

**Military Implications of Human Security:
The Case of South Africa**

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Introduction

Since its popularization by the United Nations in the early 1990s, “human security” has become a concept with significant implications for national policymakers, and national leaders in several countries have made it a foundation of their foreign policy. Yet it remains a controversial idea. One of its most widely criticized aspects is the difficulty of “operationalizing” it – translating complex, ambitious (and sometimes conflicting) components into policy that mobilizes institutions, instruments and sectors.

When the Republic of South Africa transitioned to majority rule in 1994, one of its most dramatic achievements was a fundamental redefinition of the national conception of “security.” After an exhaustive process of internal consultation – possibly the most comprehensive by any liberal democracy on record - South Africa published a series of documents in the 1990s that unambiguously announced its embrace of a human security agenda. And while the successes of the new policies have been uneven at best, the country has endeavored to reflect the new security paradigm in its domestic and foreign policies. South Africa’s choices after 1994 have had profound implications for the roles and missions of its armed forces, the particular interest of this paper.

Almost by definition, “human security” directs attention away from the traditional “security” institutions of the state – military, police and intelligence – and towards those that most directly promote human development, opportunity and wellbeing of local communities and individual citizens. Agencies that advance human rights and economic development take precedence. So adoption of a robust human security agenda raises questions about the relevance of a state’s coercive agencies. The experiences of countries like South Africa offer useful insights into the “art of the possible” for connecting military establishments to human security programs.

This paper argues that South Africa has consciously applied “human security” thinking to its armed forces. This is evident in two key respects: first, in the country’s support for Africa’s emerging security architecture; and second, in an increasing willingness to commit military forces to external peace operations. However, this “operationalization” of human security has occurred at the national-strategic level. It is much less clear whether or not the South Africans are creating a “human security ethos” within the armed forces themselves.

By 2005 South Africa had given its new model of “security” a try in a tough neighborhood for over a decade. How that agenda worked out in the experience of its armed forces provides a case that should be of interest to the rest of the world.

What is “Human Security”?

The end of the Cold War unleashed a debate that had been growing for years, provoked by scholars and practitioners increasingly dissatisfied with traditional conceptualizations of “security.”¹ Earlier mainstream approaches had tended to limit security studies to

“...the threat, use and control of military force. . .” in the context of state-centered international competition.² But by the late 1970s, scholars had begun to contest the notion that the state should be the referent object and were arguing that conventional approaches failed to capture the reality of a proliferating cast of actors and circumstances that posed a variety of threats to individual human beings.³ These views gained an increasing following through the 1980s, and by the early 1990s, the new thinking began to take hold amongst policymakers in several countries.⁴

An early milestone in the success of the new approaches occurred in 1993, with the publication of the United Nations Development Program’s annual Human Development Report that promulgated the “human security” formula,⁵ a phrase given even a sharper definition in the following year’s report.⁶ Though it remained controversial and subject to varying definition, the “human security” paradigm subsequently became something of a benchmark for an emerging new model of “security,” so it is appropriate to briefly review how this concept was framed in the 1994 UNDP publication. That document offered a qualifying discussion, castigating the inadequacies of earlier thinking on the subject:

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people. . .Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people. . .For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards.⁷

In contrast to this purportedly discredited “older thinking,” the UNDP offered a paradigm derived from the innovative new approaches, calling it “human security” and portraying it as a “people-centered” (rather than state-centered). Its most basic components were “freedom from fear and freedom from want.” This kind of “security” offered safety from “chronic threats” like hunger, disease and political repression as well as “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life.” According to the UNDP, the new model required two levels of urgent change by the societies of the world: “. . .from exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security. . .[and] from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development.”⁸

The 1994 UNDP document argued that human security required the attenuation of a wide range of threats to people.⁹ These were grouped under several constituent parts:

- *Economic security*, that assured every individual a minimum requisite income
- *Food security*, that guaranteed “physical and economic access to basic food”
- *Health security*, that guaranteed a minimum protection from disease and unhealthy lifestyles
- *Environmental security*, that protected people from the short and long-term ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature and deterioration of the natural environment
- *Personal security*, that protected people from physical violence, whether from the state, from external states, from violent individuals and sub-state actors, from

domestic abuse, from predatory adults or even from the individual himself/herself (as in protection from suicide)

- *Community security*, that protected people from loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic violence
- *Political security*, that assured people could “. . .live in a society that honours their basic human rights”

One of the most profound arguments in the UNDP formula was the shift in responsibility for the new kind of security. It could not neither be imposed by the state nor donated by the state. It was available only through a genuine, synergistic partnership between civil society and the public sector. It required the purposive collaboration of individuals, civil society in local communities, international organizations and state institutions.

While the publication of the new UNDP formula was a dramatic development, the new thinking did not appear out of whole cloth: it simply followed and (to a degree) institutionalized a perspective that already had been widely debated in the scholarly literature. Nor did the UNDP endorsement of this paradigm end the debates about security. In the UNDP conceptualization, human security was intended to be the dominant security paradigm – it was to take precedence over any other kind of “security.” But not all proponents of the broad new definitions agreed with this taxonomy, or with the UN list of the component parts. Some were inclined to accord “national security” an equivalent status. Nor did “human security” mean the same thing to all who used the phrase. Security continued to be a “contested” concept, and the broad new definitions were criticized by scholars and practitioners on a variety of grounds.¹⁰ However, the UN backing was a powerful encouragement to supporters. Secretary General Kofi Annan was a particularly vigorous advocate, and his tenure as Secretary General saw the human security concept embedded in the formal structures of the world body.¹¹

Africans were prominent among the early supporters of the new “security” thinking. Two years before the UNDP endorsed “human security,” the celebrated *Kampala Document* promulgated by the African Leadership Forum (and supported by the Organization of African Unity and United Nations) declared “security” to be fundamentally about the capability of the “. . .individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights,” a definition very close to the later UNDP conceptualization.¹² This perspective gained ground on the African Continent and the mid 1990s saw human security themes prominent in the thinking of a wide range of African scholars.¹³ By the early years of the 21st Century, the new African Union had agreed on a Common African Defence and Security Policy with a particularly nuanced and robust articulation its human security foundations.¹⁴

The new thinking resonated elsewhere as well. In 1999, a group of countries along with scholars and policy advocates, launched the Human Security Network,¹⁵ supporting its agenda with annual ministerial-level meetings.¹⁶ By 2005, the Network included twelve countries: Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia and Thailand. South Africa was participating as an

“observer.” The Human Security Network sees itself as an “informal, flexible” mechanism for “collective action,” bringing “international attention to new and emerging issues.” It seeks to apply a “human security perspective” to “energize political processes aimed at preventing or solving conflicts and promoting peace and development.” It has involved itself in a variety of international issues, including campaigns to eliminate landmines, control flows of small arms, establish of the International Criminal Court, offer human rights education and human rights law, fight international crime, and find solutions to the epidemic of HIV/AIDS.¹⁷

While the Human Security Network had by 2005 become a significant actor in its own right, countries that participate in it also have demonstrated an active individual commitment to the new security paradigm. One of the earliest was South Africa, seeking to redefine its own security policies in the wake of majority rule in 1994.¹⁸ Several years later, Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi sought to make human security the defining characteristic of Japanese foreign policy, instituting in 1998 a “Trust Fund for Human Security” in the UN Secretariat and funding it generously.¹⁹ By 2000, Canada also had made “human security” the foundation of its foreign policy, defining it as “safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. . .characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety or even their lives.”²⁰ Canadian diplomatic effort and foreign aid was backing the new emphasis with significant national resources.²¹ Other countries, ranging from Austria to Switzerland, followed suit.

The new paradigm received a significant, ringing endorsement in September 2004, when the European Union published the Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, entitled “*A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*,” calling for a “human security [crisis] response force.” The proposed force would mainly be composed of civilian specialists skilled in conflict prevention and social reconstruction. Even its small military component would be heavily imbued with a human security ethic. While it still was too early in 2005 to anticipate the implementation of these proposals, the idea itself had begun to resonate powerfully among intellectuals and policymakers in Western Europe.²² It probably is unwise to dismiss this approach merely as a resort to “soft power” by a community imbued with a “psychology of weakness.” Their embrace of human security thinking indicates that Europeans are looking at the world – and their role in it – in a significantly new way.²³

The human security concept has become a global issue and an approach increasingly endorsed by non-governmental organizations and scholars. It is attractive to a wide constituency and a growing global intelligentsia. It has the unqualified support of the world’s preeminent international organization – the United Nations – and has spawned a variety of multi-national initiatives. Yet despite the enthusiasm of its proponents, human security has not as yet provided a clear path to world peace. It is useful to recognize its limitations.

“Operationalizing” Human Security

The concept of human security has been attacked on a number of points. But the most serious difficulty with the model is methodological - how to “operationalize” it. As one of its most articulate proponents put it, the concept’s key deficiency is “. . .its tendency to remain a normative vision rather than a practical policy tool. . .”²⁴ The significant question is not “is it desirable?” but “is it feasible, and if so, how can it be implemented?”

Since the early 1990s, a growing world-wide interest in human security has resulted in considerable activity. Several countries have extensively readjusted their foreign policy to fit the new paradigm. Still others have backed a variety of projects and aid programs designed to promote human security objectives. Policymakers, activists, advocates and scholars have organized innumerable conferences and workshops. At least one country – Canada – has revised its military training seeking to inculcate a human security ethos into its armed forces.²⁵ Yet it is difficult to point to any troubled area of the world where “human security” actually has been achieved as part of a deliberate, coordinated effort. The professional literature has yet to offer good case in which some combination of actors effectively organized themselves across agencies and sectors to achieve success in all the component domains of human security. There still is a paucity of empirical proof that it can be achieved by deliberate design.

The “human security” paradigm describes a desirable alternative future, so its proponents may be justified in promoting it as a viable strategic end in itself. But the concept may be more useful as a means to an end. Following this logic, human security would provide the stepping stones along the route to something like community contentment or social peace. The human security framework may thus be particularly useful if it can be wielded as a tool to uncover the problems that must be fixed before a society could reasonably expect that contentment and peace. Its particular role would be to call attention to a destabilizing lack of adequate “security” in one or more of the component areas. In this conceptualization, “human security” serves more as an analytic device or guide to strategizing than an ultimate “end” in itself.²⁶

The authors recognize that case studies depicting the achievement of human security in the post Cold War world may be ambiguous and sparse. So they begin with the assumption that “operationalization” refers less to the implementation of human security than it does to the ways in which a particular government – or a national security establishment – rearranges its structures and operating principles in order to pursue human security objectives. Put another way, this study asks how structures, doctrine and behavior are different because of the institutional embrace of a human security framework. The results actually achieved on the ground by such changes are an important but secondary concern.

Within this definition, it should be possible to distinguish several levels of “operationalization.” One dimension clearly would be the degree to which a national government committed itself to the concept – manifested in policy at the “national/strategic” level. Even at this echelon, an interesting distinction would be

whether a government's human security initiatives were largely internal to the country or external to it; in other words, relevant to domestic or foreign policy (or both). In developed countries like Canada, Japan and Norway (where "human security" resonates strongly with the attentive public and national leaders) the societies as a whole enjoyed a high level community contentment and social peace long before the national leaders embraced a self-conscious human security agenda. In these developed nations, the "operationalization" of human security may be more evident in foreign than in domestic policy. It may be reflected in an explicitly human development complexion in the country's foreign aid programs, or in the country's willingness to engage in international humanitarian relief and peace support operations. On the other hand, in a developing nation like South Africa, achievement of human security is a pressing internal priority, and conceivably could be manifested in domestic or foreign policy.

