

AU/AWC/050/1999-04

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

PURPLE VIRTUES
CURING UNHEALTHY INTERSERVICE RIVALRY

by

Eric A. Ash, Lt Col, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Colonel Gail Arnott

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 1999

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Preface

This project addresses a troubling subject—alleged unethical conduct on the part of military professionals in the name of loyalty to their service in an entrenched bureaucratic system. Service competition for roles, functions, and resources is not inherently bad. In fact, healthy competition can spur innovation and efficiency. On the other hand, unethical parochial infighting manifested in interservice rivalry is counterproductive and jeopardizes national defense. In our contemporary era of “Jointness,” it is not enough that personnel seek career-enhancing joint positions and learn to operate with people from other services. Military members must be joint at the ethical level as well. The Department of Defense (DoD) may be able to improve joint ethics via a combination of leadership, education, and a “code of cardinal virtues.” Effective jointness necessitates operating by the right rules—in this case, ethical ones.

I am indebted to the following people for their expert instruction and professional assistance in helping to research and write this paper: Colonel Gail Arnott, my advisor, as well as Dr. Jim Toner; Dr. Dan Hughes; Dr. Jim Titus; and Dr. Grant Hammond. In addition, I would like to express appreciation to the staff of the Air University Library and Air Force Historical Research Agency. I am grateful to Brigadier General Stephen Lorenz, who launched me to Air War College. Most importantly, I thank my God for providing me strength and perseverance, and my family for their amazing patience.

Abstract

Unhealthy interservice rivalry due to poor ethical conduct on the part of individuals and the general military bureaucratic system has long been, and continues to be, problematic for harmonious joint military activity. This paper argues a common code of military virtues would help promote healthy interservice competition and retard unhealthy rivalry by improving the ethical focus of jointness. The study begins with analysis of interservice rivalry, assessing causes and situational variables. Rivalry is traditional and exists due to competing paradigms based on functional differences and competition for resources. It is personal, and it is institutional. Interservice competition itself is not a bad thing—for it can produce initiative, efficiency, and esprit de corps. If manifested in lying or other breaches of integrity, however, interservice rivalry becomes unhealthy to working relations between the military services. This was the situation in the historical case study of the “Revolt of the Admirals” in 1949. After showing unhealthy interservice rivalry at work in this case, this study analyzes ethics, integrity, values, and virtues to argue virtues are fundamental to healthy jointness. Presently the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines have different “core values” to help members focus on professional performance. Yet, all members of the same profession of arms, regardless of service component, should have a common virtuous bond—which different core values may not effectively promote. A better system would be to use the West Point motto, “Duty, Honor, Country,” or a DoD code of virtues, since virtues correspond more appropriately than values to morality and

ethics. Suggested in the paper is a code of cardinal virtues, based on the four ancient cardinal virtues—prudence (or wisdom), fortitude (courage), temperance (selflessness), and justice (truthfulness). If leadership implements it properly through a continuing educational program, a code of virtues could help cure unhealthy interservice rivalry as it exists today.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Too often in this war did the leaders fight each other while the troops fought the foe.

—Captain Basil Liddell Hart

As great as it is, the American military still lacks a common *Weltanschauung*. Its “jointness” is not from the heart, but popular today primarily as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. That act forces cooperation by law and personal careerist incentives; however, anti-joint interservice friction still exists at many functional and operational levels. For Air University’s Air War College Class of 1999, one distinguished guest speaker after another has stated parochialism eclipses jointness in Washington D.C. Interservice competition for roles, functions, and resources is not necessarily detrimental to the military, but interservice rivalry and friction based on lack of integrity or other unethical conduct undermine national defense efforts.

There are many similarities in history to Liddell Hart’s description (above) of a dilemma in the First World War, and this paper will consider some of them. It is clear today, listening to top-level military officers and officials in the DoD, that the American military has fallen short in “joint ethics.” This paper argues that clearly established joint cardinal virtues—“purple virtues”—could help provide an ethical joint focus to the

military institution as a whole, and to its individual soldiers, to help cure unhealthy interservice rivalry.

The paper first examines interservice rivalry and linkages to unethical conduct. Next, an analysis of four case studies shows how unhealthy interservice rivalry played a part in military history to undermine the effectiveness of military power. The first case study considers how the world's first separate air force, the RAF, developed partly out of a competitive impasse over resources between the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS). The second historical event involves the friction between United States Navy and Army personnel during the development of early American airpower. The 1949 "Revolt of the Admirals" serves as the third case study, where unethical behavior and interservice rivalry existed hand in hand. Finally, various issues of the Vietnam conflict provide a study of both rivalry and lack of integrity on the part of personnel from different services. Following the case study analyses, this paper assesses ethics and virtue to delineate a typology of four cardinal virtues the DoD could use as joint virtues to focus on ethical conduct between the services. Lastly, the paper contends DoD-supported education and a code of joint virtues can improve ethical conduct in interservice relations.

Chapter 2

Interservice Rivalry is Alive and Un-well

Interservice rivalry has long existed in the military and is prevalent today in the US military despite the joint focus. Primitive forms of interservice rivalry may have begun as early as Neolithic warfare, around 7,000 B.C., when man fought over possessions. During this time offensive and defensive forces performed their respective roles on behalf of the tribe, and most likely rivalry erupted between warriors selected for attack and garrison soldiers chosen to stay at home for defense. In the formal sense of the concept in terms of army versus navy, interservice rivalry would not have existed until people first used the sea militarily—perhaps by Indo-European “Sea Peoples,” such as the Philistines.¹

Why the Rivalry?

Just as past forms of inter-organizational rivalry may have erupted for various reasons, contemporary interservice rivalry also stems from differences in organization, doctrine, culture, function, uniform, and perspective. For example, when asked what makes them unique compared to the other services, Air Force members might respond: they “wear blue,” they operate primarily in the third dimension, officers do the fighting, and the Air Force has a more sophisticated and technologically oriented managerial mind-

set than the sister services. The fact that this response might spark an emotional rise from a Marine, for example, simply demonstrates the point that services are different, and members are very aware of those differences.

Another factor contributing to rivalry in the military more than in other professions is a system of “divided allegiance,” where members must demonstrate loyalty to different superiors and organizations.² Yet, despite this divided allegiance and service differences, military members should remain united morally and ethically.

Unhealthy Rivalry

Competition between different soldiers over roles and functions was no more mission-detrimental or beneficial in the past than such rivalry is today. Honest differences of perspective are not unethical and can promote service morale, technological innovation, and adaptation of improved strategy or doctrine. Healthy competition spurs organizational improvement.

On the other hand, some would argue that cooperation is more important than competition. As noted military theorist S.L.A. Marshal states, “actions taken to win an interservice battle can lose the war for the joint team.”³ Marshal continues, “An officer should remain faithful to his own Service, but when he becomes part of an all-Service team, his primary loyalty must be to the larger organization of which his unit is a part.”⁴ In his seminal work, *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington lists the typology of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness as fundamental.⁵

The third category, corporateness, is where interservice rivalry can be counterproductive to the collective sense of “organic unity.” Huntington does not list the

army or navy as professions. He lists the collective military as the profession. The maxim that “only in unity is there safety” should not be lost by competitive services, and there is potentially no greater detriment to unity than lack of integrity on the part of participants.⁶ Conscious dishonesty and other traits of unethical conduct accompanying interservice rivalry appear to be plentiful in the joint arena today. They demand attention.

Rivalry Today

Despite the mood of cooperation promoted by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, unhealthy interservice contention still exists. For example, as a result of the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Defense Panel, and other analyses, location of the “fire support control line” is one hot issue that has caused the environment in Washington D.C. to become “downright ugly,” according to an Air Force general officer.⁷

Another contentious topic is the traditional Air Force-Army debate over close air support.⁸ General Curtis LeMay stated this rivalry, which had existed well prior to the Second World War, was worked out fairly well during the war. However, later both services were guilty of reinforcing the rivalry as the Air Force went back to its bases rather than going joint, and the Army, “wasn’t looking for help, they were looking for reasons why they had to have their own tactical air force.”⁹

The “halt phase squabble,” is another issue jeopardizing cooperative jointness. Air Force predictions imply the aerial eclipse of traditional Army strategic claims that occupying land is necessary for definitive conflict resolution. At a “Clash of Visions” conference in Washington D.C. in October 1997 the spirited debate over boots-on-the-ground versus air power reached no resolution. The words of air-power champion retired

Major General Charles Link reflect frustration over major differences of opinion on the effectiveness and functions of air power in future joint warfare:

When a soldier talks about using airpower to support troops on the ground, he's applauded for his 'Jointness.' When a sailor talks about using Air Force tankers to extend the range of naval aircraft, he's lauded for his 'Jointness.' But when an airman talks about using airpower independently to kill the enemy instead of putting our troops in harm's way in the first place, he's being parochial and 'unjoints,' which is now viewed as a sin on the order of adultery.¹⁰

According to Dan Coats, Chairman of the AirLand Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, different Army and Air Force perspectives are both legitimate, based on competing paradigms. He states, however, "the reality is that we simply cannot afford both approaches by 2010."¹¹ If this is true, continued competition is on the horizon.

