



**Research Product 2010-05**

**Advisor Influence Strategies: 10 Cross-Cultural  
Scenarios for Discussion and Self-Assessment  
(Instructor's Manual)**

**Michelle Ramsden Zbylut**  
U.S. Army Research Institute

**Michelle Wisecarver, Hannah Foldes, and Rob Schneider**  
Personnel Decisions Research Institutes, Inc.

**September 2010**

**Fort Leavenworth Research Unit**


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**BARBARA A. BLACK, Ph.D.**  
**Research Program Manager**  
**Training and Leader Development**  
**Division**

  
**MICHELLE SAMS, Ph.D.**  
**Director**

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Technical review by

Kimberly Metcalf, U.S. Army Research Institute  
Jessica Gallus, U.S. Army Research Institute

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**Michelle Ramsden Zbylut**  
U.S. Army Research Institute

**Michelle Wisecarver, Hannah Foldes, and Rob Schneider**  
Personnel Decisions Research Institutes, Inc.

**Fort Leavenworth Research Unit**  
**James W. Lussier, Chief**

**U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences**  
**2511 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia 22202-3926**

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Statements and opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the United States Government, and no official endorsement should be inferred.

ADVISOR INFLUENCE STRATEGIES: 10 CROSS-CULTURAL SCENARIOS FOR  
DISCUSSION, APPLICATION, AND SELF-ASSESSMENT

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# ADVISOR INFLUENCE STRATEGIES: 10 CROSS-CULTURAL SCENARIOS FOR DISCUSSION, APPLICATION, AND SELF-ASSESSMENT

## Overview

United States military personnel understand and respect concepts like chain of command and command authority as part of their professional code. Effective military leaders, however, comprehend that influence goes beyond issuing orders and directives. Effective influence garners a commitment that exceeds compliance (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006).

Knowing a variety of influence strategies becomes particularly important to military personnel who find that part of their job requires them to interact with people outside of their chain of command. Influencing individuals outside the chain of command can be particularly daunting when influence must occur across a cultural divide. This is precisely the situation in which security force advisors, combat advisor teams, and transition teams often find themselves—attempting to influence individuals from another culture who are not in their chain of command. Indeed, security force advisors typically do not have formal command authority over their host nation counterparts; their primary role is to advise and assist their counterparts<sup>1</sup> (Kranc, 2007). Consequently, advisors may adopt a number of different influence strategies to influence their counterparts (U.S. Department of the Army, 2009).

This manual contains scenarios and materials to assist prospective advisors in learning more about the types of situations in which influence is necessary. The scenarios were drawn from real events told by returning advisors, although some scenario details have been modified and edited for assessment purposes. This manual also discusses different types of influence strategies advisors might apply in these situations. These influence strategies relate to those that appear in Army Leadership Doctrine (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006) and the psychology and management literatures.

This manual consists of materials for instructors to use to help teach advisors about the different influence tactics that can be applied to a variety of cross-cultural situations. This manual includes:

1. A scenario-based self-assessment tool that prospective advisors can use to better understand their influence strategies (Appendix A).
2. Student handouts to enable them to score their use of different influence tactics (Appendix B) and the effectiveness of influence tactics (Appendix C).
3. A scoring and interpretation guide for nine types of influence tactics (Appendix D).
4. A discussion guide that provides instructors with discussion questions for each scenario (Appendix E).
5. A student handout describing the different types of influence tactics that appeared in the assessment tool (Appendix F).

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<sup>1</sup> The term *counterpart* is used throughout this document to refer to *host nation* counterparts.

## Self-Assessment Tool: Applying Influence Strategies (Advisor Version)<sup>2</sup>

The United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI), in conjunction with Personnel Decisions Research Institutes (PDRI), developed an instrument for assessing the influence tactic preferences of advisors in situations they might encounter while deployed. The 10 scenarios in the advisor instrument were drawn from real stories reported by returning advisors and collected by members of ARI and the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA). Each scenario is paired with six to seven influence tactics that an advisor might adopt when trying to influence a counterpart or host national. These influence tactics directly map onto many of the influence tactics described in Army Leadership Doctrine (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006). Moreover, members of JCISFA, many of whom served as advisors themselves, provided feedback with respect to the various influence strategies that could be used in the different scenarios. This feedback has been incorporated into the discussion and scoring of the scenarios.

It should be noted that **this assessment tool is to be used ONLY for self-development and instructional purposes** and should not be used as a final determination that an advisor will or will not be successful in cross-cultural contexts. The scenarios should be viewed as simplified practice situations in which prospective advisors can learn more about their influence preferences and the types of situations that they might encounter while deployed. The scoring schemes and feedback included in this manual have been designed for the purposes of skill development and self-awareness. While scientific rigor was employed in developing the content of this tool, it would be inappropriate to use this tool for making administrative or personnel decisions without conducting additional scientific research that ensures the tool is effective for those purposes.

### Scoring Guides

**Scoring influence tactic preferences.** Answers to the scenarios can be scored to determine if an individual has a preference for using particular influence strategies across multiple scenarios. Self-awareness of a preference for some strategies over others may help an advisor determine whether he or she has a tendency to rely on a particular influence tactic, regardless of the situation. Feedback on different types of influence tactics also may broaden an advisor's knowledge of the potential influence strategies available for different situations. Scoring is provided for the following influence tactics:

1. Appealing to Morals and Duty
2. Inspirational Appeals
3. Rational Persuasion
4. Collaboration
5. Building Rapport
6. Using Rank or Authority
7. Using Pressure, Threats, and Warnings
8. Coalition Tactics
9. Using Negative Emotions

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<sup>2</sup> The 10-scenario assessment tool presented in this manual is a subset of 20 scenarios contained in a longer assessment tool for assessing leader influence. The 20-scenario instrument asks leaders to indicate how they would choose to influence superiors, subordinates, and individuals from other cultures. To obtain more information about the 20-scenario version of the influence assessment tool, please contact Dr. Michelle Zbylut at ARI's Fort Leavenworth Research Unit, (913) 684-9753, michelle.zbylut@us.army.mil.

The manual includes feedback about each of these tactics in order to (1) provide advisors with greater self-awareness of what tactics they use and what tactics they overlook, (2) assist advisors in understanding how the influence techniques they learn in class can be applied in practice, and (3) provide information about the general effectiveness or ineffectiveness of particular tactics. The overall goal of the feedback is to raise advisor awareness of different influence tactics at their disposal so that advisors can broaden and diversify their influence skill set.

**Scoring tactic effectiveness.** The previous scoring scheme focuses on an individual's tendency to use the same influence tactic across different situations. While some influence tactics may be effective across multiple situations, it is fair to say that each situation is unique. What is best for one situation may be inappropriate for another situation. Thus, this manual includes an additional scoring protocol that assesses the extent to which the student endorsed the best and worst influence tactics across the 10 scenarios. The best and worst courses of action were derived through discussions with subject matter experts from JCISFA.

## **Discussion Guide**

This manual includes a discussion section that instructors can use to facilitate discussion of each scenario. The discussion section consists of a brief synopsis of each scenario and questions to generate a conversation about the influence strategies that could be used in each situation. The discussion section also includes discussion points derived from focus groups with members of JCISFA, as well as insights from the psychology and management literatures on influence. Additionally, since these scenarios stem from real stories provided by returning advisors, the discussion section describes the original advisor story on which the scenario is based, reporting the situation the advisor encountered, the actions that he<sup>3</sup> took, and the outcomes of his actions.

## **Instructional Strategies**

Instructors can adopt a number of strategies for using the materials contained in this manual. Optimally, the contents of this manual would be used in conjunction with an existing lecture or briefing on influence tactics, and the self-assessment tool and scenario discussion would be used as practice examples for applying the techniques taught in class. However, this manual has been designed to help instructors communicate different influence techniques to students even if no pre-instruction on influence has been given. The next several paragraphs present different alternatives for using the materials in a classroom setting. Instructors and curriculum designers are encouraged to select or modify the strategy that best satisfies their course goals and time constraints.

**Optimal strategy 1: lecture + assessment + scenario discussion.** Since many individuals may be unaware of the names and types of different influence tactics, an optimal instructional strategy would first involve teaching students the different types of influence tactics. Once students have learned about the different types of tactics, they would then complete the assessment tool as a practice exercise for applying strategies they learned during class. Students

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<sup>3</sup> All advisors who provided these stories were male. Thus, the term "he" is used when referring to the advisors who provided the scenarios.

would then score their assessments for influence tactic preferences and effectiveness.

Since the assessment tool is for self-development purposes, it is recommended that students score their own instruments. Instructors would then provide feedback about how to interpret the scores or provide handouts (included in Appendix D) that would allow students to interpret their scores. Once the self-assessment is completed, instructors would then discuss a couple of the scenarios using the discussion questions provided in this manual. Which scenarios are selected for discussion is at the discretion of curriculum designers or instructors and might be based on considerations such as the country to which the advising class is deploying, recurrence of common themes discussed across classes (e.g., corruption), or student preference. To complete an instructional block using this strategy would likely take a minimum of three hours: one hour for lecture, one hour for assessment and scoring, and one hour to discuss two scenarios.

**Optimal strategy 2: assessment + lecture + assessment feedback + scenario discussion.**

An alternative to the previous instructional approach is to administer the assessment prior to lecture rather than after lecture. While administering the assessment tool *after* lecture uses the assessment instrument as an opportunity for scenario-based practice of the influence techniques learned during class, presenting the assessment tool *prior to* lecture provides an opportunity for students to diagnose their influence preferences before learning about the different techniques. Consequently, because students have not learned about the influence concepts in class yet, they may be more likely to report what they would naturally do in a given situation as opposed to what they think they should do based on what they learned during class. Because feedback on the assessment instrument uses terminology about influence with which students might be unfamiliar, it is recommended that feedback on the assessment tool be given after lecture. To complete an instructional block using this instructional strategy would likely take a minimum of three hours: 20-30 minutes for assessment, one hour for lecture, 30 minutes for scoring, and one hour to discuss two scenarios.

**Giving the assessment tool as mandatory homework.** The time to complete the assessment tool is approximately 30 minutes, but some individuals might take longer to read and complete the tool. Scoring and providing feedback on the tool would likely require another 30 minutes. Additional time would be required if the instructor wants to discuss each influence tactic as part of the feedback process. If class time is a precious commodity (as it often is), instructors might opt to have students complete the assessment instrument as homework. Scoring could be done in class, or handouts could be provided to assist students in scoring and interpreting their results prior to class.

When to give the assessment tool as a homework assignment is at the discretion of curriculum designers and instructors. If the purpose of the assessment tool is to have the tool serve as a practice exercise, then the tool should be given after a class on influence techniques. If the goal of the assessment tool is to prime individuals for influence instruction in class, the assessment might be given the night prior to the influence lecture. The following day could involve delivering the influence lecture, scoring the instrument, and discussing scenarios.

**Lecture + assessment tool as optional homework.** One reason why classes often rely on PowerPoint briefings is that PowerPoint is a concise and efficient way to communicate basic

information in a short period of time. The purpose of such briefings may be to provide students with the foundational knowledge that they need as the first building block of more complex skills. The disadvantage of such briefings, however, is that while a large amount of information is communicated to students, the information may seem abstract and out of context. It may not be apparent to students how to apply the facts and general principles presented during lecture to real world situations. As a result, students may find it difficult to implement the general information learned during class to the specific and unique situations they will encounter on the job.

If class time is highly compressed (i.e., only an hour can be devoted in the curriculum to the topic of influence), it may be unfeasible to cut the lecture portion of the curriculum because the lecture contains important foundational information that students must learn. If time constraints are a concern, instructors might consider delivering the lecture during class and then providing students with the assessment tool and scoring guides so students can complete the materials on their own time. Providing the assessment tool as optional homework will allow students an opportunity to apply the techniques during lecture to concrete situations they might encounter while deployed as well as receive feedback about those techniques. If desired, instructors also might provide this manual in its entirety to students to allow students opportunity for both assessment and reflection on the scenarios.

**Lecture + scenario discussion.** One of the advantages of the assessment tool is that it presents a large number of practice scenarios and influence tactics in a condensed format. Thus, while a realistic video game or simulation might require two hours to complete a single scenario, the assessment instrument encompasses 10 scenarios and multiple influence tactics in a 60-minute time commitment. Nevertheless, curriculum designers and instructors may opt not to use the assessment tool and still gain benefit from the materials included in this manual. Specifically, the scenarios included in this manual can be incorporated into lecture or used in conjunction with a lecture on influence.

Instructors may choose to use the scenarios in one of two ways. First, instructors might select scenarios to incorporate into the lecture to illustrate key points or influence challenges that advisors encounter. The benefit of this approach is that it allows instructors to take otherwise abstract influence concepts and contextualize those concepts so that trainees are more likely to retain and apply the concepts. The disadvantage of this approach, however, is that incorporating scenarios into a structured lecture may not allow trainees time to fully discuss and explore the nuances of the scenario.

A second approach to using the scenarios would be for instructors to deliver a lecture on influence and then use the scenarios as case studies for discussion. In this approach, instructors would use the scenarios to help trainees think critically about the situations and the different influence strategies that they might adopt. As little as 30 minutes of scenario discussion may help trainees develop a more complex and sophisticated understanding of a situation (Zbylut, Vowels, Brunner, & Kim, 2007), although more time might be necessary to discuss a scenario in its entirety. A disadvantage of the discussion approach is that it requires additional time for the instructor to prepare because facilitating a useful discussion requires knowledge of the scenario. Successful facilitation also requires that the instructor have a mental plan for how to steer discussion so that students raise and examine the key challenges embedded in the scenario. The


discussion section of this manual can help instructors develop a series of questions to facilitate discussion of each scenario.

**Assessment + scenario discussion.** If instructors do not have a lecture on influence readily available, instructors may opt to administer the assessment tool and discuss the scenarios without the benefit of lecture. Since trainees may have varying levels of knowledge about specific terminology associated with influence tactics (e.g., pressure tactics, rational persuasion), this is the least optimal instructional strategy. However, the definitions of the various influence tactics are provided as part of the feedback for the assessment tool, so the instructor could discuss the different influence concepts at the time of scoring the instrument. The instructor could reinforce the influence concepts during a subsequent discussion of the scenarios in class. A handout of the different influence tactics contained in the assessment tool is included in Appendix F.

### **Administering the Assessment Tool**

The influence assessment tool can be administered in class or provided to trainees to complete as homework. Detailed instructions on how to complete the tool are contained as part of the assessment tool booklet, which appears in Appendix A.

Instructors should make copies of the assessment tool to provide to students. It is recommended that the assessment tool be printed double-sided with two staples on the left hand side of the packet to create a booklet (see Figure 1). Printing the booklet in this way will allow a scenario to appear on the left side of the booklet and the response options for the scenario to appear on the right side of the booklet.



*Figure 1.* Assessment booklet with staples

Instructors can reuse the assessment booklets if they have students mark their answers on an answer sheet rather than in the booklet itself. An answer sheet is provided on the last page of the assessment booklet. Instructors who want to reuse assessment booklets can make new copies of the answer sheet for each class in which they wish to administer the assessment.

Instructors should allow students to score their own assessments since the purpose of the tool is to enhance self-awareness rather than provide a formal evaluation of the student's influence skills. Scoring handouts and guides are provided in Appendices B, C, and D.

Instructors may choose to give some feedback verbally in class, but it will be more efficient to have feedback provided through the use of handouts. For example, the instructor might discuss and describe a specific influence tactic to introduce the concept, but provide students with handouts that explain the meaning of their score (e.g., Appendix D).

It is anticipated that it will take most students approximately 30 minutes to complete the assessment tool, but some individuals may take longer depending on reading speed. Scoring the measure should take approximately 15 to 20 minutes, and another 10 minutes would be required for students to read the feedback contained in the handouts. If the instructor chooses to discuss feedback as part of class, this would require substantively more time. How much time is needed is dependent on the depth of discussion the instructor wishes with respect to different influence tactics embedded in the assessment tool.

### **Scoring the Assessment Instrument and Providing Feedback**

The assessment instrument can be scored for the types of influence tactics that students preferred for the 10 scenarios, as well as whether students endorsed taking the most effective or least effective courses of action in the various scenarios. It is recommended that students be allowed to score their answers themselves since this assessment is for self-development and self-awareness purposes. A scoring protocol for the use of different influence tactics is provided in Appendix B. A scoring protocol for the use of effective versus ineffective tactics is provided in Appendix C. Instructors should make a copy of the scoring protocols for each student so that students can score their own answers.

### **Providing Feedback on the *Types of Influence Tactics***

After students have used the scoring protocol in Appendix B to score their answers for the types of influence tactics, the instructor may wish to provide additional feedback to the students about their scores. A feedback guide for the types of influence tactics is provided in Appendix D. To optimize class time, instructors might want to provide the feedback in the form of handouts (i.e., print out Appendix B and provide to the students). However, the instructor also might wish to discuss the influence tactics, thereby capitalizing on the opportunity to reinforce influence concepts discussed in class and/or Army Leadership Doctrine. If the instructor wishes to discuss the concepts in class, he or she might cover the overview sections of the feedback contained in the handouts and allow students to read the more specific details about their scores.

The instructor should keep several things in mind while providing feedback on the different influence tactics covered in the scoring protocol:

1. The scores that students receive indicate their influence preferences with respect to these 10 scenarios. This may or may not indicate what students would do as advisors while deployed and placed in a real situation.
2. Influence tactics can be used in combination with one another. For example, using rational persuasion does not prevent an advisor from using an inspirational technique or

other influence tactic when trying to persuade a counterpart to take action.

3. Not every response option was scored as a type of influence tactic. Influence tactics that were options in only one or two scenarios (e.g., apprising) were not scored as a type of tactic because they would not provide a good indicator of someone's preference for how to behave across multiple scenarios. However, while these tactics were not scored with respect to the student's preference for that type of tactic, it does not mean that those tactics are unimportant. In some instances, those tactics are effective courses of action. Additionally, these influence tactics are included in greater detail in the discussion section of this manual.
4. Regardless of a person's scores, everyone can learn more about how to influence others. This tool is intended to provide self-awareness about one's influence preferences and the range of influence tactics available.

### **Providing Feedback on the *Effectiveness* of Influence Tactics**

Focus groups were conducted with members of JCISFA to determine the best and worst courses of action for each scenario. Members of the focus groups were experts in security force assistance, and many served as advisors on transition teams. For each scenario, focus groups identified which one to three courses of action were the best courses of action and these actions have been labeled in this assessment tool as the most effective influence tactics for a situation. Similarly, for each scenario the focus groups also identified the worst courses of action to take, and these response options have been labeled as ineffective influence actions.

Students receive two scores with respect to the effectiveness of influence tactics. First, students receive a score that indicates how likely they said they would perform the most effective influence tactics listed for the scenarios. Second, students receive a score that indicates how likely they said they would engage in the ineffective courses of action listed for a scenario. Two scores are provided rather than a single score because students could perform both ineffective and effective actions during a single influence attempt, and this feedback allows students to see to what extent they engage in both effective and ineffective tactics.

Students can use the handout provided in Appendix C to score their answers for how likely they said they were to engage in the most effective courses of action associated with each scenario on the assessment instrument. Higher scores indicate they said they were more likely to use the most effective influence tactics embedded in the scenarios, while lower scores indicate they said they would not engage in the most effective tactics.

Students also can score their answers for how likely they said they were to engage in the least effective courses of action across the 10 scenarios. In this instance, *lower* scores are preferable because lower scores indicate that students said they were unlikely to choose the least effective influence tactics for the scenarios.

To help students understand where their average scores fall with respect to the rating scale included in the assessment tool, the scoring handout contains two graphs (one for effective

influence tactics and one for ineffective influence tactics) to show students where their score falls relative to how likely they said they would be to choose those courses of action.

The best feedback about the effectiveness of various influence tactics, however, would occur through thorough discussion of the scenarios. The next section of this manual describes how to facilitate discussion for each scenario. If it is unfeasible to conduct discussion in class, instructors might consider making this manual available to students for their self-development.

### **Discussing the Scenarios**

The scenarios contained in the assessment tool were generated from real stories provided by advisors recently returned from deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan. The scenarios were slightly modified and edited for content but, for the most part, stay true to the original story. As such, each scenario provides students with an opportunity to explore the types of situations they might encounter when they deploy as advisors.

Appendix E contains materials to help instructors facilitate a discussion of each scenario. The discussion questions have been designed to focus on reinforcing the concepts included in the assessment tool and may have been discussed in class. To help reinforce the concepts during discussion, it is recommended that instructors provide students with copies of the influence tactics handout provided in Appendix F. Students can refer to the handout during discussion of key influence tactics and the scenarios.

Unless several hours have been allotted to discussing the scenarios, it is unlikely that instructors will discuss all 10 scenarios in a single session. A minimum of 20-30 minutes may be required to discuss one scenario, if not longer. Thus, instructors should select a couple of scenarios to discuss and either make the manual or Appendix E available to students. Which scenarios are best to discuss is at the discretion of curriculum designers and instructors and should be tied to the instructor's learning objectives or other conditions, such as the upcoming operational theater of the students.

It is recommended that students complete the assessment tool prior to discussing scenarios. However, instructors may opt not to give the assessment tool because it might not suit their instructional objectives. Thus, the discussion materials in Appendix E provide each scenario in its entirety, as well as all of the courses of actions associated with that scenario in the assessment tool. This will allow instructors to make handouts of individual scenarios for discussion purposes if they choose.

The discussion materials also provide a brief synopsis of the scenario and discussion questions to elicit student analysis about the different influence tactics that they may have learned about during class. Instructors should focus on allowing the students to explore the different influence tactics and help students generate their own thoughts rather than imposing answers on the students. The discussion points associated with the discussion questions are provided to help instructors steer the discussion and keep the discussion on topic. Instructors

should keep in mind that the scenarios do not have right or wrong answers—only better and worse courses of action.

Additionally, discussion materials include the original stories that served as the basis for each scenario. These stories have been edited for content and sanitized to protect the identity of individuals. Instructors may share these stories in class with students so that students can better understand the actions taken by the advisor and what the consequences of those actions were.

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## **APPENDIX A**

### **ASSESSMENT BOOKLET: APPLYING INFLUENCE STRATEGIES**

Begin printing the assessment booklet starting with the next page. The answer sheet appears on the last page of the assessment booklet in this Appendix.

## APPLYING INFLUENCE STRATEGIES: ADVISOR VERSION

### Instructions:

In this assessment, you will be presented with written descriptions of 10 scenarios that U.S. advisors could encounter while deployed. The scenarios were developed from real stories provided by advisors upon returning from their deployments. Each scenario is followed by a list of six to seven possible courses of action that an advisor could take to influence a host national. You will assume the role of the advisor who must respond to the situation.

Read each scenario and its list of possible responses carefully. Then, think about the likelihood that **you** would select each potential response. Try to think about how you have handled the same, or similar, situations in the recent past as a guide to making your selections. Use the scale provided below to rate the *likelihood* that you would use each of the approaches *listed for that scenario*. That is, evaluate the extent to which each response reflects an influence tactic you would be likely to use in the situation described.

- 7 = *Very likely*
- 6 = *Likely*
- 5 = *Somewhat likely*
- 4 = *Neither likely nor unlikely*
- 3 = *Somewhat unlikely*
- 2 = *Unlikely*
- 1 = *Very unlikely*

**Note that this is NOT a ranking from best to worst, but rather a rating for each response on a scale of 1 to 7.**

You may record your answers after each item in the assessment booklet or detach and use the answer sheet provided on the last page of this assessment tool. Using the answer sheet may help you in scoring your answers later.

## Scenario 1

CPT Howard is an advisor to the Afghan National Army (ANA). He is returning from conducting a cache search in a village up in the mountains. The mission was successful, but took several hours longer than expected. The soldiers are tired from the mission, as well as the long, dangerous journey to and from the village. They have been on the road for 20 minutes and the journey will take another four hours. The terrain is rough, steep, and perilous, made up mostly of goat trails and mountain switchbacks. If the group makes good time, it will be down to the valley floor by sunset in two hours, completing the rest of the journey under the cover of darkness.

An ANA platoon sergeant (PSG) is driving the lead vehicle, and CPT Howard is in the back with two other ANA soldiers and two Coalition Soldiers. This mission is the first time he worked with the ANA PSG. During the cache search the PSG proved himself to be competent and well-trained. He is also proficient in English, which greatly helped in successfully executing the mission. As a driver, however, he is somewhat reckless. Excited from the success of the mission, he is driving very fast down the mountain switchbacks, which include cliffs with sheer drops to the valley floor below. Everyone in the vehicle seems uneasy about the speed and the safety of the trail. One of the Coalition Soldiers is particularly anxious and starts to yell and curse at the driver. He even threatens to physically hurt the driver if he doesn't slow down. Not wanting to accidentally distract the driver, CPT Howard waits for an opportune moment to get him to stop the vehicle. Once the vehicle has halted, the driver gets out, brandishes his AK-47, and starts yelling at the Coalition Soldier that he should shut up or get out. The group cannot afford to be stopped for very long in this location, or else they risk becoming an easy target for an ambush. CPT Howard tells the Coalition Soldier to sit down and stay back. Next he has to get the ANA PSG to resume driving in a safer manner and get the group back to base safely.

## Scenario 1 Responses

Assume you are CPT Howard. Indicate how likely you would be to take each course of action.

