You should not have a favorite weapon.
--- Miyamoto Musashi, A Book of Five Rings

If there is one attitude more dangerous than to assume that a future war will be just like the last one, it is to imagine that it will be so utterly different that we can afford to ignore all the lessons of the last one.
--- MRAF Sir John C. Slessor

Adherence to dogmas has destroyed more armies and cost more battles than anything in war.
--- J.F.C. Fuller

We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit.
--- Aristotle

To make no mistakes is not in the power of man; but from their errors and mistakes the wise and good learn wisdom for the future.
--- Plutarch, Greek biographer & moralist (46 AD - 120 AD)

General

• Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
  • CALL Handbooks
    • CALL Handbook 11-33, Establishing a Lessons Learned Program (local copy), June 2011
  • Information Operations Lessons Learned

• Cohen, Eliot and Gooch, John. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York, Free Press, 1990

• Concepts and Practices in Finding and Applying Lessons Learned (local copy), by Fair, for April 2005 NDIA conference - includes diagram of the whole process

• Best Practices Methodology: a New Approach for Improving Government (local copy), 1995 GAO report

• Lessons of Post-Cold War Conflict: Middle Eastern Lessons and Perspectives (local copy), by Cordesman, for NIC 2020 project

• Lessons Identified Versus Lessons Learned, by Dunnigan, 4 Dec 2003
  • It's easier to identify a lesson than to get an organization to act on it and implement a useful solution. For that reason, the British like to use the phrase "lessons identified" to make clear that just noting a problem does not solve it. When you uncover a problem, you are calling into question the wisdom of some earlier decisions. Large organizations do not take kindly to such criticism. Excuses and creative explanations will emerge if a lesson learned threatens some cherished program.
  • But there are other problems as well. "Lessons learned" often become twisted to support pet projects. The air force has, since 1991, come up with quite different "lessons learned", than the army, for the very same battles.

• An American Way of War or Way of Battle? (local copy), op-ed piece from Jan 2004 Strategic Studies Institute newsletter

• The Victory Disease (local copy), by Karcher, posted in the Army Professional Writing Collection - "According to Dunnigan and Macedonia, the Victory Disease threatens a nation that has a history of military prowess and manifests itself in three symptoms: arrogance, complacency, and established patterns of fighting." (PDF version)

• Remarks by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on Terrorism and Foreign Policy (local copy), 29 Apr 2002 - including "certain verities that September 11th reinforced and brought home to us in the most vivid way"
  • First, there has been an end to innocence about international politics and about our own vulnerability
  • Second, the events of September 11th underscored the idea that a sound foreign policy begins at home
  • The third truth is that we can only do so much to protect ourselves at home, and so the best defense is a good offense
  • A fourth truth that September 11th underscored was the need to deny terrorists and hostile states the opportunity to acquire weapons of mass destruction
  • Finally, the new challenges have underscored the critical importance of allies, partners and coalitions

• A Military for the 21st Century: Lessons from the Recent Past (local copy), by Zinni, for Strategic Forum, Nbr 181, July 2001
• Military Lessons from Desert One to the Balkans (local copy), by Ike Skelton, for Strategic Forum, Nbr 174, October 2000

• Considerations in Acquisition Lessons-Learned System Design (local copy), Snider, Barrett, and Tenkasi, in Acquisition Review Quarterly

• Society for Effective Lessons Learned Sharing, comprised of DOE related folks, but some lessons for us all

• first battles in retrospect, PBS excerpt from concluding chapter of America's First Battles, 1776-1965, which examines what has happened to doctrine and strategy after the first engagement

• Of Saber Charges, Escort Fighters, and Spacecraft, by I.B. Holley, in AU Review
  • An aphorism of Frederick the Great, "Good fortune is often more fatal than adversity," offers a lesson for us to ponder. The teachings of failure, which subvert old ideas and established facts, serve the military institutions of the future better than do successes. Failures teach humility and are the nurse of progress. Successes stimulate blind pride and complacent self-confidence, which invite failure in future battles. So let us turn to some historical failures and learn from them.

• Clausewitzian Lessons for Modern Strategists, by Etzold, in AU Review - "strategic planners consistently overestimate the power of men to shape their times and their problems"

Writing Lessons Learned and After Action Reviews (AARs)

• See the doctrine and policy publications in joint and service sections below on this page

• Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
  • CALL Handbook 11-33, Establishing a Lessons Learned Program (local copy), June 2011 - see Appendix C on writing AARs

• After-Action Review: Technical Guidance (local copy), USAID document PN-ADF-360, Feb 2006

• Training Circular 25-20, A Leader's Guide to After-Action Reviews (local copy), Army HQ, 30 Sep 1993 -- "a leader's guide on how to plan, prepare, and conduct an AAR. It supplements and expands the guidance in Field Manual (FM) 25-101. Competent leaders must understand and apply the techniques and procedures which produce good AARs." - product of Center for Army Lessons Learned
  (PDF format)

• Society for Effective Lessons Learned Sharing (SELLS) Fact Sheets (local copy) "to help Lessons Learned professionals implement and improve lessons learned programs"

• How Effective Post-Mortems can Improve Decision Making (local copy), briefing from Warning Decision Training Branch, National Weather Service
  • discusses common errors of post-mortems of weather disasters, aircraft accidents, and other incidents
  • discusses Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), a method of capturing the human side of the post-mortem

• Local Lessons Learned Processes: a Radical Proposal for Sharing Lessons within the DoD (local copy), Navy Center for Applied Research in Artificial Intelligence

• Sample After Action Report (AAR) (local copy), from the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) - sample deals with a Homeland Security exercise

• DoE Standard - DoE Corporate Lessons Learned Program (local copy), DOE-STD-7501-99 - appendices include Lessons Learned template, flow diagram, and assessment guide

• Appendix G, After Action Reviews (local copy), in FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training, 30 September 1990

• Disaster Operations - After Action Reports (local copy), template from FEMA

• Writing the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO): Lessons Learned (local copy), by Bartolain, J7/JETCD

• A Practical Guide for Developing and Writing Military Concepts (local copy), by Schmitt, Defense Adaptive Red Team (DART), Working Paper 02-4, Dec 2002

U.S. Government

• Lessons Learned resources listed by Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)

• Lessons Learned Information Sharing, www.LLIS.gov - mostly related to homeland security and first responders

• Federal Transit Administration - Lessons Learned

• NASA
• NASA Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS)
• Columbia Accident Investigation Board report (CAIB) report at the NASA site, includes videos with Vol 1
• GAO report to NASA - Better Mechanisms Needed for Sharing Lessons Learned, Jan 2002 (local copy)

• Targets for Firefighting Safety: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy, by Diane Vaughan - discusses organizational culture issues such as "normalized deviance" -- As one manager told me, " Once you've accepted that first lack of perfection, that first anomaly, it's like you've lost your virginity. You can't go back."

• Nuclear
• Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Hard Lessons Learned From Troubled Investments - testimony before Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 25 Sep 08

• Defense Nuclear Security Lessons Learned Center (DNS-LLC)
  • The Office of Defense Nuclear Security established the Security Lessons Learned Center (SEC-LLC) at Los Alamos National Laboratory to encourage and facilitate the sharing of lessons-learned data on physical security-related issues. This center will help users from across the NNSA complex identify and implement effective solutions to various security issues.

• Department of Energy
• Department of Energy Lessons Learned - see DoE standard in writing section above
  • DOE links for lessons learned and best practices
  • Society for Effective Lessons Learned Sharing (SELLS) - see their fact sheets in the Writing Lessons Learned section above

• Labs
• Argonne National Lab "has developed an automated system for accessing lessons learned to support military planning"

Joint/DoD

• Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs)

• Joint Operations Insights & Best Practices (local copy), Joint Warfighting Center, USJFCOM, Third Edition, 11 Jan 2011
  • past reports
  • Joint Operations Insights & Best Practices (local copy), Joint Warfighting Center, USJFCOM, Second Edition, July 2008
  • Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science - Best Practices (local copy), Joint Warfighting Center, USJFCOM, First Edition, Sep 2006

• Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (local copy), version 3.0, 15 Jan 2009

• Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report (local copy), Jan 2009

• Lessons Learned resources listed by Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)

• NORAD/USNORTHCOM Lessons Learned - see their web sites on NIPRNET

• USJFCOM Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) - "collects, analyzes and disseminates lessons learned and best practices across the full spectrum of military operations"
• CJCSI 3150.25A - Joint Lessons Learned Program, 01 October 2000 (local copy)

• Continuous Process Improvement / Lean Six Sigma

• A-76 Lessons Learned Documents & Sites

• Lessons Learned Reports, Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC)

• Military Bases - Lessons Learned from Prior Base Closure Rounds, 1997 GAO report

Air Force

• USAF A9L Lessons Learned, Air Force Office of Lessons Learned
• AF Reserve Command Operations Plans Branch, A3XX

• AFI 10-204, Readiness Exercises and After-Action Reporting Program

• Enduring Look collects OEF lessons learned - (Apr 2002 AF News release) - "Air Force officials in the Pentagon began a comprehensive campaign named Task Force Enduring Look to collect data from Operation Enduring Freedom, and turn that knowledge into lessons learned to benefit the warfighter." ... "This near real-time collection, analysis and distribution of information is a departure from studies of previous wars, operations and contingencies, said the task force’s director"

• Coalition and Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence, USAF Warfare Center

• Knowledge Now, Air Force Center of Excellence for Knowledge Management

• AF Medical Service Knowledge Exchange

• USAF Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) with reports incorporating many lessons learned

• Air Combat Command Directorate of Air/Space Operations Exercises/Joint Training Lessons Learned
• AMC Lessons Learned and After Action Report (AAR) page - check AMC site

• HQ Air Force Space Command Lessons Learned and Exercise Corrective Action Board (ECAB) page no longer available

Army

• See also the Army references in the section above on writing lessons learned

• Army Regulation 11-33, Army Lessons Learned Program (ALLP) (local copy) - see also CALL Handbook 11-33 below

• Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
  • CALL Handbooks
    • CALL Handbook 11-33, Establishing a Lessons Learned Program (local copy), June 2011
  • Information Operations Lessons Learned

• The Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO), the Judge Advocate General's Corps

• CompanyCommand - sharing experiences and learning between company-level commanders
• PlatoonLeader - sharing experiences and learning between platoon-level leaders

• USAREUR Lessons Learned Office

• AMEDD Army Medical Lessons Learned

• FM 100-23-1, Appendix J, Lessons Learned from Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations - Provide Comfort (northern Iraq), Provide Relief (airlift to Somalia), Restore Hope (Somalia), and UN HA operation in Bosnia (local copy)

Navy

• Lessons Learned resources listed by Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)

• Navy Lessons Learned System (NLLS)

• NMCI - Navy USMC Intranet, see Lessons Learned section

• Intelligent Lessons Learned Systems Publications, Navy Center for Applied Research in Artificial Intelligence

• Navy Lessons Learned in Desert Shield/Desert Storm
• Navy Medical Lessons Learned System

Marine

• Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned

• NMCI - Navy USMC Intranet, see Lessons Learned section

• Marine Corps Doctrine Center

• Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, Training and Education Command - "The mission of Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One is to provide standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications that support Marine Aviation Training and Readiness and to provide assistance in the development and employment of aviation weapons and tactics."

• USMC Small Wars Center of Excellence
  • Marine lessons learned
  • Lessons Learned, by country and region

• More USMC Lessons Learned

Coast Guard

• Coast Guard Standard After Action Information & Lessons Learned System (CGSAILS)

International

• See also Humanitarian and Peacekeeping

• NATO Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC)
• NATO Military Engineering Centre of Excellence

• Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre (ALLC), includes publications of general interest and specific topics (such as cold weather ops)

• Lessons Learned in Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations
• United Nations lessons learned resources

• Russian Lessons Learned in Bosnia

• Centre for Army Lessons (CAL), Australia

• African Crisis Response Initiative: a Security Building Block (local copy), Congressional hearing

• Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC), United Kingdom

Interagency and Contingency

• See interagency operations on U.S. Government page

• The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First Line of Engagement (local copy), by Oakley and Casey, for Strategic Forum, Nbr 227, Sep 2007

• Digital C3 Systems: Potential for Sharing Lessons Learned Across Services (local copy), Army Research Institute Note 2005-02

• Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan (local copy), by Mansager, in Joint Force Quarterly, Jan 2006

• Joint Interagency Cooperation: the First Step (local copy), by Bogdanos, in Joint Force Quarterly, April 2005

• Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook (local copy), ITEA, National Defense University, Jan 2003
  (DOC file)

• Doing Windows: Non-Traditional Military Responses to Complex Emergencies (local copy), by Hayes and Sands, DODCCRP

• The Proper Role of Professional Military Advice in Contemporary Uses of Force, by Cook, in Parameters, Winter 2002

• National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD-1) (local copy), released 13 Feb 2001
  - organizes the National Security Council, abolishes the existing system of Interagency Working Groups, and assigns responsibilities to NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs) -- "Management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the U.S. Government shall usually be accomplished by the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day fora for an interagency coordination of national security policy."

• United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) (local copy)

• Presidential Decision Directive 56 - Managing Complex Contingency Operations (local copy)
  • Annex A: Illustrative Components of a Political-Military Plan for a Complex Contingency Operation

• Complex Contingency Operations Handbook (local copy), supporting PDD 56

• Interagency Training, Education, and After Action Review (ITEA)
  • Defense is From Mars, State is From Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security, by Rife, Army War College, 1998
    Discusses the culture, personality, and training differences between the Departments of Defense and State and how recognizing these differences is the first step in overcoming the biases, prejudices and stereotypes that limit their ability to work effectively together.

