

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

**SCHEDULING OSA-EXEMPTED SENIOR LEADER AIRLIFT
REQUIREMENTS**

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

23 February 2007

[Cleared for public release 6/4/2007, AU 07-195]

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Operational Support Airlift (OSA) aircraft have been supporting our country's leaders since before the inception of the United States Air Force. Within the OSA fleet are a small contingent of aircraft used specifically for transporting our most senior leaders on Special Air Missions (SAMs). While Congressional law and guidance directs that OSA aircraft and SAM missions be scheduled in a centralized fashion (17:SEC. 1086D), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has received approval from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to allow the Services to withhold certain aircraft from the normal scheduling process for their specific needs. (13:NP) These aircraft, spread among the Army and Navy, are exempted from the normal realm of OSA scheduling and support the various Service's senior leadership, chiefs and combatant commanders (COCOMs).

DoD's current system needs an overhaul because there is currently no centralized oversight that ensures the various Services are scheduling these withheld aircraft for their appropriate use. There are no standardized procedures for freeing these aircraft up to other Services when they are not being utilized by the owning Service. In addressing this central issue, I'll explain OSA in general historic terms, relate how Congressional oversight has been mandated to ensure oversight of scarce OSA assets, and then explain why the Services are currently allowed to withhold aircraft. I'll then describe how senior leader aircraft scheduling is currently conducted

by each Service and highlight the fact that visibility into each Service's process is relatively murky due to stove-piped scheduling procedures. I'll follow with alternatives for ensuring oversight for these assets. Finally, I'll introduce a recommended solution, which in the interim involves scheduling these assets using a common electronic scheduling tool and evolves into a final solution, that being to move all senior leader assets under a single Service. The use of these assets has been, and will continue to be, under the microscope of our congressional leadership as it certainly should be. Our public needs assurance that we are using their tax dollars in the most efficient way possible.

Chapter 2

OSA Then and Now

Airlift for senior leadership has been utilized since well before the inception of the USAF. In fact, the first unit with the sole purpose for providing airlift to distinguished leaders dates back to the 1930s and the 1st and 2nd Staff Squadrons, located at Bolling Field in Washington D.C. These squadron's aircraft were designated to serve as a mode of transportation for the President and members of the Cabinet. For the next 15 years, as flying became more of a commonplace and safe mode of travel, interest in flying ballooned to the point that the operation at Bolling Field became unable to accommodate all the various senior leadership requests for transportation.

Since the benefits of SAM travel became increasingly evident to U.S. dignitaries in the mid-1940s, the Department of Defense (DoD) was forced to redefine SAM missions, limiting the pool of SAM travelers to a more manageable level. In 1945, DoD made a distinction between a routine VIP movement and a SAM in that, while a routine VIP mission was a way to “catch a ride” on an existing mission, a distinguished passenger on a SAM mission was “the reason for the mission”. DoD also made the decision to set aside a pool of aircraft for use only by these distinguished passengers. In this way, there became a distinction between a VIP mission and a SAM. (1:NP)

It is important to make the distinction between what sets OSA and SAM airlift apart from other military passenger missions. *Common User Airlift* is the most general form of air travel in

DoD. Common User Airlift can be either military or commercial aircraft procured by the US/TRANSCOM commander, as the DoD single manager for transportation, to support military travel worldwide. Common User Airlift is the normal mode of travel for the majority of our personnel moving from CONUS to OCONUS. OSA airlift is used when commercial transportation, common user airlift, or organic airlift is either unavailable or the mission is of such high priority that other modes of air travel are inappropriate. OSA aircraft are not specially configured with systems such as secure communications. They are simply a means of transporting a time sensitive piece of cargo or key passenger to the destination. (5:15) SAM airlift uses specially configured aircraft that serve as “flying offices” for the most important missions supporting members of the White House, other executive branches of the US and foreign governments and for the most senior civilian and military leadership in DoD. Unlike most OSA aircraft, SAM aircraft are configured with all of the systems required to meet the busy traveler’s needs, to include secure communication. (2:37)

