

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

**CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES - DEFENSE
COOPERATION IN U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND?**

by

David B. Millar, Col, Canada's Air Force

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Edition 1, 2002 Option AWC Research Paper

Maxwell A.F.B., Alabama/U.S.

9 December 2002

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Introduction

"Our friendship has no limit. Generation after generation, we have traveled many difficult miles together. Side-by-side, we have lived through many dark times, always firm in our shared resolve to vanquish any threat to freedom and justice."

Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, Prime Minister of Canada, 14 September, 2001.

In the aftermath of September 11th, it became apparent that North America was no longer insulated from the threats that it had once assumed would never reach its borders. Canadians were equally startled as they came to recognize, literally for the first time in their lives and in the history of their country, that their freedom and safety were in jeopardy. This revelation is particularly poignant in a nation that tends to take its national security for granted, relying almost exclusively on its benevolent neighbor to ward off threats. This ambivalence however quickly evaporated following the terrorists attacks as Canadians came to realize that a threat upon the U.S. was ostensibly a threat to Canada. Security took on a wholly new emphasis and the calls to come to the defense of the U.S. and North America were resounding. The sudden outpouring of nationalism brought to the forefront the historic ties between the two nations annunciated over 62 years ago when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King created the first defense arrangements that would eventually lead to the Canada/U.S. North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) Agreement. Today, in recognition of the enormity of the threat to

North America and in fulfillment of its obligations to the U.S., the Canadian government has undertaken sweeping security measures analogous to the U.S. initiatives on Homeland Security. Indeed, the majority of the measures have been in concert with the U.S. and the most notable have been consecrated publicly as a further attestation of the bond between the two nations. Yet, there has been one striking exception; none of the measures include a military response. The U.S. has established Homeland Defense with U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) as its flagship against terrorist threats to North America. However, there has not been a similar pronouncement by Canada to join the U.S. initiative by contributing forces to the kind of collective defense that has historically united the two nations in times of crisis. Although it would seem intuitive that Canada would accept a U.S. offer to participate in continental security, using the opportunity to broaden its existing NORAD contribution, NORTHCOM stood-up on 1 October 2002 without contribution from Canadian land, sea or air forces. Why didn't Canada provide military forces to the newly constituted NORTHCOM in light of the threat to its own security?

The U.S. has naturally taken the lead to protect itself from terrorism and, as a result, has thrown a security blanket over North America under the auspices for Homeland Defense. Canada is implicated because its territory is included within the proclaimed security zone, and, by default, so is its sovereignty. The dilemma for Canada became whether to formalize an arrangement with the U.S. to assert control of its sovereignty by assigning forces to NORTHCOM, or to abstain from participation because to do otherwise would completely relegate Canadian sovereignty to the exclusive

control of the U.S. Canada elected the latter course of action because its sovereignty is more important than its physical security.

The purpose of this paper is to show in light of today's strategic environment that Canada's decision not to participate in NORTHCOM may in fact jeopardize its sovereignty. Chapter 1 provides the background on Homeland Defense vis-à-vis the Canada/U.S. relationship and sets the stage of the debate between sovereignty and security that Canada faced when offered to participate in NORTHCOM. Chapter 2 then elucidates the priority Canada places on sovereignty by describing the broad security initiatives undertaken following September 11th, which noticeably preclude the military. The lack of military involvement is explained by showcasing Canadian misgivings towards NORAD and National Missile Defense, which serve as a precursor to understanding the relevant issues pertaining to NORTHCOM. Finally, chapter 3 describes the circumstances surrounding Canada's decision not to contribute forces and posits that the decision was based on a presumption the U.S. would continue to honor Canadian sovereignty despite the Homeland Defense mission. It will be shown however that the U.S. attitude towards its bilateral and multilateral agreements is changing and that the U.S. government is prepared to act unilaterally to protect its own national interests above those of other nations. The paper concludes that Canada instead should join NORTHCOM to preserve its sovereignty and security, along side the U.S.

Chapter 1

U.S. Northern Command and the Canada/U.S. Relationship

U.S. Northern Command

On 1 October 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Wofowitz, along with the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, Gen Meyers, inaugurated the much heralded NORTHCOM, the newest of the six unified commands within the Department of Defense. The new command is a bold step forward and plays a key role in the war on terrorism along side the President's recently approved Department of Homeland Security.¹ The implications of NORTHCOM for Canada are equally bold and potentially far-reaching as, for the first time in its history, Canadian territory is consolidated under U.S. unilateral command and control.

Although the creation of NORTHCOM raised the ire of Canadians and remains the focus of media attention and government debate, creating a new unified command is routine within U.S. parlance. As a matter of course, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is charged with the responsibility of routinely reviewing the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to adapt command and control of U.S. military forces around the world to the evolving security environment. From its inception in 1947, the UCP was created from the success of World War II where command of U.S. operations and forces overseas was

¹ Press Release, US NORTHCOM Public Affairs, 2 October 2002.

centralized under a single commander who was responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The most characteristic feature of the unified command plan is its geographic orientation. Over the years, successive reviews of the UCP have debated the best way to subdivide the world whether along geographic or functional lines and whether along joint or service lines. Despite a number of perturbations, the orientation has been primarily geographic.² This latest review reaffirms the geographic orientation and for the very first time in history includes a command that encompasses the U.S. homeland. Despite the outward similarities to the existing commands, there are unique aspects pertaining to NORTHCOM that set it apart.

NORTHCOM is very different from its sister commands, namely in terms of its relationships, its mission, its roles and authorities, its assigned forces, and its area of responsibility. The creation of the new unified command is a part of the larger U.S. effort to defend against terrorism. A two-pronged approach has been undertaken which comprises Homeland Security and Homeland Defence. Homeland Security falls under the auspices of the President's Department of Homeland Security approved by Congress in November 2002. The Department unifies the various desperate agencies responsible for domestic security and safety under one centralized command and control organization. The new department will be responsible for border and transportation security, emergency preparedness and response under the Federal Emergency Measures Agency (FEMA), chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear countermeasures, and information analysis and infrastructure protection. On the other hand, Homeland

² J.F. Schnabel, R.J. Watson, K.W. Condit, B. Fairchild, W.S. Poole, *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 11-15.

Defence falls under the auspices of the UCP with NORTHCOM as the lead Department of Defense agency to command all military forces needed to protect the U.S. against attacks emanating from outside the country. In addition, however, the command also serves as an adjunct to the Department of Homeland Security, when called upon.³

Historically, defending America's national security interests has been accomplished using forces operating in designated strategic areas overseas. Following September 11th and the creation of NORTHCOM, North America ostensibly became a strategic area with forces operating within the U.S. This implies that military force could be used in internal, domestic security matters. However, following the Civil War, the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) was proclaimed to strictly prohibit such use of the military. Nevertheless, the imperative to combat terrorism is so pervasive that the President and Congress are prepared to exercise the special exigencies within the Act to permit the use of the military in support of NORTHCOM's roles.⁴

NORTHCOM has two distinct roles. The most unique, and the one to which the exigencies of PCA will be applied, is civil defense. The role of NORTHCOM in civil defense is very specific; military force will only be invoked upon direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense and if so, it will be subordinate to civil authorities in a supporting role. For the most part, the Department of Homeland Security and its agencies across the U.S. are expected to respond to domestic crisis, in particular, FEMA, which would be the lead agency. In contrast, NORTHCOM's primary mission is

³ U.S. Department of Defense Homeland Security, 30 Sep 02, available from www.defenselink.mil/specials/homeland.

⁴ Department of Defense, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide JFSC Pub 1*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 1-28 - 1-45.

homeland defense that encompasses deterrence, prevention and prosecution of threats and aggression aimed at the U.S. The preponderance of effort and resources therefore will be dedicated to this mission.

However, this will be a challenge because very few forces have been assigned to the new command. The Joint Force Headquarters-Homeland Security, the Joint Task Force-Civil Support, and the Joint Task Force 6 constitute the permanently assigned forces. Consequently, the staff of 500, in its headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, is relegated to monitor and plan for potential, direct attacks against the U.S. In case of attack, other forces will be assigned on an as-required basis depending upon the nature of the emergency.⁵

These unique aspects surrounding the creation of the new command posed significant challenges to NORTHCOM's viability, and, according to NORTHCOM officials, permitted some latitude to consider innovative solutions, such as including forces from the surrounding nations.⁶ NORTHCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR) encompasses the continental territory of the U.S., Alaska, Mexico and Canada, and extends 500 nautical miles into the surrounding waters emanating from the continent.⁷ By definition, the new unified command exercises control of U.S. forces operating in its AOR, which includes Canadian territory. What Canada initially perceived as an encroachment upon its sovereignty instead unfolded into an offer to participate in the defense of North America against terrorism. When Secretary Rumsfeld spoke to the

⁵ U.S. Department of Defense U.S. Northern Command, 30 Sep 02, available <http://www.NORTHCOM.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.whoware§ion=5>.

⁶ General Eberhart, Commander NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM and Staff briefing to AWC IOs, 10 September 2002.

