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**“QUAGMIRE”: THE PENTAGON’S WORD FOR
NATION BUILDING**

by

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Preface

As commander of the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) supporting V Corps during Operation Iraq Freedom, I observed the Corps' superb fight from Kuwait to Baghdad. The fall of the regime was lightning fast, and then we experienced a six-week lull in activity. During these six weeks, I observed a lack of planning and direction for the post conflict period. As commander of a deployable V Corps unit, I had spent eighteen months focused on ensuring that my unit was prepared to support the warfighter during high-intensity, conventional combat. At no time, even after we were alerted for possible deployment, did anyone discuss our role after the fighting was over. "Ad hoc" best describes the approach to post-conflict nation building that I observed.

My personal training and experience had not exposed or prepared me for post-conflict operations. For example, at the brigade commander's direction, my unit conducted over 45 hospital assessments in Baghdad during the 30 days after the city's fall. These were done on the fly, without prior training or structure, but we gained knowledge and experience daily. I was uneasier during this phase of the operation than at any other time, to include the combat maneuver phase. I had not trained the unit for this, and as leaders know, it is a cardinal sin to have untrained soldiers in combat situations. Training produces a confident and prepared soldier. It became clear that field grade officers, not just generals and politicians, needed an understanding of nation building, and the military's role in this type of undertaking. This paper is my attempt to

educate myself about the military's role in nation building, and what problems are encountered during these operations.

I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Stephen Burgess for his assistance, guidance, and mentorship during the writing of this paper. He was always available to answer questions, and his in-depth insights and personal interest were invaluable. Mary, my research assistant, editor, and wife, provided an occasional push to keep me going. Thanks, April and Lauren, for understanding why Dad spent so much time with his nose in a book and in front of the computer this year.

Abstract

Nation building is an appropriate task for the military, which has conducted such operations for hundreds of years. The National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and recently revised Army doctrine, states that the military, especially the Army, must assume a role in America's nation building efforts. The military's unique capabilities in personnel, equipment, and transportation make it an organization that has been, and will continue to be called upon, to assist with nation building. The military's exclusive capability to rapidly convert to an offensive combat force is essential to establishing and maintaining a secure environment required for nation building. Nation-building operations in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia encountered including indistinct policy and strategy, a lack of planning, doctrine, and training, inadequate force structure, poor interagency coordination, and resistance to nation building as an appropriate mission. Recommendations for enhancing the military's effectiveness in future nation building include establishment of a single agency for overall responsibility of nation building, nation building tasks should be included on unit METLs, realignment of force structure to include reconstruction divisions with modularity, continue to refine doctrine, training, and force structure to drive fundamental change in the mission of the military, leaders should be held accountable for preparedness and performance of nation building, and get rid of the "Powell Doctrine" in light of current realities. The military will "do Vietnams" in today's strategic environment.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The shadowland in between, where the military is used to constrain rather than to inflict violence, is rarely discussed. At the same time, the language used to describe and debate operations that could include anything from monitoring a border to battling insurgents is little known and poorly understood.

—James Carafano

From 1965 through 1973, the United States attempted to create and support governments capable of resisting external communist aggression. The strategic concern was articulated by the “Domino Theory,” which posited that if one nation fell under communist control, others in the same region would fall as well. The United States poured over \$120 billion into South Vietnam during this period in one of its most extensive and longest lasting nation building efforts. The United States approached this endeavor with the confidence developed during other post-World War II nation building efforts in Japan, Germany, and South Korea. For a multitude of reasons, which are still being debated today, the United States failed in Vietnam and lost its first war. Since Vietnam, the military has been opposed to engagements that are not conventional battles and are politically complex, referring derisively to these operations as “quagmires.” After Vietnam, refrains such as, “We don’t do Vietnams, we don’t do jungles, we don’t

do mountains,” began to be heard. This was codified in the Powell doctrine, which placed significant restrictions on the use of military force.

In spite of its reluctance, the military has continued to be involved in various nation-building environments since the Vietnam War. At first glance, the problems and difficulties occurring during these operations appeared to validate the military’s reluctance for nation building. After action reports tended to focus on the negative – what did not go well, what was not accomplished. However, as Chapter 3 will demonstrate, there are many aspects of nation building that the military does very well. The US military, and in particular the US Army, does have a role in nation building and must examine the problems, look for solutions, and openly accept this role.

The research method used will be a literature review. The amount of literature addressing these issues has recently exploded, in response to post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq. New analysis and scholarship appears daily. Articles often take completely different sides of the issues involved, differing even in whether or not to call an operation a success. These differences betray biases the writer may have. However, this paper will attempt to describe the military’s performance objectively and evaluate it in the context of strategic realities. Chapter 2 will demonstrate that the military has a role in nation building. Chapters 3 will assess recent nation building operations and identify problems the military encountered. Chapter 4 will briefly discuss these problems and make recommendations for avoiding these pitfalls in future nation-building efforts. Chapter 5 will provide a brief conclusion.

An accepted, standardized definition does not exist for the term “nation building.” Frequently, articles about nation building do not provide a definition, making it difficult

to draw conclusions about the author's intended meaning. However, there seems to be a general understanding that "nation building" means just what it says.¹ A definition for nation building does not exist in current military publications either, and in fact, the term "nation building" is not used at all. By assiduously avoiding the term, the military may believe it can avoid the quagmire it associates with the term.

For purposes of this paper, nation building will be defined as security, governance, humanitarian, and infrastructure/economic assistance rendered to a nation to promote a stable society, founded upon a free market economy and a democratic government. Assistance may be provided during peacetime, crises, emergencies, war, insurgencies, or post-conflict reconstruction. This definition builds on the terms "nation assistance" and "peace building," as found in Joint Publication 3-07.² These two terms were combined to provide an all-encompassing definition, covering the complete spectrum of military operations that could be considered part of nation building.

A key aspect of this definition is that it specifies a political outcome for nation building, that is, democratic governance. The military insists it is apolitical, and so hesitates to address goals and objectives that are not conventional warfare objectives. Yet, political goals and objectives must define the end state for the military planner. As Frederick Kagan points out, "The true center of gravity in a war of regime change lies not in the destruction of the old system, but in the creation of a new one." The difference between war and chaotic violence is political goals that define the end state.³

Since the demise of the Soviet Union and the articulation of the strategy of engagement and enlargement, the overall goal for the United States in nation building is democratization. The "democratic peace" is based on the premise that democratic

nations do not wage war against other each other. Based on this conviction, US strategy calls for the active promotion and expansion of the community of democracies and free-market countries as a way of applying national resources toward the pursuit of strategic objectives.⁴

The definition also identifies four major tasks of nation building. Security, governance, humanitarian, and infrastructure/economic assistance provides the framework for establishing a stable society. Table 1 delineates the subtasks of each major task.

Security Assistance	Governance	Humanitarian Assistance	Infrastructure & Economic Assistance
Patrolling to prevent looting, insurgency operations, & maintain border integrity	Civil/military administration Initial Authority Initial Judicial System Justice & Reconciliation Est. Local Committees	Immediate necessities of life (basic survival assistance) Food Water Shelter Emergency medical	Infrastructure Public Works Transportation System Communication System Healthcare Facilities Educational Facilities
Mine clearance and ordnance removal			
Disarmament & demobilization	Form Democratic Gov't Constitution Human Rights Participatory Gov't Elections	Sanitation & disease prevention Medical Care	Economy based on free market principles Debt restructuring Reconstruction Funds Promote Investment Facilitate Trade
Constabulary functions (law enforcement)			
Vet, train and re-establish the military		Reintegration of population	
Protect infrastructure			

Table 1 Elements of Nation Building

These tasks were assembled from a variety of sources.⁵ Throughout the literature, the myriad functions and subcomponents of nation building are called by different names, but the overarching goals for post-conflict rehabilitation remain the same.⁶

Notes

¹ Several authors have pointed out that what is referred to as “nation building” would more properly be known as “state building.” However, “nation building” has become the normative term. “State building” is the building of the institutions of government, while “nation building” refers to the cultural aspects of political development. See Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1 and Marina Ottaway, “Think Again: Nation Building,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2002, n.p. on-line, Internet, 27 September 2003, available from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/future/2002/0910building.htm>.

² Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 16 June 1995, GL4. Peace building is defined as post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Nation assistance is civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code Title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations.

³ Frederick W. Kagan, “War and Aftermath,” *Policy Review*, no. 120, August 2003, n.p., on-line, Internet, 2 February 2004, available from http://www.policyreview.org/aug03/kagan_print.html.

⁴ Robert H. Dorff, “Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability,” *Parameters* XXVI, no. 2 (Summer 1996): n.p., on-line, Internet, 28 October 2003, available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/96summer/dorff.htm>.

⁵ Conrad Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military in a Post-conflict Scenario* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 63-72; James Dobbins et al., *America’s Role in Nation-Building: Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003); William Flavin, “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,” *Parameters* XXXIII, no. 3 (Autumn 2003), 104; United Nations, *An Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities*, (New York, NY: United Nations, 1996).

⁶ Conrad C. Crane, compiler, “Civil, Military, and Political Cooperation in Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Rebuilding,” conference, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1 February 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 28 October 2003, available from <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/conf/2002/rebuild.htm>.

Chapter 2

Why Soldiers Do Nation Building

Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it.

—Dag Hammerskjold

Whether or not soldiers should be involved in nation building remains a controversial question. While campaigning for the Presidency, George W. Bush expressed a reluctance to have soldiers involved in nation building.¹ James Carafano of the Heritage Foundation states that “Nation-building is a task for which military forces are neither well suited nor appropriate,” and that the military should be reserved “for the great power missions that require the preponderance of military power that only the United States can provide.”² This chapter will refute the myth that soldiers should not be involved in nation building. In every military operation, regardless of type, there will always aspects of nation building unavoidably requiring attention.

History of Nation Building

The popular notion that America is non-interventionist and reluctant to use its military might is not borne out by history. America had its first experience with a military occupation during the Revolutionary War at Ft. Kaskaskia. This occupation was so successful that some French, who had been allies of the British, came over to the

American side.³ There have been over 200 military excursions since American became a nation, and US history has shown that peace operations have been the purview of land forces, the Army and the Marine Corps.⁴ These excursions typically fell into the categories of small wars, low intensity conflict, small-scale operations, or operations other than war. They were seldom purely combat missions, and the large scale, virtually total war of WWI, WWII, and Korea are the exceptions in military history.⁵

These missions saw our soldiers involved in roles of the constabulary, governance, civic assistance, and humanitarian assistance. These roles are found in the definition of nation building used in this paper. From the Philippines in 1898, to Haiti, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Cuba in 1920s, to the present day, the United States military has been involved in aspects of nation building. The military's involvement in many of these missions was not a short-term event. The Army was in the Philippines for over 40 years and the Marines were in Haiti for 19 years. In terms of long-lasting contributions to international peace and security, the military's achievements in nation building actually overshadow their combat successes.⁶ The best examples of this are the enduring democratic and economically vibrant nations of Germany, Japan and Korea.