In theory, and as the system was originally designed and defined, SAM missions are the exclusive domain of the 89th Airlift Wing (89 AW) and its familiar aircraft with the blue and white paint scheme. In reality, nothing could be further from the truth, and it all comes down to availability of aircraft and the ability to secure transportation for senior leaders who are eligible to fly on SAM missions. When looking at which senior leaders are eligible, it is important to understand that the list is quite long. The senior leader “pecking order” is based on Distinguished Visitor (DV) codes which arrange all individuals by current position held and seniority. All senior leaders in the spectrum between DV Code One and Three are generally considered eligible travelers. Those in the DV Code One group comprise the President and Heads of State or their reigning royalty, and their travel needs are satisfied by the Presidential

Airlift Group, the VC-25 and back-up VC-25, better known as Air Force One. Those in the DV Code One category are not considered for SAM missions since the VC-25 is reserved for the President, but I mention them because a portion of the current shortage for senior leader aircraft can be attributed to the Presidential mission, which I'll address later in this chapter. DV Code Two and Three travelers are the key customers of the SAM process and are authorized to request senior leader airlift. (5:16). Examples of DV Code Two individuals are the Vice President, all the Secretaries, governors and members of Congress. In fact nearly seven hundred individuals are priority ranked above the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who resides near the bottom of the DV Code Two list. The DV Code Three list is made up with the other generals, admirals, assistant secretaries and vice chiefs of services. (3:NP)

Based on the sheer numbers of senior leaders eligible to use this form of transportation, it is hard to imagine a "lowly four-star general" from ever gaining a seat, despite the fact that he or she may have a more immediate need to travel. In light of this conundrum, the President directed the policy of "required use" in 1993. (5:4) "Required use" travelers are those who must use OSA or other military air assets because the use of commercial air transportation is unacceptable for various reasons. The traveler may require secure communications throughout the flight or may be traveling to a location which requires more physical security than can be guaranteed by commercial travel. It might also be an issue of expediency, in that a mission is of such short notice that commercial travel is unavailable. (5:6) The President has also designated the Secretary of Defense as a "required use" traveler on the basis that twenty-four hour secure communications are required and due to the fact that there are threats to his personal security. The Secretary of Defense is also empowered to designate "required use" status for others within DoD and he has done so for the following individuals: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

EUCOM/CC (when carrying out the duties as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe), CINCLANT (when carrying out the duties as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic), the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Air Force, Navy and Army, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders and all four-star equivalent military officers. (5:6-7)

Despite the fact that each Service's senior leadership garners this "required use" status, it has historically been a gamble to secure a SAM mission. The current availability of 89 AW assets exacerbates the issue even further. Currently, one of the VC-25s is in long term maintenance until 2010. Therefore, the backup aircraft to Air Force One is one of the four C-32s used for DV Code Two and Three travelers. Of the four C-32s, two are in modernization maintenance until June of 2007. Therefore, the effects of non-availability of aircraft cascades through the system to the remaining senior leaders who otherwise might have been able to secure a SAM mission. (8:NP) This is just one reason why the Army, Navy, Air National Guard and Reserves all have their own fleets of aircraft to ensure their leadership can be assured of air transportation.