Canadian Senate and House Armed Forces Committee in February 2002 and acknowledged the success of the NORAD relationship in protecting the air sovereignty of the U.S. and Canada, he posited that:

"he would welcome Canadian participation with both the sea and the land elements, but that it would be up to Canadians to determine whether it was in their national interest to participate ..."⁸

Such an offer should not have come as a surprise given that command and control of U.S./Canada sovereign air space has been maintained under the auspices of the NORAD Agreement since 1958. Nevertheless, NORTHCOM's established boundaries and roles provoked a certain reticence amongst Canadian government officials who have always suspected the NORAD agreement as an abrogation of Canadian sovereignty. The suggestion of a deeper relationship within NORTHCOM served to further exacerbate their concerns about sovereignty.

Sovereignty versus Security

The Combatant Commander of NORTHCOM and NORAD is one in the same person. Indeed, NORAD provides air and space support for the Homeland Defence mission; however, by definition, only those resources and forces owned and operated by the U.S. fall under NORTHCOM's purview. In other words, the Canadian Forces equipment and personnel associated with NORAD are theoretically not a part of the NORTHCOM order of battle, nor are they considered as assigned forces. The same argument has been applied to space and the detection and tracking of ICBMs. This line-

⁷ U.S. Department of Defense U.S. Northern Command, 30 Sep 02, available <http://www.NORTHCOM.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.whoware§ion=5>.

in-the-sand has been delineated to placate the perception of any unsanctioned use of Canadian Forces assets. However, in all practicality, if part of NORTHCOM's mission is to deter possible air threats from entering the U.S. and the threat happens to be in Canadian sovereign air space, which ostensibly is within NORAD's purview, intuitively, Canadian Forces assets will be used to engage the threat. As a matter of fact, since September 11th, Canadian Forces CF-18s have been involved in the air intercept of suspect commercial aircraft destined for the U.S., oblivious to whether a NORAD or NORTHCOM mission. The line-in-the-sand therefore is somewhat blurred in the eyes of Canadian government officials by the wedding of NORTHCOM and NORAD under the same commander.

Another concern is potential U.S. reaction to a threat emerging from within Canadian sovereign territory. For all intents and purposes, NORTHCOM is responsible for potential threats emanating within the AOR that are aimed directly at or pose a threat to the U.S.⁹ In the case of threats from within Canadian land, sea and air approaches, U.S. assigned forces will in all likelihood be directed to prosecute them before entering into the U.S., without necessarily seeking the Canadian government's approval. The ramifications to Canadian sovereignty are significant. Ostensibly, the U.S. becomes the benefactor of Canadian sovereignty under the aegis of the NORTHCOM mandate to protect the U.S. against air, space, land and sea threats from within the AOR.

Historically, Canada chose to participate in NORAD to obviate such a circumstance. As

⁸ Government of Canada, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness: Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Ontario, 2001) 66.

⁹ General Eberhart, Commander NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM and Staff briefing to AWC IOs, 10 September 2002.

an equal partner in the bilateral arrangement, Canada reaped the benefits of being included in the spectrum of capabilities the U.S. military has to offer while, at the same time, asserting command and control over its contribution of equipment, resources, personnel and, above all, its sovereignty.¹⁰

At the time of the offer from Secretary Rumsfeld, these concerns and the arguments for and against became further inflamed by the media and incited a public debate in Canada over the potential sublimation of Canadian sovereignty. However, the aggressive schedule set by the U.S. to declare the new command operational imposed an artificial constraint within Canada that limited the debate of the pros and cons. Consequently, the initial reticence expressed by government officials quickly turned into reluctance to accept more than the status quo. The government's cautious approach is best understood by examining the events that have characterized the U.S./Canada relationship.

Canada and the U.S.

It has been opined that Canada and the U.S. are practically synonymous. Both share the same values and ideals at home and abroad, the economies are inextricably linked, the cultures and people are indistinguishable for the most part, and the two countries depend on one another for their mutual security. Some two hundred treaties and agreements legally bind the two nations together and underscore the extent of the relationship. Economically, \$475 billion worth of trade is exchanged annually between the two countries involving over 2 million employees in each country. Canada represents

¹⁰ Standing Senate Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness: Renewal of the NORAD Agreement*, Federal Government of Canada Proceedings

one quarter of U.S. exports, and it imports more goods from the U.S. than the entire European Union and three times more than Japan. The U.S. is Canada's largest foreign investor, and Canada is the leading market for 38 U.S. states. With the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994, the two countries became inseparable economically and culturally to the extent the border is seamless with over 200 million people crossing each year.¹¹ Militarily, Canada and the United States share a long tradition of cooperation in defending the continent and in fighting side-by-side for the goals and values of freedom and democracy that both uphold. The two countries have fought together in the World Wars, Korea, the Gulf, and most recently, in Kosovo. Not just in war, but also in peace, the two countries are seen as one in their peacekeeping endeavors around the world. In terms of defending the North American continent, Canada and the United States are bound together through the NORAD agreement originally signed to act as a shield against the Soviet manned-bomber threat.¹² The symbiotic relationship has been nurtured over time; however, it has not been without hardship, and when examined more closely, reveals a different perspective.

A Relationship in the Making

Canada can be characterized as a nation that has been in continual pursuit of being recognized as a sovereign, independent power by the rest of the world, and in particular, by the U.S. However, these ideals have often been curtailed because of a reliance on others for economic prosperity and security. Likewise, the perennial

Transcript, statement by LGen G. MacDonald, Deputy Commander in Chief NORAD, DND 23 March 2000.

¹¹ Canada, Government of Canada - Statistics Canada available from http://canada.gc.ca/main_e.html.

¹² D. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*. (McClelland & Stewart Inc, 1985), 239 - 247.

sovereignty movement within French-Canada and the threat of cessation has tempered the Canadian government's ability to present a strong, unified voice. As a consequence, to achieve domestic appeasement, the government has had to be more conciliatory in its deliberations in its bilateral and multilateral arrangements thus creating the impression that Canada is reluctant to act definitively or aggressively in matters of import. Overall, each of these factors has had a profound influence on shaping how Canada conducts its policy and decision-making, especially in regards to the U.S. and matters involving security. The degree of influence can be best understood through historic lenses.

Upon its creation as a nation, Canada fell under the British Empire as one of its new colonies in July, 1867. Responsible for its domestic affairs, Canada, like the other British colonies, deferred to the Empire for its international relations and foreign affairs. Yet, one of Canada's first aims would be to seek independent recognition of its abilities to govern itself both domestically and internationally. This became a single pursuit of Canada's first Prime Minister, John A. Macdonald, who recognized that independence would have to be gradual and therefore he sought a policy to remain subordinate to the empire but not subservient.¹³

While Britain and the rest of the world were building-up their arsenals of military strength, Canada pursued its domestic economic interests. A country with vast resources, the key to its power would be its economic potential, not is military. After all, the Empire and the Royal Navy were Canada's security guarantee, allowing the focus to be on the economy. For Macdonald, this was Canada's opportunity to become world recognized through trade, and he concluded the first Canadian trade agreement with

France in 1893, not surprisingly given Canada's French-Canadian origins.¹⁴ Trade with the U.S. continued to expand during this time along with Canada's protection of its industrial growth through tariffs. The unintended consequence was the almost overnight expansion of U.S. ownership of industry within Canada to offset the tariffs. For Canada, this meant stronger economic relations with the U.S. and less dependence on Britain, both economically and in terms of foreign policy.¹⁵

Canada continued to pursue an independent foreign policy and political equality with Britain by objecting to participate in her imperialistic ambitions and skirmishes. During the Sudan crisis of 1884-1885 when Britain called for assistance, Macdonald remained defiant and did not offer military support where Canada had no interests.¹⁶ This would become a recurring trend for future Prime Ministers. At the time of the Boer War in 1899, Britain appealed to the colonies for assistance. Then Prime Minister Sir Wilfred Laurier was opposed to providing military support. Yet, under a recent euphoria of British sentiment following the Diamond Jubilee, his government was compelled to order 1000 troops to war with the caveat that the British government was not to construe this as a precedent for additional support.¹⁷ This posturing was not only a means to distance Canada from the Empire but was also necessary to placate the rising anti-British

¹³ William Metcalfe, ed., *Understanding Canada - A Multidisciplinary Introduction to Canadian Studies* (New York University Press, New York, 1982), 492.

¹⁴ Ibid 493.

¹⁵ William Metcalfe edited *Understanding Canada - A Multidisciplinary Introduction to Canadian Studies* (New York University Press, New York, 1982), 116.

¹⁶ Ibid 494.