After World War II, the United States adopted the policy of "containment" in NSC-68, with the goal of containing the spread of communism. This policy resulted in a forty-year period known as the Cold War. The US intervened to prevent the spread of communism.⁷ During this period it mattered little to the US whether or not the regime supported democratic values. Many of the regimes were corrupt and weak and remained viable only because of superpower support. Democratization was not given any priority, as stabilization and containment of communism dominated strategy.⁸

Nation building continued to be part of this effort to some degree. The US remained committed to South Korea after the Korean War, and contributed immensely to its rebuilding. Throughout the Vietnam War, the US assisted the South Vietnamese government in numerous activities to win the hearts and minds of the people. The two superpowers remained engaged throughout the world for the purpose of increasing their leverage and power, although not for any humanitarian purposes. Especially in the Third World, the United States saw territories where they could increase influence, military presence, and establish a ‘fire wall’ against communist expansion. The support and assistance other countries received from the US was generally military assistance in the form of training and weapon supplies.⁹

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became possible to imagine a world where diplomacy would overtake military might as a way to resolve disputes – a New World Order. There was talk of a “peace dividend,” as if there would be no need for an army to make war anymore. The United States shifted its national security strategy from containment to engagement and enlargement. Engagement and enlargement was based on the premise of a “democratic peace;” the promotion and expansion of democracies and free-market economies promotes peace.¹⁰ It is not that democracies are conflict free, but the conflict is managed in a different way. Competition in the market place, free expression of views, and voting rights allow for conflict resolution in a peaceful way.¹¹ There seemed to be broad, international support for this idea, indicated by an increase in peace operations. From 1948 to 1978, the UN approved only 13 peace operations, and none from 1979 to 1988. However, since 1988, the UN has conducted over 38 operations.¹²

Freed from the bonds of the superpower struggle, not only were countries more free to intervene, but also, there was an increased necessity for intervention. Superpower support and influence was withdrawn from satellite countries, releasing internal disputes that had been suppressed and festering for many years. Weak regimes were not able to control socioeconomic and ethnic disputes, resulting in regional fragmentation. Since 1914, the number of new nations has increased dramatically, from 59 to over 190 nations. Many of these are weak, with the potential for more regional fragmentation.¹³ The end of the Cold War revealed “an entire class of countries with only marginal capacities to function politically and economically”.¹⁴

Presidents G.H.W. Bush and Clinton viewed the military as an instrument that could be employed for not just vital national interests, but also for international interests, including humanitarian assistance. The national security strategy documents of 1994, 1996, and 1997 emphasized the potential requirement for the military’s involvement in peace operations.¹⁵ The combat action in Somalia, and the deaths of 18 US Rangers, brought the dark side of engagement/enlargement into US living rooms. This led to retrenchment of America’s international peace and security assistance. Although the US did participate in subsequent operations, it was increasingly reluctant to do so and consistently looked for an exit date.¹⁶ When exit dates proved to be untenable, the US military insisted on defining exit strategies based on military, not political, goals.

Today’s Interests, Threats, and Strategy

September 11, 2001 was a tragic awakening for the United States of America. A failed state, Afghanistan, provided the sanctuary needed by Al Qaeda to plan, coordinate, and organize a devastating attack on America. It forced the United States to reassess the

impact of the failed state on national and world security. Failed states are now clearly recognized as potential threats to the national interests of the United States. Conventional warfare with massed armies is less likely as a future threat. The failed state with its potential for enhancing terrorist activity, wars that range from ethnic to civil, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of non-state actors, and humanitarian disasters, is the likely threat facing the United States.¹⁷

Failed states frequently generate significant and highly visible violations of human rights. The news media's coverage of pain and suffering caused by governmental collapse resulted in a public outcry to "Do something." This "CNN factor" resulted in more interventions. In the future, large scale suffering of innocent victims caused by failing governments or brutal autocratic regimes will result in an increasing number of interventions, if a country has the power and will.¹⁸

Problems of the failed states do not remain internal. They eventually affect the security concerns of neighboring states, regional stability, and ultimately international peace. Local conflicts and failed states are no longer an isolated and distant problem, as they impact their particular region and the world.¹⁹ The terrorist threat finds a safe haven for planning, organizing, and training in these states. In addition, global organized crime and narcotics traffickers thrive under the ungoverned sovereignty.²⁰

According to General Anthony Zinni, "For decades more, we're going to be dealing with this problem. You're going to be fighting terrorists; you're going to be fighting against failed or incapable states that are sanctuaries for problems. You're going to try to rebuild nations."²¹ Interventions are likely to increase due to the number of failed states,

the terrorist threat, and the world wide media transmissions of human suffering. Failed states do not just go away with time.²²

President Bush's National Security Strategy (NSS) was developed with this threat in mind. The enemy is terrorism, and the United States will take preemptive action to stop the terrorist.²³ The NSS promotes democracy and economic openness in order to strengthen the domestic stability of states, and reduce the terrorist's ability to thrive. "The Wilsonian overtones in the strategy could lead to a much more ambitious role for the U.S. military in the international arena."²⁴

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) outlines the military's strategy for securing the interests and the objectives of the NSS.²⁵ The QDR mandates that the military must be prepared to defend, deter, conduct major combat operations on a global basis, and conduct a limited number of smaller scale contingency operations.²⁶ Small-scale contingency operations are all operations other than war, and range from humanitarian assistance to low intensity combat operations.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognizes that the military will conduct nation building. Doctrine, as outlined in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, recognizes the broad spectrum of military operations, to include military operations other than war (MOOTW).²⁷ JP 3-07 provides specific guidance for the military's role in peace operations and identifies these operations as peace building and nation assistance.

The Army echoes this in the recent Field Manual (FM) 3-07 that states, "Stability operations and support operations make an important contribution to further the NSS. The worldwide participation of Army forces in these operations demonstrates our commitment; improves interoperability; reassures allies; promotes transparency; conveys

democratic ideals; deters aggression; and helps address sources of instability before they can become military crises.”²⁸ The essence of FM 3-07 is to provide the Commander in Chief with military operations, beyond force-on-force, to shape the environment. Figure 1 from FM 3-07 identifies a broad range of tasks that are not combat engagements, but are unequivocally nation building in nature. The Army’s recently revised FM 3-0 Operations and FM 3-07 Stability and Support Operations specifically recognizes the Army’s future role in nation building.²⁹

Efforts that focus on infrastructure may include reestablishing or securing—

- **Vital human services:** hospitals, water supplies, waste and hazardous material storage and processing, emergency services (police, fire, rescue).
- **Civil administration:** legislative, judicial, and administrative functions.
- **Communications and information:** television, radio, telephone, Internet, newspapers, magazines, and computer systems.
- **Transportation and distribution:** highways, railways, ports, waterways, pipelines, airports, mass transit and trucking companies.
- **Energy:** production, storage, and distribution of electric power, oil, and natural gas.
- **Commerce:** key industries and other business, banking, and finance.

Figure 1³⁰

International humanitarian law and the Geneva Convention place requirements upon military forces for aspects of nation building. During and immediately after combat operations, the military is responsible for the noncombatants in their area of operations, and in accordance with the Geneva Convention, the military must establish rule of law.³¹ Combat operations can destroy a nation’s infrastructure and ability to provide basic services to the population. Initial concerns range from individual security, to availability of water and shelter. During and immediately after major combat operations, the military

must take the first steps of nation building. The soldiers are expected to convert to peace builders and administer the rule of law in lawless states.³²

Military Capabilities

This section will highlight the unique capabilities the military contributes to nation building. The military possesses personnel, intelligence, logistics, transportation, and maneuver assets that are unmatched. By default, the military will do nation building, as no other organization has the resources available for such a massive undertaking, nor are other organizations prepared to counter violent and armed resistance. No other organization brings the combat power and security that the military can.³³ Nation building is done in politically unstable environments, and violence and weaponry are pervasive in many failed states. In today's security environment, peace operations have the potential to put peacemakers in harms way; seemingly peaceful situations can rapidly escalate into combat. It is imperative that the security forces are well disciplined, professional, and capable of conducting decisive combat operations if necessary.³⁴

The definition in the introduction referred to four major components of nation building: security, governance, humanitarian assistance, and infrastructure/economic reconstruction. The military can contribute to each of these components. Security is the initial critical requirement for nation building, and is most compatible with the military's combat mission. A safe and secure environment is essential to the development of democracy and market economy.³⁵ Infantry units have the skills to patrol, disarm, operate checkpoints, and perform counter-insurgency tactics. Security goes beyond separating the combatants and includes the constabulary role. Military police are trained to use minimum force to maintain law and order within the civilian population. As

soldiers, they can quickly revert to combat operations if the situation warrants. This capability has the tendency to make hostile elements think twice before initiating adverse actions.

In the area of governance, the military's civil affairs (CA) units have become advisors on civil society, and provide parallel government functions until civilian control is established.³⁶ CA personnel come with an awareness of indigenous populace preferences and traditions in governance. CA units train in international law, and with the Staff Judge Advocate Corp, can establish initial justice systems.³⁷

Humanitarian assistance is improved by the military's ability to safeguard, move massive quantities of supplies, distribute food and water, deploy medical teams for treatment and disease prevention, and provide security. CA units enhance the interaction between the population, the local government, and the NGOs. The military's quick reaction capabilities are vital to emergency humanitarian missions. Its capabilities and ability to rapidly deploy on humanitarian intervention will be used to prevent great human suffering.³⁸

Infrastructure and economic assistance are also in the purview of the military. The military engineers repair roads, fix airports, build buildings, and provide power generation. CA has the responsibility to assess the infrastructure and prioritize projects. CA functional specialties of finance, economics, and commerce spur economic development and initiate incentive systems.³⁹

This discussion should not suggest that the military's role is open ended. "The military is the least durable international commitment."⁴⁰ Military intervention tends to be more costly than other interventions.⁴¹ The military is an interim measure, while other

organizations prepare to take over reconstruction. Because of the development of other governmental and non-governmental organizations, the military is no longer the only viable resource for nation building. Unlike the military reconstruction efforts in Germany and Japan, these other entities will be available and pressing to assist in nation building once the situation has been stabilized.

However, the literature identifies a gap in time when the military is the only available resource for nation building.⁴² It is during this gap when the military must act as a nation builder. This gap is often referred to as a “golden moment,” when constructive and decisive steps can influence the populace to be receptive to external assistance. The military cannot squander this opportunity, so it must be prepared, ready, and willing to execute nation building as well as it does combat operations.

After any conflict, the military has the capabilities to provide the security and logistics necessary to transition from combat operations to nation building.⁴³ As the case studies will demonstrate, time and again civilian agencies were slow to respond to requirements in nation building. No other organization is prepared to fill the void in the way the military can. The military has resources and a control structure that enables it to respond to changing needs almost immediately.

The Opposing View

Although the military has been doing nation building for years, many remain skeptical about using the military as a nation-building tool. The stereotype of the military as a blunt instrument, capable only of defeating and destroying an enemy and its infrastructure, is prevalent. Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s National Security Advisor, wrote before the election, “The President must remember that the military is a

special instrument. It is lethal, and it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not designed to build a civilian society.”⁴⁴ Traditionalists, both civilian and military, continue to view operations other than war as inappropriate for true warriors.⁴⁵

The American soldier has repeatedly shown an ability and inclination to assist local civilians as soon as hostilities ceased. The Armed Forces Assistance to Korea program, a military civic action program, capitalized on the generosity of troops.⁴⁶ Soldiers reflect American values, to include compassion for others. As noted by General Schoemaker, US soldiers “have in their hearts a very compassionate spirit, and we see that demonstrated all around the world on playgrounds in Iraq, in hospitals, and orphanages in Afghanistan, and in small villages in Africa. The American soldier is a warrior who offers an extended hand of help and compassion.”⁴⁷ Military training further instills awareness and personal responsibility, including restraint in accordance with the laws of war. This is especially true of urban warfare training, where soldiers must carefully distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Soldiers expect the rules of engagement (ROE) to change based on situation, and it is the responsibility of leadership to repeat and reinforce current ROEs. It denigrates this nation’s best and brightest to say they are only killers, capable only of destruction.

Another concern is the impact on combat readiness when soldiers are committed to nation building. The longer a unit is deployed on such missions, the less likely that unit is prepared for high intensity conflict. It is true units are not available for large-scale conventional training. However, nation building provides the unit with a real world deployment. During these deployments, leaders and soldiers develop and test certain

skills in ways that no training environment can.⁴⁸ It is also true that many tasks performed by platoon, squad, and individual soldiers are common to both conventional warfare and nation building, especially when providing security.⁴⁹

Non-governmental organizations (NGO) sometimes resist the presence of the military during reconstruction or assistance efforts in order to maintain an appearance of impartiality and neutrality. They believe this secures their worker's safety and assures access. Soldiers too can provide impartial and neutral assistance. UNITAF's success in Somalia (1992-93) was a result of soldiers maintaining these ideals. In fact, these are easier operations than those with political overtones.