In a recent Air War College study, an author argues the "emergence of a dominant maneuver bias, fueled by parochial interests and sustained by its own internal logic, threatens to corrupt the intellectual foundation of the American profession of arms."¹² Although there is often an underlying issue of funding involved in interservice friction, these examples illustrate that contention exists directly today in doctrinal, strategic, and tactical areas that eventually involve funding at some point. Consternation can arise from overlap in roles and functions, causing command and control confusion, as well as operational excess and inefficiency. More often than not, however, episodic "haggling over hardware" and bitter emotional dispute over command and control of limited assets stems from gaps in service interface rather than overlap.¹³

Interservice competitiveness in the United States ebbs and flows, but today it appears not to be on the decline. With respect to the competition for resources, it is logical that friction would increase with decreasing availability of resources. War can produce such

shortages, and inter-war periods of fiscal restraint can as well. United States defense spending has dropped 30 percent over the last five years.¹⁴ The result of infighting for funds could be a mutually agreeable solution between the services based on truly objective analyses of the most cost-effective force structure mix. Yet, the services have a propensity to force a “tri-cameral” military solution where the only mutually agreeable option is to split available funding three ways.¹⁵ That may seem fair, but is it right when one service has a more lethal or more cost-effective way than others to defend national interests? It was President Lincoln who said “honesty is the best policy,” and honesty is what S.L.A. Marshal calls the “governing principle” of the military.¹⁶ With declining defense budgets and commensurate competition over resources, there must be integrity in funding decisions.

With regard to funding squabbles, there is an argument that interservice rivalry is an intended product, brought about as a result of the National Security Act of 1947 and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1949. According to the argument, interservice competition existed prior to these two acts but was indirect as services fought civilians for funding. Following the acts, however, the services fought each other under one Department of Defense.¹⁷ Thus, “The absence of consensus—interservice rivalry—has long been seen as a tool of increased civilian control of the military.”¹⁸ On the other hand, an equally strong point is that civilians in control of the military do not want such rivalry. Rather, they desire consensus, since an inter-service split over funding simply moves on to civilians, who then have to take up the same competitive rivalry themselves.¹⁹ These are interesting ideas, but more important are negative aspersions cast toward the military when economic rivalry results from ethically questionable

behavior. When that happens, civilians wonder about the professional competence and defensive abilities of a military that becomes suspect over funding issues.

There is no doubt the complex interrelationship between the military and society can have positive and negative moral effects. Service interoperability falls short when, as former Navy Secretary James Webb suggested, amoral political correctness pressures the services to eclipse moral courage with expedient measures to salvage budgets, roles, missions, and careers.²⁰ Indeed, it is an often-repeated phrase that “military members reflect the values and mores of the society that produced them.”²¹ This can be troubling when those values run contrary to the profession of arms. For example, a recent poll of American students showed that 82% believed right and wrong are relative terms, leading one assessor to claim, “Generation X lacks a solid moral foundation . . .”²²

On the other hand, the military must be careful not to play the blame game. It would most likely further erode the military’s reputation if it rationalizes the system of civilian control or the decadence of American society are what cause interservice friction.²³ Just as importantly, the military must maintain ethical standards in interservice relations if, as S.L.A. Marshal contends, “high character in the military officer is a safeguard of the character of the nation.”²⁴

Substandard ethical conduct is often the product of an unhealthy “system” rather than corrupt individuals. Defenders of this system will claim it is simply a *Realpolitik* that others do not understand or appreciate until they have been in that system.²⁵ This is a weak argument. The system must change if it is corrupted with substandard ethics. It was the message of Nürnberg, and it is the standard by which uniformed personnel must live today.

New interservice battlefronts over roles and functions are surfacing daily: space, information technology and operations, functions versus geography, missile defense, deep battle, special operations, and “military operations other than war,” to name a few. In addition, the accelerating overall pace of the military, from OPSTEMPO to incorporation of new technologies, has an effect on interservice rivalry. Even minor symptomatic squabbles can be exaggerated under such conditions. An Army general stated it recently: “Speed bumps are tough to deal with at 100 miles per hour.”²⁶

Media coverage adds to the recipe for disaster in any of these situations. As many a politician knows, once in the limelight of dishonor it is exceedingly difficult to unburden the yolk of negative media attention. In a bizarre way, then, interservice rivalry has taken on a new twist—scandal avoidance, or “hope that the other guy is getting all the attention.” From Tailhook to Aberdeen to Lt Kelly Flinn, it is sad commentary when the services pick on each other rather than come to mutual defense. No jointness here. Hence, in the explosive growth of info-media, it is ever more critical for services to collectively avoid potential land-mines that can set off scandal.²⁷

Overall, the environment promotes continued interservice rivalry, but the delineator between productive competition and unhealthy contention is ethics. The following four case studies provide examples where failed ethics led to unhealthy interservice friction and mission degradation.

Notes

¹ Larry Addington, *The Patterns of War through the Eighteenth Century* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1990), 1-6.

² James Brown and Michael J. Collins, eds., *Military Ethics and Professionalism: A Collection of Essays* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1981), 10-11. According to Sam Sarkesian, “The demand for institutional obedience and

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professional loyalty can lead to professional mediocrity and institutional sterility and constrain critical and responsible inquiry.”

³ Carl R. Pivarsky, “Airpower in the Context of a Dysfunctional Joint Doctrine,” *Maxwell Paper* no. 7 (February 1997), 2.

⁴ S.L.A. Marshall, *The Armed Forces Officer* (DOD GEN-36), (Armed Forces Information Service, Department of Defense, 1975), 142.

⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), 8-10.

⁶ Marshall, 141.

⁷ For purposes of “academic freedom,” this general officer will remain anonymous. Also John T. Correll, “Joint Fire Drill,” *Air Force Magazine*, vol. 81, no. 7, July 1998, 2.

⁸ “Selected Statements on Vietnam by DoD and other Administration Officials,” 1-30 Jan, 1968, (Research and Analysis Division, Air Force Historical Research Agency [AFHRA], Maxwell AFB, Alabama), call no. K168.04-47. A past Secretary of the Air Force, desiring to remain anonymous, noted the most apparent indicator of interservice cooperation was seen in the close air support arena which necessitated the Army and Air Force working together effectively.

⁹ General Curtis E. LeMay interview, June 1972, oral histories, AFHRA, call no. K239.0512-592. According to LeMay, the Army is simply motivated by the desire to come to the front with “everything they can get their hands on to do their job well.”

¹⁰ James Kitfield, “To Halt an Enemy,” *Air Force Magazine*, vol. 81, no. 1, (January 1988), 62.

¹¹ Dan Coats, “Joint Experimentation—Unlocking the Promise of the Future,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 17 (Winter 1997), 17.

¹² Pivarsky, 2. Pivarsky argues there is a parochial surface warfare perspective of joint doctrine.

¹³ Lieutenant General John J. Tolsom, “Air Mobility, 1961-1971,” *Vietnam Studies*, (Department of the Army, 1973), AFHRA, call no. K170.041-11, 256.

¹⁴ Sharon K. Weiner, “The Politics of Resource Allocation in the Post-Cold War Pentagon,” *Security Studies*, vol. 5, no. 4 (Summer 1996), 125. Under President George Bush, spending declined 25 percent, and the Bottom Up Review under President Bill Clinton cut spending another 5 percent.

¹⁵ Major General Hugh A. Parker interview, June 1972, oral histories, AFHRA, call no. K239.0512-601. Splitting funding is the “easy compromise solution” to jointness. For example, Parker stated, as a member of the Emergency War Plans Group on the JCS staff, he witnessed the procedure where every plan was split three ways because each service had its own perspective and was fighting for its own existence. “Now how honest some of it was remains in doubt . . .”

¹⁶ Marshall, 79.

¹⁷ Weiner, 128.

¹⁸ Weiner, 127-128.

¹⁹ Weiner, 142.

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²⁰ Honorable James Webb, speech to Naval Institute Conference, U.S. Naval Academy, 25 April 1996.

²¹ Keith Hutcheson, "The Discipline Crisis," *Armed Forces Journal* (March 1996), 40.

²² Marianne M. Jennings, "The Real Generation Gap," *Imprimis*, vol. 27, no. 8, (August 1998), 1-4.

²³ T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (London: Brassey's, 1963), 295.

²⁴ Marshall, 2.

²⁵ Richard A. Gabriel, *Military Incompetence; Why the American Military Doesn't Win* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), 4-6. Gabriel identifies systemic incompetence and "institutional practices" as the real problems behind military incompetence.

²⁶ Address to Air War College by a general officer speaking under promise of non-attribution.

²⁷ The service academies are notorious for pointing fingers at each other when scandal hits. For an example of recent Naval Academy problems, see Mark Fiore, "Top Brass at Naval Academy are Subjects of Pentagon Probe into Recent Scandals," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, 23 June 1997.

Chapter 3

Four Historical Cases

Historical examples help show where unhealthy interservice rivalry can endanger the mission. Strategists often plan schemes against the enemy, but it confounds strategy to have Machiavellian intrigue between services of the same nation. This was the situation in Britain between War Office and Admiralty air services during the first three years of World War One.