¹⁷ D. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*. (McClelland & Stewart Inc, 1985), 113.

sentiment being expressed by the growing movement of the French-Canadian nationalists in the province of Quebec.¹⁸

Much to the surprise of the allies, however, Canadians quickly rose to the call of arms providing half a million soldiers in World War I. The sudden support for Britain was more in recognition of the world crisis than an emotional response to a threat to the Empire. Yet, to continue its insistence on controlling its destiny, the Canadian government was adamant that it had a part in the decision-making of the war and in the eventual peace negotiations. Again, these demands were to assert Canada's desire for greater autonomy but also to placate the growing unrest of the French-Canadian population who saw our contribution to the war, especially after conscription was enacted, as a sign of support for imperialism.¹⁹ In the end, Canada was successful at getting a seat at the negotiating tables, surprisingly, despite strong objection from the U.S. It was thought the objection was related to Canada's diminutive stature in the realm of high-power diplomacy, although in actual fact, the U.S. was more concerned about an imbalance of British votes.²⁰ Nevertheless, the apparent disagreement that Canada perceived did not deter it from asserting itself in the deliberations over President Wilson's League of Nations initiative. Canada became infamous at the fifth League Assembly in 1924 when Canadian Senator Dandurand described Canada as "a fire proof house, far from inflammable materials" in his objection to Article X and collective defense. Although causing considerable consternation amongst the League delegates, the Senator's analogy accurately portrayed the view of Canadians at this time. In the end, Canada

¹⁸ William Metcalfe edited *Understanding Canada - A Multidisciplinary Introduction to Canadian Studies* (New York University Press, New York, 1982), 117.

¹⁹ William Metcalfe edited *Understanding Canada - A Multidisciplinary Introduction to Canadian Studies* (New York University Press, New York, 1982), 120 - 122.

dropped its opposition once the requirement for collective defense became optional. Despite the initial euphoria at the outset of the war, in the aftermath, the Senator's bold assertion reaffirmed the growing isolationist views that would characterize Canadians and Canadian government policy leading into World War II.²¹

In World War II, the government exercised caution based on its previous lessons learned. In order to appease French-Canadians, the government initially authorized a limited contribution thereby avoiding conscription. As well, to avoid being over committed, Canada indirectly supported the war effort through initiatives such as training aircrew in Canada under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan and by providing war material and foodstuffs.²² This approach achieved a balance between Canada's perception of its international moral obligations and its recurring domestic politics. As a consequence, at the end of the war, Canada was not a part of the high-level negotiations and was relegated to 'middle-power' status; a turning point in solidifying Canada's future international role.

Canada had always believed in peaceful resolution of conflict through international committee. In this sense, the UN suited the Canadian ideals. Although not a member of the Security Council, Canada did secure the agreement that non-members would be represented at the Security Council when use of force was being contemplated, thus allowing Canada to assert its views against the use of military means to resolve disputes. This backbench approach to international diplomacy was reflected in Canada's early involvement with the UN, as well. Canada was demonstrative in the creation of the

²⁰ Ibid 124.

²¹ D. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*. (McClelland & Stewart Inc, 1985), 176.

²² Ibid 193 - 195.

International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Canada also played a constructive part in the creation of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Its middle power status combined with its growing reputation as an international mediator had an infectious influence on Canadians who began to realize the need to affect international peace and security in order to ensure prosperity at home. As such, Canada sought a niche to be able to assert itself. Peacekeeping became that niche in November 1956 when the UN General Assembly approved the Canadian plan to create a UN force to intercede between Israel and Egypt over the Suez Canal. Canada from this time became synonymous with UN peacekeeping activities in the Congo, between Turkey and Greece, and to the end of the Cold War.²³ This was the role that the Canadian people preferred and that guided policy decision-making into the future. The first real tests were the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

During the lead-up to the Korean War, Canada was opposed to the U.S. involvement fearing an escalation of tension between Russia, China and the rest of the world. As a result, Canada would not commit its forces, initially, in support of the U.S. intervention. Similarly, during the Cuban Missile crisis in the early 60's when the super powers edged toward nuclear war, Canada initially reneged on its NORAD commitment by not bringing its forces to full alert as the Americans had directed. Instead, Canada appealed to the UN for an independent verification of U.S. allegations of the missile sites in Cuba. In both cases, U.S. reaction was extremely critical of the Canadian

²³ William Metcalfe ed., *Understanding Canada - A Multidisciplinary Introduction to Canadian Studies* (New York University Press, New York, 1982), 498 - 502.

government's position on such profound issues, particularly in light of the close relationship between the two countries.²⁴ These types of incidents, overtime, created cracks in the relationship that would be manifest in the way Canada tends to look at security issues differently than the U.S. This was specifically borne-out in the dispute between the two nations over the Vietnam War.

Canada was faced with a dilemma that would once again pit its national interests against its closest relationship, the U.S. By this time, 81% of foreign investment in Canada was American.²⁵ Economically dependent on the U.S., tied by a plethora of bilateral agreements, and sharing similar ideals and interests as shown through partnership in NATO and the UN, the U.S. looked to Canada for support in Vietnam, at least in principle. However, the Canadian government upheld its ideals of peace through negotiation and Prime Minister Pearson took a firm stance against U.S. intervention at a speech in Philadelphia. Not surprisingly, this infuriated the U.S. At a follow-on discussion at Camp David, President Johnson grabbed the Prime Minister by the lapel and berated him for his views. Anti-American sentiments quickly grew and were matched by anti-Canadian sentiments, as draft dodgers were welcomed to Canada in protest of the war.²⁶ A cooling-off period ensued. From the experience, the Canadian government learned it had to walk a tightrope between its pursuit of middle power ideals and the realities of being dependent upon the U.S. for its economy and security.

Since the nation's early beginnings, the Canadian government has continually sought to exercise its sovereignty through independent foreign policy. To do so, Canada

²⁴ C.F. Doron, *Forgotten Partnership*. (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1984), 77 - 96.

²⁵ Canada, Government of Canada - Statistics Canada available at http://canada.gc.ca/main_e.html.

portrayed itself as anti-conflict and anti-military, and chose to place emphasis on international trade and commerce to achieve peace and prosperity. Although this is somewhat an over simplification as attested by the patriotic support during the World Wars, Canada became labeled as such by a world whose main instrument of policy was military power. Canada sought therefore to seek independence by differing from the norm. This was fostered by a philosophy of isolationism on the part of the Canadian people, in particular French-Canadians, by the government and its policies, and physically by Canada's geographic remoteness from the world and proximity to its benevolent and powerful neighbor. Canada distanced itself from the Empire by skillfully solidifying its relationship with the U.S. through lasting trade, commerce and defense agreements, which nicely fit the Canadian ideal of harmony through economic prosperity. At the same time, it provided Canada with a blanket of U.S. protection. However, Canada had unwittingly manipulated itself into another dependency that once again influenced its decision-making both domestically and internationally. Canada's emergence as a foremost peacekeeping nation is a stellar example. Not only did this role give Canada the international recognition, it also provided the opportunity for greater foreign investment thus decreasing the dependency on the U.S. It also had the advantage of promoting Canada's altruistic belief in security through universal economic cooperation beyond the Canada/U.S. border. At home, peacekeeping was a suitable compromise to Canada's non-warlike tendencies and its commitments to international, collective peace and security. Most importantly peacekeeping gave Canada a visibly different role because, by this time, Canada had become indistinguishable from the U.S.

²⁶ L. Martin, *The Presidents and the Prime Ministers*. (Doubleday Canada Limited, Toronto, Ont., 1982), 1

Both English-Canadians and French-Canadians came to recognize the advantages of using international institutions to protect their values and ideals as Canadians, distinct from the Americans, as a form of sovereignty. Finally, peacekeeping was more befitting the modest size and relative capability of Canada's military. Overall, Canada could believe it was more independent from the influence of the U.S., a perception that it tries to portray, to this day, in its decision-making on security matters.

What can be concluded from this historical analysis? Firstly, the evidence is irrefutable that Canada's quest for its national identity as an autonomous and self-determining nation has been a singular preoccupation throughout its history. As a result, sovereignty has literally become a paranoia of the government's, especially on issues pertaining to the U.S. whom Canada is so economically dependent. Another prevalent fact is that Canada does not consider its military as a key instrument of its national security. From this perspective, it becomes clearer how the offer from Secretary Rumsfeld to participate in NORTHCOM posed a dilemma for the Canadian government. It was faced with devising security initiatives that would demonstrate to the U.S. its resolve against terrorism and, at the same time, safeguard its sovereignty from the U.S.

Chapter 2

Canadian Security Initiatives

"The government and people of Canada consider the attacks on New York and Washington to have been an attack on North America."²⁷

"The United States and Canada will work together to combat the menace of terrorism, and to protect the security of our citizens. We talked about the need for doing what will work in the long term, not merely what might make us feel good in the short term."²⁸

Security Problems

The extensive security initiatives undertaken by the Canadian government since September 11th have largely been aimed at ensuring the continued free-flow of commerce, trade and movement across the border so vital to its economy. The measures that have been implemented span the spectrum of federal agencies and are almost in lockstep with the U.S. initiatives.

Following the attacks, initial reports suggested that the terrorists had entered the United States through Canada. It has been a longstanding argument that the Canadian borders and approaches are too porous and that its immigration laws are too permissive. This became an immediate focus of attention in Canada as it quickly became apparent that there were a number of serious deficiencies.²⁹ Along the 5,526 mile border between

²⁷ Government of Canada, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness: Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Ontario, 2001) 63.

²⁸ Jean Chrétien, Prime Minister of Canada, Parliament Hill, Ottawa, Canada, September 24, 2001.