The 201st Airlift Squadron at Andrews AFB uses two C-40B (Boeing 737-700) aircraft to support the National Guard Bureau, and the 932nd Airlift Wing at Scott AFB uses three C-9C aircraft to support the Air Force Reserve. In addition to its fleet of aircraft within the 89 AW, the Air Force maintains the 310th Airlift Squadron at MacDill AFB, which uses three C-37s (Gulfstream Five) to provide combatant commander support. (7:NP) The Navy's Fleet Logistics Support Squadron One (VR-1) uses three C-37s and two C-20s (Gulfstream Three) to support senior Navy and Marine Corps leadership. (21:NP) The Army's US Army Priority Air Transport Detachment (USAPAT) uses three Gulfstream Fives and three UC-35s (Cessna Citation) to

provide support to the Army's "Big Seven", which include the Secretary of the Army and his undersecretary, the Chief of Staff of the Army and his vice chief, and the commanders of FORSCOM, TRADOC and Army Materiel Command. (6:NP) With the exception of the Reserve unit at Scott AFB and the USAF unit at MacDill AFB, the three remaining units reside at Andrews AFB along with the 89 AW. Each unit does provide support to the 89 AW SAM mission, but the key issue is whether they support the overall senior leader airlift mission as often as they can or if their aircraft are being used as efficiently as possible. This paper will examine how these units conduct their missions for providing airlift to senior leadership in a later chapter.

Chapter 3

Congressional Oversight and Withhold Aircraft

With the rising cost of operating OSA assets and the high demand for OSA aircraft by senior leadership throughout government, the OSA fleet has been under heavy scrutiny by Congress and other government agencies for any sort of mismanagement. (11: vi) As mentioned in the introduction, public law resulting from the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2006 directs that centralized scheduling should be implemented for all OSA aircraft. It also directs that DoD should ensure its regulations encourage the use of commercial transportation to the maximum extent possible and that the exclusive use of OSA aircraft should not be a requirement for any particular class of government employee. Finally, it mandates that this direction should apply uniformly throughout DoD. (4:2)

Additionally, the Committee on Appropriations submitted a report in 1999 that directs the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to consolidate all senior leader support aircraft into a centrally managed pool and disbursed to key locations around the world. The Committee also directed that these senior leader aircraft should be made available to support all the various agencies of government with no priority given to any particular agency or headquarters. (16:28) In other words, the intent of our lawmakers is that OSA should be centrally managed, not relegated to any particular office or individual. Just because a government official qualifies for travel on OSA aircraft, he or she should use the most economical means of travel available, which is normally via commercial airlines. Our DoD

leadership echoes the sentiments of Congress in directing that OSA aircraft will not be assigned to a key leader based on his rank or position, but that some personnel may require the use of OSA airlift based on communication requirements or performance enhancements required for a particular situation. (4:2-3)

The General Accounting Office (GAO), in response to concerns from certain members of Congress in CY2000, issued a report stating that the OSA requirement is much smaller than the current fleet. The report recommended that DoD perform a study to reexamine the current requirement. The study is being conducted by the Joint Staff and is currently ongoing, but it is clear that oversight for OSA airlift remains a priority with Congress to this day. (19:3-6)

In addition to the incredible amount of oversight and scrutiny being applied to the issue, it's in the Services' best interests to be cost conscious as the defense budget is further squeezed, not to mention the importance of being good stewards of our taxpayers' dollars. The Fiscal Year 2007 budget for the Air Force was cut by 3.7 billion dollars, and rising oil prices are exacerbating the issue further. (10:NP) In fact, every ten dollar rise in the cost of a barrel of oil results in a 600 million dollar increase annually for the Air Force without bringing any added capability to the fight. (20:1) Couple that with the fact that the cost per flying hour for the most common OSA aircraft ranges from 4,083 dollars for the C-37 to 4,668 dollars for the C-20H, it becomes understandable why these assets must be used wisely and efficiently. (18:Tab F)

With all the direction and oversight from above, has the military complied with the direction of our civilian leadership? The answer is yes and no. The Services' various CONUS based assets are all located in the same geographic area on Andrews AFB, but with some exceptions. As previously mentioned, the USAF has assets located at MacDill AFB, Florida for use in the CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM areas of responsibility and the Air National Guard and Reserve

have assets at Scott AFB, Illinois to support TRANSCOM and other CONUS OSA requirements. The Army and Navy have additional assets situated overseas at Ramstein AB, Germany and Hickam AFB, Hawaii. These missions are managed by the owning services, although command and control is provided via the Air Mobility Operations Control Centers (AMOCC) at both of those locations. The central issue is that while the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Special Air Missions Division (CVAM) has mission tasking authority for all USAF active duty assets and “asking” authority for the Air National Guard and Reserve assets, they have no visibility or tasking authority with Army and Navy assets. (15:1)