Birth of the RAF

The amalgamation of the RFC and RNAS into the RAF on 1 April 1918 was designed to establish the long-range bombing of Germany, to promote United States air service support for the war effort, and to facilitate better home defense against German strategic bombing. In addition, however, a paramount reason was to quell acrimonious army and navy competition over roles and aerial resources.¹ Three successive air boards had failed to settle bitter Admiralty and War Office parochialism. Although both services were guilty of questionable requisition of men and materiel, the more senior Admiralty was probably stronger and more capable of hoarding supplies. A report by one of the boards, Lord Curzon's Air Board, condemned the Admiralty attitude of suspicion that hampered progress right from the start.² After three years of friction, an exasperated

Parliament believed a separate service was the only way to clear the air of suspected intrigue and unprofessional practices on the part of senior airmen, soldiers, and sailors. In fact, the air service headquarters at Hotel Cecil on the Strand in London was known condescendingly as the House of Bolo—named after a notorious French-Egyptian spy, Bolo Pasha.³

Interservice difficulties began at least five years earlier when RFC leaders fought to keep naval and land air forces separate.⁴ Due to perceived differences in training and a debate in the Air Battalion over whether to pursue aircraft or airships, army officers held the navy in contempt, as illustrated by a 1912 memorandum from RFC Military Wing Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Sykes (later Chief of Air Staff Major General Sir Frederick): if the Royal Navy were to take over British Army personnel and airships, an existing well-trained and efficient organization would be replaced with “an utterly untrained and embryonic organization.”⁵ Sykes stated any transfer to the navy would be a gross injustice destroying morale, engendering hostility, bringing interservice rivalry to a critical state, and setting interservice cooperation back at least a decade.⁶

From that contentious start, the RNAS and RFC continued to bicker over roles and resources until the complex interaction of forces on the politico-military scene reached kindling temperature in late 1917. Members of the Privy Council fought with the War Office to regain civilian control over BEF commander General Sir Douglas Haig’s excessively costly ground and aerial operations. At the same time, First Sea Lord, John Jellicoe, and Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal William Robertson, were removed from their positions, leading to widespread speculation that the new Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, was attempting to eliminate all resistance to his war

agenda.⁷ In addition, Director General of Military Aviation, Brigadier General David Henderson, had been under Parliamentary investigation beginning in 1916, when reports surfaced that his system of procurement with the Royal Aircraft Factory was inefficient and perhaps criminally negligent. The atmosphere within the Air Service at the birth of the RAF was so plagued with parochial friction, personality conflicts, and intrigue the RAF Chief of Staff, Lord Hugh Trenchard, the Air Minister, Lord Rothermere, and the deputy to Rothermere, Henderson, all resigned!⁸ Part of the responsibility lay with an unprofessional, unethical “system.”

The RAF, British Expeditionary Force (BEF), and Royal Navy were plagued internally with traditional attributes that degraded their professionalism and performance in battle. In particular, the BEF was in an awkward transition as traditional attitudes in the Edwardian officer corps clashed with new professional ideals.⁹ Traits of personalized command, sponsorship, and gossip led to cover-ups and alterations as dominant personalities, social traditions, and personal relationships influenced nearly all activities—from promotion, to formation of strategy and doctrine, to deployment and employment of forces. Group loyalty to this system outweighed simple honesty. The military was not professional enough to be successfully joint.

Mission impact was enormous, considering Trenchard’s resignation occurred during the outbreak of Germany’s Operation Michael—when the Allies were close to defeat. At one point, German forces were within a few miles of dividing the French and British at Amiens. Meanwhile, the infant Air Ministry was embroiled in Parliamentary inquiries regarding Trenchard’s departure and other symptoms of an unprofessional system. Early attempts at long-range bombing had met with interservice friction when the RNAS and

RFC could not agree on targets, roles, and missions. The Gallipoli disaster in 1915 pointed to poor execution, poor command and control between navy and army forces, and inter-theater competition for resources as contributory to failure.¹⁰ In Britain, there was a need for home defense against German Zeppelins and Gotha bombers, but the Admiralty and War Office fought over ownership of the role. Then once the difficulty of that role became apparent, the two services could not agree who was to be responsible. Clausewitz's "fog of war" was from within.

Inter-war American Air Power

American interservice conflict over roles, organization, and ownership of air power was no less contentious than the British experience. The Americans just took a lot longer to come to the same conclusion—a separate air service. In a way, air-power development served to increase traditional navy-army friction. Chief of Air Service Command Brigadier General H.J.F. Miller wrote during the 1920s that historical competition between the services had been over resources, but then air power created "overlapping and duplication of functions and effort."¹¹ This key concept, *function*, lies at the root of interservice relations and the joint effort. As Brigadier General Benjamin Foulois stated in a 1929 memorandum, conflict between the Army and Navy over air was not about programs, but about "delineation of the basic functions and responsibilities with which each is and should be charged."¹² In the myriad circumstances surrounding interservice rivalry, the fundamental issue of contention is function. All other issues, to include ownership, organization, and funding are symptomatic of function.¹³

Just as the British airpower debate had involved home defense, the American debate involved that issue as well, where Chief of Air Service, Major General Mason M. Patrick, stood strongly for army ownership of coastal defense.¹⁴ In an attempt to settle the issue, the 66th Congress passed an appropriation bill resolution, 16 April 1920, specifying the Army would control all air operations from land, while the Navy would have all air operations attached to the fleet. However, this settled nothing when Navy Secretary Daniels forced an addendum that the Navy would also control shore stations to support air operations for the fleet.¹⁵ Shortly thereafter Secretary of War Weeks recommended Army aviation receive two-thirds of Congressional funding compared to one-third for the Navy. The fight was on.

As Patrick noted, the interservice conflict rose primarily from new technological capabilities. Aircraft could now perform expanding roles, and it was, therefore, ineffective and inefficient for the Navy to do coastal defense. In particular, the Navy should be restricted from conducting surveillance in the zone of the coast, a role the Navy was fighting hard to own. Patrick argued that when the law had been passed earlier, such land-based aerial capability did not exist. Now, however, it made sense to change the law, particularly since the new technologies were expensive.¹⁶

Championing the Navy view was Rear Admiral W.A. Moffett, Bureau of Aeronautics Chief in 1925. According to Moffett, naval air power naturally enhanced the navy's traditional role of national defense with the use of a naval "air force" to serve as an attack arm (offensive defense) for the fleet, and an "air service" to serve as the defending arm (defensive defense) for the fleet.¹⁷

In attempt to settle various claims, the US Navy and US Army conducted aerial tests that generally failed to bring about resolution. Usually, one service or the other, in order to promote its particular agenda, claimed the various tests failed by lacking “realistic conditions.”¹⁸ Of such tests, the most famous one in American airpower history involved the German “unsinkable” battleship, the OSTFRIESLAND.

The lead interservice contender was Brigadier General William (Billy) Mitchell, who carried much of the fight against the Navy under the impression that flyers were ill-equipped, over-worked, and unappreciated. Furthermore, in his attacks on the VIRGINIA, NEW JERSEY, and OSTFRIESLAND he set out to prove senior military authorities misunderstood and misapplied air power.

Unfortunately, the OSTFRIESLAND episode raised more questions than it answered, primarily due to the hostility engendered from naval accusations of foul play. No doubt Mitchell’s aircraft had sunk a ship, but the Navy responded that his demonstration proved little since it was under unrealistic conditions: no anti-aircraft defense, clear weather, stationary ship, no pumps in service, no personnel on board to shut off flooding compartments, low altitude of bombers, easy distance from shore, and preliminary trial flights.¹⁹ Mitchell, on the other hand, was interested in making a point, no matter how he did it.

Motives aside, Mitchell’s “means to his ends” were ethically questionable to the point that most historians agree he deserved court-martial. President Calvin Coolidge called Mitchell a “God-d disturbing liar,” and, indeed, Mitchell admitted during his trial his former accusations against the Navy were not factual, but based on opinion.²⁰

Again, Mitchell may have been individually culpable of ethical breaches, but it is likely he had simply fallen into that *modus operandus* due to a widespread “system” that lacked integrity. Mitchell, himself, mentioned to the House Military Affairs Committee in 1925 his suspicions that people testifying for the Government had possibly falsified data “with the evident intent to confuse Congress.”²¹ On the Navy’s part, heavy battleship focus most likely swayed accurate assessment of Mitchell and his supporters. Led by Admiral E.W. Eberle, Chief of Naval Operations, the Special Board appointed to investigate aviation found Mitchell’s “highly extravagant” statements fanciful: “the prediction that [airpower] will assume paramount importance in sea warfare will not be realized.”²²

Although the debate had started formally in 1920, there was still no answer a decade later. Just as Britain’s three air boards had failed to adjudicate the same debate on their side of the Atlantic Ocean, various American boards, committees, and sub-committees were also unable to settle American air-power contention over organization, peacetime procurement, and duplicated effort. After the Joint Board determined on 23 May 1927 that only the President would be able to decide the issues, the Navy Secretary disagreed. By 1930 the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy were at an impasse, as they would not even agree to meet to discuss the dilemma over air functions and organization.²³ Each service secretary held opinions regarding the propriety of congressional involvement in the matter, and each corresponded to the President trying to promote his particular interests in the situation.²⁴ The Attorney General tried to resolve the issue by recognizing army and naval air as different (thus no duplication), and the two services were simply left to go their separate ways—not exactly cooperative jointness.