Another important distinction is the way institutions and agencies of the state (including but not limited to the coercive agencies) "signed on" to a human security perspective and proved willing to make the necessary changes to accommodate an explicitly human security agenda. This "organizational" level of analysis would assess specific modification of institutional culture and behavior in order to promote human development themes. Such adjustments of behavior may be evident (for instance) in organizational training programs, espoused values of the organization (codes of conduct, core values, organization vision), and organizational objectives, particularly in the organization's willingness to partner with other agencies. Still another level would be the degree to which individual members of participating agencies internalized the new values that supported a human security agenda.

This study is interested in all of these levels of analysis. In cases where a country's policymakers consider "human security" to be a strategic end-state (a desirable alternative future) the national political practice could reasonably be expected to reflect both a philosophical commitment and some implementing activity by government agencies in partnership with civil-society actors. If no such commitment exists at the national level, it still is possible to envision public sector institutions pursuing human security objectives; but lacking a national vision of a human security future, this would not comprise a real human security agenda. On the other hand, it also is possible to envision a country with senior leadership rhetorically committed to a human security agenda, yet without much implementing capacity. Here, the authors argue that effective implementation of a human security agenda would require both the philosophical commitment "at the top" and the "buy-in" of agencies and sectors within the society itself. This study particularly is interested in how a security sector "buys into" and "operationalizes" human security. However, it acknowledges the need to locate that sector within the wider realm of national policy and civil-military relations in order to see whether or not synergistic cooperation is occurring across sectors and agencies.

The embrace of a human security agenda by South Africa is one of the more interesting stories in its world-wide spread, and that is the story to which the study now turns.

A South African Backdrop: The Apartheid Years

South Africa's preoccupation with human security (as defined here) is a very recent phenomenon, one of the results of the country's political transition to majority rule in the mid 1990s. In fact, for much of the 20th Century, the country's foreign and domestic policies were at odds with contemporary notions of human security – so much so that the abrupt change at the end of the century was a notable occurrence in the annals of human relations. Some historical perspective is useful in understanding the dramatic nature of the change.

South Africa's national borders are a legacy of British imperial expansion in the 19th Century. The country emerged in 1910 as a self-governing union within the British Empire, a land with upwards of twenty indigenous ethnic groups and a minority settler population of European origin. By the mid 20th Century, its European minority constituted only about 15 percent of the population, but enjoyed exclusive political and economic access. Even so, the circumstances of colonial settlement had left profound social, economic and ideological divisions within the ruling white population. By 1948 South Africa's National Party had come to represent the more rural, conservative interests within the white community – a constituency that nurtured lingering historical resentments and considered itself significantly disenfranchised by previous governments.²⁷ The National Party's rise to power in that year was a catalyst for significant change, and the new government soon formalized a system of coercive, institutionalized racism under the rubric of ethnic “separate development” (*apartheid*) that denied non-whites basic rights and opportunities. Its strategic imperative was to maintain white privilege and secure the regime by whatever means necessary. This policy ultimately drove many South Africans into anti-regime activity and armed struggle.²⁸

When it came to power in South Africa in 1948, the National Party leadership seemed to sense that its domestic policies would alienate the country from its traditional partners. South Africa left the Commonwealth under pressure in 1961. By the mid 1950s, its leaders had concluded that the country's interests lay with the anti-communist West and they endeavored to cultivate security relationships with the United Kingdom and United States, even as newly independent countries in the developing world increasingly condemned South Africa's racial policies. By 1963, the United Nations had imposed the first of several arms sanctions.²⁹ Still, until the 1970s, the security concerns of white South Africans were greatly assuaged by the presence of white-ruled colonies on their borders. However, their security concerns grew as, one by one, the neighboring countries achieved independence and majority rule. By the mid 1970s South Africa had come to be widely regarded as a pariah state: even its former allies in the West had begun to distance themselves from it politically.

South Africa's entire perception of its geopolitical threat changed dramatically in 1975, when it intervened in the ongoing liberation struggle and civil war in Angola, a colony now on the brink of independence from Portugal. The Portuguese had been fighting a bitter counterinsurgency war in this colony since the early 1960s, ultimately finding

themselves opposed by three separate indigenous nationalist groups, each with its own insurgent army. A coup in Portugal in 1974 resulted in an almost immediate decision by the country's new rulers to rid themselves of their African possessions (including Angola).³⁰ Amidst escalating violence, Portugal quietly withdrew its official presence from that country in November 1975, ending four centuries of colonial rule.

With Portugal's imminent departure from Angola, South Africa and the United States threw their support to two of the three competing Angolan groups in a very loose cooperative effort.³¹ The Soviet Bloc backed the third.³² By late 1975, the Soviets were engaged in a massive airlift to supply their faction with sophisticated military hardware and Cuban ground and air forces. The United States provided small quantities military equipment, funding, and advice while the South Africans deployed a ground force into Angola to support their ally.³³ However, in early 1976, the United States halted its involvement and withdrew from the conflict.³⁴ By this point the South Africans confronted well-equipped Cuban expeditionary forces,³⁵ and though they fought well the operation exposed serious vulnerabilities in South African military materiel, logistics and organization for combat.³⁶ They withdrew from Angola in March 1976 with a profound sense of betrayal by their erstwhile American allies and a growing sense of strategic isolation.³⁷

South Africa's leaders reacted to the Angolan experience in a number of significant ways. One was a reappraisal of policy and a new security strategy.³⁸ Since the early 1970s, they had been consolidating security decision-making under a small group of senior political insiders.³⁹ These increasingly were drawn from the senior officials of the security agencies, a group with a very strong "military" complexion. This consolidation of power escalated as the decade progressed. A politically powerful but relatively unaccountable inner circle now made virtually all significant policy decisions. It came to be widely characterized as the government of the "securocrats," a term applied particularly to the Administration of P.W. Botha, South Africa's chief of state from 1978 to 1989. The clout of the "securocrats" was strengthened by the Angolan intervention.⁴⁰

After 1975 the country's leaders increasingly believed that they were alone in the face of a "Total Onslaught" by the Communist world, spearheaded by Moscow's subversive agents and its Cuban and African proxies. This conclusion was reinforced in 1976, when South Africa's disenfranchised black majority rose up in a protracted period of violent unrest.⁴¹ The government responded with a "Total National Strategy" that relied heavily on the coercive instruments of the state to maintain security at home and intimidate enemies abroad.⁴² Local scholars described the new strategy as "[operating] at political, economic and ideological levels, [affecting] every area of society, and [impinging] on the lives of all South Africans."⁴³

The "Total National Strategy" included an assumption that South Africa would receive minimal assistance from any external source, an assumption reinforced by the "mandatory" UN sanctions in 1977 on arms sales to South Africa.⁴⁴ South Africa now proved willing to attack its enemies by air and by special operations forces well beyond its national borders. The new strategy envisioned the destabilization of hostile

neighboring states and sponsorship of insurgencies.⁴⁵ The South Africans also increased their research into chemical and biological warfare and initiated a program to acquire nuclear weapons as an ultimate strategic deterrent.⁴⁶ At the same time, they undertook a concerted program to improve their military organization for combat and achieve self-sufficiency in production of military materiel. They perfected a massive arms industry and accelerated their efforts to field new generations of indigenously designed weapons, especially those providing greater firepower, armored protection and mobility. By the mid 1980s, the South African military establishment had developed an extraordinary amount of state-of-the-art materiel developed exclusively for its unique requirements and produced by its own arms industry.⁴⁷

The end of the Cold War was a watershed event in southern Africa as elsewhere, and the ability of the *apartheid* state to use its military prowess to forestall political change until that point was an achievement. However, the advent of the F.W. de Klerk government in 1989 spelled an imminent end to the old order.⁴⁸ De Klerk wasted little time in withdrawing from external conflicts⁴⁹ and scaling down the defense sector.⁵⁰ The state's defense budget was cut by over forty percent between 1989 and 1993.⁵¹ Defense procurement fell by 60 per cent in the same period.⁵² Between 1990 and 1993, South Africa discontinued its programs to develop nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles.⁵³ De Klerk's administration also marginalized those state institutions most responsible for implementing the "Total Strategy."⁵⁴

In 1990 de Klerk released the imprisoned Nelson Mandela, lifted the ban on the opposition African National Congress (ANC) and accelerated substantive negotiations with domestic opposition groups.⁵⁵ De Klerk and Mandela then jointly supervised a Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), initiated in 1991, that led to the adoption of new "interim" constitution in 1993 formally dismantling the structures of institutionalized racism.⁵⁶ A multiracial national election in April 1994 installed majority rule under Mandela's ANC-led government.

Implementing a National Human Security Agenda (1994-2005)

The African National Congress (ANC) government that came to power in South Africa in 1994 recognized a compelling mandate to undo the combined effects of state-sponsored violence, racial discrimination and inequitable distribution of wealth, all compounded by decades of corrosive internal strife. To its credit, the new leadership unambiguously acknowledged its responsibility for a massive program of internal human development to restore an environment of social harmony and material wellbeing. South Africa's leaders articulated a variety of commitments across the entire human security spectrum.

One of the pressing early priorities was assuring the public that the state would no longer use its coercive agencies to violate the rights of law-abiding citizens, reflected in a strong emphasis on human rights in the Interim Constitution of 1993 (and in the follow-on Constitution of 1996). Another priority was the elimination of the institutional structures of coercion like the State Security Council. Still another was reform of the state intelligence agencies that had been primary instruments of state violence against

citizens.⁵⁷ A benchmark indication of the country's new direction was the *White Paper on Intelligence* (October 1994), a document that shattered the earlier South African model for the role of intelligence agencies and boldly proclaimed that "National security should . . . encompass the basic principle and core values. . . essential to the quality of life, freedom, justice, prosperity and development."⁵⁸ "Intelligence" no longer meant "repression" in South Africa.