• Leaders’ Guide for Contingency Operations: The Human Dimension (local copy), US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Psychological Operations and Effects

• See Propaganda also

• Review of Psychological Operations: Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience (local copy), by Lamb, INSS, NDU, Sep 2005

• Psychological Strategies for the Defence Against Terrorism (local copy), by Koltko-Rivera and Hancock, NATO paper, 25 Oct 2004

• Maximizing the Psychological Effects of Airpower: Lessons from Past Wars, RAND research brief
• Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars, by Hosmer, a RAND report

• Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information in Warfare, a RAND report
  • Chapter Eight: The Information Revolution and Psychological Effects

WMD & Terrorism Response

• See Center for Terrorism Studies on ANG Conflict 21 site

• See WMD-CST Lessons on ANG Conflict 21 site

• See Emergency Responders also

• Psychological Strategies for the Defence Against Terrorism (local copy), by Koltko-Rivera and Hancock, NATO paper, 25 Oct 2004

• Chemical Weapons - Lessons Learned Program Generally Effective but Could Be Improved and Expanded (local copy), GAO report, Sep 2002

• Gas, Mud, and Blood at Ypres: The Painful Lessons of Chemical Warfare (local copy), by Bundt, in Military Review, Jul-Aug 2004

• Incompatible Info Systems Pose a Homeland Security Challenge, White House Info Czar Says (local copy), 10 Dec 2002, American Forces Press Service

• Confronting Biological Weapons: a special section in Clinical Infectious Diseases, lessons from real world cases and exercises, from The Johns Hopkins University, Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies

• Silent Vector
  • Silent Vector, Andrews AFB, Oct 17-18, 2002 -- Post Exercise Overview, posted by CSIS
    • Purpose of exercise - To explore the difficulties of coping with credible warning of a terrorist attack, but with insufficient information for effective prevention
    • Scenario - Imprecise but credible warning of attack against energy and energy related infrastructure on the East Coast

• Dark Winter
  • Dark Winter, lessons learned about biodefense, during June 2002 exercise - posted by ANSER
  • "Shining Light on Dark Winter," lessons learned about biodefense, during June 2002 exercise
  • HHS Bioterrorism Preparedness (local copy), Oct 2001 Congressional testimony, includes lessons from TOPOFF and Dark Winter exercises

• TOPOFF (Top Officials)
  • Search for 2005 TOPOFF references
  • Search for 2003 TOPOFF references
  • Search for TOPOFF references
  • TOPOFF Fact Sheet (local copy), State Dept.
  • HHS Bioterrorism Preparedness (local copy), Oct 2001 Congressional testimony, includes lessons from TOPOFF and Dark Winter exercises
  • Lessons Learned from a Full-Scale Bioterrorism Exercise, CDC commentary on TOPOFF
  • A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF
  • TOPOFF 2000 After Action Report (local copy), August 2001
    The exercise was the largest peacetime terrorism exercise ever sponsored by DOJ or FEMA.

    Exercise TOPOFF was a multi-component, multi-site exercise incorporating command post exercises, full-scale training exercises, tactical exercises, and several large-scale “subexercises.” The Exercise incorporated design input from crisis and consequence managers across the nation. An important aim of the Exercise was to examine the interfaces and relationships between the participating agencies and their top officials to identify any seams, gaps, and redundancy in responsibilities that affect decision-making and subsequent actions directed to resolve the scope of consequences resulting from the simulated attacks.

• Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
  • Anthrax Bioterrorism: Lessons Learned and Future Directions, CDC article
  • Lessons Learned from a Full-Scale Bioterrorism Exercise, CDC article
  • Applying Lessons Learned from Anthrax Case History To Other Scenarios, CDC article
  • Other CDC Lessons Learned materials

• Lessons Learned - listed by Okla. City Nat'l Memorial Inst. for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), covering 9-11 and before and since

• Weapons of Mass Destruction - DoD's Actions to Combat Weapons Use Should Be More Integrated and Focused (local copy), GAO report

• see GAO reports on Terrorism and Homeland Security

9-11

• See Congressional Joint Inquiry Findings and Recommendations regarding Intelligence and 9-11

• See WMD and Terrorism Response also

• The World Trade Center Attack - the Official Documents, posted by Columbia University

• September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks - Critical Infrastructure Protection Lessons Learned (local copy), from Canadian Government

• Technology Lessons Learned from New York City's Response to 9/11: A Report from the Select Committee on Technology in Government (local copy)

• Arlington County After-Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon (local copy)

• DoD Medical Support to the Federal Response Plan, DoD IG report D-2002-087, re: 9-11 response

• Lessons of 9-11, Congressional testimony

• Filson, Leslie. Air war over America : Sept. 11 alters face of air defense mission. Tyndall Air Force Base, FL : Headquarters 1st Air Force, Public Affairs Office : [U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs., distributor] 2003.

• Civil Support Team in Action, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report
  Lessons Learned from the Deployment of the 2nd Civil Support Team (CST), New York National Guard (NYNG), in Response to the World Trade Center Attack on September 11, 2001

• Summary of "Lessons Learned" from Events of September 11 and Implications for Business Continuity, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

• Implications of 9/11 for the Financial Services Sector, Remarks by Federal Reserve Board Vice Chairman Roger W. Ferguson, Jr.

Radiation Incidents

• See WMD and Terrorism Response also

• Air Force Releases Reports on Palomares, Spain and Thule Airbase, Greenland Nuclear Weapons Accidents

• Chernobyl, the Accident and Progress Since 1986, case study at the World Nuclear Association

• The Accident at Three Mile Island, case study at the World Nuclear Association
• Low-level Radiation Harmed Humans Near Three Mile Island, examination of cancer connection, as shown from long term study, summarized in Environmental Health Perspectives, Aug 1997

Katrina Hurricane Response

• See Congressional Research Service reports

• See Katrina and Rita resources listed on AWC Index to the Internet

• The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, Feb 2006 White House report
  (local copy, PDF)
  • Chapter 2: National Preparedness - a Primer (local copy)
  • Chapter 5: Lessons Learned (local copy)
  • Appendix A: Recommendations (local copy)
• Fact Sheet on above report

Emergency Responders

• See WMD-CST Lessons on ANG Conflict 21 site

• See WMD and Terrorism Response also

• Lessons Learned Information Sharing, www.LLIS.gov - mostly related to homeland security and first responders

• Responding to Incidents of National Consequence (local copy) - Recommendations for America's Fire and Emergency Services Based on the Events of September 11, 2001, and Other Similar Incidents - from FEMA

• Protecting Emergency Responders - Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks, RAND report
  "This report presents a summary of a December 2001 working conference, sponsored by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Attending were emergency workers who responded to the bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the anthrax incidents that occurred during autumn 2001."

• National Response Team (NRT) recommendation on use of Incident Command System (ICS)/Unified Command (UC) (local copy), includes references on training standards
  The U.S. National Response Team (NRT) recommends the following document as guidance for responder training on the use of ICS/UC at incident sites, including incidents involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). ...

  All federal, state, and local responders should be trained in ICS/UC in order to coordinate effectively at WMD incident sites.

• Incident Command System/ Unified Command (ICS/UC) Technical Assistance Document, from NRT (local copy)

Special Ops

• Innovate or Die: Innovation and Technology for Special Operations (local copy), by Spulak, JSOU Report 10-7, Dec 2010

• Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way SOF are (local copy), by Turnley, JSOU Report 11-2, Mar 2011

• Future of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the war on terror (local copy), testimony by Max Boot, before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, 29 June 2006

• What's So Special about Special Operations? Lessons from the War in Afghanistan, by John Jogerst, in Aerospace Power Journal

• Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War, RAND report, 2001

• Special Operations Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom: Background and Issues for Congress (local copy), Congressional Research Service (CRS) report

Rescue & Airborne Raids

• Airborne Raids, by Col Joshua Shani, in Air University Review
  • discusses Dragon Rouge, Son Tay, Mayaguez, Entebbe, and other raids
  • Col Shani flew the lead ship in the Entebbe raid

Intelligence

• See Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports

• See info ops lessons below

• See Intelligence page, especially intelligence lessons learned from Pearl Harbor and the Cuban Missile Crisis

• See intelligence analysis, especially 2011 reports from the National Research Council for the DNI

• See Sherman Kent Center Occasional Papers

• A Strategic-Level Intelligence Advisor’s Lessons Learned (local copy), by Chang, in Military Review, July-August 2012

• Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations (local copy), Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence, Feb 2011

• Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow: Advances from the Behavioral and Social Sciences, The National Academies Press, 2011

• The Future of Intelligence Analysis, Vol I, Final Report, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 10 Mar 2006 - project commissioned by the Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Education and Training
• The Future of Intelligence Analysis, Vol II, Annotated Bibliography: Publications on Intelligence Analysis and Reform, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 10 Mar 2006

• Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 7 July 2004, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate (local copy) - warning ... 24 Mb file
  • [conclusions excerpt - much smaller file] - 1.8 Mb

• Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft, April 13, 2004 (local copy), before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
  • "The single greatest structural cause for September 11 was the wall that segregated criminal investigators and intelligence agents. Government erected this wall. Government buttressed this wall. And before September 11, government was blinded by this wall."
  • Declassified Department of Justice 1995 Memo: Instructions on Separation of Certain Foreign Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigations (local copy)

• See Rice statement to 911 Commission, and 6 Aug 2001 presidential daily briefing (PDB)

• Marine Corps Intelligence Programs and Lessons Learned in Recent Military Operations, 7 Apr 2004 testimony by Mr Michael Decker, Director of Intelligence, HQ, USMC

• Homeland Security: Intelligence Support (local copy), Congressional Research Service report

• U.S. Intelligence and Policymaking: The Iraq Experience (local copy), Congressional Research Service report

• Confronting the “Enemy Within”: Security Intelligence, the Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies, 2004 RAND report

• Mapping the Risks: Assessing the Homeland Security Implications of Publicly Available Geospatial Information, 2004 RAND report

• Tactical Information Operations in Kosovo (local copy), by Romanych and Krumm, in Military Review, Sep-Oct 2004

• Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices (local copy), ed. by Swenson, Joint Military Intelligence College, May 2003

• The Yom Kippur War: Indications and Warnings (local copy), by Aboul-Enein, in Military Review, Jan-Feb 2003 - discussing the Israeli intelligence failure

• Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations , by Jamison Jo Medby and Russell W. Glenn, RAND report, 2002

• Intelligence Issues for Congress (local copy), CRS report
• Homeland Security: Intelligence Support (local copy), CRS report
• Proposed Change to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (local copy), CRS report

• Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Dec 2002 Congressional report
  • Abridged Findings and Conclusions (local copy)
  • Recommendations (local copy) (433 Kb file - see site above for higher resolution 633 Kb original)

• Statement for the Record by Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, USAF Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service (local copy), Before the Joint Inquiry of the Senate Select Committee On Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence, Washington, D.C., 17 October 2002
  • insight into three questions:
    (a) What did NSA know prior to September 11th,
    (b) what have we learned in retrospect, and
    (c) what have we done in response?

• The Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence (local copy), by Olson, in Studies in Intelligence, Fall-Winter, No. 11, 2001

• The Uncertain Oracle: Some Intelligence Failures Revisited (local copy), from the Fort Huachuca History Program

• Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis? (local copy), by Davis, in Sherman Kent Occasional Papers: Volume 2, Number 1, Jan. '03

• Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning (local copy), by Davis, in Sherman Kent Occasional Papers: Volume 1, Number 1, Sep. ‘02

• Sherman Kent’s Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations (local copy), by Davis, in Sherman Kent Occasional Papers: Volume 2, Number 3, Jun. ‘03
  • In warning analysis, Kent judged that the analytic and policy “trades” were too distant in their relations. As a result, the “Warnees,” to use Kent’s term, mistrusted the motives and findings of “Warners” and too often failed to take requisite action to avoid dangers and seize opportunities.
  • In intentions analysis, in contrast, Kent judged that analysts and policymakers were at times too close in their thinking about an adversary’s likely course of action. In this case, neither side would take proper measure of new information that could undermine a shared conclusion.

• Al Qaeda Training Manual (local copy), including lesson on Espionage: Information-Gathering Using Covert Methods -- posted by the US Dept of Justice -- look at with a view toward countering its methods

• CIA Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft Notes (local copy) - "CIA has made this edition [1995] of the compendium available to the public to help shed light on how the Directorate of Intelligence meets the daily challenges of providing timely, accurate, and rigorous analysis to intelligence consumers"

Interrogation and Interviews

• See interrogation section on Communication Skills page

• See treatment of prisoners section on Law page

• See torture section on Law page

• High Value Interrogation Group (HIG) - interagency, announced 24 Aug 2009

• DoD News: DoD Provides Details on Interrogation Process (local copy), 22 June 2004 news release, with supporting documents

• DoD News: Defense Department Background Briefing (local copy), 20 May 2004

• DoD News: Defense Department Background Briefing (local copy), 14 May 2004

• Taguba faults leadership for Iraqi detainee abuse - Lessons-learned go to MP schoolhouse (local copy), Army News Service, 14 May 2004

• DoD News: Detainee Operations Briefing (local copy), 4 May 2004

Information Operations

• See intelligence lessons above

• See Information Ops Center

• Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
  • Information Operations Lessons Learned

• Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress Remain (local copy), GAO report, June 2004

• Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information in Warfare, a RAND report
  • Chapter Eight: The Information Revolution and Psychological Effects

• Lessons Learned Reports, Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC)

• Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada Invasion, Lybya Raid, by Anno and Einspahr, Air War College research paper

• Are We Our Own Worst Enemy? - Safeguarding Information Operations (local copy), by Magnan, for CIA Studies in Intelligence, Summer 2000

Coalitions

• See also building partnership capacity

• Coalition and Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence, USAF Warfare Center

• Coalition Warfare initiative - OSD (AT&L) International Cooperation Initiative
  • Coalition Warfare initiative supports international cooperative development of technological solutions that enable U.S. and friendly armed forces to operate more effectively together across the full spectrum of multinational operations.