²⁹ Government of Canada, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness: Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Ontario, 2001) 135-143.

the two countries, a large percentage of Canada's customs agents are university students hired on a temporary basis. At the border crossings themselves, there was little in the way of state-of-the-art technology to inspect containers and baggage entering the U.S. As a result, only one-third of the vehicles were ever properly screened. Likewise, there was no integration between Customs and Royal Canadian Mounted Police computer systems that would allow identification of potential suspects trying to enter the U.S., nor was there any link to the U.S. Customs computer system. At the airports, although adequate security measures were in place to screen passengers and baggage, the concern focused on the employees. Background checks on personnel and the control of ramp passes were not standard in all airports. However, the most glaring deficiencies existed at the seaports on the east and west coasts where upwards of 60% of the goods being off-loaded are destined for the U.S. Because of budget constraints, the port authority had cancelled the contract for policing the docks, and instead, placed the responsibility upon the customs and security agents who were unqualified and ill prepared to do the job. As a result, there was no way of controlling the crime, smuggling and gang activity that has become commonplace at portside. Concern was also expressed over the legitimacy of the numerous dockyard companies as it was suspected that many were havens for criminal activity. At the federal level, the deficiencies were also prominent. Both the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, similar to the Central Intelligence Agency, lacked the resources to conduct both domestic and international policing because of reductions in budget and resources. It was apparent that border, port, immigration, policing and intelligence would need to be addressed urgently

and that the efforts should be coordinated in conjunction with the U.S. initiatives to enhance its own internal security.³⁰

Security Initiatives

It was recognized that increased security came at the expense of freedom of action and efficiency. With Canada's reliance on the U.S. as its largest trading partner, it could ill-afford overly stringent measures that could significantly hamper the \$1.9 billion free-flow of trade between the two countries every day.³¹ Unrestricted movement of people and goods is critical to the economic prosperity of both countries, in particular Canada. Accordingly, a practical compromise between the existing deficiencies and complete militarization of the air, land and sea approaches had to be found.

The changes that were implemented within a relatively short time were far reaching. On 12 December 2001, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Manley, and U.S. Homeland Security Director, Tom Ridge, signed the Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration. The features include: integrating personnel security systems to be able to share information on suspects crossing the border; coordinating information and efforts pertaining to refugees, the issuance of visas, and the sharing of crew and passenger manifests; development of a Canada/U.S. system to permit free-flow of no-risk personnel by creating 14 integrated border enforcement teams; collaboratively developing and implementing state-of-the-art technology for screening and inspection of cargo; sharing between the respective law enforcement and intelligence agencies information through common technology and working more closely together in the identification and

³⁰ Government of Canada, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness: Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Ontario, 2001) 1-75.

³¹ Canada, Government of Canada - Statistics Canada available from http://canada.gc.ca/main_e.html.

apprehension of criminals/terrorists; and, establishing joint teams of customs agents stationed at the major Canadian and U.S. ports to enhance inspection and security. At airports, the Air Transport Security Authority authorized plain-clothed police officers to patrol airports and to fly on Canadian domestic flights.³² With respect to anti-terrorism and immigration, the Canadian government implemented the Anti-Terrorism Act on 24 December 2001 and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act on 28 June 2002. The intent of the Anti-Terrorism Act is to prevent terrorists entering Canada, to establish greater latitude for the federal courts to prosecute, to convict and punish terrorists rather than deporting them to their native countries, and to work more closely with U.S. counterparts in the isolation of terrorists and terrorists groups. The changes to the immigration laws and the anti-terrorism act deny potential terrorists refugee status and impose significant penalties for those involved in procuring, selling or falsifying documents.³³ In response to the deficiencies in the policing and intelligence agencies, additional resources were given to the RCMP and CSIS to train, equip and deploy personnel domestically and internationally in anti-terrorist operations. A greater focus was placed on inter-service cooperation between the two agencies and their counterpart agencies in the U.S. Personnel were also hired to provide additional port security and coastal surveillance.³⁴

In total since the terrorist attacks, the Government of Canada has allocated \$7.7 billion to enhancing security. This represents 1% of its gross domestic product and is

³² The Smart Border Declaration, *Building a Smart Border for the 21st Century on the Foundation of a North American Zone of Confidence*, Ottawa, Canada, 12 December 2001.

³³ Government of Canada, *Anti-Terrorism Act and the New Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)*, Ottawa, Canada, 24 December 2001.

significant in its monetary value and in its symbolic value.³⁵ Monetarily, the size of the contribution reflects the government's commitment to security, and it is recognition of the degree to which internal security within the nation had been allowed to lapse.

Symbolically, it renewed Canada's commitment to the U.S. by coming to the aide of its neighbor, friend and ally in a time of crisis. The dispatches between the President and the Prime Minister that started on 24 September 2001, up to the most recent on 9 September 2002, were reminiscent of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt and William Lyon Mackenzie King era when the cooperation between the two countries was at its highest. The common cause then was Germany and World War II.³⁶ Today, the cause is terrorism, and in the words of the Prime Minister, "our relationship has never been stronger."³⁷

Nevertheless, conspicuous by its absence is any semblance of relative military contribution to the overall security initiatives. Other than increasing the NORAD alert posture and assigning an additional \$200 million annually to disaster response and nuclear, biological and chemical threats, the military contribution is disproportionate to the government's focus on other areas and symbolically disproportionate to the U.S. military initiative to create a command exclusively dedicated to homeland defense.³⁸ It is almost perplexing, in light of the tradition of cooperation in defending the continent along side the U.S., that the Canadian government is not asserting its military in a more

³⁴ Government of Canada, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness: Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Ontario, 2001) 135-143.

³⁵ Government of Canada, *Budget 2001* Ottawa, December 10, 2001, 2001-118.

³⁶ L. Martin, *The Presidents and the Prime Ministers*. (Doubleday Canada Limited, Toronto, Ont., 1982), 115 - 146.

³⁷ Jean Chrétien, Prime Minister, *On the occasion of the Canada-U.S. Border Summit*, Detroit, Michigan, 9 September 2002.

demonstrative role beyond the existing arrangements. Add to this the unofficial acknowledgement that Canada benefits more from its defense relationships with the U.S. than it contributes. For instance, Canada is an equal partner in NORAD although it contributes only 10% of the equipment, personnel and resources.³⁹ In this sense, Canada has an obligation to reciprocate in some fashion out of deference to the U.S. This sense of obligation stems from the first public pronouncement of any U.S. President regarding Canadian security. President Franklin Roosevelt stated in August 1938: "that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened ...". Prime Minister Mackenzie King reciprocated by stating: "that hostile powers would not be allowed to base operations against the United States from Canada."⁴⁰ The impetus of the threat of German invasion at that time is not unlike the threat of terrorism today. Likewise, the outward expression of support to the U.S. that led to the creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) then is not unlike the outpouring of support following September 11th. Families housed over 23,000 people stranded on 330 flights that had been diverted to Canada from the U.S. On 14 September 2001, the Prime Minister declared a national day of mourning when 100,000 people came out to the memorial ceremony held in the nation's capitol. Subsequently, over 10,000 Canadians traveled to New York to lend their support.⁴¹

³⁸ Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, *Operation Apollo - Canada's contribution to the campaign against terrorism* available at www.dnd.ca/menu/operations/apollo/index_e.htm.

³⁹ D. Nicks, J. Bradley, C. Charland, *A History of the Air Defence of Canada, 1948-1997*, (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Canada, 1997), 5-207.

⁴⁰ L. Martin, *The Presidents and the Prime Ministers*. (Doubleday Canada Limited, Toronto, Ont., 1982), 127.

⁴¹ Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, *The Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces response to September 11, 2001, Operation Apollo - Canada's contribution to the campaign against terrorism* available at www.dnd.ca/menu/operations/apollo/index_e.htm.

However, it should not come as a surprise, considering the historical pattern of behavior that has characterized Canadian decision-making on security matters affecting its sovereignty, that Canada's reaction to a military contribution was relatively benign. The official response to Secretary Rumsfeld's offer was very succinct and deliberately released the same day as the Pentagon's announcement of the planned creation of NORTHCOM:

"While the creation of a 'Northern Command' may have potential implications for existing continental security arrangements, it is too early to speculate on what those might be At this stage, discussions do not include the possible creation of a new joint command with standing forces attributed to it."⁴²

As previously alluded, the decision also reflects in part the short notice between when the offer was made and the stand-up of NORTHCOM. Accordingly, although the statement precludes military forces, it implies the possibility of a future military contribution once "implications for existing continental security arrangements" have been fully assessed. What are the implications and how do they affect Canadian sovereignty and military participation in NORTHCOM?

North American Aerospace Defense

The implications of NORTHCOM are predicated on the history of the NORAD relationship and the manifestations of Anti-Ballistic Missiles.

