

Introduction

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Violent extremist networks and ideologies will continue to be a threat to the United States and our allies for many years. The ambition of these networks to acquire chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons is real, as is their desire to launch more attacks on our country and on our interests around the world.

**Honorable Robert Gates
U.S. Secretary of Defense
May 2007**

A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century is a capstone reference guide that describes terrorism¹ and highlights the nature of terrorism present in a full spectrum contemporary operational environment (COE),² and the likely impacts on U.S. military operations.



Figure 1. **Vectors of Domestic and Foreign Terrorism**

Despite the consistent menace of terrorism, threats can be misunderstood and frequently confused due to widely divergent views on how to define terrorism. Terrorism as discussed in this handbook centers on known principal terrorist “Threats” to the United States of America. The United States confronts terrorism in daily circumstances, both foreign and domestic, and adapts the security environment and force protection against

¹ Joint Publication 1-02. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001, as amended through 13 June 2007. See also, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC G2, TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) White Paper, *The Contemporary Operational Environment*, July 2007.

² U.S. Army Field Manual FM 7-100, *Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy*, May 2003, iv to xvi.



terrorism. The most significant U.S. concerns are terrorist organizations with demonstrated global reach capabilities and those terrorist organizations that seek to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The Problem

What is the “Threat” of terrorism? How does terrorism impact on U.S. military forces in the conduct of operations and institutional support? What measures exist to minimize terrorist action in the contemporary operational environment?

The threat of terrorism to the U.S. is present across the entire spectrum of conflict. The use of terrorism ranges from individual acts of wanton damage or destruction to property or person, to highly sophisticated operations conducted by organized extremist groups with social, environmental, religious, economic, or political agendas. Any of these terrorist activities can have significant negative impact on the conduct of missions by U.S. military forces.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) defines operational environment (OE) as a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.³ The U.S. Army builds on this DOD definition and further defines a mission setting for the current or the near-term future circumstances – the Contemporary Operational Environment.⁴



The *Contemporary Operational Environment* (COE) has several common threads or constants for defining the environment. The U.S. will not experience a peer competitor until 2020 or beyond. Armed forces will continue to be used as a tool to pursue national interests. The United States of America may direct military action within the context of

³ Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001, as amended through 13 June 2007.

⁴ Army Field Manual 7-100, *Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy*, May 2003, Foreword and iv.

an alliance, a coalition, or even as unilateral action, with or without United Nations sanctions. Military actions will be waged in a larger environment of diplomatic, information, and economic operations. Modernization of capabilities by potential or known adversaries could negate U.S. overmatch for select periods of time or specific capabilities. Similarly, advanced technologies will be readily available on a world market for nation states and non-state actors. Non-state actors can cause significant impacts on a military operation as combatants and noncombatants. Adversaries or enemies may use very simple means to counter the sophistication of specific U.S. systems. Of course, factors and their effects will vary depending on a particular situation. One additional constant that must be addressed is the issue of variables.

This contemporary period can be assessed as “...the most dangerous times of our lifetime...not so much because we know precisely what somebody’s going to do, when and where, or how they’re going to do it; but that we know their intent and we know what the possibilities are and we know what our vulnerabilities are...So terrorism is part of the tactic. In other ways it’s [terrorism] an ‘ism’, much like communism and the others, only so much as it’s embodied in whatever movements and for whatever reasons.”⁵

A dynamic and adaptive process means being more aware, better prepared, and fully ready to counter any adversary or enemy that could negatively impact on conduct of an assigned U.S. military mission. Action can range from peaceful humanitarian assistance to high-intensity combat operations.




Figure 2. **Operational Environment and the Threat**

⁵ General Peter Schoomaker, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, “Media Roundtable at the Association of the United States Army Annual Convention, Washington, D.C., 4 October 2004; available from <http://www.army.mil/leaders/leaders/csa/interviews/04Oct04Roundtable.html>; Internet; accessed 11 January 2005.

