KNOW BEFORE YOU GO:
IMPROVING ARMY OFFICER
SOCIOCULTURAL KNOWLEDGE

BY

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The U.S. entered Afghanistan and Iraq with poor language capabilities and knowledge of both nation’s cultures, and this cultural knowledge and language capability are critical enablers in a counterinsurgency campaign. According to numerous defense experts and senior Defense officials, we are in an age of “persistent conflict” where our most likely wars, like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, will be fought “among the people.” Knowledge of the cultures and language capabilities are critical to success in these operations, where the indigenous population is a center of gravity. This paper illustrates lessons learned from Vietnam War as it examines the state of the Army officer corps in terms of language capabilities and relevant academic backgrounds. It then discusses programs that are underway to improve officer language capacity and cultural knowledge to develop full-spectrum leaders. As this research identified various cultural deficiencies, it offers recommendations to increase language capacity and cultural awareness by utilizing pre-commissioning education opportunities in universities, improve training in TRADOC courses, and offer incentives for officers to seek post-commissioning educational opportunities in these critical areas.
On one hand, you have to shoot and kill somebody; On the other hand, you have to feed somebody. On the other hand, you have to build an economy, restructure the infrastructure, build the political system. And there's some poor Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, Brigadier General down there, stuck in some province with all that saddled onto him, with NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and political wannabes running around, with factions and a culture he doesn't understand. These are now [the] culture wars that we're involved in. We don't understand that culture.

—General (ret) Anthony Zinni
Address to the Marine Corps Association
September 23, 2003

Language capabilities and cultural knowledge have emerged as closely related but separately identified critical capabilities during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. The United States found itself with significant forces deployed to conduct counterinsurgency and stability operations where the support of the indigenous population and daily contact with that same population combined with the support to indigenous government agencies and security forces are critical to success. Unfortunately, the Army has found itself in this situation about forty years ago, as in Vietnam it lacked the language skills and cultural knowledge needed to positively interact with indigenous populations and allied armed forces and addressed the shortfalls with temporary solutions. To address this current culture-related capabilities shortfall, the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, and the Army have belatedly started initiatives to overcome these shortfalls. Some programs are focused on the civil education arena, while others seek to enhance military education and training.
This paper will examine if these Army programs are sufficient to meet current and future challenges associated with developing the sociocultural knowledge needed to effectively operate in another country. For this paper’s purpose, “sociocultural knowledge” includes, but is not limited to society, social structure, culture, language, power and authority structures, and interests.¹ In conducting this examination, this paper will first define the character of war that is expected to challenge the United States in an era of persistent conflict. As war’s character will be more focused on irregular warfare (IW) and stability, support and transition to reconstruction operations (SSTR), essential components of these types of warfare are described.

Since history informs decision makers, lessons learned from our decades long experiences in Vietnam are illustrated. Then our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan operations related to sociocultural skills are examined to frame the subsequent discussion of Defense Department and Army policies, programs and initiatives to provide these needed skills. Since this research identifies deficiencies, it concludes with providing observations and recommendations for pre and post-commissioning education that improves the language proficiency of the officer corps and provides incentives for officers to improve their educational background in the other areas of sociocultural knowledge.

An Era of Constant Conflict

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was unambiguous when he told senior Army leaders and others that “unconventional wars—[are] the ones most likely to be fought in the years ahead” and that these wars are “fundamentally political in nature” and
“success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior – of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.”

General George Casey, the Chief of Staff of the Army, has agreed publicly with the Secretary that we are in “a period of protracted confrontation among state, non-state and individual actors,” and that “we’re seeing the precursors of that now in Iraq and Afghanistan.” A key strategic issue is to understand the nature and character of these wars in order to meet their diverse challenges.

The character of war is what differentiates types of war from one another. For example, conventional conflict, counterinsurgency, and strategic nuclear war are three distinctly different types of war. Furthermore, individual wars within a type can be different from each other as illustrated by the insurgencies in Malaya, Algeria, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Northern Ireland. The character of war informs us as to the specific causes of the conflict, how the war is prosecuted, and the objectives of the belligerents. It is the character of war where that determines the requirement for sociocultural knowledge.

Multiple guest speakers at the Army War College during the 2007-2008 academic year have commented that “the nature of war has changed” or “the nature of war changed on 9/11.” However, noted strategic thinker Colin S. Grey is correct when he cites and interprets recognized theorist Clausewitz, noting that “the use of warfare to pursue political goals…is eternal in nature yet everchanging in character…war is violence threatened or waged for political purpose.” This distinction is more than academic. It provides the general objective and raison d’etre, if not the precise casus
belligerent of a war. Characterizing the types of conflicts we are likely to face helps us to develop capabilities and concepts to achieve our strategic and operational objectives.

Secretary Gates and General Casey, as cited above, have spoken of unconventional war with Iraq and Afghanistan as the precursors of the type of conflicts that we are likely to find ourselves facing. Academics, former senior military officers from other countries, and civilian defense analysts agree and have provided additional detail and analysis. Rupert Smith, a retired British General that commanded forces in Ireland, UN forces in Bosnia, and was the Deputy Commander of NATO during Operation Allied Force believes that the “new…paradigm of war [is] war amongst the people…in which the people…all the people…are the targets, objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force.” Civilian analyst Colin Grey noted that “irregular warfare may be the dominant form of belligerency for some years to come,” while Ralph Peters agrees that we will fight unconventional opponents in failed or failing states.

The message is clear as senior Defense officials, senior Army leaders, and leading defense analysts all believe that counterinsurgency and stability operations like those in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo are not atypical conflicts that the Army or the nation can turn their backs on once they are over, and as they did following Vietnam. We find ourselves most likely to engage in conflicts that demand irregular warfare (IW), major combat operation (MCO), and stability, support, and transition to reconstruction (SSTR) operations illustrated in figure 1 below, with SSTR operations and counterinsurgency (COIN), a main subset of irregular warfare, the most commonly encountered mission sets.
Figure 1. Irregular Warfare (IW), Major Combat Operations, and Stability, Support, and Transition to Reconstruction Operations (SSTR) Interrelationship

The Character of Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations

The character of irregular warfare, particularly the counterinsurgency subset, and stability operations is different than the character of conventional conflict associated with major combat operations. Conventional conflicts associated with major combat operations typically involve two warring nation states and combat is characterized by kinetic force-on-force operations until one side surrenders or can no longer continue to fight. The focus of our operations is on the opposing government and the opposing military. The objective of these conventional operations and conflicts can range from limited tactical operations to change the conduct of the enemy to regime change.