Unfortunately, impartiality and neutrality has not guaranteed the safety of aid workers, and providing assistance in a region can result in a perception that sides have been chosen. Ibrahim Abu Ouf, Commissioner of Sudan's Relief and Resettlement Commission, remarked, "Relief is not a value-free operation. It does not work in a vacuum."⁵⁰

In traditional peacekeeping environments or smaller humanitarian interventions, it may be possible for NGOs to act independently and impartially, but today, many humanitarian disasters are man-made, the result of failing states, intrastate conflict, and ungovernability. In responding to these types of situations, neutrality and impartiality may be unachievable. Any hint of political involvement compromises neutrality, and political problems are at the heart of these disasters.⁵¹ Given the magnitude and complexity of many of today's crises, NGOs should capitalize on the military's strengths and the military should learn how to make this a more comfortable arrangement for NGOs.⁵²

World opinion desires interventions under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). The UN's strength is that it has the appearance of being a multinational, unbiased organization.⁵³ This strength is also a practical weakness. The UN was never designed to be a primary actor or to "command." It does not have the sovereignty or legitimacy to ask sacrifice of citizens. It is a volunteer organization, which must rely on its member states for resources. In spite of espoused ideals, member states support UN actions based on their own interests. Unity of effort is difficult to achieve. The process of garnering UN commitment and resources is slow.⁵⁴ A structure and charter written to contain state-on-state violence is inadequate and unresponsive, especially within the Security Council. The veto authority of any member on the Security Council has and will continue to hamper decisive UN action.⁵⁵ As the world's only superpower, with the ability to project military force worldwide, the US may be required to act with or without UN approval.

Conclusion

After studying the history of the military, examining its capabilities, and investigating the realities of the world today, one must conclude that nation building is an appropriate role for the military. To reach any other conclusion flies in the face of all evidence, and hamstring the military's ability to conduct nation building well. Doctrine cited above, and the need to provide additional options for policy makers, reinforce this conclusion.⁵⁶ In post-conflict environments, until there is security and other organizations ready to take on nation-building efforts, the military must accept this responsibility and prepare for it accordingly. Military actions taken after the shooting stops should provide the initial framework for the road to democracy, and can contribute

positively to the country's security, essential services, human rights, and the establishment of a representative government.⁵⁷

Notes

¹ Nina Serafino, *Peacekeeping: Issues of US Military Involvement*, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2002), CRS-3, on-line, Internet, 14 October 2003, available from <http://policy.house.gov/assets/def-peacekeepingissues.pdf>.

² James Jay Carafano, "The US Role in Peace Operations: Past, Perspective and Prescriptions for the Future," Heritage Lectures No. 795 (Washington DC: Heritage Foundation), 1 & 3, on-line, Internet, 28 October 2003, available from www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/hl795.cfm.

³ Cdr Sydney Connor and Carl J. Friedrich, *Military Government*, (Philadelphia, PA: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1950), vii.

⁴ Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, "Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building," *Policy Brief*, 24 May 2003, 1; and "Land Forces," *Globalsecurity.org*, September 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 16 December 2003, available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/land.htm>.

⁵ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002), xiv.

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³⁷ LTC Dennis J. Cahill, "What is Civil Affairs?" *Special Warfare*, April 2003, 28.

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⁴⁰ David Last, "Winning the Savage Wars of Peace: What the Manwaring Paradigm Tells Us," in *The Savage Wars of Peace: Toward a New Paradigm of Peace Operations*, ed. John T. Fishel. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 226.

⁴¹ Dennis Gallagher, Michael Mousalli, and David Bosco, *Civilian and Military Means of Providing and Supporting Humanitarian Assistance during Conflict: Comparative Advantages and Costs*, Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, Report No. 1 (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee, 1998), 16, on-line, Internet 2 February 2004, available from <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/3/1886558.pdf>.

⁴² For each of the four categories of nation building tasks identified in this paper (security, humanitarian assistance, governance, and economic/infrastructure reconstruction), there is a corresponding gap identified in the literature. The security gap occurs when a civilian police force is not available to provide law and order after military intervention. This gap includes a lag in establishing a judiciary. Professor Peter Jakobsen of the University of Copenhagen states that this is the most consistent feature of peace operations in the post Cold War era. While the military and others point out that public security is not a job for the military, the military performs this mission because there are no other options. See Peter Jakobsen, "The Role of Military Forces in Managing Public Security Challenges: As Little as Possible or Filling the Gap?" revised draft for International Peace Academy, 17 April 2002, on-line, Internet 22 October 2003, available from <http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/revisISApap.pdf> and LTC Gilbert Nelson, "The US Military Role in Supporting the Rule of Law in Peace Operations and Other Complex Contingencies," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2001). The humanitarian assistance is a more manageable problems because many NGOs are already on the ground providing aid before the military arrives. They are already ameliorating the situation. However, large-scale disasters, or those occurring where security is not yet assured, require the intervention of the military to prevent humanitarian disasters. See Gallagher, 6 and Jeff Crisp, "Mind the gap! UNHCR, humanitarian assistance and the development process," *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, Working Paper No. 43, 24 November 2003, n.p., on-line, Internet,

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<http://www.jha.ac/articles/u043.htm>. Post-conflict, existing governance may have crumbled or become illegitimate. “Unfortunately, the international community’s existing instruments for undertaking activities to enhance governance and citizens’ participation are poorly adapted to the special requirements of postconflict environments.” See Robert Orr, “Governing When Chaos Rules: Enhancing Governance and Participation,” *Washington Quarterly* 25, no.4, Autumn 2002. Col Garland Williams discusses the infrastructure and economic reconstruction as going hand in hand. He points out that civilian agencies take time to get funding, organize and deploy. After intervention, the military does not have the authority to undertake reconstruction, and in any case, looks for a quick exit. This leaves the host nation without help. See Col Garland Williams, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction: On the Critical Path to Long-Term Peace,” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2003) and Crisp, n.p.

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Chapter 3

Recent Military Experience in Nation Building

Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.

George Catlett Marshall

This chapter will review four recent nation-building efforts in which the military played a significant role: Panama (1989), Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994), and Bosnia (1995). As noted in Chapter 2, the military has been involved in nation building for hundreds of years, and all of these operations provide valuable information. However, while history is never obsolete, the lessons learned from recent operations should be more obviously relevant. The case studies in this paper occurred in a strategic context similar to the one the US is currently operating in. Three occurred in failing states, like Afghanistan. Panama was not failing as obviously, but was controlled by an oppressive autocrat who seemed to delight in provoking America, similar to Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Three took place in the developing world. All occurred in the post-Cold War era, when strictures holding back certain actors (including the US) were gone, and vital interests had to be drastically redefined. There are many other similarities between the case studies in this paper and current nation building efforts, and the relevance of lessons learned is stunning.

Panama – Just Cause

Since 1903, America and Panama maintained a relationship that was sometimes accommodating, sometimes contrary, and always convoluted. After internal struggles in the early 1980s, General Manuel Noriega came to power. Tensions increased between the two countries as Noriega manipulated and nullified elections, harassed Panamanian voters, harassed Americans in Panama, profited from drug trafficking, and was indicted on drug charges in US Federal Court. Tensions culminated on 15 December 1989 when the National Assembly of Panama declared war on the US. In the largest military action since the Vietnam War, President George Bush (1989-1993) initiated Operation Just Cause on 19 December 1989. Over 14,000 U.S. troops joined forces with approximately 13,000 soldiers stationed at bases in Panama and quickly defeated any resistance from the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF). Within two weeks, Noriega was captured, and in mid-February deployed combat forces began withdrawing.¹ It is here that the Joint Military Operations Historical Collection ends its record of the Panama invasion.

While the combat operation was deemed a success, the reconstruction efforts were much more disorganized. Operation Blind Logic seemed an appropriate title for this phase of the operation. The realities of the post combat phase made it appear that planning for this phase had been an afterthought, but planning for the reconstruction actually began as early as February 1998.² Unfortunately, problems with the planning process were not evident until the execution of the operation.

Planning was highly compartmentalized. The combat and CA planners did not exchange information, discuss expectations, or coordinate. For example, the warfighting

component identified a need for a law and order function post-combat, but this was never communicated to the CA planners.³ This compartmentalization extended to civilian agencies important to reconstruction. Ostensibly, the reason given for the exclusion of other agencies was the requirement for operational security.⁴

During the planning process, reserve CA officers worked on a volunteer basis. They had special understanding of Panama and its current situation, but rotated out every thirty days. Continuity was difficult to achieve.⁵ Planning efforts ebbed and flowed for several years, just as events on the ground ebbed and flowed. On 18 and 19 December, when it became apparent that the operation would be launched, planners increased their efforts. Operating in crisis mode, planners quickly revised and completed the reconstruction plan. Ultimately, there was not enough time to get the plan approved by General Maxwell Thurman, Commander in Chief (CINC).⁶

The combat plan received much more attention, especially since XVIII Airborne Corps saw its role only in terms of “breaking things.”⁷ Nation building “was just not considered the job of the military.”⁸ Someone else could restore order out of the chaos. The CINC admitted that not enough time was spent on the reconstruction planning and General Carl Stiner, XVIII Airborne Corps commander, acknowledged that inadequate thought had been given to the reconstruction strategy.⁹ Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs until just before the invasion, could not remember any discussion about reconstruction.¹⁰

The context of the reconstruction was not understood or correctively evaluated. It was believed that any military involvement would be very brief, with the US Embassy assuming control in as little as 30 days. A realistic assessment of the effect of military

rule on political, cultural, economic and societal factors would have revealed the impossibility of this. This reconstruction was going to be complex, requiring significant joint political-military cooperation. A brief effort on the part of CA units would not return Panama to normalcy. Not only was the context misunderstood, but it was also unclear what the rebuilding should achieve and include. Discussions of strategic considerations were deferred, and critical concerns, such as what kind of democracy was realistic, what would replace the PDF, and how long rebuilding could be expected to take, remained unanswered.¹¹

The day the invasion was launched, severe civil problems became apparent immediately, beginning with massive looting and a breakdown of law and order. The PDF, which also served as the police force, collapsed. There were not enough US military police to restore order, to process and detain enemy prisoners of war, and deal with displaced personnel.¹² The remaining government bureaucracy proved just as unreliable and corrupt as the PDF. The civil structure buckled, and government workers participated in the looting. Panama was bankrupt, and its infrastructure was crumbling.¹³ Although the US quickly installed the three elected officials whose elections Noriega had nullified, it quickly became clear that “three people do not a government make,” even if they are a president and 2 vice-presidents.¹⁴

There were only 15 CA personnel in country at the onset of the invasion.¹⁵ Problems delayed mobilization of more CA, and once mobilized, their transportation into theater remained a low priority.¹⁶ The first team arrived 26 December, with 114 additional personnel arriving on January 1.¹⁷ A request for activation of CA reserves was denied for reasons that are unclear, but were probably political. This CA shortage hamstrung the

reconstruction. In addition, the chain of command for CA functions remained confused during the operation.¹⁸

In spite of these difficulties, the Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) initially got good results. CMOTF used planning as a guide and improvised where the plan was inadequate. By mid-January, the government and essential services were functioning essentially as anticipated. However, CMOTF proved unable to deal with the breakdown in law and order, and another ad hoc organization was developed to oversee restoration of public security and the judiciary. Post conflict planning had failed to anticipate many events, provide flexible responses, and provide necessary coordination.¹⁹

The chaos on the ground confirmed that the newly installed Government of Panama (GOP) would need continuing assistance. The Military Support Group (MSG) was established. One more ad hoc organization, the MSG would subsume and control organizations currently operating in the Panamanian reconstruction: public force liaison, CA, military police (MP), psychological operations (PSYOPS), and Special Forces (SF).²⁰ Col. James Steele, a Latin American specialist and Spanish speaker with a forceful character and can-do attitude, was given command. Col. Steele unintentionally created a shortage of personnel in his attempt to make the MSG a joint operation. He did not take all the personnel the Army offered him, and other service branches failed to fill the shortage. The failure to activate the reserves forced the CA into short rotations that disrupted continuity and unit cohesion, and exacerbated personnel shortages.²¹ Throughout the reconstruction, the MSG insisted on the involvement of the GOP and Panamanian people as much as possible.²²

The MSG's broad mandate was to "conduct nation building operations to ensure that democracy, internationally recognized standards of justice, and professional public services are established and institutionalized in Panama."²³ The MSG attempted to align its approach with the Bush administration policy for Latin America, and the stated purposes of the invasion: encouraging stable democratic government and transforming the PDF into a subordinate and professional civil force.²⁴

Both the MSG commander, Col. Steele, and the US Ambassador, Deane Hinton, believed an embassy country team would have been a more appropriate organization for this type of mission.²⁵ If a country team had been operating, the military would have been one part of the team. However, the "embassy was not functional," and unlike the Department of Defense, the Department of State did not have a ready pool of manpower to draw on. It would have been a slow process to gather volunteers for the country teams. The Ambassador hoped to have the military relinquish its lead role as soon as possible. He believed it inconsistent to have the military directing nation building, but there was little choice.²⁶

As in all nation-building operations, security must be a priority so that other reforms can take root. Early in the reconstruction, the GOP, that is President Endara and Vice Presidents Calderon and Ford, disbanded the PDF. It had been corrupt through and through. In its place they established a police force. Training of the force presented difficulties. It is illegal under US law for the military to train civil police, and many believe it is not a job for the military; police should train other police. In the post conflict environment however, regulations had to be relaxed to provide law enforcement and a

Panamanian presence on the street. The Army did not seem to have qualms, and began a training program.