To understand the complex interactions of the Operational Environment (OE), a framework of “systems” assists in assessing and gaining situational awareness. Joint doctrine uses systems of Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) to shape and conduct missions. PMESII and other variables such as physical environment and time (PMESII+PT) affect circumstances and information operations throughout the domains of air, land, sea, and space. This broader perspective, combined with mission, enemy and belligerents, friendly forces and partners, and cultural sensitivities and resolve, are critical to mission success. Defining physical environmental conditions include terrain or urban settings such as (space, super-surface, surface and sub-surface features), weather, topography, and hydrology. The variable of time influences action such as planning, multi-echelon decision cycles, tempo of operations, and projected pacing of popular support or dissatisfaction for operations. Whether a real world threat or an opposing force (OPFOR) created to simulate relevant conditions for training readiness, PMESII and other variables such as physical environment and time describe the OE.

The April 2007 *Country Reports on Terrorism 2006* by the Department of State⁶ and a complementary report by the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), *Reports on Terrorism Incidents - 2006*, cite the significance of key terms and definitions applied to terrorism. For example, NCTC statistics and assessment do not contain information specifically concerning combatants. Engagement among actors in the COE affects a broad band of issues from formal nation state interaction to the impact on individual combatants and noncombatants. The NCTC uses the definition of combatant as “...personnel in the military, paramilitary, militia, and police under military command and control, who are in specific areas or regions where war zones or war-like settings exist.”⁷

Acts of terrorism are part of this daily reality. Assessing and evaluating terrorism is a collection of ongoing and emerging issues. Comparing statistical data on most terrorism information collected by the State Department and other U.S. Federal activities in previous years is inappropriate based on the different collection and reporting methods currently in use.⁸ The Department of State report provides a five year review of progress as well as a focus on calendar year 2006. National Counterterrorism Center data is comparable between the NCTC 2005 assessment and the 2006 report issued in April 2007.⁹

Purpose

This U.S. Army TRADOC G2 handbook serves as an unclassified resource to inform U.S. military members on the nature of terrorism. The intention is to create situational awareness and understanding of current terrorism capabilities and limitations, and

⁶ Department of State, *Country Reports on terrorism 2006*, April 2007; available from <http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/Patterns-of-global-terrorism.asp>; Internet; accessed 2 May 2007.

⁷ National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), *Reports on Terrorism Incidents - 2006*, 30 April 2007, 4 and 5; available from <http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/Patterns-of-global-terrorism.asp>; Internet; accessed 2 May 2007.

⁸ Ibid., 5. See also, “NCTC Revises, Raises Terror Incident List From 2004,” 6 July 2005; available from http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,161645,00.html; Internet; accessed 6 July 2005.

⁹ Ibid., 2.

complement the deliberate processes of military risk management, protection of the force, mission orders conduct, and leader decision-making. This handbook is a credible awareness tool for real world threats or an opposing force (OPFOR) used as conditions for training readiness.

From a “Threats” perspective, terrorism capabilities and limitations indicate possible or probable types of threat action that may be directed against U.S. military members, organizations, and activities. Factors other than military power may place constraints on both threats and friendly forces. Commanders, organizational leaders, and other military members must “think like the threat” and can use this handbook to create operational opportunities to:

- Understand the nature of a terrorist threat, methods of planning and action, and organizational structures commonly used by terrorists and terrorist organizations.
- Know terrorist goals and objectives. Acknowledge asymmetric operations available to a terrorist. Study situational patterns and techniques in terrorism over time that can offer insight and possible trends of an adaptive enemy.
- Appreciate threat of terrorism to U.S. military forces, equipment, and infrastructure.
- Relate appropriate levels of force protection (FP), operational security (OPSEC), and terrorism countermeasures based upon unit status and situation.
- Provide relevant terrorism information that applies to U.S. military forces that are: (1) deployed on an operational mission, (2) in transit to or from an operational mission, or (3) military activities designated as installation or institutional support.
- Complement research, analysis, and contingency techniques within a “red teaming” concept and process.¹⁰

Threat and Opposing Force

Threat. Any specific foreign nation or organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or challenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies.