• Networking to Enable Coalition Operations (NECO) (local copy), terms of reference for NECO summer 2004 study by USAF Scientific Advisory Board (SAB)

• Lessons Learned on Collective Efficacy in Multinational Teams (local copy), including look at stability ops in Bosnia, by U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

• Operation Allied Force - Lessons for Future Coalition Operations, RAND Research Brief
• European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation, RAND publication (available online)

• American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies' Program - includes following
  • Coalition Operations Lessons Learned (COLL) Database
  • Coalition Operations Handbook (COH)

• After Kosovo: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Coalition Warfare, Nov 1999 Symposium from NDU
  • After Kosovo: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Coalition Warfare, Nov 1999 Symposium Summary from NDU (local copy)

• See Kosovo and Gulf War materials below and on History page

Partnering and Building Partner Capacity (BPC)

• See also coalitions

• Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance (local copy), by Livingston, Congressional Research Service (CRS) report R41817
  • Each of the military services has undertaken to organize, train, and equip themselves for SFA. However, while SOF have units specifically dedicated to a long-term role in SFA, the conventional forces services do not. Each of the services does have Security Cooperation and Security Assistance organizations that are dedicated to SFA activities, although they do not have SFA in their titles. The services also standardize training for deploying forces to support combatant commanders in their SFA mission. This effort to “train the trainers,” although an object of consistent inquiry in congressional hearings, has been endorsed in testimony by combatant commanders.
  • Along with its role in the current Afghanistan and Iraq wars, SFA is directly linked to counterterrorism strategy and is key to engaging underdeveloped and undergoverned nations (often referred to as “weak or fragile states”) in a preventive national security strategy. Regional combatant commanders apply this preventive strategy through authorities provided in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The SFA authorizations in the NDAA are often criticized as being disjointed and cumbersome, creating significant challenges to effective SFA employment. The Departments of Defense and State have presented a proposal for pooled funding to alleviate some of these challenges. The proposed Global Security Contingency Fund would be a shared resource requiring authorization by both departments. This would be similar to the temporary authorization known as “1206 global train and equip” authorization.

• Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities (local copy), by Serafino, Congressional Research Service (CRS) report RL32862

• Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations, by Marquis et al, RAND report, 2010
  • The U.S. government is facing the dual challenge of building its own interagency capacity for conducting stability operations while simultaneously building partner capacity (BPC) for stability operations. The purpose of this study is to assist the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, and other U.S. government agencies in developing an integrated BPC for stability operations strategy. To accomplish this goal, a RAND Arroyo Center study team conducted an exploratory analysis of key strategic elements within the context of BPC and stability operations guidance as well as ongoing security cooperation programs, using a variety of analytical techniques. In general, this study concludes that BPC and stability operations are receiving a good deal of attention in official strategy and planning documents. However, insufficient attention is being paid to the details of an integrated strategy. A baseline analysis of existing security cooperation programs needs to be undertaken to comprehend the type, scope, and target of activities related to BPC for stability operations. An assessment of these activities should then be conducted, focusing on both process outputs and operational outcomes. In addition, the Departments of State and Defense should develop a rigorous method for selecting and prioritizing partners whose stability operations capacity they wish to build. Ideally, the results of these analytical processes will have a significant impact on the set of BPC for stability operations activities and partners, aligning relevant and effective activities with appropriate partners.

• Security Force Assistance: An Enduring U.S. Army Structure (local copy), by Power, U.S. Army War College, Nov 2010
  • Throughout the past century, the U.S. Army has engaged in advising foreign forces, now known by the doctrinal term Security Force Assistance (SFA). In each case, advisory units were assembled ad hoc and, following the mission, the effort was disbanded. Given recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and considering the future nature of conflict, the U.S. Army has a need for a permanent Security Force Assistance capability. Further, this capability is best captured by an enduring structure. The structural solution employed in current overseas contingency operations is to imbed advisory teams into existing organizations from theater level to Brigade Combat Team, as opposed to having separate organizations under independent command and control, such as an ‘Advisor Corps.’ This research project will analyze the various recommendations for conducting SFA in the 21st Century and conclude with a feasible recommendation on the way ahead to achieve an enduring capability.

• Principles of Building Partnership Capacity (local copy), by Terry, Command and General Staff College, Nov 2010
  • The National Defense Strategy of the United States continues to place ever greater importance on the practice of building the capacity of partner nations. The role of the United States military in this endeavor will continue to grow for the foreseeable future. Thus, the central research question is: What are the core commonalities that make Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) efforts successful? The answer to this question provides six criteria to evaluate prospective BPC engagements and ten key considerations that BPC planners can utilize to increase the probability of successfully building a capacity in a partner nation. The secondary research question examines the characteristics of Joint BPC engagements (engagements involving two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander). The secondary research question provide six characteristics for the joint BPC planner to incorporate, in addition to the ten key considerations previously discussed, due to this unique type of military BPC engagement. With the ever expanding reliance on coalitions and the importance of regional security to combat global threats, BPC contributes to the overall deterrence capability of the United States.

• Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm (local copy), by Wuestner, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Feb 2009
  • On July 16, 2008 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice launched the Civil Response Corps (CRC) which would function much like our military reserve. It would ease the burden on the Armed Forces by allowing the hiring of civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them. The CRC is a product of the efforts of State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The core mission of S/CRS is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, good governance, and a market economy.
  • This Letort Paper examines the current Building Partner Capacity and Stability Operations capabilities and capacities within the Army and how they relate and complement the efforts of the CRC. Does the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense have the proper force structure and minimal capability to fight and win through all phases of conflict? This paper provides a framework for identifying proponency, institutionalizing lessons learned, and providing a military, police, and governance structure as a tool for global engagement. This new structural paradigm complements S/CRS’s efforts to provide the United States with the ability to access, influence, and build capacity throughout this new world order.

Humanitarian Assistance & Post-Conflict & Peacekeeping

• See also nation building on International Studies page

• See Peacekeeping on International Studies page

• See also Kosovo and Bosnia reports, especially CCRP reports

• See also Stability Ops section

• See also Iraq - Post Saddam

• Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons from Iraq (local copy), by Tressler, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Aug 2007

• GTA 41-01-003, Civil Affairs: Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Planning Guide (local copy), U.S. Army
• TACMEMO 3-07.6-05, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Operations Planning (local copy), U.S. Navy

• Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. State Department

• Peace Operations - Military - Lessons Learned, Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN)

• Training for Peace Operations: the U.S. Army Adapts to the Post-Cold War World, by Hardesty and Ellis, for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

• USAID-PVO Dialogue on Working in Conflict (local copy), by USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Jan 2003 - "The purpose of the Dialogue was to help the U.S. humanitarian and development communities be more effective in working in conflict settings."

• Doing Windows: Non-Traditional Military Responses to Complex Emergencies (local copy), by Hayes and Sands, DODCCRP

• Cross-Cultural Considerations in Complex Peace Operations, by Rubinstein, in Negotiation Journal, Jan 2003
• Cultural Aspects of Peacekeeping: Notes on the Substance of Symbols, by Rubinstein, in Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, Winter 1993

• Peacekeeping: Multinational Force and Observers Maintaining Accountability, but State Department Oversight Could Be Improved (local copy), July 2004 GAO report - "The mission of the MFO is to observe and report on Israeli and Egyptian compliance with the security aspects of the 1979 treaty of peace."

• Operation Iraqi Children (OIC) - helping American soldiers help the school children of Iraq

• Peace Ops - Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations - FM 3-07.31, MCWP 3-33.8, AFTTP(i) 3-2.40 -- Oct 2003

• General Anthony Zinni's MOOTW Considerations Make Sense in Iraq (local copy), by Dilegge, in Urban Operations Journal
• considerations for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations (local copy),
  by Gen Anthony Zinni, as listed in MCDP 1-0

• Lessons Learned in Transition Settings, from USAID's experiences - excerpts below
  1. Security is first. Until people feel a degree of safety, they are not ready for political development of any kind.
  2. Plans must be flexible, straightforward and have a clear goal and clear and concise objectives
  3. Keep expectations realistic. Focus on the doable ...
  4. Monitor constantly. The time invested in figuring out how you will know what's working and what's not is well worth it.
  5. Be opportunistic. Be willing to take risks.
  6. Keep the people as your customer, and align your activities with local needs. In analyzing the merit of an idea, see if it resonates with the citizenry, rather than with the "usual suspects."
• more USAID lessons learned material

• U.N. Peacekeeping - Transition Strategies for Post-Conflict Countries Lack Results-Oriented Measures of Progress (local copy), Sep 2003 GAO report - Highlights
• Foreign Assistance - Observations on Post-Conflict Assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan (local copy), July 2003 GAO report

• Correspondence courses on U.N. Peacekeeping, by the U.N. Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations (UNITARPOCI)

• Quick Look: Dealing With the Civilian Population in a Post-Saddam Iraq (local copy), USMC Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO)

• The Doctrinal Challenge of Winning the Peace against Rogue States: How Lessons from Post-World War II Germany May Inform Operations against Saddam Hussein's Iraq (local copy), U.S. Army War College research paper

• Issues in Implementing International Peace Operations (local copy), May 2002 GAO report
• UNITED NATIONS - Reform Initiatives Have Strengthened Operations, but Overall Objectives Have Not Yet Been Achieved (local copy), May 2000 GAO report

• Interagency Training, Education, and After Action Review (ITEA)
  • After Action Reviews, mostly humanitarian and peacekeeping, including Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia

• Restoring Calm After the Storm - post conflict lessons from the 1991 Gulf War, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report

• Leading Air Mobility Operations in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies (local copy), Maxwell Paper 28, August 2002

• Afghanistan Reconstruction Focus gateway to resources about many aspects of the reconstruction

• Afghanistan Report: Coordination in a Fragmented State A Lessons Learned Report Prepared for the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Dec 1996

• Lessons Learned in Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

• Haiti: a Case Study of the International Response and the Efficacy of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Crisis, by Benton and Ware

• Srebrenica: Problems of Participation in UN/NATO Operations, by Bowen, presentation for JSCOPE conference -- includes lessons learned

• The Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti), by Wilkins, ACSC Paper

• Lessons from Bosnia: the IFOR Experience (local copy), from DoD CCRP

• Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations, NATO-Led Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 1995-1997 (local copy), from DoD CCRP

• Bosnia-Herzogovina After Action Review Conference, May 1996 (local copy, HTML - reformatted for readability), at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute

• FM 100-23-1, Appendix J, Lessons Learned from Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations - Provide Comfort (northern Iraq), Provide Relief (airlift to Somalia), Restore Hope (Somalia), and UN HA operation in Bosnia (local copy)

• Crowds, Mobs and Nonlethal Weapons (local copy), by Heal, in Military Review, Mar-Apr 2000

• Hurricane Mitch After Action Review Conference, Sep 1999 (local copy), at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute

• Peace Implementation and the Concept of Induced Consent in Peace Operations, by Jablonsky and McCallum, in Parameters, Spring 1999

• Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia, by Manwaring, in Parameters, Winter 1998

• Virtual Peacemaking: A Military View of Conflict Prevention Through the Use of Information Technology (local copy), by Thomas, FMSO

Establishing Rule of Law

• See also law page

• See also Transition to/from Hostilities below

• Controlling the Beast Within: The Key to Success on 21st-Century Battlefields (local copy), by Pryer, in Military Review, Jan-Feb 2011
  • "Thus, as surreal as it sometimes seems to those of us who served in the 1990s, battlefield technology, armored vehicles, gunneries, and weapons ranges contribute less to our mission success today than does the ethical behavior of our troops."

• SFOR Lessons Learned in Creating a Secure Environment with Respect for the Rule of Law (local copy, PDF, .8 Mb) (local copy, DOC, 6.5 Mb)

• Rule of Law studies and reports, U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP)

Transition to/from Hostilities

• See also Establishing Rule of Law above

• See also Counterinsurgency below

• See also Small Wars below

• 15 Nov 2006 Senate hearings, Committee on Armed Services, prepared statements on the current situation and U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
  • Gen. John P. Abizaid, USA, Commander, United States Central Command (local copy)
  • Amb. David M. Satterfield, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq (local copy)
  • Lt.Gen. Michael D. Maples, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (local copy)
  • Gen. Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency (local copy)

• Force Planning for Ungoverned Regions and Failed States (local copy), by Binnendijk and Johnson, NDU, HASC Congressional testimony, 8 Nov 2005

• Constabulary Forces and Postconflict Transition: the Euro-Atlantic Dimension (local copy), by Armitage and Moisan, Strategic Forum 218, National Defense University, Nov 2005

• Building Police Forces in a Post-Conflict Environment (local copy), by Sheehan, testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 21 Apr 2004

• Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations (local copy), by Cavaleri, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 7, Combat Studies Institute, 2005

• Understanding the “Victory Disease,” From the Little Bighorn to Mogadishu and Beyond (local copy), by Karcher, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 3, Combat Studies Institute, 2004

• Developing Tools for Transition (local copy), Oct 2004 remarks by Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration - includes list of thresholds which are crossed by states which are failing

• "What Do You Do for an Encore?" by Conlin, in Marine Corps Gazette, Sep 2004 - looks at the transition operations in Baghdad by 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7) - including discussion of lessons for next time

• Final Report for Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on the Transition to and from Hostilities (local copy)
  • The knowledge required to be effective in conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations is different from the military knowledge required to prevail during hostilities, but no less important. Knowledge of a nation’s security interests and external relations; armed forces; the local political scene; internal social, cultural, and economic conditions; security; and social and economic well-being are as important to stability operations as the knowledge of the enemy order of battle is during hostilities. We need to treat learning knowledge of culture and developing language skills as seriously as we treat learning combat skills: both are needed for success in achieving U.S. political and military objectives.
• Supporting Papers for Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on the Transition to and from Hostilities (local copy)
• Tasking for Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on the Transition to and from Hostilities (local copy)
  • "To enhance the effectiveness across this spectrum of pre- and post-conflict issues, the 2004 Summer Study shall focus on the following issues:" [ed. - see above document for expanded description of each issue]
    1. Understanding and shaping the environment
    2. Force protection during transition
    3. Disarmament and destruction of munitions stocks
    4. Intelligence exploitation in the aftermath
    5. Stabilizing the civilian population
    6. Re-establishing the rule of law
    7. Rapid rebuilding of basic infrastructure

• Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (local copy), Sep 2004, final report of one of the panels of the 2004 DSB Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities

• The Fog of Peace: Finding the End-State of Hostilities (local copy), by Rotermund, SSI, 1999

Irregular Operations and Irregular Warfare

• See also urban ops

• See also stability ops and counterinsurgency

• See also asymmetric warfare on Future Studies page

• Coalition and Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence, USAF Warfare Center

• Strategic Culture and Strategic Studies: An Alternative Framework for Assessing al-Qaeda and the Global Jihad Movement (local copy), by Shultz, JSOU Report 12-4, May 2012

• DoD Directive 3000.07 Irregular Warfare (IW)

• Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats (local copy), version 2.0, Joint Operating Concept (JOC), USSOCOM and USJFCOM, 17 May 2010

• Air Force Doctrine Document AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare, Aug 2007

• FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency, Dec 2006
  (local copy of PDF, warning: 12 Mb file)

• Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare, 2 Aug 06, from USMC and USSOCOM
  • The Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare broadly describes how future US military forces will conduct irregular warfare in support of unified action on a regional or global scale against both state and non-state adversaries. It is meant as a guide for enhancing and improving US military irregular warfare capabilities and capacities. It also is meant as a guide toward closer integration of US military and US civilian agencies in meeting the varied challenges of irregular warfare. Finally, it will provide the basis for experimentation intended to influence subsequent concepts and capabilities development. This concept seeks to fulfill its purpose by accomplishing three objectives:
    (1) Describe the nature of irregular warfare, its emergence as the "warfare of choice" by our adversaries, and the strategic and operational opportunities and challenges of irregular warfare,
    (2) describe the importance of a comprehensive US Government approach to irregular warfare, and
    (3) describe the unique considerations required of commanders in planning, conducting, and responding to irregular warfare.