Insurgencies are civil wars, and they occur because a government has sufficiently alienated a portion of the populace that they have taken up arms against it. SSTROs occur because an event that caused the collapse of legitimate governance
and essential services. The focus of COIN and stability operations shifts from the opposing government and military forces to the population and the government, as illustrated in figure 2 below, and typically we are working with a host-nation government.

Figure 2. Focus of Operations: Conventional versus Irregular

Our strategic objective in COIN and SSTRO is to create or strengthen legitimate government institutions that provide meets the economic and social needs of the populace. Our intermediate objective, as retired General Rupert Smith observes, is to:

… establish a condition in which the political objective can be achieved by other [non-military] means and in other [non-kinetic] ways. We seek to create a conceptual space for diplomacy, economic incentives, political pressure and other measures to create a desired political outcome of stability, and if possible democracy.

Achieving these conditions and objectives means that the majority of the populace must consent to be governed, and that armed insurrection becomes socially unacceptable.
The population in a nation beset by insurgency generally falls into three categories. There is a portion of the population that supports the government, a portion that supports the insurgency, and a portion that is unallied. The population generally, is the center of gravity for both the insurgents and the COIN force, with the unallied portion of the populace a critical vulnerability and capability for both sides. In order for the COIN or SSTRO force to win over the populace, it must “be able to offer the populations of countries effected by war the hope that life will be better for them and their children because of our presence, not in spite of it.”

Figure three shows lines of operation and strategic objectives for COIN and SSTRO that are designed to win over the populace and establish a legitimate government able to provide for the population’s social and economic needs. Security and civil-military operations that place our troops in a close and regular relationship, if not a partnership, with the populace are required to support each line of operation. Obviously, the institutions and services provided must achieve political “buy-in” and acceptance from the population or they will not receive the required popular support. This means that junior leaders must have socio-cultural knowledge, not just awareness. Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen was blunt when he wrote, “neglect this knowledge and it will kill you” in an article targeting company commanders.
Theory and doctrine tell us that the focus of COIN and SSTRO is on the population and the host-nation government. The campaign in both cases is designed to gain the consent of the population for a capable government and remove their support for the insurgents in the COIN case. To do this, U.S. and allied forces must establish relationships with the population that range from the acquiescence of the populace to the presence of our forces, to outright partnership. Socio-cultural knowledge is critical to establishing those relationships according to accepted theory.

The U.S. has engaged in counterinsurgency operations before and is currently engaged in two major COIN operations. Two key questions this paper will now answer
are: (1) Has the historical record borne out the necessity for sociocultural skills? (2) How has the Army fared in ensuring that deploying soldiers had the sociocultural knowledge to effectively operate? One historical case study of Vietnam and two modern ongoing case studies of Iraq, and Afghanistan; provide insights to answer these questions. These case studies are used, because they required the large-scale use of U.S. conventional units and personnel as COIN forces, in advisory roles, and in the civil operations and reconstruction role. The scope of missions in these countries exceeded, or exceeds, the capacity of Special Forces units specifically organized and trained for the COIN and SSTRO mission set, and this is not the case in other late 20th century and early 21st century operations.

**The Army and Sociocultural Knowledge in Vietnam**

The U.S. began its active involvement with counterinsurgency operations in the Republic of Vietnam by sending advisors to the country in 1955. The advisory effort peaked in 1970, with 14,332 personnel in the country. Beginning in 1965, U.S. combat units deployed to the country, with troop strength peaking at 550,000 in 1968-69. U.S. soldiers found themselves on a battlefield that placed them among the South Vietnamese people on a daily basis— a culture completely different from their own in terms of religion, social mores, language, and environment. Advisors were faced with the additional task of trying to train and influence Vietnamese counterparts. In order to prepare combat troops and advisors for their mission, the Army developed a variety of training courses during the course of the conflict.14
Officer: Education and Training

From 1962-1965, generic counterinsurgency doctrine, theory, and techniques were taught in classes at West Point and ROTC departments. These classes emphasized counter-guerilla operations, the requirement to win the support of the populace, and the need to improve conditions within the assisted country. Classes continued at the branch level courses, Command and General Staff College, and at the Army War College. Vietnam specific education and training was limited to tactical scenarios in kinetic operations, although a guest lecture component of training courses, utilizing Vietnam veterans, could have included some sociocultural topics.\textsuperscript{15}

In 1966 the psychological operations (PSYOP) was added as a mandatory topic for cadets and within branch schools. The objective of the courses was to educate officers to evaluate all of their actions in a counterinsurgency campaign “with an eye toward its possible psychological and political effects,” and then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Harold K. Johnson, provided additional guidance in 1967 with the intent that “all military personnel” would have a greater understanding of the elements of the sociocultural aspects of counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{16} The overall impact was that counterinsurgency topics received an even greater emphasis, and increased course time devoted to, generic sociocultural topics, in the officer education system from 1966-1972. After 1972, the “no more Vietnams” mindset combined with the focus on conventional operations in Europe, resulted in a steady reduction of counterinsurgency and SSTRO topics in the Officer Education System.\textsuperscript{17}

Conventional troops, to include officers, received training on the general principles of counterinsurgency operations such as patrolling and ambushes, and troops arriving in Vietnam received a lecture emphasizing humane and legal conduct.
towards the populace. Vietnam-bound infantrymen received 16-hour orientation before leaving the United States. In spite of this training, “racism, ethnocentrism, haughtiness, and callousness” were exhibited by U.S. soldiers who “had difficulty relating to the Vietnamese, whose non-western culture, alien language, and comparatively primitive standard of living made them appear inferior in the minds of some soldiers.” This type of conduct by even a relatively limited number of soldiers, with the My Lai Massacre the most extreme expression example, can easily have a strategic impact on a counterinsurgency campaign in terms of domestic and international opinion, as well as sowing mistrust among the populace in the area of operations.

Advisor Roles: Education, and Training

Personnel assigned to advisory duty in Vietnam received additional, specialized training beyond that given to officers and enlisted men in U.S. combat units. The U.S. advisory effort in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) started in 1955 with just 342 personnel and culminated with over 14,000 advisors deployed in 1970. The U.S. advisor role was originally limited to support for Army of RVN (ARVN) units as they trained and conducted operations. These advisors found themselves with “three roles: a US Army officer following orders and supervising US subordinates, a member of an [ARVN] unit sharing its experiences and bonding with his counterpart, and a mediator interpreting and communicating between his counterpart and US superiors.” Thousands of officers found themselves fulfilling these three functions. Sociocultural knowledge would have assisted in the bonding process and in “translating” perspectives and
actions between US and ARVN units and personnel. As we shall see later, the Army was not particularly successful in equipping advisors to meet these challenges.