Ultimately Mitchell would win his campaign with the creation of the Air Force in 1947. However, he would not win the war—which still rages today over roles and organization of air power.²⁵

Returning to ethical conduct in this case, Mitchell was not alone in his quest and not alone in creating ethically questionable circumstances in the fight over air power. In *A Few Great Captains*, DeWitt Copp titles one of his chapters “The Conspirators” for good reason.²⁶ One airman guilty of conspiring was Air Corps Chief, Brigadier General Benjamin Foulois. Fearing he was being made the fool, he wrote at one point, “I am suspicious” of the Army General Staff.²⁷ Yet, Foulois’ desire to bolster the Air Corps in 1934 led to a reply to the challenge of carrying airmail that was suspicious at the least, considering the reality of Army aviation at the time: “We have assigned to this work the most experienced pilots in the Army Air Corps. We have had a great deal of experience in flying at night and in flying in fog and weather, in blind flying, and in flying under instrument conditions . . .”²⁸ This prognostication was simply untruthful, and the next day newspaper headlines noted three Air Corps pilots had died in crashes. Foulois had committed the Air Corps to mail service despite inadequacies in funding, aircraft, trained pilots, and time to prepare.²⁹ Certainly, Foulois’ response was due to a sense of duty and obligation to the President, and his “can-do” attitude was admirable. However, there was also an underlying desire to bolster the Air Corps in a time of heavy competition for resources, and the main detractor in Foulois’ decision was a lack of truthfulness. Competition was one thing, but the primary inter-war detractor to the development of airpower was the air of distrust between the services.³⁰

Revolt of the Admirals

Following constant friction over airpower functions and organization throughout the Second World War, competition for funding of the Consolidated Vultee B-36 bomber and the *United States* supercarrier in 1949 triggered unhealthy interservice rivalry between the US Air Force and US Navy in a case known historically as the “Revolt of the Admirals.” The episode was part of a larger defense debate surrounding service unification that existed from the end of the Second World War to the early 1950s.³¹ Each service had legitimate desires to protect interests in the win-lose struggle for funding under a limited budget. The Navy had already fought a losing battle against defense unification, arguing that it would lead to loss of civilian control. Now Navy leaders engaged in another uphill struggle that became unhealthy when less than honorable activities emerged in the process. Ironically this impropriety struck right at the issue of the military’s professional responsibilities to civilian society.

There are two sides to the story—one Air Force and one Navy—but the episode clearly showed a lack of discretion in placing service interests over professional responsibilities. Both services engaged in media efforts to promote their causes, and the Navy created a special secret Pentagon office, OP-23, designed exclusively to “carry the fight for the *United States* to Congress and the public.”³² Although Navy Secretary John L. Sullivan quickly deemed OP-23 inappropriate and eliminated it, he resigned in protest when, on 23 April 1949, newly appointed Defense Secretary Louis Johnson abruptly canceled the \$188 million supercarrier project (and the Navy’s role with nuclear bombing along with it), which Johnson’s predecessor, James V. Forrestal, had tentatively approved.³³

The B-36 program had significant problems that became integral to the budget competition. The main engineering hurdle was the aircraft's extreme light weight relative to its size, which required a very complex production process, including the first use of magnesium in aircraft production as well as flush rivets and bolts. From the Air Force perspective, performance and operational considerations outweighed concerns about cost overruns.³⁴ General George Kenney, originally a B-36 proponent, became disenchanted with these seemingly intractable problems, and he reduced the order of aircraft from 100 to a few test models.³⁵

Negative rumors about the B-36 grew rampant when an Air Force inspection team found evidence of inferior workmanship and materials at the Fort Worth plant. In May 1949, Republican Congressman James E. Van Zandt of Pennsylvania demanded a full investigation into the B-36 program when a document surfaced, discrediting the aircraft with insinuations of collusion on the part of Air Force Secretary W. Stuart Symington and Consolidated-Vultee (later Convair) Corporation.³⁶ The House Armed Services investigation completely exonerated Symington and the US Air Force. The fabricated document, however, turned out to be from Cedric R. Worth, a Special Assistant to the Undersecretary of the Navy. This did not speak well for the Navy. A subsequent Navy internal investigation revealed serious breaches of ethical conduct and an "alarming display of insolence and insubordination to civilian authority" on the part of many Navy leaders.³⁷ Yet, senior Navy officers were more concerned about future Navy roles and missions than about probable impropriety on the part of certain people.

Its back against the wall and perceived survival on the line, the US Navy once again took the offensive. Navy Captain John C. Crommelin heightened public awareness by

releasing a classified document attesting to the extent of unrest within the Navy about their diminished position in national defense. Against strong admiralty support of Crommelin and realistic Navy claims that the B-36 was too vulnerable a platform to single-handedly deliver nuclear bombs, Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley labeled the Navy's activities dishonest and "utterly disgraceful."³⁸ Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt S. Vandenberg defended the B-36 and reminded critics that nuclear bombing strategy was a joint matter under Joint Chiefs of Staff control, not just that of the Air Force. Within the JCS structure, the other two services had clearly aligned themselves against the Navy, and eventually the Navy lost its fight—until the Korean War budget increases eventually funded the supercarrier. As far as the "revolt" was concerned, it ultimately resulted in the loss of only one officer, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Louis Denfeld.³⁹

The impropriety of actions on the part of many military leaders did not go unnoticed nationally, but even today there is confusion regarding the ethics of this historical situation. Many of the actors in the revolt salvaged their careers quite well, and slanted memories of legends and martyrs have eclipsed much of the damage done to the Navy's reputation and its relationship with sister services. In fact, today people occasionally question why the Navy does not take similar approaches when budget cuts have the services scrambling for self-preservation.⁴⁰ Even former Secretary of the Navy, James Webb overlooked ethical aspects of the episode during a speech to the Naval Institute Conference at Annapolis 25 April 1996. While championing moral courage, he implied the 1949 revolt was admirably courageous, effective in saving the US Navy, and perhaps appropriate again in the future. This is a questionable proclamation considering the government now dictates there be formal roles-and-missions debate among the services.

Again, competitive debate is healthy, but unethical slander, fabricated evidence, and suspicious use of the press are unhealthy to jointness.

Vietnam

The final case study, the Vietnam conflict, is perhaps more an example of intra-service breakdown in ethics as it is a case of unhealthy interservice rivalry. Historian H.R. McMaster calls the American experience in Vietnam a “quicksand of lies.”⁴¹ The popular but inaccurate story of the American military in Vietnam is of battle-ignorant politicians and systems managers tying the hands of the services so they could not fight effectively.⁴² This *Dolchstoss* rationalization is weakened by the reality that Air Force, Army, and Navy personnel made plenty of mistakes on their own, some of which emanated from dishonesty on the part of frustrated and confused airmen and soldiers who allowed perceived political necessities to sway their integrity. As one author states, we lost Vietnam when it became a war of internal and interservice power struggles.⁴³ According to S.L.A. Marshal, “The resulting action was so repugnant to the standards and practices of American Forces that covering up and falsifying reports almost inevitably compounded the crime.”⁴⁴ The degraded military reputation in society was perhaps the *real* strategic defeat of Vietnam on the part of our military.

In particular, Air Force missions and targets in the 1960s in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam clearly violated established rules of engagement. To support such activities, staff officers fabricated false reports to obscure the infractions. Vietnam veteran Earl Tilford notes, “The secret [Menu] bombings of Cambodia went beyond normal clandestine operations where secrecy and deception are acceptable. These secret

bombing operations involved [the Air Force] deceiving its own officials and lying on official records . . . lying to Congress and key members of the government....”⁴⁵ The truth finally exploded when former US Air Force officer Hal Knight testified before congress he personally faked B-52 strikes into Cambodia under orders from above.⁴⁶ When Knight had asked superiors who authorized such unethical action, he was told not to ask questions and that the illegal activity was politically necessary. In a letter to Senator William Proxmire in 1973 regarding the forced retirement of Seventh Air Force Commander General John D. Lavelle, Knight stated, “I think the practice of falsifying strike reports in South Vietnam was so widespread that he could have been honestly mistaken or confused over what was permitted and what was not.... I prepared at least a dozen myself.”⁴⁷ This is the problem when honesty has ebbed to the point that nobody knows right from wrong—a dangerous situation in time of war. To illustrate, while General Lavelle deceived superiors about “protective reaction” strike orders he gave to the troops, principal United States negotiator Henry Kissinger, relying on truthfulness, publicly proclaimed the contrary as to what was going on in theater.⁴⁸ As a general officer recently stated to an Air War College audience, all the lying in Vietnam “really made you feel slimy.”⁴⁹

The ethical problems of Vietnam hampered operations all the way to the Presidency and were manifest in interservice problems. The Air Force wanted to prove air power’s ability with greater destruction, but President Lyndon Johnson believed bombing would not “win” a guerrilla war and became exasperated at the Joint Chiefs’ persistence in requesting permission for large-scale bombing in North Vietnam. Similarly, the Army kept up its demands for more troops to effectively counteract increasing North

Vietnamese hostility. Hence, Johnson and the services concealed various types of involvement and also played politics by using the press to promote agendas.⁵⁰ Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara lied to Army Chief of Staff, General Earl G. Wheeler, to keep him out of deliberations. McNamara and fellow “whiz kids” promoted a managerial mind-set that evolved into a dishonest mind-set as statistics became more lies than truth.⁵¹

In terms of jointness, the services did not cooperate well, due to circumlocution of command and control, competition for available assets, frustratingly restrictive rules of engagement, and differences of strategic and tactical opinion. According to Carl Builder, the intellectual distinction between “air force” and “airservice” is fundamental to US Air Force and US Army differences of perspective.⁵² Whereas an air force is an autonomous strategic power commanded by airmen, an airtservice is an auxiliary force to help surface combatants. This fundamental difference led to the same problems with Close Air Support and prioritizing air assets that existed since the First World War. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Ambassador to South Vietnam in 1964, General Maxwell Taylor noted, the situation in South Vietnam was seriously deteriorating, largely due to “irresponsibility and division within the armed forces.”⁵³ Tilford described the interservice situation:

Like an illegitimate child at a family reunion, the Air Force felt somewhat uncomfortable with its origins... wedded to strategic bombing, the Air Force neglected other missions, particularly close air support, which tended to tie air assets to the needs of ground commanders. This single-mindedness exacerbated interservice rivalries because, while the Air Force did not especially want the close-air support mission, neither did it want the Army to co-opt that mission and thereby avail itself of the opportunity to procure combat airplanes.⁵⁴

