Never neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimenstions of warfare, which is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain. Be skeptical of systems analysis, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise.
--- Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speech at NDU, 29 Sep 2008

Read and reread the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustaphus Adolphus, Turenne and Frederick; take them as your model; that is the only way of becoming a Great Captain, to obtain the secrets of the art of war.
--- Napoleon

The personality of the general is indispensable, he is the head, he is the all of an army. The Gauls were not conquered by the Roman legions but by Caesar. It was not before the Carthaginian soldiers that Rome was made to tremble but before Hannibal. It was not the Macedonian phalanx which penetrated to India but Alexander. It was not the French Army which reached the Weser and the Inn, it was Turenne. Prussia was not defended for seven years against the three most formidable European Powers by the Prussian soldiers but by Frederick the Great.
--- Napoleon

You should not have a favorite weapon.
--- Miyamoto Musashi, A Book of Five Rings

General Resources

• See also military journals and papers, especially using cumulative listings to browse for articles

• See also combat leadership examples on leadership page

• Systems versus Classical Approach to Warfare (local copy), by Vego, in Joint Force Quarterly, 1st Qtr 2009
  • Never neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimenstions of warfare, which is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain. Be skeptical of systems analysis, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise.
    --- Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speech at NDU, 29 Sep 2008

  • Since the mid-1990s, a systems (or sytemic) approach to warfare emerged gradually as the dominant school of thought in the U.S. military, most other Western militaries, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
  • Yet U.S. and NATO experiences in the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Israeli experience in the second Lebanon war in 2006, have revealed not only serious limitations but also important flaws in the practical application of the systems view of war.

• On Metaphors We Are Led By (local copy), by Paparone, in Military Review, Nov-Dec 2008
  • With the clever and often hidden use of metaphors, the most effective thought leaders indoctrinate others to grasp and communicate the intractable or instrutable. This essay proposes a framework that can help military practitioners judge the appropriate use of metaphor and be more reflective about how indoctrination can work to shape their "sensemaking" in important ways.

• The Militant Ideology Atlas, ed. McCants, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, Nov 2006
  • ...an in-depth study of the Jihadi Movement's top thinkers and their most popular writings. This is the first systematic mapping of the ideology inspiring al-Qaeda.
  • The CTC’s researchers spent one year mining the most popular books and articles in al-Qaeda’s online library, profiling hundreds of figures in the Jihadi Movement, and cataloging over 11,000 citations. The empirically supported findings of the project are surprising:
    • The most influential Jihadi intellectuals are clerics from Jordan and Saudi Arabia, two of the US’s closest allies in the Middle East.
    • Among them, the Jordanian cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi has had the most impact on other Jihadi thinkers and has been the most consequential in shaping the worldview of the Jihadi Movement.
    • In contrast, the study finds that Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri have had little influence on other Jihadi theorists and strategists.

• Transition to the Information Age Demands Improvements to Professional Military Education System (local copy), Congressman Ike Skelton press release, 28 Sep 05
  • Imagine what might happen if a Rembrandt received a box of 16 crayons, and an average Joe was given a full palette of oil paints, easel, and canvas. Which one is more likely to produce a work of art? The analogy may not exactly fit, but the point is clear – the tools matter less than the talent, training, and dedication that create the art. You can’t have a masterpiece without a master. I think we forget that sometimes in the realm of warfare.

• Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist (local copy), by Foster, in Joint Force Quarterly

• Changing Nature of Warfare, 25 May 2004 workshop papers from the National Intelligence Council (NIC) 2020 project

• Airpower Doctrine -Airpower Theory, bibliography by Air University Library

• From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future of War, by Evans, in Naval War College Review, Summer 2003

• The Immutable Nature of War, PBS, NOVA, interview with Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper
  • The art of war and the science of war are not coequal. The art of war is clearly the most important. It's science in support of the art. Any time that science leads in your ability to think about and make war, I believe you're headed down a dangerous path.
  • The art is the thinking. It is the intellectual underpinnings of war. It's understanding the theory and the nature. It's understanding how it is you want to bring combat power to bear, and what the operating concepts are. The science is represented by the weapons.

• Study of War Conferences (summaries) - by Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) - UNC, Duke U., and NCSU

• The Roots of Modern American Operational Art (local copy), by Col Mike Matheny, Director (as of Aug 2003 download time) of the Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP), US Army War College

• Educating the Post-Modern U.S. Army Strategic Planner: Improving the Organizational Construct (local copy), by Wilson, a 2003 SAMS paper

• Why Strategy Is Difficult (local copy), by Colin S. Gray, in Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1999

• On Strategic Performance (local copy), by Colin S. Gray, in Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1995-96
  • A holistic approach operates vertically and horizontally. Seen vertically, strategy includes all aspects of peace and security from political vision to tactical military performance. Horizontally considered, it includes the application of power on land, at sea, in the air, and in space, together with strategic nuclear and special operations forces. It is important that this dual-axis appreciation should be accepted before challenges in detail are offered.
  • Why is strategy difficult to achieve, let alone sustain? With some grateful borrowing and adaptation from Clausewitz, I find six connected reasons. [each is expanded in the article]
    • First, competence in strategy requires mastery of a challenging complexity.
    • Second, by its nature strategy is more demanding of the intellect and perhaps imagination than any structurally more simple activity—policy, operations, tactics, or logistics for prominent examples.
    • Third, it is extraordinarily difficult to train competent strategists, let alone outstanding ones.
    • Fourth, strategy is extraordinarily difficult to conduct with consistent excellence because of the unique physical and moral burdens it puts on would-be strategists.
    • Fifth, it is worth citing what Clausewitz termed friction, although the previous point can be seen as encompassing aspects of this phenomenon.
    • Finally, success in strategy calls for a quality of judgment that cannot be taught.

• Toward an American Way of War (local copy), by Echevarria, SSI

• Machines, the Military, and Strategic Thought (local copy), by Lopez et al, in Military Review, Sep-Oct 2004 - with diagrams/semantic webs of relations between actions, influences, and results

• Knowing - self, enemy, situation (local copy) - a quick, easy read from Navy CIO with topics such as types of cognitive capabilities, and knowing yourself as an agent of change
  • includes the use of storytelling as a transformational tool in the Navy

• U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy (local copy), 2006, edited by Bartholomees
• U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy (local copy), 2004, edited by Bartholomees
• U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy (local copy), 2001, edited by Cerami and Holcomb

• Airmen and Air Theory - A Review of the Sources, by Meilinger, AU Press, 2001

• Keeping the Strategic Flame (local copy), by Builder, in Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97

• The Mark of Strategic Genius, by Metz, in Parameters, Autumn 1991

• Strategy and Theory Case Studies, Naval War College

• Warfare Theory (local copy), by Gattuso, in Naval War College Review, Autumn 1996 - compares attrition theory and maneuver theory, and when each is appropriate

• Peter Faber
  • Strategy: Its Intellectual Roots and Its Current Status, by Faber, posted by the NATO Defense College
    • Excerpted from “The Evolution of Airpower Theory in the United States - From World War I to John Warden’s The Air Campaign,” in Asymmetric Warfare, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Norwegian Air Force Academy Militaerteoretisk skriftserie Nr. 4, 2002).
  • Four Questions and Answers on Asymmetric Warfare, by Faber, posted by the NATO Defense College
  • Competing Theories of Airpower: a Language for Analysis, by Faber, in Aerospace Power Chronicles - short article
  • Competing Visions of Aerospace Power: A Language for the 21st Century, by Faber, Naval War College, 1997 - 144 pages
    • "... this report 1) describes the "prison house of language" that thwarted airpower theorists in the past, 2) provides a model to analyze airpower theory properly, and 3) reviews 15 different theories of airpower...."

• The Links between Science and Philosophy and Military Theory: Understanding the Past; Implications for the Future, by Pellegrini, SAAS paper

• The Grammar and Logic of Conflict, by Fabyanic, in Air University Review, Mar-Apr 1981

• The Strategist's Short Catechism: Six Questions without Answers (local copy), Philip A.Crowl, The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, No. 20, October 6, 1977, pp. 1-14 - highlights below
  • The first and most fundamental question to be asked of any prospective war or other military action is: "What is it about?" ... What specific national interests and policy objectives are to be served by the proposed military action? How great is the value attached to those interests and objectives, and what is their fair price?
  • The second question for strategists concerns not the decision to go to war, but the proper methods of fighting the war once it starts. Assuming that a nation at war has some rational objectives, the next question is: “Is the national military strategy tailored to meet the national political objectives?” What this question suggests is that there be a close correlation between the political ends of war and the military means employed to achieve those ends.
  • A third and most difficult question that strategists must ask is: “What are the limits of military power?” This one more than any other sticks in the craw—especially in the craw of us Americans whose major national sin is grandiosity, and even more of American military officers whose professional creed is best expressed in two words: “Can do.” Yet there are many things that armed forces, no matter how powerful, cannot do.
  • Question number four is simply: “What are the alternatives?” What are the alternatives to war? What are the alternative campaign strategies, especially if the preferred one fails? How is the war to be terminated gracefully if the odds against victory become too high?
  • My fifth question is: “How strong is the home front?” Does public opinion support the war and the military strategy employed to fight it? What are the attitudes of influential elites both inside and outside the government in office? How much stress can civilian society endure under the pressures of the wartime sacrifices demanded? Is the war morally acceptable? Can it plausibly be explained as a “just war?”
  • It also brings me to the sixth and final question for strategists, which is a paraphrase of Mahan’s warning already noted. “Does today’s strategy overlook points of difference and exaggerate points of likeness between past and present?” Has concern over past successes and failures developed into a neurotic fixation that blinds the strategist to changed circumstances requiring new and different responses?
  • And one final warning to those of you who are on the threshold of your careers as strategic planners. After all your plans have been perfected, all avenues explored, all contingencies thought through, then ask yourself one final question: “What have I overlooked?” Then say your prayers and go to sleep—with the certain knowledge that tomorrow too will bring its share of nasty surprises.

• Finesse: a Short Theory of War (local copy), by Forsyth, in Military Review, Jul-Aug 2004

• On Target for Joint Theater Air Defense, 1996, Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, U. S. Air Force chief of staff
  • "The advent of the Global Positioning System, along with improving computer technology and miniaturization, has resulted in a rapid drop in the price of highly accurate cruise missiles. At the same time, sensor systems are proliferating and in the very near future it will be possible to find, fix and target virtually any surface force in the world."

• Chaos Theory for the Practical Military Mind, AU research paper by Durham

• Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model, by Yarger (local copy)
• The U.S. Army War College Methodology for Determining Interests and Levels of Intensity, by Yarger and Barber (local copy)
• Aid to Formulating a Regional Strategic Appraisal, by Sadrak, Army War College (local copy)

• Dept of War Studies, King's College London

• War, Peace, and Security Web Server, in English, from Canadian Forces College

• Fundamentals of Military Strategy, Army War College
• CATO Institute
• Air Power Development Centre, Royal Australian Air Force

• Anticipating the Future: New Perspectives on Prussian and Austrian War Planning, by Echevarria, in Parameters, review of works on 19th century strategy development, incl Moltke and Schlieffen
• In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, Arquilla and Ronfeldt ed.s, RAND, 1997
  • Neocortical Warfare? The Acme of Skill, by Szafranski, originally in Military Review
• Thumping the Hive: Russian Neocortical Warfare in Chechnya (local copy), by McIntosh, 2004 NPS paper

• MILITARY AIR POWER: The CADRE Digest of Air Power Opinions and Thoughts, military quotes book, by Lt Col CHARLES M. WESTENHOFF, 1990, (MS Word), searchable using the Find feature in Word or browser [Zipped file] [PDF file] -- lots of quotes from theorists and leaders and strategists

• Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, from Marathon to Waterloo (local copy), first published in 1851 (with later editions), by Edward Shepherd Creasy (1812-1878)

  Battle of Marathon, B.C. 490 Defeat of Athenians at Syracuse, B.C. 413 Battle of Arbela, B.C. 331 Battle of the Metaurus, B.C. 207 Defeat of Romans under Varus, A.D. 9 Battle of Chalons, A.D. 451 Battle of Tours, A.D. 732 Battle of Hastings, A.D. 1066

  Joan of Arc's Victory at Orleans, A.D. 1429 Defeat of the Spanish Armada, A.D. 1588 Battle of Blenheim, A.D. 1704 Battle of Pultowa, A.D. 1709 Defeat of Burgoyne at Saratoga, A.D. 1777 Battle of Valmy, A.D. 1792 Battle of Waterloo, A.D. 1815

• Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power, by Victor Davis Hanson, New York and London: Doubleday. 2001 - uses nine representative battles of Western versus non-Western forces to illustrate his theories

  Battle of Salamis, 480 B.C. Battle of Gaugamela, 331 B.C. (aka Battle of Arbela) Battle of Cannae, 216 B.C. Battle of Poitiers, 732 (aka Battle of Tours) Battle of Tenochtitlan, 1521

  Battle of Lepanto, 1571 Battle of Rorke's Drift, 1879 Battle of Midway, 1942 Tet Offensive, 1968

  • Reviews of Carnage and Culture

• The Military Leadership of the North and the South (local copy), by Williams, USAFA Harmon Memorial Lecture #2 (DOC file)

• A Short History of War (local copy), online military history of past 5000 years, from Army War College, with some Air War College additions

• Sonshi.com library online works by Machiavelli, Teddy Roosevelt, Caesar, Mahan, Frederick the Great, Sherman, Xenophon, Marcus Aurelius, Clausewitz, ...
  • Great Leaders in the Art of War, list by Sonshi.com

• Hints to Young Generals, by an Old Soldier (BGen. John Armstrong), Kingston: J. Buel, 1812 - [Armstrong was a major in the Revolutionary War, was at the defeat of Burgoyne in 1777, and served as ambassador to France in 1804 and saw Napoleon's army firsthand.]
  • "Books! and what are they but the dreams of pedants? They may make a Mack, but have they ever made a Xenophon, a Caesar, a Saxe, a Frederick or a Bonaparte? Who would not laugh to hear the cobler of Athens lecturing Hannibal on the art of war?"
  • "True: but as you are not Hannibal, listen to the cobler. Xenophon, Caesar, Saxe and Frederick, have all thought well of books, and have even composed them. Nor is this extraordinary, since they are but the depositories of maxims, which genius has suggested, and experience confirmed; since they both enlighten and shorten the road of the traveller, and render the labor and the genius of past ages, tributary to our own. These teach most emphatically, that the secret of successful war, is not to be found in mere legs and arms, but in the head, that shall direct them."