As the conflict and U.S involvement evolved, advisory teams were added at the Province and District level, which involved about 88 locations, and the number of personnel assigned to these teams expanded with the creation of the Civil-Operations and Revolutionary Development System (CORDS) system and the mission of providing economic, governance, and security assistance at the local level.21 The CORDS program was charged with the “pacification” of the populace by improving governance, security, and the economy at the local level. This meant that officers assigned to CORDS advisory positions found themselves involved with social, political, and economic issues at the lowest levels of Vietnamese society, which required an even greater degree of sociocultural knowledge than needed by the advisors in ARVN units. Training and education underwent substantial changes in order prepare advisors to meet these increased requirements.

The initial advisor course, attended by officers destined for assignment with ARVN units, was four weeks long. After a small number of iterations, the course was expanded to six weeks, which included just 46 hours of Vietnamese language training and 25 hours of “area studies.”22 Language training eventually constituted 50% of the course content and included native speakers as the instructors. A 1970 USMC advisor course included six weeks of immersion language training. Personnel designated for advisory assignments at the battalion, province, and district level eventually received 8-12 weeks of language training at the Defense Language Institute.23
In the later stages of the war the senior advisers assigned to the province and district levels as part of CORDS attended a total of 48 weeks of training prior to deployment. These advisors received over 195 hours of areas studies and country orientations/updates, roughly equivalent to four or five three-credit courses at a university; and 1,139 hours of language training, roughly equivalent to 16 five-credit language courses. The heavy investment made in language training and the most extensive area studies training offered to U.S. personnel belies the complexity and challenge of meaningful sociocultural education. The Army found, despite early attempts to provide sociocultural education on the cheap in terms of time, that there was no quick fix for providing advisors with the required education that would allow them to accomplish their missions. The expanded advisor education was, unfortunately, inadequate.

Despite the increases in educational content, the advisors and their Vietnamese counterparts provided feedback that indicated the advisors still lacked the necessary sociocultural knowledge. Advisors noted that language was the most important capability that they lacked since “Interpreters, although useful, have many drawbacks…they introduce inevitable inaccuracies into conversations [and] discourage frank exchange of views…permitted by private talk between a counterpart and his advisor.” One immediate effect described by an advisor was that was that the advisors became “victims of the language barrier…not fully aware of what was going on around them…This…was a crippling weakness, since few interpreters could or would render faithfully what they heard.” Another advisor summarized the impact of the lack of sociocultural knowledge, thus:
We did not understand what was going on in Vietnam. We were in a foreign land among people of a different culture and mindset...The information sent across the cultural divide was not the information received. There was a disconnect. One thing was said and another thing was heard. One thing was meant and another thing was understood...Meaning, intent, and truth were lost in translation.\textsuperscript{27}

We can conclude that the Army tried to conduct the advisory mission in Vietnam on the cheap in terms of the time devoted to educating the advisors. When the short training courses were identified as inadequate, the Army did adapt and provide increased time for educating advisors, focusing on the key area of language and other sociocultural knowledge topics. What the Army determined, though, was that a dedicated corps of officers devoted to the nation building skill set was needed.

Textbox: Vietnam: Genesis of the Foreign Area Officer Program

In 1966 the Army created a board tasked with evaluating officer education. It was led by Lieutenant General Ralph E. Haines, Jr. The board recommended the expansion of the Foreign Area Specialist Program, an intelligence focused specialty, and the merger of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations into a specialty designated the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP). The vision for the MAOP program was to create a cadre of 6,000 officers to fill G-5, S-5, advisor, and other positions requiring nation-building and politico-military expertise.\textsuperscript{28}

The MAOP officers were to receive “language training and civilian graduate schooling in anthropology, economics, foreign affairs, government, international relations, political science, psychology, public administration, or sociology.”\textsuperscript{29} However, the program was cut in the post-war period, when the Army refocused itself on conventional operations. The MAOP program and the Foreign Area Specialist Program were merged to form the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program, which is still with us.
today. In contrast to the 6,000 MAOP officers envisioned by the Haines Board, there are only 1,083 FAOs in the Army in 2006 and 1,414 FAOs in all of the services.  

Final Thoughts on Vietnam and Sociocultural Awareness

The Army devoted significant resources and time to education and training on the broad principles of counterinsurgency. It was clearly aware of the importance of the criticality of the non-military lines of operations required for victory in a counterinsurgency and, in the case of the officer corps, implemented pre and post-commissioning education and training programs. Despite this effort the U.S. generally, and the Army specifically, had a difficult time winning over the Vietnamese populace. There are numerous reasons for this failure that go well beyond the scope of this study—tour lengths, the quality of the draftee Army, and the constant movement of units to different areas are just three factors that arguably contributed to U.S. failure.

In the area of sociocultural education and training, the Army’s efforts were largely unsuccessful. Conventional units received minimal training and the troops were unable to bridge the sociocultural divide to win over the Vietnamese people. Advisors to ARVN units fared somewhat better since they received increased levels of language and cultural education, and were given the opportunity to establish a rapport with a limited group of South Vietnamese. The CORDS Program had the greatest success. It’s personnel, particularly the senior advisors, received up to a year of education in sociocultural knowledge areas, worked in one area of the country, and were in a position to establish a rapport with Vietnamese counterparts.

There are five broad conclusions that emerge from the Vietnam sociocultural training and education effort. First, counterinsurgency education and training needs to
include COIN theory, sociocultural education and training specific to the area of operations, and training in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Second, language training is the most important knowledge area since fluency is key to situational awareness and, in the case of advisors, allows for accurate private conversations with counterparts. Third, sociocultural knowledge areas are only slightly less important than language as societal thought processes, norms, and historical factors shape the worldview of allies and the target population provides the background required for mutual understanding and for developing and programs that do not alienate the indigenous population. Fourth, effective sociocultural education requires a significant investment in resources and there is no “quick fix” or “shake and bake” solution. Finally, finding the time and resources to provide comprehensive sociocultural education and education regarding the non-military components of a COIN campaign was virtually impossible outside the most extensive advisor courses.