U.S. Army Regulation 350-2

Opposing Force. (OPFOR) A plausible, flexible military and/or para-military force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force, for training and developing U.S. armed forces.

U.S. Army Regulation 350-2

¹⁰ Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, *Defense Science Board Task Force on The Role and Status of DoD Red Teaming Activities*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, September 2003).

Scope of the Issue

Terrorism is a significant operational condition for U.S. military forces in the twenty-first century. Terrorist violence has changed in recent years from sporadic incidents of the politically disenfranchised to a significant asymmetric form of conflict employed against adversaries and enemies with economic, military, social, and political aims.

While terrorist acts may have appeared to be extraordinary events several decades ago, today terrorism eclipses these former acts and demonstrates a profound impact on populations at the local, regional, national, and international levels. Terrorists do not plan on defeating the U.S. in a purely military sense. As part of a larger listing of threats, "...foes today are not trying to defeat us [U.S.] purely militarily. They're approaching this from a far broader strategic context, and in fact, they're least interested in taking us [U.S.] on head-on. They're interested in tying us down militarily, but they are really working on defeating us informationally, economically, and politically, the other dimensions of National power."¹¹

Terrorism is defined by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) as: "The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological."¹² This is not a universally accepted definition outside of the Department of Defense. For this handbook, the DOD doctrinal definition will be used unless otherwise noted in the text.

Terrorism is a special type of violence. While terrorist actions may have political or other motives, terrorism is a criminal act. Although terrorism has not yet caused the physical devastation and number of casualties normally associated with conventional warfare, terrorism often produces significant adverse psychological impacts.¹³ Examples of this impact on the United States are the 9/11 attacks and the anthrax incidents of 2001. For many people in the U.S., these attacks weakened their sense of safety and security. The experience of catastrophic terrorism was evidence that the United States was not immune to attacks by international or transnational terrorist groups. These attacks caused severe economic impacts on the nation. As Brian Jenkins testified to the 9/11 Commission, "The September 11 attack produced cascading economic effects that directly and indirectly have cost the United States hundreds of billions of dollars."¹⁴ However for many U.S. citizens, these terrorist acts fortified their will and resolve to respond and defeat this enemy. A national determination emerged from these catastrophic incidents to

¹¹ General Peter Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, "CSA Interview: Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities," (Washington, D.C.: Pentagon, 4 October, 2004), available from <http://www.army.mil/leaders/leaders/csa/interviews/04Oct04.html>; Internet; accessed 11 January 2005.

¹² FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, 5 December 1990; and Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001, as amended through 13 June 2007.

¹³ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 33-34.

¹⁴ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Statement of Brian Jenkins to the Commission, March 31, 2003; available from http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing1/witness_jenkins.htm; Internet; accessed 23 September 2004.

reassert commitment to a democratic way of life and to combat terrorism in the U.S. Homeland and on a global scale.

International concern about terrorism mounts too. Multinational groups such as the Club of Madrid, comprised of former presidents and prime ministers of democratic countries, seek an international cooperation against terrorism. Principles include acknowledging terrorism as a crime against all humanity, recognizing terrorism an attack on democracy and human rights, and rejecting any ideology that guides the actions of terrorists.¹⁵

Similarly, the Secretary General of the United Nations called for a world treaty on terrorism that would outlaw attacks targeting civilians and establish a framework for a collective response to the global terrorist threat. A complementary agreement might include a universal definition of terrorism, knowing that many different definitions exist for terrorism.¹⁶ However, the UN Member States still have no universal definition. One terrorism expert recommended in a report for the then UN Crime Branch that taking the existing consensus on what constitutes a war crime is a credible point of departure. If the core of war crimes is deliberate attacks on civilians, hostage taking, and the killing of prisoners, and is extended to conditions other than war, a simple definition could describe acts of terrorism as "peacetime equivalents of war crimes."¹⁷