7 = Very Likely 6 = Likely 5 = Somewhat Likely 4 = Neither Likely nor Unlikely 3 = Somewhat Unlikely 2 = Unlikely 1 = Very Unlikely	<b>Very Likely</b>						
	<b>Likely</b>						
	<b>Somewhat Likely</b>						
	<b>Neither Likely nor Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Somewhat Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Very Unlikely</b>						
A. Order the ANA PSG to put the gun down and get back in the vehicle ...	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
B. Tell the ANA PSG that if he does not put his gun down and get back in the vehicle, you will report the incident through his chain of command when you return to the base. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
C. Explain to the ANA PSG that he is scaring some of the soldiers in the vehicle, and this is causing them to become agitated and angry. Explain that, if he could just go slower, that would calm everyone's nerves.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
D. Tell the ANA PSG that you'll buy him dinner when you get back if he'll slow down and get you home alive. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
E. Tell the ANA PSG that the soldiers are depending on him to get them home safely and that he has a moral duty to drive carefully and keep those soldiers safe.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
F. Praise the PSG on his efforts at the cache search and his bravery and tactical skills on the mission. Then remind him that this is the easy part - just driving home. Ask him to just take it easy and not take away from his great success on the mission. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

## Scenario 2

CPT McNamara is an advisor with the Coalition forces that are working with the Afghan National Army (ANA) in Kabul. Several bombs targeting Afghan soldiers recently exploded in Kabul, and as a result, security is becoming a larger issue. Coalition forces, in conjunction with the ANA, have decided to take several precautionary measures to enhance security. One of these measures involves ensuring that all of the Afghan soldiers have authentic ID cards. Over time, some have gotten lost, and some soldiers have been operating with fake ID cards to avoid paying the fee for a new card. The effort to replace the cards will not be popular for those with lost or fake cards because the fee is a lot of money for Afghans. CPT McNamara and an ANA PSG have been tasked to conduct the ID replacement process with a Company of Afghan soldiers. CPT McNamara has worked with the PSG for several weeks. They have worked well together, although CPT McNamara has had to continually push him to act with authority rather than rely on the Coalition forces for assistance.

Today, a Company formation is scheduled to obtain the fake IDs and start the process of issuing new ones. Prior to the formation, CPT McNamara and the ANA PSG discussed how the sequence of events should take place. The PSG expressed concern that the ANA soldiers would be upset about having to pay the fee, but he agreed that he should be the one to run the event. Once the soldiers are fully assembled, CPT McNamara steps aside to let the ANA PSG run the replacement process. The ANA soldiers begin to question the PSG and argue with him about the process. At this point the ANA PSG gives up and looks over to CPT McNamara. CPT McNamara takes the PSG aside, knowing he needs to convince the PSG to carry through with this job and to not rely on CPT McNamara to get the soldiers to cooperate and complete the reissuing.

## Scenario 2 Responses

Assume you are CPT McNamara. Indicate how likely you would be to take each course of action.

7 = Very Likely 6 = Likely 5 = Somewhat Likely 4 = Neither Likely nor Unlikely 3 = Somewhat Unlikely 2 = Unlikely 1 = Very Unlikely	<b>Very Likely</b>						
							<b>Likely</b>
						<b>Somewhat Likely</b>	
					<b>Neither Likely nor Unlikely</b>		
				<b>Somewhat Unlikely</b>			
			<b>Unlikely</b>				
		<b>Very Unlikely</b>					
A. Remind the PSG that it is his duty to be strong and have courage as a soldier of the ANA. Tell him he has a moral obligation to get this job done. Tell him he needs to stand up to the soldiers who are complainers and make sure they cooperate and turn in their fake IDs. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
B. Enthusiastically tell him that this is something he needs to do for the love of his Army and the love of his country. That although it is difficult to stand up to all of the complaining soldiers and do his job today, it is an act of selflessness and patriotism that will make his family and Allah proud.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
C. Remind him that the ANA and Coalition forces have mandated that this process be conducted, and that he was selected for this job and he must do it, and that as a representative for these forces you have the authority to ensure he does his job. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
D. Warn him that if he does not stand up there and get this job done, you will inform his chain of command about his failure and he will be dishonored and punished. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
E. Explain to the PSG again in detail the importance of the ID cards in protecting soldiers and maintaining the security of the post. Remind him why the fee is being charged, and remind him that there are consequences of not having valid ID cards, most seriously that terrorists may be able to have access to the area. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
F. Ask the PSG if he wants to see his friends in the unit get blown up tomorrow. After he responds “No,” tell him, “Not having a valid ID card is causing our soldiers to get blown up.” Then ask him if he wants to help prevent future casualties. After he responds “Yes,” remind him that he was chosen to conduct this ID card reissuing, and in order to do his part to prevent future casualties, he needs to get back out there and confront the complaining soldiers.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

### Scenario 3

MAJ Dawson is an advisor to the Afghan National Police (ANP) and has been working closely with an Afghan General over the past few months to build relationships between the advisory teams and the ANP forces. On a personal level, the two men have established a reasonable rapport, although MAJ Dawson has encountered consistent difficulty in getting the General to adopt constitutional laws and Ministry directives. He believes the General is simply not knowledgeable about them and not interested in them, and relies on the tribal law and practices that he is familiar with to get things done.

MAJ Dawson has just learned that the ANP patrolmen are routinely being paid their salary in Pakistani Rupees versus the host nation Afghani. Although the Rupee is the currency of choice for local vendors, the Ministry of Finance's directive is that all payrolls should be distributed in Afghani. This allows the Ministry to maintain proper oversight of salary distribution and guard against bribes. The patrolmen receive 3500 Rupees, which is the correct value in absolute number (i.e., 3500), but which only translates to approximately 2700 Afghani. This means the local bank, which is willing to substitute Rupees for Afghani, is able to pocket the extra money of 800 Afghani from each patrolman who receives his pay in Rupees. As an advisor, MAJ Dawson knows he must ensure that proper rights and directives are being executed in accordance with the constitutional laws. He has a previously scheduled meeting with the General later that day. He decides to bring the issue of pay to the General's attention and try to convince him to change payroll activities so they are consistent with Ministry directives.

### Scenario 3 Responses

Assume you are MAJ Dawson. Indicate how likely you would be to take each course of action.

7 = Very Likely 6 = Likely 5 = Somewhat Likely 4 = Neither Likely nor Unlikely 3 = Somewhat Unlikely 2 = Unlikely 1 = Very Unlikely	Very Likely						
	Likely						
	Somewhat Likely						
	Neither Likely nor Unlikely						
	Somewhat Unlikely						
	Unlikely						
	Very Unlikely						
A. Mention you heard that patrolmen were being paid in Rupees, but had seen in the Ministry directives that they were supposed to be paid in Afghanis. State that you wonder if that is something that should be changed.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
B. Tell him that if he does not change the payroll from Rupees to Afghanis, you will bring the issue to the attention of the Ministry and the National and Coalition authorities.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
C. Explain to him the difference between paying patrolmen in Rupees versus Afghanis. Point out that the patrolmen are losing money that is rightfully theirs, and that it may serve to diminish their commitment to the organization. In addition, the bank is gaining money that does not rightfully belong to them.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
D. Begin the meeting by praising the General’s recent successes in a certain area, such as getting a certain number of recruits for the ANP or successful missions conducted by his forces. Comment on his excellent leadership capability. Then mention that you are aware of a situation that requires his leadership intervention – that his patrolmen are being paid in Rupees instead of Afghanis, which is against the Ministry directives. State that you are sure, given his great capability that he would be able to correct the situation.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
E. Tell the General that over the months that you have been working together, you have grown to consider him a friend. Tell him that the patrolmen must be paid in Afghanis in accordance with the Ministry directive, and that you would greatly appreciate it if he would change their pay from Rupees to Afghanis.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
F. Explain the situation to one of your counterparts in the ANP and ask him to go with you to speak to the General.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

#### **Scenario 4**

CPT Pelham is a logistics advisor who has been working with the Iraqi Army (IA) for about 6 months. One of his primary contacts in the IA is a MAJ who is a Maintenance officer. The two officers have a friendly relationship which has been helpful in winning over and working with other soldiers in the Battalion. One challenge has been that the IA MAJ is from the old (Saddam) Army and is set in his ways. Over the months, this has led to numerous frustrations for CPT Pelham because the IA MAJ does not use new systems or follow newly established operating procedures. One recurring frustration is that the IA MAJ is supposed to be using the new IA systems for maintenance and parts requests, and producing a regular report for his Battalion each week, but he never does. CPT Pelham has repeatedly demonstrated (more than 10 times) how to complete the report, yet the IA MAJ has rarely produced the report. Not wanting to risk harming the relationship, CPT Pelham has not made a big deal about the missing reports thus far - he just continues to ask about them. Recently, however, the IA MAJ's performance has become increasingly ineffective and the failure to follow operating procedures is beginning to affect the IA Battalion's ability to properly maintain their equipment. CPT Pelham has decided he needs to take a more proactive approach to influence the IA MAJ to complete these reports.

### Scenario 4 Responses

Assume you are CPT Pelham. Indicate how likely you would be to take each course of action.

7 = Very Likely 6 = Likely 5 = Somewhat Likely 4 = Neither Likely nor Unlikely 3 = Somewhat Unlikely 2 = Unlikely 1 = Very Unlikely	<b>Very Likely</b>						
	<b>Likely</b>						
	<b>Somewhat Likely</b>						
	<b>Neither Likely nor Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Somewhat Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Very Unlikely</b>						
A. Talk to the IA MAJ about his duties and responsibilities as a maintenance officer - ensuring that the equipment is maintained and that the report is provided to the proper authorities. Emphasize that even though filling out the report is tedious, it is the duty of his position and his moral duty to complete it. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
B. Try to motivate the IA MAJ by talking to him about how exciting it is to have the capability to track the maintenance and parts requests. Emphasize there are other BNs that are not yet using the program and reports, and that by fully using these systems he will be providing a model for the entire Iraqi Army to follow. Thank him for his patriotism to Iraq and his unit, and emphasize that completing the reports each week will be a constant reminder of his selfless dedication. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
C. Inform the IA MAJ you will not tolerate the missing reports any longer, and if he does not start producing the reports on time, you will announce his repeated failures and the operational consequences at the next Battalion staff meeting. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
D. Explain to the IA MAJ in detail the benefits of the IA maintenance systems, and how they can improve the functioning of the Battalion. Describe the different people who can use the report and the impact it can have on their ability to do their job and the capability of the entire Battalion to perform its mission. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
E. Determine a couple of things the IA MAJ is doing well, or fairly well, as an officer—perhaps ensuring his facilities are clean, or working to order some new equipment for the soldiers. Praise the IA MAJ for these specific actions and commend him for taking care of his troops. Then mention that another important way to take care of his troops is to ensure they have their equipment in top working order, and that can only happen well if he starts using the systems and completing the reports. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
F. Tell the IA MAJ if he completes the report 5 times in a row on time, you will present him with a Certificate of Accomplishment for technical capability in using the new maintenance systems. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G. Confront the IA MAJ and show him how angry you are that he is not completing the reports. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

## Scenario 5

MAJ Curillo is a Logistics Advisor to the Iraqi Army (IA) and has been assigned to a Central Issue Facility (CIF) for a new IA Brigade. He has been working with the IA CIF Officer in Charge (OIC), MAJ Al-Jamil, for about 6 months. He regards him as an honorable friend and a professional (he is from the old Army, so has some years of experience). MAJ Al-Jamil also speaks excellent English, so no interpreter is required for them to work together. One day, the staff of the IA Division enter the CIF at closing time and order MAJ Al-Jamil to issue their unit some equipment. The CIF usually closes at 1500, but these soldiers need the equipment immediately for an early departure the next day for a critical mission.

At 2130, one of the other advisors calls MAJ Curillo to go to the CIF. He tells him there are some problems with a last minute equipment issue, and they need him to make sure that the unit receives their equipment that night. He indicates that some of the underlying tension that is present may be related to tribe and denominations, and that the issuing seemed to be progressing ok until MAJ Al-Jamil sent his staff to supper, provoking further friction with the supported unit. Then while the CIF staff was at dinner, several soldiers from the supported unit were caught trying to steal additional items. This intensified the situation to the point where MAJ Al-Jamil sent his staff home and the work stopped completely. When MAJ Curillo arrives at the CIF he can feel the tension and notices that all issuing activity has stopped. He takes MAJ Al-Jamil aside and politely asks him to resume the issue. MAJ Al-Jamil tells MAJ Curillo he refuses to cooperate and will not complete the issue that night.

## Scenario 5 Responses

Assume you are MAJ Curillo. Indicate how likely you would be to take each course of action.

7 = Very Likely 6 = Likely 5 = Somewhat Likely 4 = Neither Likely nor Unlikely 3 = Somewhat Unlikely 2 = Unlikely 1 = Very Unlikely	<b>Very Likely</b>						
	<b>Likely</b>						
	<b>Somewhat Likely</b>						
	<b>Neither Likely nor Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Somewhat Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Very Unlikely</b>						
A. Remind him that the Prophet Muhammad teaches that we should show mercy to all and the Holy Quran teaches that those in power should use their power to work for justice. Tell him if he refuses to issue items like field jackets, poncho liners, and sleeping bags to hundreds of men, this would cause the lower enlisted (the powerless ones) to suffer. Emphasize he has a moral duty to issue the equipment. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
B. Tell him that he must complete the issue, and that both the Coalition force and IA Commanders support this position, and have sent you to ensure that it happens. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
C. Tell him that, if he does not complete the issue, his chain of command will have to take a disciplinary action against him. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
D. Explain in detail why the issue is required and what the consequences are for the soldiers and the mission if he does not complete the issue as requested. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
E. Thank him for everything he has accomplished so far, and compliment him on his professionalism in the face of others who were not acting as professional. Then ask if, in the interest of getting everyone out of there, he could resume the issuing.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
F. Mention that you have worked with him for 6 months and know him to be an honorable friend and a professional. Indicate that, although you understand he is angry and you understand why, as a friend you would greatly appreciate it if he would resume the process and complete the issuing. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

## Scenario 6

MAJ Mokros is a Transition Team Leader in Iraq, located at a combat outpost. The Coalition Forces (CF) S2 has reported that an Iraqi Lieutenant is releasing high value detainees in exchange for money. Two Iraqi Army (IA) S2 soldiers have come forward and confirmed the CF reports. MAJ Mokros has been instructed by higher to convince the IA Battalion Commander to remove the Lieutenant from his position. The Battalion Commander is a Kurd and the Battalion itself is 70% Sunni and 30% Shia. The Commander is experienced and well liked by most subordinates. However, he does have a reputation for being soft, especially when dealing with difficult circumstances. Initially, MAJ Mokros and an interpreter meet with the Commander in his office. MAJ Mokros tells the Commander about the problem and the evidence, and the security risk he poses to both Iraqi and Coalition forces. In response, the Commander assures MAJ Mokros that he will investigate and take appropriate action.

Two weeks pass and the officer is still in the unit. MAJ Mokros continues to ask about progress on the problem, and the Commander routinely replies that an investigation is under way. This pattern of interactions continues for the next few weeks, and the relationship becomes increasingly strained. In the meantime, MAJ Mokros hears indirectly that the Lieutenant in question has an uncle serving in the Iraqi government and the Commander might be fearful of retribution. MAJ Mokros decides he needs to meet with the Commander again to convince him to remove the Lieutenant.

### Scenario 6 Responses

Assume you are MAJ Mokros. Indicate how likely you would be to take each course of action.

7 = Very Likely 6 = Likely 5 = Somewhat Likely 4 = Neither Likely nor Unlikely 3 = Somewhat Unlikely 2 = Unlikely 1 = Very Unlikely	Very Likely						
	Likely						
	Somewhat Likely						
	Neither Likely nor Unlikely						
	Somewhat Unlikely						
	Unlikely						
	Very Unlikely						
A. Coach the IA Battalion Commander that high-value detainees who are released are likely to return to injure or kill his soldiers and even the local civilians. As the leader of the unit, it is his duty to keep his men safe and his obligation to protect the people of the city. He must remove the Lieutenant to uphold his moral and ethical responsibilities. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
B. Remind the IA Battalion Commander of the importance of his position and the many years of selfless service he has completed to reach this level in the Army. Tell him that his life has been dedicated to patriotism and the love of his country and countrymen, and although he is worried about retribution for removing the officer, he has to stay true to his personal and professional ideals and to truth and honor.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
C. Tell the IA Battalion Commander if he does not detain or move the officer out of the unit in the next week, you will not continue to work with him and you and your unit will stop supporting his Battalion.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
D. Find out some statistics about re-arrest rates, either in Iraq or elsewhere if necessary. Explain to the IA Battalion Commander the likelihood that the persons released will put soldiers and civilians in harm's way in the near future. Reiterate his role in the situation and explain what he needs to do to fix the problem. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
E. Tell IA Battalion Commander you can assist him with completing the paperwork that is necessary for the action, and that the CF S2 can provide a statement of the events to try to deflect some of the responsibility for the action away from him.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
F. Identify another IA officer that the IA Battalion Commander respects and with whom he has a positive relationship. Convince the officer of the importance of this matter, and then bring him with you to meet with the Battalion Commander.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G. Tell the IA Battalion Commander that the situation is not acceptable. Indicate how angry you are about the matter and make sure your anger shows. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

## Scenario 7

CPT Neale is meeting with a National Police Battalion Commander to discuss operations. Present at the meeting are CPT Neale and a U.S. NCO (serving as advisors), the Iraqi Commander, and his Iraqi S2. The discussion is proceeding with the aid of an interpreter. At various times during the discussion, members of the Iraqi Police Battalion enter the office to make reports or to ask for guidance on a range of matters. At one point, the Commander is informed that Shia militants have surrounded a National Police Patrol and seized their weapons. The Commander seems indecisive about what to do in response to this situation, pacing the room several times. He speaks quietly yet urgently with his men, making it somewhat difficult for the interpreter to translate. The S2 apparently has the names and cell phone numbers of most local militia leaders. He suggests that it might be feasible to contact one of the leaders and identify a means by which the weapons can be returned. The Battalion Commander is not willing to call any of the militiamen and demand the return of the weapons. He says the militiamen are simply too powerful in his sector.

It becomes apparent that the Commander is not planning to pursue any immediate action. He believes little can be done to recover the weapons and only hopes that most of the police will be released alive. Then, speaking directly to CPT Neale through the interpreter, he insists that Coalition Forces (CF) conduct a raid to arrest the militiamen, although he does not know (or is unwilling to say) where they can be found. CPT Neale wants to influence him to take action against the militia.

## Scenario 7 Responses

Assume you are CPT Neale. Indicate how likely you would be to take each course of action.

7 = Very Likely 6 = Likely 5 = Somewhat Likely 4 = Neither Likely nor Unlikely 3 = Somewhat Unlikely 2 = Unlikely 1 = Very Unlikely	<b>Very Likely</b>						
	<b>Likely</b>						
	<b>Somewhat Likely</b>						
	<b>Neither Likely nor Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Somewhat Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Very Unlikely</b>						
		1	2	3	4	5	6
A. Reply to him that maybe if he had contact information for the local militia leaders, that information could be useful for the Iraqi BN to communicate with them. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
B. Using a motivated tone, tell him he has everything he needs to be a true hero in the situation and get his weapons back – he can call the militia leaders or go out to the village to pay them a visit. Tell him he needs to take action for his pride and honor. Remind him that as a true patriot he needs to take some difficult roads and continually aspire to the next level.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
C. Tell him he must take action against the militia or they will become more and more emboldened against his forces and his forces could start losing control of the city. If this happens, he will be recognized throughout the city as a weak leader and his family’s honor will be tarnished. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
D. Help lay out the facts for him. Identify the number of Shia leaders in the region, and reason that the men who did this must report to one of those leaders. Lay out possible courses of action, including “Do Nothing.” Explain in detail why “Do Nothing” is a poor option.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
E. Tell him that you can’t just conduct the raid for him, but that if he wants some advisors to assist with planning and executing a mission you would certainly be available to assist. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
F. Talk to the Commander’s S2 on the side and see if he has an idea of which group executed the raid, and who they could call. See if you can convince him to join you in encouraging the Battalion Commander to take action.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G. Express and demonstrate to the Battalion Commander your frustration with his lack of action. With emotion insist that he must take action.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

## Scenario 8

An Afghan National Police (ANP) team and their Police Mentor Team are on a routine patrol in a small village near the mountains. The purpose of the patrol is to conduct a community-based visit to allow ANP leaders to talk with civilian leaders and instill further confidence in the ANP as well as the government of Afghanistan. As the patrol enters the village, Taliban fighters engage with a heavy concentration of rifle and automatic weapons fire. The ANP immediately dismount off their trucks to establish a base of fire while the Police Mentor Team and another ANP squad assaults from the flank. In the ensuing fight, three Taliban fighters are killed, one is wounded, and two more are captured.

CPT Siltzer is the Police Mentor Team Chief and is working with his ANP counterpart to consolidate the two forces. He notices that some of the ANP were securing the two prisoners, and he and his interpreter make their way over to that area. As they arrive, one of the patrolmen angrily insists to the Team Chief's interpreter that the prisoners should be executed. CPT Siltzer knows this patrolman and has developed a friendly relationship with him over the course of several months. During training, he was recognized as one of the best and bravest young fighters in the ANP team with a promising future ahead of him. However, it is also widely known that he recently lost his father and a younger brother to the Taliban, and his fervent opposition to the Taliban can sometimes cloud his judgment. The young patrolman's leader is still located on the south side of the village and is not in a position to influence the patrolman. CPT Siltzer wants to get him away from the prisoners and into a vehicle, so he needs to influence him to calm down and move away.

## Scenario 8 Responses

Assume you are CPT Siltzer. Indicate how likely you would be to take each course of action.

7 = Very Likely 6 = Likely 5 = Somewhat Likely 4 = Neither Likely nor Unlikely 3 = Somewhat Unlikely 2 = Unlikely 1 = Very Unlikely	<b>Very Likely</b>						
	<b>Likely</b>						
	<b>Somewhat Likely</b>						
	<b>Neither Likely nor Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Somewhat Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Very Unlikely</b>						
		1	2	3	4	5	6
A. Tell the ANP patrolman that he is an officer of the law and it is his duty and moral obligation to uphold the law. Insist that this means that he must not shoot prisoners and these two men are clearly prisoners. Tell him to get in the truck and take a break.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
B. Order the ANP patrolman to stand down and not to shoot the captured fighters. Tell him that, as the U.S. Mentor Team Chief assigned to his unit, you insist that he move away and get in a vehicle. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
C. Tell the ANP patrolman if he shoots captives he will be brought up on charges and could be executed himself. Tell him to get in the truck and take a break. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
D. Praise the patrolman for an excellent job capturing the Taliban fighters. Tell him you are proud of his valiant fighting and he has given his family much honor. Ask him to come with you and take a break in the truck while you and the other ANP patrolmen load the prisoners onto the trucks.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
E. When you go over to where the ANP patrolman is, calmly say to him in a firm and urgent tone to come over to talk to you. When he comes over, ask him to hold down his weapon. When he holds down his weapon, tell him he needs to calm down and think about what he's doing. Once he has calmed down a little, tell him it is not acceptable to shoot prisoners, and those two men are clearly prisoners. Tell him to get in the truck and take a break.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
F. Call him by his name and say, "I have known you for many months now and I respect your professionalism and value your friendship. I am asking you as a friend to stand down and let us continue processing these prisoners." Tell him to get in the truck and take a break. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G. Tell the ANP patrolman that he needs to stand down, and that if his leader was here right now, he would order him to stand down, too. Tell him to get in the truck and take a break. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

## Scenario 9

CPT Rawlins is serving as the leader of an advisory group to an Iraqi National Police (NP) Battalion. Prior to the arrival of the advisors, the Battalion did not conduct any organized training. When the advisor team arrived, training was typically planned and led either by the advisors or by other Coalition Forces. As CPT Rawlins began working with the NP Battalion, he sensed that the Battalion Commander didn't care about the capability of his force, and was only concerned with plans or policies that would benefit himself. CPT Rawlins discussed with the NP operations officer the need to plan and implement a Battalion training cycle, but he was not responsive and took no action. In two days, CPT Rawlins has a meeting scheduled with the NP Battalion Commander to convince him that he needs to develop and conduct a training plan.

## Scenario 9 Responses

Assume you are CPT Rawlins. Indicate how likely you would be to take each course of action.

7 = Very Likely 6 = Likely 5 = Somewhat Likely 4 = Neither Likely nor Unlikely 3 = Somewhat Unlikely 2 = Unlikely 1 = Very Unlikely	<b>Very Likely</b>						
	<b>Likely</b>						
	<b>Somewhat Likely</b>						
	<b>Neither Likely nor Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Somewhat Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Very Unlikely</b>						
A. Remind the NP Battalion Commander that as the leader of the unit he has a duty to ensure his patrolmen are adequately prepared for their jobs. He must develop a training plan to make sure they are prepared. If he does not develop a training plan, he is failing his responsibilities as a leader and his moral duty to take care of his men. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
B. Tell him that if he doesn't show progress on developing a training plan, the advisors and Coalition Forces will stop planning training for them, and will not include them in their own training exercises. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
C. Bring in an example of a U.S. training plan. Explain how the training plan is linked to the skills they need to develop and how setting up a plan for an entire year can help to ensure that they are continuously improving. Provide a contrast of the gains that can be achieved for a unit with and without a training plan. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
D. Tell the NP Battalion Commander that if he will formally assign one of his officers with the task of developing a training plan within a given period of time, you will provide someone from your staff to work with that officer for one hour every day until it is completed. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
E. Tell the NP Battalion Commander that if he institutes a training plan he will be viewed as a forward thinking Commander with lots of promotion potential. Describe how he will bring positive attention to himself and his battalion, and how impressed the Coalition Forces will be. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
F. Continue talking about the training cycle plan to other officers in the Battalion to find someone who agrees that it is a good idea. Get that officer to go with you to meet with the NP Battalion Commander. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G. Showing your anger and frustration, insist to the NP Battalion Commander that it is not acceptable for a unit to operate without a training plan and that he is failing his duties as a leader. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

## Scenario 10

MAJ Barrera is serving as the leader of an advisory group to the Afghan National Army (ANA). Since he arrived a couple of months ago, issues have repeatedly arisen regarding lack of accurate accountability for equipment in the ANA unit. MAJ Barrera set up a meeting between members of the advisory group and several key ANA officers to explain the situation and convince the ANA S3 to improve his accountability. At the meeting, MAJ Barrera and the other advisors try to explain the goals and benefits of accurate accountability. The ANA officers interrupt the interpreters, making rude comments, and answering questions sarcastically. MAJ Barrera ends the meeting and is planning to meet with the ANA S3 to convince him to improve his accountability.