When the Army finished its involvement in Vietnam, it turned to conventional operations, focusing in particular on the mission to defend NATO against the threat from the Warsaw Pact. The counterinsurgency and nation-building emphasis of the 1960s fell largely by the wayside and became the domain of the Special Operations Forces (including Civil Affairs and PYSOP). By the time U.S. forces entered Afghanistan and Iraq the Army did not “have any doctrine, nor was it educated and trained, to deal with an insurgency…After the Vietnam War, we purged ourselves of everything to do with irregular warfare or insurgency because it had to do with how we lost that war.”
Iraq and Afghanistan

How the U.S., and the Army in particular, entered Afghanistan in October, 2001 and Iraq in March of 2003 is well documented. In both countries the Army found itself engaged in long-term counterinsurgency and nation-building operations on a scale not seen since Vietnam for which it was unprepared, as noted above. There’s no metric that this author has found that measures the level of cultural awareness. There are several indicators that, with caution, are usable. These indicators, which are based on vignettes from both countries, as well as comments of Iraqis and American soldiers, point to a shortfall in sociocultural skills.

Indicators

The anecdotal evidence from Afghanistan and Iraq provide compelling testimony to the Army’s lack of sociocultural preparedness. In Afghanistan, the Special Forces units, which belonged to the Special Forces Group tasked with linguistic and cultural specialization in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), was reduced to showing tribal and village elders a narrated DVD on a laptop computer due to a lack of language capacity. The DVD explained why the U.S. units were in Afghanistan. All fine and well, but how were the soldiers supposed to follow-up the DVD in order to establish a rapport and gain the support of the local Afghan leaders? The situation did not improve by 2006, when only six of the more than 55,000 officers in the United States Army had a documented ability to speak Pashto, the dominate language of the area along the Pakistani border and southern Afghanistan, where the security situation is the least stable.32
Our strategic assessment of Iraqi culture was flawed on two counts. First, we interpreted membership in the Ba'ath Party as being “pro-Saddam” instead of realizing that some individuals were party members for employment purposes. We also interpreted anti-Saddam attitudes with pro-American, and we misjudged the resentment that the long-term presence of foreign forces in the country would create. At the operational level, U.S. Commanders engaged local Tribal Sheikhs in the aftermath of the fall of Baghdad in the belief that they could control the insurgency and other types of violence without understanding tribal structures or the credibility of the Sheikhs. These missteps clearly indicate a lack of knowledge in several of the areas that constitute sociocultural knowledge.

Ample anecdotal evidence is available regarding a lack of sociocultural knowledge at the tactical level in Iraq. A lack of language capability, independent of any other sociocultural knowledge, negatively impacted the ability of U.S. forces to recognize individuals wanted for detention. Immediately after the fall of Baghdad, U.S. units received lists of license plate numbers for key leaders of the Saddam Regime that were still at large. The concept was for U.S. vehicle checkpoints to compare license plates with the list. Unfortunately the list was printed using English letters and Arabic numbers while Iraqi license plates use Arabic letters and numbers.

Two National Public Radio reports the author heard, one in the 2007 and the other in February of this year highlight continuing language issues. A lack of language capability among U.S. units results in dependence on indigenous translators and has impacted the ability of our troops to determine the reliability of Iraqi security forces, identify problems impacting the local population, or win the trust of the populace. In the
2007 report, U.S. troops operating with Iraqi forces in Baghdad conducted a raid on a suspected Shia’ militia weapons cache site. Nothing was found. The Iraqi translator later translated what one Iraqi soldier said to his comrades in the presence of the U.S. soldiers, none of whom spoke Arabic. The Iraqi soldier told his comrades that the weapons the search was intended to find were, in fact, at the house of his mullah a short distance away.

In the 2008 story, U.S. forces were conducting a patrol in a Sunni Arab neighborhood of Mosul, a city where the Sunni Arab and Kurdish tensions are high, with the Arabs viewed as outsiders that the Kurds wish to push out of the city. The U.S. platoon leader asked a resident, through his Iraqi Army interpreter (a Kurd), what problems, if any, the resident was having. The translated response was that there was trouble with insurgents in the area. The translator with the NPR team later told the U.S. news personnel that the resident had actually complained about searches, theft, and harassment by Iraqi Army units composed of Kurdish personnel. The U.S. Army unit left ignorant of the real complaint and, in fact, allied with the unit that the residents view as oppressors and thieves.

Statements by both American and Iraqi personnel also point deficiencies in the other areas of sociocultural knowledge and their negative impacted on operations. Multiple junior officers indicated that they were not prepared to overcome the cultural issues, which were described by one officer as “overwhelming.” Iraqi officers agree with the assessment of the junior officers.

This author met with Iraqi officers on multiple occasions from 2003-2006 to include a meeting in 2006 was with Iraqi officers ranging in rank from Major to Colonel
who came from all of the major ethnic and sectarian groups in the country. When asked if U.S. troops were any better at relating to the American populace in 2006 versus 2003, the answer was a resounding “no” from all Iraqis. As the discussion went on, they acknowledged that there were incremental improvements, but cited racial epithets, that the Iraqi populace now understands, a lack of language capability, and multiple examples of Arab and Islamic custom that still caused problems with the populace. The Iraqi officers also pointed out that the assignment of advisors junior in rank created real discipline issues within Iraqi units. Additionally, a lack of sociocultural skills and linguist support crippled the initial advisor effort.

The initial U.S. advisor teams fielded in 2003-2004, were largely pulled from units already deployed in Iraq. A Center for Army Lessons Learned report found that there was no standardized training for advisors. These advisors had no language capability and no specialized sociocultural education to prepare them to work with Iraqi units. Advisors complained of support from native linguists who were not conversant in English or a lack of any interpreter support at all.36 The Army also established a training base for advisors at Fort Riley, KS in mid-2006 with a program of instruction that is reminiscent of its Vietnam predecessors. The eight week long course consists of 24 hours of “culture immersion training,” 10 hours of simulated meetings with indigenous officials, and 42 hours of language training (30 hours of classroom instruction and 12 hours of language lab). Note that these class hours almost exactly mirror the 25 cultural and 46 language training hours given in the six-week long Vietnam Advisors Course, which provided inadequate sociocultural knowledge and skills for bridging the sociocultural gap.37
Successes

This is not to say that the entire picture is bleak, and that there are not significant examples of sociocultural knowledge among leaders and soldiers. General David Petraeus during each of his three tours in Iraq, Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, and Colonel H.R. McMaster all conducted operations based on sociocultural knowledge and their units enjoyed significantly greater success than those units that did not bridge the cultural gap. 38

