgent strategy is effective control or influence over a relevant population. A supportive population provides security, intelligence, logistical support, and a recruiting base for each side in an insurgency and counter-insurgency struggle. If the insurgency gains control over an increasing percentage of the population, the government will correspondingly lose effective control over a larger percentage of the population. Without a focus on the relevant population, insurgent objectives are nil.⁴⁹

Terrorism normally does not contend for actual control of territory. Actors in an operational environment intend for violent acts to force their will on their targets. Insurgencies require the active or tacit support of some portion of the involved population. A terror group does not require⁵⁰ and rarely has the active support of a large percentage of the population. While insurgents may describe themselves as insurgents or guerrillas, terrorists will not usually refer to themselves as terrorists. They may describe themselves using military or political terminology such as freedom fighters, soldiers, or activists. Terrorism relies on public impact, and is therefore conscious of the advantage of avoiding the negative connotations of the term terrorist in identifying themselves.⁵¹

Other differences relate to the unit size, types of arms, and types of operations. Guerrillas usually fight in small organized formations such as platoon, company, or larger size units, whereas terrorists normally operate in small cells.⁵² An example of tenuous distinctions between terrorism and guerrilla warfare is the *Montoneros* of Argentina during the 1970s. Incidents of kidnapping high profile businessmen for ransom or assassination of government officials blurred a widening array of terrorist actions that developed into organized military-type operations. Cellular and compartmented groups gave way to organized unit-type structure for sophisticated attacks against military forces. One attack against an infantry regiment included *Montoneros* marshalling their force over 800

⁴⁸ Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, rev. ed. (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 16-20.

⁴⁹ Ariel Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol 5, No. 4 (Winter 1993): 224.

⁵⁰ Reich, *Origins of Terrorism*, 17.

⁵¹ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 29-33.

⁵² Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency," 224.

kilometers from previous urban enclaves, forming assault and support elements, conducting the attack, evacuating the force with a hijacked airplane, providing medical treatment enroute to the dispersal landing field, and vanishing among the population after landing.⁵³

Table 1-1 provides a simplified comparison of differences among guerilla warfare, terrorism, and conventional war.

Table 1-1. Simple Comparison of Conflict			
	Conventional War	Guerilla	Terrorism
Unit Size in Battle	Large (army, corps, division)	Medium (platoon, company, battalion)	Small (usually less than 10 persons)
Weapons	Full range of military weapon systems (air force, armor, artillery, etc)	Mostly infantry-type light weapons but sometimes artillery as well)	Hand guns, hand grenades, assault rifles and specialized weapons, e.g., car bombs; remote-control bombs
Tactics	Usually joint operations involving several military branches	Commando-type tactics	Specialized tactics: kidnap, assassination, car bomb, hijack, barricade-hostage
Targets	Mostly military units, industrial and transportation infrastructure	Mostly military, police and administration staff, as well as political opponents	State symbols, political opponents and the public at large
Intended Impact	Physical destruction of declared enemy	Mainly physical attrition of the enemy	Psychological fear, coercion and anxiety
Control of Territory	Yes	Yes	No
Uniform	Wear uniform	Often wear uniform	Do not wear uniform
Recognition of War Zones	War limited to recognized geographical area	War limited to the region-country in strife	No recognized war zones. Missions can be worldwide
International Legality	Yes, if conducted by international rules	Assessed in accordance with international rules	No
Domestic Legality	Yes	No	No

Terrorists do not usually attempt to challenge government military forces directly, but act to create public perceptions of an ineffectiveness or illegitimate government. This is done by ensuring the widest possible knowledge of the acts of terrorist violence among the target audience. An insurgent or guerilla force may clash with a government combat force to demonstrate that they can effectively challenge the military effectiveness of the government or to acquire military weapons and equipment. Terrorists use methods that

⁵³ Alan C. Lowe, "Todo o Nada: Montoneros Versus the Army: Urban Terrorism in Argentina," ed. William G. Robertson and Lawrence A. Yates, in *Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2003), 392-396.

attempt to neutralize the strengths of conventional forces. Bombings and mortar attacks on civilian targets where military or security personnel spend off-duty time, ambushes of convoys, and assassinations of government individuals are common tactics.