### Scenario 10 Responses

Assume you are MAJ Barrera. Indicate how likely you would be to take each course of action.

7 = Very Likely 6 = Likely 5 = Somewhat Likely 4 = Neither Likely nor Unlikely 3 = Somewhat Unlikely 2 = Unlikely 1 = Very Unlikely	<b>Very Likely</b>						
	<b>Likely</b>						
	<b>Somewhat Likely</b>						
	<b>Neither Likely nor Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Somewhat Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Unlikely</b>						
	<b>Very Unlikely</b>						
		1	2	3	4	5	6
A. Tell the ANA S3 that while accountability for equipment may sound trivial, it is highly important to a well-disciplined Army. As an officer he has a duty to the ANA and to Afghanistan to take care of the equipment their country has entrusted to them and ensure it doesn't fall into the wrong hands. It is his moral obligation to create a system to monitor this equipment.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
B. Tell him that if he does not take these meetings seriously and participate fully to find a solution, the advisory group will stop supporting their unit altogether, and that they will provide a report to the ANA and Coalition Commanders precisely why. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
C. Explain to the S3 the goals and benefits of accurate accountability. Describe in detail the consequences of failing to maintain accountability of equipment and how it hurts the soldiers and the ANA. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
D. Indicate to the ANA S3 that this problem can only be solved by having them actively involved, and that if his officers will start participating appropriately in the meeting, then the advisory group will work with them to outline a plan for accountability. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
E. Tell the S3 that if he puts together a detailed plan for equipment accountability, his chain of command as well as the Coalition Forces will be highly impressed, and it will likely lead to some type of award for him as they demonstrate the effectiveness of the system.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
F. Get visibly angry. Tell him you are there to help the ANA improve. If he and his fellow officers are not interested in working to improve, they should not bother to come to meetings in the future because they are wasting your time. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

## ANSWER SHEET

Use this quick reference sheet for your answers. Detach this page from the assessment booklet and write your answers on this sheet. This will help you score your test later and participate in discussion or reflection activities.

ITEM	ANSWER
1A	
1B	
1C	
1D	
1E	
1F	

2A	
2B	
2C	
2D	
2E	
2F	

3A	
3B	
3C	
3D	
3E	
3F	

4A	
4B	
4C	
4D	
4E	
4F	
4G	

ITEM	ANSWER
5A	
5B	
5C	
5D	
5E	
5F	

6A	
6B	
6C	
6D	
6E	
6F	
6G	

7A	
7B	
7C	
7D	
7E	
7F	
7G	

ITEM	ANSWER
8A	
8B	
8C	
8D	
8E	
8F	
8G	

9A	
9B	
9C	
9D	
9E	
9F	
9G	

10A	
10B	
10C	
10D	
10E	
10F	

## **APPENDIX B**

### **SCORING THE USE OF DIFFERENT INFLUENCE TACTICS STUDENT HANDOUT**

Print the next three pages for students so they can score their answers with respect to different types of influence tactics that they used across the 10 scenarios.

**Scoring:  
Computing the Likelihood of Using Different Influence Tactics**

This scoring guide will help you determine the extent to which you said you would be likely to engage in certain types of influence tactics across the different scenarios.

On the next page are different influence tactics that appeared in the assessment tool. You will notice that there are 9 tactics listed (e.g., Appeal to Duty/Morals, Inspirational Appeal) followed by a series of empty boxes. Below the empty boxes are item numbers that correspond to the scenario and response options on the assessment tool. For example, the Appeal to Duty/Morals tactic has 8 items associated with it, beginning with Scenario 1 and course of action E and ending with Scenario 10 and course of action A.

To compute your score for each of these tactics, you first need to fill in the empty boxes with your answers from the assessment tool. For instance, if you rated Option E on Scenario 1 with a 2, then you would write a 2 for Item 1E in the corresponding empty box in the Appeal to Duty/Morals line.

After you have filled the boxes with your answers for a given influence tactic, add your answers together to compute a score for each tactic. Write that summed score in the box labeled “Sum.”

Once you have computed scores for each of the influence strategies, refer to the interpretation guide or your instructor to receive more feedback on your scores.

An example is provided below.

Example:

Appeal to Duty/Morals:	2	2	5	1	3	2	2	1	18
Item ⇒	1E	2A	4A	5A	6A	8A	9A	10A	SUM



At this point, you should have computed a score for each of the influence tactics listed on the previous page. Now, for each influence tactic mark an *X* between the numbers where your score falls.

Did you tend to use one tactic more than the others? Or did you use a wide variety of tactics? Were there any tactics you did not use? After you have made your marks, refer to the interpretation guide or your instructor to develop a better understanding of each type of tactic and what your scores mean.

**Example:**

<b>Appeal to Duty/Morals</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>56</b>
	<i>Very Unlikely</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>		<i>Somewhat Unlikely</i>	<i>Neither Likely or Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Very Likely</i>

<b>Appeal to Duty/Morals</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>56</b>
	<i>Very Unlikely</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Unlikely</i>	<i>Neither Likely or Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Very Likely</i>

<b>Inspirational Appeal</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>28</b>
	<i>Very Unlikely</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Unlikely</i>	<i>Neither Likely or Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Very Likely</i>

<b>Rational Persuasion</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>63</b>
	<i>Very Unlikely</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Unlikely</i>	<i>Neither Likely or Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Very Likely</i>

<b>Collaboration</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>28</b>
	<i>Very Unlikely</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Unlikely</i>	<i>Neither Likely or Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Very Likely</i>

<b>Establish Rapport</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>35</b>
	<i>Very Unlikely</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Unlikely</i>	<i>Neither Likely or Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Very Likely</i>

<b>Use Rank &amp; Authority</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>28</b>
	<i>Very Unlikely</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Unlikely</i>	<i>Neither Likely or Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Very Likely</i>

<b>Use Pressure &amp; Threats</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>70</b>
	<i>Very Unlikely</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Unlikely</i>	<i>Neither Likely or Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Very Likely</i>

<b>Form Coalition</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>35</b>
	<i>Very Unlikely</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Unlikely</i>	<i>Neither Likely or Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Very Likely</i>

<b>Use Negative Emotions</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>35</b>
	<i>Very Unlikely</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Unlikely</i>	<i>Neither Likely or Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Very Likely</i>

## **APPENDIX C**

### **COMPUTING THE USE OF EFFECTIVE VERSUS INEFFECTIVE TACTICS STUDENT HANDOUT**

Print the next two pages for students so they can score their answers with respect to how often they opted to use the most and least effective influence tactics across the 10 scenarios.

**Scoring:**  
**Computing the Likelihood of Using Effective and Ineffective Influence Tactics**

The items on this sheet represent the best and worst courses of action for the 10 scenarios. In many instances, “most effective” tactics are the two tactics deemed by experts in security force assistance as the best available options listed for a scenario. “Least effective” tactics are generally the least two desirable options listed for a scenario.

Keep in mind, your scores refer to the situations and potential courses of action embedded in this assessment tool and do not necessarily indicate that you will be effective or ineffective as an advisor. While these scores might be viewed as a snapshot of your judgment to engage in effective or ineffective influence tactics across a range of situations, it is better to use these scores to help direct your attention to specific scenarios or influence tactics that you might take in different situations.

For each item listed, record your answers. Then, add your answers together to compute a score for how likely you indicated you would be to adopt those courses of action. Put your computed total in the box labeled “Sum.” The next page will help you interpret your scores.

Most Effective	Answer
1F	
1A	
2E	
2F	
3C	
3D	
4D	
4E	
5E	
5F	
6A	
6E	
7C	
8E	
8F	
9D	
9E	
10C	
10E	
<b>SUM</b>	

Least Effective	Answer
1D	
2C	
2D	
3B	
3F	
4C	
4G	
5B	
5C	
6C	
6F	
6G	
7G	
9F	
9G	
10B	
10F	
<b>SUM</b>	

Place an **X** on each graph to represent where your score falls. Where the **X** falls on the graph indicates how likely you were to select the most and least effective influence tactics across the 10 scenarios.

Higher scores in the “Most Effective Influence Tactics” category are generally better than low scores, indicating that you chose to engage in the best available influence options across the 10 scenarios.

Lower scores on the “Least Effective Influence Tactics” are generally better than high scores, indicating that you chose to avoid influence tactics that would be ineffective and damage advisor-counterpart relationships.

Again, remember that your score does not indicate whether or not you will be an effective advisor. It just tells you whether you said that you would use the most (or least) effective influence strategies of those options provided for the 10 scenarios.

<b>Most Effective Tactics</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>133</b>
	<i>Very Unlikely</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Unlikely</i>	<i>Neither Likely or Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Very Likely</i>

<b>Least Effective Tactics</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>119</b>
	<i>Very Unlikely</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Unlikely</i>	<i>Neither Likely or Unlikely</i>	<i>Somewhat Likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Very Likely</i>

## **APPENDIX D**

### **PROVIDING FEEDBACK ON THE USE OF DIFFERENT INFLUENCE TACTICS INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION AND/OR STUDENT HANDOUT**

This Appendix contains feedback regarding the scores that students obtained on the assessment tool with respect to the use of influence tactics. Scores were only computed for the 9 influence tactics that appeared in conjunction with 4 or more scenarios on the instrument.

If feedback will be conducted in class, it is recommended that instructors:

- a. Make copies of this feedback section and provide it to students.
- b. Discuss only the material in the “Overview” for each principle.
- c. Allow students to read the sections that pertain to the student’s specific scores.

## INTERPRETING YOUR INFLUENCE TACTIC SCORES

Each course of action on the assessment tool is associated with a different influence tactic. You computed scores for the influence tactics that appeared in conjunction with four or more scenarios. This handout provides information about nine of the many different influence tactics embedded in the assessment tool.

For each influence tactic, read the overview that describes the influence tactic and then read the feedback associated with your score. Also, keep in mind that your scores reflect your average response across several scenarios. Thus, your scores reflect how you answered with respect to the *scenarios on this test*. Your scores may or may not reflect how you choose to influence people on a daily basis or predict how you will influence your counterpart when you deploy.

Instead, use this information to broaden your awareness of how you approached the scenarios as a whole. Note if you preferred some influence tactics to others. Examine whether there were acceptable influence tactics that you overlooked. In instances in which the effectiveness of different influence tactics is discussed, information about those influence tactics was drawn from subject matter experts in security force assistance, as well as scientific research on the influence process. The goal of this exercise is to expand your understanding of the many influence tactics available to you as an advisor.

Additionally, while feedback is structured to focus on one influence tactic at a time, keep in mind that you can use multiple influence tactics when attempting to influence someone. Some research indicates that using multiple tactics can be more effective than using a tactic by itself (Case, Dosier, Murkinson, & Keys, 1988; Falbe & Yukl, 1992). For example, there is no reason why you can't try to arouse enthusiasm about a task while also providing logical arguments about why such a task should be performed. Pay particular attention to those tactics that received lower scores, because this indicates that you opted not to select those courses of action across multiple situations. Think about the tactic and decide if it is something that you could use in conjunction with influence strategies that you already use.

One other note—just because an influence tactic was not provided as a response option for a particular scenario does not mean that that influence tactic could not be applied to a similar situation. The number of influence tactics attached to a scenario as a potential course of action was constrained to a small number to keep the assessment tool from taking too long to complete. Thus, the tactics included in this assessment tool only represent a few of the more common approaches to influence, but many alternative ways to influence others exist.

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### APPEAL TO DUTY AND/OR MORALS

SCENARIOS: 1E, 2A, 4A, 5A, 6A, 8A, 9A, 10A

#### Overview:

Social psychology research indicates that one way to persuade an individual is to appeal to the individual's sense of moral obligation or social values (Rule, Bisanz, & Kohn, 1985). When an advisor appeals to his or her counterpart's sense of duty or moral obligation, the advisor is appealing to the counterpart's conscience and desire to do the right thing. For example, an advisor might tell a counterpart that it is his or her duty to take a specific course of action or that failing to behave in a certain way would go against most people's sense of morality.

Eight courses of action in the assessment tool are associated with the influence technique of appealing to a counterpart's sense of duty or morality.

**If you scored 41 or higher**, you indicated you were somewhat likely or very likely to use this strategy across eight different scenarios. Given the large number of scenarios in which you indicated you were likely to make a moral appeal, you might reflect on whether this is a strategy that you commonly use in your daily life. The higher your score, the more likely you were to adopt this strategy across the eight situations in the assessment tool.

In general, making a moral appeal is not necessarily a bad thing, but it does require having a good understanding of your counterpart's moral values and whether or not a sense of duty is something your counterpart values. In the eight scenarios included in the assessment tool, appealing to one's sense of duty generally did no harm, but often was not enough to compel the counterpart to take action. Thus, if you find that you use this strategy often, you might consider using this strategy in conjunction with other influence techniques when you deploy. You also should keep in mind that your sense of duty and morality may be culturally different from your counterpart's sense of duty or morality.

**If you scored between 25 and 40**, you may or may not have made moral appeals consistently across the situations in the assessment tool. For example, your decision to use this strategy might have depended on different features of the situation. Higher scores indicate you were more likely to use this strategy across the eight scenarios, with scores above 32 indicating you are more likely to use this strategy. Lower scores indicate you were less likely to choose this strategy in the eight scenarios, with scores below 32 indicating a preference to not use this strategy.

In the eight scenarios included in the assessment tool, appealing to the counterpart's sense of duty generally did no harm, although this tactic by itself often was not enough to compel the counterpart to take actions. However, you might consider the merits of incorporating this strategy into other strategies you currently use to amplify your attempts to influence others. Using this strategy effectively does require, however, that you understand your counterpart's moral value system and where his or her loyalties lie. Your sense of duty and morality may be culturally different from your counterpart's sense of duty or morality.

**If you scored 24 or lower**, you indicated you were somewhat unlikely to very unlikely to appeal to the counterpart's sense of duty or morality across eight different situations. The lower the score, the less likely you were to employ this strategy across the eight scenarios in which this influence tactic was embedded. Because this is a limited set of scenarios, this does not mean you will never use this strategy in the future or have never used this strategy in the past. It merely indicates that in the eight scenarios on this assessment tool, you were not inclined to use this influence strategy.

Because making a moral appeal was generally insufficient by itself to gain the counterpart's commitment in these eight scenarios, failing to indicate that you wanted to make moral appeals is not necessarily a bad thing. However, appealing to the counterpart's sense of duty also generally did no harm, so you might consider the merits of incorporating this strategy into other strategies that you currently use. Additionally, making a moral appeal was one of the more effective courses of action in one of the eight scenarios, so sometimes this tactic can be quite useful. Using this strategy effectively does require that you understand your counterpart's moral value system and where his loyalties lie, but if you can figure that out, this is one more tactic to consider incorporating into your influence tool bag. It is important to keep in mind, though, that your sense of duty and morality may be culturally different from your counterpart's sense of duty or morality.

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## **INSPIRATIONAL APPEAL**

SCENARIOS: 2B, 4B, 6B, 7B

### **Overview:**

Inspirational appeal is referred to as *inspiration* in the set of influence techniques described in Army Leadership Doctrine (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006). When an advisor makes an inspirational appeal to a counterpart, the advisor is attempting to arouse enthusiasm by appealing to the individual's values, ideals, and aspirations. For example, an advisor might highlight the importance of a counterpart's work for the greater good of society or appeal to other high ideals that the counterpart might hold. Inspirational appeals tend to be future-focused and emphasize an idealized future state of events. When inspirational appeals are successful, they result in commitment and exceptional performance (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006).

At first glance, making an inspirational appeal may seem similar to appealing to a counterpart's sense of duty or morality. It is worth noting that appealing to a counterpart's sense of duty or morality may or may not involve an inspirational appeal. Whether a moral appeal is also an inspirational appeal depends on how the influence attempt is

handled by the advisor. For example, an advisor might appeal to one's moral obligation to behave a specific way, but the advisor might focus on activating the counterpart's sense of guilt at failing to take action. Focusing on the guilt aspects of moral obligation is not likely to be particularly inspiring, although it may motivate some individuals. However, a moral appeal can be inspiring if the advisor focuses on how the counterpart's values and moral identity can fit into a higher calling for the greater good.

Most of what we know about inspirational appeals stems from research conducted in Western societies. In Western societies, inspirational appeals can be a highly effective influence strategy (Yukl & Tracey, 1992, Yukl, 2006). Substantively less is known about the effectiveness of inspirational appeals in other cultures.

Despite our limited knowledge about the effectiveness of inspirational appeals in other countries, we do know that previous advisors report using inspirational appeals with their counterparts. For instance, advisors returning from Iraq and Afghanistan reported that making inspirational appeals was somewhat to moderately important to their effectiveness as advisors but they only engaged in inspirational appeals about once a month on average (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009).

Four courses of action in the assessment tool are associated with making an inspirational appeal.

**If you scored 21 or higher**, you indicated you were somewhat likely or very likely to make inspirational appeals across four different scenarios, and the higher your score, the more likely you were to make inspirational appeals. In Western culture, the use of inspirational appeals can be highly effective (Yukl & Tracey, 1992), but in the four scenarios included in this assessment instrument, inspirational appeals were neither highly effective nor ineffective. That is, in these scenarios use of an inspirational appeal was not sufficient to convince a counterpart to take a course of action. However, making an inspirational appeal did not harm the advisor-counterpart relationship or undermine additional attempts at influence.

Even though inspirational appeals weren't the most effective courses of action for these four scenarios, there will still likely be a time and place for making inspirational appeals as an advisor. A survey of over 500 advisors indicated that advisors used this influence tactic approximately once a month. However, advisors also indicated that other influence tactics were more important to their effectiveness as advisors (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009). If you find yourself noticing that you use inspirational appeals consistently as your primary form of influence tactic, take steps to make sure that you don't overlook other tactics that might be more useful in the advising context. Make sure you possess and use a broad repertoire of influence tactics—perhaps combining inspirational appeals with a technique like rational persuasion. Since there does appear to be some utility in making inspirational appeals to counterparts, do continue to make appeals when appropriate, but think about amplifying your appeals with other tactics. Inspirational tactics often can be combined effectively with other forms of influence (Yukl, Falbe, & Youn, 1993).

**If you scored between 13 and 20**, you may or may not have used this tactic consistently across the four scenarios. It may be that your decision to use this tactic depended on features of the situation or you may not have felt very strongly about using this tactic in the different scenarios. Higher scores indicated you were more likely, on average, to make an inspirational appeal across the four situations, while lower scores indicate you leaned more toward not using this tactic. In the four scenarios that included inspirational appeals as a course of action, making an inspirational appeal was neither particularly effective nor particularly ineffective. On the one hand, making an inspirational appeal did not harm the counterpart-advisor relationship. On the other hand, making an inspirational appeal was typically insufficient to motivate a counterpart to take action.

In Western society, research indicates that making inspirational appeals is one of the more effective influence tactics (Yukl & Tracey, 1992), and it is often used in conjunction with other influence tactics (Yukl et al., 1993). Less is known about the effectiveness of inspirational appeals in other cultures, although a survey of past advisors indicated that using inspirational appeals was somewhat to moderately important (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009). If you find you rarely use this influence strategy, you might consider incorporating it into your influence repertoire and combining it with other strategies you currently use.

**If you scored 12 or lower**, you indicated you were somewhat unlikely to very unlikely to make an inspirational appeal across four different scenarios. The lower your score, the less likely you were to employ this tactic in the

scenarios. Because this is a limited set of scenarios, this does not mean that you are not inspirational or never use this tactic. It also does not mean that you are incapable of making an inspirational appeal.

Previous advisors indicated that, while they did not employ this tactic frequently, they did make an inspirational appeal approximately once a month (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009). Additionally, advisors indicated that making inspirational appeals was somewhat to moderately important to being effective advisors. Research in Western societies also indicates that inspirational appeals are an effective form of influence (Yukl & Tracey, 1992; Yukl, 2006) and can be used in conjunction with other influence tactics (Yukl et al., 1993). If you are not used to making inspirational appeals, consider adding it to potential tactics that you usually apply in influencing others. It is a technique that can be used in conjunction with other strategies, such as rational persuasion.

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## **RATIONAL PERSUASION:**

SCENARIOS: 1C, 2E, 3C, 4D, 5D, 6D, 7D, 9C, 10C

### **Overview:**

Rational persuasion is an influence technique described in Army Leadership Doctrine (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006). When an advisor uses logics and facts to explain to a counterpart why a course of action should be adopted, the advisor is using the influence tactic known as *rational persuasion*. In research conducted in Western societies, rational persuasion is one of the more effective influence tactics at a person's disposal (Yukl & Tracey, 1992, Yukl, 2006). Returning advisors also have indicated rational persuasion was a strategy they used frequently with their counterparts—on average, more than once a week (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009). Advisors also indicated that rational persuasion was moderately to very important to their effectiveness as advisors. Thus, advisors going to Iraq and Afghanistan can expect to employ the tactic of rational persuasion multiple times during a deployment.

Nine courses of action in the assessment tool are associated with the influence tactic of rational persuasion.

**If you scored 46 or higher**, you indicated you were somewhat likely or very likely to use rational persuasion across nine different scenarios. Given the diversity of scenarios for which you believed rational persuasion was appropriate, you may have a preference for using this influence tactic in your daily life. Take a moment to reflect on whether this statement is true. The higher your score, the more likely you were to adopt this strategy across scenarios.

In general, using rational persuasion is probably an effective strategy. Research in both Western cultures and advisor groups indicates that rational persuasion is a commonly used influence tactic (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009; Yukl & Tracey, 1992). In four of the scenarios that had rational persuasion as an influence option, rational persuasion was one of the more effective strategies to employ. In the remaining five scenarios that had rational persuasion as a course of action, rational persuasion was never a poor option.

While rational persuasion tends to be a useful tactic to have in one's skill set, it is important to make sure that you do not neglect other influence tactics that might be available to you. Remember that some people are not moved by facts or logic or they may be able to come up with a better rational explanation than yours. In those situations, you might need to rely on other influence tactics. Additionally, rational persuasion can be combined with other forms of influence tactics, such as inspirational appeal, collaboration, and pressure. Combining multiple tactics to influence a counterpart may sometimes be more effective than relying on logic alone.

**If you scored between 28 and 45**, you may or may not have used rational persuasion consistently across the nine scenarios. Higher scores indicate that you were more likely to use this tactic across the scenarios, with scores above 36 indicating that you were more likely to use rational persuasion than to not use this tactic. Lower scores indicate that you were less likely to use this tactic, with scores below 36 indicating a preference to not use rational persuasion.

In general, using rational persuasion is probably an effective strategy. Research in both Western cultures and advisor samples indicates that rational persuasion is a commonly used influence tactic (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009; Yukl & Tracey, 1992). In the nine scenarios that had rational persuasion as an influence option, rational persuasion was one

of the more effective strategies in four scenarios and was never a poor option in the remaining five scenarios. If you scored toward the lower range of this category, you might reflect on whether you overlook this influence tactic as a viable strategy in your daily life. If you know that you are going into a situation in which you will be required to influence someone to do something, think through the logical reasons why that individual should adopt your preferred course of action. When you communicate your rationale to the person you are trying to influence, it is effective to do so in a respectful way. Your tone and choice of words should not be condescending or argumentative.

**If you scored 27 or lower**, you indicated you were somewhat unlikely to very unlikely to use rational persuasion as an influence tactic across nine different scenarios. In four of the nine scenarios, rational persuasion was one of the most effective influence techniques that could be employed, and in the remaining five scenarios, using rational persuasion was unlikely to do harm. A lower score in the rational persuasion category suggests you might be missing an important influence tactic from your influence skill set.

While rational persuasion is by no means the only method to influence another person, research in both Western cultures and advisor groups indicates that rational persuasion is an effective and commonly used method for influencing others (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009; Yukl & Tracey, 1992). Returning advisors indicated they used rational persuasion more than once a week when influencing their counterparts (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009).

Rational persuasion is a skill you will need as an advisor and can be combined with many other influence tactics, such as inspirational appeal or exchange. You may find that you can easily incorporate this tactic in influence strategies that you already use. If you know that you are going into a situation in which you will be required to influence someone to do something, think through the logical reasons why that individual should adopt your preferred course of action. When you communicate your rationale to the person you are trying to influence, do so in a non-threatening, non-condescending, and non-argumentative way.

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## **COLLABORATION**

SCENARIOS: 6E, 7E, 9E, 10D

### **Overview:**

Collaboration is an influence technique discussed in Army Leadership Doctrine (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006). When an advisor uses *collaboration* as an influence technique, the advisor is offering to provide assistance, resources, or other forms of partnership to entice the counterpart to behave or act in a certain way. Collaboration can be a useful strategy for advisors because it gives a counterpart ownership over the course of action and potentially can mitigate a counterpart's concerns about assuming responsibility and limited resources.

Research in Western societies identifies collaboration as one of the more effective influence tactics that can be used (Yukl, 2006). Collaboration is often used in combination with other influence tactics (Yukl et al., 1993). In addition to research conducted with Western individuals, advisors returning from Iraq and Afghanistan also indicated that using collaboration as a method of influencing counterparts was moderately important to their effectiveness as advisors (Ramsden Zbylut, 2009). However, collaboration (as a method for influencing a counterpart) was not used as frequently as one might expect; advisors reported using collaboration as an influence tactic only slightly more than once a month (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009).