The new leaders faced a difficult conundrum when it came to justice for *apartheid* era atrocities. South Africa's ability to move forward depended on a seemingly incompatible combination of accountability for past crimes and forgiveness for their perpetrators. There was ample blame to go around: both the South African government and its opponents had engaged in egregious violations of human rights. Cultures of secrecy had left many families with anguishing uncertainty about the fate of loved ones. The country's solution was a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that set a remarkable precedent with world-wide implications. The Commission was authorized to grant amnesty to those who made full disclosure and provided evidence of genuine repentance for earlier acts. The Commission subsequently endured a fair amount of controversy, but its overall function has been remarkably therapeutic for the society as a whole.⁵⁹

The injustices and violence of the past were problems that required resolution after 1994, but a more pressing problem was the threat of criminal violence that did not end with the advent of majority rule. South African society continued to be traumatized by very high rates of violent crime. And while there were many contributing factors, the situation was worsened by the incapacity of a demoralized and discredited police establishment inherited from the *apartheid* era. South Africa's new leaders devoted substantial effort to reform of law enforcement and rehabilitation of policing.⁶⁰ Progress in the decade after majority rule was slow and uneven, and violent crime continued at a very high level. By 2005 some analysts were cautiously commending improvements in police capacity, although South Africans confronted with exposés of police corruption in mid 2005 still were painfully aware of continuing deficiencies in police ethics and professionalism.⁶¹

Human security thinking infused much of the national government structure after the advent of majority rule. It was evident in seemingly unexpected places like the Department of Environment and Tourism, whose development-related departmental vision spoke of "a prosperous and equitable society living in harmony with our resources;"⁶² or the imposition of counter-trade "offsets" for foreign materiel purchased by the South African government. (The offsets required foreign sellers to invest in South Africa's economy, with emphasis on the economic empowerment of formerly disadvantaged communities.)⁶³

The South African government after 1994 was particularly sensitive to the importance of economic development and economic opportunity. Prior to the advent of majority rule, the ANC and its political allies had agreed on a national Reconstruction and Development Strategy with a heavy human security emphasis. This strategy diverted state attention and resources primarily to human development, and it was this strategy that was now adopted to inform the development agenda of the new South Africa. The

approach was endorsed by the interim Constitution of 1993 and formally adopted as South Africa's *Reconstruction and Development Programme* in 1994.⁶⁴ The *Programme* guided the government's activities from 1994 onwards, and was rearticulated as the government's *Growth, Employment and Redistribution* (GEAR) strategy announced in mid 1996. These two documents were nothing less than a human security manifesto. They emphasized economic growth and employment for all, redistribution of the country's benefits with particular attention to opportunities for the "poor," access to adequate services such as health and education, and basic security for persons, property and livelihoods.

There were, of course, inevitable difficulties in fulfilling the many competing demands of the government's ambitious new mandate, exacerbated by unrealistically high expectations on the part of previously disadvantaged communities and resistance by various influential individuals and groups. In 2004, South Africa still suffered from a destabilizing unemployment rate of well over 25 per cent.⁶⁵ The government's emphasis on affirmative action programs led to widespread accusations of unwarranted favoritism and deterioration in state services. While the new government did not lack the will to make rapid, fundamental change, it had neither the resources nor the expertise to immediately and fully meet all the high expectations. By the early years of the 21st Century, South Africans were complaining that their government's rhetoric seldom matched the country's reality. But the national leadership had committed itself to an explicit human security agenda for national development, and by the end of the 20th Century had made progress in its pursuit.⁶⁶

South Africa's human security agenda was particularly evident in its domestic policies, but it soon was a key feature its foreign policy as well. In the years before majority rule, world approbation had contributed to South African policies that were often aggressively unilateralist. In stark contrast, the new national leadership viewed the country as one of the world's "middle powers" whose interests were best protected by a vigorous communitarianism. They now were strongly inclined to seek consultative multilateral solutions to international problems.⁶⁷ In the first few years after the advent of majority rule, South Africa ". . . joined, re-joined or acceded to some forty-five inter-governmental organizations and multi-lateral treaties" in addition to substantive engagement in diplomatic effort to reform international organizations such as the UN, International Monetary Fund and World Bank.⁶⁸

The new leaders also quickly endeavored to reconnect with the rest of Africa, calling for an African Renaissance and seeking to export the values now ensconced in their Constitution. These included the human security staples of human rights and freedoms, protection from discrimination in its various forms, the rule of law, primacy of constitutional guarantees, and the liberal democratic norms of universal suffrage, government responsiveness and transparency. However, the responses of other African leaders to South African initiatives were mixed at best.⁶⁹

Among other things, the South Africans soon were criticized by other Africans for failing to match their advocacy with substantive foreign aid (although given the country's

pressing internal needs such an expectation probably was naïve and unfair). They also were criticized by Western countries for their reluctance to engage immediately in peace operations in Africa, a disparagement that failed to recognize the country's sensitivities to lingering regional fears of South African hegemony. Even so, immediately after the advent of majority rule, the country began to participate in regional development and security forums such as the South African Development Community and the African Union. It quickly established a variety of development-oriented relationships with other African countries ranging from management of shared water resources to transfrontier wildlife conservancies to trans-national health programs. The commitment to a human security agenda was not restricted to the country's political leadership, nor was confined to the executive branch of government. A flurry of legislative activity backed the same agenda.

In keeping with human security thinking, many of South Africa's links to the rest of the continent came as initiatives from civil society, and it is very important to credit the role of South African non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in promoting human security thinking both in South Africa and elsewhere on the continent. As envisioned in the original UNDP paradigm, human security requires the synergistic partnership of public and private sector institutions. Particularly after 1994, a diverse community of South African-based NGOs became very active in human development, health and environmental concerns in South Africa itself and outside the country's borders, some faith oriented, some distinctly secular.

South African scholars played a critical role in spreading the new thinking about "security" in the South Africa and the region as a whole.⁷⁰ Linkages between academe and government in South Africa continued to reinforce that relationship. The scholars established multiple connections to agencies, actors and governments elsewhere in Africa and forged rich webs of connections to world-wide "communities of practice" for research and initiatives in human development, conflict resolution and government reform. Institutions involved in such efforts included the Centre for Conflict Resolution associated with the University of Cape Town,⁷¹ and the Centre for Defence and Security Management, part of the Graduate School for Public and Development Management at the University of Witwatersrand.⁷² South Africa is one of the few countries on the continent with influential "think tanks" like the Institute for Security Studies whose advice is sought by governments and regional organizations and whose studies, conferences and consultation have consistently stressed the merits of a human security approach.⁷³ South Africa has a public sector scientific establishment represented in the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) whose subordinate agencies are engaged in research, consulting and program development across a wide spectrum of human development activities in Africa, ranging from river basin management to community policing.⁷⁴

From the advent of majority rule, the South Africans found themselves pressured from various quarters to participate in efforts to resolve or prevent regional conflict. Despite the intensity of these pressures, the new leaders at first proceeded cautiously, fearful that other African countries would suspect hegemonic inclinations and devious motives.

However, by 1999, the government had sufficient confidence to publish a *White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions*,⁷⁵ a remarkable document commissioned by the Department of Foreign Affairs in compiled in consultation with other departments, Parliament and civil society.⁷⁶ It was infused with human security thinking, calling specific attention to broadening notions of “security” that ideally should include “. . . political, economic, social, cultural and personal security.” It argued that solutions to instability required “. . . effective governance, robust democracies and ongoing economic and social development.”⁷⁷ The *White Paper* analyzed international peace operations in general, noting the requirements for civilian experts, civil police and military forces of various kinds, and arguing that South Africa should be prepared to furnish personnel in each of these categories.⁷⁸ It also analyzed and recommended criteria for South African participation.⁷⁹ This *White Paper* was a milestone in South African thinking on human security-related engagement with the rest of the Continent.

One specific result of the *White Paper’s* recommendations was the creation of a National Office for the Co-ordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) within the Department of Foreign Affairs. This body was chartered to coordinate the cross-departmental and cross-sectoral communications that were supposed to occur before the country committed itself to international peace operations. However, this process appeared somewhat dysfunctional in 2005 – the Office of the President making most of the substantive decisions on such issues with little outside consultation.⁸⁰ Even so, by 2005 South Africa had become significantly engaged in regional peace operations, having deployed peacekeeping contingents or observers as far afield as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sudan and Ethiopia.⁸¹ The country also had hosted consultations between warring parties in Burundi, Congo and Côte d’Ivoire.

By 2005, South Africa’s primary contribution to human security outside its borders seemed to be its growing involvement in Africa’s rapidly evolving regional security architecture and its commitment to regional peace operations, particularly the latter.⁸² These contributions were given a very public face in an April 2005 address to the National Assembly by Minister of Defence Mosiuoa Lekota.⁸³ Lekota boldly asserted that “South Africa and other nations should. . . make ready to step up the content and levels of their contribution to peace support operations” and concluded by declaring “it is [South Africa’s] duty to rise to the complex challenges of peacekeeping in Africa.” He defended the country’s costly decision to purchase large, European-produced military transport aircraft largely because of their anticipated role in peace operations, and he proudly touted South Africa’s contribution to a southern African brigade that he said would be trained and prepared for regional peace operations by the end of June.⁸⁴

Beyond any question, the government of South Africa after 1994 embraced a deliberate human security agenda to inform both its domestic and its foreign policy. Over the succeeding decade, its policy choices were manifested in a variety of programs and involvements that promoted human security at home and advocated human security abroad. And while the implementation of the human security agenda was hindered by lack of resources and inevitable programmatic errors, the domestic objectives seemed to resonate with the society at large, while the external involvements were producing some

grumbling about the wisdom of spending the country's wealth abroad when so many internal needs remained unmet. Still, the authors are aware of no other country in Africa that in the early 21st Century made as explicit a commitment to the ideals of human security as South Africa.

Human security thinking did not permeate all South African government activities in the same degree; and one government agency reflected almost in stereotype the limits and the possibilities of the new approach. That agency was South Africa's military.

A New Security Establishment for a New South Africa

In the process of political reform that ushered in majority rule, the future of South Africa's security establishment – including armed forces – was no means foreordained. In the minds of many citizens the security services (military, police and intelligence) were associated with the most unpleasant features of the *apartheid* era and the public was not initially convinced of their desirability.

For some years prior to the advent of majority rule in 1994, ANC intellectuals had debated the nature of the security establishment that would be appropriate for a new South Africa.⁸⁵ Many of these had deep roots in academe – either in South Africa or the United Kingdom. They now endeavored to apply “cutting edge” thinking from the world's best scholarship to South Africa's unique situation and circumstances.⁸⁶ Despite a diversity of views, this influential group ultimately arrived at essential agreement about the kind of military needed by the new South Africa.⁸⁷ Much of their effort was reflected in the debates of the Military Research Group, a rather loose collection of academics and intellectuals that coalesced in the early 1990s. This organization became essentially the ANC “think tank” on security.⁸⁸ Its perspectives were highly influenced by human security notions. Although the scholars were inspired by concepts imported from elsewhere, they also made their own substantial contributions to the ongoing worldwide debates.⁸⁹

The new model of “security” endorsed by the ANC intellectuals did not reject a role for traditional agencies of the state – intelligence, police and military. It assumed a place for the structures and equipment already in place in South Africa, and emphasized a “primary function” for the defense forces – preservation of national sovereignty and territorial integrity – roles requiring the maintenance of a conventional military establishment much like the one already in existence. However, in their model, the new military forces were to be under very firm and accountable civilian control – and would not be the exclusive province of unaccountable “securocrats” as in the *apartheid* years. This new thinking was reflected in subsequent restructuring of both the executive and legislative branches of government.⁹⁰ By 1995, South Africa's Department of Defence had been reorganized to include a civilian Secretary of Defence under the (civilian) Minister and Deputy Minister. In Mill's words, this new arrangement, “marked a radical departure from the past when a civilian minister. . . had headed a ministry that was totally dominated by the military, had no civilian representation or involvement of any consequence, and was subject to virtually no effective system of financial or policy accountability.”⁹¹