Terrorists may have their own definitions of terrorism. Notwithstanding, terrorist acts often fail to translate into concrete long-term gains or achieve an ultimate terrorist objective.¹⁸ Escalating acts of terrorism can be self-defeating when the acts become so extreme that public reaction loses attention on the terrorist's intended purpose and focuses on the acts rather than the political issue. The example of Palestinian defiance to Israeli controls in this geographic region of the Middle East illustrates how progressively violent acts of resistance or terrorism can sometimes alienate large sections of public opinion that once may have supported a Palestinian viewpoint.¹⁹ When the threat or use of terrorism is used in coordination with capabilities such as political or military power, strategic impact may be successful. Some people see the struggles for Algerian independence or Israeli independence as strategic outcomes that used terrorism as a major instrument of influence. Other people may see the 2004 Spanish withdrawal from coalition forces in Iraq as an operational outcome of terrorism in Spain, and a means toward terrorist strategic aims to fracture the coalition and eventually cause removal of U.S. presence and prestige in the Middle East.

¹⁵ *The Madrid Agenda*, Club de Madrid, available from <http://www.clubmadrid.org/cmadrid>; Internet; accessed 26 April 2005.

¹⁶ Ed McCullough, "Annan calls for treaty outlawing terrorism," Associated Press, 10 March 2005; available from http://www.kentucky.com/mld/kentucky/news/weird_news/11099663.htm?template; Internet; accessed 26 April 2005.

¹⁷ United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, "Definitions of Terrorism," available from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html; Internet; accessed 11 May 2007.

¹⁸ Caleb Carr, *The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians: Why it has Always Failed and Why it will Fail Again* (New York: Random House, 2002), 11.

¹⁹ Caleb Carr, "TIME.com Interview with Calib Carr," 1 February 2002; available at <http://www.time.com/time/2002/carr/interview.html>; Internet; accessed 31 August 2004.

WOT and the Contemporary Operational Environment

The U.S. *National Defense Strategy* identifies four types of challenging threats. Traditional challenges exist by states that employ recognized military capabilities and forces in the more conventional forms of military competition and conflict. Irregular challenges are the more unconventional ways and means to counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents. Catastrophic challenges involve the acquisition, possession, and possible use of WMD or methods that produce WMD-like effects. Disruptive challenges may be the use of breakthrough technologies to limit or negate the operational advantage of an opponent.²⁰



On a global scale, the U.S. *National Defense Strategy* has four strategic objectives: (1) secure the United States from direct attack, (2) secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action, (3) strengthen alliances and partnerships, and (4) establish favorable security conditions. Four ways that the U.S. accomplishes those objectives are assuring allies and friends, dissuading potential adversaries, deterring aggression and coercion, and when necessary, defeating adversaries.²¹ These principles are integral to situational awareness in the War on Terrorism (WOT).

The *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* (NMSP-WOT) addresses the WOT nature of the threat, and states priorities and responsibilities within the U.S. Armed Forces. The nature of this environment is a war against extremists that advocate the use of violence to gain control over others, and in doing so, threaten our [U.S.] way of life. Success will rely heavily on close cooperation and integration of all instruments of national power and the combined efforts of the international community. The overall goal of this war is to preserve and promote the way of life of free and open societies based on rule of law, defeat terrorist extremism as a threat to that way of life, and create a global environment inhospitable to terrorist extremists.²²

Targeting Vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities exist in terrorist plans, operations, and support functions. The United States targets eight major terrorist vulnerabilities. The intent is to maintain the initiative and determine the tempo, timing, and direction of military operations.

For example, denying resources to terrorists and terrorist networks is critical to countering the ideological support of terrorism. These efforts minimize or eliminate state and private support for terrorism as well as make it politically unsustainable for any

²⁰ *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, 1 March 2005, 2.

²¹ *Ibid.*, iv.