One of the detractors of harmonious army-air force relations was the Unified Action Armed Forces doctrine, which stated component commanders retain control of units of their own service. Hence, problems arose at air operations centers, where Army and Air Force commanders competed for control of air assets. For example, the Army said it should control its own Caribou aircraft, whereas the Air Force was of the opinion such aircraft were “air” and therefore under Air Force control. While the Army complained that Air Force control would violate the principle of unity of command, the Air Force noted the army’s inability to properly coordinate air power due to its lack of an air operations planning staff.⁵⁵ According to LeMay, interservice problems were to some extent a product of the McNamara “system” that tried to play the services one against the other. In this situation the Army tried to build back a tactical air force, making the argument that the Air Force neglected tactical roles, neglected to support the Army, and focused its budget on strategic forces.⁵⁶ More than any doctrinal differences, interservice friction was largely a matter of poor command and control due to each service desiring a piece of a very small pie in Southeast Asia.⁵⁷

Overall, Vietnam was a situation where soldiers at all levels were not sure where to draw the lines. Saddled with a bankrupt strategic bombing doctrine and errors of assumption and interpretation about the enemy, the services compounded their problems with interservice friction and deceit. There were, of course, examples of harmonious interservice and intra-service operations, such as the development of army air mobility, search and rescue, and some close air support.⁵⁸ Yet, in many respects there was great confusion, uncertainty, lack of moral force, breakdown of discipline, rationalization of failure, manipulation of the record, service bias, and ineffective service dogma vice

effective doctrine. As a result, Vietnam remains an example of ethical erosion leading to poor interservice cooperation. Furthermore, the 7 June 1998 CNN debacle about alleged sarin nerve gas during operation Tailwind in 1970 shows that Vietnam still haunts us.⁵⁹

In summary, these four case studies illustrate the detrimental mix of unethical conduct and interservice rivalry. While these examples highlight the negative side of interservice rivalry, there are countless other historical examples where jointness worked well, largely as a result of commitment to professionalism and truthfulness. Regardless of time or circumstance, the profession of arms demands a fundamental bedrock of virtuous conduct.

Notes

¹ “War Cabinet Committee on Air Organization and Home Defence Against Air Raids, 2nd Report.” 9 August 1917, Public Record Office (PRO), Air 9/5, London, UK. This report, commonly known as the “Second Smuts Report,” recommended establishing a separate RAF. Also, Malcom Cooper, *The Birth of Independent Air Power* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 50.

² “First Report of the Air Board,” PRO, Air 8/2.

³ Eric Ash, *Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution, 1912-1918* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 123.

⁴ Walter Raleigh and H.A. Jones, *The War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force* (Official History), (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1922), 188-9.

⁵ Frederick H. Sykes memorandum, 1912, Sykes Papers, Royal Air Force Museum (RAFM), Hendon, London, MFC 77/13/9.

⁶ Sykes memorandum, Sykes Papers, MFC 77/13/9.

⁷ Newspaper clipping, London *Daily News* (no page number), 16 April 1918, Sykes Private Papers, Conock Manor, UK.

⁸ Rothermere to Trenchard, 13 April 1918, Trenchard Papers, RAFM, MFC 76/1/19.

⁹ Tim Travers, *The Killing Ground. The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900-1918* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 4-27.

¹⁰ Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 161-3.

¹¹ H.J.F. Miller memorandum, undated, AFHRA, call no. 145.91-565.

¹² “Demarcation of Activities of Army and Navy Aircraft.” 28 Feb 1929, AFHRA, call no. 145.91-565.

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¹³ Major General Timothy A. Kinnan, address to Airpower Symposium, 2 March 1999, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. This concept of function, in relation to geographic control and responsibility, is still raising debate between air and ground thinkers as a contemporary doctrinal issue.

¹⁴ “Revision of Policy of the Army and Navy Relating to Aircraft.” 1923, AFHRA, call no. 145.91-565.

¹⁵ Ibid. The original 66th Congressional Resolution was Public No. 251, passed on 5 June 1920. The major official reorganizations resulted from the Morrow and Lassiter Boards, which pointed out problems in the Air Service. In 1926 the Air Corps Act created the Air Corps, giving flyers political recourse via access to the President, and also gave the Air Corps a substantial part of the Army budget. A decade later the General Headquarters Air Force stood up.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Admiral W.A. Moffett speech, competing lectures delivered to G-3 Course No. 9, Army War College, Washington Barracks, 9 November, 1925, AFHRA, call no. 145.91-565.

¹⁸ For example, see “Panama and Hawaiian Reports on Coordination Between the Coast Artillery and Air Service in Coast Defense.” AFHRA, call no. 145.91-565.

¹⁹ “Report of Special Board, Result of Development of Aviation on the Development of the Navy.” 17 Jan 1925, AFHRA, call no. 145.91-565.

²⁰ Mark A. Clodfelter, “Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and Legacy of William Mitchell’s Strategic Thought,” in *The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory*, ed. Philip S. Meilinger (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997), 103-4.

²¹ Clodfelter, 102.

²² “Report of Special Board,” AFHRA, call no.145.91-565.

²³ Hiram Bingham to James W. Good (Sec of War), 10 May, 1929; Good to Bingham, 18 May, 1929; C.F. Adams (Sec of Navy) to Good, 6 June, 1929, AFHRA, call no. 145.91-565. Bingham was Chairman of the Joint Committee on Aerial Coast Defense.

²⁴ Patrick J. Hurley (Sec of War) to President, 18 February, 1930; Ernest L. Jahncke (acting Sec of Navy) to President, 14 April 1930; and F.H. Payne (acting Sec of War) to President, 10 September 1930, AFHRA, call no. 145.91-565.

²⁵ Kinnan.

²⁶ DeWitt S. Copp, *A Few Great Captains, The Men and Events that Shaped the Development of U.S. Air Power* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1980), 133 and 144.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Copp, 184-5.

²⁹ Copp, 221.

³⁰ Copp, 427.

³¹ Dean C. Allard, “Interservice Differences in the United States, 1945-1950; A Naval Perspective.” *Air Power Journal*, vol. 3 (Winter 1993), 72.

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³² Philip S. Meilinger, “The Admirals’ Revolt of 1949: Lessons for Today.” *Parameters*, vol. 19, (September 1989), 86. Also, Alfred Goldberg, “Land-based versus Sea-based Air: The Role and Impact of the Carrier.” RAND Paper RM-6367-PR, (August 1970), 14.

³³ Paul R. Schratz, “The Admirals’ Revolt.” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 112/2/996 (February 1986), 65.

³⁴ J.T. Cosby (B-36 project engineer) interview, 3-4 December 1973, AFHRA, call no. K239.0512-693.

³⁵ Thomas M. Coffey, *Iron Eagle, The Turbulent Life of General Curtis LeMay* (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1986), 284-6.

³⁶ Coffey, 286.

³⁷ Meilinger, “The Admirals’ Revolt,” 90.

³⁸ Meilinger, “The Admirals’ Revolt,” 91.

³⁹ Richard C. Knott, *A Heritage of Wings: An Illustrated History of Navy Aviation* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 184.

⁴⁰ James L. George, “Where’s the Admirals’ Revolt?” *Proceedings* (May 1993), 66-71; and Edward P. Stafford, “Saving Carrier Aviation—1949 Style.” *Proceedings* (January 1993), 44.

⁴¹ H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the lies that led to Vietnam* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997), 243.

⁴² Carl H. Builder, *The Icarus Syndrome: The role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the US Air Force* (New Brunswick: Rand, Transaction Publishers, 1994), 264. Builder mentions the erroneous interpretation of political leadership being exclusively at fault in leading to air-power indecisiveness in Vietnam.

⁴³ Earl H. Tilford, Jr., *Crosswinds; The Air Force’s Setup in Vietnam* (College Station, Texas: Texas University Press, 1993), xiv. Tilford’s Vietnam account may be less balanced and scholarly than other histories, but it still provides a perspective on the importance of integrity in wartime.

⁴⁴ Marshall, 92-93.

⁴⁵ Tilford, 125-6.

⁴⁶ Hal Knight testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, 16 July 1973, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, First Session, 93rd Congress.

⁴⁷ Knight to Proxmire, January 1973, read before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 16 July 1973.

⁴⁸ Arthur J. Dyck, “Ethical Bases of the Military Profession,” *Parameters*, 10 (March 1980), 43; and Richard T. DeGeorge, “The Need for a Military Code of Ethics,” *Army* (December 1984), 133-7.

⁴⁹ Name withheld to protect academic freedom.

⁵⁰ McMaster, 244.

⁵¹ McMaster, 301.

⁵² Builder, 64.

⁵³ Robert S. McNamara, *In Retrospect* (New York: Random House, 1995), 165.

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⁵⁴ Tilford, 183.

⁵⁵ Major General George S. Eckhardt, "Vietnam Studies; Command and Control, 1950-1969" (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army), AFHRA, call no. K 170.041-12.

⁵⁶ General Curtis LeMay interview, June 1972, oral histories, AFHRA, call no. K239.0512-592.

⁵⁷ Former Air Force Secretary (desiring to remain unnamed), oral recording, AFHRA.

⁵⁸ John J. Tolsom, Air Mobility Vietnam Studies, Department of the Army, 1973, 58 and 253, AFHRA, K170.041-11.