Stability Operations and Support Operations, and Counterinsurgency

Time is of the essence: regardless of the outcome of current campaigns, our enemies will keep applying irregular methods until we demonstrate that we can defeat them.
– David Kilcullen

Counterinsurgency is not just thinking man’s warfare—it is the graduate level of war.
– Special Forces Officer in Iraq, 2005

• See also irregular operations and warfare above

• See also transition to/from hostilities above

• See also counterinsurgency on Military Theory page

• See also coercion theory on Military Theory page

• See also nation building on International Studies page

• See also asymmetric warfare on Future Warfare Studies page

• See also cultural awareness & cross-cultural communication, including Peace Corps materials on communicating and constructing projects in other cultures

• See also T.E. Lawrence on Military Theory page, especially his thesis on the requirements for a successful rebellion

• See also the urban ops, small wars, and humanitarian sections

• See also Iraq - Post Saddam

• See also Small Wars Manual

• See also IO Sphere at Cyberspace and Info-Ops Center - especially the Summer 06 articles re: info-ops in counterinsurgency

• U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center

• Strategic Culture and Strategic Studies: An Alternative Framework for Assessing al-Qaeda and the Global Jihad Movement (local copy), by Shultz, JSOU Report 12-4, May 2012

• WHAM: Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan and Elsewhere (local copy), by Henriksen, JSOU Report 12-1, Feb 2012

• Observations of a Strategic Corporal (local copy), by Mitchell, in Military Review, July-August 2012

• Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities (local copy), by Serafino, Congressional Research Service (CRS) report RL32862

• Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations (local copy), Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence, Feb 2011

• The Challenge of Nonterritorial and Virtual Conflicts: Rethinking Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism (local copy), by Sloan, JSOU Report 11-1, Mar 2011

• Evidentiary Validation of FM 3–24: Counterinsurgency Worldwide, 1978–2008 (local copy), by Paul and Clarke, Joint Force Quarterly, Jan-Mar 2011

• Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook (local copy), CALL 11-16, Feb 2011 - "observations, insights, and lessons"

• Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy (local copy), Feb 2010

• Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, by Paul et al, a RAND report, 2010
  • "Insurgency has been the most prevalent form of armed conflict since at least 1949, as well as the subject of countless historical and contemporary studies. Contemporary discourse on the subject is voluminous and often contentious, but to date there has been a dearth of systematic evidence supporting the counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches, practices, and tenets that make for successful operations. Relying on a collection of the 30 most recent resolved insurgencies, along with a bank of factors that helped or hindered the COIN force in each case and in each phase of each case, several commonalities emerge. For instance, the data show that good COIN practices tend to “run in packs” and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict. The importance of popular support is confirmed, but the ability to interdict tangible support (such as new personnel, materiel, and financing) is the single best predictor of COIN force success. Twenty distinct approaches to COIN are rigorously tested against the historical record, providing valuable lessons for U.S. engagement in and support for COIN operations. A companion volume, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies, presents in-depth profiles of each of the insurgencies. "

    • Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies, by Paul et al, a RAND report, 2010
      • "A collection of the 30 most recent resolved insurgencies, covering the period 1978 to 2008 and a bank of 76 factors and approaches that helped or hindered the COIN force in each case and in each phase of each case supplement an analysis of historical and contemporary insurgencies, providing valuable lessons for U.S. engagement in and support for COIN operations. The cases are also broken down by phase, allowing an analysis of the progress of the COIN force on its way to victory or defeat. Each case includes a scorecard to associate these factors with the overall case outcome. "

• Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency, and the Indirect Approach (local copy), by Henriksen, JSOU Report 10-3, Apr 2010

• Let's Win the Wars We're In (local copy), by Nagl, in Joint Force Quarterly, 1st Qtr 2009
• John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005)
  • slides by Nagl (local copy)
  • Interview with LTC John A. Nagl (local copy), by Dr. Christopher K. Ives, Combat Studies Institute, Jan 2007

• Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation (local copy), U.S. State Department, 15 May 2008

• Military Review, Mar-Apr 2009
  • Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq (local copy), by West, Military Review, Mar-Apr 2009
  • Testing Galula in Ameriyah: the People Are the Key (local copy), by Kuehl, Military Review, Mar-Apr 2009
  • A View from Inside the Surge (local copy), by Crider, Military Review, Mar-Apr 2009
  • All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System Is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence (local copy), by Connable, Military Review, Mar-Apr 2009
• Military Review, Mar-Apr 2008
  • Human Terrain Mapping: a Critical First Step to Winning the COIN Fight (local copy), by Marr et al, Military Review, Mar-Apr 2008
  • Restoring Hope: Economic Revitalization in Iraq Moves Forward (local copy), by Brinkley, Military Review, Mar-Apr 2008
  • Combating a Modern Insurgency: Combined Task Force Devil in Afghanistan (local copy), by Donahue and Fenzel, Military Review, Mar-Apr 2008
  • Anbar Awakens: the Tipping Point (local copy), by Smith and MacFarland, Military Review, Mar-Apr 2008
  • A Strategic Failure: American Information Control Policy in Occupied Iraq (local copy), by Goldstein, Military Review, Mar-Apr 2008
  • The Reflective Military Practitioner: How Military Professionals Think in Action (local copy), by Paparone and Reed, Military Review, Mar-Apr 2008
  • Follow the Money: the Army Finance Corps and Iraqi Financial Independence (local copy), by Landes, Military Review, Mar-Apr 2008
  • Preparing for Economics in Stability Operations (local copy), by Anderson and Wallen, Military Review, Mar-Apr 2008
  • Stabilizing Influence: Micro-Financial Services Capability (local copy), by Shircliffe, Military Review, Mar-Apr 2008

• Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future Operations (local copy), GAO report, 30 Oct 2007

• Handbook 7-34, PRT Playbook, Sep 2007, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
  • Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) were established as a result of the need to develop the infrastructure necessary for the Afghan and Iraqi people to succeed in a post-conflict environment. The efforts of PRTs take place every day during a time when major conflict is commonplace in both countries. PRTs have become an integral part of the long-term strategy to transition the lines of security, governance, and economics to the indigenous people. Integrated appropriately, PRTs serve as combat multipliers for maneuver commanders engaged in governance and economics, as well as other critical lines of operation. In addition, PRTs serve as force multipliers for U.S. Government (USG) development agencies engaged across the stability and reconstruction sectors.
  • This playbook focuses on PRTs in general, with additional information specific to Iraq and Afghanistan. The information contained in this playbook comes from multiple sources inside and outside the USG with the understanding that the manner in which PRTs operate is likely to change over time.

• Byting Back -- Regaining Information Superiority Against 21st-Century Insurgents, by Libicki et al, RAND Report, 2007
  • supporting papers
  • Heads We Win -- Improving Cognitive Effectiveness in Counterinsurgency, by Gompert, RAND research brief, 2007
  • Heads We Win -- The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN), by Gompert, RAND paper, 2007
  • Subversion and Insurgency, by Rosenau, RAND paper, 2007
  • Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, by Byman, RAND paper, 2007
  • Money in the Bank -- Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations, by Rabasa et al, RAND paper, 2007

• Doctrine
  • Air Force Doctrine Document AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare, Aug 2007
  • FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency, Dec 2006
    (local copy of PDF, warning: 12 Mb file)

  • DoD Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," November 28, 2005
    • "...provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop; establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the Department of Defense for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations...."
  • FM 3-0, Operations
    • Chapter 9, Stability Operations
  • FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations
  • TC 7-98-1, Stability and Support Operations Training Support Package, US Army
    • Principles of Stability and Support Operations
      • Legitimacy
      • Restraint
      • Security
      • Perseverance
      • Unity of Effort
      • Objective

• Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces (local copy), HASC Report, 27 Jun 07

• Rethinking Insurgency (local copy), by Metz, SSI, June 2007

• Combating the Unrestricted Warfare Threat: Integrating Strategy, Analysis, and Technology, Unrestricted Warfare Symposium, Johns Hopkins University, Mar 2007 - proceedings online

• War 2.0, by Rid, Hoover Institute, Feb 2007
  • War’s true transformation has a face very different from the one originally envisioned by the Pentagon’s civil and military leadership, in which the force with the more expensive cutting-edge equipment would prevail. Yet let there be no misguided enthusiasm: new means of communication neither “annihilate space” nor disperse the fog of war; on the contrary, the web makes warfare even more chaotic, messy, and deadly. Just as the telegraph once did.
  • ...ordinary users must be treated as co-developers who can come up with a new product or add a competitive edge to it, not merely as consumers. Tactical battle guidelines and lessons-learned essays benefit from user-developed suggestions and improvements in a way that is analogous to the “patches” of open-source applications or Wikipedia’s articles, called peer-production in the industry’s jargon.
  • The information environment does not stay external to the organization any longer, neither for the U.S. Army nor for its enemies. It is flooding the hierarchy from the bottom up, and enabling new forms of networked organizations.

• How to Win in Iraq, by Krepinevich, in Foreign Affairs, Sep-Oct 2005

• Modernizing U.S. Counterinsurgency Practice: Rethinking Risk and Developing a National Strategy (local copy), by Sewall, in Military Review, Sep-Oct 2006

• Building a Second-Half Team: Securing Cultural Expertise for the Battlespace, by McIntosh, in Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2007

• The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified, by Perito, USIP Special Report No. 152, Oct 2005
• Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan, by Dziedzic and Seidl, USIP Special Report No. 147, Aug 2005

• Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (local copy), 1964 book by Galula, reviewed by Daly in Military Review, Sep-Oct 2006
  • Currently, Galula’s ideas pervade the new counterinsurgency manuals that are being developed for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.

• Counterinsurgency Reader, special edition of Military Review, Oct 2006

• Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency (local copy), by Cohen et al, in Military Review, Mar-Apr 2006

• Neo-Strategicon: Modernized Principles of War for the 21st century (local copy), by Dunlap, in Military Review, Mar-Apr 2006

• Heads We Win — The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN), RAND Counterinsurgency Study — Paper 1, by Gompert, RAND study, 2007
• Heads We Win: Improving Cognitive Effectiveness in Counterinsurgency, by Gompert, RAND occasional paper, 2007
• Subversion and Insurgency, RAND Counterinsurgency Study — Paper 2, by Rosenau, RAND Study, 2007

• Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare, from USMC and USSOCOM
  • The Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare broadly describes how future US military forces will conduct irregular warfare in support of unified action on a regional or global scale against both state and non-state adversaries. It is meant as a guide for enhancing and improving US military irregular warfare capabilities and capacities. It also is meant as a guide toward closer integration of US military and US civilian agencies in meeting the varied challenges of irregular warfare. Finally, it will provide the basis for experimentation intended to influence subsequent concepts and capabilities development. This concept seeks to fulfill its purpose by accomplishing three objectives:
    (1) Describe the nature of irregular warfare, its emergence as the "warfare of choice" by our adversaries, and the strategic and operational opportunities and challenges of irregular warfare,
    (2) describe the importance of a comprehensive US Government approach to irregular warfare, and
    (3) describe the unique considerations required of commanders in planning, conducting, and responding to irregular warfare.

• The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned, by Kreps, in Parameters, Spring 2007

• Military Aviation: Issues and Options for Combating Terrorism and Counterinsurgency (local copy), Congressional Research Service report RL32737

• Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success, by Flavin, in Parameters, Autumn 2003

• Pedagogy for the Long War: Teaching Irregular Warfare, Oct 29 - Nov 1, 2007 -- a joint conference sponsored by Marine Corps Training and Education Command and the US Naval Academy

• Shifting Fire: Information Effects in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations: a Workshop Report (local copy), by Collins and Rohozinski, U.S. Army War College, Nov 2006
  (abridged version)

• Understanding Indian Insurgencies: Implications for Counterinsurgency Operations in the Third World (local copy), by Mitra, Strategic Studies Institute, Feb 2007

• Inside an Insurgency - Parameters, Winter 2006-07
  • “Inside an Insurgency” is a thematic presentation incorporating three articles that analyze the impact of human, network, and systems behavior during an insurgency. The authors provide imaginative insight into the world of the insurgent and recommend strategies for successfully countering asymmetric threats in the era of the Long War.

• Definitions
  • counterinsurgency - (DOD Dictionary) Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN.
  • insurgency - (DOD Dictionary, NATO) An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.
  • insurgent - (DOD Dictionary) Member of a political party who rebels against established leadership. See also antiterrorism; counterinsurgency; insurgency.
  • irregular forces - (DOD Dictionary) Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.
  • stability operations - (DOD Dictionary) An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

• Beating Goliath: Why Insurgents Win (and Lose), briefing by Dr. Jeffrey Record, Air War College, Jan 2007
• The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency, executive summary, by Record, Sep 2006
• Why the Strong Lose, by Dr. Jeffrey Record, Air War College, in Parameters, Winter 2005-06

• Rage Against the Machines: Mechanization and the Determinants of Victory in Counterinsurgency Warfare , by Lyall (Princeton) and Wilson (USMA), May 2007
  • Empirical evidence suggests that Great Powers and weak states alike are increasingly unable to wage successful counterinsurgency campaigns. We argue that this decline can be explained by rising levels of mechanization within state militaries. Unlike their earlier counterparts, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit the creation of information-gathering networks among local populations. Mechanized militaries therefore struggle to wield their power discriminately, pushing fence-sitters into the insurgency. We test this claim using a new dataset of 238 insurgencies (1800-2000) and a microlevel comparison of two U.S. Army Divisions in Iraq (2003-04). We find that mechanization is associated with a decreasing probability of incumbent victory; that regime- and power-based explanations only account for nineteenth century outcomes; and that oft-cited factors such as terrain or ethnolinguistic divisions are largely unconnected to outcomes in counterinsurgency warfare.