It is important to note that collaboration has a downside. As an advisor, you do not want to make promises that you cannot keep or promise resources that you cannot deliver. Be very careful about promising resources that are outside of your control or ownership. If you fail to provide something that you promised your counterpart, you may damage your relationship.

Four courses of action in the assessment tool are associated with the influence technique of collaboration. In two scenarios, collaboration was among one of the most effective influence techniques to employ.

**If you scored 21 or higher**, you indicated you were somewhat likely or very likely to use collaboration as an influence tactic across the four scenarios for which collaboration was an option. The higher your score, the more

likely you were to use collaboration as an influence strategy. In Western culture, the use of collaboration as a form of influence can be highly effective (Yukl & Tracey, 1992, Yukl, 2006). In two of the four scenarios, collaboration was a highly effective influence technique to use. In the remaining two scenarios, collaboration appeared to do no harm. This is consistent with what advisors report returning from Afghanistan and Iraq: using collaboration as an influence tactic was moderately important to their effectiveness as advisors (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009).

If you find that you often use collaboration as a form of influence, you should probably continue to use collaboration as an influence strategy. However, collaboration is a strategy often used in conjunction with other strategies (Yukl et al., 1993), so consider combining strategies like inspirational appeal or rational persuasion when using collaboration. Additionally, you should take care to avoid making promises on which you cannot deliver. If you use collaboration too frequently, you may be over-committing resources that you do not have or taking resources away from other ventures. Each time you make a promise or a commitment to a counterpart, you should ensure that you can fulfill that promise. Otherwise, you could easily break the hard-earned trust that you have won with your counterpart.

**If you scored between 13 and 20**, you may or may not have used collaboration consistently across scenarios. Higher scores indicate that you were more likely to choose collaboration as a tactic, with scores above 16 indicating that you were more likely to use collaboration than to not use collaboration. Lower scores indicated that you were less likely to apply this tactic to the scenarios, and scores below 16 indicated your tendency to not use collaboration as a tactic.

In two of the four scenarios, collaboration was one of the more effective influence techniques to use. In the other two scenarios, collaboration appeared to do no harm. Since collaboration is a technique often used in conjunction with other influence techniques (Yukl et al., 1993), you might consider if you can use collaboration with other strategies that you use to make a request more appealing to your counterpart.

At least one important caveat exists in the use of collaboration. You should avoid making promises on which you cannot deliver. If you use collaboration too frequently, you may be over-committing resources that you do not have or taking resources away from other ventures. Each time you make a promise or a commitment to a counterpart, you should ensure that you can fulfill that promise. Otherwise, you could easily break the hard-earned trust that you have won with your counterpart.

**If you scored 12 or lower**, you indicated you were somewhat unlikely to very unlikely to use collaboration across four different scenarios. The lower the score, the less likely you were to employ this tactic. Because this is a limited set of scenarios, this does not mean you are unwilling to collaborate or never use this influence technique. It also does not mean you are incapable of using collaboration in the future under the right conditions.

However, in two of the four scenarios, collaboration was among the most effective of the influence tactics that could be employed. In the remaining two scenarios, using collaboration did no harm. Additionally, advisors indicated that collaboration as a form of influence was moderately important to their effectiveness as advisors (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009). Thus, it might be useful to explore why you indicated you were unlikely to use collaboration in the four scenarios in this assessment tool, particularly since collaboration is an influence technique that can be combined with other influence techniques (Yukl et al., 1993).

At least one important caveat does exist with respect to using collaboration. You should avoid making promises on which you cannot deliver. If you use collaboration too frequently, you may be over-committing resources that you do not have or taking resources away from other ventures. Each time you make a promise or a commitment to a counterpart, you should ensure that you can fulfill that promise. Otherwise, you could easily break the hard-earned trust that you have won with your counterpart.

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## **ESTABLISH RAPPORT AND CREATE POSITIVE FEELINGS:**

SCENARIOS: 1F, 3D, 4E, 5E, 8D

### **Overview:**

When an advisor focuses on building rapport, creating goodwill with a counterpart, or communicating an understanding of the counterpart's point of view before making a request, the advisor is using rapport and relationship building as an influence strategy. In FM 6-22, this influence technique is referred to as *relationship building* (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006). In general, this strategy is one that should be applied over time because the effectiveness of the technique rests on a foundation of trust and respect. While it may take time to establish rapport and build relationships, relationship building as an influence tactic is thought to build stronger commitment to requests than many other influence tactics do (U. S. Department of the Army, 2006). Unfortunately, if a poor relationship exists between advisor and counterpart due to mutual disrespect for one another or a lack of trust, attempting to generate rapport in a specific instance is unlikely to result in immediate compliance with a request.

Building rapport with and conveying respect for one's counterpart is essential to advising effectively (Committee on Armed Services, 2007; Ryan, 2008), and advisors who engaged more often in rapport building and respectful behaviors also reported their counterparts were more willing to listen to their advice (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009). Additionally, returning advisors reported that they engaged in relationship building behaviors (e.g., demonstrating respect and building rapport) daily to weekly with their counterparts (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009). Given the criticality of relationship building to the advisor's job, advisors should capitalize on every opportunity to build relationships with their counterparts. This includes building relationships while trying to influence a counterpart.

For advisors, relationship building can and should be viewed as more than an influence tactic; building rapport lays the foundation of trust necessary for a constructive working relationship with a counterpart. Influence strategies that serve to build relationships with a counterpart can enable the advisor more opportunities to mentor across the duration of a deployment. Conversely, influence strategies that serve to derail the advisor-counterpart relationship may create a long-term problem for the advisor with respect to advising and mentoring because the counterpart may not be receptive to the advisor's guidance.

Five courses of action in the assessment tool are associated with rapport building as an influence strategy, and four of these courses of action were among the best actions that could be taken in the scenarios.

**If you scored 26 or higher**, you indicated you were somewhat likely to very likely to use rapport building tactics across five different scenarios. Given the importance of relationship building and rapport to advisor effectiveness, it is good that you selected influence strategies that serve to enhance the advisor-counterpart relationship. You should keep in mind that rapport building also can be used in conjunction with other influence tactics, such as rational persuasion, and this combination of strategies might make a more persuasive case to the counterpart to adopt a course of action.

It is important to note that falling back on one's relationship might not always be successful at persuading a counterpart to take a specific course of action in a particular situation. However, one of the benefits of this tactic is that it focuses on building the advisor-counterpart relationship rather than undermining that relationship. Even if building rapport did not result in compliance with an immediate request, it may yield benefits down the road in the form of a stronger advisor-counterpart relationship.

**If you scored between 16 and 25**, you may or may not be using rapport building in a consistent manner across the five scenarios. Because this strategy was one of the most effective influence strategies to adopt in at least four of the five scenarios, you might want to examine the scenarios in greater detail to explore what tactics you were most likely to employ and how rapport building behaviors might be combined with those tactics. Rapport building is a tactic that can be used in conjunction with many other influence strategies, like rational persuasion, and also may serve to strengthen your bond with your counterpart.

**If you scored 15 or lower**, you indicated you were somewhat unlikely to very unlikely to use rapport building behaviors across the five scenarios for which rapport building was an option. Because rapport building was among

the most effective influence strategies to use in four of the five situations, you should review the scenarios and explore the instances in which you did not view rapport building as a viable influence tactic. Because rapport building can be used in conjunction with other influence strategies, think about how you might focus on building relationships during interactions with your counterpart. Without a good advisor-counterpart relationship, an advisor will have a difficult time persuading his or her counterpart to act on advice or suggestions.

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## **USE RANK AND AUTHORITY:**

SCENARIOS: 1A, 2C, 5B, 8B

### **Overview:**

When an advisor exercises the power of authority associated with his or her rank or position, the advisor is using rank and authority as a means for persuading others. In FM 6-22, this strategy is referred to as making a *legitimate request* (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006). Within the U.S. military chain of command, supervisors have legitimate power to direct subordinates to accomplish tasks, and subordinates are obligated to comply. If only it were that easy for advisors. Advisors are not the supervisors of counterparts (Kranc, 2007), and counterparts do not necessarily have to do what an advisor says. Thus, the advisor may have limited legitimate authority that can be exercised over a host national, and the advisor will often need to try other influence approaches.

Returning advisors indicated that, of the many influence tactics that could be used, they used legitimate authority substantively less than other tactics (e.g., rational persuasion, apprising, and collaboration). Exercising legitimate authority was even reported to be used less frequently than pressure tactics (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009). Advisors reported they used legitimate authority a few times to once a month during a deployment, indicating that rank and authority are used occasionally, but not to a great extent.

Four courses of action in the assessment tool are associated with the influence technique of using rank and authority. In two of those scenarios, using authority is one of the least effective influence tactics, but in another scenario, using authority is one of the more effective influence tactics to employ.

**If you scored 21 or higher**, you indicated you were somewhat likely or very likely to use rank and authority across four different scenarios. Given that advisors generally do not have command authority over their counterparts, the consistent use of this strategy across situations might be viewed as ineffective. In two of the situations, for example, using rank and authority were among the least effective courses of action. Moreover, using rank and authority with a counterpart could result in damaging the advisor-counterpart relationship, because the counterpart should be viewed more as a professional equal than someone of subordinate status. Using rank and authority is an influence tactic that can backfire when used inappropriately in the advising context.

However, instances do exist when it is appropriate for an advisor to “pull rank.” For instance, if the advisor is dealing with a crisis situation and the advisor finds him or herself in the “leadership” position, the advisor might deem it necessary to use “leader” status to effect change. These occasions tend to be more the exception than the rule while advising, but such occasions can arise. If other modes of persuasion are available, though, the advisor might consider exploring those alternatives first.

**If you scored between 13 and 20**, you may or may not have used this strategy consistently across scenarios. In this assessment tool, the appropriate use of rank and authority was dependent on the scenario. Four of the situations on this assessment tool offered using rank and authority as an influence option. In two of those situations, using rank and authority was among the least effective courses of action, but in another situation using rank and authority was among one of the best courses of action. In the fourth scenario, using rank was neither the best nor worst course of action.

In general, advisors returning from deployment report that using rank and authority is one of the least frequently used influence tactics (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009). Other tactics are often available and more appropriate for the advisor-counterpart situation. However, instances do exist when it is appropriate for an advisor to “pull rank.” For instance, if the advisor is dealing with a crisis situation and the advisor finds him or herself in the “leadership”

position, the advisor might deem it necessary to use “leader” status to effect change. These occasions tend to be more the exception than the rule while advising, but such occasions can arise. If other modes of persuasion are available, though, the advisor might consider exploring those alternatives first.

**If you scored 12 or lower**, you indicated you were somewhat unlikely to very unlikely to use rank or authority across the four scenarios in which exerting some form of legitimate authority was an option. Your score mirrors what advisors returning from deployment report. In general, advisors tend to use influence tactics other than rank and authority for influencing counterparts (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009). Other influence strategies are often available to advisors and more appropriate for the situation.

In two of the situations included on the assessment tool, using rank and authority was among the least effective influence tactics to employ. Thus, scores in this influence tactics category scale should be toward the lower end of the possible range of scores, and your scores are in that lower range. However, occasional situations do exist in which advisors need to exert some form of legitimate authority. In one of the four scenarios on the assessment tool, using rank and authority was among the better influence tactics to employ, at least for achieving short-term goals. Revisit Scenario 1A and examine whether you overlooked exerting rank and authority as a viable influence strategy. If you failed to give consideration to “pulling rank,” don’t forget that using one’s legitimate authority can be one more tool that an advisor can use to effect change in urgent circumstances.

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### **USE PRESSURE AND THREATS:**

SCENARIOS: 1B, 2D, 3B, 4C, 5C, 6C, 7C, 8C, 9B, 10B

#### **Overview:**

When an advisor demands that a counterpart adopt a course of action and strongly emphasizes the negative consequences that will result if the counterpart fails to take that course of action, the advisor is using *pressure tactics*. Pressure tactics may take the form of an overt threat, such as removing advisor support, or may be more subtle, such as providing a warning that something bad will happen as a result of failing to adopt the advisor’s course of action.

Pressure tactics are referred to as a “hard tactic.” Pressure tactics are not considered “hard” because they are “mean” or “unfair” but because such tactics limit the ability of the individual to choose to comply with a request and how to comply with a request (Tepper, Brown, & Hunt, 1993). Pressure tactics give the counterpart very little “wiggle room” or negotiating latitude in the influence process.

The effectiveness of pressure tactics depends upon the situation. When the need for action is urgent and necessary, an advisor may need to use pressure tactics to gain immediate compliance (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006). However, if pressure is used frequently or is not mission-related, pressure tactics can breed resentment (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006). Thus, consistent use of pressure tactics may serve to undermine the advisor-counterpart relationship, so advisors should consider carefully which situations merit the use of pressure tactics and which situations will allow alternative influence tactics to be used.

Advisors returning from deployments did indicate using pressure tactics. Advisors indicated using pressure tactics at least once a month and that the use of pressure was moderately important to advisor effectiveness (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009). While pressure tactics were not used as frequently as other influence tactics (e.g., rational persuasion), such findings indicate that pressure tactics can be another useful influence skill that advisors have at their disposal.

All 10 of the scenarios on this tool provided an option to use some form of pressure or threat. Pressure tactics were among the least effective influence tactics in six of the scenarios, but was one of the more effective tactics in one of the scenarios.

**If you scored 51 or higher**, you indicated you were somewhat likely to very likely to use this strategy across all 10 scenarios. While these scenarios are only paper-based situations, your score may suggest a need to reflect on

whether you rely on pressure tactics in your daily life. In six of the 10 scenarios, using pressure was among the least effective courses of action, often believed to result in damaging the advisor-counterpart relationship.

Using pressure can be effective if the conditions are right. When action must be taken immediately and stakes are high (e.g., people's lives are at risk), pressure may be one of the best strategies to employ—particularly if all other influence attempts have failed. However, if pressure is the default influence technique that you use, you may find yourself alienating your counterpart, which will make it more difficult for you to influence your counterpart in the future. Use pressure and threats sparingly and only when necessary.

**If you scored between 31 and 50**, you probably varied with the extent to which you chose to employ pressure tactics across the scenarios. Higher scores indicate you were more likely to use pressure tactics across the 10 scenarios, while lower scores indicated you were less likely to use pressure as a mode of influence. In six of the 10 scenarios, using pressure was among the least effective courses of action, often resulting in damaging the advisor-counterpart relationship. If you scored higher than 40 in this influence tactic category, you should probably explore why you indicated a preference for using pressure tactics.

Using pressure can be effective in the right conditions. When action must be taken immediately and stakes are high (e.g., people's lives are at risk), pressure may be one of the best strategies to employ—particularly if all other influence attempts have failed. It is best to use pressure and threats sparingly and only when necessary. Repeated use of pressure tactics can undermine the advisor-counterpart relationship.

**If you scored 30 or lower**, you indicated you were somewhat unlikely to very unlikely to use pressure tactics across the 10 scenarios. Because pressure tactics were among the least effective courses of action in six of the scenarios, a lower score is probably better in this particular influence category.

However, in one of the 10 scenarios, the use of pressure tactics was merited and one of the best courses of action. If you scored low on the use of pressure tactics, take some time to reflect on the situations that you might encounter as an advisor and under what conditions you would be willing to use pressure and threats. Returning advisors indicated using pressure tactics on average at least once a month (Ramsden Zbylut et al., 2009), so it is possible that you will find it necessary to use pressure tactics at some point during your deployment.

Using pressure can be effective in the right situations. When action must be taken immediately and stakes are high (e.g., people's lives are at stake), pressure may be one of the best strategies to employ—particularly if all other influence attempts have failed. Use pressure and threats sparingly and only when necessary. Repeated use of pressure tactics can undermine the advisor-counterpart relationship.

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## COALITION TACTICS

SCENARIOS: 3F, 6F, 7F, 8G, 9F

### Overview:

When an advisor uses the involvement or support of others to persuade a counterpart to comply with a request, then the advisor is using *coalition* tactics. For example, an advisor might bring another Afghan officer (e.g., form a coalition with that officer) to a meeting to convince a counterpart to adopt a course of action. It should be noted that the advisor might bring his or her “coalition” to a meeting or the advisor may merely say that other people are “on board” with the advisor's point of view. Thus, giving someone *the perception that one has a coalition* also can be used in lieu of bringing actual members of a “coalition” to the influence attempt.

Coalition tactics are not listed in Army Leadership Doctrine (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006), but are described in the psychology and management literature. Like pressure tactics, coalition tactics are referred to as a “hard tactic” because they restrict the ability of the individual to choose whether to comply or how to comply with a request (Tepper et al., 1993). That is, using a coalition tactic can make it very difficult for a person to say no to a request, depending on who else is in the “coalition.” In general, coalition tactics tend to be less effective than other influence strategies and tend to reduce a person's commitment to a course of action (Yukl & Tracey, 1992).

Five scenarios in the assessment tool offered coalition tactics as a potential course of action. In three of these scenarios, coalition tactics were among the least effective courses of action that could be taken.

**If you scored 26 or higher**, you indicated you were somewhat likely or very likely to use this strategy across five different scenarios. In the scenarios on this assessment tool, the use of coalition tactics would tend to undermine the advisor-counterpart relationship, making future influence attempts difficult. Additionally, research indicates coalition tactics are often not an effective influence strategy to employ (Yukl & Tracey, 1992). This is not to say coalition tactics should never be used. Instead, advisors should carefully consider how the use of coalition tactics will impact the advisor-counterpart relationship and determine if any benefits from using coalition tactics outweigh the costs of those tactics. You might explore in greater detail why you chose to use coalition tactics so often in the five scenarios.

**If you scored between 16 and 25**, you may or may not have used this strategy consistently across the five scenarios. Higher scores indicated you were more likely to use this strategy, with scores above 20 indicating a higher likelihood of using coalition tactics. In three of these scenarios, coalition tactics were among the worst courses of action to take, and in the remaining two scenarios, coalition tactics were not among the most effective influence strategies to use. You should explore your score and the scenarios in greater detail to examine whether you thought any situations merited the use of coalition tactics. In the scenarios on this assessment tool, the use of coalition tactics would tend to undermine the advisor-counterpart relationship, making future influence attempts difficult. Additionally, research indicates that the use of coalition tactics is often not an effective influence strategy to employ (Yukl & Tracey, 1992). This is not to say that coalition tactics should never be used. Instead, advisors should carefully consider how the use of coalition tactics will impact the advisor-counterpart relationship and determine if any benefits from using coalition tactics outweigh the costs of those tactics.

**If you scored 15 or lower**, you indicated you were somewhat unlikely to very unlikely to use coalition tactics in the five different scenarios. In three of these scenarios, coalition tactics were among the worst courses of action to take, and in the remaining two scenarios, coalition tactics were not among the most effective influence strategies to use. In the scenarios on this assessment tool, the use of coalition tactics would tend to undermine the advisor-counterpart relationship, making future influence attempts difficult. Additionally, research indicates that coalition tactics are often not an effective influence strategy to employ (Yukl & Tracey, 1992). Thus, a low score in the category of coalition tactics reflects good judgment on your part for the particular situations included on this assessment tool. However, keep in mind that the occasional use of coalition tactics might be merited if you need to use a “hard” tactic, and this is one of many strategies that you could employ to influence someone if other tactics will fail. As an advisor, you should carefully consider how the use of coalition tactics will impact the advisor-counterpart relationship and determine if any benefits from using coalition tactics outweigh the costs of those tactics.

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## **USE NEGATIVE EMOTIONS:**

SCENARIOS: 4G, 6G, 7G, 9G, 10F

### **Overview:**

When an advisor demonstrates a negative emotion such as anger, fear, or sadness to persuade a counterpart to adopt a course of action, the advisor is *using negative emotions* as an influence tactic. Using negative emotions can sometimes be used as a form of intimidation (Leary, 1996). For example, anger may be used to amplify the use of pressure and threats. In other instances, negative emotion may be used to match the mood of the counterpart to build rapport and camaraderie. We can think of examples of this from our daily lives in which we commiserate with someone or share the sadness of another person. Sometimes negative emotion may simply be used to convey information about the importance of the situation and the necessity to take action. Within this tool, the primary negative emotion targeted was the use of anger.

Little, if any, research has been conducted with advisors and the use of negative emotion as an influence tactic. However, discussions with security force experts in the course of developing feedback for this assessment tool suggest that, in these scenarios, the occasional use of negative emotion can be effective, but the consistent use of

negative emotion can be detrimental. When anger is used rarely by an advisor, the emotion can communicate the importance of the situation. When anger is used frequently by the advisor, the emotion can communicate that the advisor angers easily regardless of the situation. In sum, anger and other negative emotions may have more impact if they are reserved for special instances.

Five scenarios in the assessment tool offered negative emotions as an influence tactic. In each situation, use of negative emotion was among the worst courses of action to take.

**If you scored 26 or higher**, you indicated you were somewhat likely or very likely to use negative emotion across the five scenarios. While the occasional use of negative emotion can be useful, consistent use of negative emotion across situations is likely to damage relationships and undermine influence attempts. In all five scenarios, using negative emotion was among the worst possible courses of action that could be taken. You should take time to review each of these scenarios and explore whether other courses of action would yield better results.

**If you scored between 16 and 25**, you may or may not have used this strategy consistently across the five situations. If you scored above 20, you were more likely to use negative emotion, and if you scored below 20 you indicated you were less likely to use negative emotion. Because the use of negative emotion was one of the most ineffective courses of action in all five scenarios, if you scored above 20, you should explore the different scenarios in which you were more likely to use negative emotion. The use of negative emotion may be effective when used infrequently, but could be harmful to the advisor-counterpart relationship when used often.

**If you scored 15 or lower**, you indicated you were somewhat unlikely to very unlikely to use negative emotion across the five different scenarios. Because using negative emotion was among the least effective courses of action in all five scenarios, a lower score in this category indicates good judgment for these scenarios. However, keep in mind that the occasional use of negative emotions, such as anger, may sometimes be merited. If you are someone who rarely displays anger, then a display of anger may convey the importance of the situation to someone who knows you well. You can explore the discussion section of different scenarios to examine in greater detail some of the issues with using negative emotions.

## **APPENDIX E**

### **INSTRUCTOR DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR THE INDIVIDUAL SCENARIOS**

This Appendix contains discussion material for each scenario included on the assessment tool. Each scenario and the response options are presented again in the event that you, the Instructor, want to discuss individual scenarios without having students complete the assessment tool itself.

Each scenario includes a brief synopsis of the scenario, a series of discussion questions, additional information relevant to the discussion questions, and a description of the real event that inspired the scenario.

## Scenario One

CPT Howard is an advisor to the Afghan National Army (ANA). He is returning from conducting a cache search in a village up in the mountains. The mission was successful, but took several hours longer than expected. The soldiers are tired from the mission, as well as the long, dangerous journey to and from the village. They have been on the road for 20 minutes and the journey will take another four hours. The terrain is rough, steep, and perilous, made up mostly of goat trails and mountain switchbacks. If the group makes good time, it will be down to the valley floor by sunset in two hours, completing the rest of the journey under the cover of darkness.

An ANA platoon sergeant (PSG) is driving the lead vehicle, and CPT Howard is in the back with two other ANA soldiers and two Coalition Soldiers. This mission is the first time he worked with the ANA PSG. During the cache search the PSG proved himself to be competent and well-trained. He is also proficient in English, which greatly helped in successfully executing the mission. As a driver, however, he is somewhat reckless. Excited from the success of the mission, he is driving very fast down the mountain switchbacks, which include cliffs with sheer drops to the valley floor below. Everyone in the vehicle seems uneasy about the speed and the safety of the trail. One of the Coalition Soldiers is particularly anxious and starts to yell and curse at the driver. He even threatens to physically hurt the driver if he doesn't slow down. Not wanting to accidentally distract the driver, CPT Howard waits for an opportune moment to get him to stop the vehicle. Once the vehicle has halted, the driver gets out, brandishes his AK-47, and starts yelling at the Coalition Soldier that he should shut up or get out. The group cannot afford to be stopped for very long in this location, or else they risk becoming an easy target for an ambush. CPT Howard tells the Coalition Soldier to sit down and stay back. Next he has to get the ANA PSG to resume driving in a safer manner and get the group back to base safely.

**Assume you are CPT Howard. How likely you would be to take each course of action?**

- A. Order the ANA PSG to put the gun down and get back in the vehicle.
- B. Tell the ANA PSG that if he does not put his gun down and get back in the vehicle, you will report the incident through his chain of command when you return to the base.
- C. Explain to the ANA PSG that he is scaring some of the soldiers in the vehicle, and this is causing them to become agitated and angry. Explain that, if he could just go slower, that would calm everyone's nerves.
- D. Tell the ANA PSG that you'll buy him dinner when you get back if he'll slow down and get you home alive.
- E. Tell the ANA PSG that the soldiers are depending on him to get them home safely and that he has a moral duty to drive carefully and keep those soldiers safe.
- F. Praise the PSG on his efforts at the cache search, and his bravery and tactical skills on the mission. Then remind him that this is the easy part - just driving home. Ask him to just take it easy and not take away from his great success on the mission.

**Synopsis:**

In this situation, the advisor must weigh the importance of immediate safety with the long-term concern of building and maintaining relationships. This scenario also illustrates that an advisor can have multiple and competing priorities in a given situation: advising and developing the counterpart, building relationships, diffusing tensions among multiple parties, promoting safety, and influencing multiple individuals simultaneously. In this respect, the advisor’s role is multifaceted, with coaching and development being one of many important aspects of the advisor’s job.