In Tal Afar, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, under the command of Colonel McMaster, underwent a relatively thorough sociocultural awareness training and education program prior to deployment. Colonel McMaster produced a seven page reading list on counterinsurgency, Islam, Arab customs, and Iraqi history and politics. The officers of the Regiment held discussion groups on the readings and any trooper could expect Colonel McMaster to ask pointed questions. The regiment also sent two troopers per platoon to basic Arabic language courses at a local college for five weeks prior to deployment. This gave some platoons one soldier out of every eight that possessed a basic knowledge of Arabic, which Middle East Foreign Area Officer Mike Eisenstadt noted “pays huge dividends, for it demonstrates the kind of respect for the local population and their traditions that helps establish rapport and build relationships.” 39

This training and education enabled the regiment to establish a rapport with the local populace, who in turn provided intelligence. One cavalryman related the story of how residents in one neighborhood insisted on fixing a Bradley Fighting Vehicle that had thrown a track, providing chai (tea) for the soldiers while the residents did all of the work. 40 Such was the rapport with the local Iraqis that the Mayor of the city appealed
directly to General Casey (the MNF-I commander at the time), Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and President Bush to have the unit remain beyond its scheduled return to the United States. McMaster’s local training and education effort had produced a unit that could successfully wage a counterinsurgency campaign in a very alien cultural environment. His was not the only success, but it stands out as one of the best publicized.

It is apparent that U.S. forces have enjoyed local successes, failures, and many challenges in the sociocultural arena. Success in the early years of both conflicts appears to have depended heavily on unit leaders and less on the training and education provided by the institutional Army. The next key issue that deserves examination is to determine what the Army and the Defense Department have done to educate and train forces for the current and future operating environment, and what impact it had.

Current Policies, Programs, and Capabilities

Awareness of our shortfall in sociocultural knowledge started soon after the 9/11 attacks. The rediscovery of counterinsurgency theory and doctrine as the long-term nature of the U.S. commitments in both Iraq and Afghanistan became apparent, which brought the sociocultural knowledge topic to the forefront of capabilities discussions in concert with other topics. Between 2004 and the end of 2006, Military Review published 19 articles on counterinsurgency and SSTRO related topics, a trend that was matched in Parameters. Sociocultural knowledge, referred to by some authors as “cultural awareness,” “cultural savvy,” and “cultural understanding,” along with language
skills, were commonly mentioned as required knowledge areas in these professional journal articles.

More official studies echoed the opinions presented in the professional journals. The Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition To and From Hostilities found that the DoD lacked adequate capacity for language and knowledge of other cultures. The Defense Language Transformation Roadmap notes that, “Post 9/11 military operations reinforce the reality that the Department of Defense needs a significantly improved organic capability in languages…and regional area skills.” Army officer language qualifications and degree backgrounds supported this assessment.

As of October, 2006, five years after the invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. Army had just six officers, four in Special Forces, with an official Pashto language rating. Table 1 displays the number of officers that had ratings in a selection of languages that might serve well in the crisis spots of the post-Cold War and post-Colonial world. Language capacity for the Arab world is particularly limited to just 910, or just 1.6% of the Army officer corps at the time the data was compiled.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Arabic</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Arabic</td>
<td>693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandarin Chinese</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>1358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashtu</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farsi</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>3370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6765.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Army Officer Selected Language Capacity
As Table 2 shows, officers with degrees directly relevant to sociocultural knowledge, or that might have a sociocultural knowledge application (e.g., general history, political science, public policy and administration) were held by 16.5% of the officer corps. Eliminating degrees in economics, history, political science, and public policy and administration reduces the number of relevant degree holders to just 2.6% of the officer population. Area or regional studies degree holders comprise just 1.28% of Army officers. These numbers are almost certain to climb in the coming years as the DoD and Army respond to the recognized shortfall in sociocultural knowledge as major DoD policies, and the supporting service programs, take effect.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree Category</th>
<th>BA</th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>PhD</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Studies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthropology</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic and Arab Studies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Studies</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Studies</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>560+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>3438</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Studies</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Relations</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American Studies</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Studies</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>3103</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Policy and Public Admin</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian and Soviet Area Studies</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Intelligence</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area or regional studies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Army Officer Degrees Relevant to Sociocultural Knowledge
National and DoD Sociocultural Policy Initiatives

Two federal programs open to the civil populace are designed to increase the number of citizens with sociocultural knowledge. The National Security Education Program provides opportunities for undergraduate students to study abroad in countries other than those in Western Europe. Students that accept the grants or fellowships must then serve in the federal government, preferably in a national security position. Another component of this program provides assistance to citizens with fluency in a foreign language to learn English. A third component seeks to create a civilian reserve language corps by funding college education and volunteers who will serve the nation in times of crisis and their special language abilities are relevant.44

The purpose of the National Security Language Initiative is to increase K-16 language education in “strategic” languages such as Mandarin Chinese and Standard Arabic. Funds are provided to public school systems and universities to increase and improve their language education capacity. The stated goal of the program is to educate “2,000 advanced speakers of Arabic, Chinese, Russian, Persian, Hindi, and Central Asian languages by 2009.”45

The Defense Department has produced separate instructions for the management of Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) and the management of DoD language and regional proficiency capabilities. An annual FAO program assessment and a Defense Language Roadmap are supporting documents. The FAO policy directed the agencies, services, and combatant commands to identify their FAO requirements in a relatively unconstrained manner. The instruction also directed the services to ensure that FAOs have a career path that includes general officer or flag rank opportunities.46 In response to this instruction, the Services will increase the number of FAOs from
1,164 in 2005 to 2,159 by 2012 with the Army having the greatest increase from 739 in 2005 to 1,021 by 2012.\textsuperscript{47}

The DoD language management instruction and its “roadmap” details the departmental oversight of language and regional proficiencies, establishes goals for improving the number of active, reserve, and civilian personnel that can speak a foreign language, and tracks the careers of language specialists and FAOs. Some of the tasks detailed include the requirement for junior officers to have language training, improve study abroad opportunities, and incorporate regional studies topics into “professional military education and predeployment training.”\textsuperscript{48} The instruction also details “regional proficiency levels” in order to standardize the assessment of an “individuals awareness and understanding of the historical, political, cultural (including linguistic and religious), sociological (including demographic), economic, and geographic factors of a foreign country.”\textsuperscript{49}