In February of 1990, the US Justice Department stepped in with help in the form of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). ICITAP provided money and personnel for training and equipping a force over five years. However, ICITAP had never attempted a program of such magnitude, and did not have answers for the short term. In order to provide enough manpower until the Panamanian force had built up, MPs, SF, and reservists accompanied the Panamanian police on joint patrols.²⁷ Eight months into ICITAP's program, it was clear the new officers, all of whom came from the PDF, were not taking their training to heart. Toward the end of MSG mandate, the police force attempted a coup that had to be put down by the MSG. This caused a delay in the planned withdrawal of the MSG.

The MSG included democratization in their statement of purpose. During their yearlong mandate, efforts were to be made to "consolidate democracy." The people were to be taught democratic practices from the top down and the bottom up. Aside from a few sketchy ideas, there were few other specifics for establishing democracy.²⁸ To expect an ad hoc agency at the last minute to develop a comprehensive democratization plan was too much. Democratization, a complex and difficult problem, deeply dependent on the circumstances and requiring substantial resources, confounds even experts.

MSG assigned CA personnel to each of the GOP ministries to assist with the rebuilding. MSG encouraged GOP to select projects and then coordinate them with the local level. This developed links between the central and local government that had been nonexistent, and cultivated the perception that the new government was the source of new

development. Reconstruction efforts were limited, and not part of a larger rebuilding plan. Priority was given to essential infrastructure, such as schools, health clinics, public transportation. In spite of understaffing, engineers and medical units made significant contributions.²⁹ Engineers continue to conduct yearly exercises.³⁰ Help for reconstruction that was supposed to come from USAID did not arrive until after 1990. Like many other civilian agencies, USAID was unprepared. Again, their lack of preparation was partially a result of being kept out of the planning process by the military. The massive infusion of economic aid did not arrive in the amount President Bush promised. Funds were eventually cut back, as public interest died away.³¹

The commander and chief of staff of the MSG developed a unique and somewhat uncomfortable relationship with the GOP. The leadership discussed a multitude of things with the MSG commanders, to include their roles. Advice was provided. MSG had all the assets and the GOP none, including resources for security. Commanders of the MSG were aggressive and selected for their can-do attitude, which the leadership of the GOP came to rely on. While Col. Steel, Ambassador Hinton, and the Panamanian leadership did not seem uncomfortable with this relationship, it may have sent the wrong signal to a people whose perceptions and expectations of the military were very different from our own.³²

The MSG was deactivated on January 17, 1991. Military operations wound down as civilian and GOP organizations began to operate more fully. Some government and police corruption continues. The judicial system remains complex and beset by problems. The United States continues to provide aid, primarily for the maintenance of the Panama Canal and democratization. Still, there seems to be reason to be optimistic

about the long-term success of nation building in Panama. The vast majority of the population receives adequate education and is literate. The 1994 and 1999 elections were monitored and considered successful, and multiple parties operate in the political system. In the slow process of nation building, the basic framework is present, but the painstaking task of building a stable democracy is still in its infancy.³³

Somalia – Operation Restore Hope (UNITAF) and Operation Sustain Hope (UNOSOM II)

In the 1960s, after being granted independence by Italy and Britain, Somalia established a fledgling democracy. Nine years later, General Mohamed Siad Barre took over the Somali Republic in a military coup. He ruled for twenty years, propped up by both the United States and the Soviet Union at different times, as the two superpowers vied for influence in the region. Both powers lost interest and abandoned the country at the end of the Cold War. Without outside economic support, Somalia erupted into civil war, and Barre fled Mogadishu in 1991, after popular riots and clan violence forced a central government collapse.

The civil war escalated and food supplies were disrupted as the clans raided each other's food storehouses. Drought exacerbated the food shortage. It was feared that over 300,000 people could die. Various NGOs and a formal UN mission (UNOSOM I) attempted to alleviate the suffering, but their efforts to distribute aid failed. Warlords and clans continued to hijack food stores and demand protection money. UNOSOM I, a traditional peacekeeping operation, was doomed to failure. There was no peace for the small UN force to keep. Pakistani forces attempted to bring order to the chaotic situation and provide security, but were authorized to use force in self-defense only. Even the U.S.

made a limited attempt to help by airlifting food to remote regions of the country. Gangs and factional fighting continued to hamper distribution. The suffering persisted and media coverage resulted in calls to "do something." This has since been referred to as the "CNN syndrome." It was clear that a significant ground force would be needed in order to bring security to Somalia.³⁴

As the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Command (CENTCOM) became aware that they might be asked to assist in Somalia, they began planning in accordance with the Joint Operations Crisis Action Plan.³⁵ Outgoing President Bush ordered forces to deploy to Somalia to provide security for humanitarian relief supplies and their distribution. President Bush insisted that this order be interpreted in the narrowest sense, and not include any possibility for nation building.

Operation Restore Hope, conducted by a multinational task force (United Task Force or UNITAF) began on 8 December 1992. UN endorsed and US led, forces eventually numbering over 38,000 were assembled from a coalition of the willing. For the first time since Goldwater-Nichols, a Marine headquarters staffed a Joint Task Force (JTF).³⁶ On the military side, UNITAF had unity of effort and unity of command.

Special Envoy Robert Oakley provided essential diplomatic help and coordination. He provided the link between the US, the UN, and local factions, negotiating where necessary and providing excellent diplomatic support.³⁷ He contributed to forging a coherent civil-military strategy, characteristic of a counterinsurgency.³⁸

Diplomatic efforts allowed the Marines to land without initial resistance, and with the help of Special Envoy Oakley, the warlords essentially cooperated with the US.³⁹ There were occasional firefights, but after the Marines responded vigorously, the Somalis

complied with UNITAF directives.⁴⁰ These directives were the four “nos:” no banditry, no “technicals,” no roadblocks and no visible weapons.⁴¹ There was no directive to disarm or attack the warlords or their clans, so the operation remained essentially neutral.⁴²

The strong, long standing presence of NGOs on the ground would require assiduous civil-military cooperation. Coordination was critical because the relief supplies were controlled by the NGOs.⁴³ Extensive CA and PSYOPS missions began as the mission progressed, with the establishment of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in each of the nine Humanitarian Response Sectors (HRS). The CMOC was based on a model that had worked well in Operation Provide Comfort, and provided a place where CA personnel could provide coordination between the military and NGOs.⁴⁴ In some sectors, CMOC and NGO headquarters were not collocated, which led to misunderstandings.⁴⁵ Unfortunately, there were insufficient numbers of civil affairs personnel and some of the CMOCs were inadequately staffed. The US military had requested a call up of CA reserves, but the new Clinton administration asked that the request be “reconsidered.”⁴⁶ Thus, it was difficult to establish unity of effort, and as the CMOC was not a command and control headquarters, unity of command was a problem.⁴⁷ Cooperation between NGOs and the military was described as only “good enough,”⁴⁸ In contrast, coordination had been much better during Operation Provide Comfort.⁴⁹

In spite of some difficulties, the operation generally went well. The first two phases of the operation were planned for 50 days, but were completed in 19. During the third phase, control of airfields and roads was consolidated in two months, and the relief and

security net was established. Food relief was extended throughout the country.⁵⁰ Death from famine disappeared, and the banditry and warring were confined to areas outside UNITAF control. Ambassador Oakley noted that Mogadishu was calm and weapons were not seen on the street.⁵¹

In addition to food aid, the military organizations initiated other assistance as well. The UN, CENTCOM, or the Department of State did not endorse these projects, fearing they might be accused of stepping outside the mission's mandate and encouraging mission creep. In spite of this lack of support, Army engineers and Seabees constructed nine airfields, 15 helipads, 14 wells, built base camps, repaired schools, medical clinics and bridges, and improved 2,500 kilometers of road. The infrastructure was improved to the degree that aid workers had access throughout the country. Streets were cleared, water supplies restored, and the police force began to be reestablished. Medical assessments of various villages were coordinated and feeding centers established in Mogadishu. Schools and markets reopened, and crops were planted.⁵²

Had UNITAF remained a little longer, normalcy might have gained a stronger foothold, but the US was anxious to withdraw.⁵³ After Vietnam, any mission longer than six months began to take on the appearance of a quagmire to the military. This attitude has been typical of US military efforts during the post-Cold War. The mission was handed over to the UN on 4 May 1993, with only 30-50 percent of total forces in place.⁵⁴ UNOSOM II was already off to a bad start.

After the inauguration of President Bill Clinton, the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali approached the new administration about expanding the mandate. President Clinton agreed, and the mandate of UNOSOM II was expanded to include

extensive nation building efforts. 25,000 multinational soldiers arrived to take the place of American soldiers. The US left behind 1,300 combat troops and 3,000 logistics and intelligence soldiers.⁵⁵ An unwieldy and complex command and control structure was complicated further when US forces did not use the chain of command as intended.⁵⁶

Based on agreements in Addis Ababa signed by over 190 representatives from Somalia, including Aideed's clan, UNOSOM II began disarmament. Aideed's faction did not comply.⁵⁷ Violent episodes between UN forces and the warlords began increasing. Warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed's forces demonstrated an increasing willingness to engage the UNOSOM II forces. In June, Aideed's forces killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. The UN Security Council passed a resolution seeking the arrest and punishment of those involved.⁵⁸

American forces joined the hunt for Aideed. A joint special operations task force was dispatched to assist forces already on the ground, and more aggressive tactics were employed.⁵⁹ These tactics, and a propaganda campaign by Aideed, turned many Somali citizens against the UNOSOM II forces. In the beginning, foreign forces had been assisting Somalis, but now were conducting military operations against a warlord and his clan. The broader mandate had cost the UN its impartiality and increased civilian casualties.⁶⁰ Raids continued, and on 3 October 1993, 18 US soldiers were killed, precipitating the withdrawal of US forces and a repudiation of the nation-building mandate.⁶¹ Five months later, all American forces were withdrawn and Somalia reverted to pre-intervention chaos. The UN proved itself incapable of managing such an extensive and complex military mission.⁶²

Haiti – Operation Uphold Democracy

Haiti obtained its independence from France in 1804. Since that time, Haiti has had a turbulent history, characterized by significant political upheaval, sometimes lapsing into chaos. This history included a US military intervention from 1915-1934 and a ruthless, brutal dictatorship from 1934-1989.