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>What are some things the advisor should be concerned with in this situation?</p>	<p>Concerns include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Building a relationship with the ANA PSG and ensuring that relations between Coalition forces and Afghan forces do not deteriorate.</li> <li>• Getting down the hill safely.</li> <li>• Defusing the situation so that no one gets shot.</li> </ul>
<p>What should the advisor hope to accomplish in this situation?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Do you agree with this advisor’s goals? Why or why not?</li> </ul>	<p>The advisor who reported this incident indicated his concerns were to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Get the driver to drive more carefully so that the vehicles did not drive over a cliff.</li> <li>• Get individuals to put down their weapons so no one would be shot.</li> <li>• Gain the trust of the driver.</li> </ul>
<p>Of the influence tactics listed as options for this scenario, which tactics do you think are most effective?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option F?</li> <li>• What are the advantages and disadvantages of Option F?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option A?</li> <li>• What are the advantages and disadvantages of Option A?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option C?</li> <li>• What are the advantages and disadvantages of Option C?</li> </ul>	<p>Experts indicated that, of the influence tactics listed, the following options may be the most effective for this particular situation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Option F:</b> praising the ANA PSG on the mission and reminding him to take it easy driving home</li> <li>• <b>Option A:</b> ordering the ANA PSG to put down the gun and get in the vehicle</li> </ul> <p>Option F uses the influence tactic of building rapport and generating positive feelings. This tactic is referred to as <i>building relationships</i> in FM 6-22. In this situation, the advisor is attempting to build rapport and trust through the use of praise and by generating positive feelings.</p> <p>In Option A, the advisor is attempting to use his <i>legitimate authority</i> as an American officer to order the ANA PSG to do what he wants. That is, the advisor is using his position and rank to establish himself as the legitimate person in power in this situation.</p> <p>Both A and F can be effective in gaining the short-term outcome of defusing the situation and getting down the hill safely, but F also helps promote the long-term gain of building relationships.</p> <p>Which influence strategy should be adopted will largely depend on the amount of risk that is inherent in the situation. For example, if there is a possibility that</p>

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Would you combine any of these influence tactics with one another? Why or why not?</li> </ul>	<p>being stopped for a long period of time on the road will risk ambush, there might not be enough time to have a lengthy conversation with the ANA PSG. However, if time permits, option F is the superior option because it also has the long-term benefit of building a relationship with the ANA PSG.</p> <p>Experts also indicated <b>Option C</b> (explaining to the ANA PSG that he is scaring some of the soldiers) could be an effective method of achieving the short-term goal of driving down the mountain safely. In the incident reported by the advisor who actually experienced this situation, the advisor used a combination of A and C, as well as some other approaches, and this seemed to work well for the advisor in this particular situation. The advisor’s story underscores the <b>importance of combining multiple influence tactics to achieve an objective.</b></p> <p>Option C is an example of <i>rational persuasion</i> in which the advisor attempts to persuade the ANA PSG to slow down by explaining that driving slower will make everyone calm down.</p> <p>It should be noted that, in this situation, Option C should be used with caution. Experts noted that, unless handled properly, telling the ANA PSG that his driving is scaring soldiers might have the unintentional consequence of having the advisor appear as weak and scared. Option C might be more effective if other logical arguments were used to compel the ANA PSG to drive more carefully.</p>
<p>Which strategies are least effective in this situation?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What kind of influence tactic is Option D?</li> <li>Can Option D be made more effective by trying a different reward?</li> <li>What is the difference between an exchange tactic and the influence tactic known as apprising?</li> </ul>	<p><b>Option D</b> indicated the advisor should tell the ANA PSG that he would buy him dinner if he would slow down and get everyone home alive. Experts indicated Option D is the worst influence tactic to use in this situation because, not only is it a bribe, but the reward probably is not of value to the ANA PSG.</p> <p>Option D is an example of an influence tactic in which the advisor proposes that compliance will <b>result in</b> some form of <i>positive benefit</i>. Specifically, Option D is a form of <i>exchange</i> tactic in which the advisor is attempting to offer the ANA PSG something of value in exchange for compliance with a request to drive more carefully. In this situation, the exchange tactic might work better if the advisor offered something of value, whether tangible or intangible, to the ANA PSG. Exchange tactics typically work to gain short-term compliance and may not result in a long-term commitment to behavioral change.</p> <p>When an advisor uses an exchange tactic as a form of influence, the advisor is offering a positive benefit that is within the advisor’s control. That is, the advisor has control over the thing of value that is being offered in exchange for compliance with his or her request.</p> <p>However, an advisor also can use positive benefits outside of his or her control to persuade a counterpart to comply with a request. When an advisor describes benefits that are outside of his or her control, he or she is using <i>apprising tactics</i>. For example, the advisor might explain how compliance with a request could result in a sense of personal satisfaction or help that person’s career.</p>

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>What other types of influence tactics were included as response options for this scenario?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option B?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option E?</li> </ul>	<p><b>Option B</b> is a <i>pressure</i> tactic in which the advisor is threatening the ANA PSG with a negative outcome for non-compliance with his request. Option B may produce short-term results in this situation, but will likely destroy trust and the relationship between the advisor and the ANA PSG.</p> <p><b>Option E</b> is an <i>appeal to</i> the ANA PSG’s <i>sense of duty or morality</i> to do the right thing. This tactic may or may not produce the desired short-term result, but unless the advisor is condescending, will probably not alienate the ANA PSG in the long-term.</p>
<p>What other strategies not listed might an advisor try in order to influence the ANA PSG to slow down?</p>	<p>One subject matter expert indicated that one goal of the advisor might be to use this opportunity to coach the ANA PSG to think more deeply about risk. For example, the ANA PSG might not understand that his driving behavior is risky. In some instances, the ANA PSG might even believe that his driving quickly down the mountain is a safer course of action than driving slowly since it will shorten the time that they are on the mountain. Thus, one strategy that the advisor might adopt is to assist the ANA PSG in thinking about the different types of risks associated with different courses of action (i.e., driving slow versus driving fast) so that the PSG will see that the rational course of action is to drive more cautiously. Using this logic is an example of rational persuasion, but it has an additional benefit of mentoring the ANA PSG.</p>

### What Really Happened?

The ANA PSG was recklessly driving down the mountain on goat trails in a pickup truck. In addition to individuals in the truck cab, ANA and Coalition Soldiers were being transported in the truck bed. A Coalition Platoon Leader (PL) began to yell, curse, and physically threaten the driver to slow down because it was dangerous. The advisor believed that the PL’s behavior was distracting to the driver, so he got the ANA PSG to stop the vehicle. The ANA PSG got out of the truck, racked his AK-47, and started yelling at the PL. The PL began yelling back (e.g., “How dare you point your weapon at me! I’m an American”). The ANA PSG understood what the PL was saying because the ANA PSG spoke some English. The ANA soldiers and Coalition Soldiers began to take sides.

The advisor’s first concern was to get everyone to put down their weapons. Several times, the advisor ordered the Coalition PL to sit down and shut up since he was the one who started it. The advisor then calmed the ANA PSG, explaining that this was not a personal attack against him but that the PL was just scared because of how he was driving.

The advisor reported that standing up to the Coalition PL and telling the PL that his actions were wrong gained the trust of the Afghan soldiers present. Later that day, the Coalition PL told the advisor that his actions were wrong and that he was sorry for putting the advisor in the middle of this situation. The advisor also gained the respect and trust of the Coalition PL for not being a “yes man” and taking action in the situation.

## Scenario Two

CPT McNamara is an advisor with the Coalition forces that are working with the Afghan National Army (ANA) in Kabul. Several bombs targeting Afghan soldiers recently exploded in Kabul, and as a result, security is becoming a larger issue. Coalition forces, in conjunction with the ANA, have decided to take several precautionary measures to enhance security. One of these measures involves ensuring that all of the Afghan soldiers have authentic ID cards. Over time, some have gotten lost, and some soldiers have been operating with fake ID cards to avoid paying the fee for a new card. The effort to replace the cards will not be popular for those with lost or fake cards because the fee is a lot of money for Afghans. CPT McNamara and an ANA PSG have been tasked to conduct the ID replacement process with a Company of Afghan soldiers. CPT McNamara has worked with the PSG for several weeks. They have worked well together, although CPT McNamara has had to continually push him to act with authority rather than rely on the Coalition forces for assistance.

Today, a Company formation is scheduled to obtain the fake IDs and start the process of issuing new ones. Prior to the formation, CPT McNamara and the ANA PSG discussed how the sequence of events should take place. The PSG expressed concern that the ANA soldiers would be upset about having to pay the fee, but he agreed that he should be the one to run the event. Once the soldiers are fully assembled, CPT McNamara steps aside to let the ANA PSG run the replacement process. The ANA soldiers begin to question the PSG and argue with him about the process. At this point the ANA PSG gives up and looks over to CPT McNamara. CPT McNamara takes the PSG aside, knowing he needs to convince the PSG to carry through with this job and to not rely on CPT McNamara to get the soldiers to cooperate and complete the reissuing.

**Assume you are CPT McNamara. How likely you would be to take each course of action?**

- A. Remind the PSG that it is his duty to be strong and have courage as a soldier of the ANA. Tell him he has a moral obligation to get this job done. Tell him he needs to stand up to the soldiers who are complainers and make sure they cooperate and turn in their fake IDs.
- B. Enthusiastically tell him that this is something he needs to do for the love of his Army and the love of his country. That although it is difficult to stand up to all of the complaining soldiers and do his job today, it is an act of selflessness and patriotism that will make his family and Allah proud.
- C. Remind him that the ANA and Coalition forces have mandated that this process be conducted, and that he was selected for this job and he must do it, and that as a representative for these forces you have the authority to ensure he does his job.
- D. Warn him that if he does not stand up there and get this job done, you will inform his chain of command about his failure and he will be dishonored and punished.
- E. Explain to the PSG again in detail the importance of the ID cards in protecting soldiers and maintaining the security of the post. Remind him why the fee is being charged, and remind him that there are consequences of not having valid ID cards, most seriously that terrorists may be able to have access to the area.
- F. Ask the PSG if he wants to see his friends in the unit get blown up tomorrow. After he responds “No,” tell him, “Not having a valid ID card is causing our soldiers to get blown up.” Then ask him if he wants to help prevent future casualties. After he responds “Yes,” remind him that he was chosen to conduct this ID card reissuing, and in order to do his part to prevent future casualties, he needs to get back out there and confront the complaining soldiers.

**Synopsis:**

In this situation, how the advisor defines the problem will dictate the action that the advisor deems most appropriate for addressing this situation. If the advisor defines the problem as a security problem (i.e., fake and lost ID cards are undermining security), then the advisor might feel compelled to step in and take charge of issuing IDs. If the advisor defines the problem as an opportunity to build the ANA PSG’s authority and leadership skills, then the advisor will focus on coaching the ANA PSG to deal with the situation of fake and lost ID cards. The advisor also must assess whether the issue of lost and fake ID cards is one worth pursuing. While lost and fake ID cards pose security concerns, charging for ID cards may cause conflict between Afghan troops and ANA leaders and between the advisor and counterpart. Additionally, replacing the ID cards may not solve the problem if the enemy is willing to pay more than the cost of replacing the card.

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>What is the problem that the advisor should be working to solve in this situation?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is the advisor’s role to ensure security in the area or to ensure that his counterpart learns to be an effective leader?</li> <li>• If the ANA PSG is unsuccessful at getting individuals to replace their ID cards, what, if anything, should the advisor do?</li> <li>• What are the pros and cons of the advisor allowing the ANA PSG to not enforce the guidance on replacement IDs? Is this a battle that the advisor should choose to fight?</li> </ul>	<p>The subject matter experts’ discussion of this scenario indicated that the real problem the advisor should address is the problem of an Afghan leader who is unwilling to do the task required. In the U.S. military, leaders may sometimes be required to enforce unpopular regulations. U.S. leaders know that part of their job is to follow orders from Higher and to enforce those orders with their troops. If individuals were able to pick and choose which orders they followed, military units would no longer be able to function effectively.</p> <p>As part of establishing professional military and police forces, advisors must be able to instill this same degree of professionalism in their counterparts. In turn, counterparts need to instill this professionalism in their troops. Thus, while the immediate problem of fake and missing ID cards appears to be a pressing issue, the larger issue is one of building a professional organization in which troops listen to their leaders and leaders do what is necessary to enforce organizational policy and values.</p> <p>Experts identified that part of the problem is that the ANA PSG is a weak leader, so the advisor may need to take some time to build his confidence.</p> <p>Experts also indicated this might be a battle that the advisor chooses not to fight. Replacing IDs may or may not solve the problem and could lead to strained relationships. The advisor would have to weigh the advantages and disadvantages based on the situation before determining whether to act or not.</p>
<p>Of the influence tactics listed, which do you think are most effective?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option E?</li> <li>• What are the advantages and disadvantages of Option E?</li> </ul>	<p>The subject matter experts indicated the following options might be effective in this situation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Option E:</b> Explaining to the PSG in detail the importance of ID cards in maintaining security.</li> <li>• <b>Option F:</b> Asking the PSG if he likes seeing his friends get blown up and reminding him to do his part in reissuing IDs.</li> </ul> <p>In Option E, the advisor is using <i>rational persuasion</i> to explain why reissuing ID cards is one of the best courses of action.</p>

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option F?</li> <li>• What are the advantages and disadvantages of Option F?</li> </ul>	<p>In Option F, the advisor is <i>pairing requests strategically</i> to make compliance more likely. In this particular example, the advisor asks the PSG a rhetorical question of whether he likes seeing his friends get blown up. When the PSG says, “No,” then the advisor provides a logical reason as to how ID cards are related to the bombs. Then the advisor indicates to the PSG that the PSG has been ordered to conduct the ID card reissuing and that the PSG can thus be part of the solution to the problem of security.</p> <p>Both E and F can be effective, but E can be the better option <i>if</i> the person being dealt with is intelligent and logical. Depending on how the advisor conveys the message in F, the advisor might come across as condescending and patronizing.</p>
<p>Which influence tactics are least effective in this situation?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option D?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option C?</li> </ul>	<p>Experts indicated <b>Option D</b>, which relies on <i>pressure tactics</i>, was the worst option because it might destroy the relationship between the advisor and the ANA PSG.</p> <p><b>Option C</b>, in which the advisor is asserting his <i>legitimate authority</i> as a U.S. advisor, is also a poor option because it undermines the authority of the PSG in the Afghan soldiers’ eyes and is likely to hurt the advisor-counterpart relationship.</p>
<p>What types of influence tactics were the other response options?</p>	<p><b>Option A</b> is an <i>appeal to</i> the counterpart’s sense of <i>duty or morality</i>.</p> <p><b>Option B</b> is an <i>inspirational appeal</i>.</p> <p>An inspirational appeal differs from an appeal to duty or morality. Appealing to one’s sense of duty or morality can be viewed as inspirational, but appealing to one’s morality also could serve to motivate one through the avoidance of guilt or shame. Similarly, one may inspire someone by evoking a “call to duty,” but inspiring an individual often involves persuading that person to think beyond their current obligations and focus on achieving some future ideal end-state.</p>
<p>What could the advisor do prior to this situation to prepare the ANA PSG to handle reissuing the ID cards?</p>	<p>If the advisor has identified the PSG as a “weak leader” prior to the event, then the advisor can help build the PSG’s confidence by talking through the PSG’s strengths and by walking the PSG through the different sources of opposition he is likely to encounter while reissuing IDs. The advisor can ask the PSG what he sees as the benefits of ID cards and then coach the PSG on how to relay those benefits to Afghan troops (i.e., teach the PSG to use rational persuasion).</p>
<p>What are some other strategies that the advisor might try to address this situation?</p>	<p>One strategy experts discussed was that the advisor and ANA PSG could offer to let the troops have new ID cards for free this time but insist that individuals will have to pay for replacement cards next time. That might solve the short-term problem of issuing cards and quelling opposition to paying the fee. However, this strategy will be unlikely to solve the ID card problem in the long-term because some individuals will sell their ID cards to make a profit.</p>

## **What Really Happened?**

Several bombs had targeted Afghan soldiers, and part of new security measures was to take fake ID cards from soldiers and reissue valid ID cards. The advisor and Afghan counterpart discussed the sequence of events to reissue ID cards, and they had decided that the ANA counterpart should run the event. The advisor coached the counterpart that he had to take charge of the situation regardless of whether the individuals were officers or higher-ranking NCOs. The counterpart knew there would be opposition to reissuing IDs because the cost of a new ID was approximately \$10 and this was a lot of money to Afghan soldiers.

Many Afghan soldiers attended the event. As the counterpart began giving instructions to the soldiers, the advisor backed away from the counterpart so that the counterpart would be in charge. When the advisor was out of sight, the troops began questioning the counterpart's authority and telling the counterpart what they would and would not do. Rather than taking charge of the situation, the counterpart looked over to the advisor for assistance in controlling the situation. The advisor stepped back out in front of the soldiers and told them to quiet down. The advisor then told them it doesn't matter who gives the instructions and instructions do not have to come from a General in order for them to follow guidance. After that, the counterpart gave further instructions and got the soldiers their ID cards. The advisor remained in sight during the remainder of this process.

After this event, the counterpart was able to give correct instructions for reissuing new ID cards, but would always stop the brief when his authority was challenged. Eventually, the advisor received a new counterpart, but continued to encounter the same problem with the new counterpart.

### Scenario Three

MAJ Dawson is an advisor to the Afghan National Police (ANP) and has been working closely with an Afghan General over the past few months to build relationships between the advisory teams and the ANP forces. On a personal level, the two men have established a reasonable rapport, although MAJ Dawson has encountered consistent difficulty in getting the General to adopt constitutional laws and Ministry directives. He believes the General is simply not knowledgeable about them and not interested in them, and relies on the tribal law and practices that he is familiar with to get things done.

MAJ Dawson has just learned that the ANP patrolmen are routinely being paid their salary in Pakistani Rupees versus the host nation Afghanis. Although the Rupee is the currency of choice for local vendors, the Ministry of Finance's directive is that all payrolls should be distributed in Afghanis. This allows the Ministry to maintain proper oversight of salary distribution and guard against bribes. The patrolmen receive 3500 Rupees, which is the correct value in absolute number (i.e., 3500), but which only translates to approximately 2700 Afghanis. This means the local bank, which is willing to substitute Rupees for Afghanis, is able to pocket the extra money of 800 Afghanis from each patrolman who receives his pay in Rupees. As an advisor, MAJ Dawson knows he must ensure that proper rights and directives are being executed in accordance with the constitutional laws. He has a previously scheduled meeting with the General later that day. He decides to bring the issue of pay to the General's attention and try to convince him to change payroll activities so they are consistent with Ministry directives.

**Assume you are MAJ Dawson. How likely you would be to take each course of action?**

- A. Mention you heard that patrolmen were being paid in Rupees, but had seen in the Ministry directives that they were supposed to be paid in Afghanis. State that you wonder if that is something that should be changed.
- B. Tell him that if he does not change the payroll from Rupees to Afghanis, you will bring the issue to the attention of the Ministry and the National and Coalition authorities.
- C. Explain to him the difference between paying patrolmen in Rupees versus Afghanis. Point out that the patrolmen are losing money that is rightfully theirs, and that it may serve to diminish their commitment to the organization. In addition, the bank is gaining money that does not rightfully belong to them.
- D. Begin the meeting by praising the General's recent successes in a certain area, such as getting a certain number of recruits for the ANP or successful missions conducted by his forces. Comment on his excellent leadership capability. Then mention that you are aware of a situation that requires his leadership intervention – that his patrolmen are being paid in Rupees instead of Afghanis, which is against the Ministry directives. State that you are sure, given his great capability that he would be able to correct the situation.
- E. Tell the General that over the months that you have been working together, you have grown to consider him a friend. Tell him that the patrolmen must be paid in Afghanis in accordance with the Ministry directive, and that you would greatly appreciate it if he would change their pay from Rupees to Afghanis.
- F. Explain the situation to one of your counterparts in the ANP and ask him to go with you to speak to the General.

**Synopsis:**

Many advisors will encounter situations in which they are confronted with the issue of corruption. Such situations present challenges for advisors because what is considered corruption by Western standards might be considered the normal way of doing business in another culture. The situation presented in this scenario is made more challenging by the difference in rank between the advisor, a MAJ, and the counterpart, a General. The advisor must determine if this situation represents an “acceptable level of corruption” (and therefore, should not be dealt with) or is an issue worth pursuing with the General. If the advisor determines this is an issue worth pursuing with the General, then the advisor is likely to be more effective if he or she focuses on effecting change, rather than making value judgments about what is morally right and wrong in another person’s culture.

<b>Discussion Questions</b>	<b>Additional Information Relevant for Discussion</b>
<p>How important is it for the advisor to pursue the issue of pay with the General?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Why should the advisor pursue this issue with the General?</li><li>• What are some reasons the advisor might not pursue this issue with the General?</li></ul>	<p>There is not a definitive answer with respect to whether the advisor should press this issue with the General. Instead, there are arguments for and against each course of action. The advisor must use his or her judgment as to how important it is to pursue the issue of how much and in what currency police are paid.</p> <p>A few reasons for pursuing this issue with the General include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Police personnel are not receiving the pay they deserve.</li><li>• This may be a primary means of getting Afghanis into the economy. Enforcing the policy of paying in Afghanis helps promote a national Afghan currency.</li><li>• The General should be following government policy, not deciding which policies he wishes to uphold. The role of the military and police is to support the government, not create their own policy for a region.</li></ul> <p>Some reasons for the advisor to overlook this issue include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• This might not be viewed as corruption in the local culture. The cut in pay could be viewed as a surcharge the bank imposes as a matter of routine.</li><li>• To achieve the larger mission, advisors may sometimes need to determine an “acceptable level of corruption” on some issues. What is considered “corrupt” can vary from culture to culture. If the advisor destroys his relationship with the General, he will be unable to accomplish anything during his deployment.</li><li>• The local vendors are using Rupees, and paying the police in Rupees is paying the police in the local currency. Local vendors and banks may not be equipped to deal financially in Afghanis.</li></ul>

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>Of the influence tactics listed, which tactics do you think are most effective?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option D?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option C?</li> <li>• What are the advantages and disadvantages of Option C?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option A?</li> </ul>	<p>Experts indicated the following options are the best choices for this particular situation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Option D:</b> Praising the General and then bringing the matter of pay to his attention.</li> <li>• <b>Option C:</b> Explaining to the General that police are losing pay that is rightfully theirs.</li> </ul> <p>Additionally, <b>Option A</b> would likely be used in conjunction with Options C and D, but would probably not be effective if used as an influence tactic by itself. Option A is an example of trying to use <i>indirect influence</i> in which the advisor is hinting at what he or she wants without directly asking for it. This strategy allows the General to take ownership of the idea, which could be important for a person of his status and rank.</p> <p>In Option D, the advisor is using the tactic of <i>building relationships and rapport</i>. Of the response options listed, this is the best course of action because the advisor is likely to be more effective if he engages in ego-stroking behavior with a person of such high rank.</p> <p>In Option C, the advisor is using <i>rational persuasion</i> with the General. This is generally an effective influence tactic to use. However, the advisor might wish to tone down the last statement (i.e., the bank is gaining money that does not rightfully belong to them) because the advisor is making an accusatory statement based on Western ideology. The advisor should be aware that the bank's behavior may or may not be viewed as inappropriate in the local culture and should attempt to assess that prior to imposing Westernized value judgments.</p> <p>In the real story reported by the advisor, the advisor used Option C (rational persuasion), and this influence tactic worked for him.</p>
<p>Which tactics are least effective in this situation?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option B?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option F?</li> </ul>	<p>Experts indicated <b>Option B</b>, which relies on <i>pressure</i> tactics, was the worst option because tattling on the General to the Ministry of Finance will destroy the advisor-counterpart relationship. In Option B, the General also might interpret the advisor's words as insinuating that he is corrupt.</p> <p>Experts also indicated <b>Option F</b> is a poor course of action because involving another individual from the ANP might cause the General to lose face if it turns out he is unable to change the payroll activities. Option F is an influence tactic that relies on a <i>coalition tactic</i> in which the advisor leverages the support of others to get the General to comply with his request.</p>
<p>What type of influence tactic is Option E?</p>	<p><b>Option E</b> is a <i>personal appeal</i> in which the advisor asks the General to comply with the request out of friendship. Option E would probably not achieve the desired results because the advisor has had difficulty in getting the General to comply in the past despite a reasonable rapport. However, this tactic might be used in conjunction with other tactics and would probably do no harm to the relationship or influence attempt.</p>

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>What are some other strategies that the advisor might try to address this situation?</p> <p><b><u>Follow-up Question</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What issues other than corruption could the advisor discuss with the General to persuade him?</li> </ul>	<p>The advisor might try to bring up different issues with the General that are more pertinent to effecting immediate change. For example, while the advisor might bring up the issue of corruption, it might be more fruitful to have a discussion about the importance of forcing the vendors to accept their own currency (i.e., the currency of Afghanistan rather than the currency of Pakistan).</p>

### **What Really Happened?**

In reality, this incident occurred between a Sergeant First Class (SFC) and an Afghan General, and thus had the potential for serious issues due to differences between the ranks of the two parties involved.

Transition team advisors must ensure Host Nation leaders are fluent in constitutional laws and Ministry directives and must build Host Nation leaders' knowledge to ensure proper rights and directives are being executed. Approximately 30 ANP were being paid in Pakistani Rupees rather than the Host Nation's Afghanis. While Rupees were the currency of choice among local vendors, the Ministry of Finance had directed that pay be distributed in Afghanis. This would allow the Ministry proper and lawful oversight of salary distribution.