Insurgency and guerrilla warfare may actively target noncombatants. Some insurgencies and guerrilla campaigns consider police and security personnel, in addition to military forces, as targets in an expanded definition of combatants. Examples exist of insurgents or guerillas deliberately placing civilians on a target list. A Vietcong directive in 1965 detailed the types of people who must be “repressed,” and stated, “The targets of repression are counterrevolutionary elements who seek to impede the revolution and work actively for the enemy and for the destruction of the revolution...Elements who actively fight against the revolution in reactionary parties such as the Vietnamese Nationalist Party, Party for a Greater Viet Nam, Personality and Labor Party, and key reactionaries in organizations and associations founded by the reactionary parties and the U.S. imperialists and the puppet government.”⁵⁴ Deliberate dehumanization and criminalization of an enemy by a terrorist is a perspective of attempting to justify terrorism.

Insurgents may use more than one form of violence to obtain their objective with a combination of terrorism and insurgent or guerilla warfare as common.⁵⁵ Situations in Iraq illustrate the difficulty in identifying a terrorist from a guerilla or an insurgent. One assessment of contemporary threats in Iraq qualified four groups with different tactics and goals.⁵⁶ These include: (1) Iraqi nationalists, known as Former Regime Elements, fighting to reclaim secular power lost when Saddam Hussein was deposed, (2) hardcore fighters, many of which are foreign, aligned with terrorist groups who want to turn Iraq into another Afghanistan to be used as an anti-Western stronghold to export Islamic revolution to other countries, (3) conservative Iraqis who want to install an Islamic theocracy, but not use terror tactics, and (4) ordinary criminals that are paid to conduct attacks or who kidnap westerners and sell them to the terrorists.

Real-world events can also present situations that are vague and open to multiple interpretations for the same group. Al-Qaida is a transnational terrorist group. Correspondingly, al-Qaida could be defined as a global insurgency with the intent to overthrow the current world order. Al-Qaida does have political objectives of removing the U.S. from the Middle East to enhance their ability to overthrow their definition of apostate regimes. A long term vision seeks to reconstitute a caliphate across major portions of the Middle East, Northern Africa and areas of the Trans-Sahara, and Indo-South Asia-Southeast Asia regions. Using this secular base of power and the wealth of oil reserves and production, the new caliphate could serve as a means of further spreading a form of fascist ideology throughout the world.

⁵⁴ Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” 216.

⁵⁵ Bard E. O’Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Dulles: Brassey’s, Inc, 1990), 26.

⁵⁶ Jim Krane, “U.S. Faces Complex Insurgency in Iraq,” *Duluth News Tribune.com*, (4 October 2004); available from <http://www.duluthsuperior.com/mld/duluthsuperior/news/world/9833731.htm>; Internet; accessed 16 November 2004; and Bruce Hoffman, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq* (Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2004), 12-13.

Section IV: State Sponsored Terror

Some nations and states often resort to violence to influence segments of their population, or rely on coercive aspects of state institutions. National governments can become involved in terrorism or utilize terror to accomplish the objectives of governments or individual rulers. Most often, terrorism is equated with non-state actors or groups that are not responsible to a sovereign government. However, internal security forces can use terror to aid in repressing dissent, and intelligence or military organizations can perform acts of terror designed to further a state's policy or diplomatic efforts abroad.

The U.S. Department of State lists five state sponsors of terror in its 2006 assessment of terrorism. These state sponsors of terror are; Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Venezuela is listed in a special category of not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Libya's inclusion on the list of state sponsors of terrorism was rescinded in 2003 after Libya officially renounced terrorism and abandoned its WMD programs.⁵⁷

State Terror. This form of terror is sometimes referred to as "terror from above" where a government terrorizes its own population to control and repress them. These actions are acknowledged policy of the government and apply official institutions such as the judiciary, police, military, and other government agencies. Changes to legal codes can permit or encourage torture, killing, or property destruction in pursuit of government policy.