The restructuring in the Department of Defence occurred at the same time that the Parliament was undertaking efforts to consolidate legislative authority over defense policy. What emerged in the legislative branch of government was a separate committee in both houses, Senate and National Assembly, along with a larger Joint Standing Committee on Defence with membership from both houses. The Joint Standing Committee was now endowed with significant constitutional prerogatives to oversee policy, funding and programs, and by the late 1990s had significantly expanded the parliamentary footprint in oversight of defense activities. (Later, when the Senate transformed into the Council of Provinces, legislative oversight passed largely to the Portfolio Committee on Defence.)⁹²

In the thinking about security evident in the emerging new strategic approach, the country's orientation primarily would be defensive. The new South Africa would no longer threaten its neighbors – in fact, its military typically was to be used in circumstances of regional cooperation. And despite its emphasis on the “primary function,” the Defence Force also would be tasked to engage in a wide range of human security-related activities, including disaster relief and peace support operations. Not all of the members of the Military Research Group were unanimous on these issues, of course, and Gavin Cawthra observes that its ultimate willingness to retain a large, conventional force was partly motivated by a desire to placate the existing South African military establishment.⁹³ Rocky Williams adds that the emphasis on the “prime function” stemmed in part from a concern that democratic civil-military relations required a military whose roles were strictly limited.⁹⁴ But regardless of its motivation, the emphasis developed by the Military Research Group subsequently was embedded in the interim Constitution of 1993, the ANC Manifesto of 1994, the permanent Constitution of 1996 and follow-on official documents that would more specifically defined the new defense establishment.⁹⁵

Foundational Documents

The new South African government that came to power in 1994 was committed to stakeholder “buy-in” on policy issues and sponsored a series of conferences that defined the new security establishment. The two most important documents were the *South African White Paper on Defence* (1996) and the *South African Defence Review* (1998). They provide both a roadmap for national policy and an interesting glimpse of the emerging collaboration between policymakers, civil society and the military in the new South Africa.

The White Paper on Defence (1996)

Because of the massive redirection of funding initiated by the de Klerk government after 1989, the military services had faced some years of austerity by 1994. That and the international sanctions of previous decades had rendered much of South Africa's military materiel depleted, deteriorated or obsolete. By 1994, the military establishment was still there, but each of the military services was facing severe problems of obsolescent

materiel and declining capital investment.⁹⁶ One of the early challenges faced by the new government was a plea from the military forces for substantial recapitalization. Soon after the advent of the new government, the leaders of the military establishment, both civilian and military, began lobbying for a fundamental re-equipping of the armed forces.⁹⁷ They would be obliged to wait until 1998 before the government would commit itself to a major program of materiel acquisition, but their pressure contributed to a substantial South African effort (begun by 1995) to redefine the national military and its supporting armaments industry.

Parliament responded to the plea for military upgrading by demanding that the Defence Force first define itself and its role, demonstrating how it would embody the priorities of the new South Africa, and in response, in 1995 the Department of Defence launched an extraordinary, wide-ranging series of consultations with scholars, practitioners, civil servants and members of the attentive public.⁹⁸ The intended result of the consultations was a “white paper” defining the role of the military in the country. A new *White Paper on Defence* finally appeared in 1996 in the wake of an excruciatingly exhaustive consultative process.⁹⁹

It was the vision of the ANC intellectuals in the Military Research Group that ultimately prevailed in the new *White Paper*. The principal drafter of the paper was University of Cape Town scholar Laurie Nathan.¹⁰⁰ The new document was remarkably similar to ideas he had published earlier.¹⁰¹ Even so, Nathan’s first draft proved to be highly contentious and provoked accusations from the military establishment that it was “anti-military” in tone and substance. Ultimately, the senior leadership of the Ministry of Defence intervened to provide “guidance” and Nathan was obliged to incorporate a large number of changes. The final version reflected input from a broad range of sources. Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Defence scrutinized early drafts and obliged Nathan to defend his work in three special sessions before the paper finally was accepted by the Cabinet and approved by Parliament in May 1996.¹⁰² Despite the wide collaboration and many changes, the new *White Paper* bore the clear human security imprint of the thinking of the Military Research Group.

It was an articulation of a whole new philosophy of national defense. Its authors tried very hard to capture the essence of fundamental transformation they believed was required in South Africa. They started by redefining national security, characterizing it in the broadest possible terms. Their document captured one of the clearest expressions of human security on record anywhere:

In the new South Africa national security is no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It has broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters. At the heart of this new approach is a paramount concern with the *security of people*.

Security is an all-encompassing condition in which *individual citizens* live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment

which is not detrimental to their health and well-being [emphasis added].¹⁰³

The *White Paper* went on to argue that that security would be “sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs” of the citizenry, implying a much more limited role for the security organs of the state than was formerly the case.¹⁰⁴ Yet despite its apparent embrace of a human security paradigm, the *White Paper* unambiguously endorsed a conventional military establishment, stating that the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) would be a “balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force” and that its “primary role [would] be to defend South Africa against external military aggression.”¹⁰⁵ At the same time, the *White Paper* was very careful to emphasize that the new military would have a “primarily defensive orientation and posture,” and that South Africa’s foreign policy would emphasize “regional security” and “military co-operation with southern African states in particular.”¹⁰⁶ The document placed great emphasis on strong civilian control of the new military, with specified linkages of accountability and oversight that extended to the executive and legislative branches of government and even to civil society.¹⁰⁷

The *White Paper* went far in addressing core interests and concerns of the new ANC-dominated government, and provided a philosophical framework for the nature of the new South African military. However, it left open a number of questions about the size, structure and equipping of the force. It did not reconcile its vision of a conventional, high technology military with its own assessment of the most likely military roles. These issues would be taken up by a later document.

The Defence Review (1998)

With the initial *White Paper* in hand by 1996, the Department of Defence could turn to the particular details of a new military establishment. South Africa’s military leaders were strongly motivated by a pressing desire to define the future Defence Force, since a host of issues (including armaments acquisition) had been left in abeyance pending government agreement.¹⁰⁸ Again, The Department of Defence initiated an extraordinary process of national consultation, resulting in the publication of a *Defence Review* in late 1998.¹⁰⁹ This consultation “. . . featured three National Consultative Conferences, a host of Regional Workshops in all provinces, Public Hearings in Parliament. . . It drew together a wide range of interest groups, including: academics, clergy, *industrialists*, media, *pacifists*, Parliamentarians, and members of the defence establishment. . .” (emphasis added).¹¹⁰ The Minister of Defence at the time claimed it to be the “most inclusive and transparent” process of its kind ever undertaken, a boast difficult to refute despite its somewhat self-serving tone. Key figures in drafting this paper were Air Force Major General Len Le Roux and Army Colonel (Dr.) Rocky Williams, both at the time active members of the South African National Defence Force. Both considered that their role was to comply with the general guidance of the Interim Constitution (of 1993) and recently published *White Paper on Defence*, reconcile the competing visions of interested political actors and achieve consensus among a diverse community of stakeholders.¹¹¹

One of the most important relationships in the consultations that produced the *Defence Review* was the extensive involvement of the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Defence, which insisted on exercising its oversight responsibilities, deliberating on the *Review* issues in great detail, while at the same time “learning the ropes” about military affairs. As a result of this involvement, Parliament achieved a remarkable degree of “ownership” over the resulting agreement.¹¹²

The *Defence Review* built upon the foundational *White Paper*, specifying in some detail the nature and role of the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF). It dealt with force design, doctrine and deployment and defined issues of resources and accountability.¹¹³ To a degree, the *Defence Review* tempered the more radical human-security oriented *White Paper*, paying distinctly more attention to the outlines of a conventional military establishment and its supporting infrastructure and distinctly less to the implications of broad new definitions of “security.” It framed its intention very explicitly:

The government has adopted a broad, holistic approach to security, recognising the various non-military dimensions. . . [but it] has adopted a narrow, conventional approach to defence. . . The SANDF is designed and equipped chiefly to fulfill its primary mission of defence against aggression.¹¹⁴

Despite the strong emphasis on this “primary function,” the *Defense Review* nonetheless recognized that South Africa’s military had “. . . personnel, skills and resources which are utilised for various non-military tasks.”¹¹⁵ It devoted an entire chapter to these tasks, including among them protection of natural resources, education and training programs, disaster relief, search and rescue and provision of health services.¹¹⁶ Additional chapters addressed the South African participation in international peace operations, military support to national law enforcement and military participation in environmental security concerns.¹¹⁷ The *Defense Review* thus contained the threads of a significant range of human security concerns, an unusual feature for a military supposedly preoccupied with defense of the national borders against aggression by external foes.

There was, in fact, a significant discontinuity within the official documents. While the *White Paper on Defence* specified conditions under which South Africa would engage in international peace operations,¹¹⁸ it did not explain how a high technology Defence Force organized primarily for conventional, high-intensity conflict along the country’s borders also could provide the wherewithal most appropriate to the articulated range of future roles, particularly against threats at the low end of the technological spectrum, including the challenges of various humanitarian and peace operations.¹¹⁹ The human security roles for the South African military establishment enshrined in the *White Paper on Defence*¹²⁰ and *Defence Review*¹²¹ were at odds with the high-technology conventional military establishment also described in the *Defence Review*,¹²² a military trained and equipped to defeat sophisticated external foes in classic military confrontations.

Within a few years of the publication of the *Defense Review*, one of its authors – Rocky Williams - was challenging the “primacy” of the “prime function,” an explicit recognition that the SANDF increasingly was diverting its attention to the messy humanitarian

challenges of the post Cold War era and away from conventional military operations.¹²³ William's unambiguous advocacy of the new roles pointed to sharply differing views within South Africa's "Defence" establishment. Williams boldly argued that ". . . South African defence planners will have to disenthral themselves of many of the assumptions upon which they operate,"¹²⁴ a direct challenge to any preoccupation with conventional military missions.

By 2002 the South Africans also had published a military strategy, listing the missions they envisioned for the Defence Force.¹²⁵ These missions still covered a considerable spectrum, ranging from high to low intensity conflict. They included "high-end" roles such as "repelling [a] conventional onslaught" or "repelling [an] information onslaught" and "low-end" missions subsumed by various kinds of peace operations, search and rescue and support of the national police.¹²⁶ While South Africa's military leaders clearly wanted the capability to cope with all conceivable contingencies, including a massive, conventional attack by a sophisticated enemy on their borders, none of the documents really made a case for the existence of a threat that would warrant such a capability. It is not at all clear that South Africa will face any such "high-end" threat in the foreseeable future and it is even less clear that South Africa can afford a military that can deal with the full range of conceivable contingencies.

Still, the completion of the *Defence Review* in 1998 was sufficient justification for South Africa's leaders to embark on a massive program of weapons acquisition, a program intended to rectify deficiencies in the Defence Force's conventional warfighting capabilities. In November 1998, the country announced its intention to purchase a variety of sophisticated new weapons from a select list of foreign suppliers, these were described in South Africa as "Strategic Packages."¹²⁷ The following year, South Africa signed contracts for jet aircraft from the United Kingdom and Sweden, patrol corvettes and submarines from Germany, and utility helicopters from Italy.¹²⁸ The acquisitions had an initial value of about four billion dollars.¹²⁹ They were controversial in a nation struggling to meet many human needs and facing no immediate external security threat. With subsequent allegations of graft and kickbacks in the arms purchases, public dissatisfaction was widespread and occasionally harsh.¹³⁰ Nor, except for the helicopters and possibly the frigates, was it clear that the new arms would contribute to the humanitarian operations now beginning to preoccupy the Defence Force. In circumstances of plentiful resources, the situation may not have been a matter for much concern, but South Africa's resources are far from infinite. The weapons purchases seemed to reflect a continuing ambivalence in South Africa about the nature and intended role of its new military.