The NORAD agreement is the centerpiece of the U.S./Canada continental security arrangements. However, its implications permeate beyond just the military relationship. Signed in 1958 as a consequence of World War II and concerns over continental security, the NORAD agreement was formulated by the Military Cooperation Committee under

the aegis of the PJBD.⁴³ The agreement culminated a decade of partnerships and agreements that saw equipment, personnel, technology and territorial sharing between the two countries in order to secure one another's defense. The defense industry, trade, and economic benefits that resulted from the collaboration were equally beneficial to both countries in both the long and short term. Nevertheless, the agreement was not met with euphoria throughout Canada. Characteristic of its aversion to super power dominance, those who were sovereignty conscious were skeptical that the agreement was yet another step in solidifying the 51st state. Indeed, the permanent presence of American strategic and tactical aircraft on Canadian soil; the installation of radar sites throughout Canada manned by U.S. military personnel; the construction of various facilities in Canada funded by U.S. security interests; and finally, the approval of over flight by bombers laden with nuclear weapons, gave the appearance of significant U.S. presence that constituted, in the minds of many, an invasion of Canadian sovereignty. These concerns were somewhat mitigated early on by the way Canada depicted the NORAD agreement on the international stage. Concerned that the NORAD agreement could be viewed overseas as an inward-looking mechanism to isolate North America from European allies, Canada was careful to assuage any such concerns by promoting the NORAD agreement as a reflection of its commitment to collective security, similar to NATO. This rumination allowed Canada to remain true to its foreign policy ideals while convincing itself that it was not completely abrogating control to the U.S. Nevertheless,

⁴² Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, Ottawa, Canada, 17 April 2002.

⁴³ G. Lindsey, *Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the Cold War*, ed J. J. Sokolsky, J.T. Jockel, *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation The Road From Ogdensburg* (The Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY., 1992), 61.

despite the elaborate rationale, skepticism towards NORAD would resurface every 5 years upon the anniversary of its renewal.⁴⁴

The agreement is complex. It melds both the President and the Prime Minister into a unified command and control arrangement and ostensibly gives each equal authority over decision-making within their respective countries. For instance, the Prime Minister can decide not to prosecute a target in Canada although the U.S. feels it poses a threat to them; recall the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Commander of NORAD reports to both in the daily execution of air defense over Canada and the U.S. His second in command, responsible for daily operations, is a Canadian who exercises direct control over the three NORAD regions: Alaska, Canada and Continental U.S. In the Canadian region, the Canadian Commander has a U.S. deputy who is second in command and oversees all NORAD activities in Canada. Today, Canada contributes approximately 268 people, working in the U.S. at NORAD facilities. In terms of Canadian equipment, NORAD has at its disposal: a network of radars; 4 squadrons of CF-18s; access to Canadian satellite resources; and, access to command and control facilities. Over the years, the relationship has grown so close that the two sides are indistinguishable except for the color of uniform.⁴⁵

In its initial stages, the threat to North America constituted the manned bomber capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear weapons. The NORAD role was to detect incoming aircraft using a series of land-based radars, and intercept and destroy

⁴⁴ G. Lindsey, *Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the Cold War*, ed J. J. Sokolsky, J.T. Jockel, *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation The Road From Ogdensburg* (The Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY., 1992), 61 - 67.

⁴⁵ D. Nicks, J. Bradley, C. Charland, *A History of the Air Defence of Canada, 1948-1997*, (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Canada, 1997), 5-207.

them using U.S. and Canadian aircraft stationed throughout North America.⁴⁶ Canada was a willing partner in this role, which was very much related to potential breach of its own sovereignty, and it contributed the bulk of the fighter aircraft to intercept the Soviet bomber sorties that would routinely fly over the pole into Canadian air space to test NORAD's rapid reaction capability. In a sense, Canadian territory became the early warning of impending Soviet attack on the U.S.

The advent of the ICBM shifted the emphasis away from the manned bomber and air defense to the early detection and warning from space of potential nuclear attack. U.S. funding, equipment and infrastructure were realigned to meet the new priority and the focus became satellites instead of aircraft. Canada's participation dwindled. Its inability to afford the cost of the technology was a contributing factor, but more importantly, its foreign policy stance on non-proliferation was the most serious impediment to participation in this aspect of NORAD. Ballistic missile defense further challenged the Canadian government's advocacy of arms control and put Canada squarely in the middle of its bilateral obligation and its broader foreign policy objectives. Characteristically, the latter was upheld during the 1968 NORAD renewal when Canada renounced participation in any aspect of ballistic missile or ballistic missile defense systems, thereby resigning itself to the air defense role only.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ G. Lindsey, *Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the Cold War*, ed J. J. Sokolsky, J.T. Jockel, *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation The Road From Ogdensburg* (The Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY., 1992), 60 - 65.

⁴⁷G. Lindsey, *Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the Cold War* ed J. J. Sokolsky, J.T. Jockel, *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation The Road From Ogdensburg* (The Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY., 1992), 71.

The next major evolution of the NORAD agreement was reflected in the 1981 renewal. Two factors influenced amendments that would reinvigorate Canada's involvement. The first was that deterrence had been firmly ensconced within U.S. and Soviet doctrine. One of the outcomes was a resurgence of air defense against the manned-bomber in recognition that the cruise missile threat was as pervasive as the ballistic missile threat. This led to a redefinition of the roles to include: aerospace warning comprised of the detection, validation and warning of attack from air or space; and aerospace control comprised of detection, identification, intercept and destruction of targets within North America's sovereign air space. The other major factor was the consummation of an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The agreement all but eliminated the deployment of a national system except for mutually agreed nodes. Non-proliferation and deterrence became the mainstays once again. For Canada, this resolved the original conundrum. In the end, both outcomes were entrenched in the renewal and Canada agreed to remove its objection to ABM and to accept North American Aerospace Defense as the new name for the command.⁴⁸ What followed was a complete modernization to bring the new NORAD into the 21st century. The U.S. replaced outdated radar sites with a series of long-range and mid-range radars positioned throughout Canada's north overlooking the northern approaches. Airborne Early Warning was integrated into the air defense net and all command and control facilities were upgraded to be fully interoperable between Canada and the U.S. Forward operating bases and over-the-horizon radars were also constructed

⁴⁸ D. Murray, *NORAD and U.S. Nuclear Operations* ed J. J. Sokolsky, J.T. Jockel, *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation The Road From Ogdensburg* (The Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY., 1992), 209-235.

in the farthest-reaches of Canada. In concert, the U.S. continued to pursue advances in missile and space technology, the most notable being the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). Canada was offered an opportunity under the pretext of NORAD to assist in the research and development of the program; however, this was too reminiscent of the 1968 debacle.⁴⁹ Accordingly, Canada refrained from participation by reasserting its objection to missile defense systems of any kind.

National Missile Defense

Canada's contribution to NORAD has not been consistent. In fact, it has waned twice over the implications of missile defense, and each time, the relevance of NORAD itself came into question. The ensuing debate always focused on two sides of the sovereignty debate: the proponents who argued that membership in NORAD enhanced Canadian sovereignty through membership in a larger, more encompassing umbrella of defense with shared responsibility and control; and, the opponents who reiterated that membership undermined Canadian sovereignty because of U.S. controllership. The most recent debate preceded the May 2001 renewal and NMD (National Missile Defense), the son of ABM, became the center of attention.

Upon the recommendation of the PJBD, Canada initiated the renewal process a year in advance with the aim of having the new agreement in place before the 2001 Presidential Elections; otherwise, there could have been a gap while awaiting review by potentially a new administration. As it turned out, the premonitions were serendipitous

⁴⁹ D. Cox, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defense*, ed J. J. Sokolsky, J.T. Jockel, *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation The Road From Ogdensburg* (The Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY., 1992), 240.

as the Republicans replaced the Democrats in the White House. However, there was also a downside to deliberating the renewal too early.

The PJBD recommended to both governments that the agreement be renewed unchanged for another five years. However, as with all previous renewals, the Canadian government wanted to examine the changes to the international security environment and to the trends of globalization that could have implications on the agreement.

Accordingly, a Parliamentary Committee comprised of members from each of its official federal parties convened to interview witnesses from across the military, foreign affairs and academia. At issue was the Clinton administration's renewed interest to deploy a robust NMD system to address the burgeoning ICBM threat from rogue nations.

Extensive research, development and testing had been underway leading up to the NORAD renewal. On the horizon, however, was the election that, depending on the outcome, could result in either deployment of NMD or a policy reversal in light of its enormous cost and implication to the ABM treaty and proliferation. Regardless of the outcome, the implications of NMD to NORAD and the new ICBM threat resurrected old arguments in Canada.⁵⁰ Amongst the military, foreign affairs and academia, there were two distinct proponents: those in favor of participation in NMD and those seemingly against it. The Department of National Defence (DND) sided for NMD and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), synonymous with the U.S. State Department, sided against.

⁵⁰ Standing Senate Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness: Renewal of the NORAD Agreement*, Federal Government of Canada Proceedings Transcript 23 March 2000.

NMD is a U.S. sponsored program to deploy a fixed number of missile defense units to defend against a limited intercontinental ballistic missile threat. Whereas in the past, the U.S. relied on its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent against the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the rise in nations with a nuclear capability gave impetus to be able to defend against a limited nuclear attack, either intentional or accidental. Deploying a NMD capability would give the U.S. another option other than launching a retaliatory nuclear strike. It was also rationalized that although rogue nations may not necessarily use their missiles directly against the U.S., the threat of using them could dissuade the U.S. from intervening in regional conflicts. A NMD capability would obviate this sort of brinkmanship.⁵¹ Conceptually, NMD would rely on NORAD detection and tracking systems, integrated into a limited number of deployed missile sites dispersed in Alaska and the U.S., to shoot down incoming missiles. Phase one of the plan envisages a system capable of intercepting a small number of warheads using 100 interceptors that would take five years to deploy once a decision was made. Additional radars would have to be installed in Alaska, Great Britain and Greenland as part of the first phase. Phase 2 would comprise additional interceptors and radars to provide redundancy, and would be operational five years hence.⁵² Given the seemingly adamant pursuit of this plan, the Parliamentary Committee focused its deliberations to better understand the shift in U.S. policy towards NMD in an effort to assess the implications to NORAD and future Canadian participation.