It seemed in 1990 that the country and its leaders had finally tired of the turmoil and might begin working toward a lasting democracy. Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected Haiti's president by a clear majority, but was ousted and exiled less than eight months later by a military coup led by General Raoul Cedras. Sanctions and intense diplomatic pressure were used in an attempt to force the military junta to restore the elected government.⁶³ The deaths of 18 servicemen in Somalia made the US government timid and emboldened the military government of Haiti, which defied international pressure.⁶⁴ Haitians refugees, fleeing the oppression and misery, began arriving in the United States in ever increasing numbers.⁶⁵

Planning for a military contingency began in earnest in October 1993. Civil military planning began around the same time. Initially, the best guidance received about the political-military objective seemed to be the name of the operation, Uphold Democracy.⁶⁶ Eventually, UN Security Council Resolution 940 provided more specific guidance. A multinational force (MNF) was to restore the legitimately elected government of Haiti and provide a secure environment for the transfer of the operation to the UN. Still, the US policy was inconsistent and therefore confusing for planners.⁶⁷ Planners forged ahead and listed key events to meet the resolution's objectives: establish control of Haitian territory, return the deposed President and his government, and establish and train an

interim security force.⁶⁸ These objectives were much narrower than in Panama or Somalia during UNOSOM II.⁶⁹

In spite of limited objectives, CA planners correctly believed the civil administration in Haiti would require help to operate. Joint Task Force commanders tried to ignore the need for nation building by evoking Somalia and the buzzwords “mission creep.” However, combat planners did include annexes for Civil Affairs and PSYOPs. Planners made an effort to anticipate every possible complication, and in fact envisioned more resistance than actually materialized.⁷⁰

In May, a second, less-classified plan was developed, based on the assumption that a forced entry might not be necessary. This plan was primarily humanitarian in nature, and addressed actions and issues that might occur after the military landing. The stepped-down classification allowed greater interagency coordination, and virtually all branches of the government contributed in some way to this plan.⁷¹ This integrated planning was also an attempt to minimize military involvement in nation building, something the military was trying to avoid.⁷² To facilitate interagency coordination, the military hosted several meetings in June and July, with a range of government organizations involved. ICITAP, which would again train Haitian police, was included, as was the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).⁷³ DOD and USAID developed a thorough “Interagency Checklist for Restoration of Essential Services.” Responsibility for the various tasks was divided between DOD and USAID, with DOD handling security and military related functions.⁷⁴

When the flood of refugees from Haiti threatened to become overwhelming, the American government acted. A massive combat force assembled for an invasion of Haiti, but a last minute peace mission brokered by former President Jimmy Carter, Colin Powell, and Sam Nunn allowed the MNF to land unopposed on 19 September 1994. The landing took place with the consent of General Cedras, the military dictator, who continued an odd collaboration with the MNF, until his departure on 10 October. President Aristide returned to Haiti on 15 October.⁷⁵

The 10th Mountain Division quickly accomplished its preliminary tasks, securing ports, airports, roads, and major cities. Eventually, multinational forces arrived to round out the force structure. CA, PSYOPs, medical, engineer, military police, and other armored forces arrived soon afterward.⁷⁶ CA began assessments of the power, water, waste, and fire-fighting systems.⁷⁷ CMOCs were established to coordinate NGO activities. Civil-military cooperation, while not perfect, was significantly better than in previous operations.⁷⁸ With the assistance of Army engineers, electricity and clean drinking water were restored. The engineers delivered food and medical supplies, and restarted efforts to clean up mountains of garbage that had built up.⁷⁹ Off-duty soldiers devoted time to repairing schools and providing supplies for children.⁸⁰

In spite of advanced planning, civilian agencies were slow to develop and respond. The MNF roles expanded beyond what had been planned, although massive reconstruction and assistance was to be avoided to ensure that the military stayed out of “nation building” and expectations of the populace didn’t grow too much.⁸¹ Military lawyers had to find ways to work around the restrictions of Title 10, US code.⁸² Title 10 limited humanitarian assistance to mission essential elements, or those required for

emergency humanitarian reasons, such as water purification or medical treatment. The infrastructure was too damaged to ignore and soldiers of all branches commenced other reconstruction projects as operational necessities.⁸³ By October 1995, 332 infrastructure projects had been completed and 375 more waited finishing.⁸⁴ As missions increased, the chronic shortage of engineers, MI, and CA personnel reappeared. Although CA reserves had been activated, rotations still hampered their efforts somewhat.⁸⁵ Doctrine too, was in short supply.⁸⁶

Security and rule of law had to be provided by the MNF. The MNF did not want this constabulary role, but there was little choice.⁸⁷ Expanded security roles included operating detention facilities and developing new crowd control techniques, and providing protection for President Aristide, which the Department of Justice could not do.

There was no civilian police force in Haiti. Policing was the job of the Haitian Army, and they had done it badly. President Aristide dismissed the military. The US military relied heavily on UN Civilian Police (CIV POL) to train former members of the military for the interim police force. Contingents of police from several other countries eventually augmented the interim force. Within two months of the landing, the interim police force was patrolling alongside the US military. 15,000 weapons were collected through a weapons-buy-back program and confiscation of caches.⁸⁸ Overly restrictive ROEs caused some initial problems, but these rules were amended.⁸⁹

CA and PSYOPS personnel were tasked to form government institutions at the local level. They also formed assistance teams and worked for the governmental ministries.⁹⁰ The scope of CA missions broadened and the number of missions increased.

Another important humanitarian issue was the repatriation of the thousands of migrants who had tried to escape desolate lives. The MNF established the environment whereby 16,000 individuals were repatriated. In addition, each day several hundred new migrants were returned to their homes and villages.⁹¹

The economy had suffered under military rule and the imposition of sanctions. Many countries acted quickly to pledge money to assist Haiti. The UN sanctions and multinational character of the operation prompted much of this support. The military had no plan to attempt to intervene in the economy in any lasting way, yet it was unclear if non-DOD agencies were prepared to act.⁹²

Within six months, the MNF met its limited objectives, and most analyses state that it scrupulously avoided nation building. However, by the definition in this paper, it was involved in all of the aspects of nation building, to include assisting the government. Involvement was limited and short term to be sure, but much of it did appear to constitute nation building.

In March 1995, responsibility was transferred to the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). UNMIH, US led with a US troop majority, had a mandate to sustain security, professionalize the security forces, and allow free and fair elections to take place.⁹³ As in the case of Somalia, the US defined “security” differently than the UN. The MNF staff managed this discrepancy skillfully, and efforts were made to resolve this difference of opinion. The transition was managed carefully, unlike Somalia where the transfer between UNITAF and UNOSOM II was hasty and awkward.⁹⁴

Haitian security forces lacked confidence and did not always intervene when they should have. CIVPOL forces were unsure of their role as peacekeepers. Some of the

new forces committed human rights abuses and were convicted of drug offenses. At times, military forces intervened to maintain order. The Haitian judiciary, based on and working with inadequate laws, did not improve the poor security situation.⁹⁵ In spite of these problems, the Haitian National Police became one of the more competent components of the Haitian bureaucracy.⁹⁶

Elections were held in December 1994. Turnout was small, but there were few problems. The new president, René Preval, received strong support from those who voted and took office in February 1995. One of his first acts was to ask UNMIH to stay beyond its planned withdrawal date. In June 1996, UNMIH completed its mission, ending US troop involvement.⁹⁷

It is generally agreed that the US military did an excellent job, but the situation has worsened in spite of continuing UN and US aid. “Without long-term military involvement, most US policy goals have been frustrated.”⁹⁸ The economy, judicial system, and political leadership have proven dysfunctional and resistant to modification, and improvements have been vanished. In recent months, anti-government protestors have poured onto the streets by the thousands, and 50 have been killed by police.⁹⁹ Haiti looks much like it did before US intervention.¹⁰⁰

Bosnia – Operation Joint Endeavor

The breakup of Yugoslavia is an archetype of the intrastate conflict that creates strategic instability, and has led to an increasing emphasis on nation building. From 1945-1980, President Josip Broz Tito maintained control in an ethnically diverse Yugoslavia by ensuring that all groups participated in government. The country was made up of six republics. The fragile equilibrium he achieved began to disintegrate after

his death in 1980, and was further affected by the demise of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe later that decade. The economic crisis that accompanied this demise allowed nationalist forces to run rampant. These forces were difficult to rein in, especially when a leader like Serbia's President, Slobodan Milosevic, exploited them. Milosevic fanned the flames of an aggressive Serbian nationalism to further his personal desire for power, in what he hoped would be a Serbian dominated Yugoslav republic.¹⁰¹

In response to hostile words and diplomacy, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared their independence in 1991. This declaration was followed by civil war, as Serbia moved against Croatia and Bosnia to keep them in the republic. The situation in Bosnia was particularly intricate. Ethnic rivalry among Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims), Croats, and Serbs, and a cultural and economic divide between city dwellers and those in the country, made the war especially difficult. Warring factions aligned and realigned, as their interests shifted.¹⁰²

By 1992, the Serbians occupied 70% of Bosnia. As they advanced, Serbians eliminated Croats and Muslims in their "ethnic cleansing" strategy. 200,000 were dead or missing. Eventually the war in Bosnia caused the displacement of 2.8 million people. The media cataloged mounting atrocities, camps that evoked memories of WWII Germany, and the plight of 2.8 million displaced persons. By 1995, the war had stalemated.¹⁰³

The UN encouraged the European Community to take the lead in ending the conflict, but they could not muster coherent leadership. The UN launched UNPROFOR as a traditional peacekeeping operation. Continued violence forced the Security Council to

expand the mandate of UNPROFOR, but peacekeeping forces were not beefed up for the more robust missions.¹⁰⁴

After years of inaction, the US was energized after the massacre at Srebrenica and the shelling of a Sarajevo marketplace. Western militaries trained the Croats. NATO attacked Serbian positions with airpower, while the Croats and Bosnians in August of 1995 launched a combined offensive. The hostile parties agreed to mediation in Dayton, Ohio in November of 1995.¹⁰⁵

Richard Holbrooke, chief US negotiator, brokered an ambitious agreement, the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) at Dayton, one that intended to build the peace, not just stop the fighting. Holbrook wanted the military to take on political and humanitarian tasks, but military leaders negotiated actively to limit their role as much as possible. Two issues in particular were contentious. The military did not want to take on any police functions and it wanted absolute clarity in its relationship with the civilian implementation authority. Both issues were decided the way the military wished. UN authorized and NATO led, Implementation Force (IFOR) would not take on policing responsibilities, and the UN High Representative would have no authority over IFOR. IFOR's narrow "military only" mandate included terminating hostilities, safeguarding the force, and providing lasting security and arms control. The final agreement allowed "IFOR unlimited authority to accomplish limited responsibilities" and an exit date of one year later, guaranteed by President Bill Clinton.¹⁰⁶

Through December 1995 and January 1996, 60,000 NATO troops that made up IFOR entered Bosnia. The country was divided into three regions, each controlled by an individual NATO nation. The US military had segregated its planning for Operation

Joint Endeavor from virtually all other agencies involved, leading inevitably to problems in implementation. Even the NATO and US encountered implementation problems because of a lack of coordination. The resultant lack of clarity and unity of effort was no surprise. Improvised responses to segregated planning occurred in command and control, mission limits, logistics and personnel procedures, rules of engagement, and status of forces.¹⁰⁷ CA arrived late due to mobilization issues, and progress was bogged down initially.¹⁰⁸ While civil involvement was strictly limited, CA components were still important in developing understanding of and building consensus for Dayton.¹⁰⁹ Frontlines in the war had become static and so it was relatively easy for IFOR to separate belligerents. In spite of initial problems, IFOR completed its mission before the year was over.¹¹⁰

In contrast to the military mission, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was given charge over the following: repatriation of refugees, holding elections, monitoring human rights, demobilizing armies, facilitating dialogue between warring factions, overseeing the UN civilian International Police Task Force (IPTF), and reporting progress to the UN and governments concerned. To accomplish these tasks, OHR coordinated the activities of the following agencies: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY).¹¹¹ The list of organizations participating gave the impression that resources available to OHR were significant. However, unlike the military, these organizations had no standing pool of manpower from which they could create a staff and workers. Recruiting and organizing was slow and tedious. The OHR was given no

funding and begged money from the European Union (EU). OHR had authority but no resources.¹¹²