²² Joint Chiefs of Staff, J5 War on Terrorism, Strategic Planning Division, Briefing (U) *The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT)*, Version 18 April 2005.

country to support or condone terrorism. Techniques in coordinating such actions may include a methodology of identifying or mapping key organizational components that affect resources such as technology, key figures, and locations. Identifying the major connections among these components can spotlight weak assailable links of networks and where targeting and action plans may be most effective. Measuring results and adapting operations enable a process for improved U.S. Joint leader education, training, and WOT operations.²³

Interaction among these elements may range from peaceful humanitarian assistance to high-intensity combat operations. Alliances and coalitions are the expectation in most operations, but U.S. unilateral action is always a consideration. Military operations are considered with other elements of national power such as diplomatic, economic, social-cultural, and information for both the U.S. and an adversary. Advanced technologies are available to almost anyone, yet sophistication of weapon systems may be a liability. Intelligence and operational tools must overlap and integrate complex sensor-surveillance systems and the clarity of human intelligence “eyes on the ground” collection and analysis. Engagement among significant actors in the COE can span formal nation-state representatives to the impact of individual combatants and noncombatants on a farmer’s field or city alleyway.



Red Teaming


What is “Red Teaming?” Red Teaming is a concept to analyze and appreciate adversary and enemy thinking, planning, and action. This methodology complements and informs intelligence collection and analysis of friendly forces, and enhances predictive estimates of adversary intentions and capabilities. Aggressive red teaming challenges emerging operational concepts, evolving contingency plans, and operational orders of friendly forces. The purpose is to discover weaknesses of friendly forces before an adversary or enemy identifies vulnerabilities and takes advantage of them. The perspective of an adversary may be that of a confirmed threat or a contingency that poses scenarios for friendly forces training and readiness.

A U.S. Defense Science Board task force validated two primary reasons for expanding the role of red teaming in the Department of Defense (DOD): (1) To deepen understanding of the adversaries the U.S. now faces in the war on terrorism and in particular their capabilities and potential responses to U.S. initiatives, and (2) To guard against complacency. Red teaming

²³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, J5 War on Terrorism, Strategic Planning Division, Briefing (U) *Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism*, Version 19Jan05, 5 April 2005.

stresses concepts, plans, and systems to identify vulnerabilities and capabilities before direct confrontation with a real world adversary. To best apply red teaming programs, red team members must be able to understand the thinking and motivations of adversaries with different cultural and social backgrounds, assess and analyze acting as independent and adaptive adversaries, and interact and recommend in constructive and creative ways with the supported friendly forces leader and military decisionmaker.²⁴

Understanding the rationale of a terrorist involves detailed study of different cultural decisionmaking, societal norms, or theological conviction. Extremism, as is the case of al-Qaida or associated ideological movements, can be a violent and distorted variant of religion and a desire for secular power. Terrorism may be used by groups with a single issue such as environmental or animal protection. Threats differ depending on conditions, circumstances, and influences in the contemporary operational environment.



Approach to Understanding Terrorism

The 2007 version of *A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* builds on a database of open source information and focus topic updates. The purpose and intended audience, although primarily U.S. military forces, provides a useful awareness to other activities in interagency,

interdepartmental, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, private volunteer, humanitarian relief, and civilian organizations. The chapters of this handbook address the following topics:

Chapter 1: *The Face of Terrorism Today*, defines the concept of terrorism and provides basic terms of reference for a common vocabulary. Attention focuses on contemporary terrorism. Patterns and trends are addressed further in chapter 5.

Chapter 2: *Terrorist Motivations and Behaviors*, presents an overview of terrorist behavior and examines individual or group declared ideology or philosophy. General descriptions highlight the diversity of mindset, lifestyle, and conduct of a terrorist.

Chapter 3: *Terrorist Organizational Models*, provides examples and diagrams of hierarchical and networked terrorist group organizations, as well as address on the increasing number of loosely affiliated or independent terrorist cells with ideological support to international or transnational terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida. Each type of model has its capabilities and limitations for analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

²⁴ Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, *Defense Science Board Task Force on The Role and Status of DoD Red Teaming Activities*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, September 2003), 1, 15, 16, and Appendix 1.