⁵¹ Statement of The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology Honorable Paul G. Kaminski Before a Session of the House Committee on National Security Subcommittee on Military Research and Development and Subcommittee on Military Procurement on National Missile Defense, May 15, 1997.

The motivation behind developing what was then called a ballistic missile defense system emerged from the Soviet long-range missile threat in the 1950s and 1960s. Because of the potential imbalance to the nuclear deterrent theory posed by the new technology, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union pursued an agreement to limit the capability so as not to give either side an advantage. In 1972, both signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that limited either side from building a nation-wide missile defense system. Instead, each country was permitted to erect a local system to project a specific area of interest. The Soviet Union constructed a system to protect Moscow that is still functional today; whereas, the US decommissioned its system that was constructed around its ICBM silos in 1976. The treaty thus ensured ongoing vulnerability thereby leaving the deterrence theory of nuclear weapons intact. The next milestone in missile defense came during the tenure of President Reagan when he proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983. Analogous to Star Wars, the system used spaced-based technology to defeat missiles. However, events such as the end of the Cold War, the technological challenges and the cost of the system prevented it from going beyond the drawing board. It was not until the 1998 report to Congress by the Commission on the Ballistic Threat to the US, chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, that BMD was rejuvenated.⁵³

The report concluded the BMD threat was no longer from Russia, but instead potentially from accidental firing or rogue nations possessing intercontinental missiles.

⁵² Presentation by the Honorable John D. Holum Senior Adviser for Arms Control and International Security U.S. Department of State Conference on International Reactions to U.S. National and Theater Missile Defense Deployments Stanford University, March 3, 2000.

Nations such as China, Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan, North Korea had developed and tested ballistic missile capabilities. For instance, North Korea tested the Taepo Dong 1 missile in 1998 and is working on the Taepo Dong 2 having a greater range. The Missile Defence Act was subsequently passed in the U.S. in July 1999, a year before the NORAD renewal discussions that declared the U.S. would deploy a NMD system "as soon as technologically possible."⁵⁴ The pronouncements represented a direct violation of the ABM treaty and signaled the U.S.'s intent to abrogate its commitment. The shock waves were still reverberating when the Parliamentary Committee began its deliberations.

Canada has chosen to use its middle power status to promote its belief in non-nuclear proliferation through the international forums of the UN and NATO. Canada has always promoted a robust, multilateral, non-proliferation arms control and disarmament regime. DFAIT has been demonstrative at the UN, taking the lead in ratification of the Combined Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-proliferation of Missile Technology Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty. It was thought that if the U.S. unilaterally defied the ABM treaty and deployed NMD, it could result in the proliferation of Russian nuclear weapons to overwhelm NMD's defensive capabilities and thus spark a new arms race. From DFAIT's perspective, Canada's association with NMD through NORAD would be hypocritical given Canada's foreign policy and long standing activism against proliferation. It would also undermine the government's international credibility: on one hand promoting stability through collective institutional cooperation to rid the world of nuclear weapons; while on the other hand, endorsing a system that would give the U.S.

⁵³ R. Handberg, *Ballistic Missile Defense and the Future of American Security*, (Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 2002), 1- 37.

⁵⁴ Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate 6 Oct 1998, *The Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*. (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1998).

and Canada dominance over the rest of the world. DFAIT anticipated that a similar face-saving predicament would befall Russia. Russia has had to acquiesce to the unification of Germany, NATO expansion, ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, and to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It was felt that nullification of the ABM treaty could compel Russia to change its demeanor to reassert its presence nationally and internationally as a matter of reputation. DFAIT however was also very much aware of the importance of Canada's bilateral agreements with the U.S. and was cognizant of the adverse economic, political and security implications of fundamental disagreement. Accordingly, DFAIT moderated its view towards NMD by accepting that missile defense would not necessarily have to be incompatible with arms control and disarmament if a compromise was found between Russia and the U.S.⁵⁵

On the other hand, the proponents of NMD in Canada are less overt; instead, choosing to articulate the benefits of close military association with the U.S. as the primary reason for strengthening the NORAD agreement. Their rationale is based on the threat to North America. As expressed in the Rumsfeld Report, rogue nations possessing an ICBM capability with nuclear, chemical and biological warheads, represents a threat to U.S., and by proxy, either an indirect or direct threat to Canadian security. As an indirect threat, although the missile may be targeted against the U.S., there is a potential for technological error whereby Canada becomes the target. Directly, a missile may be targeted against Canada to dissuade the U.S. from getting involved elsewhere, without having to directly attack the U.S. In terms of weapons of mass destruction, a detonation

⁵⁵ Standing Senate Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness: Renewal of the NORAD Agreement*, Federal Government of Canada Proceedings Transcript, statement by Mr. P. Heinbecker, Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security Policy, 23 March 2000.

close to the border region could have equally devastating effects on Canada as the U.S. Therefore, supporters of NMD argue that the capability to defend against a threat from the air through offensive means has always been a hallmark of Canada's contribution to NORAD. During the era of the Soviet manned-bomber, Canadian Forces aircraft were the means to defeat the threat. This role persists today to a lesser extent due to the introduction of the ICBM. The advent of technology has necessitated a shift in the means but not the requirement to defeat a threat. It is argued that NMD is the latest means and represents a logical manifestation of the fighter role and NORAD missions. Therefore, Canada should not contest the use of existing NORAD architecture to support the NMD mission nor should Canada exclude itself, as it has in the past, if NMD were to be integrated within NORAD. However, Canada's contribution should extend beyond the rhetoric of political backing and into the realm of actual participation in NMD for fear the current NORAD roles, and therefore Canada's contribution, become obsolete.

The historical precedence has already been established. Canada owned and operated long-range, high altitude, nuclear tipped BOMARC missiles to intercept Soviet bombers between 1960 and 1970.⁵⁶ This was at a time when Canada provided a more balanced contribution to the bilateral agreement. Back when the manned-bomber threat and later the missile threat were predominate, Canadian involvement and especially the territory upon which the early warning radars were based (Distant Early Warning Line, Mid-Canada and Pine Tree Lines) were essential to the early detection of a threat to the U.S. In this sense, Canada's physical contribution to the U.S. was invaluable. This is less

⁵⁶ D. Cox, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defense*, ed J. J. Sokolsky, J.T. Jockel, *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation The Road From Ogdensburg* (The Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY., 1992), 244.

the case today as technology moves the threat to the higher ground. Undoubtedly, Canada's intellectual contribution, demonstrated by the outstanding men and women in uniform who participate in the day-to-day operations, is immeasurable by any standard. Although it is significant in itself to the relationship, military leaders argue that it can in no way offset the financial disparity that exists between the U.S. and Canada especially if the relevance of Canada's contribution is outmoded by technology. Military leaders also express the self-conscience dilemma of continually being on the receiving end with little to show in return. Specifically, as a consequence of the NORAD relationship, Canada gains access to U.S. technology, information, equipment and resources that are at the leading edge of the revolution in military affairs. The prominence that this affords Canada allows it to be more influential at the international level and to participate in peace and security discussions that have broader implications to its trade and commerce worldwide. Their argument is that Canada accrues many first, second and third order benefits through membership in NORAD and therefore needs to ensure its contribution remains balanced, as practicable as possible, and relevant. However, it is a known fact that the U.S. plans to deploy NMD regardless of Canadian participation. The current plans do not require use of Canadian territory nor Canadian owned infrastructure or equipment. The U.S. could adopt a go-it-alone attitude, especially if the U.S. becomes disillusioned with the one-sided approach to the agreement.⁵⁷

The Parliamentary Committee was faced therefore with these two opposing views. DFAIT leaned towards the negative implications of NMD while DND leaned

⁵⁷ Standing Senate Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness: Renewal of the NORAD Agreement*, Federal Government of Canada Proceedings Transcript, statement by Mr. D. Bon, Acting Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy, DND, 23 March 2000.

towards the positive implications. Not surprisingly, the debate was reduced to the implications on Canadian sovereignty should Canada decide to participate in NMD or to end its commitment to NORAD because it refused to participate in any form of NMD and was no longer providing a relevant contribution. DFAIT questioned whether NORAD was the best way of protecting Canadian sovereignty while DND reinforced that no other viable alternative would afford Canada the same protection or benefits. As in the past, a stalemate resulted and an indecision regarding NMD became a decision to maintain the status quo and to renew the agreement as the PJBD had originally recommended.⁵⁸ For all intents and purposes, this was a practical decision. NMD is still in its nascent stage therefore any timeline for deployment is notional. Also, the U.S. has not committed to integrating NMD within NORAD nor have they approached Canada to participate. Even if Canada was approached, it remains theoretically possible to isolate Canadian participation from the detection, warning, and prosecution processes should this be the case and still remain a partner in NORAD. In its totality, the Parliamentary Committee assessed that Canada would supposedly have sufficient time to observe the developments and decisions surrounding NMD before the next anniversary in 2006 and to reassess the strategic environment and the implications to the agreement. Canada approved the renewal in June 2000.⁵⁹ However, September 11th and the changing security environment suddenly resurrected these exact same arguments but this time in terms of the implications of NORTHCOM.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Standing Senate Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness: Renewal of the NORAD Agreement*, Federal Government of Canada Proceedings Transcript, statement by Mr. D. Bon, Acting Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy, DND 23 March 2000.