• Iraq Study Group Report, 6 Dec 2006, from U.S. Institute of Peace

• CAC Commander's Counterinsurgency Reading List, Ft. Leavenworth

• U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Initiative
  • USGOV Counterinsurgency Conference, 28-29 Sep 2006 - selected speeches/papers below
    • The American Counterinsurgency Tradition (local copy), by Cohen, Johns Hopkins University
    • Counterinsurgency Redux (local copy), by Kilcullen, State Dept.
    • Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency (local copy), by Kilcullen, State Dept.
    • Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Creating a Comprehensive Approach. A British View (local copy) by Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely, Director, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom

• Drew, Dennis M., “U.S. Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge: A Short Journey to Confusion,” The Journal of Military History, Vol 62, No. 4, October 1998, pp. 809-832

• Future of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the war on terror (local copy), testimony by Max Boot, before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, 29 June 2006

• Non-Military Strategies For Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned From Past Counterinsurgencies, by Kurt M. Campbell and Richard Weitz, The Princeton Project Papers, 13 Sep 2006
  (alternate source)
• Counterinsurgency Airpower: Air-Ground Integration for the Long War, by Belote, in Air & Space Power Journal, Fall 2006

• HASC Terrorism, Unconventional Threats Subcommittee - 27 Sep 06 testimony on the Irregular Warfare Roadmap
  • Chairman Saxton Opening Statement (local copy)
  • Mr. Mario Mancuso, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (local copy)
  • Vice Admiral Eric Olson, USN, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (local copy)
  • Brigadier General O.G. Mannon, USAF, Deputy Director, Special Operations, Joint Staff (local copy)

• Advice for Advisors
  • Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador (local copy), by Ramsey, GWoT Occasional Paper 18, Combat Studies Institute Press, Sep 2006 - appendix is "21 Recommended Practices in Working with Counterparts"
    (abstract)
  • Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present (local copy), by Ramsey, GWoT Occasional Paper 19, Combat Studies Institute Press, Oct 2006 - published as a supplement to Occasional Paper 18, and includes articles on rebuilding Iraqi Army
    (abstract)

• Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: a Tale of Two Insurgencies (local copy), by Corum, SSI, March 2006
• Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: an Operational View, by Corum, in Air & Space Power Journal, Fall 2002
• The Myth of Air Control Reassessing the History, by Corum, in Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 2000
• The Air War in El Salvador, by Corum in Airpower Journal, Summer 1998

• Unconventional Airpower, by Downs, in Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2005

• It's the Tribes, Stupid, by Pressfield, posted by D-N-I, Oct 2006 - an alternative view
  • For two years I've been researching a book about Alexander the Great's counter-guerrilla campaign in Afghanistan, 330-327 B.C. What struck me most powerfully is that that war is a dead ringer for the ones we're fighting today – even though Alexander was pre-Christian and his enemies were pre-Islamic.
  • The heart of every tribal male is that of a warrior. Even the most wretched youth in a Palestinian refugee camp sees himself as a knight of Islam. The Pathan code of nangwali prescribes three virtues – nang, pride; badal, revenge; melmastia, hospitality. These guys are Apaches.
  • What the warrior craves before all else is respect. Respect from his own people, and, even more, from his enemy. When we of the West understand this, as Alexander did, we'll have taken the first step toward solving the unsolvable.

• Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency (local copy), by Kilcullen, in Military Review, May-June 2006

• Al-Qaeda as Insurgency (local copy), by Morris, US Army War College project, Mar 2005

• COIN Modeling: An MDMP Technique for Planning Counter-Insurgency Campaigns, by Hales, SAMS monograph, 2005
  • Successful COIN operations do not necessarily lead to a decisive battle, but successfully isolate the insurgent from his sources of power. Therefore, an effective COIN planning process must be comprehensive enough to address the military and non-military conditions that sustain the insurgency. This requires the planners to understand the critical aspects of the overall society and its key participants while developing logical lines of operations to achieve the desired endstate. This monograph recommends a modification to the MDMP in order to make it compatible with the realities of counter-insurgency warfare.

• Best Practices in Counterinsurgency (local copy), by Sepp, in Military Review, May-June 2005 - lists 48 selected insurgencies of the 20th century - and compares successful and unsuccessfull practices

• Military Review, Mar-Apr 2007
  • Transcript: General Petraeus on the Way Ahead in Iraq (local copy)
  • HUMINT-Centric Operations: Developing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban Counterinsurgency Environment (local copy), by Baker
  • Learning about Counterinsurgency, by LtGen Sir John Kiszely, British Army
  • Principles and Priorities in Training for Iraq (local copy), by Hickey
  • A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe's Colombia (2002-2006) vs FARC (local copy), by Marks
• Military Review, Jan-Feb 2007
  • Developing a National Counterinsurgency Capability for the War on Terror (local copy), by Hillen
  • Using Occam's Razor to Connect the Dots: the Ba'ath Party and the Insurgency in Tal Afar (local copy), by Patriquin
  • Thailand: Anatomy of a Counterinsurgency Victory (local copy), by Marks
• Military Review, Sep-Oct 2006
  • Battlefield Victories and Strategic Success: the Path Forward in Iraq [COIN in Northern Iraq] (local copy), by Gibson
  • American Military Performance in Iraq (local copy), by West
  • Modernizing U.S. Counterinsurgency Practice: Rethinking Risk and Developing a National Strategy (local copy), by Sewall
  • The Human Terrain System: a CORDS for the 21st Century (local copy), by Kipp et al
  • Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency (local copy), by Teamey and Sweet
  • Intelligent Design: COIN Operations and Intelligence Collection and Analysis (local copy), by Zeytoonian et al
  • Networks: Terra Incognita and the Case for Ethnographic Intelligence (local copy), by Renzi
• Military Review, Jul-Aug 2006
  • Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks (local copy), by Hammes
  • Full-Spectrum Analysis: a New Way of Thinking for a New World (local copy), by Wolfberg
• Military Review, May-Jun 2006
  • Assessing Iraq's Sunni Arab Insurgency (local copy), by Eisenstadt and White
  • Developing Warrior Lawyers: Why It's Time to Create a Joint Services Law of War Academy (local copy), by Corn

• Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century--Creating a National Framework (local copy), Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, State Department, 11 Sep 2006

• Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terrorism, ed. by Murray, Strategic Studies Institute, Sep 2006 (local copy)

• Airmen First: Shaping the Expeditionary Air Force for Counterinsurgency (local copy), by Kostelnik, NPS thesis, Sep 2006

• Irregular Warfare Special Study, Joint Warfighting Center, 4 Aug 2006 (local copy)

• Irregular Warfare: Impact on Future Professional Military Education (local copy), by Paschal, US Army War College, March 2006

• Countering Irregular Threats (local copy), USMC, June 2006 - "A Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats: An Updated Approach to Counterinsurgency"

• Stability Operations in Strategic Perspective: A Skeptical View, by Gray, in Parameters, Summer 2006
• Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?, by Gray, Strategic Studies Institute, Mar 2006 (local copy)

• Changing Tires on the Fly: The Marines and Postconflict Stability Ops, by Hoffman, September 10, 2006 - posted by Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)

• DoD Report to Congress: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

• RAND
  • Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions, by Vick et al, RAND report, 15 Sep 2006
  • Building Partner Capacity Is the Key to a Successful Counterinsurgency Strategy, by Vick et al, RAND report, 15 Sep 2006
  • Shaping the Future Air Force, by Shlapak, RAND report, 7 Sep 2006
    • Examines how U.S national security strategy and the USAF might change to better confront new challenges presented by future major regional conflicts and counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and nation-assistance operations.
  • On “Other War” - Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research, by Long, RAND report, 9 Aug 2006
  • Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, by Lambeth, RAND report, 2005
  • Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16–20, 1962, U.S. military, allied military, and civilian experts/veterans at guerrilla warfare and COIN - held by Rand, sponsored by ARPA - included discussion of best practices which counterinsurgents needed to accomplish:
    • Identify and redress the political, economic, military, and other issues fueling the insurgency
    • Gain control over and protect the population, which the counterinsurgent must see as the prime center of gravity in any counterinsurgency conflict
    • Establish an immediate permanent security presence in all built-up areas cleared of enemy forces
    • Accumulate extensive, fine-grained human and other intelligence on insurgent plans, modes of operation, personnel, and support networks
    • Avoid actions that might antagonize the population
    • Convince the population that they represent the “winning side” and intend to prevail until complete victory is secured

• Strategic Implications of Intercommunal Warfare in Iraq (local copy), by Terrill, SSI, Feb 2005

• The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005 (local copy), by Yates, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 15, Combat Studies Institute, 2006

• Cyber-Mobilization: The New Levée en Masse, by Cronin, in Parameters, Summer 2006
  • The effects of connectivity are not only broadening access but also actually changing the meaning of knowledge, the criteria for judging assertions, and the formulating of opinions. As more and more people are tapping into the web, the dark side of freedom of speech, indeed of freedom of thought, has emerged.
  • The Internet is utterly intertwined with the insurgency in Iraq, for example. Insurgent attacks are regularly followed with postings of operational details, claims of responsibility, and tips for tactical success. Those who use insurgent chat rooms are often monitored by the hosts and, if they seem amenable to recruitment, contacted via email.

• Military Review, Mar-Apr 2006
  • So You Want to Be an Advisor (local copy), by Bolger
  • CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future (local copy), by Andrade and Willbanks
  • Revisiting CORDS: The Need for Unity of Effort to Secure Victory in Iraq (local copy), by Coffey
  • Strategic Aspects of Counterinsurgency (local copy), by Celeski
  • Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency (local copy), by Cohen et al
  • Neo-Strategicon: Modernized Principles of War for the 21st century (local copy), by Dunlap
  • Soldiering in Unfamiliar Places: The Dutch Approach (local copy), by Gooren
  • OIF Phase IV: A Planner's Reply to Brigadier Aylwin-Foster (local copy), by Benson (see Aylwin-Foster article below)
  • Telling the Afghan Military Story ... THEIR WAY! (local copy), by Ricks
  • The Nine Principles of Combined Arms Action in a Counterinsurgency Environment (local copy), by Bogart
• Military Review, Jan-Feb 2006
  • Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq (local copy), by Petraeus
  • The Objective Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition (local copy), by McFate
  • The Second Learning Revolution (local copy), by Scales
  • Control Roaming Dogs: Governance Operations in Future Conflict (local copy), by Thomas
  • What's Wrong in Iraq? or Ruminations of a Pachyderm (local copy), Waghelstein

• Winning the Minds in "Hearts and Minds": a Systems Approach to Information Operations as Part of Counterinsurgency Warfare (local copy), by Molinari, SAMS paper, AY04-05

• Philippine Information Operations During The Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign (local copy), by Bridgewater, in IO Sphere, Spring 2006 - discusses lessons of use today

• A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency (local copy), by Zuhur, Dec 2005, Strategic Studies Institute

• Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD (local copy), Defense Science Board report, Sep 2005

• Why They Hate Us: Disaggregating the Iraqi Insurgency (local copy), by Steliga, Naval Postgraduate School, Mar 2005

• Psychological Operations and Counterterrorism (local copy), by Post, in Joint Force Quarterly, issue 37, 2nd Quarter, 2005

• The Air Force’s Missing Doctrine: How the US Air Force Ignores Counterinsurgency, by Beebe, in Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2006

• Vice Chmn of JCS, stability ops testimony to Congress, 4 Apr 06 (local copy)

• Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot (local copy), ed. Huber, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press

• Getting Inside the Enemy’s Head: The Case for Counteranalysis in Iraqi Counterinsurgency Operations, by Gyves, in Air & Space Power Chronicles, Mar 2006

• The Air Force’s Missing Doctrine: How the US Air Force Ignores Counterinsurgency, by Beebe, in Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2006

• Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War (local copy), by Hendrickson and Tucker, for Strategic Studies Institute, Dec 2005

• Chasing U-Boats and Hunting Insurgents (local copy), by Breemer, in Joint Force Quarterly, Jan 2006

• Al Qaeda in Iraq: Demobilizing the Threat (local copy), by Kraner, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Dec 2005

• What Lies Beneath Saddam's Legacy and the Roots of Resistance in Iraq (local copy), by Munson, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Dec 2005

• Third Generation Gangs Revisited: the Iraq Insurgency (local copy), by Haussler, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Sep 2005

• February 2004 translation of terrorist Musab al Zarqawi letter (local copy) - as posted by the State Department

• Military Review, Nov-Dec 2005
  • Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations (local copy), by Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, British Army, in Military Review, Nov-Dec 2005 - a critical assessment of actions in Iraq (see reply in later issue)
  • Maginot Line or Fort Apache? Using Forts to Shape the Counterinsurgency Battlefield (local copy), by Demarest et al, in Military Review, Nov-Dec 2005
• Military Review, Jul-Aug 2005
  • Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations (local copy), by Chiarelli, in Military Review, Jul-Aug 2005
  • Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency? (local copy), by Grubbs and Forsyth, in Military Review, Jul-Aug 2005
  • Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (local copy), by Lynn, in Military Review, Jul-Aug 2005
  • “Stay the Course”: Nine Planning Themes for Stability and Reconstruction Operations (local copy), by Cavaleri, in Military Review, Jul-Aug 2005 - "I have identified nine specific planning themes applicable to stability and reconstruction operations conducted as part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT):"
    • Legitimacy
    • Security
    • Commitment
    • Situational understanding
    • Unity of effort
    • Infrastructure
    • Economic status
    • Planning effort
    • Media
• Military Review, Jan-Jun 2005
  • Pacifying the Moros: American Military Government in the Southern Philippines, 1899-1913 (local copy), by Byler, in Military Review, May-Jun 2005
  • The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture (local copy), by Cassidy, in Military Review, May-Jun 2005
  • Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship (local copy), by McFate, in Military Review, Mar-Apr 2005
  • French Algeria and British Northern Ireland: Legitimacy and the Rule of Law in Low-Intensity Conflict (local copy), by Campbell, in Military Review, Mar-Apr 2005
  • Nicaragua: Civilians and Military After the Sandinista Revolution (local copy), by Villarreal, in Military Review, Mar-Apr 2005
  • Somalia: Soldiers in SOSO (local copy), by Blackstone, in Military Review, Mar-Apr 2005
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina: Coalition Doctrine and LOT Houses (local copy), by Packett et al, in Military Review, Mar-Apr 2005
  • Fighting Terrorism and Insurgency: Shaping the Information Environment (local copy), by Emery et al, in Military Review, Jan-Feb 2005