American Way of War

• see also strategy models

• see also counterinsurgency

• The Echo of Battle: The Army Way of War , book by Linn, Nov 2007
  • In the face of radically new ways of waging war, Brian Linn surveys the past assumptions--and errors--that underlie the army's many visions of warfare up to the present day. [from Harvard Universary Press summary]

• The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency, Executive Summary, by Record, Sep 2006

• Rage Against the Machines: Mechanization and the Determinants of Victory in Counterinsurgency Warfare , by Lyall (Princeton) and Wilson (USMA), May 2007 (supercedes earlier version titled "The American Way of War and Peace in Comparative Perspective")
  • Empirical evidence suggests that Great Powers and weak states alike are increasingly unable to wage successful counterinsurgency campaigns. We argue that this decline can be explained by rising levels of mechanization within state militaries. Unlike their earlier counterparts, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit the creation of information-gathering networks among local populations. Mechanized militaries therefore struggle to wield their power discriminately, pushing fence-sitters into the insurgency. We test this claim using a new dataset of 238 insurgencies (1800-2000) and a microlevel comparison of two U.S. Army Divisions in Iraq (2003-04). We find that mechanization is associated with a decreasing probability of incumbent victory; that regime- and power-based explanations only account for nineteenth century outcomes; and that oft-cited factors such as terrain or ethnolinguistic divisions are largely unconnected to outcomes in counterinsurgency warfare.

• Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? (local copy), by Gray, SSI, March 2006
  • Characteristics of the American Way of War
    

    Apolitical Astrategic Ahistorical Problem-solving, optimistic Culturally challenged Technology dependent Focused on firepower

    Large-scale Aggressive, offensive Profoundly regular Impatient Logistically excellent Highly sensitive to casualties

• The American Way of War through 2020 (local copy), by Gaffney, for the National Intelligence Council's NIC 2020 Project, 2004

• Toward an American Way of War (local copy), by Echevarria, SSI, March 2004

• The New American Way of War, by Boot, in Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003

• The American Way of War (local copy), by Cebrowski and Barnett, Transformation Trends newsletter, 13 Jan 2003
• The Global Transaction Strategy (local copy), by Barnett and Gaffney, Transformation Trends newsletter, 16 Dec 2002
• NewRuleSets.Project
  • The Top 100 Rules of the New American Way of War (local copy), by Barnett and Gaffney, 3 Jan 2003
  • Life After DoDth or: How the Evernet Changes Everything , by Barnett
  • The Pentagon's New Map, by Barnett

• National Culture and Warfare - Whither Decisive Force (local copy), Joint Force Quarterly Autumn 1996 review essay by Andre, referencing Decisive Force: the New American Way of War by Hoffman

Grand Strategy

• see also strategy models

• Strategic Studies Institute
  • Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: the Little Book on Big Strategy (local copy), by Yarger, The Letort Papers, Feb 2006
  • American Grand Strategy after 9/11: an Assessment (local copy), by Biddle, Apr 2005
  • Grand Strategy for the United States in the 21st Century? (A Look at the National Security Document of 2002 and Beyond) (local copy), by Tinsley, Mar 2005
  • Planning for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations without a Grand Strategy (local copy), by Mangan, Mar 2005

• Does the PRC have a Grand Strategy of Hegemony? (local copy), Congressional testimony by Mosher, 14 Feb 2006

• Lesson 1 - Grand Strategy: Theory and Practice (local copy), USMC CSC 8802 (5.5 Mb)

Principles of War

• see also Future of War for ideas on challenges the principles might face, and might need to change to handle

• see also Cebrowski and Co. re: new rules and new map of warfighting

• see also Transformation of War at Center for Transformation Studies

• see also leadership competencies and skills for ideas on what principles will take advantage of the leadership skills of the future

• 12 new principles of warfare, by van Avery, in Armed Forces Journal, July 2007

• Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency (local copy), by Cohen et al, in Military Review, Mar-Apr 2006

• Neo-Strategicon: Modernized Principles of War for the 21st century (local copy), by Dunlap, in Military Review, Mar-Apr 2006

  Perceived Worthiness Informed Insight Strategic Anchoring Durability

  Engagement Dominance Unity of Effect Adaptability Culminating Power

• Future Warfare: Rethinking the Principles of War - project by the Office of Force Transformation (OFT)
  Have the Principles of War changed? Some think it is an interesting question, and to that end we have put together a team to examine this subject. The group includes the Office of Force Transformation, the U.S. Naval Institute, the Royal Uniformed Services Institute, and Johns Hopkins University. In search of the answer, this group is hosting a summer seminar series followed by a national essay contest to produce a textbook on this subject.
• Speakers bios, notes, etc. from the seminar above, at Johns Hopkins University
  • What Do We Know About Future Warfare? - 15 March 2005 notes by Dr Colin Gray

• Malignants in the Body Politic: Redefining War through Metaphor, SAAS paper, 2004

• Competition, War & Transformation: Interagency Framework for Operational Planning and Force Development (local copy), June 2004 briefing by Kiefer, Joint Staff J7
  • For full benefit, download the slideshow and view locally from your hard drive (and not using a browser) so you can view the notes which accompany many of the individual slides
  • Purpose: discuss concept elements which are missing or not fully developed in current JOpsC family of concepts
  • Agenda
    • Freedom of Action
    • Dimensions of Competition
    • Fires & Maneuver
    • Principles of War - several good slides about issues, shortfalls, & changes needed
    • Legitimacy
    • Definitions
    • Principles of Transformation
    • Sense-Making

• Rethinking the Principles of War, by Morgan, McIvor, and SecNav Action Team, in Proceedings, Oct 2003

• The Growing Imperative to Adopt "Flexibility" as an American Principle of War (local copy), by Frost, Strategic Studies Institute

• Principles of War on the Network-Centric Battlefield: Mass and Economy of Force, by Murdock, in Parameters, Spring 2002

• Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future, by Schneider, in Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues
• The Principles of War in the 21st Century: Strategic Considerations (local copy), by Johnson et al, Strategic Studies Institute

• The Information-Based RMA and the Principles of War, by Litton, in Air & Space Power Chronicles - includes discussion of six of the traditional principles which may be influenced most by the emergence of information-based warfare

• Sailing New Seas, by Reason and Freymann, Newport Paper No. 13, Naval War College
  • Appendix A - Fighting Principles
    "There are no new principles of war. However, different principles should receive different emphases in different environments. Some are especially appropriate to the Navy's current environment. This appendix highlights a few of those principles."

• Threat Kingdom (local copy), by Flynt, in Military Review - examines emerging threats, targets, means, and ends
  The new principles of war are no longer "using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one's will," but rather are "using all means…to compel the enemy to accept one's interests. - from Unrestricted Warfare, by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui

• Review of The Principles of War for the Information Age, by Robert Leonhard (local copy), in Naval War College Review
  • Leonhard criticizes the traditional nine principles and proposes seven new ones

    knowledge and ignorance, dislocation and confrontation, distribution and concentration, opportunity and reaction,

    activity and security, option acceleration and objective, and command and anarchy

• A Fresh Look at Some Old Principles-Building a Framework for the Twenty-First Century (local copy), by Heinz, Naval War College paper - expands on Leonhard book above
  • framework based on the independent Law of Humanity and the dependent Laws of Risk, Adaptability, and Duality of War
  • new principles of war - Comparative vs. Exclusive Advantage, Knowledge vs. Estimates, Confrontation vs. Dislocation, Concentration vs. Distribution, Reaction vs. Opportunity, Security vs. Activity, Objective vs. Option Acceleration, Anarchy vs. Command

• No More Principles of War? (local copy) by Glenn, in Parameters, Spring 1998 - examines the traditional nine principles, the Principles of Operations Other than War, and the Principles of Operations

  Figure 1. Principles of War and Operations Other than War
  (as in 1993 FM 100-5, Operations) and Principles of Operations as
  proposed in Initial Draft, 1998 FM 100-5, Operations.

  Principles of War	Principles of Operations Other than War	Principles of Operations
  Objective	Objective	Objective
  Offensive	Perseverance	Offensive
  Mass	Legitimacy	Massed Effects
  Economy of Force	Restraint	Economy of Force
  Maneuver	-	Maneuver
  Unity of Command	Unity of Effort	Unity of Effort
  Security	Security	Security
  Surprise	-	Surprise
  Simplicity	-	Simplicity
  -	-	Morale
  -	-	Exploitation

  [Ed. note: the 2004/2005 draft of Marine Small Wars manual uses the OOTW principles above, but lumps Legitimacy and Restraint together, and uses the word Persistence instead of Perseverance.]

• US Coast Guard Publication 1
  • Chapter 4 - Principles of Coast Guard Operations (local copy)

    clear objective effective presence unity of effort on-scene initiative

    flexibility managed risks restraint

  • Appendices (local copy) - including descriptions of the Principles of War and the Principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

• General Arnold's Fundamental Principles of Air Power (local copy)
• Lord Tedder's Principles of Air Warfare (local copy)

• Applying the Principles of War in Information Operations, by Nelson, in Military Review, Sep-Nov 1998-->

• International Principles of War
  • Principles of War - of US, UK, Australia, Soviets, France, and China (local copy), from 1997 AFSC Pub 1

  • Principles of War - a Translation from the Japanese, by West, Command & General Staff College

Tenets of Air and Space Power

• see also spacepower theory at the Center for Space Studies

• AFDD 1, Chapter 3, Principles of War and Tenets of Air and Space Power
  • Tenets of Air & Space Power
    • Centralized Control & Decentralized Execution
    • Flexibility & Versatility
    • Synergistic Effects
    • Persistence
    • Concentration
    • Priority
    • Balance

• Airmen and Air Theory - A Review of the Sources, by Meilinger, AU Press, 2001

• Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower, by Smith, SAAS paper, 2001

• Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power, by Meilinger, in Air & Space Power Chronicles
  - (alternate source at AF History Office, big PDF file, long load time)
  1. Whoever controls the air generally controls the surface.
  2. Air Power is an inherently strategic force.
  3. Air Power is primarily an offensive weapon.
  4. In essence, Air Power is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations.
  5. Air Power produces physical and psychological shock by dominating the fourth dimension--time.
  6. Air Power can conduct parallel operations at all levels of war, simultaneously.
  7. Precision air weapons have redefined the meaning of mass.
  8. Air Power's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen.
  9. Technology and air power are integrally and synergistically related.
  10. Air Power includes not only military assets, but an aerospace industry and commercial aviation.

• Fifty Questions Every Airman Can Answer, by Baier, Air Force Doctrine Center
• 50 More Questions Every Airman Can Answer, by Baier, Air Force Doctrine Center

• Competing Theories of Airpower: a Language for Analysis, by Faber, in Aerospace Power Chronicles - short article

Strategy Models and Criticisms

• see also strategic art

• Military Doctrine, by Drew and Snow, including Doctrine Tree and discussion of relationship between doctrine and strategy

• A Primer on Strategy Analysis, by Mowbray

• The Compleat Strategyst: Being a Primer on the Theory of Games of Strategy, by Williams, RAND - classic book from 1954

• The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Interests, by Arnold, in Parameters, Spring 1994 - discusses the Nuechterlein National Interest Matrix

• U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy (local copy), 2006, edited by Bartholomees
• U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy (local copy), 2004, edited by Bartholomees
• U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy (local copy), 2001, edited by Cerami and Holcomb

• In Search of the Missing Link: Relating Destruction to Outcome in Airpower Application, by Williams, 1994 SAAS paper - examines destruction-outcome linkage model as applied to strategies from WW II, Korea, Vietnam, and the 1991 Gulf War

• Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model, by Yarger (local copy)
• The U.S. Army War College Methodology for Determining Interests and Levels of Intensity, by Yarger and Barber (local copy)
• Aid to Formulating a Regional Strategic Appraisal, by Sadrak, Army War College (local copy)

• Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China (local copy), by Lieutenant General Li Jijun, Vice President of the Academy of Military Science, The Chinese People's Liberation Army

• John M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973

• Wylie, Joseph C. Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989

In Other Languages

• War, Peace, and Security Web Server, in French, from Canadian Forces College

• Air & Space Power Journal in Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, and French

• Military Review, has Spanish, Portuguese, and Arab editions

• See list of non-English military journals on AWC Study Tips page

Bibliographies/Collections

• AU Library Bibliographies

• Great Warrior Leaders/Thinkers, references by AU Library (selected ones below)

  Arnold, Henry H. ("Hap") Chamberlain, Joshua L. Chennault, Claire L. Cochran, Jacqueline. Davis, Benjamin O., Jr. De Seversky, Alexander. Doolittle, James H. Douhet, Giulio Eaker, Ira C. Eisenhower, Dwight D. Fuller, John Frederick Charles Halsey, William F.

  Hannibal Jomini, Antoine Henri LeMay, Curtis E. Liddell Hart, Basil Henry Mahan, Alfred Thayer Mitchell, William (Billy) Patton, George S. Rommel, Erwin J. Schwarzkopf, H. Norman Spaatz, Carl Trenchard, Hugh Montague Yeager, Charles E.