Chapter 3

Obstacles and Attitudes to NORTHCOM

NORTHCOM - Canadian Obstacles

Three prevalent characteristics underscore Canadian decision-making about the implications of NORAD and ABM/NMD that are relevant to participation in NORTHCOM: sovereignty, process and time.

Sovereignty is the largest impediment preventing Canada from participating in NORTHCOM. The debate dates back to the founding of Canada under the guise of the Royal Empire. Since that time, successive Canadian governments have risen and fallen from power based on the public's perception of whether the country was too close or too distant from its benefactor. As described, this overarching theme influenced Canada's contribution in war, the formulation of its foreign policy, and ultimately how the nation defined its identity, both domestically, in terms of its culture and linguistic differences, and internationally, in terms of its part in contributing to global peace and security. These forces have shaped the Canadian physic and dominate the debate of participation in NORTHCOM and whether Canadian sovereignty, ironically, is more threatened by terrorists or by closer association with the U.S.

The idealists argue predominantly on the political aspects of closer association with the U.S. There is general agreement that the Canadian economy is dependent upon

the U.S. economy and therefore, Canada should do its utmost to foster this aspect of the relationship. Witness the extensive efforts by the Canadian government to instill confidence in the U.S. administration through its broad-reaching measures to secure its land and sea borders following September 11th. It is also generally agreed that the plethora of other bilateral arrangements between the two countries, such as cultural, academic, research and development, and defense help foster the economic relationship. The idealists, however, draw a line on the relative importance of the military bilateral relationships with the U.S. relative to the overall economic relationship, arguing that the strength of the economic relationship pervades the military relationship, and not the other way around. Idealists contend that, although NORAD is a significant symbol of the close cooperation between Canada and the U.S., changes to the agreement, whether in favor or otherwise, historically have not adversely affected the economic relationship. The Cuban missile crisis and the inclusion of ABM exceptions within past NORAD negotiations, for example, did not denigrate economic cooperation. The economic relationship has surpassed the defense relationship to the point that the two are independent of one another. The idealists are applying this same rationale to the argument surrounding Canada's participation in NORTHCOM. This does not imply that idealists have an irreverent view of the defense relationships with the U.S. and that NORAD and/or NORTHCOM would not serve Canadian interests. Instead, the idealists take a pragmatic approach by opting for the status quo, as has been the tendency within the NORAD agreement. In this way, Canada achieves the best of both worlds, while minimizing the implications to its sovereignty. The Prime Minister reaffirmed the stronghold of idealist

thinking within in the Canadian government when he referred to the Canada/U.S. relationship as:

“... a relationship based on shared values of freedom and human dignity. A model to the world of civility and respect. And, in the context of globalization, a guide to how nations can develop strong friendships while retaining distinct identities.”⁶⁰

The fallacy of the idealist argument however is manifest in how they define sovereignty. Canadians have a tendency to portray themselves in contrast to Americans. This tendency originated from the historic perception that the U.S. wanted to absorb Canada into the Union. Over time, the annexation of Alaska, the interference with Newfoundland joining the Canadian confederation, and the extensive development of U.S. installations on Canadian territory helped perpetuate paranoia in Canada. As a result, Canadians began to portray themselves as not American. This attitude is prevalent today as the government tries to restrict the amount of American culture and advertising on Canadian television and in Canadian magazines for fear of Americanization. It is also the foundation for the idealist’s contention that closer military association with the U.S. would further undermine Canadian sovereignty. Essentially, by placing Canadian land, sea and air forces under a command relationship within NORTHCOM, Canada would relinquish control of its sovereignty to the U.S., which would have untold consequences to its identity, independence and self-determination. The logic of the argument breaks down when you consider that the U.S. has no interest in absorbing Canada or any other nation, nor does it have any ambition towards controlling Canadian sovereignty. The fact that the U.S. has been sensitive to Canada's preoccupation with its sovereignty is

⁶⁰ J. Chrétien, Prime Minister of Canada, address on the occasion of the U.S./Canada Border Summit, September 2002.

reflected by its acquiescence towards an equal partnership in NORAD, despite the growing lopsidedness of Canada's contribution.⁶¹ If the idealist contention were true, Canadian participation in NORAD would be proportional to its contribution.

Realists argue that the two countries are more alike than not and that the creation of defense agreements has spawned cooperation and collaboration in a wide range of activities between the two countries. Strong fundamental agreements that bind the security of the two countries are the basis for lasting economic relationships. Likewise, Canada has used its defense relationship with the U.S. to promote its prominence in other international forums where military strength is recognized as a symbol of power and influence. Being closely aligned with the U.S. allows Canada an equal presence and representation of Canadian ideals and values. At the same time, other nations recognize this special relationship and will consult with Canada on matters relevant to the U.S. The NORAD agreement is the symbol to others of the close relationship between the two countries. The realist approach is to actively promote greater association with the U.S. to strengthen Canada's ability to control and maintain its sovereignty. Abstaining from participation in NORTHCOM is tantamount to relinquishing control of Canadian sovereignty, in the realist opinion. NMD is held in the same regard and therefore participation in both NMD and NORTHCOM is essential. The concern for the realist however is whether the U.S. will continue to indulge the perennial obfuscation surrounding Canada's commitment to collective defense of the continent or will the U.S.

⁶¹ J.J. Sokolsky, J.T. Jockel, *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation The Road From Ogdensburg*, (The Edwin Mellen Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1992), 3.

grow tired and simply forge ahead alone?⁶² Recall in 1968 when Canada opted out of ABM defense because of its unwillingness to participate in any aspect of missile or space activity beyond that of warning and surveillance. The U.S. subsequently modified the UCP and assigned ABM to the newly formed U.S. Space Command relegating Canada to a position of spectator.⁶³ A similar fate could befall Canada because of its objection to NMD. If NORTHCOM is assigned the responsibility for NMD, by not being a part of NORTHCOM, Canada could be completely marginalized, along with its sovereignty. Until Canada works out the idealist and realist views, the sovereignty debate will continue to preclude Canada's future participation in substantive defense matters with the U.S.

There are indications that Canada is undertaking a process to address sovereignty and the implications of its relationship with the U.S. There are five key indicators: the ABM treaty; the recently commissioned study on the Canada-U.S. relationship; the results of the study on Canadian Security and Military Preparedness; the completion of the Defense Review initiated on 1 September 2002; and the federal election in 2003, all of which have an element of predictability as to their influence on the decision to participate in NORTHCOM.

Recall that one of the factors influencing participation in NORTHCOM is a decision by the U.S. on the ABM Treaty. DFAIT indicated that should Russia and the U.S. reach an accommodation on the ABM Treaty, that would avoid the possibility of

⁶² D.Cox, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defense*, ed., J. J. Sokolsky, J.T. Jockel, *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation The Road From Ogdensburg* (The Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY., 1992), 259.

⁶³ D. Murray, *NORAD and U.S. Nuclear Operations* ed., J. J. Sokolsky, J.T. Jockel, *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation The Road From Ogdensburg* (The Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY., 1992), 229.

nuclear proliferation, Canada would be more amenable to NMD. When President Bush announced his intention to withdraw from the Treaty in December 2001, President Putin reacted nonchalantly in light of the unilateral U.S. announcement of commensurate reductions to its strategic nuclear arsenal.⁶⁴ As a result, DFAIT will likely relax its objection towards NMD and be more amenable to considering Canadian participation in both NMD and NORTHCOM.⁶⁵

In January 2002, the government commissioned a parliamentary study to examine the future of Canada-U.S. relations. The purpose of the bi-partisan commission is to address a watershed of issues ranging from adopting the U.S. dollar as a common currency to greater economic integration, even beyond the bounds of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Headed by DFAIT, the mandate will be to create an institutional framework of the relationship to move beyond many informal liaisons that currently exist to more formalized agreements. One of the implied intents of the study is to show that Canadian sovereignty is not a function of the relationship with the U.S., but instead, is defined by Canada's distinctiveness as a country. Therefore, the commission should conclude that, despite some paranoiac fears within Canada, the U.S. has no more

⁶⁴ Statement by President of the United States, *US Withdrawal from ABM Treaty*, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 13 June 2002.