⁵⁹ Mark Thompson, "Absolutely No Evidence," *Time Daily Magazine*, vol. 152, no. 5, 3 August 1998, [http://cgi.pathfinder.com/time/magazine/1998/dom/980803/press.absolutely_no_evid4.html]

Chapter 4

Cardinal Virtues

The first requirement of a unified establishment is moral soundness in each of the integral parts, lacking which there can be no soundness at all.

—S.L.A. Marshal

The four previous cases show where interservice rivalry, and sometimes intra-service friction, became unhealthy due to erosion of ethical standards at individual and systemic levels. Erosion of ethical standards may be due, in part, to peoples' lack of clear understanding of ethical concepts. Ethics is a vast subject, and when used in the military sense usually refers to issues of just war and moral authority of combatants. Regarding jointness, however, ethics involves concepts—such as character, honesty, and integrity—commonly known as virtues. Although our military services have established certain “core values” in attempt to maintain ethical standards, integrity-based conduct must flow more from fundamental “virtues” than situational “values.” This next section analyzes ethics more narrowly, arguing a typology of four cardinal virtues provides a useful framework for guiding ethical behavior in interservice relations.

Ethics

Ethics means different things to different people. Ethics can be individual or systemic, relative or absolute, good or evil, total or limited, or prescriptive or theoretical.

It is often easier to describe what constitutes unethical than ethical behavior, and regulatory measures to promote ethical conduct are usually couched in the negative rather than positive: “we will not lie,” rather than “we will tell the truth.” Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulty of precise definition, most experts in the profession of arms readily agree that ethics is critically important. After all, it is even imbedded in the officer’s commission and oath of office: “special trust and confidence,” and “no mental reservation or purpose of evasion.”¹

According to military ethicist James Toner, ethics is best determined by a blend of customs, rules, goals or expectations, and circumstances, and it involves the “study of good and evil, of right and wrong, of duty and obligation in human conduct, and of reasoning and choice about them.”² In order for an act to be ethical, according to Toner, its means (or objective), ends (or intent), and circumstances must all be acceptable. This undermines Machiavellian arguments that in jointness ends justify means. Machiavelli wrote in *The Discourses* justice, humanity, and shame are unimportant means; all that counts is the end—life and liberty of the state.³ Surely members of the profession of arms would not agree life and liberty of any service or the DoD supplant issues of morality and justice among its members.

Toner also dismisses “cultural ethical relativism,” or the idea that ethics depends on the situation—such as the environment in the joint arena. The major problem with situational ethics is that cultural standards can slip into what Herodotus and Polybius called “the decay of political glory.”⁴ History is replete with examples where ethical standards were perverted due to “bureaucratic barriers” and were allowed to continue in a state of “honor among thieves.”⁵ General Perry Smith states, “I remember so often the

Air Force people would say in the Air Staff, ‘We’ve got to fudge the figures because the Navy’s doing it.’”⁶

In addition, Toner addresses another important issue to jointness with what he calls competing loyalties and “dueling duties,”—when universal ethical obligations conflict with each other.⁷ Indeed, personnel often face conflicting right choices in a situation. As one writer described this ethical consciousness, “we walk a tightrope, constantly oscillating between the extremes of crusader and chameleon...”⁸

Rejecting prescriptivism, egoism, and various nihilistic ethical concepts, Toner is a strong proponent of proportionalistic ethical conduct, while clearly maintaining proportionalism is not black and white, but a complex issue.⁹ Proportionalism dictates acting for the greatest good, which, with respect to interservice rivalries, means the greatest good for the nation and DoD, rather than for specific services or individual military members. Yet, as Toner emphasizes, there are morally ambiguous possibilities where people cannot act according to the greatest good. For example, murdering a few members of a survival party in order for the majority to have enough food to survive would be morally contemptable. Thus, proportionalism, although the preferred moral option, still has limits.

Imbedded in proportionalism is the ethics equation, object—intent—circumstances, where each element must be in harmony to create the greatest good. In other words, a military service cannot lie to congress or a sister service under pretense the act is ethical because it is does the greatest good for the nation. That argument did not stand up in Vietnam; nor will it today in joint activities.

The only addendum to Toner's ethical equation is what he calls the "principle of double effect," or the concept that it is ethically permissible to have a second unintended bad consequence if the intended first consequence was ethical. This simply acknowledges that actions continually lead to new reactions in a chain of events, and that while Clausewitz's fog and friction in war are at work, ethical judgments should not be placed on those sometimes unforeseen consequences.

Ethics in the military is the means itself—the means to bring about the desired end of efficient and effective military power to serve national interests. One of the fundamental military concepts manifesting ethics into ends is captured by the West Point motto: "Duty, honor, country."¹⁰ Re-prioritizing these into honor, duty, country, Toner then transcribes them into ethical concepts military members should use as a guide to focus efforts appropriately: principle, purpose, and people.¹¹ In other words, one's honor involves living according to one's principles. Duty is then linked to purpose, and finally, is the need to focus efforts on behalf of people—one's countrymen. By concentrating efforts and loyalty to principle, purpose, and people, military members will more effectively work through bureaucratic barriers and dueling duties to maintain good ethical standards. Approved solutions are in many respects anathema to ethical issues, and Toner's typology is but a helpful suggestion to promote ethical conduct.

Another similar idea comes from General Matthew Ridgway, whose priority is "country-service-superior."¹² These concepts are important considerations in the quest for interservice ethics, but only if put into practice. Thus, continual practice to gain ethical "strength of will" under difficult circumstances becomes a critical issue.¹³ According to Rushworth Kidder, in his noteworthy book, *How Good People Make Tough*

Choices, the process is ongoing and requires “ethical fitness” to strengthen the atmosphere of separating right from wrong.¹⁴

Integrity

Whether determining the ethics of an act through its object—intent—circumstance or manifesting the act through principle—purpose—people, a key underlying concept is integrity. Integrity is “forthright honesty” or “soundness of moral principle.”¹⁵ Toner calls it wholeness, because it involves more than just partial truth. He also refers to “responsability” in relation to integrity, because it is the ability to respond in all situations according to the right ethical orientation.¹⁶ Charles Myers argues in a seminal article on core values that the integrity-link to jointness “on the hill” is obvious: “Decisions about the procurement and employment of weapon systems, for example, must be based on full and exact reports about the system’s performance.”¹⁷ Thus, although the military pays much attention to integrity *of* command, each service must also be concerned with integrity *in* command.

Core Values

In order to practice integrity in each command and institutionalize ethical conduct, military services have established particular “core values” to guide member performance. According to Huntington, a value is appropriately part of the professional military ethic “if it is derived from the particular expertise, responsibility, and organization of the military profession.”¹⁸ This concept would then seem to be a useful guide in determining service values. For the Air Force, those values were first formally introduced by the Dean of Faculty at the Air Force Academy, Brigadier General Ruben A. Cubero, and then

adopted by the rest of the Air Force: “Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence In All We Do.” The Army maintains a different list of core values: “Duty, Loyalty, Selfless Service, Honor, Courage, Respect, and Integrity.” Geared to produce effectiveness in combat, the Navy and Marine Corps have the same core values: “Honor, Courage, and Commitment.” Table 1 shows service core values in relation to each other.

Table 1. Service Core Values

AIR FORCE	ARMY	MARINES	NAVY
Integrity First	Integrity		
Service Before Self	Selfless Service	Commitment	Commitment
Excellence in all we do	Duty		
	Honor	Honor	Honor
	Personal Courage	Courage	Courage
	Loyalty		
	Respect		

These three lists contain fundamentally important concepts similar in some respects, but different in others. The difference raises interesting questions. Why do all members of the profession of arms not have the same bedrock ethical foundation in the same core values? Are interservice differences again impacting procedure even to the point of affecting published ethical standards?

Despite differences in core values, published standards at the joint level promote moral courage and ethical conduct. It would be helpful if they also specifically addressed

interservice relations. Joint Publication (Pub) 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,” states that team begins with integrity, calling it the “cornerstone for building trust.”¹⁹ The document continues, military service is based on values—integrity, competence, physical courage, moral courage, and teamwork—common to all the services and the bedrock of combat success.²⁰ The primary joint regulation on ethics, DoD Directive 5500.7, “Standards of Conduct Joint Ethics Regulation,” is primarily concerned with financial matters.²¹ Interestingly, the section on ethical conduct is in chapter 12, in the last four pages of a 160-page document. Also, this “single source of standards of ethical conduct and ethics guidance,” contains different *values* than the ones embraced as “core” by each separate service.

The joint ethics regulation attempts to tie together conceptually ethics and values, stating: “Ethics are standards by which one should act based on values. Values are core beliefs such as duty, honor, and integrity that motivate attitudes and actions. Ethical values relate to what is right and wrong....”²² The document then lists primary ethical values. *Honesty* is being truthful, straightforward, and candid. *Integrity* is being faithful to one’s convictions, following principles, and acting with honor. *Loyalty* is faithfulness and devotion, balancing interests, values, and institutions to promote national harmony. *Accountability* is accepting responsibility for decisions and their consequences. *Fairness* is open-minded impartiality. *Caring* is showing compassion. *Respect* is treating people with dignity. *Promise keeping* is keeping commitments. *Responsible citizenship* is exercising discretion and acting within bounds of authority. Finally, *pursuit of excellence* is setting the example of superior diligence and commitment in striving beyond mediocrity. This list contains valuable concepts for healthy interservice relations, and the

regulation emphasizes ethical conduct even to the point of stating DoD personnel should “be prepared to fall somewhat short of some goals for the sake of ethics and other considerations.”²³

Yet, evidence suggests within the services nobody dare fall short, and fine-sounding ethical pronouncements are disregarded when it comes to protecting funding, roles, and functions. For example, in a recent Air War College paper an author argues against joint doctrine, as established in Joint Publication (PUB) 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” stating it is corrupt, serving parochial service interests. As to why there is discrepancy between regulatory intent and interservice practice, part of the answer may be services concentrating on “values” rather than more fundamental “virtues.”