• Sun Tzu Bibliography, by Stein, Air War College, Nov 1999, includes other classical Chinese works [RTF file]
• Sun Tzu Bibliography, AU Library, with call numbers
• Clausewitz Bibliography, AU Library, with call numbers
• Corbett, Julian Stafford, AU Library resources

Compare & Contrast

• see also international principles of war above

• see also comparisons of cultures at the culture studies center

• Football vs. Soccer - American Warfare in an era of unconventional threats (local copy), by Cassman and Lai, Nov 2003 Armed Forces Journal (AFJ) - copyrighted material appearing courtesy of the authors and AFJ
• Learning from the Stones: a Go Approach to Mastering China's Strategic Concept, Shi (local copy), by Lai, for Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)

• A Balkan Sun Tzu vs. the NATO Clausewitz: A Tentative Interpretation of the Serbo - NATO War
• War & Society, Volume 13, Number 2, October 1995, Tim Hamlett, 'Hemisphericity and Reasoning Styles in Chinese and Western Thinkers: A Comparison of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu'
• Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared, by Michael Handel
• Corbett, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu (local copy), by Handel, in Naval War College Review, Autumn 2000

• Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction, by Bassford, paper from meeting of Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, Ga. St. U.

• Vietnam and Desert Storm: Learning the Right Lessons from Vietnam for the Post-Cold War Era, by Col. Joseph P. Martino, USAF (Ret), incl table comparing the two wars
• Competing Theories of Airpower: a Language for Analysis, by Faber, in Aerospace Power Chronicles - short article

• Clausewitz - Eastern and Western Approaches to War, by Summers, in AU Review

• Soviet Military Theory in English, by Whiting, in AU Review, May-June 1976

Sun Tzu (or Sunzi) & more

• Sun Tzu on the Art of War (local copy), 1910 translation by Lionel Giles
• Sun Tzu’s Art of War Study Guide & Introductory Working Bibliography, by Stein, Air War College, 2008, excellent annotated guide to studying Sun Tzu and related writings - [.rtf version]

• A Swift, Elusive Sword: What If Sun Tzu and John Boyd Did a National Defense Review, by Richards, at CDI

• The Native Roots of Psychology in China: Sunzi and the School of Strategists as Pioneers of "Psychological Art" by Gawlikowski, at XVII International CongressInternational Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology, Xi’an, August 2-6, 2004

  Sun Tzu vs. the NATO Clausewitz: A Tentative Interpretation of the Serbo - NATO War

• Sun Tzu Bibliography, AU Library, with call numbers

• Sun Tzu Art of War in Information Warfare, INSS, NDU Press

• Sun Tzu On the Art of War, Giles translation with intro and comments, posted by Korea Web Weekly
• Sun Tzu's The Art of War, with explanation of each Chinese character
• New translation of Sun Tzu, posted at Sonshi.com

• Sun Tzu and the Art of Business homepage, "the business strategist's headquarters"

• The 36 Strategems or Strategies of Ancient China

Greek

• See Ancient Military History, especially Peloponnesian War and Alexander references

• The Battle of Marathon or What’s a 2500-year-old battle got to do with me?, by MajGen I.B. Holley, in AU Review

• Thucydides and the Teaching of Strategy (local copy), a Joint Force Quarterly review essay by Bernstein, regarding The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, by Strassler

• Thucydides and PME: History's Role in Intermediate and Senior Service School, by Rynecki, in Air & Space Power Chronicles

Roman

• See Ancient Military History

• The Strategemata , by Frontinus - original Latin and English translation - a detailed examination of Roman strategy and tactics

• Military Commentaries, by Gaius Julius Caesar

• The Military Institutions of the Romans (De Re Militari), by Flavius Vegetius Renatus, 390 A.D., translated by Clarke, 1767

• The Military Affairs of Ancient Rome & Roman Art of War in Caesar's Time, by Brady

Medieval

• See Medieval Military History

• The Strategikon - A Forgotten Military Classic (local copy), by Charles C. Petersen, Military Review, Aug 1992 - Byzantine warfare

Niccolo Machiavelli, 1469-1527

• The Prince, by Niccolo Machiavelli

• The Art of War [two sources]
  • The Art of War, by Niccolo Machiavelli
  • The Seven Books on the Art of War, by Niccolo Machiavelli, Citizen and Secretary of Florence, 1520

• Machiavelli's influence on Clausewitz mentioned in Clausewitz: Eastern and Western Approaches to War, by Col Harry Summers, in Air University Review, Mar-Apr 1986

Hermann-Maurice comte de Saxe, 1696-1750

• from Westenhoff quotes book
  • Saxe, Hermann Maurice de, Marshal of France. Commissioned at age 12, a regimental commander of cavalry at 17; leading military commander of the early eighteenth century; author of My Reveries (1732).

  • "The ultimate object of mobility is to obtain superior power in battle."
  • "Few orders are best, but they should be followed up with care."

• other quotes
  • It is not big armies that win battles, it is the good ones.
  • Hope encourages men to endure and attempt everything; in depriving them of it, or in making it too distant, you deprive them of their very soul.

• My Reveries upon the Art of War, by Marshal Herman Maurice de Saxe, Published posthumously in 1757

• Maurice de Saxe, "My Reveries upon the Art of War," in Roots of Strategy: The 5 Greatest Military Classics of all Time, ed. and trans. Thomas R. Phillips, (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940; reprinted by Stackpole Books, 1985),
  • I do not favor pitched battles, especially at the beginning of a war, and I am convinced that a skillful general could make war all his life without being forced into one.
  • I do not mean to say by this that when an opportunity occurs to crush the enemy that he should not be attacked, nor that advantage should not be taken of his mistakes. But I do mean that war can be made without leaving anything to chance. And this is the highest point of perfection and skill in a general.

Frederick the Great, 1712-1786

• from Westenhoff quotes book
  • Frederick II ("the Great"), King of Prussia. Brilliant military leader and domestic reformer; rebelled against military discipline as a youth and was court-martialed; in the Seven Years' War of 1756-1763, he held off the armies of Russia, France, and Austria (all larger powers) through adroit maneuvering, timing, and skill.

  • "Every art has its rules and maxims. One must study them: theory facilitates practice. The lifetime of one man is not long enough to enable him to acquire perfect knowledge and experience."
  • "It would further human knowledge if, instead of writing new books, we would apply ourselves to making decent extracts from those that are already in existence. Then one would hope to avoid wasting his time by reading."
  • "The greatest secret of war and the masterpiece of a skillful general is to starve his enemy."
  • "In order to have rest oneself it is necessary to keep the enemy occupied."
  • "Petty geniuses attempt to hold everything; wise men hold fast to the key points."
  • "Skepticism is the mother of security."
  • "But since the best dispositions become useless if they are not executed, it is essential that the general should be industrious in seeing whether his orders are executed or not."

• The King of Prussia's Military Instruction to his Generals (local copy) (lengthy, 161k to download)
• Particular Instruction of the King of Prussia to the Officers of his Army, and especially those of the Cavalry (local copy) (lengthy, 111k to download)

Napoleon, 1769-1821

• from Westenhoff quotes book
  • Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France. Military leader; multiskilled reorganizer of continental European politics and law.

  • "If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering on an undertaking, I have meditated for long and have foreseen what may occur. It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others; it is thought and preparation."
  • "Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. Space we can recover; lost time, never."
  • "War is composed of nothing but accidents, and though holding to general principles, a general should never lose sight of everything to enable him to profit from these accidents; that is the mark of genius."
  • "A battle sometimes decides everything; and sometimes the most trifling thing decides the fate of a battle."
  • "Fumblings, the middle course, lose all in war."
  • "Nothing is more important in war than unity in command."
  • "The whole art of war consists of a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive followed by rapid and audacious attack."
  • "The first quality for a commander-in-chief is a cool head, which receives a correct impression of things. He should not allow himself to be confused by either good or bad news."
  • "Morale makes up three quarters of the game, the relative balance of manpower accounts for only the remaining quarter."

• The Military Maxims of Napoleon, by General Burnod, 1827

• The Human Element and Air Combat: some Napoleonic Comparisons, by Wells, in Aerospace Power Journal, Spring 1988

• Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare (local copy), by Ross, USAFA Harmon Memorial Lecture #28 (DOC file)

Carl von Clausewitz, 1780-1831

• see Westenhoff quotes book and search on Clausewitz to see excellent selection of quotes

• see center of gravity

• Clausewitz Condensed (local copy), hypertext version of report from Congressional Research Service
• Who Is Afraid of Carl von Clausewitz? A Guide to the Perplexed, by Handel, Naval War College
• Clausewitz for Beginners, by Cannon, in Airpower Journal

• Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from Future Mistakes?, by Fleming, in Parameters, Spring 2004

• Quotations from Clausewitz
  • Tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war.
  • In tactics the means are the fighting forces . . . the end is victory.
  • The original means of strategy is victory -- that is, tactical success; its ends . . . are those objects which will lead directly to peace.
  • Strategy . . . confers a special significance . . . on the engagement: it assigns a particular aim to it.
  • Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose. . . . The aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it.
  • In war more than anywhere else things do not turn out as we expect. . . . Perseverance in the chosen course is the essential counterweight.

• On War online, 1873 translation by Graham, posted at the Clausewitz Homepage
• On War online, 1873 translation by Graham, posted at Sonshi.com

• The Trinity, the Whole Trinity, and Nothing but the Trininty (local copy), by Polo, National War College paper - emphasizing trinity of passion, chance, and reason

• On War without the Fog (local copy), by Kiesling, in Military Review, Sep-Oct 2001 - pointing out that Clausewitz never uses "fog of war"

• Echevarria
  • Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought (local copy), by Echevarria, in Naval War College Review, Winter 2003
  • Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine - Again! (local copy), by Echevarria, for SSI
  • War, Politics, and RMA - the Legacy of Clausewitz (local copy), by Echevarria, in Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1995-96
  • A Balkan Sun Tzu vs. the NATO Clausewitz: A Tentative Interpretation of the Serbo - NATO War

• Some Thoughts on Clausewitz and Airplanes, by Smith, Air University Review, May-Jun 1986
• Clausewitz: Eastern and Western Approaches to War, by Col Harry Summers, in Air University Review, Mar-Apr 1986

• The Clausewitz Homepage, lots of stuff
  • By-Concept Index to On War, from SAMS
  • John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz, article from War and History, Nov 1994
  • Who Is Afraid of Carl von Clausewitz? A Guide to the Perplexed, by Handel, Naval War College
  • Doctrinal Complexity: Nonlinearity in Marine Corps Doctrine, by Bassford, in Maneuver Warfare Science
  • Clausewitz: Toward a Theory of Applied Strategy, by Echevarria, in Defense Analysis
  • English-Language Bibliography on Clausewitz
  • Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction, by Bassford, paper from meeting of Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, Ga. St. U.

• Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War, by Beyerchen, in International Security
• Clausewitzian Friction and Future War (local copy), McNair Paper, by Watts
• Clausewitz and the Indirect Approach ... Misreading the Leader, by Davidson, in Airpower Journal
• Clausewitz's Theory: On War and Its Application Today, by New, in Airpower Journal
• AU Library Bibliography on Clausewitz

Centers of Gravity

• See individual theorists, especially Clausewitz above and Warden below

• Definitions
  • centers of gravity - (DOD Dictionary) Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs. See also capability; decisive point.
  • capability - (DOD Dictionary) The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.)
  • decisive point - (DOD Dictionary) A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. See also center of gravity.

• JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning - Center of Gravity is in Chapter IV, on pages IV-8 (pdf page 132) thru IV-19 - key terms, diagrams, and discussion of how to analyze COGs and integrate them into planning, ...
  • A COG can be viewed as the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act. The COG is always linked to the objective. If the objective changes, the center of gravity also could change.
  • key terms
    • critical capability — a means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such, and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s).
    • critical requirement — an essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational.
    • critical vulnerability — an aspect of a critical requirement, which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects.

• Understanding the Link between Center of Gravity and Mission Accomplishment (local copy), by Pierce and Coon, in Military Review, May-Jun 2007

• Center of Gravity Analysis (local copy), by Eikmeier, in Military Review, Jul-Aug 2004

• Machines, the Military, and Strategic Thought (local copy), by Lopez et al, in Military Review, Sep-Oct 2004 - with diagrams/semantic webs of relations between actions, influences, and results - and addressing the strategic COG (SCOG)

• Engaging Civil Centers of Gravity and Vulnerabilities (local copy), by Sele, in Military Review, Sep-Oct 2004

• Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities
  by Dr Joe Strange, USMC War College, and Colonel Richard Iron, UK Army
  • Summary of the article [PDF]
  • Part 1, What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity [PDF]
  • Part 2, The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities [PDF]
  • About the Authors [PDF]

• Echevarria
  • Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It’s Not What We Thought (local copy), by Echevarria, in Naval War College Review, Winter 2003
  • “Reining in” the Center of Gravity Concept, by Echevarria, in Air & Space Power Journal, Summer 2003
  • Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine - Again! (local copy), by Echevarria, for SSI

• Systemizing Effect Based Air Operations, by Noedskov, in Air & Space Power Chronicles -- analysis aimed at CoG

Culminating Point

• see also tipping point

• culminating point - (DOD) The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. a. In the offense, the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. b. In the defense, the point at which counteroffensive action is no longer possible. (from the DoD Dictionary)

• Culminating Points (local copy), by Hall, in Military Review, July 1989

• other military references to "culminating point"

Decisive Battle

• See also decisive force

• decisive engagement - (DOD Dictionary) In land and naval warfare, an engagement in which a unit is considered fully committed and cannot maneuver or extricate itself. In the absence of outside assistance, the action must be fought to a conclusion and either won or lost with the forces at hand.