The South African "defense" documents, though impressive results of hard work and tedious consultation, could not be expected to fully and permanently settle all the security dilemmas of the state. Their authors seemed to recognize them as authoritative for the requirements of the time, but also as snapshots of work-in-progress and not definitive descriptions of the country's future. By mid 2005, the South Africans were writing a new *White Paper on Defence* and *Defence Review*.¹³¹ Knowledgeable insiders suggested that one of the main revisions would be a significant shift from the earlier emphasis on

conventional military capabilities to those required for a greater capacity to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies.

Human Security and the Military in the New South Africa

A decade of majority rule has produced many changes in South Africa, a fact that particularly has been true of its military establishment. In addition to the dramatic reorganization of security decision-making, the “civilianization” of the Ministry of Defence and the imposition of substantial Parliamentary oversight, the nature of the military itself also changed dramatically since the *apartheid* years.

One fact remained essentially unchanged. Despite the cutbacks in military funding after 1989, South Africa arrived at majority rule with the best-led, most versatile and most combat effective military in Sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa’s armed forces still enjoy that singular distinction. They continue to reflect much of the culture of the *apartheid* years, and even some of the same personnel and materiel, but it is not at all the same military.

Although they employed non-whites in various military roles, South Africa’s *apartheid* era leaders were unwilling to mobilize the non-white majority to fight the country’s regional wars. The military of that era never exceeded 150,000 personnel, most of which were part-time, white citizen-soldiers.¹³² In contrast, the new South African military is no longer dependent on compulsory military service. Since 1994 it has been manned by volunteer professionals. More importantly, its members are drawn from very different communities than in the past. The new organization was formed by merging the old South African Defence Force with seven other military establishments. These included the liberation armies of the African National Congress and Pan African Congress that had been fighting the South African state, four more from the quasi independent ethnic “homelands” of the old South Africa (the so-called TVBC states¹³³) and the mostly Zulu “self-defence force” of the Inkatha Freedom Party. Initial estimates were that this would add some 40,000 personnel to the 110,000-person South African Defence Force, although the numbers that ultimately showed up for duty were much less.¹³⁴ The integration of all these military forces was followed by a process of downsizing, rationalization and demobilization to reduce the military to its 2005 strength of about 75,000.¹³⁵ The demobilized soldiers were assisted in their reintegration into South African society, but the whole process proved to be slow, difficult and traumatic, very costly and politically fraught.¹³⁶ It was still working itself out in 2005.

Demobilization was difficult, but integration was even more so. South Africa struggled to integrate the leaders of the disparate militaries into a new officer corps while maintaining some common standard of professional behavior and expertise. Given the widely differing backgrounds and tremendous disparity in educational qualifications, this was a considerable challenge, leading to accusations by white officers that unqualified personnel were promoted or fast-tracked to senior rank and accusations by non-whites of continuing racist attitudes on the part their white colleagues. Observers have suggested that the overall competence of the Defence Force has declined markedly since 1994 when

the integration began, with a significant increase in reported instances of indiscipline. These tensions and problems are an inevitable result of such massive transformation. However, they also have retarded the ability of the South African military go much beyond an emphasis on basic professional skills. The strains within the new South African military have been accompanied by an unfortunate loss prestige for its military within South African society as a whole.

During the *apartheid* era, the white community in South Africa took considerable pride in its military establishment. A very large proportion of that community's male members performed compulsory military service. The Defence Force was a professionally competent and effective organization that performed extraordinary feats in operations against its various opponents. Despite a vocal anti-war movement within the white community, the old Defence Force generally could take the respect and support of its parent society for granted. It also could depend on a culture of secrecy and government censorship to conceal its bad news. In the post-*apartheid* era, these features no longer obtain. The Defence Force no longer enjoys a privileged status. It has suffered from severe lack of funding as the country diverts resources to other more pressing requirements. Its "other ranks" now are largely drawn from South Africa's black and rural communities and are no longer closely connected to the country's social and economic elites. The inevitable problems resulting from a difficult social transformation are quickly picked up by a somewhat unsympathetic press. (One preoccupation of that press has been the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the military, now estimated by the Defence Force itself at 23 percent.¹³⁷) The result of these trends has been a worrying lack of sympathy within South Africa for military activities in general, including external military deployments for peace operations.

Despite the trauma of a military establishment in a difficult transition, South Africa's actual commitment of military power has been very much in consonance with a human security agenda. This has been true both internally to South Africa and in its limited external military deployments. In the case of the former, immediately after the advent of majority rule, South Africa was obliged to dispatch military ground forces to maintain order in urban areas, supplementing the role of a thoroughly discredited South African Police. Although senior military leaders disliked that mission, the Army apparently performed it competently. Throughout the subsequent decade, the South African Air Force and Navy continued to perform search and rescue operations, important but unheralded missions that require technical competence, courage and skill.

Since 1994 South Africa's external military deployments have almost exclusively involved humanitarian relief and peace support operations. The South Africans have been conscientious participants in regional military exercises since 1997, most of which reflect themes of humanitarian relief, conflict resolution or peacekeeping. (These exercises also have included participants or observers from Europe and North America.) South Africa hosted its own exercise of this type in 2000, and routinely offers its military aircraft to transport other participating national contingents.¹³⁸ The most recent such exercise - *Thokgamo* ("Peace") - was held in Botswana in June 2005 in an operation that replicated a brigade-sized multi-national peacekeeping operation under an international mandate,

and included contingents from at least nine countries, including South Africa.¹³⁹ Such military exercises provide some South African personnel with exposure to international peace operations experts, an opportunity for humanitarian crisis planning and good “hands-on” exercising in a range of civil-military issues, including the function of a civil-military operations center (CMOC).

In addition to the regional exercises, South Africa participated in a vast international humanitarian relief operation during severe flooding in neighboring Mozambique in 2000. Its Air Force particularly was commended for the courage, skill and persistence of its pilots.¹⁴⁰ South Africa also has been substantively involved in external peace support operations since 1998, a topic discussed in more detail below.

Commitment of military force in consonance with human security thinking is not the same thing as building an organizational culture oriented to human security. In other words, deployment for peace support operations does not necessarily indicate that a military establishment is particularly suited by training or equipment to promote human security in its operations or that it is imbued with a human security ethic suited to the human security demands of peace missions. In the case of the South African National Defence Force, despite the continuous involvement in humanitarian relief and peace support operations since 1998, the evidence for a genuine human security ethos is somewhat ambiguous.

A very astute South African officer presented a paper in early 2005 that summarized key issues in officer training for the country’s new military, a paper remarkable for its candor.¹⁴¹ He noted that the *apartheid*-era military had placed primary emphasis on military experience and did not particularly emphasize intellectual development or concern for broader social and economic issues. He went on to argue that the new South African military likewise has not emphasized institutionalized education in its first decade, and he questioned whether the South African military provides real “education” at all in the broad liberal model. (He also observed that existing educational programs have had a pressing priority of facilitating the integration of officers from widely differing backgrounds into the new unified military.¹⁴²) This author suggested that while all levels of military education and training now stress an understanding of the Constitution – and some of its implications for military members – they provide little understanding of political and economic dynamics and no real grounding in the broad cultural competencies particularly useful in peace operations. The only exceptions to this rather dismal portrait were courses available for selected senior field grade officers, courses that included Defence civilians and in foreign military students.¹⁴³

While the South African Defence Force may be limited in its educational opportunities in general, by 2005 it was providing its personnel a substantial amount of training on peace operations. This included modules of instruction at the Corps Schools and Army Battle School and a “peacekeeping” phase in the curriculum of the Senior Joint Staff Course at South Africa’s National War College.¹⁴⁴ Military units about to deploy for peace operations got additional specialized training oriented to their expected roles.¹⁴⁵ That said, much of this instruction seemed to heavily oriented to the mechanics of

peacekeeping, although Defence Minister Lekota noted in early 2005 that “International Humanitarian Law” and “Law of Armed Conflict” were staples. He went on to urge that future training include “conflict resolution, negotiation and humanitarian actions,” implying that these were underemphasized at the time.¹⁴⁶

Since the advent of majority rule in 1994, the typical external missions for the Defence Force have been involvements in complex humanitarian emergencies. These have included a peace enforcement intervention (under a regional mandate) in Lesotho in 1998, flood rescue and relief in neighboring Mozambique in 2000, deployment of peacekeeping ground forces to Burundi first under a bilateral arrangement and then as part of a UN mission, participation in the UN peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and several smaller-scale observer missions.¹⁴⁷ The 1998 Lesotho operation was something of a watershed in South African thinking about peace operations and warrants a brief description.

South Africa’s transition to majority rule in 1994 coincided with a political crisis in the small southern African kingdom of Lesotho (a country wholly enclosed within the borders of South Africa), resulting in instability and violence. Reacting to the crisis in Lesotho, several southern African countries (including South Africa and Botswana) consulted about a military operation to reestablish order. The crisis ebbed without external intervention, though the situation in Lesotho remained unstable. In late 1998, order again broke down when elements of Lesotho’s small army mutinied. South Africa and Botswana then intervened with a combined task force in an effort to restore order, justifying the operation under a somewhat dubious Southern African Development Community (SADC) mandate.¹⁴⁸ The intervention force was commanded by an experienced and well-respected South African officer and the South Africans apparently thought that a show of force would quickly intimidate the competing factions in Lesotho, reflecting more hubris than understanding of the situation. South African intelligence about the situation in Lesotho apparently was faulty, and the intervention quickly turned into a messy peace enforcement operation that was widely – perhaps unfairly - criticized for incompetence and use of excessive force. Order ultimately was restored and the SADC Task Force withdrawn by May 1999.¹⁴⁹ South Africa subsequently contributed military training program in Lesotho (together with Botswana and Zimbabwe), which lasted until May 2000.¹⁵⁰ However, the Lesotho intervention turned into a public relations nightmare for the South African military, significantly tempering any lingering national enthusiasm for peace enforcement.

At best, the Lesotho intervention highlighted the dangers of attempting to conduct conventional military operations – even by reasonably competent, well led and well equipped forces – in the complex environments of African civil turmoil. South Africa’s subsequent participation in regional peace operations has included the deployment of sizable combat forces both to Burundi and to the Democratic Republic of the Congo but since 1998 the South Africans have studiously avoided peace enforcement missions. The current preference seems to be support operations – transport, communications, logistics, infrastructural maintenance and health. The country’s technological sophistication lends itself to these kinds of niche roles, and such capacities are important in post-conflict

nation building, although the South Africans do not seem to be engaged in that at present. There is little evidence that the South African military currently is cultivating competence in its military forces for human security roles such as post-conflict rebuilding and human development. It has no equivalent, for instance, to the civil-affairs officers of the US Army.¹⁵¹

In fact, the South African military in 2005 still viewed international peace operations through the filter of the *Defence Review* of 1998, where they were classified as a secondary function. This meant that the Defence Force would not create special structures for such operations but would take resources for peace operations out of those oriented to its primary function. The individual services (Army, Air Force, Navy and Military Health Service) were not creating components dedicated to peace support missions.¹⁵² This requires an emphasis on “multi-role” force preparation and skills-based training, an approach difficult even for the well-resourced military establishments of the wealthy, developed Western countries.