The advisor reported he explained to the General that the General must enforce the proper payroll distribution from the Afghan National Bank. The advisor grabbed his job book and showed the General the place in the Ministry of Finance's Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) where it clearly stated that patrolmen were to receive 3500 Afghanis. The advisor further explained to the General why the Afghan National Bank was willing to substitute Rupees for Afghanis. The advisor explained that offering the patrolmen 3500 Rupees, while correct in quantity, translated to approximately 2700 Afghanis. This meant the bank was pulling a scam on each patrolman by retaining some of their pay.

The advisor reported his actions helped to greatly enhance his relationship with the General. The General valued the advisor's opinion and respected the advisor because he was able to see that the advisor was willing to research, build knowledge, and execute decisions to benefit him and his district. From that day forward, the General initiated and conducted conversations with the advisor on what he had learned about policy, procedure, and leadership throughout his country. The General communicated warmly to the advisor that he felt that he couldn't have an advisor who cared any more about him and his police.

## Scenario Four

CPT Pelham is a logistics advisor who has been working with the Iraqi Army (IA) for about 6 months. One of his primary contacts in the IA is a MAJ who is a Maintenance officer. The two officers have a friendly relationship which has been helpful in winning over and working with other soldiers in the Battalion. One challenge has been that the IA MAJ is from the old (Saddam) Army and is set in his ways. Over the months, this has led to numerous frustrations for CPT Pelham because the IA MAJ does not use new systems or follow newly established operating procedures. One recurring frustration is that the IA MAJ is supposed to be using the new IA systems for maintenance and parts requests, and producing a regular report for his Battalion each week, but he never does. CPT Pelham has repeatedly demonstrated (more than 10 times) how to complete the report, yet the IA MAJ has rarely produced the report. Not wanting to risk harming the relationship, CPT Pelham has not made a big deal about the missing reports thus far - he just continues to ask about them. Recently, however, the IA MAJ's performance has become increasingly ineffective and the failure to follow operating procedures is beginning to affect the IA Battalion's ability to properly maintain their equipment. CPT Pelham has decided he needs to take a more proactive approach to influence the IA MAJ to complete these reports.

**Assume you are CPT Pelham. How likely you would be to take each course of action?**

- A. Talk to the IA MAJ about his duties and responsibilities as a maintenance officer - ensuring that the equipment is maintained and that the report is provided to the proper authorities. Emphasize that even though filling out the report is tedious, it is the duty of his position and his moral duty to complete it.
- B. Try to motivate the IA MAJ by talking to him about how exciting it is to have the capability to track the maintenance and parts requests. Emphasize there are other BNs that are not yet using the program and reports, and that by fully using these systems he will be providing a model for the entire Iraqi Army to follow. Thank him for his patriotism to Iraq and his unit, and emphasize that completing the reports each week will be a constant reminder of his selfless dedication.
- C. Inform the IA MAJ you will not tolerate the missing reports any longer, and if he does not start producing the reports on time, you will announce his repeated failures and the operational consequences at the next Battalion staff meeting.
- D. Explain to the IA MAJ in detail the benefits of the IA maintenance systems, and how they can improve the functioning of the Battalion. Describe the different people who can use the report and the impact it can have on their ability to do their job and the capability of the entire Battalion to perform its mission.
- E. Determine a couple of things the IA MAJ is doing well, or fairly well, as an officer—perhaps ensuring his facilities are clean, or working to order some new equipment for the soldiers. Praise the IA MAJ for these specific actions and commend him for taking care of his troops. Then mention that another important way to take care of his troops is to ensure they have their equipment in top working order, and that can only happen well if he starts using the systems and completing the reports.
- F. Tell the IA MAJ if he completes the report 5 times in a row on time, you will present him with a Certificate of Accomplishment for technical capability in using the new maintenance systems.
- G. Confront the IA MAJ and show him how angry you are that he is not completing the reports.

**Synopsis:**

Previous advisors who provided feedback on these scenarios indicated that attempting to get their counterparts to complete reports was a recurrent problem, and they had little success in compelling their counterparts to write the required reports. Part of the reason why advisors have difficulty compelling their counterparts to write reports is that counterparts have found that writing reports does not result in change. Thus, report writing is viewed as a futile endeavor. This situation is one that the advisor is both likely to encounter and unlikely to resolve unless something changes within the larger system. Actions an advisor takes to directly influence the counterpart may or may not actually get the report written. Regardless, some courses of action are worse than others because some courses of action will not only fail in accomplishing the objective, but will ruin the advisor-counterpart relationship.

<b>Discussion Questions</b>	<b>Additional Information Relevant for Discussion</b>
<p>Why do you think reports are not getting written?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• What are some reasons why reports do not get written in a timely fashion in the United States?</li><li>• How could one overcome those obstacles?</li></ul>	<p>The counterpart may not be writing reports for any number of reasons, and the reason will suggest different courses of action the advisor might take to rectify the problem.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The counterpart is willing to write reports, but does not understand either how to write a report or how to input the report into the appropriate system.<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• If the issue is that the counterpart does not have the skills to complete the task, then training might be a solution.</li><li>• If the issue is that the counterpart cannot acquire the skills in a reasonable period of time (e.g., the counterpart might not be literate), then perhaps the task can be delegated to someone who is capable.</li></ul></li><li>• The counterpart believes writing the report is a waste of time.<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The counterpart might not understand how reports result in changes at a higher level. Explaining this or showing the value of reports at higher levels might help enhance motivation. This might involve a multilevel collaboration in order for the counterpart to see how information is used. A multilevel collaboration also would create an opportunity for other individuals in the system to see the process from different points of view.</li><li>• The counterpart’s assessment might be correct; writing reports is a waste of time because no one uses the information in them. In this instance, the advisor will have a difficult time effecting change unless the advisor has power to change the parts of the system that are broken.</li></ul></li><li>• The counterpart may not have enough time to do the task because other tasks are more pressing or interesting.<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The advisor would need to convince the counterpart of the importance of the reports.</li></ul></li><li>• The counterpart is unmotivated to perform any part of his job well, and this includes report writing.<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The advisor might need to try a carrot-and-stick-approach to offer the counterpart something of value in exchange for performance on a task. However, this strategy is often short-lived since the counterpart would likely perform the task only when the reward is available. Another drawback of using a reward strategy is that, over time, the reward loses its potency and greater and greater rewards must be given to achieve the same level of performance.</li></ul></li></ul>

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>Of the influence tactics listed, which tactics do you think are most effective?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option D?</li> <li>• What are the advantages and disadvantages of Option D?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option E?</li> </ul>	<p>None of the options provided are guaranteed to get the counterpart to write the report. However, of the options listed, the best influence strategies are <b>Options D and E</b> because they both attempt to get the counterpart to recognize and internalize the importance of completing the reports. Thus, if the counterpart begins writing the reports, it will be because he wants to write the reports, not because some external factor (e.g., reward or punishment) is driving him to write the reports.</p> <p><b>Option D</b> describes the influence tactic of <i>rational persuasion</i>. In this option, the advisor is trying to persuade the counterpart that report writing is important by explaining various ways the report can help the Battalion function. Option D is effective because it can help the counterpart believe in the importance of writing reports. This may foster a continuous commitment to completing the task. However, if the results of the reports are truly not used by others, Option D could backfire because the advisor’s statements to the counterpart would prove to be untrue.</p> <p><b>Option E</b> uses the tactic of <i>building rapport</i>. In this tactic, the advisor is promoting positive feelings by focusing on the many good things the counterpart has done and demonstrating that writing the reports is a continuation of that good work. Even if the advisor is unsuccessful at persuading the counterpart to write the reports, the advisor will have nurtured the advisor-counterpart relationship.</p>
<p>Which tactics are least effective in this situation?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option C?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option G?</li> </ul>	<p>Experts indicated <b>Option C</b>, which relies on <i>pressure</i> tactics, is an ineffective strategy for getting the reports written. Further, this tactic will likely cause the MAJ to avoid the advisor and damage the advisor-counterpart relationship so that little gets accomplished in the future. Experts also viewed Option C as an empty threat that holds little meaning to the counterpart.</p> <p>Experts indicated <b>Option G</b>, which <i>uses negative emotion</i> to gain compliance, is another ineffective course of action because it will likely hurt the relationship and result in the MAJ avoiding the advisor when possible.</p> <p>Experts also indicated, however, that showing anger can be compelling when used infrequently <b>and</b> a close relationship exists between the advisor and counterpart. In the actual incident reported by the advisor, the advisor did use anger to persuade the counterpart to complete the report, and it did not harm the relationship. This is likely because the advisor had demonstrated patience with the counterpart for the six months prior to the incident and the advisor and counterpart already had a good, longstanding relationship.</p>

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>What types of influence tactics were the other options?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option A?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option B?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option F?</li> </ul>	<p><b>Option A</b> is an attempt to <i>appeal to</i> the counterpart's <i>sense of duty or moral code</i>. This might be persuasive to some counterparts, but this tactic by itself does not communicate to the counterpart any sense of why writing reports is meaningful.</p> <p>Experts indicated <b>Option B</b>, which makes an <i>inspirational appeal</i> to the counterpart, is unlikely to achieve results. While the experts noted there was not a drawback to using Option B, writing routine reports is simply not inspiring or exciting.</p> <p><b>Option F</b>, which was providing the counterpart with a Certificate of Appreciation for completing five reports, is an example of an <i>exchange tactic</i>. This approach might produce results in the short-term, but once the reward is removed, the counterpart might lose incentive to complete the reports. Additionally, over time the reward can lose its appeal and the counterpart might desire something of higher value in exchange for reports. On the other hand, if the counterpart successfully completes five reports, he might have established a routine for completing the reports so there is the possibility he would continue that work habit.</p>
<p>What are some other strategies that the advisor might try to address this situation?</p>	<p>One option is to attempt to arrange some sort of multilevel collaboration in which multiple parties involved at different levels of the process come together to see how reports are developed and used at different levels in the organization. This would give people who write reports a chance to see how their reports are used and also provides individuals who use the results of the reports to gain a perspective on difficulties with writing reports. This strategy involves examining the larger system of how reports are used and written.</p> <p>Another option would be to implement some sort of role modeling approach in which someone could come in and write the reports for a short time frame. This might allow others to see the benefits yielded by writing reports (if such benefits exist). However, the disadvantage of this approach is that it might foster the belief that, if counterparts decide not to do something they don't want to do, then the advisor will arrange to have someone else appointed to do the task.</p>

### **What Really Happened?**

This incident occurred between a logistics advisor, who was a CPT, and an Iraqi Army maintenance advisor, who was a MAJ. The CPT had been working with the MAJ for approximately six months and had established a good relationship with him. However, the MAJ was from the old Army (i.e., Saddam's Army) and was resistant to doing things different from the ways in which he was accustomed. In particular, the MAJ did not like to use the new Iraqi Army systems for maintenance and parts requests. Although the advisor taught the MAJ how to complete a BN deadline report more than 15 times, the MAJ rarely produced a report. The advisor had been patient with the MAJ in the past but decided to have a conversation with the MAJ about producing more reports.

The advisor and his interpreter walked up to the MAJ and a few of his troops. Using an interpreter, the advisor spent five minutes talking to the MAJ about miscellaneous things before asking about the report.

The MAJ indicated he had not completed the report, and the advisor got the impression the MAJ did not seem particularly interested in doing so. The advisor believed the MAJ knew how to do the report, but simply chose not to. This angered the advisor, so the advisor verbally embarrassed the MAJ in front of his troops. The interpreter also knew how to convey anger and emotion while translating, and proceeded to convey both the content and emotion of the message. The MAJ became angered and embarrassed. As the MAJ started to talk, the advisor began to walk away, but then turned back. The MAJ promised to do the report, and so the advisor sat down and talked to the MAJ about something else before he left in order to end the conversation on a positive note.

The MAJ did complete the report the following day, but failed to complete it every week after that. The advisor reported the incident did not damage their relationship, primarily because they had a strong relationship before this happened. Initially, the MAJ was angry at the advisor and felt insulted. However, the advisor felt the MAJ's ineffectiveness was worth risking the relationship because the relationship no longer mattered at that point. Because the MAJ never forgot the incident, for the duration of the advisor's deployment he would remind the advisor that he "did work" after completing each task. Although the MAJ continued to rely on his previous way of doing things, he did become more involved in the BN maintenance program.

### **Scenario Five**

MAJ Curillo is a Logistics Advisor to the Iraqi Army (IA) and has been assigned to a Central Issue Facility (CIF) for a new IA Brigade. He has been working with the IA CIF Officer in Charge (OIC), MAJ Al-Jamil, for about 6 months. He regards him as an honorable friend and a professional (he is from the old Army, so has some years of experience). MAJ Al-Jamil also speaks excellent English, so no interpreter is required for them to work together. One day, the staff of the IA Division enter the CIF at closing time and order MAJ Al-Jamil to issue their unit some equipment. The CIF usually closes at 1500, but these soldiers need the equipment immediately for an early departure the next day for a critical mission.

At 2130, one of the other advisors calls MAJ Curillo to go to the CIF. He tells him there are some problems with a last minute equipment issue, and they need him to make sure that the unit receives their equipment that night. He indicates that some of the underlying tension that is present may be related to tribe and denominations, and that the issuing seemed to be progressing ok until MAJ Al-Jamil sent his staff to supper, provoking further friction with the supported unit. Then while the CIF staff was at dinner, several soldiers from the supported unit were caught trying to steal additional items. This intensified the situation to the point where MAJ Al-Jamil sent his staff home and the work stopped completely. When MAJ Curillo arrives at the CIF he can feel the tension and notices that all issuing activity has stopped. He takes MAJ Al-Jamil aside and politely asks him to resume the issue. MAJ Al-Jamil tells MAJ Curillo he refuses to cooperate and will not complete the issue that night.

**Assume you are MAJ Curillo. How likely you would be to take each course of action?**

- A. Remind him that the Prophet Muhammad teaches that we should show mercy to all and the Holy Quran teaches that those in power should use their power to work for justice. Tell him if he refuses to issue items like field jackets, poncho liners, and sleeping bags to hundreds of men, this would cause the lower enlisted (the powerless ones) to suffer. Emphasize he has a moral duty to issue the equipment.
- B. Tell him he must complete the issue and that both the Coalition force and IA Commanders support this position, and have sent you to ensure that it happens.
- C. Tell him that, if he does not complete the issue, his chain of command will have to take a disciplinary action against him.
- D. Explain in detail why the issue is required and what the consequences are for the soldiers and the mission if he does not complete the issue as requested.
- E. Thank him for everything he has accomplished so far, and compliment him on his professionalism in the face of others who were not acting as professional. Then ask if, in the interest of getting everyone out of there, he could resume the issuing.
- F. Mention that you have worked with him for 6 months and know him to be an honorable friend and a professional. Indicate that, although you understand he is angry and you understand why, as a friend you would greatly appreciate it if he would resume the process and complete the issuing.

**Synopsis:**

In this situation, the counterpart has refused to issue equipment to a unit who arrived after normal operating hours and subsequently has stolen some equipment from the facility. The advisor has been called to the scene to help rectify the situation. This situation places the advisor in multiple roles: advisor, social support, and peacemaker. First, the advisor is present to assist and mentor his counterpart to take the most professional course of action. Second, the advisor can function as the counterpart’s friend and ally to deal with a difficult situation. Providing social support can ease the tension of the situation and make the counterpart more receptive to influence. Third, the advisor can serve as a peacemaker between the two parties in conflict, helping to broker a solution that appeases both the counterpart and the unit requesting equipment.

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>To what extent does the advisor need to ensure that equipment is issued? To what extent does the advisor need to take the side of his counterpart?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Question</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• What would happen if the advisor failed to persuade the MAJ to issue the equipment?</li></ul>	<p>Potential points to bring up during discussion include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The importance of the mission—the more important the mission is, the more important it is to issue the equipment, regardless of how badly the requesting unit is behaving.</li><li>• The importance of supporting the counterpart, who has been put in a difficult position.</li><li>• The advisor can be supportive of the counterpart (e.g., commiserate with the counterpart), but still acknowledge that the equipment needs to be issued.</li></ul>
<p>Of the influence tactics listed, which tactics do you think are most effective?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option E?</li><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option F?</li></ul>	<p>The best strategy is one that involves backing the counterpart while ensuring the equipment is issued. It may be easy for an advisor to sympathize with the counterpart, since many advisors will likely have had an experience in which they also had to deal with difficult and inconsiderate people. However, given the importance of the mission, the equipment must be issued because the mission should transcend personal differences. Moreover, part of the advisor’s mission is to ensure the counterpart behaves with professionalism and respect, and true professionalism is most tested when dealing with difficult people and situations.</p> <p><b>Option E</b> is the best influence tactic in this situation because it is an honest assessment of the situation, conveys respect to the counterpart, and advises the counterpart of the best course of action to take—the path of least resistance. In this particular situation, it is important to take the counterpart’s side or run the risk of harming the relationship, but it is also important to ensure the equipment is issued. Option E best accomplishes both goals. Option E is an example of <i>building rapport</i>.</p> <p><b>Option F</b> is also an effective influence strategy because the advisor focuses on some of the positive aspects of the counterpart (e.g., professionalism) and stresses the importance of the advisor-counterpart relationship. This strategy is a form of <i>personal appeal</i> because it focuses on using friendship as a method of persuasion. This strategy could be made stronger by combining it with another strategy (e.g., rational persuasion), such as explaining why the equipment should be issued (e.g., to get it over with, because the unit needs the equipment, etc.).</p>

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>What do you think of Options A and D?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option D?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option A?</li> </ul>	<p><b>Option D</b> is an example of <i>rational persuasion</i>. While it is good to provide justification about the importance of issuing the equipment, this strategy by itself will likely be insufficient to compel the counterpart to issue the equipment. Since the situation is emotionally charged and the counterpart feels he has been wronged or treated unfairly, some indication the advisor understands the counterpart is upset or “in the right” is required to move the situation forward. Thus, to use Option D effectively would likely require combining it with another strategy, such as building relationships.</p> <p>In the actual incident reported by the advisor, the advisor used <b>Option A</b>, but used Option A in conjunction with Options D, E, and F. <i>All</i> of these strategies in concert were required to get the counterpart to issue the equipment.</p> <p>Option A appeals to the counterpart’s <i>sense of duty and morality</i>. Although using Option A worked for the advisor in this particular situation, this strategy can be risky because the advisor is most likely not Muslim and the counterpart might find it derogatory to be preached to from someone outside his faith. In this situation, the use of Option A did not backfire, primarily because the advisor and counterpart had a close relationship prior to this incident. As a general rule, however, this strategy is not advised in a situation like this unless the advisor has discussed religion in a constructive manner before with his or her counterpart.</p>
<p>Which tactics are least effective in this situation?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option C?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option B?</li> </ul>	<p>Experts indicated <b>Option C</b>, which relies on <i>pressure</i> tactics, is an ineffective strategy for this situation. Since the counterpart has likely been pressured and threatened prior to the advisor’s arrival, additional threats and pressure will probably not achieve the desired results. Moreover, since the counterpart has been put in the difficult position of having to issue equipment outside of normal business hours to individuals who were stealing from his organization, implying that the counterpart is doing something wrong is likely to harm the counterpart-advisor relationship.</p> <p><b>Option B</b> relies on the advisor’s <i>legitimate authority</i> and also is an ineffective course of action. Relying on one’s authority in this situation, particularly when the counterpart both believes he is in the right and the advisor is his friend, is likely to be viewed as insulting. Option B most likely would not result in the counterpart issuing the equipment and might damage the advisor-counterpart relationship.</p>

### What Really Happened?

Similar to what was described in the scenario, the advisor had been assigned to his counterpart at the Central Issue Facility (CIF) for approximately six months. The counterpart was a MAJ who had been part of Saddam’s Army, so he had several years of experience and behaved with great professionalism. The advisor viewed the counterpart as a friend and honorable man. Because the counterpart spoke excellent English, they could converse without the aid of an interpreter.

The counterpart had been tasked with issuing equipment to a new Iraqi Army Brigade, and the Commanding General was present. The advisor was not present at this time. The IA Division staff

ordered the counterpart to issue equipment at approximately 1500, which was the typical close of business hours. Thus, from the counterpart's perspective, this was a last minute request. The unit needed to leave early in the morning so it was important to get the equipment issued as soon as possible. The issuing progressed for several hours uneventfully until the counterpart gave his staff a break for dinner.

At this point, friction developed between the supported unit and the CIF Officer in Charge (OIC). The advisor was informed later that issues of tribe and denomination had contributed to escalating tensions. The more pressure unit staff placed on the counterpart, the less responsive and receptive he became. Finally, the counterpart sent his staff home after dinner and work stopped completely.

The advisor was informed of the tension at the CIF warehouse and asked to intervene. By the time he arrived at the warehouse, it was approximately 2100. When the advisor arrived, he calmly asked his counterpart what was happening. Next, using one of the best interpreters available, the advisor spoke to the unit's G-4 and apologized to the Commanding General for the time delay and confusion. Through conversations with the U.S. transition team NCOIC, the advisor discovered that some of the soldiers from the supported unit had tried to steal some additional items from the CIF, exacerbating a situation already made tense by late working hours.

The counterpart brought this to the attention of the unit's chain of command. They assured him that the soldiers would be punished, but the damage had been done. The counterpart no longer wanted to support the unit.

The advisor took the counterpart aside and politely asked him to resume issuing the equipment. The counterpart refused. The advisor then told the counterpart he had worked with him for six months and knew him to be an honorable friend and professional. The advisor requested the counterpart to resume the issue, and the counterpart again refused. The advisor then explained in detail why they needed to do the issue. At this point, the counterpart agreed to issue some of the items. The advisor thanked him and complimented the counterpart of being more professional than those he was supporting.

Then, the advisor gently reminded the counterpart that the Prophet Mohammed teaches that mercy should be shown to all and the holy Quran teaches that those in power should use their power to work for justice. If they refused to issue field jackets, poncho liners, and sleeping bags to hundreds of Jinood, it would be the lower enlisted (the powerless ones) who would suffer. At this, the counterpart relented, and the unit received their issue in its entirety. The issue took until midnight.

## Scenario Six

MAJ Mokros is a Transition Team Leader in Iraq, located at a combat outpost. The Coalition Forces (CF) S2 has reported that an Iraqi Lieutenant is releasing high value detainees in exchange for money. Two Iraqi Army (IA) S2 soldiers have come forward and confirmed the CF reports. MAJ Mokros has been instructed by higher to convince the IA Battalion Commander to remove the Lieutenant from his position. The Battalion Commander is a Kurd and the Battalion itself is 70% Sunni and 30% Shia. The Commander is experienced and well liked by most subordinates. However, he does have a reputation for being soft, especially when dealing with difficult circumstances. Initially, MAJ Mokros and an interpreter meet with the Commander in his office. MAJ Mokros tells the Commander about the problem and the evidence, and the security risk he poses to both Iraqi and Coalition forces. In response, the Commander assures MAJ Mokros that he will investigate and take appropriate action.

Two weeks pass and the officer is still in the unit. MAJ Mokros continues to ask about progress on the problem, and the Commander routinely replies that an investigation is under way. This pattern of interactions continues for the next few weeks, and the relationship becomes increasingly strained. In the meantime, MAJ Mokros hears indirectly that the Lieutenant in question has an uncle serving in the Iraqi government and the Commander might be fearful of retribution. MAJ Mokros decides he needs to meet with the Commander again to convince him to remove the Lieutenant.

### **Assume you are MAJ Mokros. How likely you would be to take each course of action?**

- A. Coach the IA Battalion Commander that high-value detainees who are released are likely to return to injure or kill his soldiers and even the local civilians. As the leader of the unit, it is his duty to keep his men safe and his obligation to protect the people of the city. He must remove the Lieutenant to uphold his moral and ethical responsibilities.
- B. Remind the IA Battalion Commander of the importance of his position and the many years of selfless service he has completed to reach this level in the Army. Tell him that his life has been dedicated to patriotism and the love of his country and countrymen, and although he is worried about retribution for removing the officer, he has to stay true to his personal and professional ideals and to truth and honor.
- C. Tell the IA Battalion Commander if he does not detain or move the officer out of the unit in the next week, you will not continue to work with him and you and your unit will stop supporting his Battalion.
- D. Find out some statistics about re-arrest rates, either in Iraq or elsewhere if necessary. Explain to the IA Battalion Commander the likelihood that the persons released will put soldiers and civilians in harm's way in the near future. Reiterate his role in the situation and explain what he needs to do to fix the problem.
- E. Tell IA Battalion Commander you can assist him with completing the paperwork that is necessary for the action, and that the CF S2 can provide a statement of the events to try to deflect some of the responsibility for the action away from him.
- F. Identify another IA officer that the IA Battalion Commander respects and with whom he has a positive relationship. Convince the officer of the importance of this matter, and then bring him with you to meet with the Battalion Commander.
- G. Tell the IA Battalion Commander that the situation is not acceptable. Indicate how angry you are about the matter and make sure your anger shows.

**Synopsis:**

In this situation, the advisor has become aware of corruption, as well as security threats caused by the corruption. However, the primary problem for the advisor is not necessarily how to deal with the corruption himself, but how to convince the counterpart to deal with the corruption. Dealing with the corruption, primarily through removal of the LT, poses risk to the Iraqi BN Commander, either in the form of physical safety or job security. Thus, the advisor must be able to either mitigate the risk for the BN Commander or convince the BN Commander that dealing with the LT is worth the risk.