• decisive point - (DOD Dictionary) A geographic place, specific key event, critical system, or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. See also centers of gravity.

• Gettysburg's "Decisive Battle" (local copy), by Goss, in Military Review, Jul-Aug 2004

• Paralyzed or Pulverized? The Fall of the Republican Guard (local copy), by Belote, in Joint Force Quarterly, Apr 2005

• Air University posted materials with reference to Clausewitz and "decisive battle"

• other military references to "decisive battle", historical, theoretical, and modern

Antoine Henri Jomini, 1779-1869

• from Westenhoff quotes book
  • Jomini, Antoine Henri, General of Brigade of France and Lieutenant General of Russia. Served as Marshal Ney's chief of staff; director of the French general staff's historical section in the Napoleonic Wars; author of The Art of War (1855).

• Introductory Material to Summary of the Art of War (local copy), by Jomini, 1838 - different format and packaging of above material, with Jomini's letter to the Emperor
  • Of all theories on the art of war, the only reasonable one is that which, founded upon the study of military history, admits a certain number of regulating principles, but leaves to natural genius the greatest part in the general conduct of a war without trammeling it with exclusive rules.
  • On the contrary, nothing is better calculated to kill natural genius and to cause error to triumph, than those pedantic theories, based upon the false idea that war is a positive science, all the operations of which can be reduced to infallible calculations.
  • In all the arts, as in all the situations of life, knowledge and skill are two altogether different things, and if one often succeed through the latter alone, it is never but the union of the two that constitutes a superior man and assures complete success. Meanwhile, in order not to be accused of pedantry, I hasten to avow that, by knowledge, I do not mean a vast erudition; it is not the question to know a great deal but to know well; to know especially what relates to the mission appointed us.

• The Art of War (local copy), by baron Henri Jomini

  • To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:—

    1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.
    2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion.
    3. Grand Tactics.
    4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.
    5. Engineering,—the attack and defense of fortifications.
    6. Minor Tactics.
  • It is proposed to analyze the principal combinations of the first four branches, omitting the consideration of tactics and of the art of engineering.
  • Familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to be a good infantry, cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a general, or for a staff officer, this knowledge is indispensable.

• The Military Leadership of the North and the South (local copy), by Williams, USAFA Harmon Memorial Lecture #2 (DOC file) - with discussion especially of Jomini's influence

• Jomini, Antoine Henri, AU Library resources
• Cornell University Making of America (MoA) Collection (300+ hits when searched on "Jomini") Using advanced search can find the following:
  • Baron de Jomini's Treatise on Military Operations, 1865
  • General Jomini (local copy, a quick 15 pages), bio article by G.B.M. in The Galaxy, published 1869
    • He said that it was while studying the accounts of the battle of Leuthen that the great principle which is the foundation of the art of war flashed upon him; and a careful study of Napoleon's early Italian campaigns proved to him that he had at last mastered the secret. ... it was simply this -- to bring the greatest mass of troops to bear upon the decisive point of a field of battle or theatre of operations, at the opportune moment.
    • Not long after [Austerlitz], the Emperor [Napoleon], when at Schönbrunn, with more leisure than usual, directed Maret to read to him the portions of the work ["Treatise on Great Operations"] indicated in Jomini's letter. After listening to a few pages, he exclaimeed:
         "They say the age does not advance! Why, here is a young major, a Swiss at that, who teaches us what my professors never taught me, and what very few generals understand!"
         After hearing a little more, he said, much excited,
         "Why did Fouché allow such a work to be published? It teaches my whole system of war to my enemies. The book must be seized, and its circulation prevented."
         After a few moments' reflection, he again said:
         "But I attach too much importance to this publication. The old generals who command against me will never read it, and the young men who will read it do not command; nevertheless, such works must not be published hereafter without permission."
         He then ordered Jomini's name be placed on the list of promotions for the campaign, as colonel on the general staff; and he was immediately assigned as senior aide-de-camp to Marshal Ney.
    • Jomini conversed frankly about the modern changes and improvements in fire-arms, railways, telegraphs, etc. He freely acknowledged their advantages, and the changes they would bring about in war, but insisted that they could not modify its principles. "Woe to the general," said he, "who trusts in the modern inventions, and neglects the principles of strategy; those principles will remain unchanged through all the improvements of the future, and can never be inconsistent with them; future history will show that under no circumstances can those principles be violated with impunity."
• Intro to Interpreting Modern War - Jomini, History of Warfighting: Theory and Practice, Command and General Staff College - excellent quick summary of Jomini by Thomas Huber (local copy)

• Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction, by Bassford, paper from meeting of Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, Ga. St. U.

Dennis Hart Mahan, 1802-1871

• from Westenhoff quotes book
  • Mahan, Dennis Hart. Professor of military art and science at West Point; founder of professional military study in the United States; influenced many Civil War generals.

  • "Attack the enemy suddenly when he is not prepared to resist. Celerity is the secret of success."

• McClellan, A Historian's View, with discussion of what he was taught by Professor D.H. Mahan at West Point -"It is doubtful that Professor Mahan ever had a more brilliant pupil than McClellan." -- "Professor Dennis Hart Mahan gave his students the practical lessons of the French Field Commander."

• Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction, by Bassford ... "[A.T.] Mahan's father, military educator Dennis Hart Mahan, had been a devout Jominian, and so was he."

• "All officers of this command must now study their books; ignorance of duty must no longer be pleaded. The commanding general has the power at any time to order a board to examine the acquirements and capacity of any officer, and he will not fail to exercise it. Should any officer, high or low, after the opportunity and experiences we have had, be ignorant of his tactics, regulations, or even of the principles of the Art of War (Mahan and Jomini), it would be a lasting disgrace." By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman, from: HQ General Orders No.62 (24 July 1862)

• To do the greatest damage to our enemy with the least exposure to ourselves, is a military axiom lost sight of only by ignorance of the true ends of victory. --Dennis Hart Mahan

• 1826 Dennis Hart Mahan, highest ranking graduate in the U. S. Military Academy class of 1824, begins four years of study in France.
• 1830 Mahan becomes an instructor at USMA.

• The Battle of Gettysburg: A Historical Perspective, 1995 ACSC research project including an interactive Asymetrix Toolbook product
  • "The Toolbook examines the influences of Dennis Hart Mahan and the concept of the decisive battle. Mahan derived his teachings from the works of the Swiss officer, Antoine Henri Jomini. The leaders of both the Northern and Southern armies and the overwhelming majority of their generals were graduates of the United States Military Academy, West Point. An overriding influence in their military education was the teachings of Dennis Hart Mahan, who taught for many years at West Point." -- training of the military leaders at Gettysburg "was dominated by the actions of Napoleon, the writings of Jomini, and formulated by the teachings of Mahan. The advantages of rapidity of movement, invasion of the enemy's territory, and a deadly blow to his forces culminating in a decisive battle, were the tenets that shaped the Civil War decision makers' thinking. They fought as they were trained to fight. A decisive battle was exactly what the generals were expecting and what they were seeking at Gettysburg."

• The History of Warfighting: Theory and Practice, Command and General Staff College -- "As the American Civil War progressed, most senior commanders continued to rely upon Jominian theory as interpreted by Dennis Hart Mahan and [Gen. Henry Wager] Halleck, even though it did not specifically address sweeping technological changes such as railroads and ironclad warships. A few commanders, like U. S. Grant, paid little attention to Jominian rules and adopted a more pragmatic approach that seemed to fit the changed conditions better than the Napoleonic model then in vogue."

Charles-Jean-Jacques-Joseph Ardant du Picq, 1821-1870

• from Westenhoff quotes book
  • du Picq, Charles Ardant, Colonel, French Army. Military leader in the Crimean and Franco-Prussian wars; author of the classic Battle Studies (1870).

  • "With equal or inferior power of destruction he will win who has the resolution to advance, who by his formations and maneuvers can continually threaten his adversary with a new phase of material action, who, in a word, has the moral ascendancy."

• Battle Studies - Ancient and Modern Battle (local copy), by Ardant du Picq

Pre-A.T. Mahan Maritime Strategy

• Mahan's Forebears: the Debate over Maritime Strategy, 1868-1883, by Apt, in Naval War College Review

Alfred Thayer Mahan, 1840-1914

• from Westenhoff quotes book
  • Mahan, Alfred Thayer, Admiral, USN. Son of Dennis Hart Mahan; naval historian and theorist; author of The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890), one of the most influential volumes of historical analysis ever written.

  • "The strategist is he who always keeps the objective of the war in sight and the objective of the war is never military and is always political."
  • "The proverbial weakness of alliances is due to inferior power of concentration."

• Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction, by Bassford ... "[A.T.] Mahan's father, military educator Dennis Hart Mahan, had been a devout Jominian, and so was he."

• Mahan's Classical View and the Profession of Arms, by Chipman, in AU Review, about the enduring lessons which may even apply to air power
• The Reluctant Seaman, about Alfred Thayer Mahan
• Mahan, Alfred Thayer, AU Library resources
• Mahan Articles, posted at the Cornell University Making of America (MoA) Collection (700+ hits when searched on "Mahan") Using advanced search you can find many articles, including the following:
  • The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, unsigned review of Mahan's major work, Atlantic Monthly (Oct. 1890)
  • The United States Looking Outward, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Atlantic Monthly (Dec. 1890)
  • Admiral the Earl of St. Vincent, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Atlantic Monthly (March 1893)
  • Admiral Saumarez, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Atlantic Monthly (May 1893)
  • Admiral Lord Exmouth, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Atlantic Monthly (July 1893)
  • The Isthmus and Sea Power, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Atlantic Monthly (Oct. 1893)
  • Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion, by Alfred T. Mahan, in North American Review (Nov. 1894)
  • Lessons from the Yalu Fight, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (Aug. 1895)
  • The Future in Relation to American Naval Power, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Harper's Magazine (Oct. 1895)
  • Nelson at Cape St. Vincent, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (Feb. 1896)
  • The Engineer in Naval Warfare, by Alfred T. Mahan, in North American Review (Dec. 1896)
  • Nelson in the Battle of the Nile, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (Jan. 1897)
  • The Battle of Copenhagen, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (Feb. 1897)
  • Nelson at Trafalgar, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (March 1897)
  • Preparedness for Naval War, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Harper's Magazine (March 1897)
  • A Twentieth-Century Outlook, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Harper's Magazine (Sept. 1897)
  • The Strategic Features of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Harper's Magazine (Oct. 1897)
  • The Spanish Armada: Introduction, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (June 1898)
  • Current Fallacies Upon Naval Subjects, by Capt. Alfred T. Mahan, in Harper's Magazine (June 1898)
  • The Peace Conference and the Moral Aspect of the War, by Alfred T. Mahan, in North American Review (Oct. 1899)
  • The Merits of the Transvaal Dispute, by Alfred T. Mahan, in North American Review (March 1900)
  • Effects of Asiatic Conditions Upon International Policies, by Alfred T. Mahan, in North American Review (Nov. 1900)

Julian Stafford Corbett, 1854-1922

• Corbett in Orbit: A Maritime Model for Strategic Space Theory (local copy), by Klein, in Naval War College Review, Winter 2004

• Inherent Differences in the Conditions of War on Land and on Sea (local copy), Julian S. Corbett, [.rtf file]
• Strategy in the Navy, 1909, by Spenser Wilkinson, an attack on Corbett's views/influence
• Corbett, Julian Stafford, AU Library resources

Maj Gen Emory Upton, 1839-1881

• The Military Policy of the United States from 1775, GPO 1904 (from 1878 manuscript), by Maj Gen Emory Upton

• Prophets or Praetorians? The Uptonian Paradox and the Powell Corollary, by Cassidy, in Parameters, Autumn 2003

• Making Do with Less, or Coping with Upton's Ghost (local copy), by Cohen, SSI
  "More than one generation of American military professionals have inherited and perpetuated Civil War Major General Emory Upton’s distrust of -- and disdain for -- civilians in general and politically elected or appointed civilian leaders in particular."

Helmuth von (The Elder) Moltke, 1800-1891

• from Westenhoff quotes book
  • Moltke, Helmuth von ("The Elder"), Field Marshal of Germany. Twentieth-century strategist and military reformer whose military successes led to German unification; linguist and novelist.

  • "You will usually find that the enemy has three courses open to him, and of these he will adopt the fourth ."
  • "Remember, gentlemen, an order that can be misunderstood will be misunderstood."
  • "The offensive knows what it wants, whereas the defensive is in a state of uncertainty." - S. T. Das paraphrasing Moltke, The Elder

• Moltke and the German Military Tradition: His Theories and Legacies, by Echevarria, in Parameters
• Anticipating the Future: New Perspectives on Prussian and Austrian War Planning, by Echevarria, in Parameters, review of works on 19th century strategy development, incl Moltke and Schlieffen

• Moltke listed Homer's works, the Bible, and On War among three of the five books which most influenced him. Eberhard Kessel, Moltke (Stuttgart: K.F. Koehler, 1957), 108 - [this from the notes to Echevarria's Borrowing from the Master: Uses of Clausewitz in German Military Literature Before the Great War ]

Sigismund Wilhelm Lorenz von Schlichting, 1829-1909

• see also Kipp article for Schlichting's influence on Russian/Soviet theorists and strategists

• Borrowing from the Master: Uses of Clausewitz in German Military Literature before the Great War, by Echevarria, in War and History - includes discussion "the Schlichting controversy, at the core of which was the issue of the high casualty rates, especially among infantry and cavalry units, experienced in the Wars of Unification"

Early Russian/Soviet Theory and Doctrine

• Mass, Mobility, And The Red Army's Road To Operational Art 1918-1936 (local copy), by Kipp, FMSO, 1988
  • - do a search on Schlichting to find the references to his influence on Russian doctrine
  • - EXCELLENT discussion of impact by and influences on Leer, Svechin, Triandafillov, Tukhachevsky, and others who contributed to Russian/Soviet operational art, theory, and doctrine in this period

World War I

• see also Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell, and Lawrence

• Rules of Success in Air Combat (aka "Dicta Boelcke"), by Hauptmann Oswald Boelcke, 1916 - basic rules for visually-based air combat success

Giulio Douhet, 1869-1930

• from Westenhoff quotes book
  • Douhet, Giulio, General, Italian Air Force. Early aviator and air power advocate; author of The Command of the Air (1921) and Probable Aspects of a Future War (1928).