⁶⁵ Standing Senate Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness: Renewal of the NORAD Agreement*, Federal Government of Canada Proceedings Transcript testimony by Paul Heinbecker Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 23 March 2000.

intention of absorbing Canada than Canada has becoming the 51st state and, as a result, closer bilateral relations with the U.S. do not pose a threat to its sovereignty.⁶⁶

The other two noteworthy indicators are the Canadian Security and Military Preparedness study and the Defense Review. The Canadian Security and Military Preparedness study was completed in February and was, in part, the catalyst for Defense Review launched on 1 September 2002. The Defense Review is to update the White Paper on Defense, last written in 1984, to reflect the changing security environment, prioritize the mission and roles of the Canadian Forces and realign resources, equipment, personnel and budget to achieve the government's military objectives.⁶⁷ The Canadian Security and Military Preparedness Report reaffirms the current trends of equipment obsolescence, inadequate funding, under trained personnel, lack of resources, and over commitment.⁶⁸ The Defense Review should provide the government of Canada with options to address these deficiencies. The underlying problem, as with any military, is funding. In the past, Canada has relied heavily upon its alliances for collective defense as a means to defray otherwise enormous defense expenditures. This approach will undoubtedly be reaffirmed by the two reviews, and it should point to the significant opportunities that can accrue through additional integration of Canada/U.S. forces within a framework like NORTHCOM that encompasses land, sea and air forces.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Mr. L. Yves Fortier, Former Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, *Canada and Sovereignty*, lecture, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Ont, 23 January 2002.

⁶⁷ Government of Canada, Department of National Defense, *The Defense Review*, September 2002.

⁶⁸ Government of Canada, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness: Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Ontario, 2001).

⁶⁹ Government of Canada, Department of National Defense, *The Defense Review*, September 2002.

Finally, the federal election scheduled for the Fall of 2003 will be the ultimate indicator. Whereas the outcomes of the other indicators can be predicted with some confidence, the position of the political leaders on Defense is far less certain. Canada's penchant towards its military has not been stellar and therefore it has not featured prominently on the campaign trails of the past. Nevertheless, there is general agreement amongst the political parties that the condition of Canada's military desperately requires attention. The pronouncements in the last six months by the U.S. ambassador to Canada have been instrumental in drawing the attention of all parties to the situation.⁷⁰ As a result, although not likely to be a campaign issue, the elected government will be faced with the same situation after the election as before and therefore should continue with the same courses of action laid down by the government prior to the election.

By combining the predicted results of these five key indicators, it appears intuitive that Canada will eventually assign forces to NORTHCOM. It is regrettable that the process precludes an earlier decision. It seems however that the military has in fact drawn this conclusion and has convinced the government to at least take some initial steps. Canada has surreptitiously indicated it will establish a cell in NORTHCOM Headquarters to observe, plan and support coordination of U.S. and Canadian land and sea operations on a case-by-case basis.⁷¹ Strategically this is perhaps the best course of action in light of the government's anti-military predilection. At the same time, this approach provides a signal to the U.S. of Canada's interest and desire to remain actively engaged. Hopefully the U.S. will recognize the circumstances and continue to extend its

⁷⁰ U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci has been supportive in trying to emphasize the need to bolster the Canadian military and its contribution to NORAD and NATO.

benevolence and understanding towards the collective defense of the two nations while Canada takes the time to complete its detailed review of the Canada/U.S. relationship over the next year or so. However, indications are otherwise; there are telltale signs that U.S. policy is changing and is becoming less benevolent.

NORTHCOM - U.S. Attitude

It is being purported that the U.S. attitude towards its bilateral and multilateral relationships is becoming more and more unilateral. In actual fact, the U.S. policy towards international relations is undergoing a noticeable change of direction and countries, such as Canada, need to take notice.⁷² At the multilateral level, the U.S. appears to be becoming more obstreperous towards issues that are not within its national interests. For instance, the U.S. has not ratified the 1997 Land Mine Treaty to ban anti-personnel land mines, nor the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 to investigate and prosecute those who commit war crimes. This has created the impression that the U.S. is disengaging itself from international agreements. In actual fact, the U.S. abstentions are for such valid concerns as the need to use landmines for force protection along the border between North and South Korea.⁷³ Likewise, the trepidation over the ICC is a reflection of the U.S. concern for its military members who are engaged in almost every international conflict and who, by the sheer consequence of U.S. military preponderance, may become the victims of their own benevolence.⁷⁴ At the

⁷¹ The Honourable John McCallum Minister of National Defence, lecture to the Toronto Board of Trade, Toronto, Ontario, 25 October 2002 available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/eng/archive/speeches/2002/oct02/BOT_s_e.htm.

⁷² J.S. Nye Jr, *The Paradox of American Power*, (University Press, Oxford, New York, 2002), 154.

⁷³ Ibid 156.

⁷⁴ Ibid 160.

bilateral level, the U.S. has renounced its participation in the ABM Treaty with Russia. Although the announcement did not instigate a negative reaction from the Russian President, as many onlookers predicted, it is being interpreted as a further indictment of a unilateralist approach, despite the pervasive threat of nuclear weapons from rogue nations described earlier.⁷⁵ This portrayal falls on the heels of U.S. pronouncements on the war on terrorism, the war in Afghanistan, the axis of evil, and the most poignant of all, the potential attack on Iraq, all in the aftermath of September 11th. Accordingly, the portrayal of a change in U.S. policy is accurate but is legitimized by the changing face of the security environment in which the U.S. finds itself; all the more reason for nations to take stock. The most revealing evidence of the change is in the U.S. National Security Strategy that unabashedly enunciates the new U.S. unilateral approach:

"We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively ..."⁷⁶

For Canada, the implications of the changing U.S. attitude must be assessed in the context of its bilateral relationship and its presumption that the U.S. will continue to remain ambivalent to the types of procrastinations and noncommittal demeanor that has historically typified Canada's decision-making. The premonitions show that the U.S. will act unilaterally in face of a threat to its national interests and this could pose a greater

⁷⁵ C. Krauthammer, The Bush Doctrine - ABM, Kyoto, and the New American Unilateralism, *Early Bird*, 4 June 2001.

⁷⁶ U.S. Government, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, Chp 3, pg 6.

challenge to Canadian sovereignty than participating in the security of North American as an active member of NORTHCOM.

Conclusions

The examination of the Canada/U.S. relationship and its historic underpinnings in chapter 1, and the description of the security initiatives undertaken by Canada following September 11th in chapter 2 provide a perspective on how Canada ranks its sovereignty in relation to its security. Chapter 3 uses this to describe Canada's decision-making against participation in NORTHCOM and contrasts it with the changing U.S. attitude towards today's strategic environment. What then can be concluded about Canada's decision not to participate in NORTHCOM? To Canada, the heart of the debate of whether or not to assign land, sea and air forces to NORTHCOM is not about U.S. control of Canadian Forces. NORAD is a perfect example of the effectiveness of combined forces under a unified command and control structure where Canadian Forces aircraft are commanded under the auspices of the U.S. combatant commander. Nor is the debate about the use of Canadian equipment, resources and personnel by the U.S. Again, the precedence is replete throughout history where Canada and the U.S. have collaborated in such areas and Canada in particular has reaped the benefits. The heart of the debate lies at the political level, within government, and the innate perception that contributing additional forces under the command of the U.S. will further erode Canada's sovereignty as opposed to enhancing it through collective security. Canada sees this as a greater threat than the threat of terrorism itself. The roots of the paranoia of becoming Americanized are historic, and, in large part, are self-aggrandized to the point of preoccupation when issues of defense cooperation are tabled. The debate of pros and cons often results in indecision that becomes a decision for the status quo. This was the

outcome within the limited time Canada had to consider the offer by Secretary Rumsfeld to participate in NORTHCOM. Instead, Canada opted to enhance its economic security by investing heavily in all other forms of border, port and airport security to protect the flow of trade critical to the Canadian economy. The efforts were aimed at pacifying U.S. concerns about the permeability of Canada's defenses against terrorism, without having to commit military forces to NORTHCOM. It was presumed these initiatives, along with the historic defense agreements, would satisfy the U.S. However, the existing defense agreements are no longer sufficient to protect U.S. interests, and there are growing signs that the U.S. is no longer prepared to be dependent on others for its security. It appears the U.S. is reverting to a more unilateral approach in the pursuit of its national interests, especially involving terrorism. The latest National Security Strategy serves notice to countries like Canada that the U.S. is prepared to take preemptive measures without prior consultation. In other words, if the threat to the U.S. is imminent, then it will no longer regard Canadian sovereign interests in deference to its own, as Canada has historically presumed. In recognition of this fact, Canada has undertaken a broad range of initiatives to assess the future of Canada/U.S. relations with the goal of making improvements, including militarily. Additionally, Canada has committed a small planning and coordination cell as an interface between the Canadian Forces and NORTHCOM while it undertakes the broader assessment of its relationship with the U.S. Indeed, based on recent comments from the new Minister of National Defence, there are indications that Canada's mind-set towards sovereignty and security is changing:

"Sovereignty means that we must be able to defend Canada and participate meaningfully in the defence of North America."⁷⁷

Nevertheless, this may not be timely enough for the U.S. who is advancing Homeland Security and Homeland Defense at breakneck speed. Admittedly, Canadian sovereignty and security are enhanced through close association with the U.S. If Canada wants to avoid being excluded from actively contributing to the defense of North America and therefore its own sovereignty, it needs to be in lock step with the U.S. by assigning forces in support of NORTHCOM.

⁷⁷ The Honourable John McCallum Minister of National Defence, lecture to the Toronto Board of Trade, Toronto, Ontario, 25 October 2002 available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/eng/archive/speeches/2002/oct02/BOT_s_e.htm.

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