CVAM scheduling will be explained more completely in the next chapter, but the Army and Navy assets are not managed formally via CVAM because the Deputy Secretary of Defense has agreed to allow the Services to “withhold” their aircraft from the normal scheduling process for their specific needs. (13:NP) The next chapter will discuss the problems that occur when airlift assets are withheld.

Chapter 4

The Withhold Aircraft Scheduling Shell Game

Before I discuss SAM scheduling, it is important to begin with OSA scheduling since the process for scheduling Army and Navy assets to support CVAM senior leader missions is normally the same as scheduling for OSA missions. It is also important to again make the distinction among the various types of travelers on these aircraft. The understandable reasoning behind the withhold issue is in large part due to the fact that the majority of Army and Navy leadership would not be able to fly on their own assets due to being bumped by individuals within the US Government residing in a higher Category Code than their three or four star rank.

OSA assets, while assigned to the various Services, are centrally scheduled and controlled by the Joint Operational Support Airlift Center (JOSAC) located at US/TRANSCOM. (2:13) The JOSAC receives 2,835 airlift requests monthly from 1,775 active validators residing in myriad agencies within the US Government. The JOSAC coordinates scheduling of 199 OSA aircraft located throughout the CONUS, then provides command and control for the duration of the mission. All facets of the mission, to include mission generation, re-routing existing missions or pulling ongoing missions for higher priority tasks, are handled from within the JOSAC. (14:NP)

As previously mentioned, CVAM is the central focal point tasked to the support the US Government's SAM needs, and the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff has overall responsibility for ensuring that SAM operations are conducted in a seamless manner. The Secretary of the Air

Force is also designated as the executive agent for SAM missions, and is charged to ensure that senior leader aircraft only be utilized when missions are in the national interest and when commercial aircraft are unavailable or unsuitable for the mission. (7:NP) Congressional requests for transportation are initially received by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Legislative Affairs (ASD/LA) who reviews then validates the request. The ASD/LA then determines whether the mission requires senior leader assets or if it can be satisfied using commercial assets or common user airlift. If a SAM is warranted, ASD/LA tasks CVAM to provide assets, and only if CVAM or another Service cannot support the request does the Joint Staff become involved.

In cases where CVAM cannot provide support, ASD/LA passes the request to the DoD Executive Secretariat (DoD ExecSec) who will use TRANSCOM's Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) request system to work the request directly with TRANSCOM or the J-4 Joint Logistics Operations Center. Requests from other agencies within the U.S. Government go directly to the DoD Exec Sec who then uses the SAAM request system as mentioned above. (15:1-2)

In all cases, CVAM is hard wired into the process as are the active duty 89 AW and 310 AS, the Air National Guard's 201 AS and the Air Force Reserve's 932 AW. All of these units operate using a common electronic flight scheduling system, which enables CVAM and the various squadrons to have visibility into where each unit's assets are being utilized and to what degree. (9:NP) CVAM directly "tasks" the 89 AW and 310 AS but can only "ask" the 201 AS and 932 AW for support. The bottom line is that CVAM has connectivity with all four units, whereas there is none with the Army and Navy other than requesting their assistance when needed. If advised by the Army or Navy that they cannot support a mission, CVAM has no way

of knowing where the Army or Navy assets are being used, or even if they are being used at all.
(7:NP)

Scheduling for the Navy is accomplished directly between the SECNAV's front office and the Fleet Logistics Support Squadron (VR-1) at Andrews AFB. Previously, user requests were sent directly to VR-1, but SECNAV determined that more oversight was required to ensure the assets were being used efficiently, and by eligible travelers. The VR-1's aircraft are designated for the Navy's "Required Users" which consist of SECNAV, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Vice CNO and Assistant Commandant. Required users coordinate directly with VR-1 with their requests. The procedures for all other authorized users such as four star equivalents and Congressional Delegations are handled by the Military Assistant or the Personal Aide to SECNAV. These individuals take the airlift requests, ensure their validity, and then pass the requests directly to VR-1 Operations to determine if the mission can be supported.