  • "Because of its independence of surface limitations and its superior speed the airplane is the offensive weapon par excellence."
  • "The guiding principle of bombing actions should be this: the objective must be destroyed completely in one attack, making further attack on the same target unnecessary."
  • "In order to assure an adequate national defense, it is necessary--and sufficient--to be in a position in case of war to conquer the command of the air."
  • "Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur."

• Command of the Air (local copy) (38 Mb), by Giulio Douhet, from AF History Support Office - (18 Mb version, lower resolution)

• Giulio Douhet: More on Target Than He Knew, by Estes, in Airpower Journal
• Reflections on Douhet: the classic approach, by Shiner, in AU Review
• Giulio Douhet and Strategic Air Force Operations, by Eula, in AU Review

• Giulio Douhet: Father of Air Power 1869 - 1930, a short biography -- part of "Italy at War, 1940-1943"

• Douhet, Giulio, AU Library resources

Hugh Montague Trenchard, 1st Viscount, 1873–1956

• from Westenhoff quotes book
  • Trenchard, Hugh Montague, British Air Marshal, Viscount. Commander of the Royal Flying Corps in the field in World War I; chief of Air Staff from 1919 to 1929; single-minded advocate of air progress.

  • "It may be said that Douhet was the theorist of air power, Mitchell the publicist and catalytic agent, and Trenchard the organizational genius." - Harry H. Ransom
  • "The four principles of air power that I set out were:"
    1. To obtain mastery of the air, and to keep it, which means continually fighting for it.
    2. To destroy the enemy's means of production and his communications by strategic bombing.
    3. To maintain the battle without any interference by the enemy.
    4. To prevent the enemy being able to maintain the battle.

William "Billy" Mitchell, 1879-1936

• William "Billy" Mitchell's Air Power, words of Mitchell, published by the Airpower Research Institute
  • The Essence of Air Power
  • Fundamental Truths About Airpower
  • The Aeronautical Era
  • Air Power and the Air Force
  • Air Power and Control of the Air
  • Airmen in Air Power
  • Air Power and Armies and Navies
  • Training and Education for Air Power
  • Air Power Functions
  • Conclusion
  • Endnotes
• Billy Mitchell, brief bio and review of ideas
• Mitchell, William (Billy), AU Library resources

Interwar Air Power Theories and Doctrine

• See also Between the Wars on the History page

• Air Warfare, by William Sherman, 1926

• The Thread of Doctrine, by Pauly, in Air University Review, May-June 1976 - discusses ACTS and its predecessors, as well as the documents of the period
  • The basic documents produced during this period that reflected the evolution of these early ideas include:
    • War Department Training Regulation No. 440-15, "Fundamental Principles for Employment of the Air Service" (1926)
    • Air Corps Tactical School, "Employment of Combined Air Force" (1926)
    • War Department Training Regulation No. 440-15, "Employment of the Air Forces of the Army" (1935)
    • WDFM 1-5, "Employment of the Aviation of the Army" (1940)
    • AWPD-1, "Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Forces" (1941)
    • FM 31-35, "Aviation in Support of Ground Forces" (1942)
    • WDFM 100-20, "Command and Employment of Air Power" (1943) - superseded FM 1-5

• Warden and the Air Corps Tactical School: What Goes Around Comes Around, by Belote, for Airpower Journal
• Warden and the Air Corps Tactical School: Déjà Vu?, by West, SAAS paper, Oct 1999

• The Development of US Strategic Bombing Doctrine in the Interwar Years: Moral and Legal?, by Faber, in Journal of Legal Studies, 1996/1997
  • Regarding Employment of Combined Air Force, Air Service Tactical School, 1924-1925
    • The text provides a series of working propositions that establish an intellectual foundation for the follow-on work of the ACTS Bomber Mafia from roughly 1928-1935. In particular, the Combined Air Force text codified five crucial propositions of air warfare for Army airmen.
      1) The goal of an air attack is "to undermine the enemy’s morale, [or] his will to resist."
      2) Airmen can best destroy morale, however, by attacking the interior of an opponent’s territory. Attacks against vital points or centers will not only terrorize populations into submission, they will also save lives. (In the future, for example, the Army will not have to gradually wear down and overcome enemy forces interposed between itself and an opponent’s territory.)
      3) Air power is an inherently offensive weapon that is impossible, in absolute terms, to stop.
      4) Since air power is the only military tool that can hit centers of concentration and sources of supply, and since it is the only tool that can undermine national morale with minimum effort and materiel, combatants should use it extensively in strategic operations. Strategic targets, after all, are typically more important than tactical ones.
      5) Last, "In any scheme of strategical operations the object is to cause complete destruction or permanent and irreparable damage to the enemy which will have a decisive effect."

Thomas Edward (T.E.) Lawrence, 1888-1935

• In 1946, in a conversation with General Raoul Salan of France, Vo Nguyen Giap reportedly informed him, "My fighting gospel is T.E. Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom. I am never without it."

• Principles of Warfare Culminating Seminar, by Schneider, 13 Apr 2005, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) - quick summary of Lawrence's ideas and their application today

• Twenty-Seven Articles, by Lawrence, reprinted from The Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917, reproduced in Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present - see PDF page 11
• Twenty-Seven Articles, by Lawrence, reprinted from The Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917 - alternate source

• from his book Seven Pillars of Wisdom (various editions during the 1920's and 1930's) .. [red highlight added by AWC]
  • full text available online
  • full text available online, second source
  • "However it was, things in the Hejaz went from bad to worse. No proper liaison was provided for the Arab forces in the field, no military information was given the Sherifs, no tactical advice or strategy was suggested, no attempt made to find out the local conditions and adapt existing Allied resources in material to suit their needs."
  • "As I have shown, I was unfortunately as much in command of the campaign as I pleased, and was untrained. In military theory I was tolerably read, my Oxford curiosity having taken me past Napoleon to Clausewitz and his school, to Caemmerer and Moltke, and the recent Frenchmen. They had all seemed to be one-sided; and after looking at Jomini and Willisen, I had found broader principles in Saxe and Guibert and the eighteenth century. However, Clausewitz was intellectually so much the master of them, and his book so logical and fascinating, that unconsciously I accepted his finality, until a comparison of Kuhne and Foch disgusted me with soldiers, wearied me of their officious glory, making me critical of all their light. In any case, my interest had been abstract, concerned with the theory and philosophy of warfare especially from the metaphysical side."
  • "Here was a pompous, professorial beginning. My wits, hostile to the abstract, took refuge in Arabia again. Translated into Arabic, the algebraic factor would first take practical account of the area we wished to deliver, and I began idly to calculate how many square miles: sixty: eighty: one hundred: perhaps one hundred and forty thousand square miles. And how would the Turks defend all that? No doubt by a trench line across the bottom, if we came like an army with banners; but suppose we were (as we might be) an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man's mind; and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so we might offer nothing material to the killing. It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target, owning only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at."

• The Evolution of a Revolt, by Lawrence, in Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, Oct 1920 - with mention of Foch, Saxe, Moltke, Hannibal, Mohammed, and others .. [red highlight added by AWC]
  • Tactically the only campaigns I had studied step by step were the ancient affairs of Hannibal and Belisarius, Mohammed and the Crusades! My interests were only in pure theory and I looked everywhere for the metaphysical side, the philosophy of war, about which I thought a little for some years. Now I was compelled suddenly to action, to find an immediate equation between my book-reading and our present movements.
  • While we were training the regulars (of course not sending officer or light machine guns to Feisal in the hills meanwhile), the Turks suddenly put my appreciation to the test by beginning their advance on Mecca. They broke through my "impregnable" hills in twenty-four hours, and came forward from them towards Rabegh slowly. So they proved to us the second theorem of irregular war - namely, that irregular troops are as unable to defend a point or line as they are to attack it.
  • My own personal duty was command, and I began to unravel command and analyse it, both from the point of view of strategy, the aim in war, the synoptic regard which sees everything by the standard of the whole, and from the point of view called tactics, the means towards the strategic end, the steps of its staircase. In each I found the same elements, one algebraical, one biological, a third psychological.
  • The third factor in command seemed to be the psychological, that science (Xenophon called it diathetic) of which our propaganda is a stained and ignoble part. Some of it concerns the crowd, the adjustment of spirit to the point where it becomes fit to exploit in action, the prearrangement of a changing opinion to a certain end. Some of it deals with individuals, and then it becomes a rare art of human kindness, transcending, by purposeful emotion, the gradual logical sequence of our minds. It considers the capacity for mood of our men, their complexities and mutability, and the cultivation of what in them profits the intention. We had to arrange their minds in order of battle, just as carefully and as formally as other officers arranged their bodies: and not only our own men's minds, though them first: the minds of the enemy, so far as we could reach them: and thirdly, the mind of the nation supporting us behind the firing-line, and the mind of the hostile nation waiting the verdict, and the neutrals looking on.
  • It was the ethical in war, and the process on which we mainly depended for victory on the Arab front. The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander.... In Asia we were so weak physically that we could not let the metaphysical weapon rust unused. We had won a province when we had taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom: the presence or absence of the enemy was a secondary matter.
  • It was an irony of fate to entrust this side-show of a side-show, with its opportunity of proving or disproving the theory, to an outsider like myself, not qualified technically to make the best of it. I would have given so much to show that Saxe was the greatest master of his kind of war, but now all I can say is that we worked by his light for two years, and the work stood. This is a pragmatic argument that cannot be wholly derided.
  • The experiment was a thrilling one, which took all our wits. We believed we would prove irregular war or rebellion to be an exact science, and an inevitable success, granted certain factors and if pursued along certain lines. We did not prove it, because the war stopped: but here the thesis is:-
    • It seemed that rebellion must have an unassailable base, something guarded not merely from attack, but from the fear of it: such a base as we had in the Red Sea Ports, the desert, or in the minds of the men we converted to our creed.
    • It must have a sophisticated alien enemy, in the form of a disciplined army of occupation too small to fulfil the doctrine of acreage: too few to adjust number to space, in order to dominate the whole area effectively from fortified posts.
    • It must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent. active in a striking force, and 98 per cent. passively sympathetic. The few active rebels must have the qualities of speed and endurance, ubiquity and independence of arteries of supply. They must have the technical equipment to destroy or paralyse the enemy's organized communications, for irregular war is fairly Willisen's definition of strategy, "the study of communication" in its extreme degree, of attack where the enemy is not.
    • In fifty words: Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.

Basil Henry Liddell Hart, 1895-1970

• from Westenhoff quotes book
  • Liddell Hart, Sir Basil Henry, Captain, British Army. Military theorist and historian; advocate of combined arms warfare and the indirect approach; author of numerous books, including Paris, or the Future of War (1925) and Strategy (1954).

  • "A modern state is such a complex and interdependent fabric that it offers a target highly sensitive to a sudden and overwhelming blow from the air."
  • "Air power is, above all, a psychological weapon--and only short-sighted soldiers, too battle-minded, underrate the importance of psychological factors in war."
  • "Loss of hope, rather than loss of life, is the factor that really decides wars, battles, and even the smallest combats."
  • "War and truth have a fundamental incompatibility."
  • "While the horizon of strategy is bounded by war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace."
  • "True economy of force is using the indirect approach to effect a psychological defeat without engaging in actual combat."
  • "To strike with strong effect, one must strike at weakness."
  • "If the enemy is certain as to your point of aim he has the best possible chance of guarding himself-and blunting your weapon. If, on the other hand, you take a line that threatens alternative objectives, you distract his mind and forces."
  • "Originality is the most vital of all military virtues as two thousand years of history attest."
  • "The principles of war could, for brevity, be condensed into a single word: concentration."

• Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London, incl how to use the centre
• Liddell Hart, Basil Henry, AU Library resources

• Clausewitz and the Indirect Approach… Misreading the Leader, by Davison, in Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 1988 - discusses Liddell Hart's attack on Clausewitz

• additional references to Liddell Hart and the indirect approach

World War II

• See World War II Military History

• General Arnold's Fundamental Principles of Air Power (local copy)

• Lord Tedder's Principles of Air Warfare (local copy)

Mao Tse-tung or Mao Zedong, 1893-1976

• Mao Zedong Reference Archive

• Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung
• [selected] Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, with commentary, posted at Washington State University

• Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) Reference Archive, at Marxists.org
• On Guerrilla Warfare, from Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Vol. IX, 1937

• Compound Warfare in the Military Thought and Practice of Mao Zedong and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Huai Hai Campaign (November 1948-January 1949), by Bjorge, Combat Studies Institute

• Heeding Sun or Mao? Assessing China's Military Thinking, by Halloran, Global Beat, NYU
• Flawed icon of China's resurgence, CNN profile of Mao Tse-tung (1893-1976)
• Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung, with a history of the work and its impact, by Ferguson, at Princeton U.