• Al Qaeda as Insurgency (local copy), by Morris, in Joint Force Quarterly, Oct 2005

• Countering Global Insurgency: A Strategy for the War on Terrorism , by Kilcullen, posted by USMC Small Wars Center of Excellence

• The Importance of Treating Culture as a System: Lessons on Counter-Insurgency Strategy from the British Iraqi Mandate (local copy), by Casebeer, in Strategic Insights, Oct 2005

• Lessons Learned from Operation AL FAJR: the Liberation of Fallujah (local copy), by Ballard, 4th Civil Affairs Group - presented at 2005 DODCCRP conference

• Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902, by Deady, in Parameters, Spring 2005

• Peacekeeping at the Speed of Sound: The Relevancy of Airpower Doctrine in Opertions other than War, by Hillen, in Airpower Journal, Winter 1998

• Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations (local copy), by Cavaleri, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 7, Combat Studies Institute, 2005

• Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population’s Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency, by Ford, in Parameters, Summer 2005

• From the Ashes of the Phoenix: Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgency Operations (local copy), by Tovo, US Army War College, Mar 2005

• Force Protection Lessons from Iraq (local copy), by Pattee, in Joint Force Quarterly, issue 37, 2nd Quarter, 2005

• Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation (local copy), by Hammes, Strategic Forum 214, NDU, Jan 2005

• French Ground Force Organizational Development for Counterrevolutionary Warfare Between 1945 and 1962 (local copy), by Jackson, CGSC thesis, 2005

• Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Respons (local copy), by Metz and Millen, SSI, Nov 2004

• In Search of an Elusive Enemy: The Victorio Campaign (local copy), by Gott, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 5, Combat Studies Institute, 2004 - lessons for today from fighting Apache Chief Victorio

• Stability, America's Enemy, by Peters, in Parameters, Winter 2001
  • "Our insistence on stability above all stands against the tides of history, and that is always a losing proposition. Nonetheless, our efforts might be understandable were they in our national interest. But they are not."

• EBO Planning Template with stability indicators and measures

• Winning the War by Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and Post-Conflict in the 21st Century (local copy), by Matthews, Strategic Studies Institute, Dec 2004 - conference report

• Intervention, Stabilization, and Transformation Operations: The Role of Landpower in the New Strategic Environment, by Metz and Millen, in Parameters, Spring 2005
• Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response (local copy), by Metz and Millen, Strategic Studies Institute, Nov 2004

• US Army Doctrine and Belligerent Occupation (local copy), by Burgess, School of Advanced Military Studies, AY 03-04

• Shadows of Things Past and Images of the Future: Lessons for the Insurgencies in Our Midst (local copy), by Manwaring, SSI, Nov 2004

• Military Review, 2004
  • Winning the War of the Flea: Lessons from Guerrilla Warfare (local copy), by Cassidy, in Military Review, Sep-Oct 2004
  • Winning the Nationbuilding War (local copy), by Anderson, in Military Review, Sep-Oct 2004
  • Something Old, Something New: Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analysis (local copy), by Grau, in Military Review, Jul-Aug 2004
  • An Unconventional War: The Philippine Insurrection, 1899 (local copy), by Bundt, in Military Review, May-Jun 2004

• The Tipping Point: How military occupations go sour, by Swidey, in Boston Globe, 27 Apr 2003
  • A tipping point is a concept drawn from epidemiology, where it describes the moment at which an infectious disease becomes a public health crisis. The idea is that small changes will have little or no effect on a system until a critical mass is reached. Then just one additional small change ''tips'' the system, producing dramatic consequences. The concept has been applied to human behavior to describe everything from the breakout of bestsellers to the spread of buzzwords.
  • ''A tipping point is a reflection of a set of structural conditions that allow any match that's lit to set off a grass fire,'' says Lustick. A pigeon-hunting fracas between a few British soldiers and some peasants midwifed the Egyptian independence movement. A traffic accident between Israeli soldiers and a couple of Palestinians sparked the first Intifada. In both cases, the occupier was caught off-guard. Being alert to the underlying conditions requires solid, on-the-ground information about how people are feeling, and an awareness of the cultural codes and networks connecting various parts of society. That's hard to come by for an occupying power.

• Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, by Hoffman, RAND Occasional Paper, June 2004

• Insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan: Change and Continuity (local copy), by Metz and Millen, SSI, for National Intelligence Council NIC 2020

• Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions (local copy), Congressional Research Service (CRS) report

• Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars, by Cassidy, in Parameters, Summer 2004
• Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare, by Tomes, in Parameters, Spring 2004

• Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (local copy), Nov 2003 paper from the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, NDU

• InfantryDoctrine and Collective Training For Stability and Support Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

• America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, a RAND study, 2003

• Stability Operations - Joint Operating Concept, United States Joint Forces Command, draft document

• Lessons Learned on Collective Efficacy in Multinational Teams (local copy), including look at stability ops in Bosnia, by U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2003

• Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: the Information Revolution and Post-Modern Warfare (local copy), by Metz, SSI, 2000
  • So far thinking on the revolution in military affairs has focused on what might be called physical precision—the ability to hit targets with great accuracy from great distances with precisely the desired physical effect. Military strategists and commanders must come to think in terms of psychological precision as well: shaping a military operation so as to attain the desired attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions on the part of both the enemy and other observers, whether noncombatants in the area of operations or global audiences.
  • Today the American military is not as strong at psychological precision as it should be, in part because technological advantages appear to make psychological effectiveness unnecessary. The explanation, though, runs even deeper than that. For a nation composed of many cultures, the United States has never had a deep understanding of other cultures, perhaps because it was never a major colonial power. This has shown up whenever the U.S. military is engaged in cross-cultural conflict. Often American strategists “mirror image” the enemy and build their campaigns based on what they feel would cause Americans to surrender without taking into account the psychological differences between antagonists.

  • See also Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability (local copy), by Metz, SSI, 1995

  • See also The Future of Insurgency (local copy), by Metz, SSI, 1993

• The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: Civic Action (local copy), by Christiansen, Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998

• Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, And The Marines In Vietnam (local copy), by Pelli, posted by USMC Small Wars Center of Excellence

• Not by Bombs Alone - Lessons from Malaya (local copy), by Simpson, in Joint Force Quarterly, summer 1999

• Insurgency and Counterinsurgency - American Military Dilemmas and Doctrine Proposals, by Drew, Airpower Research Institute

• The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (local copy), by Fall, in Naval War College Review, Winter 1998

• The U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP): A Proposed Alternative Strategy for the Vietnam War (local copy), by Williamson, USMC CSC paper, 2002

• Combined Action Platoons: A Strategy for Peace Enforcement (local copy), by Brewington, USMC CSC paper, 1996
  • "The concept of the Combined Action Platoon, as it evolved in Vietnam, has potential applications in operations other than war, particularly Chapter VII UN Peace Enforcement missions."

• Force Requirements in Stability Operations, by Quinlivan, in Parameters, Winter 1995

• Democracy and Protracted War: the Impact of Television, by Venanzi, in Air University Review, Jan-Feb 1983

Urban Ops (UO)

• See also small wars

• See Urban Operations section on SOF page

• Also known as - Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)
• Also known as - Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)
• Also known as - Fighting In Built Up Areas (FIBUA)

• Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities, by Melillo, in Parameters, Autumn 2006

• "How marines are preparing for hybrid wars,". by Hoffman, in Armed Forces Journal, March 2006

• Air Force Operations in Urban Environments (local copy), executive summary of the summer 2005 study by USAF Scientific Advisory Board (SAB)
  • Air Force Operations in Urban Environments (local copy), terms of reference for summer 2005 study by USAF Scientific Advisory Board (SAB)

• Urban Warfare: a Soldier's View (local copy, 2.5 Mb), by Scales, in Military Review, Jan-Feb 2005

• Aviation Urban Operations: Are We Training Like We Fight? September 2004 Maxwell Paper, by Kemper
• AFTTP (I) 3-2.29, Aviation Urban Operations - multiservice procedures for aviation urban operations, Air Land Sea Application Center - aka FM 3-06.1, MCRP 3-35.3A, NTTP 3-01.04

• Traditions, Changes, and Challenges: Military Operations and the Middle Eastern City (local copy), by DiMarco, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 1, Combat Studies Institute, 2004

• Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations , by Jamison Jo Medby and Russell W. Glenn, RAND report, 2002

• Urban Sunrise (local copy), AF Research Lab, Feb 2004 - describes the research performed to explore the potential to enhance military urban operations

• MOUT in Iraq: Population Dependent? -- posted at the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

• Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) -- resources at the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

• Handbook for Joint Urban Operations

• Small Wars Journal, formerly known as Urban Operations Journal and before that as Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) Homepage -- excellent resource, includes discussion area, articles new and archived, research links, and more
  • Urban Warfare Study: City Case Studies Compilation, Apr 1999 Marine Corps Intelligence Activity report - examines Russians in Chechnya, Israelis in Lebanon, and British in North Ireland

• Decision-making in Urban Operations, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, a handbook on decision-making in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), was developed from in-depth interviews with veterans having substantial urban combat experience
• Evaluating an Approach to MOUT Decision Skills Training (local copy), by U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

• Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations, by Medby and Glenn, RAND report, 2002

• Aerospace Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring New Concepts, by Vick et al, RAND report, 2000
  • Lessons Learned from Past Urban Air Operations, RAND report

• The City's Many Faces: Proceedings of the Arroyo-MCWL-J8 UWG Urban Operations Conference

• Block by Block: the Challenges of Urban Operations (local copy), ed.s Robertson and Yates, Combat Studies Institute, 2003 - includes Stalingrad, Hue, Kabul, Beirut, Panama City, Grozny, Sarajevo, and Latin America (warning: large file, 13 Mb)

• A 'Crushing' Victory: Fuel-Air Explosives and Grozny 2000, by Grau and Smith
• The Human Terrain of Urban Operations, by Peters,, in Parameters, Spring 2000
• The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat, by Thomas, in Parameters, Summer 1999
• Urban Warfare and the Urban Warfighter of 2025, by Hahn and Jezior, in Parameters, Summer 1999

• Ready for Armageddon: Proceedings of the 2001 RAND Arroyo-Joint ACTD-CETO-USMC Nonlethal and Urban Operations Program Urban Operations Conference
  • Appendix B - Lessons Learned, Operation Hue City

• Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots (local copy), by Schnaubelt, for Parameters, Summer 1997

• Lessons Learned, Operation Hue City (local copy), from Urban Combat: A Marine Recalls the Tet 1968 Battle For Hue, by Mr. Nicolas Warr, USMC Veteran and Author of Phase Line Green, presented at International Infantry and Small Arms Symposium & Exhibition, June 1999

Violent Non-State Actors

• See also Small Wars and Stability Ops

• Violent Non-State Actors: Countering Dynamic Systems, by Thomas and Casebeer, in Strategic Insights, Mar 2004
  (local copy)

• Non-State Threats and Future Wars, book by Dr Robert Bunker, reviewed in Parameters, Summer 2003

• Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
  • Violent Systems: Defeating Terrorists, Insurgents, and Other Non-State Adversaries (local copy), by Thomas and Casebeer, INSS Occasional Paper 52, Mar 2004
  • Lords of the Silk Route: Violent Non-State Actors in Central Asia (local copy), by Thomas and Kiser, INSS Occasional Paper 43, May 2002

Small Wars & Guerilla Wars

• See also Small Scale or Smaller Scale Contingencies on Issues and Doctrine page

• See also stability ops and counterinsurgency

• See also urban operations

• Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities, by Melillo, in Parameters, Autumn 2006

• Preliminary “Lessons” of the Israeli-Hezbollah War, by Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies

• One Step Back, Two Steps Forward: An Analytical Framework for Airpower in Small Wars, by Stuewe, in Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2006

• Effects-Based Airpower for Small Wars: Iraq after Major Combat, by Read, in Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2005

• Small Wars Journal, formerly known as Urban Operations Journal and before that as Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) Homepage -- excellent resource, includes discussion area, articles new and archived, research links, and more

• Preparing Leaders for Nationbuilding (local copy), by Donahoe, in Military Review, May-June 2004

• Small Wars Manuals
  • Small Wars 21st Century, Jan 2004 draft
    • Small Wars 21st Century is intended to give Marines an assist in preparation for and conduct of stability and support operations. The Commandant has read Small Wars and he has asked that we get the feedback of Marines on the ground in Iraq before we go to official printing. It should be noted that this publication is not intended to replace the Small Wars Manual of 1940, nor is it meant to be a how-to book for tactics, techniques, and procedures. TTPs are addressed on the Small Wars website.
  • Small Wars Manual, 1940 (local copy), full text
  • The Small Wars Manual: Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12-25, a book review (local copy), Naval War College
  • The Small War Manual and Marine Corps Military Operations Other than War Doctrine (local copy), by Ford, CGSC thesis, 2003

  • MATA Handbook for Vietnam, Jan 1966
  • Handbook for Military Support of Pacification, Feb 1968

• USMC Small Wars Center of Excellence
  • A Century of Small Wars Shows They Can Be Won, by Max Boot, New York Times, 6 July 2003
  • Culture... A Neglected Aspect of War (local copy), by Lindberg, 1996 CSC paper