The problem with values is they can be situational—culturally driven and temporal. And as discussed above, relativism has shortcomings when it comes to ethics—and values. Values are dictated by profit and by circumstance, because they are based on “valuation” or worth. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a value as something “worthy of esteem for its own sake; that which has intrinsic worth.” The worth, strength, or excellence of the military is important, but it should be moral and ethical for reasons that go beyond its worth. For under certain circumstances, perhaps again in conditions of interservice rivalry, less than ethical behavior could lead to improved end-strength or worth. Business as a whole is concerned entirely with one issue—worth—and yet the business world is not well known for ethical practices. As one author notes, the National Socialists of Germany in 1940 had integrity, were excellent in what they did, and practiced service before self.²⁴

Core “values” do not promote the moral factor necessary in military ethics. On the other hand, “virtues” do. Furthermore, Toner argues that values simply do not go deep enough because they are focused on means rather than ends.²⁵ The issue of morality is that of linking means to ends in terms of three things: agent, act, and outcome. Since our services certainly desire to be moral agents doing moral acts to effect morally ethical outcomes, perhaps they should at least rename their core values “core virtues.”

Virtues

Integral to ethics and integrity is virtue, another concept with varied definitions and referring to different personal and institutional qualities. Yet, virtue is neither temporal nor linked to end-value. Bridging the gap between ethics and virtue, author William Frankena proposes there are “ethics of duty” and “ethics of virtue.”²⁶ Ethics of duty involves blind obedience and obligation, but ethics of virtue is based on motive rather than result—and therefore better inculcates the moral factor of ethics into conduct.

The following definition of virtue also imbeds the “ethic” concept: “doing one’s duty regardless of personal cost or interest . . .the *ethical* obligation to put military duties first.”²⁷ This is particularly fundamental to the military, in terms of courage. Students of war have learned that paramount to the soldier’s courage on the battlefield is the desire not to let down fellow comrades in arms. That bond, so vital to courage, clearly fails when lack of ethics and unhealthy rivalry exist. Thus, in terms of virtues, ethics is a root of courage in the military.

More than values, virtue has long been linked to the military profession. In pre-Christian Rome “virtu” stood for manliness or “military courage and intelligence

combined with civic responsibility and personal integrity.”²⁸ Then later, under Christian influence virtue meant “humility and cheerful acceptance of suffering rather than . . . aggressive self-assertion by force.”²⁹ According to Machiavelli, it was “military valor.”³⁰ In relation to its Italian roots, “virtu” meant a taste for finery. For example, in 19th-Century Italy, Nicolo Paganini was one of the more famous *virtuosi* violinists. In this early concept of the word, however, there was still distinction between refined excellence and values based on morality. In Greece, virtue was *Areté*, which stood for goodness, excellence, and “a state of character concerned with choice, . . . [it was] rational principle (logos).”³¹ Hence, *Areté* was more “practical wisdom” than moral wisdom, and thus the military officer needed to have not just *Areté*, but ethical *Areté*. Toner sums up the issue nicely with his definition of the virtue, integrity, as soundness of moral principle.³²

Therefore virtue is similar to value in that it stands for worth, but more specifically, it is moral worth or general moral excellence. It is not only right thinking, but requires right action as well. As mentioned above, philosophers through the ages identified a variety of concepts as virtues. For example, integrity, excellence, steadfastness, and courage are common virtues. Yet, for purposes of establishing ethical guidance for joint activities in the profession of arms, virtues can be distilled into four “cardinal” virtues.

The four cardinal virtues—prudence, courage, temperance, and justice—are ancient concepts, perhaps as old as the profession of arms. In Plato’s *Symposium* the doctrine of virtue is founded on this four-fold intellectual framework.³³ Balanced virtue, as represented by these cardinal facets, is also seen in the *Republic*, when Glaucon discusses with Socrates the concept of the cardinal virtue *justice* in terms of the duality of a good guardian: high-spirited, yet gentle at the same time.³⁴

Justice involves three relationships fundamental to social existence: individual to individual, individual to institution (or society), and institution to individual. The first relationship is “reciprocal,” the second is “legal,” and the third is “ministering.”³⁵ All three necessitate integrity and morally right action between military members, between members and their services, and between sister services. In order for jointness to work, there simply must be justice at all levels. Jointness fails this cardinal virtue, for example, when, as Perry Smith notes, “some people will never lie for themselves, but they’ll lie for the institution.”³⁶ This is very dangerous today as people are deceived into rationalizing lies as an acceptable part of being a team player. As Aristotle notes, the reason justice works is due to its common perception among the polis.³⁷ In other words, only when military services all have confidence that mutual justice will exist, can they work effectively together. If there is any perception of doubt due to interservice rivalry, then the system becomes unhealthy.

Prudence (or wisdom) is the foundational virtue for the other three, since it is via sound reasoning that people commit themselves to justice, temperance, and courage.³⁸ Prudence involves what Clausewitz calls *coup d’oeil*—the ingenious ability to grasp the obvious, to see through the fog, and to anticipate the unexpected. In terms of interservice relations, prudence involves unbiased perception, purity, and candor. It is intelligence tempered by morality.

Fortitude is bravery under conditions of vulnerability.³⁹ It is “readiness to fall in battle,” provided that such sacrifice is for a good or just cause. History is full of reckless or immoral acts that led to the death of soldiers. Those acts are not virtuous. Therefore, the moral motive is the key to bravery in terms of a cardinal virtue, and this is where

fortitude is linked fundamentally to prudence. Military services desire bravery, but it needs to be moral.

The final cardinal virtue, *temperance*, involves balance and moderation. Specifically, it is avoiding extremes that may be tangential issues to the larger mission. Temperance focuses on whole situations rather than component parts.⁴⁰ The individual or unit with temperance has a systemic perspective, thinking less of him/herself, and more of the greater good. Thus, temperance promotes strategic thinking and cohesiveness—critical issues in terms of effective jointness. For example, temperance is the ability to see beyond just winning resources for the service. It is working to obtain the best resource mix for the whole nation. In armed conflict, temperance promotes winning the war, not just winning the battle. Temperance can therefore be tied to the concern for desired end-states and effects.

Promoting cardinal virtues might not be the end-all cure to unite ethics regulations and interservice relations, but it might improve service focus on joint ethics just as the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been effective in instilling other types of joint conduct.

Notes

¹ Thomas Begines, “Special Trust and Confidence,” *Ethics & National Defense; The Timeless Issues*, James C. Gaston and Janis Bren Hietala, eds. (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993), 6.

² James H. Toner, *True Faith and Allegiance; The Burden of Military Ethics* (The University of Press of Kentucky, 1995), 9-17.

³ William Ebstein, ed., *Great Political Thinkers, Plato to the Present*, 4th ed. (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1969), 284.

⁴ Polybius, “The Histories.” in *Great Political Thinkers, Plato to the Present*, 4th ed., William Ebstein, ed. (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1969), 122.

⁵ Charles R. Myers, “The Core Values: Framing and Resolving Ethical Issues for the Air Force,” *Air Power Journal* (Spring, 1997), 50.

⁶ Perry Smith, “Leadership and Ethics: a Practitioner’s View.” *Moral Obligation and the Military* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1988), 136-8.

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⁷ Dr. James H. Toner, faculty forum lecture, 3 September 1998, Air War College, Air University.

⁸ Kermit D. Johnson, "Ethical Issues of Military Leadership." in *The Parameters of Military Ethics*, Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown eds. (Washington D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's), 74.

⁹ Toner lecture. In particular, Toner warns against falling into the "fallacy of false dichotomy"—between absolutes and relatives.

¹⁰ Arthur J. Dyck, "Ethical Bases of the Military Profession." *Parameters*, 10 March 1980, 43.

¹¹ Toner, *True Faith and Allegiance*, 100.

¹² Marshall, 81.

¹³ Marshall, 154.

¹⁴ Rushworth M. Kidder, *How Good People Make Tough Choices* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1995), 57.

¹⁵ Myers, 47; and Toner, *True Faith and Allegiance*, 70.

¹⁶ Toner, *True Faith and Allegiance*, 101.

¹⁷ Myers, 47.

¹⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), 61.

¹⁹ Joint Publication (Pub) 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, 10 January 1995, vi-vii.

²⁰ Joint Publication 1, ii-1.

²¹ DoD Directive 5500.7 "Standards of Conduct Joint Ethics Regulation," Office of the Secretary of Defense, August 1993.

²² DoD Directive 5500.7, 155.

²³ DoD Directive 5500.7, 157.

²⁴ Myers, 40.

²⁵ Toner interview.

²⁶ William K. Frankena, *Ethics*. 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 63.

²⁷ Myers, 47.

²⁸ William Ebsstein, ed., *Great Political Thinkers, Plato to the Present* (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1969), 285-6.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Aristotle, *The Politics of Aristotle*, ed. and trans. Ernest Barker (London: Oxford University Press, 1978), lxxiv-lxxv.

³² Toner, *True Faith and Allegiance*, 70.

³³ Joseph Pieper, *The Four Cardinal Virtues* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965), xi.