Sociocultural Education and Training for Army Officers

In response to the demands of the current and future operating environment, the requirements of the DoD instructions regarding language, regional proficiency, and FAO management; the Army instituted changes in education at West Point and in ROTC programs. West Point Cadets are required to take two semesters of a foreign language and, starting with the class of 2009, the non-technical majors must take four semesters of a foreign language. The Academy also increased the number of Cadets that are participating in “semester abroad” programs and shorter 7-10 programs. In academic year 2007-2008 approximately 140 cadets would participate in semester abroad programs while a further 390 would attend the shorter overseas programs.\textsuperscript{50}
ROTC cadets are “encouraged” to take language courses when it is “feasible” in the words of one defense official speaking on a non-attribution basis. Additionally, cadets in their senior year receive instruction on “cultural awareness” from their ROTC instructors and, as part of the National Security Education Program, the Department of Defense provided $24 million to four universities to provide enhanced language education and overseas studies opportunities.⁵¹ Finally, ROTC cadets can compete for Olmstead Scholarships, which fund studies opportunities, or overseas opportunities offered through their universities.

Sociocultural education for commissioned officers has changed little. The sociocultural education requirements of the Infantry Officer Basic Course are an excellent example. Sociocultural knowledge training consists of self-taught modules on country specific culture for either Iraq or Afghanistan. The Iraq requirement consists of just 89 pages of material on Iraqi culture, history, customs, and geography. A foreign language requirement utilizing the self-paced Rosetta Stone software takes approximately 12 hours to complete. Online testing is the method for tracking student completion of these course requirements. Classroom time with a live instructor consists of just one-hour on cultural awareness, although more than an additional 39 hours are dedicated to “Stability Operations” and course field training is COIN focused.⁵² While the author was unable to find any sociocultural training requirements for the Captain’s Career Course, the TRADOC Cultural Center at Fort Huachuca has prepared training support packages for these courses.

Officers attending Intermediate Level Education receive 201 hours of COIN related education, of which just six hours are on general sociocultural topics. Students
are also required to take a regional studies course and can pick from four electives that are focused on the Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan, China, or Korea. Students with orders sending them to Iraq or Afghanistan receive 24 hours of classroom language instruction and are required to complete an additional 32 hours of computer based education using the Rosetta Stone software. As figure 3 shows, the Rosetta Stone Software does not bring the student anywhere near achieving a minimal official language rating. 

![Figure 3, Language Proficiency Upon Completion of Rosetta Stone Training (Source: USACGSC)](image)

Senior Service College (SSC) students are required to take a regional studies elective course that consists of 30 hours of class time in the case of the Army War College. Other blocks of instruction in the curriculum provide single class periods covering counterinsurgency and stability operations theory, and some practical discussion of the strategic and operational level factors for COIN and SSTRO. Guest speakers, depending on the topic contribute to the sociocultural portion of SSC education. There is no language education requirement but language classes, and the Rosetta Stone software are available.
The Army has clearly tried to adapt pre-commissioning education and professional military education to provide officers with some sociocultural knowledge, with the focus obviously upon operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While some knowledge is better than no knowledge, the Army should be realistic about the level of regional expertise or language fluency that officers will achieve. The regional studies hours are, at best, comparable with the regional studies education provided in the six-week Vietnam advisors course, and officers today receive fewer hours of language training than the Vietnam advisors, and a large percentage of today’s training is not with an interactive human instructor.

Just as the Vietnam advisors found themselves inadequately trained to bridge the language and cultural barriers, our officers today are almost certain to find themselves in the same situation. Our training and education system finds itself in the same situation that instructors noted in the early stages of the Vietnam War as they lamented the lack of time and other resources needed to properly train their students as illustrated by the following comment:

We cannot give a complete course in geography, political science, applied psychology, comparative religions, ethnology, aesthetics, economics, and the tactics and techniques of counter guerrilla operations—it just cannot be done. Yet knowledge in all of these areas is vital to success in counterinsurgency operations…”

At best, today’s sociocultural knowledge education for officers can provide them with survival level capabilities that will prevent them from making egregious errors and demonstrate an effort to learn on the part of U.S. military personnel. With this examination completed, five observations that identify shortcomings in the DoD and Army programs are now identified.
Observations on Policies, Programs and Foreign Area Officers

This paper’s first observation is that the National Security Education Program National, National Security Language Initiative, and the DoD instruction for language and regional proficiency management are too language-centric. The clear emphasis of these programs is on increasing language capacity, a critical operational capability. Brigadier General Michael Vane and Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Fagundes observed that “a soldier might speak a language, but unless he has solid political, military, and strategic knowledge, he is useless as an adviser…the reverse is not necessarily true, however." Non-language education in sociocultural topics can produce officers that can plan and lead effective operations in a foreign culture.

Second, the goal of creating a language corps of 2,000 civilian linguists by 2009, particularly linguists that will deploy when and where needed seems optimistic. Compare this goal to the fact that, as noted earlier, the Army officer corps had just six Pashto speakers by 2006, five years after invading Afghanistan. Language courses are typically long, often taking a year or more to achieve minimal fluency. Effective courses also require a low instructor to student ratio, making student throughput a real constraint on producing trained personnel. We should also remain aware that many foreign officers are extremely rank conscious when dealing with advisors, which means that we should provide officers with the requisite language ability in order to fill these assignments.

Third, while the increase in the number of FAOs is a good personnel decision since they provide the best combination of service experience, language capability, and regional expertise, they are not a panacea for the current shortfall in language or regional expertise among the officer corps. It seems unlikely that the Army will
substantially increase the number of FAOs in the force beyond what is currently
planned, although this would make an excellent use of some of the authorized increase
in total Army end strength. FAOs are expensive to produce, costing the Army an
average of $143k, and it takes four to five years to produce a qualified FAO.\textsuperscript{56}

Furthermore, increasing the number of FAOs to match the force of 5,000-6,000
Military Assistance Officer recommended during the Vietnam conflict would cost at least
$570m and would take an unknown number of years given the limited capacity of our
graduate area studies and language programs. Finally, there are nine regional FAO
specialties.\textsuperscript{57} This means that the anticipated force of 1,021 Army FAOs will provide an
average of 113 of these sociocultural experts per region—a number that is clearly
insufficient to meet the requirements of the tactical force in operations of the same
scope as Iraq or Afghanistan and also fill the higher level (and often JDAL) assignments
the FAO corps is intended to fill. Additionally, FAOs are not suited to fill some tactical
level assignments, since their tactical skills will have certainly eroded during the years
spent in the educational pipeline.