Examples in recent decades include Stalin's purges of the 1930s that terrorized an entire Soviets population. Nazi Germany during the 1930s-1940s aimed at the deliberate destruction of state enemies and intimidation of nations and



regional states. Methods included demonstration trials with predetermined verdicts on political opponents, punishing family or friends of suspected enemies of the regime, and extralegal use of police or military force against the population.⁵⁸ More recent examples are Amin's policies of mayhem and murder in Uganda, and Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons on his own Kurdish population in Iraq.

Other types of state terror can include death squads as unofficial actions taken by officials or functionaries of a regime to repress or intimidate their own population. While these officials will not claim responsibility for such activities, information often indicates that these acts are sponsored by the state. Several programs in South and Central American regimes during the 1970s terrorized their populations with death squads.

States may employ terrorist networks with no formal recognition. Terror activities may be directed against the governmental interests of other nations or private groups or individuals viewed as dangerous to the state. Examples include Soviet and Iranian

⁵⁷ Department of State, *Country Reports on terrorism 2006*, April 2007, 145; available from <http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/Patterns-of-global-terrorism.asp>; Internet; accessed 2 May 2007.

⁵⁷ United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, "Definitions of Terrorism," available from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html; Internet; accessed 31 May 2007.

⁵⁸ *International Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, 1997 ed., s.v. "Stalin's Great Terror."

assassination campaigns against dissidents who had fled abroad, or Libyan and North Korean intelligence operatives destroying airliners on international flights.⁵⁹

State Sponsors of Terror. Some governments provide supplies, training, and other forms of support to non-state terrorist organizations. This support can be provided without intending any specified governing authority by the state. Provision can be safe haven or physical basing for a terrorist network. Another crucial service a state sponsor can provide is false documentation for personal identification such as passports or internal identity documents. Other means of support can include access to training facilities and expertise not readily available to terrorists, extension of diplomatic protections and services such as immunity from extradition, use of embassies and other protected grounds, or diplomatic pouches to transport weapons or explosives.

Iran is the most active state sponsor of terrorism. Official support includes extensive funding, training, and weapons to terrorist networks such as HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PLFP-GC). Irrefutable evidence exists that Iran provides guidance, training, and weapons to Shia factions in Iraq. Similarly, Iran provides technology and training to insurgents and terrorists in Iraq for constructing explosively formed projectiles (EFP) as improvised explosive devices (IED).⁶⁰ EFP-IEDs are one of the most effective casualty producing weapons in the ongoing coalition presence in Iraq.



Syria's political and material support of Hizballah is another example. Syrian political support includes the physical basing of leadership structure for several terrorist organizations such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), HAMAS, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PLFP-GC). Suspicions remain under investigation on Syrian involvement in the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.⁶¹




Other states remain a concern. Sudan has openly supported HAMAS, but has been taking measures to disrupt foreign fighters from using Sudan as a logistics base and transit point for extremists going to Iraq. North Korea has not been openly supporting terrorist networks for several decades; however, the recent 2006 detonation of a nuclear device by North Korea provides a threat of expanding the possibility of WMD technology being obtained by terrorist networks.

⁵⁹ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 190.

⁶⁰ Department of State, *Country Reports on terrorism 2006*, April 2007, 147; available from <http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/Patterns-of-global-terrorism.asp>; Internet; accessed 2 May 2007.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 148.

The U.S. Department of State accents, “A state that directs WMD resources to terrorists, or one from which enabling resources are clandestinely diverted, may pose a potentially grave WMD terrorism threat.”⁶² Cuba has provided sanctuary to members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Revolutionary Forces of Columbia (FARC), and National Liberation Army (ELN), and maintained close relationships with other state sponsors of terror such as Iran.⁶³



Section V: Other Forms of Terrorism

Forms of terrorism threats range non-state transnational networks with global reach capability such as al-Qaida, terrorist cells affiliated with regional or international aims, or individual self-radicalized and unaffiliated terrorists with single issue agendas. Yet, each type of network or terrorist cell has criminal intentions limited by finite capability. Terrorists exist as a foreign and domestic threat of the United States in the U.S. Homeland and in United States presence throughout the world.