If CVAM is in need of a naval senior leader asset, they work via the JOSAC to coordinate with the SECNAV's office requesting assistance. While the SECNAV's personnel have stated that they assist CVAM whenever naval assets are available, naval senior leadership still take precedence. In all cases, SECNAV has "trump authority" for the use of all VR-1 assets. VR-1 and the SECNAV's office use an Excel spreadsheet in all of their scheduling endeavors. (21:NP)
CVAM has no visibility into the Navy's scheduling system other than information that is provided at CVAM's request. (7:NP)

Scheduling for the Army is conducted in much the same fashion as the Navy. Requests for travel are placed to the Headquarters Department of the Army Executive Travel Office where they are validated and prioritized, then sent on to the USAPAT for action. The three Gulfstream

Fives are used primarily in support of the previously mentioned “Big Seven” Army leaders as well as SecDef and congressional delegations (CODELs) in the event that CVAM’s assets are overtaxed. The three UC-35s are used strictly within the CONUS in support of the Army’s remaining senior leadership, which include three and four star general officers and the Army Assistant Secretaries. Each UC-35 mission is cost analyzed in comparison to commercial travel and only scheduled when cost analysis shows a savings to the US Government. According to the Army’s Executive Travel Office, their UC-35 missions reduce the need for JOSAC support by 30% annually. Much like the Navy, Army points of contact have emphasized that they continue to support CVAM for non-Army related missions whenever they are able. (6:NP) Since Army scheduling is conducted directly between the Army’s Executive Travel Office and USAPAT, CVAM has no visibility into how the Army’s assets are being utilized other than being told that the Army can or cannot support a CVAM mission request. (7:NP)

In summary, Navy and Army scheduling of aircraft withheld from the JOSAC process is stove-piped. While CVAM is the primary provider of senior leader airlift, they have no authority to utilize Navy or Army assets other than to make a request.

Chapter 5

Alternatives to Lend Scheduling Oversight

The most recent USAF Capability Review and Risk Assessment lists airlift as a Tier One shortfall making it one of the USAF's uppermost capability deficiencies. This shortage in airlift capability was highlighted at the last Executive Air Force Requirements for Operational Capabilities Councils as well as the most recent CORONA. OSA and SAM airlift are no less of a scarce commodity, so they must be managed as efficiently as possible.

There are four alternatives that range from simply limiting travel for less senior officials, fixing the problem by acquiring additional assets, providing additional scheduling oversight via a joint arrangement or utilizing a single service provider agreement. The fifth alternative only changes current procedures in that each Service has visibility into the other Service's operations, enabling them to police themselves and provide reassurances that each Service is managing its assets appropriately.

The first alternative is simply to reduce support to the lowest priority users to some yet to be determined level based on the difference between the overall senior leader requirement versus available assets. The advantage of this alternative is that access to senior leader assets for DV Code Two leaders will increase and become more stable for planning purposes. The disadvantage is that key DV Code Three leaders such as Vice Chiefs, Assistant Service Secretaries and most four-star generals will have fewer opportunities. (8:NP) This alternative

does not address the withheld aircraft, so the Army and Navy would still be able to schedule their withheld assets as they do today along with an associated lack of visibility to the other Services.