As noted earlier, there are indications of resistance within South Africa’s “Defence” establishment to any protracted emphasis on peace operations at the expense of conventional capabilities and missions.¹⁵³ It is noteworthy that the South African contribution to a standing southern African combat brigade, announced in 2005, apparently will include heavy armor. Despite the trauma of the 1998 Lesotho experience, the southern Africans generally, and South Africa in particular, may be looking to the SANDF largely as the “hammer” – ready and able to provide overwhelming combat power when needed in future peace enforcement options.

South Africa has committed its military to regional peacekeeping operations and appears likely to continue such commitments, but its capacities to engage in corollary humanitarian-related activities (and interest in doing so) may be limited. A primary problem is funding. South Africa’s post-*apartheid* military has struggled with an egregious lack of resources to meet its minimum needs. Even as the *White Paper on Defence* and *Defense Review* were providing substantial definition to a new South African military establishment and the country was committing itself to a massive acquisition of new military materiel, its armed forces were facing very difficult circumstances.¹⁵⁴ This includes painful shortfalls in funds for training, maintenance and equipment replacement. Greg Mills notes that between 1990 and 1998, South Africa’s defense budget had fallen from 4.5 per cent to a mere 1.6 per cent of the gross domestic product, a reduction of almost US\$3 billion.¹⁵⁵ According to Jakkie Cilliers, the Air Force in late 1997 had been obliged to halt flight activity except in cases of emergency and the Army lacked sufficient resources to continue normal training.¹⁵⁶ These problems partially were caused – and certainly exacerbated - by the enormous costs of integrating and rationalizing the human resources of the new military, and demobilizing redundant personnel in the wake of majority rule, but government priorities also clearly had shifted away from “Defence.” The South African military establishment found itself in increasingly severe straits as the decade progressed.

Even after initiating the weapons acquisitions in 1998, the paucity of resources continued to haunt the South African military. The added expense of regional peace support

operations further strained its financial resources. Shortfalls plagued military planning, to the point that even some of the ongoing efforts to field newly purchased weapons appeared to be in jeopardy by 2005 and South Africans were having difficulty funding their regional military commitments along with routine training and maintenance.¹⁵⁷ In fact, they were struggling to fund even the normal military education and training programs. The lack of resources apparently also had some operational impact. By 2004 Defence Force analysts were complaining about the country's lack of appropriate military materiel to support the peace operation in the ongoing UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By 2005, the funding problems were so great that noted South African security analyst Jakkie Cilliers was urging the government to recognize the military's "capacity problems" and "prioritise" its responsibilities, while the Jane's Defence Weekly southern Africa correspondent, Helmoed-Römer Heitman, said flatly that "South Africa's enthusiasm for . . . peace support operations was outrunning its capacity."¹⁵⁸

Despite these funding problems, South Africa seemed in 2005 to be increasing its commitment to future military involvement in regional peace operations, though still largely in terms of conventional capabilities. In 2004 the country announced its intention to buy new A400M jet transports to replace its ageing fleet of C-130 aircraft. (It presumably would acquire between eight and fourteen of these large, sophisticated aircraft when they are produced in 2009.) South Africa has an undeniable need for more military airlift, particularly if it intends to increase its commitment to regional humanitarian relief and peace support operations.¹⁵⁹ In 2005 the country also was intensively involved in regional discussions to field a Southern African Development Community (SADC) "standby" brigade, in which the South African contribution apparently would include conventional armored forces.¹⁶⁰

Ironically, at ground level, the *apartheid*-era military probably was substantially better equipped to perform human security-related activities than the contemporary SANDF. Compulsory military service during the *apartheid* years resulted in a force whose personnel at all ranks had a wide range of skills – from education to health to economic empowerment to infrastructural maintenance. South Africa attempted to take advantage of these qualifications. Its military forces stationed in Southwest Africa (now Namibia) engaged in a considerable effort to "win hearts and minds" in local communities of indigenes.¹⁶¹ The ultimate objective of their activity may have been preservation of South African sovereignty (or at least a political evolution favorable to South Africa) rather than human security *per se*, but their activities reflected the kinds of competencies that would enable a military force to engage in human security development. Those competencies do not seem to have been replicated in the post-*apartheid* military.¹⁶²

The South African Case: Some Conclusions

Since 1994, South Africa's domestic and foreign policies have been heavily infused with human security thinking. The South African *Reconstruction and Development Programme* and *Growth, Employment and Redistribution* (GEAR) strategy which offer the general approach for the country's human development, can be characterized as

human security manifestos. To date, these have not been notably successful. Yet whether or not the country ever will have the resources to fully implement their provisions, they are clear expressions of intent. Likewise, South Africa's vigorous engagement with international partners on a broad range of issues ranging from the environment to reform of international monetary institutions to conflict prevention and peace support all point to a strong human security emphasis in its foreign policy. The country has "observer" status within the influential Human Security Network and is vigorously engaged in promoting security architecture in Africa that is heavily imbued with human security values. So at the national-strategic level, South Africa is fully committed to a human security agenda.

Some South African government agencies are infused with human security thinking, reflecting organizational cultures that encourage effective collaboration with civil society and foreign partners to promote human rights, economic empowerment of disadvantaged communities, health and healthful environments, political access and similar human security objectives. This has resulted in progress in a variety of areas despite deep continuing problems and needs, although successes probably are due as much as anything to a robust civil society with a rich diversity of institutions that advocate or promote human security themes.

Human security thinking also is evident in South Africa's resort to military power in the post-*apartheid* era. One way in which South Africa has "operationalized" human security is by establishing a long-term commitment of its armed forces to peace operations. Although it has the most capable military establishment in Sub-Saharan Africa, the country has strenuously eschewed any appearance of unilateralism in its use. It has gone the "extra mile" to depict itself as a cooperative regional partner, participating in regional organizations and fora, accepting roles in regional conflict resolution and peace support, and refraining from pursuit of narrow national interests through military strength. (With one unfortunate exception, it has even shied away from peace enforcement.) South Africa has developed a strategic doctrine for participation in international peace operations. Its military commitments at the national-strategic level thus also conform to human security thinking.

The nature of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) itself, however, may not be as closely aligned to human security thinking as that of its parent government. This seems to have been a deliberate intent of the *Defence Review* - emphasizing a conventional military focused on the "prime function," and equipped with the modern arms of the "strategic packages." Some senior South African military officials have been ambivalent about an expansion of military roles, probably concerned about lack of resources to fulfill all the expectations inferred in a broad range of potential missions. This ambivalence is evident in the training and actual employment of South African military forces since the mid 1990s.

By the standards of the developing world, South Africa's forces are well disciplined and competently led, but they are not currently inclined to take a particularly active role in human development and "nation-building" activities that have become something of an expectation for military forces deployed into humanitarian emergencies and peace

support operations. South African military forces are, however, committed to participation in such operations and likely will continue to be so committed. It is entirely possible that peace operations will be their main focus for the foreseeable future.

There is no inherent reason why contemporary military forces should be trained and equipped for exclusively “human security” roles, and many reasons why a country may not wish to build such capabilities in its military establishment. Except for the richest of the developed countries, it may simply be too expensive to field a military capable of performing missions across the entire spectrum of conflict at the same time able to engage in substantive human development activities. For that matter, the UNDP formula seems to suggest that “security” should be sought through activities and agencies largely outside the military sphere. Even for those military contingents that participate in peace operations, there are many “niche” roles that do not require human development competencies or an organization steeped in a human security ethos. Still, it is evident that contemporary military forces often find themselves responsible for restoration of some sort of normality within regions and among populations most egregiously deficient in human security. Some countries – Canada as a particular case in point – have undertaken to make such responsibilities the prime concern of their military forces. This may be a principal destiny for the better African military establishments as well. It will be interesting to see how the new South African military reacts to this possibility in the next decade of its existence.

End Notes

¹ See, for instance, Steve Smith, “The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years,” in S. Croft and T. Terriff, Editors, *Critical Reflections on Security and Change* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 72-101; Emma Rothschild, “What is Security?” *Daedalus* 124, no. 3 (Summer 1995).

² Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (June 1991), 211-39.

³ Richard Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 94-102.

⁴ See, *inter alia*, Jessica T. Mathews, “Redefining Security,” *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 2 (1989), 162-77; Steve Smith, “The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 20, no. 3 (1999), 72-101; Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (1997), 5-26.

⁵ *Human Development Report, 1993*, United Nations Development Program, available at: <http://www.undp.org/hdro/93.htm>

⁶ *Human Development Report, 1994*, United Nations Development Program, available at: <http://www.undp.org/hdro/94.htm>

⁷ *Ibid*, 22.

⁸ *Ibid*, 22-4.

⁹ *Ibid*, 24-33.

¹⁰ See, *inter alia*, Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” 213; Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*; Helga Haftendorn, “The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security,” *International Studies Quarterly* 35, (1991), 3-17; Simon Dalby, “Contesting and Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Social Discourse,” in K. Krasue and M. Williams, Editors, *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 12-8; Robert H. Dorff, “A Commentary on *Security Studies for for 1990s* as a Model Core Curriculum,” *International Studies Notes* 19, no. 3 (Fall 1994), 27.

¹¹ Among other things, Annan instituted a UN Commission on Human Security. Its final report, issued in 2003, resulted in a permanent UN Advisory Board on Human Security. See < [Hhttp://www.humansecurity-chs.org/abhs/index.html](http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/abhs/index.html) > 29 September 2005. See also Rob McCrae and Don Hubert, eds., *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001), ix.

¹² *The Kampala Document: Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation* (New York: African Leadership Forum, 1992), 9.

¹³ See, inter alia, H. Solomon and M. van Aardt, editors, *Caring Security in Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Monograph No. 20, 1998); Larry A. Swatuck and Peter Vale, "Why Democracy Is Not Enough: Southern Africa and Human Security in the Twenty-first Century," *Alternatives* 24 (1999).

¹⁴ "Human security means the security of the individual with respect to the satisfaction of basic needs of life; it also encompasses the creation of the social, political, economic, military, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival, livelihood and dignity of the individual, including the protection of fundamental freedoms, the respect for human rights, good governance, access to education, healthcare, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his/her own potential." Quoted from the draft agreement by Jakkie Cilliers, *Human Security in Africa: A Conceptual Framework for Review* (Monograph for the African Human Security Initiative, 2004) available at < [Hhttp://www.africanreview.org](http://www.africanreview.org) > 10 October 2005.