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>What should be the advisor’s goal in this situation?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Question</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• What are some things that the advisor should be aware of in this situation?</li></ul>	<p>Although corruption and the resulting security issues are problematic and need to be addressed, the advisor’s goal should be to get the counterpart to address the problem.</p> <p>The advisor should be aware that having the counterpart fire the LT could put the counterpart in physical danger or could harm the BN Commander’s job security. The LT has an uncle who works in the Iraqi government who could make the counterpart’s life difficult.</p> <p>To be persuasive, the advisor must be able to either mitigate the risk for the BN Commander or convince the BN Commander that dealing with the LT is worth the risk.</p>
<p>Of the influence tactics listed, which tactics do you think are most effective?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option E?</li><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option A?</li></ul>	<p>Unless the advisor can somehow mitigate the risk or convince the counterpart that firing the LT is worth the risk, the advisor will probably be unable to convince the counterpart to take the desired action. Optimally, the choice of influence strategy would both mitigate risk and convince the counterpart that taking action is worth the risk.</p> <p><b>Option E</b> is an effective strategy because it helps to mitigate some of the risk posed to the counterpart by having the Coalition forces bear some of the responsibility in removing the LT. Option E is an example of the influence strategy <i>collaboration</i>, and it makes the advisor and counterpart partners in the decision to remove the LT.</p> <p><b>Option A</b> is an example of <i>appealing to one’s sense of duty or morality</i>. This strategy may be effective because the LT’s actions appear to create real security issues that have serious consequences. The counterpart appears to be a BN Commander who has a good relationship with his troops, so protecting their lives is probably something that he cares about.</p> <p><b>Optimally, options A and E would be used in conjunction with one another.</b> Appealing to one’s sense of right and wrong can garner commitment to the action. The advisor’s willingness to accept some of the responsibility in the decision helps reduce some of the potential fallout from the counterpart making the decision on his own.</p>

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>Which strategies are least effective in this situation?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option C?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option F?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option G?</li> <li>• When might the use of negative emotions, such as getting angry, be an effective influence tactic?</li> </ul>	<p>Experts indicated <b>Option C</b> is a highly ineffective course of action. Option C relies on <i>pressure</i> tactics, but the pressure that the advisor can bring to bear on the situation does not exceed the personal threat the counterpart faces if he removes the LT from his position. Moreover, if the advisor delivers on his threat to remove all support from the BN, the advisor will be unable to effectively advise and mentor his counterpart, and the performance of the Iraqi BN as a whole might needlessly suffer. Option C could irrevocably damage the relationship between counterpart and advisor and likely only create future resistance on the part of the counterpart.</p> <p><b>Option F</b> is an example of a <i>coalition tactic</i> in which the advisor would leverage the involvement or support of others to get the counterpart to comply with the request to remove the LT. Sometimes bringing other individuals into a situation can help convey the impression that many people are in agreement that this is a correct course of action to take. Thus, using a coalition tactic can be persuasive in some situations. However, a coalition tactic is inappropriate in this situation because the BN Commander’s job and personal safety are at risk. Bringing an additional person from the Iraqi Army into this situation poses a breach of trust between the counterpart and advisor, and it also could present an opportunity for the counterpart to lose face in front of others.</p> <p><b>Option G</b> would likely be ineffective because the advisor’s anger is less punitive than the job and safety risks that the counterpart would face by removing the LT. Option G is an example of <i>using negative emotions</i> to persuade the counterpart to take a course of action. In the actual incident reported by the advisor, the advisor used negative emotion, and it did not persuade the counterpart to adopt the desired course of action in the way that the advisor wanted.</p> <p>Experts noted that Option G might be effective if the advisor and counterpart had a strong relationship and the advisor rarely used angry outbursts as an influence tactic. When used rarely, anger can convey the importance and immediacy of an issue. Moreover, if the advisor has desired resources that the counterpart wants, anger can be a cue that those resources could become unavailable. Thus, use of anger can be effective, but only when used sparingly and with proper judgment.</p>
<p>What kind of influence tactics are Options B and D?</p>	<p><b>Option B</b> is an example of an <i>inspirational appeal</i> because it is an attempt to appeal to the positive aspects of the counterpart’s service and professionalism. While there are some positive attributes of using this tactic in this situation, it does not address the counterpart’s very real concerns about his job or safety. This tactic could be used, however, in conjunction with Options A and E. Praising the individual for his professionalism and selfless service would likely be more helpful than harmful in this situation, particularly if used in conjunction with another influence tactic.</p> <p><b>Option D</b> is an example of <i>rational persuasion</i> because the advisor is using evidence to make a compelling argument about why it is important to remove the LT. Rational persuasion is a tactic often used by advisors and, in general, tends to be more effective than ineffective. In this particular instance however, statistics, logic, and evidence may not be enough to address the counterpart’s concerns about retribution for removing the LT. Option D, however, could be used in conjunction with options A and E to build a compelling case to remove the LT.</p>

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>What is another solution that the advisor could suggest to the counterpart?</p> <p><b><u>Follow-up Question</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What would happen if the counterpart transferred the LT to a job that did not involve detainees?</li> </ul>	<p>An advisor placed in this situation is likely concerned about two things: (1) a LT is releasing detainees who should not be released, and (2) the counterpart needs to do something about the LT. However, an effective advisor also would realize that dealing with this issue poses personal problems for the counterpart.</p> <p>Experts in the focus group indicated one solution the advisor might consider is helping the counterpart find a solution that removes the LT from contact with detainees but does not result in the LT being fired. One strategy could be to promote the LT to another position or to transfer the LT to another unit. While promotion removes the LT from the situation, however, an advisor adopting this course of action should be aware that he or she is essentially rewarding bad behavior.</p> <p>In the actual situation reported by the advisor, the counterpart decided to transfer the LT to another company. The advisor did not believe this was a good solution because it simply moved the problem (i.e., a corrupt LT) to another location, and eventually the LT was transferred back.</p>

### **What Really Happened?**

An advisor reported that his attached Coalition Forces S2 indicated an Iraqi Lieutenant was releasing high value detainees for money. Two Iraqi Army S2 soldiers came forward and confirmed the CF reports. The advisor was instructed to encourage the Iraqi BN CDR to correct this issue immediately. The BN CDR was well-liked by his subordinates, but had a reputation for being soft.

Using an interpreter, the advisor met with his counterpart in the counterpart's office. The advisor indicated he was angry; he was very direct with his counterpart. He instructed his interpreter to translate verbatim because he wanted his counterpart to see that he was upset and his behavior was unacceptable. The advisor told the BN CDR that this Iraqi LT was a security risk to his forces and the Coalition Forces. The counterpart assured the advisor that he would investigate this matter and take proper action. The advisor had his doubts that any action would be taken.

Two weeks passed, and the Iraqi LT was still at the unit. The advisor met with the BN CDR to ask about progress, and the BN CDR said the investigation was ongoing. The advisor followed-up with the BN CDR for several weeks, and the relationship between the advisor and counterpart became strained.

After four weeks had passed, the advisor sat down with the BN CDR and made an ultimatum. The advisor told him if he did not see results soon, the advisor would not continue to work with him. The advisor told the BN CDR he was putting the advisor's men in harm's way. Two days passed, and the LT was moved out of the BN Headquarters and to a company.

The advisor informed the counterpart that this was not an effective method of dealing with the situation. The counterpart then informed the advisor that the LT had an uncle serving in the Iraqi government and he was afraid of retribution. The advisor told the BN CDR that he was a leader and had to make difficult decisions. The counterpart did not respond to the advisor's comment.

A month later, the LT returned to work at BN Headquarters. The advisor reported that the BN had many discipline problems, which he attributed to poor leadership and cultural obstacles. The advisor reported that his relationship with the BN CDR was strained due to this incident and he believed his counterpart did not fully understand the advisor's position. The advisor acknowledged this might have been due to his approach.

## Scenario Seven

CPT Neale is meeting with a National Police Battalion Commander to discuss operations. Present at the meeting are CPT Neale and a U.S. NCO (serving as advisors), the Iraqi Commander, and his Iraqi S2. The discussion is proceeding with the aid of an interpreter. At various times during the discussion, members of the Iraqi Police Battalion enter the office to make reports or to ask for guidance on a range of matters. At one point, the Commander is informed that Shia militants have surrounded a National Police Patrol and seized their weapons. The Commander seems indecisive about what to do in response to this situation, pacing the room several times. He speaks quietly yet urgently with his men, making it somewhat difficult for the interpreter to translate. The S2 apparently has the names and cell phone numbers of most local militia leaders. He suggests that it might be feasible to contact one of the leaders and identify a means by which the weapons can be returned. The Battalion Commander is not willing to call any of the militiamen and demand the return of the weapons. He says the militiamen are simply too powerful in his sector.

It becomes apparent that the Commander is not planning to pursue any immediate action. He believes little can be done to recover the weapons and only hopes that most of the police will be released alive. Then, speaking directly to CPT Neale through the interpreter, he insists that Coalition Forces (CF) conduct a raid to arrest the militiamen, although he does not know (or is unwilling to say) where they can be found. CPT Neale wants to influence him to take action against the militia.

### **Assume you are CPT Neale. How likely you would be to take each course of action?**

- A. Reply to him that maybe if he had contact information for the local militia leaders, that information could be useful for the Iraqi BN to communicate with them.
- B. Using a motivated tone, tell him he has everything he needs to be a true hero in the situation and get his weapons back – he can call the militia leaders or go out to the village to pay them a visit. Tell him he needs to take action for his pride and honor. Remind him that as a true patriot he needs to take some difficult roads and continually aspire to the next level.
- C. Tell him he must take action against the militia or they will become more and more emboldened against his forces and his forces could start losing control of the city. If this happens, he will be recognized throughout the city as a weak leader and his family’s honor will be tarnished.
- D. Help lay out the facts for him. Identify the number of Shia leaders in the region, and reason that the men who did this must report to one of those leaders. Lay out possible courses of action, including “Do Nothing.” Explain in detail why “Do Nothing” is a poor option.
- E. Tell him that you can’t just conduct the raid for him, but that if he wants some advisors to assist with planning and executing a mission you would certainly be available to assist...
- F. Talk to the Commander’s S2 on the side and see if he has an idea of which group executed the raid, and who they could call. See if you can convince him to join you in encouraging the Battalion Commander to take action.
- G. Express and demonstrate to the Battalion Commander your frustration with his lack of action. With emotion insist that he must take action.

**Synopsis:**

In this situation, two members of the advising team are conducting a meeting with the BN Commander of the Iraqi National Police when they receive word that a Police Patrol has been surrounded by militants. Although the S2 has the names of local militia leaders and indicates that they might be able to contact a militia leader to have the weapons returned, the BN Commander is resistant to the S2's idea. Rather than taking action, the BN Commander indicates there is very little to be done in the situation and hopes *most* of the police will be released alive. His suggestion is that the Coalition Forces conduct a raid, but the advisor wants the BN Commander to take action.

<b>Discussion Questions</b>	<b>Additional Information Relevant for Discussion</b>
<p>What are some reasons why the BN Commander might be resistant to the idea of acting against the militia?</p>	<p>Reasons for the BN Commander's resistance might include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. The BN Commander does not believe his force could adequately stand against the militia. In the scenario, it is noted he believes the militia is too powerful in his sector.</li><li>2. The BN Commander might fear that, if he takes action, the militia might retaliate against him or his family.</li><li>3. The BN Commander might believe that, if he fails to take action, the Coalition Forces will step in. Thus, the Coalition Forces would assume the danger and risks of engaging the militia.</li></ol>
<p>Of the influence tactics listed, which strategy do you think is most effective?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Question</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option C?</li></ul>	<p>In this situation, it is important to get the BN Commander to take action because (a) it is his professional responsibility to do so, and (b) his men's lives are at stake. While there seems to be some concern about the loss of weapons, a very real danger exists for the patrolmen who have been captured. Additionally, if the BN Commander fails to take action, he could compromise his authority and credibility by his unwillingness to take a stance against the militia and protect his men.</p> <p><b>Option C</b> is an example of a <i>pressure tactic</i> in which the advisor emphasizes the extreme negative consequences associated with the BN Commander's failure to take action.</p> <p>Although pressure tactics can often backfire when trying to influence others, it is appropriate and effective to use pressure in this instance. Men's lives are in danger, and the negative consequences outlined by the advisor are likely accurate. If the BN Commander fails to take action, not only are the police who are currently captured at risk, but all police are at risk in the future. Failure to take action in this situation will communicate to the militia that they can attack police in the future without fear of repercussion. While the advisor's use of pressure might seem harsh, his assessment is honest.</p>

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>How effective do you think Option D would be in this situation?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Question</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option D?</li> </ul>	<p><b>Option D</b> may or may not be effective at compelling the BN Commander to take action in this situation, but it may be the next best influence tactic to try after using pressure tactics. Option D also could be used in conjunction with the pressure tactics outlined in Option C.</p> <p>Option D is an example of <i>rational persuasion</i> in which the advisor attempts to persuade the BN Commander using logic and reason. Rational persuasion may not work in this situation because the BN Commander already seems to have a good understanding of the situation, so the addition or repetition of facts may do nothing to change the BN Commander’s mind. However, providing a course of action and describing the potential outcomes to the BN Commander probably will not worsen the situation, and it might help shift the BN Commander from a “do nothing” mentality into a decision making mindset.</p>
<p>How effective is Option F?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Question</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option F?</li> </ul>	<p>In <b>Option F</b>, the advisor subverts the BN Commander’s authority by trying to include the S2 as part of a <i>coalition</i> to persuade the BN Commander to take action. This strategy would likely be perceived by the BN Commander as undermining his authority and could potentially damage the relationship with the BN Commander in future interactions. If the advisor believes the BN Commander will be replaced soon, however, future relationships might not be a concern.</p> <p>This option also is probably unfeasible given the short time frame in which this situation unfolds. There might not be time to take the S2 aside, particularly since this situation occurs during a meeting.</p> <p>While there might be some drawbacks associated with the advisor forming a coalition with the S2, it might be appropriate for other members of the advising team to work with the S2 to persuade the BN Commander to take action. For instance, if the S2 has an advisor, the S2’s advisor could work with the S2 for strategies for the S2 to compel the BN Commander to act against the militia.</p>
<p>Which tactic is the least effective in this situation?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Question</b></p> <p>What kind of influence tactic is Option G?</p>	<p><b>Option G</b> is an example of <i>using negative emotions</i> such as anger or frustration to persuade an individual to adopt a course of action. Although using negative emotions might be effective under certain conditions, it is not likely to be effective in this situation. The situation is likely already emotionally charged, and if the BN Commander has not already been swayed by this, it is unlikely additional emotion is going to change the situation. The use of negative emotion by the advisor also could alienate the BN Commander.</p> <p>However, if the advisor and the BN Commander have a close relationship or the advisor controls resources the BN Commander wants, then the BN Commander might be motivated to reduce the negative reactions of the advisor. This scenario does not indicate, though, that the advisor and BN Commander have an especially strong relationship or that the advisor controls any resources the BN Commander wants.</p>

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>What kinds of influence tactics are Options A, B, and E?</p>	<p><b>Option A</b> is an example of using an <i>indirect strategy</i> to persuade the BN Commander. In Option A, the advisor essentially hints that the contact information could be used to communicate with the local militia leaders. In this strategy, the advisor never explicitly states the BN Commander should do anything.</p> <p>Indirect strategies can be useful to help others save face or allow others to take ownership of an idea. In this particular situation, the BN Commander does not appear to want to have ownership of the idea, and thus, by itself, an indirect approach will likely be unsuccessful to compel the BN Commander to take action. If the BN Commander wanted to take action, he would not have suggested the Coalition Forces conduct a raid.</p> <p>In this situation, an indirect strategy might be helpful when used in conjunction with another strategy, such as pressure. For example, after pressuring the BN Commander by outlining the negative effects associated with a failure to take action, the advisor might follow up with the hint that the BN Commander already possesses the contact information of the militia leaders who could help solve this problem.</p> <p><b>Option B</b> is an example of an <i>inspirational appeal</i> because it is an attempt to appeal to the positive elements of the BN Commander’s personality. Using this tactic requires a good understanding of what motivates the BN Commander. Appealing to the BN Commander’s sense of patriotism may or may not work; the BN Commander may have stronger allegiances to others than to his country or to his men. In this situation, the BN Commander seems to be concerned with other matters, like the strength and power of the local militia.</p> <p>While Option B might not be very effective when used in isolation, Option B might be used after using another strategy (e.g., pressure) to gain compliance. That is, once the BN Commander has decided to take action against the militia, the advisor might use inspirational appeal to keep the BN Commander motivated to follow through on the decision and to build the BN Commander’s confidence in his decision.</p> <p><b>Option E</b> is an example of <i>collaboration</i> in which the advisor tries to entice the BN Commander to take action by offering to provide assistance and resources in planning and executing the mission. This is an appropriate strategy for an advisor to use in this situation because it informs the BN Commander that this mission needs to be his responsibility but the advisors are available to assist. While this is an appropriate strategy to use, it might not be successful in persuading the BN Commander to take action because the BN Commander does not appear to want ownership of a raid against the militia.</p>

## What Really Happened?

A Transition Team Leader, the Team NCOIC, an Iraqi National Police Battalion Commander, the Iraqi S2, and an interpreter were meeting in the BN Commander's office to discuss operations. During this meeting, the group was informed that Shia militants had surrounded a National Police Patrol and seized their weapons. Unlike the scenario presented for discussion and reflection, no police were currently surrounded by militants so immediate action to save lives was not required.

The S2 had the militia leader's name and cell phone number. However, the BN Commander was unwilling to call the militia leader and demand return of the weapons. The Team Leader attempted to reason with the BN Commander. The Team Leader used logical arguments, but also tried appealing to the BN Commander's pride and honor. The BN Commander was adamant that he could do nothing because the militia was too powerful in his sector. The BN Commander suggested that the Coalition Forces conduct a raid to arrest the militiamen involved, although he did not know (or was unwilling to say) where they were.

The Team Leader grew increasingly frustrated with the commander's indecision and inaction. He had the interpreter call one of the militia leaders, a man who he knew, and threaten him with detention unless the weapons were returned. Shortly thereafter, the militiamen in question arrived at the Battalion base and asked to see the BN Commander. The militia leader returned the weapons and claimed to be a peacemaker who wanted to avoid bloodshed.

The intent of the advisor was not only to recover the weapons but also to encourage the Battalion to take a more active role against militia. The advisor found verbal appeals to be ineffective. The advisor reporting this incident indicated that, in Iraq, there is an expression that "there are four fingers between the ear and the eye." The meaning of this expression is that actions speak louder than words. Although it was not the advisor's intent, the act of calling and threatening the militia leader and its successful result shamed the BN Commander into better behavior. After this event, the BN Commander took a more active role against the militia. The advisor had previously learned that expression of emotion during interaction was perfectly reasonable and used the full range of appropriate emotions during the situation. The interpreter was able to mimic these emotions for effect. Knowing that the BN Commander was a profane man, the advisor used appropriate vocabulary. The advisor reported that he took a big chance by threatening the militia leader. He reported that he had not thought through what he would or could do if his threats failed. He had no real evidence against the man and no way to legally detain him.

To the advisor's surprise, the relationship between the advisor and the BN Commander was strengthened by this event. The BN Commander took the opportunity to humiliate the militia leader as a gift to the advisor. The BN Commander also said he admired the "recklessness" of the advisor, although the advisor reports that might have been flattery. The impact of this incident on the Battalion was fairly good. The advisor indicated that the positive impact on the Battalion was not specifically due to the advisor's behavior, but by the men seeing the militia leader turn in the weapons. The event encouraged the men because they saw proof the militia could be resisted.

In describing this incident, the advisor noted that advisors must be willing to assume risk in their interactions with Iraqis. However, advisors must be aware that, if their plans fail or they cannot deliver, then they will lose face. This advisor emphasizes that "advisors must be themselves." Iraqis can judge the sincerity and authenticity of an advisor by his intonation and body language.

## Scenario Eight

An Afghan National Police (ANP) team and their Police Mentor Team are on a routine patrol in a small village near the mountains. The purpose of the patrol is to conduct a community-based visit to allow ANP leaders to talk with civilian leaders and instill further confidence in the ANP as well as the government of Afghanistan. As the patrol enters the village, Taliban fighters engage with a heavy concentration of rifle and automatic weapons fire. The ANP immediately dismount off their trucks to establish a base of fire while the Police Mentor Team and another ANP squad assaults from the flank. In the ensuing fight, three Taliban fighters are killed, one is wounded, and two more are captured.

CPT Siltzer is the Police Mentor Team Chief and is working with his ANP counterpart to consolidate the two forces. He notices that some of the ANP were securing the two prisoners, and he and his interpreter make their way over to that area. As they arrive, one of the patrolmen angrily insists to the Team Chief's interpreter that the prisoners should be executed. CPT Siltzer knows this patrolman and has developed a friendly relationship with him over the course of several months. During training, he was recognized as one of the best and bravest young fighters in the ANP team with a promising future ahead of him. However, it is also widely known that he recently lost his father and a younger brother to the Taliban, and his fervent opposition to the Taliban can sometimes cloud his judgment. The young patrolman's leader is still located on the south side of the village and is not in a position to influence the patrolman. CPT Siltzer wants to get him away from the prisoners and into a vehicle, so he needs to influence him to calm down and move away.

**Assume you are CPT Siltzer. How likely you would be to take each course of action?**

- A. Tell the ANP patrolman that he is an officer of the law and it is his duty and moral obligation to uphold the law. Insist that this means that he must not shoot prisoners and these two men are clearly prisoners. Tell him to get in the truck and take a break.
- B. Order the ANP patrolman to stand down and not to shoot the captured fighters. Tell him that, as the U.S. Mentor Team Chief assigned to his unit, you insist that he move away and get in a vehicle.
- C. Tell the ANP patrolman if he shoots captives he will be brought up on charges and could be executed himself. Tell him to get in the truck and take a break.
- D. Praise the patrolman for an excellent job capturing the Taliban fighters. Tell him you are proud of his valiant fighting and he has given his family much honor. Ask him to come with you and take a break in the truck while you and the other ANP patrolmen load the prisoners onto the trucks.
- E. When you go over to where the ANP patrolman is, calmly say to him in a firm and urgent tone to come over to talk to you. When he comes over, ask him to hold down his weapon. When he holds down his weapon, tell him he needs to calm down and think about what he's doing. Once he has calmed down a little, tell him it is not acceptable to shoot prisoners, and those two men are clearly prisoners. Tell him to get in the truck and take a break.
- F. Call him by his name and say, "I have known you for many months now, and I respect your professionalism and value your friendship. I am asking you as a friend to stand down and let us continue processing these prisoners." Tell him to get in the truck and take a break.
- G. Tell the ANP patrolman that he needs to stand down, and that if his leader was here right now, he would order him to stand down, too. Tell him to get in the truck and take a break.

**Synopsis:**

In this situation, the Afghan leadership is inaccessible, and an ANP patrolman wants to execute prisoners. This particular patrolman recently lost a father and a brother to the Taliban, so the advisor must take the patrolman’s threat seriously. Additionally, this incident happens immediately after a firefight, so the patrolman’s adrenaline is probably high. The advisor’s role in this situation is to prevent the situation from escalating using whatever means are available to him. The advisor should start by adopting strategies that will deescalate the tension of the situation.

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>Of the influence tactics listed, which tactics do you think are most effective?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• To what lengths should the advisor go to prevent the patrolman from executing the prisoners?</li><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option F?</li><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option E?</li><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option D?</li><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option A?</li><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option G?</li><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option B?</li><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option C?</li><li>• What are the advantages and disadvantages for each influence tactic?</li><li>• Should the advisor be willing to resort to violence against the police officer to protect the prisoners?</li></ul>	<p>It is imperative that the advisor prevent the patrolman from executing the prisoners, not only because it is improper to execute captives, but because it is important for Afghans to understand and live by the Rule of Law. Thus, any of the tactics are worth pursuing in this situation, although some will have potential drawbacks.</p> <p><b>Options E and F</b> are the first approaches an advisor should try.</p> <p><b>Option F</b> is an example of a <i>personal appeal</i> that uses friendship to persuade the patrolman to relax his stance. Option F is a good first step to persuade the patrolman to take a step back because it is an attempt to deescalate the emotion in a very tense situation. Option F helps to build rapport and prisoner safety simultaneously.</p> <p><b>Option E</b> is an example of <i>pairing requests strategically</i> to enhance compliance. Option E uses a “<i>foot-in-the-door</i>” strategy in which the advisor gains overall compliance by getting the patrolman to comply with a string of small requests (e.g., come over here, put your weapon down, etc) until the goal is achieved. Option E also serves to deescalate the situation and potentially separates the patrolman from the immediate vicinity of the prisoners.</p> <p>If Options E and F fail, the advisor might consider <b>Option D</b>, which uses the tactic of <i>building rapport</i>. This strategy also attempts to deescalate tension in the situation, as well as separate the patrolman from the prisoners.</p> <p><b>Option A</b> is an example of <i>appealing to</i> the patrolman’s <i>sense of duty or moral obligation</i> and has the potential for success. However, <b>Option A is risky in this cultural context</b> because the patrolman might feel a moral obligation to exact revenge for the deaths of his family. Thus, if Option A is effective, it will be effective, but if Option A backfires, someone might die. An advisor in this situation will need to think carefully about the individual he or she is dealing with before using this strategy in this situation.</p> <p><b>Option G</b> is an example of a <i>coalition tactic</i> in which the advisor invokes the image of the patrolman’s leader as also ordering the patrolman to stand down. This action demonstrates that a coalition tactic does not necessarily require the physical presence of a second person; it merely requires that the person being influenced believes that multiple parties want the person to behave in specific way. Option G might or might not work in a similar situation. However, it is worth trying if other strategies have failed.</p> <p><b>Option B</b> is an example of the advisor using his <i>legitimate power</i> to order the patrolman to stand down. This might not work and does not attempt to deescalate the situation, but if other strategies have failed, then this tactic should be tried.</p> <p><b>Option C</b> is an example of using <i>pressure tactics</i> to get the patrolman to comply with the advisor’s request. This tactic should be used as a last resort if all other attempts fail. However, this strategy also may fail. If the patrolman believes it is the correct and honorable thing to execute prisoners from a group that killed his family, then the patrolman might be willing to accept the consequences of his actions, even if that means his own death.</p>

## **What Really Happened?**

A Police Mentor Team was on a routine patrol with the Afghan National Police (ANP), when they entered a small village near the mountains. The purpose of the patrol was to conduct a community-based visit to allow ANP leaders to talk with civilian leaders and build confidence in the ANP and Afghan government. As the patrol entered the village, Taliban fighters engaged with a heavy concentration of rifle and automatic weapons fire. The ANP immediately deployed off their trucks to establish a base of fire while the Police Mentor Team and another ANP squad assaulted from a flank. In the ensuing fight, three Taliban fighters were killed, one was wounded, and two more were captured. As the Team Chief was working with his ANP counterpart to consolidate the two elements (ANP and Mentor Team), the Team Chief noticed that the ANP had secured two of the prisoners. One of the ANP patrolmen stated to the Team Chief through the interpreter that they should be executed.