Fourth, the current effort to provide some sociocultural knowledge in the officer
basic, Captain’s Career Courses, and Intermediate Level Education (ILE) appears boiler
plated. Sheila Miyoshi Jager, in a recent Strategic Studies Institute monograph
differentiated between “the kinds of cultural knowledge that are required at the tactical
level…is quite separate from the cultural knowledge that are required to formulate grand
strategy and policy.”\textsuperscript{58} This implies that the sociocultural portion of the ILE curriculum,
already noted as too short, does not provide the sociocultural knowledge needed for
Majors that will go to joint duty assignments in the J-2, J-3, and J-5 directorates at the
Combatant Commands, or joint and Department of the Army assignments in Washington, where they are involved in with the operational and strategic levels of war.

Finally, not all senior Army leaders appear to agree with the need for U.S. soldiers to bridge the language and culture gap. BG Daniel Bolger, in a *Military Review* article on how to be an advisor in Iraq writes of enabling the Iraqis to reach across the culture and language barriers.\(^5^9\) This appears to miss the point that attempts by U.S. personnel to reach across the language and culture divides makes a favorable impression on the Iraqis, and the ability to do so allows the U.S. advisors to have situational awareness, as opposed to their predecessors in Vietnam.

In summary, current programs and policies appear to either focus too heavily on language skills as a panacea, vice an enabler, for sociocultural awareness. Current education programs are focused on tactical level skills, and the task of providing sociocultural education that provides real language and regional expertise, like the 48 week training program for senior CORDS advisors in Vietnam, exceeds time and other resource requirements the Army can, or will, provide. With these observations, this paper identifies options that could increase the sociocultural education level of the officer corps.

**The Way Ahead**

Improving the sociocultural knowledge of our officer corps would improve the Army’s strategic, operational, and tactical capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. Colin S. Gray noted in a monograph for the Army’s Strategic Studies Institute that while cultural expertise is not a panacea for the difficulties we’ve encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq, “there is no mode of warfare, conducted in any environment, wherein the
enemy’s strategic culture is of no importance.” Gray adds that this is particularly true in irregular wars which “are won or lost in the minds of the local people…If we do not understand what is in those minds, what they value and how much they value it, success secured…will most likely only be temporary.”

The FAOs are our sociocultural experts. Their training program includes two years at a university studying the history, sociology, economics, geography, and politics of their target region or country. This is followed by attendance at language school and then a year of in-country training. The key point is that the FAOs are educated at universities and not at military schools for the non-language portion of their education. The Army needs to leverage the universities in the pre-commissioning phase of an officer’s career beyond the current level of effort.

Precommissioning Initiatives

First, the United States Military Academy (USMA) is overdue for a comprehensive reassessment of its curriculum, particularly for cadets majoring in the humanities or social sciences. The academy, in keeping with its roots as the nation’s first engineering school, has a curriculum that requires cadets majoring in these subject areas to devote four semesters of advanced mathematics, four semesters of science, and three semesters of engineering. Math majors are also required to take the three semester engineering sequence. As former Army officer Andrew Exum observes, this is unmatched in any similar curriculum at a civilian university and is questionable as to whether it truly prepares officers to meet the needs of the nation in the contemporary operating environment.
Simply cutting the math and science requirements in half and dropping the superfluous engineering courses would allow the addition of seven more semesters relevant to sociocultural knowledge or the relevant major for the individual. This would allow an addition of two more semesters of language education, which brings the total semesters of language to six for humanities and social science majors and four for math majors. Language training for the humanities and social sciences majors would continue through the senior year instead of terminating at the end of the junior year, which currently gives the cadet one year for the language skills to perish. Additionally, there would still be room after the addition of more language courses to add courses that contribute to sociocultural knowledge. The result would come closer to producing the “Pentathlete” officer the Army seeks for its ranks upon commissioning, and this adjustment appears, on the surface, to be a no-cost or low-cost initiative.

The second main precommissioning initiative involves the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC). ROTC is the true center of gravity for the Army officer corps because 55.2% of Army officers were commissioned out of the ROTC programs in 2000, and ROTC accounted for 2/3 of new Army officers in 2006. ROTC cadets should also face more stringent language requirements, and the Army should create programs that encourage cadets to major in fields that are more directly related to sociocultural expertise. ROTC currently lacks even the minimal two semester requirement of West Point, and ROTC cadets are simply “encouraged” to take foreign language courses. Nearly 100% of ROTC cadets have French or Spanish language classes available to them, 60% have access to Russian classes, and over 30% have standard Arabic and Mandarin Chinese instruction available. Non-Scholarship ROTC
cadets should have a two-semester language requirement while cadets on scholarship should have a four-semester requirement, similar to cadets at USMA. This is a no-cost initiative. A low-cost initiative might provide an additional stipend for successful completion of coursework in the more difficult languages or pay for the language courses of the non-scholarship cadets if they take the more difficult languages.

The Army should also consider prioritizing scholarship awards to applicants or currently enrolled cadets that choose to major in a field directly relevant to sociocultural knowledge such as area studies, regional or country history, politics, and anthropology. Again, this is a no-cost initiative. Additional initiatives could provide additional stipend funds or scholarships for majoring in these relevant fields. Finally, the Army should reopen or expand ROTC programs in the large cities, particularly those in the northeast where there are large immigrant populations.65.

Officer Professional Military Education Initiatives

Post-commissioning education initiatives will tend to be more expensive in terms of money and manpower than pre-commissioning initiatives. Military or U.S. government run programs have costs that include training base overhead (personnel and facilities) and a loss of personnel time as officers attend the education or training opportunity. Attendance at civilian institutions or those run by other government agencies still incurs a period where the officer is drawing pay but is not in a normal duty assignment and there are tuition costs.

The Army currently sends approximately 250 officers per year to advanced civil schooling. These officers are given 12-18 months to complete all degree requirements before returning to a regular assignment. For many officers this is perceived as a
relatively poor deal since school usually follows assignments in units that deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, requires the officer to compress two years of course work into a shorter time frame and the officer probably returns to a deploying unit. The Army should study the cost effectiveness of the following three initiatives, which are relatively high-cost compared to other proposals in this paper. First, the Army should grant these officers an additional six months for degree completion if they are working towards a sociocultural knowledge related degree. Second, the Army should create a secondary specialty code that designates officers completing an advanced degree that focuses on a critical region as “provisional FAO,” with eligibility to serve in non-language coded FAO positions on COCOM staffs or in Washington. These officers could serve in language coded positions if they have a documented capability. Third, the Army should guarantee a follow-on assignment of up to 12 months for some form of in-country study or 24 months in an interagency duty position (e.g., USAID or the State Department) following graduate school if the degree is in an SSTRO or sociocultural knowledge related field.