¹⁵ The Network actually originated in a 1998 bilateral agreement between Canada and Norway, the Lysøen Cooperation named after the Norwegian island on which the idea was conceived. See [Hhttp://www.humansecuritynetwork.org](http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org); and [Hhttp://www.emb-norway.ca/policy/humansecurity/Hhumansecurity.htm](http://www.emb-norway.ca/policy/humansecurity/Hhumansecurity.htm)

¹⁶ Venues include:

- Lucerne, Switzerland (2000)
- Petra, Jordan (2001)
- Santiago de Chile (2002)
- Graz, Austria (2003)
- Bamako, Mali (2004)

¹⁷ See < [Hhttp://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/network-e.php](http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/network-e.php) > 1 August 2005.

¹⁸ Rocky Williams, an influential actor in the South African transformation, characterizes human security as the "central pillar" of South African government policy after 1994. Dr. Rocky Williams, "Human Security and the Transformation of the South African National Security Environment from 1990-2004: Challenges and Limitations," *Journal of Security Sector Management* (March 2005), 5, available at < [Hhttp://www.jofssm.org/issues/jofssm_sp_04_rocky_human_security.doc](http://www.jofssm.org/issues/jofssm_sp_04_rocky_human_security.doc) > 6 August 2005.

¹⁹ Julie Gilson and Phillida Purvis, "Japan's pursuit of human security: humanitarian agenda or political pragmatism?" *Japan Forum: The International Journal of Japanese Studies* 15, no. 2 (June 2003), 193-207; Bert Edström, "Japan's foreign policy and human security," *Japan Forum: The International Journal of Japanese Studies* 15, no. 2 (June 2003), 209-25.

²⁰ *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1999), 5.

²¹ See < [Hhttp://www.humansecurity.gc.ca](http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca) > 1 August 2005.

²² For details on emerging European thinking on this topic, see < [Hwww.iss-eu.org](http://www.iss-eu.org) > 1 August 2005.

²³ See particularly Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003) 27-42.

²⁴ Williams, "Human Security," 1.

²⁵ See, for example, *Duty with Honor: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003) available at < [Hhttp://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca](http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca) > 26 September 2005.

²⁶ Dan Henk, "Human Security: Relevance and Implications," *Parameters* XXV, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 91-106.

²⁷ The National Party was rooted in the Afrikaner community – comprising approximately 55% of the population of European descent – and tended to represent the interests of the more rural, less affluent and more socially conservative part of the "white" population. Afrikaners nurtured a heritage of frontier independence, cultural distinctiveness and sense of unique destiny in southern Africa. Many also maintained strong, historically-based resentments against the United Kingdom, dating back to British colonial aggrandizements in the 19th Century, culminating in the Boer War (1899-1902) in which British arms subjugated the South African Republic and Orange Free State, formerly independent Afrikaner

republics. British counter-insurgency measures in that conflict included atrocities that both impoverished rural families and left a legacy of great bitterness. The National Party had served in South African coalition governments prior to 1948, but had seen its agenda harden and its conservative inclinations on social issues increase in the preceding decade. Many of South Africa's Afrikaans-speaking white citizens now sought through the National Party to establish their political space, reaffirm their cultural values and guarantee their economic security. One of National Party's most consistent programs was a form of "affirmative action" – guaranteeing jobs for whites, particularly Afrikaners. For useful details of South Africa political history, see, *inter alia*, William H. Vatcher, *White Laager: The Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism* (New York: Praeger, 1965) and Hermann Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People (Reconsiderations in Southern African History)* (Richmond, VA: University Press of Virginia, 2003).

²⁸ See, *inter alia*, Steven Mufson, *Fighting Years: Black Resistance and the Struggle for a New South Africa* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990); Howard Barrell, *MK: The ANC's Armed Struggle* (London: Penguin, 1990); and Robert Harvey, *The Fall of Apartheid: The Inside Story from Smuts to Mbeki* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

²⁹ This was UN Security Council Resolution 181.

³⁰ Portugal subsequently hosted a conference for the leaders of the competing indigenous Angolan groups and brokered an agreement amongst them in January 1975. This was the Alvor Accord named for the Portuguese town in which the consultations were held. However, by March 1975 the agreement had completely broken.

³¹ The motives for South African involvement in the Angolan conflict have been analyzed elsewhere and need not be repeated in detail here, but the war was part of the violent decolonization of the region in which South Africa sought to secure itself against the pressures of national liberation in southern Africa. By 1975 the Angolan civil war also had become thoroughly embroiled in the proxy conflicts of the Cold War. The South Africans intervened on behalf of the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi. UNITA at one time had been the most politically radical of the three competing Angolan groups, establishing loose ties to the People's Republic of China, but after 1975 was increasingly beholden to the South Africans. When the South Africans withdrew from Angola in 1976, Savimbi retreated to the remote southeastern corner of Angola where, with continuing South African assistance, he rebuilt his forces and waged an increasingly successful insurgency against the Marxist government in Luanda. In 1975 and early 1976, the United States supported the Front For the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA), headed by Holden Roberto and backed by Mobutu Sese Seko, leader of neighboring Zaïre. US support was organized by the Central Intelligence Agency and funneled through the significant US presence in Zaïre. The FNLA's battlefield incompetence enabled the Soviet-backed MPLA to crush it decisively and permanently by early 1976. Zaïre's Mobutu then committed elements of his own army to the conflict in Angola, only to see them routed as well. For an interesting, if somewhat sensationalized, account of the US involvement, see John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc, 1984).

³² This was the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, better known by its Portuguese acronym, MPLA. This faction won the initial phases of the civil war and established itself as the government of Angola in 1976.

³³ For a brief useful overview, see Fred Bridgland, *The War for Africa: Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent* (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing Limited, 1990).

³⁴ This was as a result of the Clark Amendment, a tangible expression of US Congressional disapproval of the Ford Administration's foreign military adventures. For a brief, useful discussion of the US change of policy, see Bridgland, *The War for Africa*, 3-11.

³⁵ For an interesting discussion of the rationale for this intervention, in the words of those responsible for it, see Hilton Hamann, *Days of the Generals* (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2001), 14-45.

³⁶ The South Africans found themselves particularly disadvantaged by the Cubans' Soviet-made artillery with its superior ranges, rates of fire and projectile lethality. See *inter alia*, Bridgland, *The War for Africa*,

³⁷ Hamann, *Days of the Generals*, 21-45; and Helmoed-Römer Heitman, *The South African War Machine* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985), 170-174.

³⁸ See, *inter alia*, Robert S. Jaster, "South African Defense Strategy and the Growing Influence of the Military," in *Arms and the African*, ed. W. Foltz and H. Bienen (New Haven, CT: York University Press, 1985).

³⁹This process was reflected in the South African State Security Council, established by statute in 1972, and its implementing organ, the National Security Management System. The implementing legislation was the Security, Intelligence and State Security Act of 1972. Standing membership of the committee included the Prime Minister (later, State President), ministers of Defence, Police, Foreign Affairs and Justice, and senior officials of the Defence Force, Police, and Security Intelligence among others. See, *inter alia*, A. Seegers, "South Africa's national security management system, 1972-1990," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 29, no. 2 (1991): 253-273; and K. Grundy, *The Militarisation of South African Politics* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1986).

⁴⁰See, *inter alia*, Chris Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); and Deon Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984) and K. Grundy, *The Militarisation of South African Politics* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1986); Greg Mills, *South Africa: The Total National Strategy and Region Policy During the Botha Years, 1978-1989*. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Lancaster, UK, 1990.

⁴¹Protest riots had begun in the black township of Soweto just outside of Johannesburg and quickly spread throughout the rest of the country. This was the beginning of a long period of unrest in South Africa that would profoundly mark an entire generation.

⁴²The new strategy, in effect from 1978 to 1989, was associated preeminently with the leadership of Prime Minister (later State President) P.W. Botha, advanced to the office of Prime Minister in September 1978. The strategy itself was first officially articulated in a 1977 *White Paper on Defence*. See, *inter alia*, Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa – An Analysis of South African Regional Policy Since 1978" in *Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern Africa 1978-1988*, ed. S. Chan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 179-217; K. Grundy, *The Militarisation of South African Politics*; G. Mills and S. Baynham, "South African Foreign Policy, 1945-1990," in *From Pariah to Participant*, ed. G. Mills (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1994), 18-33; and G. Sole, "South African Foreign Policy Assumptions and Objectives from Herzog to De Klerk," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 2, no. 1 (1994).

⁴³J. Cock and L. Nathan, "Introduction" in *War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa*, ed. J. Cock and L. Nathan (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989), xiii.

⁴⁴The sanctions were imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 418.

⁴⁵See, *inter alia*, J. Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War Against its Neighbours* (London: Penguin, 1986); William Minter, *Apartheid's Contras: An inquiry into the roots of war in Angola and Mozambique* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994); Robert M. Price, "Pretoria's Southern African Strategy," in *Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern Africa 1978-1988*, ed. S. Chan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 145-69; and Willem Steenkamp, *Borderstrike! South Africa into Angola* (Durban: Butterworths, 1983).

⁴⁶South Africa's nuclear strategy, though never publicly articulated, was much more nuanced than merely the threat of nuclear strikes against regional opponents. The South Africans apparently believed that a likelihood of their nuclear use in a regional conflict would impel the United States to intervene. Helen E. Purkitt and Steven F. Burgess, *South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 79-84; Hannes Steyn, Richard van der Walt and Jan van Loggerenburg, *Armament and Disarmament: South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Experience* (Pretoria: Network Publishers, 2003), 43, 61-71.

⁴⁷Annette Seegers, "Apartheid's military: its origins and development," in *The State of Apartheid*, ed. W. James (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1987); Dan Henk, *South Africa's Arms Industry: Continuity and Change after a Decade of Majority Rule* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, forthcoming).

⁴⁸Since the 1970s, the governments of both John Vorster and P.W. Botha had made a series of efforts to achieve internal solutions to the country's political problems; but by the late 1980s, the social and economic strains of domestic unrest and interminable regional conflict had begun to tell on South Africa's white minority, which increasingly saw little prospect of a better future. However, without the attenuation of the East Bloc threat, the South African government would have had difficulty convincing the white population to risk fundamental political change. Batchelor and Willett, *Disarmament and Defence*, 62-6. Helmoed-Römer Heitman, southern African correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, personal communication, 12 June 2004 and 20 April 2005. See also Steven Friedman, editor, *The Long Journey: South Africa's Quest for a Negotiated Settlement* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1993).

⁴⁹ See, *inter alia*, Scott Thompson, "South Africa and the 1988 Agreements," in *Disengagement from Southwest Africa: The Prospects for Peace in Angola and Namibia*, ed. O. Kahn (New Brunswick, ME: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 117-30; and John Marcum, "Retrenchment and Recalculation: South Africa and the Anglo-Namibian Agreements," in *Disengagement from Southwest Africa: The Prospects for Peace in Angola and Namibia*, ed. O. Kahn (New Brunswick, ME: Transaction Publishers, 1991)

⁵⁰ These efforts were facilitated by other dramatic events occurring at the same time – the collapse of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, decreasing Soviet interest in Africa and Soviet disinclination to continue substantive support to regional clients. For an overview of the African political context at the time, see Michael Clough and Jeffrey Herbst, *South Africa's Changing Regional Strategy: Beyond Destabilization* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1989).

⁵¹ Peter Batchelor and Susan Willett, *Disarmament and Defence: Industrial Adjustment in South Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 67.