The second alternative being discussed is to purchase or lease additional aircraft to increase support to senior leaders. While the exact number of aircraft is currently being determined by the Joint Staff based on results of their latest data call, the advantage would include increased flexibility and access for all DV Code Two and Three travelers. The first disadvantage to this alternative is cost. The approximate purchase cost for one C-40B is 85 million dollars with an annual cost of 10.5 million dollars for maintenance and additional manpower. Costs to purchase a C-37 are approximately 65 million dollars with an annual cost of 5.8 million dollars for maintenance and additional manpower. Leasing costs for a C-40B are approximately 15 million dollars per year with an annual cost of 5.8 million dollars for maintenance and additional manpower. Leasing a C-37 requires an annual outlay of approximately 5 million dollars along with 5.8 million dollars for maintenance and additional manpower. If the purchase requires using a new operating location, the cost could range between 5 and 20 million dollars based on geographic location. Another disadvantage is delivery time, with the understanding that it will take approximately two years if the aircraft are purchased, and any kind of lease longer than five years will require congressional legislation which could also take up to two years. Additionally, these aircraft would be required to be retrofitted with secure communications which would push the bill even higher. (8:NP) Again, the withheld aircraft issue is not addressed in this alternative, so the question would still remain concerning whether the withheld assets were being utilized in the most efficient and appropriate way possible.

The third alternative is to pool all senior leader aircraft, to include CVAM, Army and Navy withheld assets, then establish a joint scheduling entity under the VCJCS. The joint schedulers

would determine which traveler is assigned to a specific mission, and any flying hours not utilized by one Service would be made available to the other Services. Any additional airlift needs would be pulled from the OSA assets routinely scheduled via the JOSAC. Advantages of this alternative are that there would be a single source for all senior leader travel requirements. This alternative also provides total visibility and increased efficiency of scheduling along with savings resulting from manpower reductions. One disadvantage to this alternative would be funding, i.e. who pays the bill if a member of one Service flies on another Service's aircraft. Another problem is that each Service has different aircrew procedures, crew rest rules and aircraft security requirements. The final hurdle would be the development of a command and control architecture that could efficiently manage the various Service's missions as they occur under one roof. (8:NP)

The fourth alternative would be to appoint one Service as the provider for all senior leader travel. The appointed Service would buy out the other Service's assets, manpower, facilities and support. All scheduling would be conducted by the designated Service, possibly using schedulers from each Service to ensure all entities' needs are being fairly met. One advantage of the fourth alternative is that all assets, to include previously withheld aircraft, would be managed by a single provider. There would also be standardized procedures for aircrew and maintenance personnel as well as one source of funding along with some level of manpower reductions. The only real disadvantage is that the Services not designated as the sole provider will likely believe they are not being supported as well as when the operations remained under their purview.

(8:NP)

The fifth alternative is to use an electronic scheduling tool common to all Services. This tool would be standardized between all affected entities to enable all players to see the same

common operating picture. The advantage of this alternative is that it allows all Services, CVAM and the Joint Staff to see how each Service's assets are being utilized and whether they are being used appropriately. Such a system would also allay Service frustrations in believing that their particular assets were being used for CVAM purposes at a greater rate than the others. One disadvantage would be that the Army and Navy assets are still being scheduled by their respective Services. Another disadvantage would be the cost of procuring the system.

The next chapter will discuss my recommendation of the options for the long term, along with an interim recommendation that will enable Services to better gauge each other's management of the senior leader aircraft scheduling process and ease some of the frustrations currently being encountered by all entities concerned.