• Mao's 1928 formula of 16 Chinese characters
  • when the enemy advances, we retreat; when he camps, we harass him; if he tires, we attack; when he retreats, we pursue

Ernesto "Che" Guevara, 1928-1967

• Che Guevara and Guerrilla Warfare: Training for Today's Nonlinear Battlefields (local copy), by Lewis, in Military Review, Sep-Oct 2001

• Guerrilla Warfare, by Ernesto "Che" Guevara, written in 1961 - posted at the Small Wars Center of Excellence

• Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare, by Ernesto Guevara, Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, 1961

• Ryan, Henry Butterfield. The Fall of Che Guevara: a story of soldiers, spies, and diplomats. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

• Mary-Alice Waters
  • Edited volumes containing Ernesto Che Guevara's essays and field notes from the Cuban (1957-1959) and Bolivian (1967) campaigns
    • The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara (1994) and
    • Episodes of the Cuban Revolutionary War, 1956-58 (1996)

Vo Nguyen Giap, 1911-

• Giap, Nguyen Vo. How We Won The War. Philadelphia: Recon Publications, 1995.

• Currey, Cecil B. Victory at Any Cost: The Genius of Viet Nam’s Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap. Washington: Brassey’s, Inc., , 1997.
  [book review in Air Power Chronicles]
  • from Chapter Eleven
    • And he learned from Ho the need for perseverance.
    • So also did Giap learn from Communist Party theorists, most importantly from Mao Tse-tung and Lenin. From Lenin, Giap came to understand that the goal toward which one strives is much more important than the means one uses to achieve it. Both followers and their welfare could be sacrificed without hesitation if by so doing one furthered the revolutionary struggle.
    • Giap learned the value of the ideas of Karl von Clausewitz, who also insisted on the close relationship between politics and armed struggle.
    • Giap also studied carefully the writings of Mao Tse-tung, then the foremost philosopher of people's wars. Mao believed that all of life was governed by uniform and unchanging laws.
    • Although the similarity of Sun Tzu's doctrine to those developed by Giap is plain, when asked if he had been influenced by the aphorisms in The Art of War, Giap replied, "Sun Tzu has interesting ideas. I once studied him and found that he said that ... if enemy forces are ten times larger, then we should not fight. If I had followed him we would still be in the jungle."
    • In 1946, in a conversation with General Raoul Salan of France, Giap reportedly informed him, "My fighting gospel is T.E. Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom. I am never without it."
    • ... Lawrence noted ... "Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent active in a striking force and 98 per cent passively sympathetic."

Bernard Brodie, 1910-1978

• from Westenhoff quotes book
  • Brodie, Bernard. Eminent strategic thinker; father of nuclear deterrence theory; author of numerous books, including the classics Strategy in the Missile Age (1959) and War and Politics (1973).

  • "Air power had a mighty vindication in World War II. But it was Mitchell's conception of it--anything that flies--rather than Douhet's that was vindicated."
  • "Soldiers usually are close students of tactics, but rarely are they students of strategy and practically never of war."
  • "Deterrence now means something as a strategic policy only when we are fairly confident that the retaliatory instrument on which it relies will not be called to function at all."
  • "In wars throughout history, events have generally proved the pre-hostilities calculations of both sides, victor as well as loser, to have been seriously wrong."
  • "The bias toward the offensive creates special problems in any technologically new situation where there is little or no relevant war experience to help one reach a balanced judgment."

• Strategy as an Art and a Science, by Bernard Brodie, in Feb 1959 Naval War College Review, discusses strategists from Clausewitz to RAND (local copy)

John Boyd (1927-1997) and the OODA Loop

• How orientation works, by Chet Richards, 27 June 2008

• Conference: July 13, 2007 -- 2007 Boyd Conference, The Alfred M. Gray Research Center, Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia - check agenda for links to papers, articles, books

• Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd, book by Osinga, London: Routledge, 2007
  • DNI review of book, by Richards
• Also by Osinga (copyrighted, appearing here courtesy of the author)
  • On Boyd, Bin Laden, and Fourth Generation Warfare as String Theory (local copy), paper by Osinga, published in John Olson, On New Wars, Oslo, 2007
  • John Boyd and strategic theory in the postmodern era (local copy), by Osinga, originally published as "John Boyd et la Theorie Strategique a lére postmoderne," in Defense & Securite Internationale, Nr 27, 2007
  • A Discourse on Winning and Losing: Introducing Core Ideas & Themes of Boyd’s ‘Theory of intellectual evolution and growth’ (local copy), presentation by Osinga, at Quantico, 13 July 2007 - illustrates the range of Boyd's vision, far more than just OODA -- also includes the final version (non-simple) of the OODA loop, with the feedback links so often overlooked
  • A Discourse on Winning And Losing: Core Ideas & Themes of Boyd’s ‘Theory of intellectual evolution and growth’ (local copy), longer presentation by Osinga, at Air War College, 25 Sep 2007

• The Essential Boyd, by Grant T. Hammond, Boyd biographer
• The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security , by Grant T. Hammond, Boyd biographer

• Boyd and Military Theory, includes Discourse on Winning and Losing, at Defense and the National Interest website
  • Discourse on Winning and Losing - the complete Boyd briefings

• From Air Force Fighter Pilot to Marine Corps Warfighting: Colonel John Boyd, His Theories on War, and Their Unexpected Legacy, by Cowan, USMC Command and Staff College Research Paper, 1999-2000

• Boyd page at J. Addams
  • Certain to Win: Boyd's OODA Loop as a business weapon, briefing by Richards (associate of Boyd)

• A Swift, Elusive Sword: What If Sun Tzu and John Boyd Did a National Defense Review, by Richards, at CDI

• War, Chaos, and Business, includes excerpts from John Boyd, Chet Richards, and others
  • Destruction and Creation, by John R. Boyd, excerpts
  • Essence of Winning and Losing, by John R. Boyd, including OODA loop
  • A Discourse on Winning and Losing, by John R. Boyd
  • Organic Design for Command and Control, by John R. Boyd
  • Categories of Conflict, by John R. Boyd
  • Patterns for Successful Operations, by John R. Boyd
  • Boyd on Clausewitz

• Boyd, Metcalfe and Amdahl - Modelling Networked Warfighting Systems, presentation by Kopp, Monash University - includes discussion of combining Metcalfe's Law, of exponential improvement in power, with the limiting effect of Amdahl's Law

• War in the Pits: Marine-Futures Traders Wargame (local copy), NDU Strategic Forum 61, by West
  • Marine generals and colonels vs futures traders in decisionmaking wargame
  • "The traders' OODA loop, executed at much higher speed, is ISAA: Information, Sort by Priority, Act, Assess"
• Virtual Stress (local copy), in Marines Online, senior Marines vs futures traders in decision making wargame

• Hierarchical Interactive Theater Model (HITM): an Investigation into the Relationship between Strategic Effects and OODA Loops, by Bullock, AFIT research paper
• Strategic Effects of Airpower and Complex Adaptive Agents: an Initial Investigation, by Tighe, AFIT research paper - includes OODA discussion
• Manipulating the OODA Loop: the Overlooked Role of Information Resource Management in Information Warfare, by Schechtman, AFIT research paper

• The OODA Loop and application in UIT Cognitive Engineering
• Defining Air and Space Power, by Baner, at Air Chronicles, Mar 99, includes extensive discussion of the OODA loop as a way of examining and defining air and space strategy
• USMC MCDP 6, Chapter 2 Command and Control Theory, with the OODA Loop as a point of departure

AirLand Battle Doctrine

• AirLand Battle Doctrine - a selected bibliography, by USAMHI

• The Evolution of the Airland Battle Concept, by Romjue, in Air University Review, May-June 1984

• Romjue, John L. "AirLand Battle: The Historical Background." Military Review, Mar 1986, pp. 52-55

• Galloway, Archie. "FM 100-5: Who Influenced Whom?" Military Review, Mar 1986, pp. 46-51 - discusses the combined influences of Clauswitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu on the 1982 manual

• Airland Battle: The Wrong Doctrine for The Wrong Reason, by Powell, Ira C. Eaker Essay, in Air University Review, May-June 1985

• Army Doctrine and Modern War: Notes Toward a New Edition of FM 100-5, by Kagan, in Parameters, Spring 1997
  • AirLand Battle doctrine, epitomized by FM 100-5/1986, was and still is a very good doctrine for industrial age warfare. Had subsequent editions of FM 100-5 retained it and improved on it, the US Army might now have a sound basis for reviewing its core operational doctrine. Unfortunately, AirLand Battle became one of the casualties of the end of the Cold War; FM 100-5/1993 eliminated it in favor of a generalized doctrine which is antithetical to the key elements of AirLand Battle. The Army's most forward-looking doctrinal piece, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, has subsequently consigned AirLand Battle to the dustbin of history along with other legacies of the industrial age.

Weinberger & Powell

• Prophets or Praetorians? The Uptonian Paradox and the Powell Corollary, by Cassidy, in Parameters, Autumn 2003

• The Use of Force -- The Six Criteria Revisited, speech by Hon. Caspar W. Weinberger, at AFA Policy Forum, 14 Sep 1999

• Weinberger Doctrine, 1984 (as recounted in the above speech)
  • First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.
  • Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning.
  • Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives.
  • Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed — their size, composition and disposition — must be continually reassessed and readjusted if necessary.
  • Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.
  • Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.

• Force-Protection Fetishism: Sources, Consequences, and (?) Solutions, by Record, in Aerospace Power Journal, Summer 2000
  • Force-protection fetishism is rooted in Vietnam—specifically in the resultant Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which is the intellectual construct of the strategic lessons that many military professionals drew from the war. Caspar Weinberger, President Ronald Reagan’s secretary of defense, proposed six “tests” for using force, later amended by Gen Colin Powell’s emphasis on overwhelming force. These tests effectively deny the legitimacy of force as a tool of coercive diplomacy by restricting its use to circumstances involving clear and present threats to manifestly vital national interests

• Alan Ned Sabrosky and Robert L. Sloane, The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the "Weinberger Doctrine," Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1988

John Warden

• Warden vs Pape, by Bence, in Air & Space Power Chronicles

• The Enemy as a System, by Warden, for Airpower Journal - the Five-Ring Model
  • We cannot think strategically if we start our thought process with individual aircraft, sorties, or weaponsor even with the enemy's entire military forces. Instead, we must focus on the totality of our enemy, then on our objectives, and next on what must happen to the enemy before our objectives become his objectives. When all of this is done rigorously, we can begin to think about how we are going to produce the desired effect on the enemy -- the weapons, the delivery systems, and other means we will use.
  • As strategists and operational artists, we must rid ourselves of the idea that the central feature of war is the clash of military forces. In strategic war, a clash may well take place, but it is not always necessary, should normally be avoided, and is almost always a means to an end and not an end in itself.
  • If we are going to think strategically, we must think of the enemy as a system composed of numerous subsystems. Thinking of the enemy in terms of a system gives us a much better chance of forcing or inducing him to make our objectives his objectives and doing so with minimum effort and the maximum chance of success.

• Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century, by Warden, in Battlefield of the Future
• Warden and the Air Corps Tactical School: What Goes Around Comes Around, by Belote, for Airpower Journal
• Warden and the Air Corps Tactical School: Déjà Vu?, by West, SAAS paper, Oct 1999

• The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, by Warden, published in hard copy by NDU Press
  • Electronic copy courtesy of Air War College Nonresident Studies.
  • The Air Campaign, viewable by chapter, faster loading, includes front material
  • The Air Campaign, single file (300 Kb), useful for word/phrase searches

Robert Pape

• Warden vs Pape, by Bence, in Air & Space Power Chronicles

• The Changed Nature of Strategic Air Attack, by Conversino, in Parameters
  "Strategic bombing doesn't matter." With that, Dartmouth political scientist Robert Pape dismissed an entire airpower mission as essentially irrelevant to contemporary, non-nuclear warfare.[1] His book, Bombing to Win, a comprehensive examination of the employment of "strategic" airpower, is, however, undermined by his reliance on a flawed and outdated paradigm. Pape continues to view "strategic" in obsolescent terms that relate to the platform employed or the target attacked. He is hardly alone in holding this view.

• Competing Theories of Airpower: a Language for Analysis, by Faber, in Aerospace Power Chronicles - short article

  With the above goals in mind, let us look at a conceptual framework (and air-centered "language") that anyone can use to analyze multiple theories of airpower. The framework is the creation of Dr. Robert Pape, who deliberately attempts to link military means with political ends. ...

  Question #1: according to Dr. Robert Pape and Colonel Pat "Doc" Pentland, USAF, all theorists must answer a key question before they begin air operations. Pape's question asks the following: should I adopt a punishment strategy, which tries to push a society beyond its economic and psychological breaking point, a denial strategy, which tries to neutralize an opponent's military ability to wage war, or a decapitation strategy, which destroys or isolates an opponent's leadership, national communications, or other politico-economic centers? (Note that punishment and denial strategies try to translate military effects into political change. A decapitation strategy, in contrast, does the opposite.)

• Making the Connection: An Air Strategy Analysis Framework, SAAS paper by Ehrhard
  This study analyzes and builds on Dr. Robert Pape’s framework for analyzing airpower strategies. The analysis shows the underlying value of his Targets and Timing, Mechanism, Outcomes construct as well as the considerable clarification and expansion it requires in order to perform comprehensive air strategy analysis for the broad range of strategic air and space tasks.

• The Mechanism for Strategic Coercion: Denial or Second Order Change?, SAAS paper by Sullivan
  • from the abstract
    • Two contemporary theories of strategic coercion seem to offer promising alternatives to brute force. First, Robert Pape’s Denial Theory is based on the assumption that states make decisions as if they are rational, unitary actors attempting to maximize the utility of their choices. Essentially, nations perform a cost-benefit evaluation to determine the best course of action. Theoretically, one may be able to coerce a target nation by raising the expected costs to a prohibitive level, but Pape advocates that this is generally ineffective in conventional conflicts. Instead, coercion requires that the target nation be denied the probability of achieving the sought-after benefits. Denial Theory proposes that the specific means for coercion is the opponent’s military vulnerability: defeating an opponent’s military strategy denies him the probability of achieving benefits and results in coercion.