The Team Chief, through the interpreter, immediately ordered the ANP patrolman to not shoot the two captured fighters. The ANP patrolman's leader was still located in another part of the village and not in a position to restrain his angry patrolman, who wanted to execute the two captured fighters. The patrolman who fervently wanted to execute the prisoners was one of the bravest and best young fighters on the District Police Force, and he had already lost his father and one brother to the Taliban. The Team Chief had a strong relationship with this young patrolman.

The Team Chief informed the ANP patrolman and the other three patrolmen at the scene that the fighters were no longer combatants and had surrendered. The ANP patrolman was extremely frustrated and threw his assault rifle at the feet of the Team Chief. The Team Chief further explained to the patrolman that, by arresting the Taliban fighters and treating them humanely, it reinforced the Rule of Law, instilled further confidence in the local population of the professionalism and integrity of the ANP, and separated their behavior on a cultural and moral level from that of the Taliban. The ANP followed the orders of the advisor—reluctantly at first—but took the detainees under ANP control without abuse.

The Police Mentor Team Chief spoke later that day with the patrolman's immediate supervisor and the District Chief of Police about the incident, each of whom agreed that the Rule of Law should be followed. Although the patrolman was emotional and angry with the advisor's orders at the time, his cooler head prevailed in the situation, creating a stronger bond with the Team Chief and other advisors.

Approximately four weeks later, the same element of ANP and advisors came into contact with Taliban, killing 10 Taliban fighters and capturing six more. The Team Chief, noticing the ANP patrolman from the previous month's engagement taking charge of the detainees, asked the ANP patrolman what he was planning to do with his detainees. The ANP patrolman emphatically stated he was placing them under arrest and moving them to the District Headquarters. It was a positive moment in the development and continued progress of the District Police Force and a strong indicator the fledging Rule of Law process was finally gaining momentum.

### Scenario Nine

CPT Rawlins is serving as the leader of an advisory group to an Iraqi National Police (NP) Battalion. Prior to the arrival of the advisors, the Battalion did not conduct any organized training. When the advisor team arrived, training was typically planned and led either by the advisors or by other Coalition Forces. As CPT Rawlins began working with the NP Battalion, he sensed that the Battalion Commander didn't care about the capability of his force, and was only concerned with plans or policies that would benefit himself. CPT Rawlins discussed with the NP operations officer the need to plan and implement a Battalion training cycle, but he was not responsive and took no action. In two days, CPT Rawlins has a meeting scheduled with the NP Battalion Commander to convince him that he needs to develop and conduct a training plan.

**Assume you are CPT Rawlins. How likely you would be to take each course of action?**

- A. Remind the NP Battalion Commander that as the leader of the unit he has a duty to ensure his patrolmen are adequately prepared for their jobs. He must develop a training plan to make sure they are prepared. If he does not develop a training plan, he is failing his responsibilities as a leader and his moral duty to take care of his men.
- B. Tell him that if he doesn't show progress on developing a training plan, the advisors and Coalition Forces will stop planning training for them, and will not include them in their own training exercises.
- C. Bring in an example of a U.S. training plan. Explain how the training plan is linked to the skills they need to develop and how setting up a plan for an entire year can help to ensure that they are continuously improving. Provide a contrast of the gains that can be achieved for a unit with and without a training plan.
- D. Tell the NP Battalion Commander that if he will formally assign one of his officers with the task of developing a training plan within a given period of time, you will provide someone from your staff to work with that officer for one hour every day until it is completed.
- E. Tell the NP Battalion Commander that if he institutes a training plan he will be viewed as a forward thinking Commander with lots of promotion potential. Describe how he will bring positive attention to himself and his battalion, and how impressed the Coalition Forces will be.
- F. Continue talking about the training cycle plan to other officers in the Battalion to find someone who agrees that it is a good idea. Get that officer to go with you to meet with the NP Battalion Commander.
- G. Showing your anger and frustration, insist to the NP Battalion Commander that it is not acceptable for a unit to operate without a training plan and that he is failing his duties as a leader.

**Synopsis:**

In this situation, an Iraqi National Police BN has been reluctant to take over training responsibilities for their people, instead leaving training responsibilities to the advisors and Coalition Forces. For the Iraqi BN to be successful over time, however, training responsibilities must be transitioned to the Iraqis. Thus, the advisor wants to work with the Iraqi BN to have the Iraqis begin to take responsibility for their training. Unfortunately, members in the Iraqi BN do not appear to be concerned with assuming training responsibilities.

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>Why should the advisor be concerned with whether or not the Iraqi BN assumes training responsibilities?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Question</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• To what extent should the advisor push the issue of getting the Iraqi BN to assume training responsibilities?</li></ul>	<p>To be a self-sustaining entity, the Iraqis must assume responsibility for developing the capabilities of their security forces. If the Iraqis do not develop a systematic method for institutionalizing training, they will be unable to sustain a quality police force over time.</p>
<p>Of the influence tactics listed, which tactics do you think are most effective?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option D?</li><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option E?</li><li>• What are the potential drawbacks of using Option E as an influence strategy?</li></ul>	<p>Since the Iraqi BN does not appear to have much interest in developing a training plan, none of the influence tactics might be successful at persuading the BN Commander. However, of the tactics listed, <b>Options D and E</b> are the tactics most likely to be successful.</p> <p><b>Option D</b> is an example of a consultation/collaboration strategy in which the advisor promises assistance if the BN Commander will assign an Iraqi officer to the task of developing a training plan. This strategy is most likely to work in this situation because the BN Commander appears to be motivated by personal interest, and this strategy promotes a win-win situation for the Commander. If the training plan is successful, the Commander can take credit for the success and his BN is stronger. If the training plan is not successful, the Iraqi subordinate can be blamed. Additionally, this tactic provides for some advisor participation, which could be helpful to the Iraqis, without requiring extensive advisor involvement.</p> <p><b>Option E</b> also might work in this situation. Option E is an example of <i>describing a positive benefit</i>—specifically, <i>apprising</i> the BN Commander of the personal benefits associated with developing a training plan. Since the BN Commander seems motivated by personal interest, this approach might be persuasive.</p> <p>However, some caution should be used when trying Option E. While standing out as an innovative thinker may be viewed as a positive thing to the advisor, in some organizations and societal cultures, being “forward thinking” can be hazardous to one’s career. Before the advisor uses terms like “forward thinking,” the advisor should assess whether that would be a reward or a liability to the BN Commander in his particular organization given his organization’s culture.</p>

<p>Which tactics are least effective in this situation?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option F?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option G?</li> </ul>	<p><b>Option G</b> is the worst course of action in this situation, regardless of how the advisor feels. Option G uses <i>negative emotion</i> to try to persuade the BN Commander to take action.</p> <p>Since the advisor does not appear to have a very high opinion of the BN Commander, their relationship is probably not that strong. An emotional display would be unlikely to enhance future working relationships. Further, becoming angry in this situation is not likely to make the BN Commander care more about training than he did prior to the influence attempt.</p> <p>While demonstrating anger can be effective in some situations, the advisor should put this issue into perspective relative to other issues. Would it be better for the advisor to get visibly angry over the lack of a training plan or should the advisor save his anger for a time when urgent and immediate action is required, such as when lives are in danger? If negative emotion is used sparingly, it can carry more weight than if the advisor is frustrated and angry in every situation.</p> <p><b>Option F</b> is another poor choice of influence tactic in this particular situation. Option F is an example of a <i>coalition tactic</i> in which the advisor attempts to find another Iraqi who has an interest in developing a training plan and then taking that individual to meet with the BN Commander. In this instance, the coalition approach seems both desperate and subversive. Because the subordinates in the unit know what the BN Commander cares about, they know that training is not his priority. The advisor will probably not be able to find anyone motivated to assume responsibility for developing a training plan. Moreover, the BN Commander is not likely to appreciate any advisor activities (e.g., activities that could be construed to indicate that the BN Commander does not care about his BN) that put the BN Commander in a negative light.</p>
<p>What kinds of influence tactics are Options A, B, and C?</p>	<p><b>Option A</b> is an appeal to <i>one's sense of morality or duty</i>. This tactic probably will not work by itself, since the BN Commander does not seem interested in his duty or moral obligation to his BN. If the BN Commander does have a sense of obligation to his BN, then he does not appear to understand how developing a training plan helps to serve his unit. This strategy might be combined with other strategies, however.</p> <p><b>Option B</b> is a <i>pressure</i> tactic in which the advisor threatens to halt training by the advisors and Coalition Forces. If this is not a threat the advisor can deliver, the advisor runs a substantial risk of being viewed as someone who makes empty threats. If this is a threat on which the advisor can follow through, ceasing training still may not accomplish anything. If the BN Commander does not view training as important, then whether or not the Coalition forces provide training support is immaterial. The Iraqis will not receive training. The BN Commander might care about how failure to be included in Coalition training exercises reflects poorly on him, so there is a chance that he might respond to such a threat, but by making the threat, the advisor would likely destroy the relationship. Thus, the advisor might be able to accomplish the implementation of a training plan, but would have difficulty persuading the BN Commander to do anything else for the duration of the deployment.</p> <p><b>Option C</b> is an example of <i>rational persuasion</i>. In this strategy, the advisor uses</p>

	<p>logic and facts to explain why a training strategy is necessary. While this technique can often be effective, in this instance the BN Commander seems to be an individual motivated primarily by personal interest. Explaining the training benefits to the BN Commander probably will not be persuasive unless the training benefits can be linked back to how training will make the BN Commander look good. Additionally, the advisor may come across as trying to “sell” the American way of managing training, and the BN Commander may not be receptive to that. However, if the advisor can promote the training plan as one example of managing training, allows for an Iraqi solution to developing a training plan, <i>and</i> indicates the personal benefits the BN Commander might reap from instituting training, the advisor might be more successful. Thus, the advisor might use rational persuasion in conjunction with another strategy, such as option D or E. Option D gives Iraqis ownership of the training, while Option E appeals to the BN Commander’s personal interests.</p>
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**What Really Happened?**

Like the situation described in the scenario, the incident recounted by the advisor involves an advisor attempting to convince a counterpart to make BN training a priority. The National Police Battalion did not conduct any sort of organized training and the advisor wanted to change that. Training was planned and led by the advisor team or Coalition Forces.

The incident reported by the advisor differs slightly from the scenario presented in that the advisor did not deal with the BN Commander, but primarily with the Iraqi Operations Officer. The advisor reported that the Operations Officer did not care about efficiency of the BN’s National Police. He seemed more concerned with personnel gain (i.e., receiving more money and raising money for the BN) rather than the success of his BN. Only after the advisors convinced the counterpart that a BN training cycle was ultimately in the Operations Officer’s personal interest did he agree to develop and implement training. Additionally, the advisor team refused to plan and conduct training for the NP BN, which led to no training being conducted for seven months. It was only after convincing the counterpart that the implementation of a BN training cycle would bring positive attention to the BN and himself that the counterpart was convinced. The advisor team also explained how the training would please Coalition Forces. Only when Coalition Forces stopped planning training for the NP and it personally benefited NP leadership did the counterpart plan and implement training.

## Scenario Ten

MAJ Barrera is serving as the leader of an advisory group to the Afghan National Army (ANA). Since he arrived a couple of months ago, issues have repeatedly arisen regarding lack of accurate accountability for equipment in the ANA unit. MAJ Barrera set up a meeting between members of the advisory group and several key ANA officers to explain the situation and convince the ANA S3 to improve his accountability. At the meeting, MAJ Barrera and the other advisors try to explain the goals and benefits of accurate accountability. The ANA officers interrupt the interpreters, making rude comments, and answering questions sarcastically. MAJ Barrera ends the meeting and is planning to meet with the ANA S3 to convince him to improve his accountability.

**Assume you are MAJ Barrera. How likely you would be to take each course of action?**

- A. Tell the ANA S3 that while accountability for equipment may sound trivial, it is highly important to a well-disciplined Army. As an officer he has a duty to the ANA and to Afghanistan to take care of the equipment their country has entrusted to them and ensure it doesn't fall into the wrong hands. It is his moral obligation to create a system to monitor this equipment.
- B. Tell him that if he does not take these meetings seriously and participate fully to find a solution, the advisory group will stop supporting their unit altogether, and that they will provide a report to the ANA and Coalition Commanders precisely why.
- C. Explain to the S3 the goals and benefits of accurate accountability. Describe in detail the consequences of failing to maintain accountability of equipment and how it hurts the soldiers and the ANA.
- D. Indicate to the ANA S3 that this problem can only be solved by having them actively involved, and that if his officers will start participating appropriately in the meeting, then the advisory group will work with them to outline a plan for accountability.
- E. Tell the S3 that if he puts together a detailed plan for equipment accountability, his chain of command as well as the Coalition Forces will be highly impressed, and it will likely lead to some type of award for him as they demonstrate the effectiveness of the system.
- F. Get visibly angry. Tell him you are there to help the ANA improve. If he and his fellow officers are not interested in working to improve, they should not bother to come to meetings in the future because they are wasting your time.

**Synopsis:**

In this situation, the advisor is concerned about equipment accountability and wants the ANA S3 to improve accountability. However, at a meeting between Afghan officers and the advisor team, the Afghan officers were sarcastic and rude. Thus, the advisor appears to have larger issues than equipment accountability since the leaders in the ANA do not appear to respect the advisor team.

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>What is the primary issue the advisor should be concerned with in this situation?</p>	<p>While equipment accountability is a concern, the larger issue is that the ANA does not appear to respect the advisor team, as indicated by the rude behavior of the Afghan officers. Since the advisor team has only been working with the ANA for a couple of months, this lack of respect does not bode well for the advising team to be successful at influencing their counterparts over time.</p>
<p>Of the influence tactics listed, which tactics do you think are most effective?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option E?</li><li>• How could Option E be made more effective?</li><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option D?</li><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option C?</li><li>• What other facts and information could be used to make Option C a more compelling argument?</li></ul>	<p><b>Option E</b> is an example of <i>describing a positive benefit</i> for complying with the advisor’s request. Specifically, the advisor is <i>apprising</i> the S3 of how putting together a plan for equipment accountability will personally benefit the S3. Option E is one of the better tactics to use in this situation because the advisor does not appear to have a good relationship with the counterpart and thus has limited personal sway over him. However, this tactic will only be effective if the S3 is held accountable for developing a plan.</p> <p>Option E might work better if it were combined with a <i>collaboration</i> strategy, such as <b>Option D</b>. For example, rather than indicating that the S3 should put a plan together, the advisor might say, “We should put a plan together,” which would help to build the advisor-counterpart relationship and ensure that the plan is an Afghan plan, not a plan imposed by the Americans. By itself, however, a collaboration strategy may not be sufficient to persuade the S3.</p> <p><b>Option C</b> is an example of <i>rational persuasion</i> and is a reasonable approach to attempt in this situation. While it may or may not be successful, it probably will not harm the relationship or hurt chances of improving the relationship in the future.</p> <p>To make Option C more compelling, the advisor also could indicate that the advisors will send up an equipment report that is accurate and that eventually there could be consequences in terms of pay.</p>
<p>How effective is Option A?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Question</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option A?</li></ul>	<p><b>Option A</b> is an example of the advisor trying to influence the ANA S3 by appealing to the Afghan’s <i>sense of duty or morality</i>. In this situation, this is a strategy worth trying because it conveys the importance of equipment accountability without demeaning or blaming the ANA S3 for the previous lack of accountability. However, the success of this approach is contingent upon how much the ANA S3 cares about his mission and the ANA. If the S3 cares about his duty and country, the advisor’s appeal might work. If the S3 cares only about himself or has other loyalties, this strategy would probably be ineffective.</p>

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
<p>Which tactics are least effective in this situation?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Questions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option F?</li> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option B?</li> <li>• What can the advisor threaten to make the use of pressure tactics more successful?</li> </ul>	<p><b>Option F</b> is the worst course of action in this situation, regardless of how the advisor feels. The Afghans are already demonstrating unprofessional and rude behavior in this situation, and getting visibly angry reinforces that behavior. In this instance, the advisor needs to be a role model for proper behavior, and getting angry will have no effect on individuals who already lack respect for the advisor. Option F is an example of <i>using negative emotion</i> to influence others.</p> <p><b>Option B</b> is an example of using <i>pressure tactics</i>. While some pressure tactics might be effective in this situation, the particular form of threat used in this situation probably will not succeed. The reason why this form of pressure will not work in this situation is because the advisor team may not be able to stop supporting the unit and thus, the advisor might be put in a position where he fails to deliver on his threat. Failure to deliver on the threat would only undermine the advising team’s credibility with the ANA further.</p> <p>While the advisor may not be able to stop supporting the ANA unit completely, the advisor might be able to cut off equipment. The advisor also must follow up with sending reports to the ANA and Coalition Commanders to hold the S3 accountable. Since the equipment is disappearing, cutting off the equipment would not be likely to put the unit in a worse position than it already is. Since equipment also appears to have some value to the people taking it, removing equipment is punitive to those individuals who are taking it.</p>
<p>What do you think about Option D?</p> <p><b>Follow-up Question</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of influence tactic is Option D?</li> </ul>	<p><b>Option D</b> is an example of a <i>collaboration tactic</i> in which the advisor offers to work with the Afghans to develop a plan for accountability.</p> <p>Option D is a reasonable approach to attempt because it actively engages the ANA in the process. This influence tactic also will not further deteriorate advisor-counterpart relations. However, option D by itself may not be compelling enough to get the Afghans to take action. Option D might be more effective if it was then followed up with a pressure tactic, such as “If you do not create a plan for accountability, your equipment will be cut off.”</p> <p>Additionally, collaboration might be necessary for any form of influence to work in this situation. The S3 might not know how to create a plan for equipment accountability, and the advisors may need to assist with that process. Collaboration also is more likely to work than imposing an American solution on the problem because, given the lack of respect for the advising team, the Afghans are unlikely to adopt what they perceive as the “American way of doing things.”</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In the actual incident reported by the advisor, the advisor was an NCO and not a MAJ. What role, if any, do you think the rank of the advisor played in the rudeness of the Afghan officers?</li> </ul>	<p>In both Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a pronounced distinction between the respect given to officers versus NCOs. Iraqi and Afghan officers often do not hold their NCOs in the same regard as American officers hold their NCOs. This lack of respect appears to be part of the culture, although not every Host Nation officer holds this mindset.</p> <p>The lack of respect can present a challenge for American NCOs who function as advisors to host nation officers, because the counterpart may not view the NCO</p>

Discussion Questions	Additional Information Relevant for Discussion
	<p>advisor as a credible authority or may be offended by taking the advice of an NCO. Indeed, some NCO advisors in both Iraq and Afghanistan have reported struggling with gaining the respect of their officer counterparts. However, some NCO advisors are able to “win over” their counterparts, but this can require diligent effort to build the relationship. U.S. NCOs (and U.S. officers, too) should make the most of every opportunity to demonstrate their expertise to host nation personnel. Not all NCOs will encounter difficulties in dealing with counterparts who are officers, but sometimes NCOs will confront disdain and disrespect on the part of their counterparts.</p>

### **What Really Happened?**

This incident took place at Brigade Headquarters in an Afghan Military Training Center. The advisor was discussing the issue of equipment accountability with officers from the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the U.S. Army. The primary advisor reporting this incident was an NCO. As the advisor was trying to explain the goals of accountability, the ANA officers interrupted with rude comments. The ANA’s interpreter was inefficient in the way that he answered the advisors’ questions and would often just nod his head. The advisor describing this incident indicated he began to rely on his interpreter and asked his interpreter to relay everything that had been said. The advisor’s interpreter communicated everything in a prompt and efficient manner.

The advisor told the ANA officers that the advisor team was there to help them develop a better military and that their resistance was going to hinder their progress. The advisor told them this was their Army and it would only get better when they stopped being corrupt. One of the ANA officers told the advisor he didn't like having an NCO telling him what to do and he would quit. The advisor told the ANA officer that the advisor was there because he knew how to make things better. If the officer did not like it, he could feel free to quit. The advisor informed him that they would get someone in his place who was more interested in making Afghanistan better. The advisor reported that showing the Afghans that the advisors were interested in their cause made them turn things around and changed their attitude. The advisor did not report whether the problem of equipment accountability was ever solved.

## **APPENDIX F**

### **HANDOUT OF INFLUENCE TACTICS THAT APPEAR AS RESPONSE OPTIONS ON THE ASSESSMENT TOOL**

Print copies of this handout for students to help facilitate discussion of the different influence tactics when discussing the scenarios in class.

## INFLUENCE TACTICS THAT APPEAR ON THE ASSESSMENT TOOL

Influence Tactic	Description
Appeal to Duty and/or Morality	When an advisor uses this tactic, the advisor appeals to the counterpart's conscience and desire to do the right thing. For example, the advisor might tell a counterpart that taking an action is their duty or moral obligation. This tactic may sometimes use guilt as a motivator, but also may rely on a counterpart's desire to follow norms and social conventions.
Inspirational Appeal	Inspirational appeal is a tactic in which the advisor attempts to motivate a counterpart to take action by appealing to an individual's values, ideals, and aspirations. In this instance, the advisor is attempting to persuade the counterpart to take action out of a higher calling. While appealing to one's sense of duty may activate the motivation to avoid guilt or to comply with social norms currently in place, an inspirational appeal attempts to persuade a counterpart by generating enthusiasm for something selfless and noble.
Rational Persuasion	The advisor uses logic and facts to explain to a counterpart why a course of action should be adopted.
Collaboration	The advisor offers to provide assistance, resources, or other forms of advisor-counterpart partnership to entice the counterpart to behave or act in a certain way. Collaboration can be a useful strategy for advisors because it gives a counterpart ownership over the course of action and potentially can mitigate a counterpart's concerns about responsibility and limited resources.
Establishing Rapport and Creating Positive Feelings	When an advisor focuses on building rapport, creating goodwill with a counterpart, or communicating an understanding of the counterpart's point of view before making a request, the advisor is using rapport building as an influence strategy. In FM 6-22, this influence technique is referred to as <i>relationship building</i> .
Use Rank or Authority	When an advisor exercises the power of authority associated with his or her rank or position, the advisor is using rank and authority as a means for persuading others. In FM 6-22, this strategy is referred to as making a <i>legitimate request</i> .
Use Pressure, Threats, or Warnings	When an advisor demands that a counterpart adopt a course of action and strongly emphasizes that negative consequences will result if the counterpart fails to take that course of action, the advisor is using pressure tactics. Pressure tactics may take the form of an overt threat, such as removing advisor support, or may be more subtle, such as providing a warning that something bad will happen in the future as a result of failing to adopt the advisor's course of action.

Influence Tactic	Description
Coalition Tactics	When an advisor uses the involvement or support of others to persuade a counterpart to comply with a request, then the advisor is using coalition tactics. For example, an advisor might bring another Afghan officer (e.g., form a coalition with that officer) to a meeting to convince a counterpart to adopt a course of action. It should be noted that the advisor might bring his or her “coalition” to a meeting or the advisor may merely say that other people are “on board” with the advisor’s point of view.
Use Negative Emotion	When an advisor demonstrates a negative emotion such as anger, fear, or sadness to persuade a counterpart to adopt a course of action, the advisor is using negative emotions as an influence tactic. Using negative emotions can sometimes be used as a form of intimidation. For example, anger may be used to amplify the use of pressure and threats. In other instances, negative emotion may be used to match the mood of the counterpart to build rapport and camaraderie. Sometimes negative emotion may simply be used to convey information about the importance of the situation and the necessity to take action.
Apprising Tactics	When an advisor explains how compliance will personally benefit his or her counterpart, the advisor is apprising the counterpart of the positive benefits of taking a course of action (e.g., taking action will help to develop one’s expertise). Unlike exchange tactics, the resulting personal benefits to the counterpart are outside the control of the advisor.
Exchange Tactics	When an advisor offers something of value in exchange for compliance with the request, the advisor is using some form of exchange to persuade the counterpart to take action. Unlike apprising tactics, exchange tactics focus on the exchange of rewards or positive benefits that are within the control of the advisor.
Personal Appeal	When an advisor attempts to persuade a counterpart by appealing to the counterpart’s sense of friendship or loyalty, the advisor is making a personal appeal.
Use an Indirect Approach	An advisor is using an indirect approach by hinting to the counterpart or using other indirect suggestions to take action.
Pair Requests Strategically	The social psychology literature indicates that individuals can use successive requests in a way that makes compliance more likely. One well known strategic pairing is called the <i>foot-in-the-door principle</i> . In this principle, the advisor might make a small request to make the counterpart comfortable with compliance. The advisor may follow up with successively greater requests until the advisor’s overall objective is achieved.