The 1,700 members of UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) also encountered start-up difficulties. The first and only large international police force had deployed in Haiti, and many of the same problems were encountered in Bosnia. Language differences and a lack of doctrine hampered their efforts. Additionally, their mandate was only to advise, monitor, and train Bosnian police. They had no authority to investigate or arrest, and carried no arms. There was no legitimate policing going on for months. Filling this void were ethnic police forces that cared little for protecting minorities or repatriating refugees.¹¹³ IPTF had no authority and no resources.¹¹⁴

With civilian organizations slow to coalesce, pressure began to build on the military to undertake tasks not in their mandate. Initially, the military adamantly refused to accept work that could be construed as mission creep. Admiral Leighton Smith, IFOR Commander said, "We've been through this in Vietnam and you can see the connection - we can't let that happen in Bosnia, we can't let ourselves get involved in something that we know is not going to come out right because we're not trained to do it."¹¹⁵ For two years no war criminals were arrested because the civilian side had not developed the capability and the military refused to take on the responsibility. IFOR would not protect mass graves, and OHR could not.¹¹⁶ Ivo Daalder, a staffer with President Clinton's National Security Council, said it became clear that the military, "as the most capable instrument inside Bosnia, will probably have to do more."¹¹⁷

While restraint still guided involvement so that overt dependence did not develop, the civil-military operation would become wide-ranging.¹¹⁸ Assistance was given where

the military was uniquely qualified to help and where military objectives were furthered. CA negotiated and influenced relationships between the military, civilians, NGOs, and IOs. CA soldiers linked equipment, personnel, and funds to tasks, and augmented staff at OHR, OSCE, IMF, World Bank, and IPTF. Voter registration programs were developed and work devoted to ensuring free and fair elections. Engineers established TV and radio broadcasting. Plans and policies for police forces were established in accordance with international standards.¹¹⁹

As the yearlong operation of IFOR drew to a close, it became patently clear that IFOR could not withdraw. The political transformation required to prevent a return to violence had barely begun. The military endstate, insisted on by military leaders, had been insufficient to resolve underlying issues. Military leader faced the fact that if they ever hoped to withdraw, a political goal would have to define the endstate. After his re-election in November 1996, President Clinton announced that US soldiers would remain in Bosnia until 1998.¹²⁰

In 1996, IFOR was replaced by SFOR, with reduced force strength of 33,000. SFOR's peacebuilding mandate included promoting reconstruction and reconciliation. The "GFAP Gap," that is, the inability of civil agencies to meet their GFAP tasks, resulted in continued support to civil organizations.¹²¹ Public assistance projects included restoring essential services, economic assistance, and use of the military to implement features of Dayton. After intense debate in the US Congress, SFOR began apprehending war criminals.

Force structure shortfalls were highlighted during this period. Difficulties in Reserve Component recall were experienced as the leadership tried to fill the increased

need for engineers, MPs, and CAs. Inadequate numbers of MPs saw their duties increase as SFOR continued. In 1996, the IPTF was finally granted policing powers. Engineer branch coped with problems of command and control, construction unit allocations, and bridging while laboring under an immense workload. Shortages of personnel and inadequate doctrine for peace operations hindered military intelligence (MI), as did a lack of linguists.¹²² However, with its ability to improvise and retool, the US military has been given high marks for its performance.

While the violence has stopped, SFOR mandates continue to be extended because the peace is brittle. The UN continues to publish resolutions in an attempt to address the various problems. To this end, the power of the OHR has gradually increased, and is now virtually unrestricted. In May 2000, the international community finally brought a rational approach to the process of nation building in Bosnia.¹²³

Because of conceptual inadequacies, the Dayton Accords created a very weak state.¹²⁴ The economy remains feeble as it tries to rebuild a country and establish an open market.¹²⁵ Police reform is slow. Very few of the refugees have returned to their original homes and separation of the warring parties has created ethnic separation, something that was deemed undesirable.¹²⁶ As early as the 1996, hard-line nationalists were being elected to the government, and in December 2003, the extremist parties were the big winners. War crimes suspects, including Milosevic, headed three of these parties. Pro-democracy parties, with 42% of the seats, have significant divisions and may not be able to form a government.¹²⁷ It is not difficult to believe that if SFOR leaves, the violence will begin anew.¹²⁸

Conclusion

The case studies demonstrate that the military performed its tasks well, even those additional tasks that could be called mission creep. In spite of this, none of the interventions achieved the political goals for which they were initiated. The military appears to have failed in its missions when long-term goals are not obtained. Progress in these countries ranges from tenuous in Panama, to a return to chaos in Somalia. The overriding issue in each case study has been the lack of a clearly defined political end state. In Panama, democracy was left largely undefined. Even as Somalia drifted from a humanitarian to a nation building operation, a plan for democratization was never clear. In Haiti, restoring Aristide to the presidency was not bolstered by any national strategy beyond this simple goal.¹²⁹

In addition, the policy makers have not galvanized the will of the nation to provide the correct resources and time to obtain the long-term goals. As in Somalia, when resources are inadequate for mission accomplishment, disaster strikes. The extraction of military forces and capitulation to the warlords in Somalia demonstrated a lack of will and severely damaged US credibility. Casualty aversion and premature redeployment dates have hampered the military's ability to properly execute the mission. In Somalia, the rapid extraction of the military due to the casualties brought that mission to an unsuccessful close. The established dates for withdrawal from Haiti resulted in the military's departure before the institutions could be reinforced enough to survive. The expected funding for Panama's reconstruction quickly evaporated along with America's level of interest.

While performing generally well, the military did experience recurrent and persistent problems. There was limited planning for stabilization and support operations. The impact of fuzzy political goals made it difficult to develop a supporting plan. As noted in Panama and Haiti case studies, combatant commanders remained focused on the initial phases of military operations, virtually ignoring the reconstruction phase. In Somalia and the IFOR Bosnia mission, military commanders pushed for a very limited mandate that excluded nation building. Other than Haiti, there was minimal interagency coordination. The military's tendency to keep the plan close-hold and not involve external organizations adversely impacted the operation. Policy makers did not correctly anticipate what the situation would be after the initial military objectives were met. In both Panama and Haiti, the breakdown of governance and the level of corruption were not anticipated.

Doctrine and training was based on the cold-war model that did not address the post-conflict tasks. Operations in Panama, Somalia and Haiti were undertaken with minimal doctrine in the area of peace operations and nation building.¹³⁰ Commanders, such as Generals Shinseki and Nash, found themselves in Bosnia without a comprehensive doctrine for nation building. Both officers articulated the fact that they had trained as warfighters for thirty years and were now engaged in peace operations for which they had no guide or training.¹³¹ Still, military commanders adjusted their unit training and tactics based on the mission at hand once they were on the ground. The military's initiative, flexibility, and adaptability allowed for operational success.

Again, the cold-war model was the force structure the military used in these operations. This force structure is dominated by combat arms units on active duty with

the bulk of supporting elements, such as CA and MP, in the Reserve Component. Therefore, there were limitations in the quantity and types of units available for these operations. Combat arms units are not as vital to nation building during post-conflict as are combat support and service support units. Aside from the controversy about whether or not soldiers should do policing, there were never enough military police to provide the law and order. The decisions not call up the Reserve CA units limited the military effectiveness in Panama and Somalia.

The military-civil relationship in each of these case studies was uncomfortable and awkward. Coordinating mechanisms were inefficient or non-existent. In Panama and Somalia, insufficient numbers of CA personnel prevented effective coordination. In Haiti, pre-deployment training and the secondary plan alleviated some of these difficulties, but there were still cultural clashes between the military and civilian agencies. The military did attempt to capture lesson learned from Panama and Somalia, and subsequent operations attempted to improve interagency coordination.

Underlying all these problems seems to be an inability to openly accept the role as nation builder. The cold war focus and Vietnam experience produced a culture that was unwilling to look beyond decisive combat operations, seemingly unwilling to learn and challenge old knowledge. This is still a culture prone to say, “We can’t do that,” rather than, “Let’s find out how to do it.”

Notes

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- ³ Ibid., 55.
- ⁴ Richard H. Shultz, Jr., "The Post-Conflict Use of Military Forces: Lessons from Panama, 1989-91," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 16, no. 2 (June 1993), 149.
- ⁵ Schultz, "Post Conflict Use," 151.
- ⁶ Fishel, 61.
- ⁷ Fishel, 55.
- ⁸ Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 43.
- ⁹ Richard H. Schultz, *In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation Building in Panama following Just Cause* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1993), 16 and Shultz, *Post Conflict Use*, 151.
- ¹⁰ von Hippel, 43.
- ¹¹ Schultz, *Aftermath of War*, 18.
- ¹² Conrad C. Crane, *Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller Scale Contingencies During the 1990s*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 4.
- ¹³ Schultz, *Aftermath of War*, xi.
- ¹⁴ Fishel, 68.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., 65.
- ¹⁶ Schultz, "Post Conflict Use," 155.
- ¹⁷ Fishel, 68-69.
- ¹⁸ von Hippel, 44.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., 73 & 79.
- ²⁰ von Hippel, 39.
- ²¹ Schultz, *Aftermath of War*,
- ²² Ibid., 33 & 40.
- ²³ Ibid., 33.
- ²⁴ Ibid., 33 & 40.
- ²⁵ Country Team: The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001, 130.
- ²⁶ Schultz, *Aftermath of War*, 40 & 46.
- ²⁷ Ibid., 24.
- ²⁸ Fishel, 84.
- ²⁹ Crane, 5.
- ³⁰ Schultz, "Post Conflict Use," 162.
- ³¹ Von Hippel, 45.
- ³² Schultz, "Post Conflict Use," 164 & 165.
- ³³ Information in the Panama section was compiled from Ronald Cole, *Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama*, (Washington,

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DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995); Fishel, 19-121; Haass, 107-108; von Hippel, 27-55, and Schultz, *Aftermath of War*.

³⁴ Chris Klep and Donna Winslow, "Learning Lessons the Hard Way – Somalia and Srebrenica Compared," in *Peace Operations Between War and Peace*, ed. Erwin A. Schmidl. (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 95.

³⁵ Fishel, 191.

³⁶ Donald G. Rose, "Peace Operations and Counterinsurgency: The US Military and Change," (PhD dissertation, Pittsburgh University PA, 2000), 185.

³⁷ Rose, 185.

³⁸ Mockaitis, 47.

³⁹ Richard W. Stewart, *The United States Army in Somalia 1992-1994*, USA Center for Military History (AUSA Commemorative Edition, December 2002), 6.

⁴⁰ Thomas R. Mockaitis, "From Counterinsurgency to Peace Enforcement: New Names for Old Games?" in *Peace Operations Between War and Peace*, ed. Erwin A. Schmidl. (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 47.

⁴¹ Dobbins, 61.

⁴² Stewart, 6 and Dobbins, 56. Technicals were the trucks mounted with heavy weapons.

⁴³ Rose, 233.

⁴⁴ Operation Provide Comfort was the humanitarian assistance effort providing aid to the Kurds in Northern Iraq after the Gulf War.

⁴⁵ Rose, 232.

⁴⁶ Fishel, 193.

⁴⁷ Fishel, 196.

⁴⁸ Quoted in Rose, 228.

⁴⁹ Rose, 228.

⁵⁰ Ibid.,

⁵¹ Mockaitis, 48.

⁵² Rose, 181-191.

⁵³ Mockaitis, 48.

⁵⁴ Fishel, 200 and Stewart, 11.

⁵⁵ Haass, 45.

⁵⁶ Fishel, 195-198.

⁵⁷ Von Hippel, 66-68.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 60.

⁵⁹ Stewart, 13.

⁶⁰ Fishel, 199-201.

⁶¹ Haass, 45.

⁶² John Hillen, "Peace(keeping) in Time: The UN as a Professional Military Manager," *Parameters* XXVI, no. 3, Autumn 1996, n.p., on-line, Internet, 7 November 2003, available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96autumn/hillen.htm> and von Hippel, 122. Information in the Somalia section was compiled from Dobbins, 55-71; Fishel, 189-207; Haass, 43-46; and von Hippel, 55-92.