Huba Wass de Czege & Positive Ends strategy

• Biographical Sketch (from SSI)
  HUBA WASS DE CZEGE is a retired U.S. Army brigadier general. During his career as an infantry officer, he served two tours in Vietnam and gained staff experience at all levels up to assistant division commander. General Wass De Czege was a principal designer of the operational concept known as AirLand Battle. He also was the founder and first director of the Army’s School for Advanced Military Studies where he also taught applied military strategy. After retiring in 1993, General Wass De Czege became heavily involved in the Army After Next Project and served on several Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency v advisory panels. He is a 1964 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and holds an MPA from Harvard University.

• Towards a Strategy of Positive Ends (local copy), by Wass de Czege and Echevarria, SSI paper, 2001
  • Defense planners and strategists have recently proposed a variety of alternatives for America’s role in what many see as a dramatically different international situation. Most of those proposals, though, continue with a Cold War paradigm of trying to foresee what the next threat might be and how the United States might best prepare itself to respond to it. Consequently, the possibility of taking advantage of the intrinsic dynamism of the new security environment in order to create conditions that might promote positive ends-long-term peace, stability, and prosperity-has remained largely overlooked.

• The Psychology of Coercion: Merging Airpower and Prospect Theory, SAAS paper by Kimminau

Coercion Theory

• Integrated Coercive Strategies and the Role of the Air Component (local copy), by Krause, in Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 41, 2nd quarter 2006

• What Should We Bomb? Axiological Targeting and the Abiding Limits of Airpower Theory, by Kan, in Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2004

• The Essence of Coercive Air Power: a Primer for Military Strategists, by Mueller, in Air & Space Power Chronicles

• Coercive Airpower in the Global War on Terror: Testing Validity of Courses of Action (local copy), by Cody, SAMS paper, June 2003

• The Role of Non-Lethal Airpower in Future Peace Operations - "Beyond Bombs on Target" by Elder, ACSC paper, Apr 2003

• The Politics of Coercion: Toward a Theory of Coercive Airpower for Post–Cold War Conflict, by Hinman, CADRE Paper No. 14, Aug 2002

• Employing Aerial Coercion to Combat Terrorism: Recommendations for the Theater CINC (local copy), by Damiano, Naval War College paper, Feb 2002

• Economic Coercion in the Service of National Security (local copy), by Taylor, for Navy War College forum, June 1998

• A Unified Field Theory of Coercive Airpower, by Walker, in Aerospace Power Journal, Summer 1997

• Sustained Coercive Air Presence: Provide Comfort, Deny Flight, and the Future of Airpower in Peace Enforcement, SAAS paper by Kramlinger, Feb 2001
• Small Wars, Big Stakes: Coercion, Persuasion, and Airpower in Counterrevolutionary War, SAAS paper by Brozenick, June 1998
• Beyond Gunboat Diplomacy: Forceful Applications of Airpower in Peace Enforcement Operations, SAAS paper by Tubbs, Sep 1997
• Coercive Air Strategy: Forcing a Bureaucratic Shift, SAAS paper by Pray, Jan 1995
• The Psychology of Coercion: Merging Airpower and Prospect Theory, SAAS paper by Kimminau, June 1998
• The Mechanism for Strategic Coercion: Denial or Second Order Change?, SAAS paper by Sullivan, Apr 1995

Air Control Theory

• The Myth of Air Control: Reassessing the History, by Corum, in Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 2000

• Project Control: creative strategic thinking at Air University, by Dean, in Air University Review, July-August 1984

Prospect Theory

• Psychologist wins Nobel Prize, by Smith, in Monitor on Psychology

  The team's findings have countered some assumptions of traditional economic theory--that people make rational choices based on their self-interest--by showing that people frequently fail to fully analyze situations where they must make complex judgments. Instead, people often make decisions using rules of thumb rather than rational analysis, and they base those decisions on factors economists traditionally don't consider, such as fairness, past events and aversion to loss.

  For example, they found that people's decisions can be swayed by how the situation is framed. When Kahneman and Tversky asked people to hypothetically decide what procedure to take to cure a disease, most preferred a procedure that saved 80 percent of people to one that killed 20 percent.

• more references on Prospect Theory, by Kahneman and Tversky

Chaos and Complexity

• operating environment of Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity (VUCA)

• See also John Boyd section

• Observing al Qaeda through the Lens of Complexity Theory: Recommendations for the National Strategy to Defeat Terrorism (local copy), by Beech, Army War College, July 2004

• Complexity Theory and Network Centric Warfare (local copy), by Moffat, CCRP

• Chaos as Strategy, by Liotta, in Parameters, Summer 2002

• Complexity, Conflict Resolution, and How the Mind Works, by Jones and Hughes, in Conflict Resolution Quarterly, Summer 2003

• Chaos, Complexity and Conflict, by Weeks, in Air & Space Power Chronicles

• War, Chaos, and Business, includes excerpts from John Boyd, Chet Richards, and others

• Complex Targeting: a Complexity-Based Theory of Targeting and Its Application to Radical Islamic Terrorism, SAAS paper by Glenn

• Chaos Theory: the Essentials for Military Applications (local copy), Newport Paper No. 10, by James

• Chaos Theory for the Practical Military Mind, AU research paper by Durham

• Complexity Theory (local copy), Appendix C of Newport Paper No. 13 - Sailing New Seas, by Reason and Freyman, Naval War College

• Chaos, Complexity and Deterrence (local copy), National War College paper by Valle
• Chaos, Criticality, and Strategic Thought (local copy), National War College paper by Mann
• An Examination of the Applicability of Complex Systems Theory to Policy Making (local copy), National War College paper by Wilhelm
• Chaos, Complexity, and the Military (local copy), National War College paper by Gore

• Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security (local copy), NDU, ed.s Albert and Czerwinski

• Simplified Complexity: Thinking in the White Spaces (local copy), NDU Strategic Forum 139, by Gingrich

• War in the Pits: Marine-Futures Traders Wargame (local copy), NDU Strategic Forum 61, by West
  • Marine generals and colonels vs futures traders in decisionmaking wargame
  • "The traders' OODA loop, executed at much higher speed, is ISAA: Information, Sort by Priority, Act, Assess"
• Virtual Stress (local copy), in Marines Online, senior Marines vs futures traders in decision making wargame

• Black Lights: Chaos, Complexity, and the Promise of Information Warfare (local copy), by Schneider, in Joint Force Quarterly

• More complexity theory resources at NDU

• More complexity theory resources at dotmil locations

Counterinsurgency & Irregular Warfare

• See also lessons learned page for extensive resource list

• See also American way of war on this page
• See also coercion theory on this page
• See also T.E. Lawrence on this page, especially his thesis on the requirements for a successful rebellion

• See also nation building on International Studies page

• Doctrine
  • U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (local copy), Jan 2009
  • DoD Directive 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, Dec 2008
  • Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation (local copy), U.S. State Department, 15 May 2008
  • Joint Irregular Warfare Concept of Operations (JOC) (local copy), 11 Sep 07
    • Joint Irregular Warfare Concept of Operations (JOC), Revised Appendix C (local copy)
      • This new appendix annotates tasks, conditions and effects desired for conducting IW and is intended to provide the Military Departments with additional detail on IW that could inform DoD capability development processes.
  • Air Force Doctrine Document AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare, Aug 2007
  • FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency, Dec 2006
    (local copy of PDF, warning: 12 Mb file)
  • FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency

• Irregular Warfare Is Warfare (local copy), by Coons and Harned, in Joint Force Quarterly, 1st Qtr 2009
  • DOD needs to implement the options identified in the Joint Staff assessment of GPF IW capabilities and capacity. The general purpose forces need a new COIN and CT paradigm; the current paradigm of U.S.-based joint expeditionary forces organized into JTFs is inappropriate for steady-state IW requirements. DOD should embrace a return to the Cold War paradigm of large numbers of empowered MILGRPs operating under the direction of U.S. Chiefs of Mission and collaborating regionally to defeat transnational adversaries.

• Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How Do We Know They Work? (local copy), by Malkasian and Meyerle, a Letort Paper, SSI, Mar 2009
  • Field research over two months in 2007 and two months in 2008 with four different PRTs—Khost, Kunar, Ghazni, and Nuristan—plus interviews with the leadership of 10 others, suggests that PRTs do make a difference. They strengthen governance and contribute to security. Civilian development agencies—USAID, NGOs, the United Nations (UN), the Afghan government’s National Solidarity Program— cannot do the same job as the PRTs. Each plays a role in reconstruction, but none match the PRTs’ capacity to complete projects in contested areas.

• Listen to the Airman (local copy), by Gentile, in Military Review, Mar-Apr 2008 - recommends looking at Dunlap's views in the monograph below
• Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An Airman's Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine, by Dunlap, Airpower Research Institute (ARI) Paper

• New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict (local copy), by Kilcullen, in State Department eJournal, May 2007
  • Five Practical Steps
    1. Develop a new lexicon
    2. Get the grand strategy right
    3. Remedy the imbalance in government capability
    4. Identify the new "strategic services"
    5. Develop a capacity for strategic information warfare
• Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency (local copy), by Kilcullen, in Military Review, May-June 2006 -- many apply to higher levels as well

  Know your turf. Diagnose the problem. Organize for intelligence. Organize for interagency operations. Travel light and harden your combat service support (CSS). Find a political/cultural adviser. Train the squad leaders—then trust them. Rank is nothing; talent is everything. Have a game plan.

  Be there. Avoid knee-jerk responses to first impressions. Prepare for handover from day one. Build trusted networks. Start easy. Seek early victories. Practice deterrent patrol­ling. Be prepared for setbacks. Remember the global audi­ence. Engage the women, beware of the children. Take stock regularly.

  Exploit a “single narra­tive.” Local forces should mirror the enemy, not the Americans. Practice armed civil affairs. Small is beautiful. Fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces. Build your own solution—only attack the enemy when he gets in the way. Keep your extraction plan secret. Whatever else you do, keep the initiative.

• U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative (ICI)
  • USGOV Counterinsurgency Conference, 28-29 Sep 2006 - selected speeches/papers below
    • The American Counterinsurgency Tradition (local copy), by Cohen, Johns Hopkins University
    • Counterinsurgency Redux (local copy), by Kilcullen, State Dept.
    • Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency (local copy), by Kilcullen, State Dept.
    • Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Creating a Comprehensive Approach. A British View (local copy) by Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely, Director, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom

• Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency (local copy), by Cohen et al, in Military Review, Mar-Apr 2006

• Neo-Strategicon: Modernized Principles of War for the 21st century (local copy), by Dunlap, in Military Review, Mar-Apr 2006

• Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare (local copy), from USMC and USSOCOM
  • The Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare broadly describes how future US military forces will conduct irregular warfare in support of unified action on a regional or global scale against both state and non-state adversaries. It is meant as a guide for enhancing and improving US military irregular warfare capabilities and capacities. It also is meant as a guide toward closer integration of US military and US civilian agencies in meeting the varied challenges of irregular warfare. Finally, it will provide the basis for experimentation intended to influence subsequent concepts and capabilities development. This concept seeks to fulfill its purpose by accomplishing three objectives:
    (1) Describe the nature of irregular warfare, its emergence as the "warfare of choice" by our adversaries, and the strategic and operational opportunities and challenges of irregular warfare,
    (2) describe the importance of a comprehensive US Government approach to irregular warfare, and
    (3) describe the unique considerations required of commanders in planning, conducting, and responding to irregular warfare.

• Future of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the war on terror (local copy), testimony by Max Boot, before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, 29 June 2006

• Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, by Galula, 1964

Hybrid Wars, Hybrid Warfare

• See also future of warfare on future warfare studies page

• See also 4th and 5th generation warfare on future warfare studies page

• Hybrid Warfare and Challenges (local copy), by Hoffman, in Joint Force Quarterly, 1st Qtr 2009
  • DOD needs to implement the options identified in the Joint Staff assessment of GPF IW capabilities and capacity. The general purpose forces need a new COIN and CT paradigm; the current paradigm of U.S.-based joint expeditionary forces organized into JTFs is inappropriate for steady-state IW requirements. DOD should embrace a return to the Cold War paradigm of large numbers of empowered MILGRPs operating under the direction of U.S. Chiefs of Mission and collaborating regionally to defeat transnational adversaries.
• Conflict in the 21^st Century: the Rise of Hybrid Wars, by Hoffman, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Dec 2007
• "How marines are preparing for hybrid wars,". by Hoffman, in Armed Forces Journal, March 2006

• Hybrid Wars (local copy), by McCuen, Military Review, Mar-Apr 2008
  • The critical point is that to win hybrid wars, we have to succeed on three decisive battlegrounds: the conventional battleground; the conflict zone's indigenous population battleground; and the home front and international community battleground.