³⁴ Plato, *The Republic*, Book II, in *Great Dialogues of Plato*, trans. W.H.D. Rouse, ed. Eric H. Warmington and Philip G. Rouse (New York: The New English Library Limited, 1956), 172.

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- ³⁵ Pieper, 71.
- ³⁶ Smith, 138-9.
- ³⁷ Aristotle, 137.
- ³⁸ Pieper, 3.
- ³⁹ Pieper, 117.
- ⁴⁰ Pieper, 146-7.

Chapter 5

Implementing Purple Virtues

Establishing joint cardinal virtues through leadership, education, and a code of virtues will help dissuade unhealthy interservice rivalry and promote the kind of ethical competition that enhances jointness. The most important factor in this process is the leader at all levels in the chain of command.

The leader, according to Perry Smith, is the key to instilling unit integrity and maintaining it.¹ Admiral James Stockdale believes good leaders must be moralists, and Toner says the military must have a union of leadership and virtue.² This is what Toner calls the “ethics of leadership.”³ He states, “Leaders must be able to respond to the chief challenge of leadership: being technically and tactically and ethically proficient.” The reason this is such a leadership challenge is that people cannot “touch, taste, or feel” ethics.⁴ Yet, through inspiring leadership they must learn to “feel” it in the affective domain.

The leader is the one who must fight against subordinates’ inclination to abandon moral ethics in embracing the dictum, “what works is right.”⁵ The leader must ease moral tension by placing into perspective the military’s “hierarchical responsibilities.”⁶ Brigadier General Malham M. Wakin describes the “transformational” view of leadership as the leader’s responsibility and role to foster cooperation in mission accomplishment

vice adversarial relationships.⁷ This relates to joint cooperation. Finally, the leader is the key personal example of ethical character, because without an ethical boss there is little hope for ethical conduct in the unit.⁸

In addition to the leader’s personal example, there must be an educational methodology of some kind to promote desired conduct. As William J. Bennett states, people are not born with virtues; they must be learned.⁹ Arguably, they can also be unlearned. Therefore, an educational process must be continual and effective to promote cardinal virtues in interservice relations.

Another rationale for continual education is that people do not have time to read Aristotle in the heat of battle.¹⁰ Yet, as one author notes, the educational process is complicated, involving both the theoretical and the practical. To be effective it must probe the uncomfortable and morally ambiguous issues, rather than flee from them. Finally, ethics education is difficult in that professionals often resent and are resistant to ethics education.¹¹

Yet, there is one tool that may be valuable to leadership’s role in cardinal virtues education. That tool is a code.

Table 2. Possible Cardinal Virtues Code of Ethics

CARDINAL VIRTUES	Military Service is Commitment to:
Prudence	Unbiased Judgment; Showing Discretion
Courage	Moral Self-sacrifice in the Face of Danger
Temperance	Balance and Restraint; Nation above Self or Service
Justice	Truthfulness and Fair Action in all Circumstances

A Cardinal Virtues Code may be useful in promoting healthy interservice relations. Any code is like a spiritual and moral rallying point as well as a check on action. It is a professional's rule of conduct—understood as important despite its restricting function.

People tend to have a love-hate relationship with rules and check-lists. For example, motorists may dislike speed limits, but they appreciate the fact that highways are safer when drivers follow the rules. To further the illustration, however, many motorists will not follow speed limits unless they are enforced. To date, the services and congress have tried to develop various consensus-building mechanisms, such as the Program Objective Memorandum in PPBS and the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.¹² These programs can be criticized as artificial enforcers; nevertheless, like the highway patrol and speed limits, they serve their purposes. The ethical questions that arise are “Can we, and do we wish to artificially enforce ethics?”

There are arguments for and against a cardinal virtue code. Samuel Huntington, who describes “professional ethics” itself in terms of a code governing behavior, says associational professions, such as law and medicine, have written codes, but bureaucratic professions like the military have more general senses of collective professional responsibility.¹³ Wakin has reservations, as does Toner, about a code of virtuous conduct, believing it could conflict with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). William Diehl prefers a written code of ethics over the present unwritten one for two reasons: it would stand the test of time, and it would be tangible evidence that the military is serious about embracing ethics.¹⁴ Another proponent of a code of ethics states it is better to have moral obligations “spelled out and defended than assumed or

ignored.”¹⁵ According to Kidder, ethical codes are valuable in that they provide people shared reference points.”¹⁶

A cardinal virtues code would most likely be a type of “creedal code,” promoting a joint ethical renaissance in the military of the new millennium. Such a code would not compete with or replace the function of the UCMJ. It would not be a legal entity, but rather, an educational one serving to inculcate into new members the desired perspective and to continually remind the rest of the military where they should stand. A code of ethics should not promote narrow-mindedness, but serve as a springboard to moral thinking that is essential to the profession of arms.¹⁷ As Richard George states, “No code . . . should be accepted and followed uncritically.”¹⁸

Just as the Code of Conduct serves to support and guide the conduct of soldiers from all the services, particularly in prisoner-of-war (POW) status, the cardinal code would promote interservice relations by serving and guiding the conduct of other “POWs” (Prisoners of Washington).

Regardless of logic, educational plan, and leadership emphasis behind a code of virtues, it may still be difficult or impossible to get military members to embrace such a code. Therefore, a good “plan B” might be to use the time-honored West Point motto, “Duty, Honor, Country” as a foundation for joint ethics. As mentioned above, this motto comes much closer to an ethical typology or equation than do core “values,” particularly when those values are service specific.

According to military ethicist Anthony Hartle, Duty-Honor-Country provides linkage between the commission, the oath of office, and the professional military ethic. It is the

motto of the “traditional idealistic code” unique to an American military founded on strength of character and universal equality rather than nobility.¹⁹

“Duty, Honor, Country” is enduring and has the necessary moral implications. Most likely, military members of the profession of arms, regardless of service, would be willing to accept that motto as their own. Whether code or motto, the military needs a common ethical bond in order to enhance harmonious and effective jointness.

Notes

¹ Perry Smith, “Leadership and Ethics: A Practitioner’s View,” in *Moral Obligation and the Military* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1988), 137.

² James H. Toner, “Leadership, Community, and Virtue,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 11 (Spring 1996), 103.

³ Toner, “Leadership, Community, and Virtue,” 101.

⁴ Douglas A. Martz, “Professional Military Ethics.” *Marine Corps Gazette* (August 1990), 58.

⁵ Kermit D. Johnson, “Ethical Issues of Military Leadership.” *Parameters*, 4, no. 2, (1974), 36.

⁶ Michael Walzer, “Two Kinds of Military Responsibility,” in *The Parameters of Military Ethics*, Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown, eds. (Washington D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), 68.

⁷ Malham M. Wakin, “The Ethics of Leadership II,” in *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, 2nd ed., Malham M. Wakin, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 200.

⁸ Johnson, 38.

⁹ William J. Bennett, ed. *The Book of Virtues* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 12.

¹⁰ James C. Gaston and Jamis Bren Heitala, eds., *Ethics & National Defense; The Timeless Issues* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993), 140.

¹¹ Gaston and Heitala, 135-6.

¹² Sharon K. Weiner, “The Politics of Resource Allocation in the Post-Cold War Pentagon,” *Security Studies*, vol. 5, no. 4 (Summer 1996), 130-132.

¹³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), 10 and 61.

¹⁴ William F. Diehl, “Ethics and Leadership: The Pursuit Continues.” *Military Review*, (April 1985), 36-42.

¹⁵ Richard T. DeGeorge, “The Need for a Military Code of Ethics.” *Army* (December 1984), 30.

¹⁶ Rushworth M. Kidder, *How Good People Make Tough Choices* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1995), 99.

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¹⁷ Toner, 89.

¹⁸ *Military Ethics: Reflections on Principles—the Profession of Arms, Military Leadership, Ethical Practices, War and Morality, Educating the Citizen Soldier* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987), 28.

¹⁹ Anthony E. Hartle, *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 44-47.

Chapter 6

SUMMARY and CONCLUSION

Napoleon Bonaparte was as great as a man can be without virtue.

—Tocqueville

Just as one of history's greatest leaders succumbed largely to a tragic flaw, so too might the American military suffer from an ethical breakdown. Interservice competition is here to stay, but unhealthy interservice rivalry need not remain. A helpful cure involves establishing a more effective joint focus on ethical conduct between the services. A code of cardinal virtues or the West Point motto would help in that process.

Some have argued that truly effective jointness would require reorganizing into just one military service. That would not solve the problem. It would simply serve to replace interservice parochial rivalry with intra-service functional rivalry. As long as there are different types of fighting in different mediums—land, water, air, information, and space—there will be rivalry. With one military service, different branches would compete for functions and funding just as the different services do today.

Besides, interservice rivalry is not a bad thing. Competition between services produces innovation and efficiency. It is unhealthy rivalry that harms jointness. That can be reduced without going to one military service.

Presently the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines have different core values. This is dysfunctional, considering each service is part of the same military profession, and each service's functional differences do not require different core values. The core values are also limited in effecting joint ethical conduct because values are not enough. They are situationally tied to worth and lack a moral domain. On the other hand, virtues are more appropriate as an ethical bedrock. The four cardinal virtues first established in ancient Greece—prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice—could be inculcated into a cardinal virtues code for all the services. In the absence of such a code, it would still be preferable to replace different core values with the respected motto of West Point: “Duty, Honor, Country.” This motto implies virtuous concepts that could provide an ethical foundation and a common bond for all the military services. With solid backing from leadership and a continual educational process, jointness will benefit from reduced unhealthy interservice rivalry.

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