  • Lessons Learned
    • Hard copies may be requested of lessons learned for Bosnia, Haiti, Sea Angel, and U.N. Peacekeeping
  • Lessons Learned, by Region/Country (some are directly linked below)
    • Lessons Learned: Iraq (1991 and 2003)
    • Lessons Learned: Afghanistan
    • Lessons Learned: Cuba
    • Lessons Learned: Lebanon
    • Lessons Learned: Rwanda
    • Lessons Learned: Grenada
    • Lessons Learned: El Salvador
    • Lessons Learned: Nicaragua
    • Lessons Learned: Philippines

• Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars, by Cassidy, in Parameters, Summer 2004

• Britain's Small Wars

• Seeking Shadows in the Sky: the Strategy of Air Guerrilla Warfare, by Hoffman, 2000 SAAS paper

• Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly (local copy), by Cassidy, in Military Review, Sep-Oct 2000

• Airpower and Restraint in Small Wars: Marine Corps Aviation in the Second Nicaraguan Campaign, 1927–33, by Johnson, in Aerospace Power Journal, Fall 2001

• From FOCO to Insurrection: Sandinista Strategies of Revolution, by Nolan, in Air University Review, Jul-Aug 1986

• Related books [no endorsement implied]
  • Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists, by Corum and Wray, 2003
  • The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, by Boot, 2003
  • Mars Learning: The Marine Corp's Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, by Bickel, 2000

Strategic Corporal/Three-Block War

• See also Abu Ghraib on AWC Military Law page

• See also tipping point on Military Theory page

• See also cultural awareness & cross-cultural communication

• Behavioural Conflict: From General to Strategic Corporal: Complexity, Adaptation and Influence, by Mackay and Tatham, Shrivenham Paper number 9, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Dec 2009

• Educating the Strategic Corporal: a Paradigm Shift (local copy), by Stringer, in Military Review, Sep-Oct 2009
  • The U.S. military assumes that commissioned officers, based upon their level of education and hierarchical roles, will bear the main weight of interagency and intercultural interactions in current and future stability and counterinsurgency operations. That hypothesis is wrong because the era of the “strategic corporal” is upon us.
  • Post-Cold War military operations are highly decentralized, requiring men and women at all levels throughout the force to exercise complex leadership and management tasks. In the new world disorder, everybody—NCO, officer, and Soldier—not just the best and the brightest destined for generalship—requires a crucial degree of profes­sional military competence.
  • Given the ongoing changes from training to education, now is the time to add language instruction, cultural education, and interagency exchange programs to the portfolio.

• Custer in Cyberspace (local copy), by Gompert and Kugler, Defense Horizons number 51, Feb 2006
  • One of the consequences of the network revolution and corresponding distribution of authority is that many more persons up and down the ranks will be making combat decisions than compared to the days of centralized command and control. Power is migrating from headquarters “to the edge.” Therefore, it is essential to foster battle-wisdom not just for senior officers but also for the junior officers and noncommissioned officers leading units in the field.

• The Strategic Corporal and the Emerging Battlefield: the Nexus between the USMC's Three Block War Concept and Network Centric Warfare, by Szepesy, Mar 2005 thesis, The Fletcher School, Tufts University -- includes Fallujah Case Study

• The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War (local copy), by Krulak, in Marines Magazine, January 1999, as posted on the USMC Commandant's Page
  • The lines separating the levels of war, and distinguishing combatant from "non-combatant," will blur, and adversaries, confounded by our "conventional" superiority, will resort to asymmetrical means to redress the imbalance. Further complicating the situation will be the ubiquitous media whose presence will mean that all future conflicts will be acted out before an international audience.
  • The inescapable lesson of Somalia and of other recent operations, whether humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, or traditional warfighting, is that their outcome may hinge on decisions made by small unit leaders, and by actions taken at the lowest level.
  • How do we prepare Marines for the complex, high-stakes, asymmetrical battlefield of the three block war? ... The first step of the process is unchanged. Bold, capable, and intelligent men and women of character are drawn to the Corps, and are recast in the crucible of recruit training, where time honored methods instill deep within them the Corps' enduring ethos. Honor, courage, and commitment become more than mere words.
  • An institutional commitment to lifelong professional development is the second step on the road to building the Strategic Corporal.
  • Leadership, of course, remains the hard currency of the Corps, and its development and sustainment is the third and final step in the creation of the Strategic Corporal.

• Cultivating Intuitive Decisionmaking (local copy), by Krulak, in Marine Corps Gazette, May 1999, as posted on the USMC Commandant's Page
  • Marines involved in these amorphous conflicts will be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and, potentially, within the space of three contiguous city blocks. Thus, we refer to this phenomenon as the "three block war." Success or failure will rest, increasingly, with the individual Marine on the ground -- and with his or her ability to make the right decision, at the right time, while under extreme duress. Without direct supervision, young Marines will be required to make rapid, well-reasoned, independent decisions while facing a bewildering array of challenges and threats. These decisions will be subject to the harsh scrutiny of both the media and the court of public opinion. In many cases, the individual Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy. His or her actions may not only influence the immediate tactical situation, but have operational and strategic implications as well. If we accept the maxim "battles are won and lost [first] in the mind of the commanders," we can safely assume that the three block war, may very well be won or lost in the minds of our "strategic corporals."

• Strategic Scouts for Strategic Corporals (local copy), by Sargent, in Military Review, Mar-Apr 2005 - FAOs as a possible solution to some of the cultural awareness needs

Iraq - Post Saddam

• See also Post Conflict above

• See also transition to/from hostilities above

• See also Counterinsurgency above

• See also Small Wars above

• Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons from Iraq (local copy), by Tressler, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Aug 2007

• Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces (local copy), HASC Report, 27 Jun 07

• Iraq Study Group Report, 6 Dec 2006, from U.S. Institute of Peace

• How to Win in Iraq, by Krepinevich, in Foreign Affairs, Sep-Oct 2005

• DoD Report to Congress: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

• It's the Tribes, Stupid, by Pressfield, posted by D-N-I, Oct 2006 - an alternative view

• Improving Security in Iraq, 18 Jul 2005 hearings of Senater Foreign Relations Committee
  • Iraq's Security (local copy), 18 Jul 05 Congressional testimony by Pollack, of Brookings Institution
  • Military Options in Iraq (local copy), 18 Jul 05 Congressional testimony by Cordesman, of CSIS
• Iraq Transition - The Way Ahead (Part I) , 18 May 2004 hearings of Senater Foreign Relations Committee
• Iraq Transition - The Way Ahead (Part II) , 19 May 2004 hearings of Senater Foreign Relations Committee
  • The “Post Conflict” Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan (local copy), 19 May 04 Congressional testimony by Cordesman, of CSIS

• Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues (local copy), June 2004 GAO report

• Recommendations for Iraq stability (local copy), May 2004 Senate testimony by Larry Diamond, senior advisor to CPA in Baghdad Jan-Mar 2004

• Iraq's Transitional Law (local copy), GAO report on phases of transfer
• Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports on Iraq-related issues (Local Copies)

• President Outlines Steps to Help Iraq Achieve Democracy and Freedom (local copy), 24 May 04 speech
  • "There are five steps in our plan to help Iraq achieve democracy and freedom. We will hand over authority to a sovereign Iraqi government, help establish security, continue rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure, encourage more international support, and move toward a national election that will bring forward new leaders empowered by the Iraqi people."
• White House Fact Sheet: The Transition to Iraqi Self-Government (local copy), 24 May 04

• Assistance for Iraq, USAID site
  • Iraq Reconstruction Accomplishments: A Brief Overview - menu on right of page links to bridges, marshlands, etc.

• The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities (local copy), Congressional Research Service (CRS) report

• Pre-war Planning for Post-war Iraq, from DoD NESA pages

• Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction (local copy), 5 Feb 2004 speech, by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence
• Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft Myths (local copy), CIA press release, 28 November 2003
• Declassified excerpts from Oct 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (local copy), released 18 July 2003

• Coalition Provisional Authority Briefing, Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) (local copy), 14 Jan 04

• Statement to Congress by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) (local copy), 2 Oct 03

• Iraq: Lessons Learned Conference - the Coalition Provisional Authority hosted a conference in Baghdad, Iraq that explored how lessons learned from recent Central European economic reforms can help Iraq manage its transition to a market economy

• Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Briefing on His Recent Trip to Iraq (local copy), 23 Jul 2003

• Rebuilding Iraq (local copy), 15 May 2003 GAO report

• CALL Handbook NO. 03-20: U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps TTP, Stability and Support Operations (SOSO)
  the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) assembled a Combined Arms Assessment Team (CAAT) to collect specific stability and support lessons and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to help meet the challenges in post-war Iraq. The CAAT was composed of Army and Marine Corps officers and DA civilians considered specialists in areas relative to the hazards presented by the current situation in Southwest Asia.

• Quick Look: Dealing With the Civilian Population in a Post-Saddam Iraq (local copy), USMC Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO)

• The United States and Iraq's Shi'ite Clergy: Partners or Adversaries? (local copy), by Terrill, for SSI, Feb 2004

• Nationalism, Sectarianism, and the Future of the U.S. Presence in Post-Saddam Iraq (local copy), by Terrill, for SSI, July 2003

• Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario (local copy), by Crane and Terrill, for SSI, Feb 2003 -- discusses four phases of transition - Security, Stabilize, Build Institutions, and Handover/Redeploy

• The Doctrinal Challenge of Winning the Peace against Rogue States: How Lessons from Post-World War II Germany May Inform Operations against Saddam Hussein's Iraq (local copy), U.S. Army War College research paper

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

• See also Small Wars above

• Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Lessons Learned - bibliography by Air University Library

• Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War (local copy), by Hendrickson and Tucker, for Strategic Studies Institute, Dec 2005

• Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom, by Bunker and Sullivan, in Military Review, Jan-Feb 2005 - discusses which groups use which methods against which targets

• Developing Adaptive Leaders: the Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom (local copy), by Wong, for Strategic Studies Institute, July 2004

• Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed (local copy), by Wishnick, for Strategic Studies Institute, May 2004

• A Framework for Assessing Key Issues of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Its Aftermath (local copy), GAO special publication

• A Relatively Promising Counterinsurgency War: Assessing Progress in Iraq (local copy), Oct 03 Congressional testimony
• Statement by MGen (ret) Robert H. Scales, Jr. (local copy), Oct 03 Congressional testimony

• See Operation Iraqi Freedom page at ANG Conflict 21

• See Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), section on Operation Iraqi Freedom

• See also Embedded Media reports and lessons

• DoD Briefing on Joint Lessons Learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (local copy), 2 Oct 03
• Admiral Expands on Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned (local copy), 2 Oct 03
• DoD Briefing on the First Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq (local copy), 9 Sep 2003 - includes mention of Small Wars Manual
• A Proud Legacy Continues: The Fighting 5th Marines in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, by Brown, in Marine Corps Gazette, Feb 2005

• DoD Briefing on Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned Process (local copy), 3 Jun 2003

• OIF veterans discuss lessons (local copy), 31 Jul 03 - Air Warfare Center

• Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq: the Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey (local copy), by Merrill, Strategic Studies Institute

• Iraq War: Defense Program Implications for Congress (local copy), CRS report

• 09 July 03 statement of Secretary Rumsfeld before the Senate Armed Services Committee (local copy)
• Joint Ops Key to Military Lessons Learned from Iraq (local copy), highlights of Gen Franks testimony before Congress
• 09 July 03 statement of General Franks before the Senate Armed Services Committee (local copy)
• Slides summarizing 09 July 03 testimony of Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks (local copy), from the DoD Office for Transformation

• The Wages of War Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 2003 Conflict , by Conetta, 20 Oct 2003, Project on Defense Alternatives
  • Appendix 1. Survey and assessment of reported Iraqi combatant fatalities in the 2003 War
  • Appendix 2: Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 1991 Gulf War
• Catastrophic Interdiction: Air Power and the Collapse of the Iraqi Field Army in the 2003 War, by Conetta, 26 Sep 2003, Project on Defense Alternatives
• Civilian Casualties in the 2003 Iraq War: A Compendium of Accounts and Reports, by Murphy and Conetta, 21 May 2003, Project on Defense Alternatives

• The Decision to go to War in Iraq (local copy), July 2003 report by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee

• Success in Iraq result of lessons learned (local copy), says Lt Gen Keys, May 2003

• Operation Iraqi Freedom - by the Numbers (local copy), April 2003, CENTAF Assessment and Analysis Division

• The Military Lessons of Operation Iraqi Freedom, by Noonan, for Foreign Policy Research Institute

• "Instant Lessons" of the Iraq War, by Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), over 3,600 kb
  Executive Summary, about 500 kb

• The Doctrinal Challenge of Winning the Peace against Rogue States: How Lessons from Post-World War II Germany May Inform Operations against Saddam Hussein's Iraq (local copy), U.S. Army War College research paper

Global War on Terrorism - Afghanistan and elsewhere

• See Global War on Terrorism page

• See also Small Wars above

• See also transition to/from hostilities above

• Operation Enduring Freedom lessons learned, login at Center for Army Lessons Learned

• Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual, Second Edition (local copy), JSOU Press, Apr 2011

• Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook (local copy), CALL 11-16, Feb 2011 - "observations, insights, and lessons"

• The Challenge of Nonterritorial and Virtual Conflicts: Rethinking Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism (local copy), by Sloan, JSOU Report 11-2, Mar 2011

• Multiplying by Zero (local copy), by Veneri, in Military Review, Jan-Feb 2011
  • For the U.S. forces to leave Afghanistan, we need them to “stand up, while we stand down.” For our efforts to have an impact, the Afghans have to function at a level where they can provide their own security, governance, and economic well-being, which arguably they were able to do in some shape or form before 1973. I am not sure we can get them up on their knees, let alone get them to stand up. Even if we get them up on their knees through unlimited funding and no time constraints, I am still not sure the U.S. would be able to leave. I did not arrive at this conclusion through a deep-seated analysis of the current strategy or some academic study of the region. I came to this idea as I watched three Afghan men trying to inflate a basketball, and I wondered if this were a metaphor for our efforts in Afghanistan.