Effects-Based Approach to Operations

• See also effects-based ops (ebo) on Issues and Doctrine page

• Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations (local copy), 2006 - a joint publication

Decisive Force

• See also decisive battle

• See also Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO)

• 'Decisive Force' Now Measured By Speed, by Scarborough, in The Washington Times, 7 May 2003 - posted by Office of Force Transformation

• Decisive Force: Strategic Bombing in the Gulf War, by Davis, published by Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996

• National Culture and Warfare - Whither Decisive Force (local copy), Joint Force Quarterly Autumn 1996 review essay by Andre, referencing Decisive Force: the New American Way of War by Hoffman

• FM 100-7, Decisive Force: the Army in Theater Operations (local copy, 4.5 Mb), May 1995 version

Shock and Awe, Rapid Dominance, Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO)

• Shock and Awe: America's 21st Century Maginot Line (local copy), by Dana, Naval War College paper, 2003

• Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) references
  • Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) references at JFCOM
  • Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) references National Defense University
  • Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) references in DoD

• Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (local copy), by Ullman and Wade, book from NDU Press, 1996
  • includes nine historical examples
  • Review of the book (local copy), Naval War College Review, Summer 1998
  • Response by author, and response by reviewer (local copy), Naval War College Review, Spring 1999
• Rapid Dominance: A Force for All Seasons, 1998 follow-on to Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance

• Shock-Based Operations - New Wine in an Old Bottle (local copy), by Shanahan, National War College paper, 2001

Cebrowski and Company

• see also Transformation of War

• see also Network Centric Warfare

• The American Way of War (local copy), by Cebrowski and Barnett, Transformation Trends newsletter, 13 Jan 2003
• The Global Transaction Strategy (local copy), by Barnett and Gaffney, Transformation Trends newsletter, 16 Dec 2002

• NewRuleSets.Project
  • The Top 100 Rules of the New American Way of War (local copy), by Barnett and Gaffney, 3 Jan 2003
  • Life After DoDth or: How the Evernet Changes Everything , by Barnett
  • The Pentagon's New Map, by Barnett

    Show me where globalization is thick with network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows, and collective security, and I will show you regions featuring stable governments, rising standards of living, and more deaths by suicide than murder. These parts of the world I call the Functioning Core, or Core. But show me where globalization is thinning or just plain absent, and I will show you regions plagued by politically repressive regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder, and-most important-the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global terrorists. These parts of the world I call the Non-Integrating Gap, or Gap.

    Globalization’s “ozone hole” may have been out of sight and out of mind prior to September 11, 2001, but it has been hard to miss ever since. And measuring the reach of globalization is not an academic exercise to an eighteen-year-old marine sinking tent poles on its far side. So where do we schedule the U.S. military’s next round of away games? The pattern that has emerged since the end of the cold war suggests a simple answer: in the Gap.

Chinese Warfare Theory

• see also Sun Tzu and Mao

• see also Chinese views of future warfare on Future Studies page

• Remarks for the Carnegie Discussion on February 6, 2007 - by Wortzel, posted by Carnegie Endowment

• The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China, by Sawyer, pub. by Basic Books, Jan 2007

• Chinese Strategic Power: Myths, Intent, and Projections, by Sawyer, in Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Winter 2006/07, Vol. 9, Issue 2.

• Does the PRC have a Grand Strategy of Hegemony? (local copy), Congressional testimony by Mosher, 14 Feb 2006

• China’s Military Ambitions in Space, Wortzel and Cheng, Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy, 28 Nov 2006

• Shaping China's Security Environment: the Role of the People's Liberation Army, ed. Scobell and Wortzel, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Oct 2006

• Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006 (local copy), DoD Annual Report to Congress

• China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, ed. by Mulvenon and Finkelstein, CNA Corporation, Dec 2005

• The Science of Military Strategy, English edition, published by Military Science Publishing House, 2005
  "The book contains the major Chinese military theories, including the basics of strategic science and laws of modern warfare and strategy, featuring the new experience and guidelines of the PLA combat since 1990s, as well as issues on future warfare.
  The book's Chinese version was first published in 2001. It took more than 20 military translators two years to finish the English version, the sources said. " - Xinhua News Agency, 10 Oct 2005

• Unrestricted Warfare, by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999 - (alternate source, PDF)
  • FBIS Editor's Note: The following selections are taken from "Unrestricted Warfare," a book published in China in February 1999 which proposes tactics for developing countries, in particular China, to compensate for their military inferiority vis-à-vis the United States during a high-tech war.
  • "In terms of beyond-limits warfare, there is no longer any distinction between what is or is not the battlefield. Spaces in nature including the ground, the seas, the air, and outer space are battlefields, but social spaces such as the military, politics, economics, culture, and the psyche are also battlefields. And the technological space linking these two great spaces is even more so the battlefield over which all antagonists spare no effort in contending. [3] Warfare can be military, or it can be quasi-military, or it can be non-military. It can use violence, or it can be nonviolent. It can be a confrontation between professional soldiers, or one between newly emerging forces consisting primarily of ordinary people or experts. These characteristics of beyond-limits war are the watershed between it and traditional warfare, as well as the starting line for new types of warfare."
  • [3] The battlefield of beyond-limits war differs from those of the past in that it encompasses all natural spaces, such as the social realm, and the continually developing sphere of technology where space is now measured in nanometers. Today, these spaces are interlocked with each other. For example, outer space can be seen as a natural space, and also as a technological space, because each step in the militarization of outer space requires a technological breakthrough. In the same way, the interdynamics between society and technology are to be seen constantly. There is no more typical example of this than the effect of information technology on society. From these things we can see that the battlefield is ubiquitous, and we can only look upon it with "omnidirectionality."

• Principles of War - of US, UK, Australia, Soviets, France, and China (local copy), from 1997 AFSC Pub 1

• Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China (local copy), by Lieutenant General Li Jijun, Vice President of the Academy of Military Science, The Chinese People's Liberation Army, Aug 1997

• Learning from the Stones: a Go Approach to Mastering China's Strategic Concept, Shi (local copy), by Lai, for Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), May 2004

• New Century, Old Thinking: the Dangers of the Perceptual Gap in U.S.-China Relations (local copy), by Puska, for Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Apr 1998

• China's Manned Space Program: Sun Tzu or Apollo Redux? (local copy) by Johnson-Freese, in Naval War College Review, Summer 2003

• Chinese Warfare: the Paradox of the Unlearned Lesson, by Sawyer, in American Diplomacy

• China's Electronic Strategies (local copy), by Thomas, in Military Review, May-June 2001

• Behind the Great Firewall of China: A Look at RMA/IW Theory From 1996-1998 (local copy), by Thomas, FMSO, 1998

• Like Adding Wings to the Tiger: Chinese Information War Theory and Practice (local copy), by Thomas, FMSO, 2000

Psychology of War

• see also psychological operations at the Cyberspace and Information Operations Study Center

• see also psychological effects on Lessons Learned page

• see also psychological effects on Military Medicine page

• see also combat stress & PTSD on Military Medicine page

• see also psychology of terror at Center for Terrorism Studies - includes psychology of terrorists, victims, and society

• see Westenhoff quotes book - chapter on Psychological Effects, and also do a search on the word psychological

• Airpower and Psychological Denial (local copy), by Hallman, in Joint Force Quarterly, issue 37, 2nd Quarter, 2005

• Psychological Operations and Counterterrorism (local copy), by Post, in Joint Force Quarterly, issue 37, 2nd Quarter, 2005

• Understanding Fear's Effect on Unit Effectiveness (local copy), by Daddis, in Military Review, Jul-Aug 2004

• Moral Psychology in Times of War, by Bertha, posted at the USAF Academy

• The Risk of Optimism in the Conduct of War, by Chisholm, in Parameters, Winter 2003

• Psychological Effects of Aerial Bombardment, by Fracker, in Airpower Journal, Fall 1992

• Milgram Obedience Experiment, aka Milgram Experiment, examined how far folks would go in obeying orders that may have conflicted with their consciences

• Stanford Prison Experiment, classic examination of the psychology of imprisonment - for both prisoners and guards

• other links

Dimensions of War

• Command and Control Implications of Network-Centric Warfare, by Phister and Cherry, Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), Feb 2005
  • As shown in Figure 2, C2 elements span four dimensions of warfare:
    • (1) physical,
    • (2) information,
    • (3) cognitive, and
    • (4) social.
    C2 sensors, systems, platforms, and facilities exist in the physical domain. Information collected, posted, pulled, displayed, processed, and stored resides in the information domain. Perceptions and understanding of this information exist in the cognitive domain, which also contains the mental models, preconceptions, biases, and values that influence how the information is interpreted and understood, along with the nature of responses that may be considered. C2 processes and the interactions among individuals and entities that fundamentally define organization and doctrine are part of the social domain. Given the variety of elements involved in information age warfare and its effects-based orientation, command intent must be congruent across joint forces, coalition elements, interagency partners, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.

Tippping Point

• see also culminating point

• The Tipping Point: How military occupations go sour, by Swidey, in Boston Globe, 27 Apr 2003
  • A tipping point is a concept drawn from epidemiology, where it describes the moment at which an infectious disease becomes a public health crisis. The idea is that small changes will have little or no effect on a system until a critical mass is reached. Then just one additional small change ''tips'' the system, producing dramatic consequences. The concept has been applied to human behavior to describe everything from the breakout of bestsellers to the spread of buzzwords.
  • ''A tipping point is a reflection of a set of structural conditions that allow any match that's lit to set off a grass fire,'' says Lustick. A pigeon-hunting fracas between a few British soldiers and some peasants midwifed the Egyptian independence movement. A traffic accident between Israeli soldiers and a couple of Palestinians sparked the first Intifada. In both cases, the occupier was caught off-guard. Being alert to the underlying conditions requires solid, on-the-ground information about how people are feeling, and an awareness of the cultural codes and networks connecting various parts of society. That's hard to come by for an occupying power.

• other tipping point references

Other Theories, Laws, etc.

• see also research and theory page on Cyberspace & Information Operations Study Center site

• see also research and theory page on Behavioral Influences Analysis site

• see also research and theory page on Socio-Cultural and Language Resources site

• see also Occam's Razor, aka Law of Parsimony, Principle of Economy, or Principle of Simplicity on Thinking Skills page

• see also game theory on Thinking Skills page

• see also scientific method and reason on Thinking Skills page

• The Art of Design: a Design Methodology (local copy), by Banach, Military Review, Mar-Apr 2009

• Social Balance Theory: Revisiting Heider’s Balance Theory for many agents, by Khanafiah and Situngkir
  (alternate source)

• DARPA's Policy Analysis Market for Intelligence: Outside the Box or Off the Wall? (local copy) by Looney, in Strategic Insights, Sep 2003
• Futures Markets Applied to Prediction (FutureMAP) program withdrawn (local copy), 29 July 2003 news release from DARPA

• Military Theory and Information Warfare, by Henry and Peartree, in Parameters, Autumn 1998 - includes comparison of theories from Sun Tzu through Arquilla, Stein, and Libicki

• Eliminating the Rhetoric: An Evaluation of the Halt-Phase Strategy, by Nowland, a SAAS paper, 2001

• General Robert E. Lee and Modern Decision Theory, by Gilster, in AU Review, Mar-Apr 1972, including discussion of battle of Chancellorsville, and brief discussion of
  • Lanchester Equations
  • Bayes’ Theorem
  • Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Theorem

• Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle

  • Every time a major power, even for the noblest of reasons, considers intervention, that power must confront the politico-military equivalent of Werner K. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle: to inject yourself into the situation is to change the situation and, at least temporarily, will probably mean some liberal idealistic principles taking the proverbial back seat to realpolitik.
    --- from Lost in the Snow: the US Intervention in Siberia during the Russian Civil War, by Stamp, CSI, Leavenworth

  • No matter how well designed and statistically reliable our study may be, the fact that we are doing a study influences the data we collect. ... Heisenberg, an atomic physicist, posited we cannot measure anything without altering it or its environment and we cannot know the extent of our disruptions with certainty. Whenever we measure, we must consider the effect that the act of collecting data has on the data itself.
    --- from Chapter 9 of Executive Decision Making, from the Naval War College

• Metcalfe's Law: "The power of a networked system grows exponentially with the number of devices in the network." - from Evolution or Revolution: Tracing Outsourcing's Controversial Path, by Hamblen, in Chips, Jan 1998

• Moore's Law
  • ... Moore’s Law, which states that the number of transistors per square inch on a chip, a measure of computing power, doubles every year—now actually every 18 months
    --- from Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare, by Meigs, in Parameters, Summer 2003

• Parkinson's Law - after Cyril Northcote Parkinson (1909-1993), British historian
  • Any of several satirical observations propounded as economic laws, especially “Work expands to fill the time available for its completion.” [from The American Heritage® Dictionary]

• Peter Principle - after Laurence Johnston Peter (1919-1990)
  • The theory that employees within an organization will advance to their highest level of competence and then be promoted to and remain at a level at which they are incompetent. [from The American Heritage® Dictionary]

Related Resources

Your first act against the enemy shouldn't be a nibble! It should demonstrate determination and have traumatic impact!
--- Sir John Woodward
• In Praise of Attrition, by Peters, in Parameters, Summer 2004
  • There is no substitute for shedding the enemy’s blood.

• Virtuous Destruction, Decisive Speed (local copy), by Peters, May 2004, for National Intelligence Council NIC2020 project
  • The next two decades will challenge us with technologies we cannot anticipate, with implacable, anti-Western enemies we cannot dissuade and with no shortage of regional crises we cannot discourage. Yet, the greatest military obstacles facing the United States are, and likely will remain, of our own making: Misconceptions about the nature and demands of warfare as morally obtuse as they are intellectually lazy.
  • The lessons of recent wars, which we willfully misread, are many. Among them are that there is no substitute for shedding the enemy’s blood in adequate quantities; that an enemy must be convinced practically and graphically that he is defeated; and that speed of resolution in tactical encounters has emerged as a crucial determinant in strategic success.
  • We have entered a new age of attrition warfare which we refuse to recognize.
  • Attrition is the essence of warfare, not something to be avoided—and no rule says that attrition must be fairly distributed.

• Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement (local copy), by Reimer, in Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-1997
  • Many believe that precision strike weapons can win all future wars. Yet history has shown that the human dimension of warfare cannot be countered by technology alone. War is essentially an expression of hostile attitudes. Technology cannot overcome the greed, fear, hate, revenge, or other emotions that cause wars.

• The Time Value of Military Force in Modern Warfare: The Airpower Advantage, by Givhan, a SAAS paper, 1996

• Memoirs, by Gen. William T. Sherman

• Meditations, by Marcus Aurelius

• Eisenhower as Strategist: the Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace (local copy), by Metz, SSI

Studying the Military

• Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS)
  • Armed Forces & Society journal

• Center for Research on Military Organization

• Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

• Peace, War, and Social Conflict - a section of the American Sociological Association

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