Chapter 4: ***Terrorist Targeting of U.S. Military Forces***, assesses potential or probable targeting of U.S. military forces by terrorist organizations. Three operational environments are a situational framework for protection of the force and risk management: (1) friendly forces that are deployed in operational missions, (2) friendly forces in-transit to or from an operational mission, or (3) friendly forces that are primarily static in location such as an installation or other institutional support location.

Chapter 5: ***Terrorism of the Foreseeable Future***, examines the future of terrorism with an adaptive enemy. Patterns of current operations and emergent actions offer possible and probable trends for the immediate future. These trends include flexible organizational models, enhanced methods of attack, expanded transnational support structures, increased weapon system lethality, exploited media marketing, escalating ideological extremism, and geographic regions of increased terrorist activity.

Appendices to Army TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1 provide additional information to understanding terror and the ways and means of conducting terrorism.

A: ***Terrorist Planning Cycle***. Description of traditional planning and operations sequence provide a baseline for understanding emergent actions by terrorists. An adaptive enemy demonstrates the ability to abbreviate detailed planning and conduct of operations in a much reduced time period.

B: ***Firearms***. Illustrations, photographs, and descriptions present a survey of selected conventional small arms used by terrorists. Open source intelligence summaries and reports provide the basis for this sampling of hand or shoulder fired weapons.

C: ***Conventional Military Munitions***. Illustrations, photographs, and descriptions present a survey of selected conventional military munitions used by terrorists including fragmentation grenades, rocket propelled grenades, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, and artillery munitions.

In 2007, five supplemental handbooks to TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1, *A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, focus topics of terrorism:

- TRADOC G2 Handbook 1.01, ***Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terrorism***. (2007) v 5.0
- DCSINT Handbook 1.02, ***Critical Infrastructure Threats and Terrorism***. (2006)
- DCSINT Handbook 1.03, ***Suicide Bombing in the COE***. (2006)
- TRADOC G2 Handbook 1.04, ***Terrorism and WMD in the Contemporary Operational Environment***. (2007)
- DCSINT Handbook No. 1.05, ***A Military Primer on Terrorism in the Contemporary Operational Environment***. (2006) This handbook is a U.S. Army “For Official Use Only” reference guide on terrorism and is published as a 5 inch by 7 inch, hip-pocket booklet.

Conclusion

This capstone handbook and its supplemental handbooks provide an appreciation of an increasingly common method of conflict – Terrorism. Promoting knowledge and awareness of terrorism enhances the ability of U.S. military forces to assess conditional vulnerabilities, determine enemy threats, dissuade and deter terrorist acts, deny use of particular terrorism means, and defend against terrorist attack.²⁵ These actions are a combination of defensive and offensive measures to combat terrorism. The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* describes campaigning along four simultaneous fronts: (1) defeat terrorist organizations of global reach through relentless action; (2) deny support to terrorism; (3) diminish the conditions that encourage terrorism; and (4) defend the people and interests of the United States of America against terrorism.²⁶

The aim of the terrorist, whether terrorism is viewed as a strategy, a campaign, or a tactic, is an attack on resolve. The world today is complex. A significant difference in the War on Terrorism from previous recent wars is the reality of a protracted conflict of uncertain duration.²⁷ The War will be conducted and assessed in a perspective of decades rather than in weeks, months, or years.

The overarching purpose of this “Threats” handbook is to create situational awareness and understanding of terrorism, and to complement the deliberate processes of military risk management, protection of the force, mission orders conduct, and leader decisionmaking.

²⁵ Moilanen, Jon H. “Engagement and Disarmament: A U.S. National Security Strategy for Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction,” *Essays on Strategy XIII*. Mary A. Sommerville ed., Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1996.

²⁶ The White House, “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” Washington, D.C. (February 2003): 11, 29-30; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2003/17798.htm>; Internet; accessed 8 December 2003.

²⁷ Cofer Black, “The International Terrorism Threat,” Testimony before the House International Relations committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, Washington, D.C., 26 March 2003; 6, available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2003/19136.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 April 2005.