Conflict will continue to be an adaptive and often asymmetric arena. Given the significance of U.S. military power and the effectiveness of other U.S. elements of national power in finance, intelligence, diplomatic, legal, and social domains, a noticeable structural change has occurred in many terrorist activities. Enemy downsizing⁶⁴ to reduce physical and cyber visibility already appears as small cells or even individuals acting in a distributed or semi-independent manner. Some terrorists are fully independent and have self-radicalized. Terms such as fifth generation warfare or unrestricted warfare indicate capabilities that globalization provides advanced knowledge and technology, mobile international transportation, and cyber-space communication⁶⁵ as expanding means for asymmetric conflict.

The Internet offers a worldwide, near instantaneous communication link to exchange ideas, information, and lessons learned. Indoctrination and training of terrorists can be in a dispersed mode and greatly reduce a need of formal hierarchy or organizational structure. Intent within an ideology can be placed into action by individuals rather than depending on large networks with layers of coordination, control, and logistic support.⁶⁶

⁶² Ibid., 147 and 153.

⁶³ Ibid., 146.

⁶⁴ Henry Crumpton, “Remarks at Transnational Terrorism Conference,” January 16, 2006; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2006/59987.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 May 2007.

⁶⁵ “The Architect and Fifth generation Warfare,” June 4, 2006; available from http://www.thestrategist.org/archives/2006/06/the_architect_o.html; Internet; accessed 13 March 2007.

⁶⁶ Andrew Black, “Al-Suri’s Adaptation of fourth Generation Warfare Doctrine,” *Global Terrorism Analysis*, the Jamestown Foundation, September 21, 2006; available from <http://www.jmaestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370137>; Internet; accessed 1 November 2006.

The descriptor of “homegrown threat” to the United States is indicative of individuals or small groups of individuals resident in the United States that are intent on harming the U.S. citizenry. These terrorists may be U.S. citizens or citizens from other nations. Examples range terrorists who have quietly embedded themselves in our society from international locations to U.S. citizens with special agendas that may result in terrorist attacks. Either type of group or individual may incorporate established criminal links to enhance capabilities. One homegrown Sunni Islamic extremist group self-titled as Assembly of Authentic Islam, operated primarily in state prisons in California and committed armed robberies to finance attacks on perceived enemies of Islam, including the U.S. Government.⁶⁷ Incidents in 2007 include a plan to attack U.S. military members on Fort Dix, New Jersey by a small group of Islamic extremists resident in the U.S. for several years. This group appears to have had put an ideological concept into action with no coordinating links to larger terrorist networks.



Figure 1-2. **Foreign, Domestic, or Home Grown Faces of Terrorism?**

Conclusion

Terrorism is foremost a political problem. Common terms and definitions assist in focusing situational awareness of the Threat. Actions consider aspects of terrorist activity that may include political demonstration, criminal conduct, and possible links to paramilitary operations or low intensity conflict.⁶⁸

The psychological impact of terror on a target audience must be viewed as a means to an end. Threats can be evaluated by knowing terrorist intent and functional capabilities. Each threat should be examined in the context of its particular operational environment. Individual terrorist cell or group associations and affiliations, current or projected levels of training, decisionmaking authority within a cell or group to plan and act, and the sophistication of emergent tactics, techniques, and procedures are examples of critical variables with which to assess intent and capability to act.

⁶⁷ Robert Mueller, Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” January 11, 2007; available from <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress07/mueller011107.htm>; Internet; accessed 14 March 2007.

⁶⁸ Long, *The Anatomy of Terrorism*, 11 and 13.