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- ⁶⁴ Fishel, 211.
- ⁶⁵ Dobbins, 62.
- ⁶⁶ Fishel, 212-213.
- ⁶⁷ John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy The United States Military Campaign, in Haiti, 1994-1997*, (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1998), 204.
- ⁶⁸ Dobbins, 74.
- ⁶⁹ von Hippel, 107.
- ⁷⁰ Fishel, 213-214.
- ⁷¹ Ballard, 73-74.
- ⁷² Dobbins, 73.
- ⁷³ Ballard, 73-74.
- ⁷⁴ Crane, 20.
- ⁷⁵ Ballard, 73-74.
- ⁷⁶ Dobbins, 74.
- ⁷⁷ H. Allen Holmes, “Civil Affairs Soldiers are Crucial to Peace,” address, Worldwide Civil Affairs Conference, Washington, DC, 20 June 1996, on-line, Internet , 2 February 2004, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1996/s19960620-holmes.html>
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- ⁸² Crane, 20.
- ⁸³ Ballard, 119.
- ⁸⁴ Von Hippel, 116.
- ⁸⁵ Fishel, 226.
- ⁸⁶ Crane, 21.
- ⁸⁷ Dobbins, 75.
- ⁸⁸ Ballard, 148.
- ⁸⁹ Ibid., 133.
- ⁹⁰ Ibid., 151 and Crane, 21-22.
- ⁹¹ Dobbins, 78.
- ⁹² Ballard, 122-123.
- ⁹³ Von Hippel, 107.
- ⁹⁴ Ibid., 122.
- ⁹⁵ Ballard, 179.
- ⁹⁶ Dobbins, 77.
- ⁹⁷ Von Hippel, 105.
- ⁹⁸ Crane, 22.
- ⁹⁹ Richard Lezin Jones, “Haiti’s Neighbors are Pressing Aristide for Reforms,” *New York Times Online*, 30 January 2004, on-line, Internet, 2 February 2004, available from

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¹⁰⁹ Pamela J. Brady, "Joint Endeavor: The Role of Civil Affairs," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1997, 45.

¹¹⁰ Crane, 95-96.

¹¹¹ von Hippel, 165.

¹¹² Brady, 45-47.

¹¹³ Dobbins, 97.

¹¹⁴ Sayre, 70.

¹¹⁵ Mokhiber, n.p.

¹¹⁶ Dobbins, 96.

¹¹⁷ Mokhiber, n.p.

¹¹⁸ Tuozzolo, 55.

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¹²⁰ David, 4.

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¹²⁸ R. Craig Nation, *War in the Balkans*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 331. Other information in the Bosnia section compiled from Dobbins, 87-109; Haass, 37-42; Sayre; and von Hippel, 127-167.

¹²⁹ Fishel, 240-241.

¹³⁰ Rose, 217.

¹³¹ Howard Olsen and John Davis, *Training US Army Officers for Peace Operations: Lessons from Bosnia*, Special Report (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), n.p., on-line, Internet, 17 October 2003, available from <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr991029.pdf>.

Chapter 4

Discussion and Recommendations

“I’ll be damned if I permit the United States Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions, to be destroyed just to win this lousy war.”

Senior Officer
Saigon, South Vietnam

This chapter will discuss in greater detail the problems the military encountered in the four case studies reviewed in Chapter 3, and make recommendations for improvement. In some ways, the case studies are dated because much has already been done in response to these four operations.¹ This chapter will briefly discuss some of these changes. The continuing pace of nation building has provided the impetus for the military to learn and fix some of the problems encountered in the past. Awareness of the problem of failed states and interest in nation building increased dramatically in the 1990s and most especially after 11 September 2001. The long-term commitment in the Balkans and current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, sustain and encourage further understanding of nation building.

Policy & Strategy

Policy development is not in the purview of military forces. However, it is policy that guides and frames military operations. The tendency for policy makers to provide

vague goals makes it difficult for the military to prepare a supporting strategy. It is understood that political situations do not always lend themselves to rendering clear-cut goals. However, the military leadership must encourage and advise the political leadership so that as policy has as much clarity as possible. Then military leadership can ensure that military strategy meets political goals, as envisioned by the political leadership.

Nation building is a resource intensive undertaking that requires significant manpower, funding, and time. Shortfalls in long-term commitment have produced failures. Case studies examined in this paper are not considered successful because long-term policy objectives have yet to be reached. The most successful nation building has been where the US remained actively engaged for many years.² Successful nation building requires a long-term commitment of a vast array of resources such as expertise, manpower, material, time, and political will. Countries are not rebuilt quickly or easily.

It is understood that even the United States, the world's sole superpower, does not have an infinite amount of resources to conduct unlimited nation building. The United States' resources are stretched thin supporting a variety of worldwide commitments. The limitation of resources will require the United States to carefully assess future actions so that the force can successfully accomplish current nation-building missions.³ Plans must be resourced adequately or scaled back if the commitment and/or resources are not available.

The complexity of nation building requires intra-agency coordination and analysis. The resources required to successfully conduct nation building are spread out over various government and non-governmental organizations. A single agency must be

charged with overall responsibility and accountability to reduce confusion and increase coordination. The military's dominance of nation-building has been through default, and the US's nation building efforts would be vastly improved with better coordination and utilization of available national resources.

Recommendations:

- Military leadership should attempt to clarify political goals so the strategy can produce the desired end state.
- The political leaders must obtain the will of the nation, and resource the military to accomplish the stated political goals.
- DOD must seek intra-agency planning/coordination and establishment of a single agency for overall responsibility of nation building.

Doctrine, Plans & Training

Doctrine

This is one area where the military has made great strides, beginning at about the time of the Somalia operation. However, from the intervention in Panama to Bosnia, the military did not completely capture the lessons of its peace operations in its doctrine. Carafono notes that the military “has the tradition of forgetting.” The military's vast experience in civil government was not available during occupation duties in World War I, and its first military governance field manual was not published until 1940. Again, after World War II, the military continued to relearn lessons that it should have known.⁴ Until lessons are incorporated into doctrine, the military will repeat mistakes.

The military started taking positive steps in doctrine with the Army's initial Peace Operations Manual, FM 100-23, published in 1994. The Joint Staff established Joint Publication 3-07, 1997, entitled "Peace Operations." FM 3-0, "Operations," dated 2001, is the Army's capstone doctrinal manual and divides operations into 4 areas: offensive, defensive, stability and support. FM 100-23 was replaced with FM 3-07, Stability and Support Operations, in February 2003. FM 3-07 addresses many aspects of nation building, and outlines significant nation building roles and responsibilities. The Army's publication of FM 3-0 and FM-07 are major steps forward from a past that was lacking in the doctrine and, therefore the training necessary for effective nation building.

The informal "Powell Doctrine" has handicapped formal doctrine. The Powell Doctrine emerged in response to the "quagmire" of Vietnam. Career military officers were committed to taking steps to prevent future failures. "We don't do Vietnams" became the Pentagon's watchword. The success of the Gulf War, and the failure of Somalia, reinforced the Powell Doctrine in military culture. Rather than figuring out how to succeed in Vietnam and Somalia, many military leaders let the civilian leadership know they would only fight certain types of wars. This cultural view failed to recognize the aspects that are critical to sustaining peace and ultimately meeting the political objective of democratization.

Recommendations:

- Continue to emphasize the new doctrinal changes and refine them as needed.
- Get rid of the "Powell Doctrine" in light of current realities. The military will "do Vietnams" in today's strategic environment.

Planning

Efforts for post-conflict reconstruction planning have improved little since the time of the case studies. Mr. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, directed that DoD personnel not participate in interagency wargaming of post conflict Iraq.⁵ The post conflict environment varies greatly depending upon the context. In order to operate successfully in a given region, that region's cultural, political, economic, security and history must be thoroughly studied and understood.⁶ This understanding is vital to successful planning.

There is a significant body of knowledge that can contribute to an integrated, well thought out reconstruction plan.⁷ The State Department's 2,500-page "Future of Iraq" project, and the Army War College's study with 135 specific reconstruction tasks are superb examples of this. Many of the plans were extremely detailed and have proven to be correct in most of their predictions in post-conflict Iraq. DOD has failed to take advantage of the extensive literature and expertise available, and fails to plan for nation building activities. The US has paid dearly for not capitalizing on these efforts and integrating them into a single plan. "Like it or not, and prepared for it or not, contemporary conflict requires strategic planning and cooperation between and among coalition partners, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the US civil-military representation."⁸ Security classifications should not render the coordination ineffective.⁹

Recommendations:

- Planning for nation building must include interagency representatives and major NGOs so planning is complete and not compartmentalized.¹⁰

- Combatant commands should have contingency plans that address nation building.
- Planners at all levels must comprehend the context of the operation.

Training

The case studies demonstrate that the military, at the tactical level, adapts, innovates and performs the arduous and necessary tasks fairly well, in spite of ad hoc planning and training. This is probably because many of the tasks do overlap between combat operations and peacekeeping. Studies of recent peacekeeping operations have shown that Army combat units have conducted mostly tasks that are directly related to their go-to-war Mission Essential Task List (METL).¹¹ General Abizaid, current CENTCOM Commander, coauthored an article in which he states that a highly disciplined force grounded in warfighting skills is the essential starting point for peace operations.¹² However, placing nation-building tasks on the unit METL demonstrates that the Army embraces the mission of stability and support operations and training can take place before a mission change is directed.¹³ Units should examine how peacekeeping operations affect their METL.

The Army provides four to six weeks of mission specific training prior to deployment, when most units receive their peace operations training.¹⁴ The 1st Marine Division, which conducted combat operations in Iraq, is receiving nation building specific type skills training prior to their return to Iraq as part of the occupation force.¹⁵ III Corps, set to take over operations in Iraq, has undertaken a wide-ranging training program that includes a reading list to develop cultural awareness and studying water, sewer, electricity and landfill operations.¹⁶ These four to six weeks are referred to as

“just in time training,” and proponents believe that because combat skills overlap peace operations, more extensive training is not required.

Not everyone believes that “just in time” training is sufficient. The US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences does not agree adequate combat training equates to adequate peace operation training. Soldiers at all levels state that they wished they had had specific training to prepare them for the unique dilemmas of nation building. Even though Bosnia is considered a successful nation-building operation for the military, many of the senior officers were not prepared for their role. Generals Shinseki, Crouch, Nash, and Meigs served as senior commanders in Bosnia but readily state they did not have the training to enhance their skills in peace operations. Each of the generals had extensive careers in warfighting but limited exposure to training in peace operations.¹⁷ According to Ambassador John Menzies, “You aren’t warfighting. You are building it up. You aren’t destroying things. It isn’t a battlefield. It is a completely different environment. You must be able to transition from one to the other.”¹⁸

When soldiers say they weren’t trained adequately, the military must take a harder look. The Army must begin to teach soldiers “the other part of 21st Century soldiering, which is that you haven’t just to win the conflict, you have then got to win the peace, and that is difficult too.”¹⁹ Peacekeeping skills must become part of the soldier’s training base immediately. The Army should identify those critical skills needed and incorporate them into basic initial entry training followed by periodic unit level training. The key aspect of this training must be related to working with and around a local population. The ability to communicate, negotiate, resolve conflicts, diffuse potentially explosive confrontations with or between the population, and sensitivity/cultural training are

examples of the types of training at the individual soldier and squad level needed. It is primarily at this level that the military interfaces with the population during nation building. The Army can't wait for a feasibility study, as 100,000 soldiers prepare to deploy and rotate into Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Training of the officer corps will improve the Army's ability to transition from combat to stability and support operations. The officer corps needs to be prepared for post-conflict reconstruction; they are on the ground and become the governors, humanitarians, and builders.²⁰ The officer corps must be trained and ready to lead in nation building or be faced with the law of unintended consequences.²¹ The officer corps must be trained in the doctrine on peace operations, and that training should start at the officer basic course and continue throughout their career.²² Military leaders must be trained so they understand the strategic and political implications of tactical decisions. Understanding how military force can achieve political ends and how political decisions affect the employment of force are key to achieving success. Leaders must learn to accept ambiguity and lack of clarity as the norm and learn to deal with it.²³

In addition, the leadership must receive geopolitical and cultural training. The Senior Service Schools should place more emphasis on geopolitical and cultural awareness and peace operations. Officers and NCOs should become familiar with a foreign language.²⁴ Soldiers on the ground with language skills can break down barriers and relieve tensions with the local population. In addition, they are better capable of picking up intelligence information.²⁵

Recommendations:

- Begin nation building/peace operations individual task training in basic training; inculcate the soldier from the start.
- Nation building tasks should be included on unit METLs.
- Institutionalize training for officers on nation building and regional cultures should be expanded.
- Develop senior NCOs and officers who are regional experts and have language skills

Force Structure

The case studies showed that the effectiveness and efficiency of nation building has been hampered by the current force structure. According to the Army Chief of Staff, the Army is still structured as it was to fight the Soviet Army during the cold war and must transition.²⁶ Additionally, cold war strategy did not anticipate nation building outside of the European region. Bruce Berkowitz, Rand Corporation, believes the military's current nation building capability is based on the cold war in which the Army would be rebuilding European nations once the Soviet invasion had been repulsed. This would entail nation building in countries that the military was very familiar with culturally, and would be for a limited span of time.²⁷ Rebuilding Germany would have been very different than rebuilding Iraq.