• CALL Publication 09-37 Small-Unit Ops in Afghanistan Handbook

• Operation Anaconda: an Air Power Perspective (local copy), AF/XOL, Feb 2005

• Supporting Air and Space Expeditionary Forces: Lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom, by Tripp et al, 2004 Rand report

• Air Force surgeon general: Better OIF patient care, interoperability result of lessons learned in OEF (local copy)

• The Origins of al Qaeda’s Ideology: Implications for US Strategy, by Henzel, in Parameters, Spring 2005

• Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: An Assessment, RAND paper, May 2003

• National Military Strategy and the GWOT - Choosing the Means (local copy), by Shreves, National War College paper, 2004

• 15th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium & Exhibition, February 2004
• 14th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium & Exhibition, 11-13 February 2003
  • Operation Enduring Freedom Lessons Learned (local copy), by BG Bruce Burda, USAF, Vice Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command
  • USACAPOC (A) Operation Enduring Freedom, Lessons Learned In Afghanistan (local copy), by BG Thoms Maney, USA, Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
  • Lessons Learned in the Global War on Terrorism (local copy), by MG Geoff Lambert, USA, Commander, Army Special Forces Command
  • Red Teaming the Terrorist Threat to Preempt the Next Waves of Catastrophic Terrorism (local copy), by Dr. Joshua Sinai, ANSER
  • Bin Laden: His Future and Ours (local copy), by Peter Probst, Vice President and Director of Programs, Institute for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence
  • 3rd Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team: NOT IF BUT WHEN (local copy), by Dr. Xavier Stewart, Moderator, 3rd Weapons of Mass Destruction, Civil Support Team WARNING: file is 17 Mb

• Lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom (local copy), AF Sec. Roche, in Air Force Policy Letter Digest, Dec 02

• Final Report: The U.S. Army's Initial Impressions of Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle (local copy), by Crane, for the Center for Strategic Leadership, Sep 2002

• Facing the Hydra: Maintaining Strategic Balance while Pursuing a Global War against Terrorism (local copy), by Crane, SSI, May 2002

• What Can We Learn from Enduring Freedom? by Vego, in Naval Institute Proceedings, July 2002

• When Devils Walk the Earth - The Mentality and Roots of Terrorism, and How to Respond (local copy), by Ralph Peters, for the USMC Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO)

• Combating Terror: Are There Lessons to Be Learned from Foreign Experience (local copy), CRS report

• Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for the Army and Defense Policy (local copy), by Biddle, SSI, Nov 2002
  This monograph examines the Afghan Model’s actual role in the fall of the Taliban, using evidence collected from a combination of 46 participant interviews, terrain inspection in Afghanistan, and written documentation from both official and unofficial sources. The author argues that neither of the main current interpretations is sound: Afghanistan offers important clues to warfare’s future, but not the ones most people think.

• What Not to Learn from Afghanistan, by Hawkins, Parameters, Summer 2002

• The Ongoing Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, and Nation Building, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

• Feedback from Operations in Afghanistan, After Action Review (AAR) Comments, posted on U.S. Army Infantry homepage

• Operation Enduring Freedom, bibliography by Air University Library
• Operation Enduring Freedom - Lessons Learned, bibliography by Air University Library

• Initial Lessons Learned (local copy), excerpt from Chapter 3 Fighting the War on Terror, of the DoD Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2002

• Military analysts reviewing successes of war in Afghanistan, National Public Radio, November 21, 2001

• Demystifying Transformation (local copy), 14 Aug 2002, from American Forces Press Service, includes brief discussion of Millennium Challenge 2002 and operations in Afghanistan and what they show and don't show about transformation

• What's So Special about Special Operations? Lessons from the War in Afghanistan, by John Jogerst, in Aerospace Power Journal, Summer 2002
• Special Operations Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom: Background and Issues for Congress (local copy), by Bruner et al, CRS Report for Congress, 15 Oct 2001

• Operation Enduring Freedom - Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Handbook No. 02-8, Center for Army Lessons Learned
  • CHAPTER I: The Contemporary Operational Environment (COE)
  • CHAPTER II: Universal and Enduring Techniques and Procedures to Support Tactical Operations in Afghanistan (Desert Environment)
    includes operations in caves and tunnels

• Pentagon plumbs lessons from war, Chicago Tribune January 14, 2002

• Afghanistan and Beyond: Reflections on the Future of Warfare (local copy), by Blank, 1993, Strategic Studies Inst., about lessons to be learned from the Soviet war in Afghanistan

• Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War, the Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Russian Documents and Memoirs
• Soviet Combat Engineers in Afghanistan - Old Lessons and Future Wars, FMSO

• Caves and Tunnels
• See handbook 02-8 above, Chapter II
• Joint Tunnel Warfare Center, at China Lake
  "will offer weapons development, tactics development and training for ground and air forces, as well as for the intelligence communities of the U.S. and its allies during Operation Enduring Freedom"
• Resources on U.S. Army Operations in Caves and Tunnels, from the Center for Military History

USS Cole

• Cohen Absolves USS Cole Skipper, Crew (local copy)

• SecNav/CNO Reading Room - USS Cole includes the Judge Advocate General Manual Review of the USS COLE attack

• USS Cole - Implications and Implementation of Lessons Learned (local copy), 3 May 2001 statement by Gen Robertson, to the Senate Armed Services Committee

• Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress (local copy), CRS report

• USS Cole Briefing - Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen (local copy), 19 Jan 2001

• DoD USS Cole Commission Report, Executive Summary, 9 Jan 2001 (local copy)

• SecDef Assessment of Accountability Arising from the Attack on USS Cole (DDG-67) on 12 Oct 2000 (local copy)

• The Attack on the U.S.S. Cole (local copy), Oct 1999 testimony before the House Military Readiness Subcommittee

• Attack on the Cole: Medical Lessons Learned, in Naval Institute Proceedings

• Attack on the USS Cole: International Information Program (IIP) Archives, State Dept

Kosovo and Balkans

• See Humanitarian and Peacekeeping lessons above

• See Coalition lessons above

• See also Small Wars above

• See also Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports on Kosovo/Bosnia

• See Kosovo and Balkans sections on History page, especially the Air Force Magazine list of articles examining Kosovo with hind-sight

• Tactical Information Operations in Kosovo (local copy), by Romanych and Krumm, in Military Review, Sep-Oct 2004

• Legal and Ethical Lessons of NATO’s Kosovo Campaign (local copy), Naval War College International Law Studies Series, Volume 78, 2002 -- a whole passel of articles by military and civilian contributors, discussing almost every major aspect of the war

• Lessons from Kosovo: the KFOR Experience, from DoD CCRP - primarily C2 and C4ISR, includes lessons from information operations in humanitarian situations
  (local copy of section 1, section 2, section 3, section 4, section 5, section 6)

• Operation Allied Force - Golden Nuggets for Future Campaigns (local copy) Maxwell Paper 27, August 2002

• Task Force Hawk -- Lessons Learned in Albania
• Kosovo Air Operations - Army Resolving Lessons Learned Regarding the Apache Helicopter (local copy), GAO report
• "Mission Too Far? Decision to Send Apaches to Kosovo Cost Money, Credibility," ABC News report

• Lessons Learned from Kosovo (local copy), After Action Review
• Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report (local copy)

• Kosovo- Lessons from the Crisis, report by UK Ministry of Defence

• UN - Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (local copy) -- includes suggestions on changing the way targeting and mission planning is handled

• Lessons Learned From the Kosovo Conflict - the Effect of the Operation on Both Deployed/Non-Deployed Forces and on Future Modernization Plans (local copy), Oct 1999 testimony before the House Military Readiness Subcommittee
• Operations in Kosovo: Problems Encountered, Lessons Learned and Reconstitution (local copy), Oct 1999 testimony before the House Military Readiness Subcommittee
• Operations in Kosovo (local copy), Oct 1999 testimony by Gen Jumper, before the House Military Readiness Subcommittee

• Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo, CSIS assessment prepared for USAF Planning Staff, updated

• True Blue: Behind the Kosovo Numbers Game, by Rebecca Grant, in Air Force Magazine, Aug 2000
• Nine Myths About Kosovo, by Rebecca Grant, in Air Force Magazine, June 2000

• NATO'S Air War For Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, RAND report, 2001
• Why Milosevic Decided to Settle the Conflict Over Kosovo When He Did, RAND Research Brief
• The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did, RAND Book

• Operation Allied Force: Strategy, Execution, Implications, transcript of colloquy by the Eaker Institute for Aerospace Concepts -- featuring comments by Gen John Jumper, Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason, and Dr Edward Luttwak

• Deliberate Force - A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning, Final Report of the Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study, covering air operations during the Fall of 1995

• The Balkans, a series of articles, at DNI

• NATO's Attack on Serbia: Anomaly or Emerging Doctrine? by Mangum, in Parameters, Winter 2000-01

• War in Europe: NATO's 1999 War Against Serbia Over Kosovo, PBS special
• Give War a Chance: Examining the Gulf between What Diplomats Want and What the Military is Prepared to Deliver, PBS special

• Rapidly Deploying Aerospace Power - Lessons from Allied Force, by Jumper, in Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 1999

• After Kosovo: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Coalition Warfare, Nov 1999 Symposium from NDU
  • After Kosovo: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Coalition Warfare, Nov 1999 Symposium Summary from NDU

• After-Action Report (AAR) SFOR7 - Citizen-Soldiers in Bosnia, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report
• Bosnia-Herzogovina After Action Review Conference, May 1996 (local copy, HTML - reformatted for readability), at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute

• Lessons from Bosnia: the IFOR Experience (local copy), from DoD CCRP
• Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations, NATO-Led Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 1995-1997 (local copy), from DoD CCRP

• Military Preventive Medicine Support - The Balkan Experience, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

Khobar Towers

• Khobar Towers Reports (local copy)
  • Khobar Towers Sec Cohen Report
  • Khobar Towers IG Report
  • Khobar Towers LtGen Record Report
    • Comments Regarding the Downing Task Force Report
  • Khobar Towers - Downing Task Force Report, released as Annex A of "Report to the President and Congress on the Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad"

• FBI announces indictment for Khobar Towers (local copy)

• Khobar Towers' Aftermath: The Development of Force Protection, by Murrey
• Khobar Towers: The Aftermath and Implications for Commanders, 1998 Air War College research paper
• From Beirut to Khobar Towers: Improving the Combating Terrorism Program, 1998 ACSC research paper

Somalia

• Lessons Unlearned: Somalia and Joint Doctrine (local copy), by Allard, Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1995
• Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (local copy), by Allard, NDU Press

• Contact Military History Institute for the classified after action review for Somalia.

• FM 100-23-1, Appendix J, Lessons Learned from Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations - Provide Comfort (northern Iraq), Provide Relief (airlift to Somalia), Restore Hope (Somalia), and UN HA operation in Bosnia (local copy)

Desert Storm Gulf War

• See also Small Wars above

• See History Page

• Myths of the Gulf War Some “Lessons” Not to Learn, by Hammond, in Airpower Journal, Fall 1998
  • MYTHS? OR TRUTHS WITH ASTERISKS? - author's reply to response to above article, included comment "the bulk of my article was a presentation given to the chief of staff of the Air Force’s Airpower Symposium, a gathering of general officers and major-command participants held at Maxwell Air Force Base in the fall of 1992"

• Fog of War - the 1991 Air Battle for Baghdad, by Arkin and others
• Baghdad - The Urban Sanctuary in Desert Storm? by William Arkin, in Airpower Journal, Spring 1997 - showing how the significance of the city re: bombing was blown out of proportion

• Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War, RAND report, 2001

• DoD Press Conference on Iraq Air Strikes (local copy), 16 Feb 2001, Southern/Northern Watch, includes discussion of rules of engagement and approval process for striking targets

• Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS)
• GAO report NSIAD-97-134, Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign (local copy) (local copy of summary)
• U.S. Navy in Desert Shield/Desert Storm - Lessons Learned and Summary

• Criticism of the JFACC during Desert Storm

Iran-Iraq War

• FMFRP 3-203 - Lessons Learned: Iran-Iraq War, 10 December 1990, Marine Corps Historical Publication - includes appendix on "How To Attack The Iraqi Army"

• Chemical Warfare in the Iraq-Iran War, SIPRI report

Vietnam

• See stability ops and counterinsurgency

• See History Page

• A New Kind of War, by Krulak, posted by Small Wars Journal

• The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: Civic Action (local copy), by Christiansen, Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998

• Lessons Learned, Operation Hue City (local copy), from Urban Combat: A Marine Recalls the Tet 1968 Battle For Hue, by Mr. Nicolas Warr, USMC Veteran and Author of Phase Line Green, presented at International Infantry and Small Arms Symposium & Exhibition, June 1999

• After Action Report, IA DRANG Valley Operation (Nov 1965) 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry (local copy, PDF) (local copy, DOC)
  - LTC Hal Moore's original after action report
  - see also Landing Zone X-Ray website

• Rolling Thunder 1965: Anatomy of a Failure (local copy), by Drew, Airpower Research Institute

• Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War, RAND report, 2001

Korea

• See History Page

• Bibliography for Lessons Learned in Korean War, AU Library
• Korean War lessons learned in medicine
• Tactical Employment of Strategic Air Power in Korea, by Futrell
• the US Air Force in Korea: Problems that Hindered the Effectiveness of Air Power, by Kropf

World War II

• See History Page

• WW II U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report, Europe
• WW II U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report, Pacific

• Command Decisions, collection of essays on the key decisions by both sides in both theaters of WW II
• Combined Bomber Offensive (local copy), 1968 discussion by Frankland, Eaker, Slessor, Galland, and other historians and primary players

• Second World War Deception - Lessons Learned for Today’s Joint Planner - analysis of six Allied deception operations

World War I

• See History Page

• Lessons Learned from the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) (local copy), in WW I
• U.S. Bombing Survey, World War I (summary) (local copy)
• The Air Battle of St. Mihiel (local copy), from Airpower Research Institute

American Civil War

• See History Page

• After Action Report, by Joshua L. Chamberlain

Miscellaneous

• Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned

• Nonproliferation Sanctions, RAND report, chapter three is "History and Lessons Learned"

• Operations Against Enemy Leaders, RAND Research Brief
• Operations Against Enemy Leaders, RAND Book

• Lessons Learned: Stress Issue at DeploymentLINK

• Hurricane Mitch After Action Review Conference, Sep 1999 (local copy), at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute

• Resources on U.S. Army Operations in Caves and Tunnels, from the Center for Military History

• Oklahoma City Bombing, 1995 - After Action Reports

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