The Army should propose a review of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School curriculum. Currently officers attending the course take one regional elective that meets once per week. If there is “empty space” in the curriculum it might allow more additional time for regional studies courses or other sociocultural knowledge course work. This would allow more time for students to transition from the tactical level sociocultural knowledge they developed as junior officers to operational and strategic level sociocultural knowledge. It would also better prepare them for follow-on assignments at the regional combatant commands.
Two other initiatives, one no cost and the other relatively high conclude this paper's recommendations. The no cost initiative is the implementation of regionally focused management for the 34A Strategic Intelligence career field. All 34A officers attend graduate school at the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC). The majority of their subsequent assignments are at the COCOM level or higher, typically working regional or country-desk intelligence accounts. Currently FA34 officers are assigned world-wide wherever an opening at the right grade is available. For example, this means that an officer who focused his or her graduate studies on the Middle East and then spends three years at U.S. Central Command becoming a regional or sub-regional expert, may never work the region again following that initial assignment. Consequently, Human Resources Command should work to assign FA34 officers in billets that build deep sociocultural expertise in a region, as opposed to moderate or shallow expertise in several regions. A Middle East focused officer might, for example, attend the NDIC and regionally focus on the Middle East, then serve at U.S. CENTCOM, move to the Middle East Division of DIA, and then move to Army-Central Command or it's supporting intelligence brigade. At the end of that last theoretical tour, the officer would have 8-10 years experience working Middle Eastern issues. Our current assignment process almost guarantees that this hypothetical officer would follow the CENTCOM tour with an assignment to USPACOM or Korea, then move to a CONUS assignment that focused on neither the Middle East or the Pacific.

Finally, for long-term advisor commitments like Iraq and Afghanistan that exceed the capacity of Special Forces to carry out the mission, the Army should develop lengthy advisor training courses similar to those for CORDS personnel in Vietnam. In
order to recoup the training time and expense, advisors would need to serve tours of
more than one year in duration or serve repeatedly in advisor duty positions. The Army
developed special incentive programs during Vietnam to attract officers to the CORDS
program and could easily do so again. This is a high-cost option compared to the six-
week advisor training we currently have.

**Conclusion**

Sociocultural knowledge matters at all levels of warfare. Sociocultural expertise
is required for developing national level policy, theater engagement plans, operational
plans at all levels of war, and the conduct of tactical operations. Individuals with
sociocultural expertise, or at least deep sociocultural awareness, matter. Well known
senior leaders like General David Petraeus and Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli in
Iraq, General John Abizaid in Central Command, and Lieutenant General David Barno
in Afghanistan were all recognized as successful commanders. They all possessed
educational backgrounds that provided them with, at the least, an appreciation for the
importance of sociocultural factors in a counterinsurgency environment.

Social cultural awareness also matters at the operational or tactical levels.
Colonel H.R. McMaster, the commander of the effective “clear, hold, and build”
operations in Tal Afar later helped develop the “surge strategy” and continues to advise
General Petraeus, holds a Doctorate in Military History with an emphasis on Vietnam
and counterinsurgency. Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl also has an advanced degree
and was a key member of the team that wrote the new counterinsurgency manual.
Major Greg Ryckman, a South Asia Foreign Area Officer had focused his thesis
research on a forgotten country called Afghanistan while living in Pakistan, and was the
only officer in the CENTCOM headquarters in the fall of 2001 and winter of 2002 with relevant sociocultural knowledge of that country.

The point is it does not take thousands of officers with relevant knowledge or academic backgrounds to have a significant and positive impact on current and future operations, or the Army as an institution. Even relatively modest increases the in the number of officers with advanced sociocultural knowledge or academic fields relevant to irregular warfare and SSTRO will significantly increase the effectiveness of our armed forces as they continue to protect U.S. interests in an era of persistent conflict.

Endnotes


4 The author heard multiple guest speakers make this comment while a student at the U.S. Army War College during the 2007-2008 academic year.

5 Ibid.


7 Colin S. Grey, Another Bloody Century (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2007), 382; and Ralph Peters, Fighting for the Future (Mechanicsburg; Stackpole, 1999), 133.

9Ibid.

10Smith, 272.


16Ibid., 456.

17Ibid. 455-461. See also 477-484.

18Ibid., 463.

19Ibid., 402-404.

20Ramsay, 27-35.

21Ibid., 35-37.

22Ibid., 39-43.

23Ibid., The Province Senior Advisers and District Senior Advisers received 60 hours of country orientation and background during a six week basic course and an additional 135 hours of area orientation and mission specific knowledge areas (e.g., rural development, advisor techniques, situation updates).

24Ibid., 39-43.

25Ibid. 46.

26Ibid.

27Ibid.
28Ibid. 62-63 and Andrew J. Birtle, 442-443.

29Ibid. 62-64.


31General Jack Keane, as quoted in U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, xiv.

32Data compiled from the Army Human Resources Command data base 11 OCT 06.

33Andrew Stewart, Friction in U.S. Foreign Policy: Cultural Difficulties with the World, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 9.


40McCone, 18.

42 Data compiled from the Army Human Resources Command internal data base on 11 October 2006.

43 Ibid. The author acknowledges that eliminating economics, history, political science, and public policy and administration degrees in determining the number of officers with sociocultural relevant degrees, as some of those degrees are almost certainly in non-U.S. history, foreign political topics, or other relevant subfields of the major degree. Unfortunately, the Human Resources Command database does not offer this level of fidelity in an officer’s educational background.


57Ibid.

58Sheila Miyoshi Jager, On The Uses Of Cultural Knowledge (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 4.


61Ibid., 25.


65 Jaffe. Jaffe’s article highlights St. Johns University, one of two remaining ROTC programs in New York City, where 40 of the 120 cadets speak a second language. Jaffe also points out that there is no ROTC program in the greater Detroit area with its large Arab-American population, and that New York City (population 8.2m) currently produces fewer officers for the Army (34) than Alabama (pop. 4.5m, 174 officers).