After Vietnam, the Army reorganized its structure to ensure that the Reserve force would be required for any sustained operations. The Army's current force structure is designed so that a great percentage of the combat service support units are in the Reserve force. The reserve units do not receive as much training as active duty, and it is difficult to have them on active duty for more than one year at a time. Mobilization of the

reserves is a slow process and not responsive to the operational tempo of today's world. The Army's Combat service and service support units are essential to nation building once the combat units have established security and must be ready to begin nation building once an area is secured.

The Army was designed for high intensity combat operations and is now faced with a wide spectrum of missions. The issue is not how to do one or the other, but how to properly resource a more flexible Army, capable of doing many types of missions.²⁸ The Army must have a structure that allows it to take on these missions efficiently and effectively.²⁹ The Army grapples with structure issues and comes up with ad hoc units for current operations in Afghanistan. The Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) is a new civil-military model instituted in the Afghanistan. The PRT incorporates local civilian authorities and attempts to work with NGOs in reconstruction efforts.³⁰

Briefly, there are numerous options on how best to organize for nation building operations. The Army is currently assessing feasibility of placing more combat support and service support units in active component. Thirty-six National Guard artillery battalions will be converted and trained as military police, engineers and civil affairs specialists.³¹ A proposal for stabilization and reconstruction divisions for the active Army and the reserves is under consideration at the Pentagon. It does not require forces increase, but reallocation. These stabilization and reconstruction units could deploy as smaller groups, independently, or in support of combat forces. The units would be composed of military police, civil affairs, construction engineers, medical units, and psychological operations units.³² A separate Pentagon study outlined a brigade-sized

force that could be organized for nation building. The rotational assignment of current forces to stability operations has also been discussed at the Pentagon.³³

“Transformation” of the military refers to the creation of a lighter, more deployable force. However, the principle of mass still has its place in military doctrine. Before stabilization and reconstruction can be conducted, it is imperative that the security force be substantial enough to remove any doubt about who is in charge. The more troops the ground means more security and reduces the number of casualties of civilians and soldiers. When the number of soldiers is low during stabilization, the number of casualties has been high.³⁴ During the WWII occupation, the Army planned to “stifle resistance by putting troops into every nook and cranny.”³⁵ The US entered Somalia and Haiti with decisive and overwhelming force. They responded quickly and firmly to resistance and “established a dominating physical and psychological presence.”³⁶ In Somalia, after the American military presence was reduced, Somali warlords felt freer to engage UN forces. Current nation building missions will continue for some time, while other military interventions may be necessary. This type of mission is not an abnormality. With the Army stretched thin, it makes sense to ask for a permanent increase in end strength. The temporary increase Secretary Rumsfeld recently authorized is only a temporary fix.³⁷

Recommendations:

- Realign Combat Support and Combat Service Support units in the active and reserve component (more needed on active duty).
- Establish reconstruction divisions with modularity.

- Increase the overall force so more units are available for immediate post conflict stabilization phase.

Military Civil Relationship

In each of the case studies, the military and NGOs had an uncomfortable and awkward working relationship. Here again, the literature expresses two different opinions about the current ability of the military and NGOs to work together. Some of the most negative literature comes from the NGO side of the house. Other literature points out that working together, continuing interface, discussion, and behavior modification has greatly improved civil-military relations. It is pointless to try and prove that NGO perceptions of the military are wrong, and it seems that most constructive thing for the military to do is to keep trying. The military must continue to develop an understanding of NGOs and make adjustments to ease the strain and improve cooperation.

The NGOs and the military have distinctly different cultures and this strains their interactions. The military is an organization in which someone is always in charge, command and control is expected and executed, and every aspect of the mission is tracked.³⁸ The military commander's training, experience, and position does not accommodate independent operators.³⁹ This is often perceived as arrogance to the NGO.⁴⁰ NGOs are independent organizations and do not respond favorably to being treated as a subordinate organization to the military command and control system. The NGOs are typically decentralized and use a consensus based approach, oftentimes operating without any formal connections.⁴¹ A primary concern for the NGOs is their ability to maintain neutrality and impartiality. They often choose to remain distant from

a military that is acting as a policy tool of a government.⁴² The need to maintain secrecy in some military operations further distances it from the NGO community.⁴³

As the Pentagon reviews organizational structures during transformation, special attention should be paid to its own ability to liaison with external agencies. The Pentagon has not yet aligned itself to maximize information flow with external agencies, specifically with NGOs. In the past, the military and NGOs had settled for makeshift liaisons when working in the same arena. As a minimum the Pentagon should have a standing interface with well-established non-governmental organizations such as the Red Cross and the United Nations.⁴⁴ This interface should enhance planning for peace operations, to include nation building and facilitate incorporating the NGOs. In addition, it is key that the military units tasked to execute the missions are informed of the coordination and planning conducted at higher levels. Without this knowledge, the military commander on the ground will make decisions based solely on the military's concerns.⁴⁵

The military must learn to work with NGOs and capitalize on their expertise and country awareness. NGOs have often been in the country for many years, and therefore have a deep level of cultural awareness and experience. This awareness can assist the military in understanding the local situation. From road conditions, routes, community leadership, to an in depth understanding of problems facing the population, NGOs can be a major benefit to the military's success. The military must adopt a collegial manner with NGOs. The military will find itself working with many different organizations during nation building operations; the operative word is "with." A team approach will decrease friction.⁴⁶ The civil-military mission is reality and will require diplomatic, military, and

other organizations working together for a common objective. This synergy of effort will enhance mission accomplishment.⁴⁷ The military may have to relinquish some level of control to better achieve unity of effort.

Recommendations:

- Increase military awareness of NGOs' structure, capabilities, expertise, and culture.
- Interface with NGOs wherever possible and include NGOs in training exercises.
- DoD must work to improve the interagency planning process and establish responsibility for a coordinated nation building effort.
- DoD must establish an open interface with NGOs.

It's Not My Job

The warfighting ethos dominates the military culture.⁴⁸ The primary emphasis in the QDR is for the military to deter aggression and decisively defeat the enemy, should deterrence fail.⁴⁹ General Schoomaker's list of focus areas for the Army does not even hint of nation building and is oriented primarily on warfighting.⁵⁰ Lieutenant General James Helmly, Chief Army Reserve, continues to believe that soldiers are required only when the nation is at war.⁵¹ It is not just the military leadership, but the political leadership as well that have been reluctant to the military's role in nation building. President G.W. Bush stated he didn't believe it was appropriate for troops to be used in nation building. Conservative politicians have disapproved of efforts in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.⁵² This may reflect a streak of isolationism that Americans seem to

come by naturally. However, this aversion to nation building has been the primary reason for our failure to accept, properly plan, resource, and execute the mission.

Accepting this mission represents a fundamental change for the military, that is, a change in the organization's primary mission. Nation building must be accepted as a mission that is as important as warfighting. Peripheral changes, such as changes in doctrine and training, further fundamental change, as do external pressures, such as the requirement to perform nation-building missions. Bureaucracies built on rote performance of tasks and tradition change slowly, but evidence suggests that the military is changing.⁵³

Leadership at all levels must be held accountable for the ability of their units to perform operations other than war. Only then do leaders attempt to internalize the lessons of nation building and train their units appropriately. A commander whose unit cannot execute a battlefield maneuver is removed. Given that nation building is as critical to national security as combat is, it is only right that leaders take responsibility for this.

For all reasons cited in this paper, the US military, specifically the US Army, should openly accept and prepare for nation building. The Army's strategic relevance will be determined by its ability to perform missions other than war. For a period of time, strategists speculated that the Army might be made irrelevant by airpower. Now it is clear that the Army may be the most relevant and appropriate force for operations in the foreseeable future if it accepts nation building as a mission and learns to win the peace.

Recommendations:

- Continue to refine doctrine, training, and force structure to drive fundamental change in the mission of the military.
- Just as soldiers are taught the combat history of their units, they should learn about the history and tradition of military nation building. Emphasize that the military is justifiably proud of its history in peace.
- Leaders at all levels should be held accountable for preparedness and performance of nation building.

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⁶ Richard H. Schultz, "Peace Operations: Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Restoration-Assistance Missions," *Special Warfare*, April 1994, 3.

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¹¹ Maj. Gregory D. Reilly, *Peace Operations: A Mission Essential Task?* School of Advanced Military Studies (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command and

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¹⁴ Nina Serafino, *Peacekeeping: Issues of US Military Involvement*, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2002), CRS-3, 8, on-line, Internet, 14 October 2003, available from <http://policy.house.gov/assets/def-peacekeepingissues.pdf>.

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Chapter 5

Conclusion

“Whatever blood is poured onto the battlefield could be wasted if we don’t follow it up with understanding what victory is”

General Anthony Zinni
USMC (Retired)

The military indisputably has a role in nation building. It flies in the face of all evidence to suggest that it does not. History and current security needs of the United States indicate that this will be a future military mission. The consistent and recurrent problems as reflected in the case studies do not relieve the military of this critical responsibility. The military has tried to withdraw from nation building because of these problems, but this is the wrong lesson to draw from history. The military must learn to successfully and confidently do this mission. Before the military can organize properly, train appropriately, and execute nation building as decisively as it does combat operations, its senior leadership must embrace nation building and be held accountable for it.

The difficulties the military has experienced are not intractable and this paper has made recommendations for improvements. The military has already made great strides toward overcoming these problems. Continuing improvements in doctrine, planning, training, force structure, and civil military relations will institutionalize nation building as

a mission. Nation building responsibilities should be a priority in the military's transformation. It is through these efforts that the military will come to accept its role as an integral part of the United States' nation building endeavors. Acceptance of this role is perhaps the military's greatest difficulty.

In the current strategic environment, it is a role that cannot be filled by any other organization. Failing states require a force self-sustaining in austere environments and capable of transitioning from peace operations to combat rapidly. "We don't do Vietnams" is the wrong answer if the military is truly an instrument of policy. The answer for total victory lies in winning the peace after battle and the military's contribution is critical to success. Battlefield victory without successful nation building produces a Pyrrhic victory. Had America departed without investing in Germany's future, it is likely that Europe would have felt the agony of war again. Nation building is in our strategic interests, and must be recognized as such in order to properly plan and resource this mission. The commitment to Germany's reconstruction and democratic government is the best example of the long-term benefits of nation building.

Today we await the outcome of the Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The combat victories were swift and innovative, and proved US combat power is overwhelming. This campaign has been eclipsed by the apparent lack of preparedness for nation building. Months after major combat operations, the US government and the military struggle to implement an integrated plan. The military must place a higher priority on its responsibilities in nation building and understand the impact of this contribution to total victory. Clausewitz's seminal piece On War is dedicated to

the art of defeating the enemy, but there is no reference to winning the peace. Today's military must get beyond 19th Century concepts of war and enter the 21st Century.

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