Chapter 6

Recommendations

Throughout my research, I have gotten the impression from CVAM, Army and Navy that they had no way of determining to what level each was supporting their own mission as well as the overall senior leader mission for our Nation's leaders. CVAM has no insight into how Army and Navy assets are being used and at what level, and the Army and Navy have no way of determining whether one is supporting CVAM more than the other. This lack of information leads to frustration that one Service is carrying more of the load than the other. (11:vi) All the while, the Joint Staff is tasked by Congress to report regularly on plans, requirements and standardization for the OSA fleet. They are directed to study the usage of these assets despite the fact that they have no institutionalized way to regularly monitor how these assets are being managed, other than directing data calls to determine senior leader travel requirements. (17:SEC. 1086) The data calls end up being time consuming for all affected entities and don't always return the type of data required to accurately describe the situation. (8:NP) This conundrum can be solved relatively easily by adopting alternative five in the interim to provide all players with a common electronic scheduling system that lends overall situational awareness to everyone involved.

As explained earlier, CVAM, 89 AW, 310 AS, 210 AS and the 932 AW are all "hard wired" together with the same electronic scheduling system. The system used by all is provided by CAMP which offers a suite of web based products for flying operations, and includes flight

scheduling, maintenance management and inventory control. The previously mentioned units only currently employ the flight scheduling module of CAMP. Since the majority of the affected units are already using CAMP, this alternative would only require the Army and Navy to procure the system, and all entities would then be able to share each other's information. This way everyone has the same common operating picture and when it comes time for a Joint Staff directed data call, the information can be displayed in myriad types of reports and pulled from any one of the user's systems without all of the data mining and extra work slowing the current process. (12:NP)

The Army and Navy acquired their own assets for a reason, non-support from the overall system, and have continually resisted efforts to jointly schedule or combine the senior leader aircraft fleet. For example, in May 2002, the Secretary of the Army rejected SECAF's formal request to establish a formal agreement to incorporate Army assets into a centralized pool with USAF assets. A more recent request from the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff was also rejected. (6:NP)

Despite Service concerns for non-support of their senior leadership, the fact remains that direction from Congress requires a pooling of assets and centralized form of scheduling by a single manager. (17:SEC 1086b) The easiest way to accomplish this direction is by adopting the fourth alternative and utilizing a single Service manager. This alternative simplifies the funding issues and alleviates the training and aircrew standardization issues. While this alternative may take some time to iron out all the obstacles, immediately implementing the common scheduling tool alternative will provide a bridge that enables situational awareness for everyone. It also enables Joint Staff agencies to pull data and incorporate any studies that might be required to smooth the way to a single manager system. The common scheduling tool could remain in place

even after a single manager system is implemented to enable oversight and added visibility to each Service to ensure their interests are being fairly met.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

While demand for senior leader airlift has always been at a premium, demand is higher today than ever before. The post September 11 environment has brought with it new roles and missions for SOCOM, NORTHCOM and STRATCOM which necessitate new senior leader airlift requirements for secure communications. COCOM travel has increased over thirty percent this past year alone, and travel for Army senior leadership has increased approximately thirty percent due largely to Operations ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM. (8:NP)

OSA aircraft, and particularly those aircraft used for SAM missions, continue to be high demand low density resources, and as such will continue to feel the brunt of congressional and DoD oversight and scrutiny. While it is appropriate that senior leader assets are exempted from the normal OSA scheduling process, our lawmakers demand that there must be centralized oversight to ensure the various Services are scheduling these exempted and withheld aircraft for their appropriate use. (17:SEC1086c) This cannot be accomplished without having overall insight into how the Army and Navy are utilizing their assets. While the Army and Navy manage their assets in a relatively efficient manner, their management is occurring within a strictly Service-centric arena, with no institutionalized input to the overall management of DoD senior leader assets.

The DoD must immediately procure a common scheduling tool which enables the Services to manage their assets in a standardized fashion. This tool will also allow the Services, as well as DoD leadership, to have instant and continuous oversight into how these assets are being employed. This scheduling tool will then enable DoD to have better insight into providing a final solution for managing these assets as it works toward implementing a single Service manager system for all senior leader assets. Our Congressional leadership and use of scarce public dollars demand that DoD manage these assets in the most efficient manner possible. The best way to accomplish this direction is under a single Service using a scheduling tool that provides situational awareness to all affected parties.

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