⁵² David Botha, *South Africa's Defence Industry, Charting a New Course?* (Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies, ISS Occasional Paper 78, 2003), 1. Arms production as a percentage of South Africa's manufacturing output was reduced from a high of 6.6 percent in 1989 to 4.5 percent by 1994. Batchelor and Willett, *Disarmament and Defence*, 81. According to Cawthra, "[defence industry] employment fell from 150 000 in 1989 to just over 70 000 in 1993, while the share of defence R&D as a proportion of the country's total R&D fell from 48 per cent to 18 per cent." Gavin Cawthra, "South Africa," in *Arms Procurement Decision Making, Volume II: Chile, Greece, Malaysia, Poland, South Africa and Taiwan*, ed. Ravinder Pal Singh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 147. See also Batchelor and Willett, *Armament and Disarmament*, 70-1.

⁵³ For details of South Africa's chemical and biological warfare programs and their dismantling, see Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, *The Rollback of the South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Program* (Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, Air War College, 2001); for additional details on these and South Africa's nuclear weapons program, see Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess, *South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005); Roy E. Horton III, *Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria's Nuclear Weapons Experience* (Colorado Springs, CO: USAFA Institute for National Security Studies, Occasional Paper Number 27, August 1999). For "insider" descriptions of South Africa's nuclear program, its origins, growth, dismantling, and motivations, see Hannes Steyn, Richard van der Walt and Jan van Loggerenburg, *Armament and Disarmament: South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Experience* (Pretoria: Network Publishers, 2003); F.W. de Villiers, Roger Jardine and Mitchell Reiss, "Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (November-December 1993): 98-109; J. Shearer, "Denuclearisation of Africa: the South African dimension," *Disarmament* 16, no. 2 (1993): 171-185; and D. Howlett and J. Simpson, "Nuclearisation and denuclearisation in South Africa," *Survival* 35, no. 3 (1993): 154-173; F.W. de Klerk, *The Last Trek – A New Beginning* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 273-4; and Batchelor and Willett, *Disarmament and Defence*, 71-2.

⁵⁴ De Klerk found it necessary to outmaneuver the existing military intelligence and security bureaucracy that contained powerful actors unsympathetic to his reform agenda. He also "civilianized" the leadership of the national security bureaucracy, substantially reducing the clout of senior military and security professionals. For De Klerk's motivation in his own words, see his autobiography: F. W. de Klerk, *The Last Trek – A New Beginning* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

⁵⁵ See, *inter alia*, H. Adam and K. Moodley, *South Africa's Negotiated Revolution* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1992); Friedman, *The Long Journey*; David Ottaway, *Chained Together: Mandela, De Klerk and the Struggle to Remake South Africa* (New York: Random House, 1993). For a discussion of de Klerk's motivations from his own pen, see F.W. de Klerk, *The Last Trek*, particularly pages 159-341.

⁵⁶ In 1993, De Klerk and Mandela shared a Nobel Peace Prize for their achievements.

⁵⁷ See particularly Jakkie Cilliers and Markus Reichert, editors, *About Turn: The Transformation of South African Military and Intelligence* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1995)

⁵⁸ See < <http://www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1995/intelligence.htm> > 15 September 2005

⁵⁹ See, *inter alia*, Traggy Maepa, *Beyond Retribution: Prospects for Restorative Justice in South Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Monograph No. 111, February 2005)

⁶⁰ See < <http://www.iss.co.za> > (10 October 2005) for a continuously updated account of crime statistics. See also Antony Albeker, "Paying for Crime: South African Spending on Criminal Justice." ISS Paper 115, July 2005, available at < <http://www.iss.co.za> >.

⁶¹ Earnest Mabuza, “Police ‘Have Come a Long Way in Past 10 Years,’” *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 30 September 2005.

⁶² < [Hhttp://www.environment.gov.za](http://www.environment.gov.za)H > 20 August 2005.

⁶³ The offsets had the local designation of “Industrial Participation Protocols.” There were two varieties – the National Industrial Participation Protocol (NIPP) and the Defence Industrial Participation Protocol (DIPP). For additional detail, see Peter Batchelor and Paul Dunne, “Industrial Participation, Investment and Growth: The Case of South Africa’s Defence Related Industry,” Paper prepared for the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town and Middlesex University Business School, UK, February 2000; David Botha, *Offsetting the Costs of SA’s Strategic Defence Packages* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Occasional Paper 75, 2003).

⁶⁴ The CODESA process produced an interim Constitution in 1993; the Constitution was finalized in 1996 and both versions unambiguously endorsed a human security agenda. For detail on the *Reconstruction and Development Programme*, see < [Hhttp://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/white_papers/rdpwhite.html](http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/white_papers/rdpwhite.html)H > 28 September 2005

⁶⁵ *The World Factbook 2005*, the Central Intelligence Agency, available from the Superintendent of Documents < [Hhttp://bookstore.gpo.gov](http://bookstore.gpo.gov)H > 17 October 2005.

⁶⁶ For specific details, see the UNDP 2000 Human Development Report for South Africa, available at < [Hhttp://www.undp.org.za/sahdr2000/sahdr20002.html](http://www.undp.org.za/sahdr2000/sahdr20002.html)H > 26 September 2005

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 3-6.

⁶⁸ Undated publication quoted by Jakkie Cilliers, *An Emerging South African Foreign Policy Identity?* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Occasional Paper No. 39, April 1999), 4, available at < [Hhttp://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Papers/39/Paper39H.html](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Papers/39/Paper39H.html) > 30 September 2005.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 5.

⁷⁰ See, for example, Larry A. Swatuck and Peter Vale, “Why Democracy is not enough: Southern African and human security in the 21st Century, *Alternatives* 24 (1999).

⁷¹ See < [Hhttp://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za](http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za)H > 26 September 2005

⁷² See < [Hhttp://pdm.mgmt.wits.ac.za](http://pdm.mgmt.wits.ac.za)H > 26 September 2005.

⁷³ < [Hhttp://www.iss.co.za](http://www.iss.co.za)H > 9 September 2005. For useful illustrative examples, see, for instance, Jakkie Cilliers, “Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa,” ISS Occasional Paper 102, April 2005 and Jakkie Cilliers, *Human Security in Africa: A Conceptual Framework for Review*, a publication of the African Human Security Initiative (AHSI), 2004, < [Hhttp://www.africanreview.org](http://www.africanreview.org)H > 9 October 2005.

⁷⁴ CSIR was created by act of Parliament in 1945. A public sector body separate from the civil service, it was chartered to support the domestic economy by conducting “pure” and applied research, coordinating other national scientific research efforts and encouraging the training of researchers and technicians. See Denys Graham Kingwill, *The CSIR-the first 40 Years* (Pretoria: Scientia Printers, CSIR, 1990). For details about current activities, see < [Hhttp://www.csir.co.za](http://www.csir.co.za)H > 26 September 2005.

⁷⁵ See < [Hhttp://www.trainingforpeace.org/events/archive/whitepaper.pdf](http://www.trainingforpeace.org/events/archive/whitepaper.pdf)H > 28 September 2005.

⁷⁶ The final draft of this paper was written by Mark Malan, one of South Africa’s most experienced authorities on international peace operations. A former army officer and scholar, Malan was serving in 2005 on the directing staff of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KA IPTC) in Accra, Ghana.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, paragraph 2-1.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, paragraphs 2-3 and 2-4.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, section 6.

⁸⁰ Vanessa Kent and Mark Malan, *Decisions, Decisions: South Africa’s foray into regional peace operations* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper 72, April 2003), 2, available at < [Hhttp://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Papers/72/Paper72.html](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Papers/72/Paper72.html)H > 25 September 2005.

⁸¹ Minister of Defence Mosiuoa Lekota, in a speech to the National Assembly in April 2005, listed South Africa’s external military deployments as 1,262 personnel in Burundi, 1400 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 257 in Sudan, 7 in Ethiopia/Eritrea and 3 in Liberia. See < [Hhttp://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05041116151001.htm](http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05041116151001.htm)H > (12 October 2005).

⁸² It is important to stress that these were not the only South African external involvements in human security-related activities. As examples, in 2002, South Africa hosted the highly influential UN-sponsored World Summit on Sustainable Development. See < [Hhttp://www.johannesburgsummit.org](http://www.johannesburgsummit.org)H > and <

[Hhttp://www.unep.org](http://www.unep.org)H > 20 August 2005. In September 2005, the South African government pledged some R 36 million (US\$ 6 million) to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Veronica Mohapeloa, "SA Pledges R36m to the Global Fund," *BuaNews* (Tshwane), 7 September 2005.

⁸³ See < [Hhttp://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05041116151001.htm](http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05041116151001.htm)H > (12 October 2005). Lekota, who in South Africa's parliamentary system is himself a Member of Parliament, presented his remarks in advance of a vote on the "defence" budget.

⁸⁴ Ibid

⁸⁵ See, *inter alia*, "Ready to Govern: ANC Policy Guideline for a Democratic South Africa," adopted at the National Conference, May 1992, < [Hhttp://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/readyto.html](http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/readyto.html)H > (25 March 2005); L. Nathan, "Beyond arms and armed forces: a new approach to security," *South African Defence Review*, 4, (1992): 12-21; and B. Fanaroff, "A trade unionist perspective on the future of the armaments industry in South Africa," *South African Defence Review* 7 (1992): 10-4.

⁸⁶ The South African professional literature at the time reflected a rich ferment in thinking about new definitions of "security." See, *inter alia*, M. van Aardt, "Doing battle with security: a Southern African approach," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 3, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 13-28; and Hussein Solomon, "From marginalised to dominant discourse: Reflections on the evolution of new security thinking" in *Caring Security in Africa*, ed. H. Solomon and M. van Aardt (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Monograph No. 20, 1998).

⁸⁷ See, *inter alia*, M. Shaw, "Biting the bullet: negotiating democracy's defence" in *South African Review 7: The Small Miracle. South Africa's Negotiated Settlement*, ed. S. Friedman and D. Atkinson (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1994), 228-56.

⁸⁸ The Military Research Group was coordinated by South African scholar Gavin Cawthra, based at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, and included other academics like Laurie Nathan, Jakkie Coq and Rocky Williams. It disbanded by about mid 1995. Author's interview with Gavin Cawthra, 22 June 2004.

⁸⁹ See, *inter alia*, Jakkie Cilliers and Hussein Solomon, Editors, *People, Poverty and Peace: Human Security in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Monograph Number 4, 1996); and H. Solomon and M. van Aardt, Editors, *Caring Security in Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Monograph Number 20, 1998).

⁹⁰ Greg Mills, "The South African National Defence Force: Between Downsizing and New Capabilities." *Naval War College Review* LII, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 79-80.

⁹¹ Ibid, 79. Still, Heitman adds a cautionary note. The new arrangement preserved a considerable role in defense policymaking for the (uniformed) Chief of the South African National Defence Force, somewhat compromising the intended strength of civil control. Helmoed-Römer Heitman, southern African correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, personal communication with the author, 20 April 2005.

⁹² Ibid, 80-2. Author's interview with Len Le Roux, Director of the Defence Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 10 June 2005. See also <

[Hhttp://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/parliament/committees.htm](http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/parliament/committees.htm)H > 12 August 2005;

[Hhttp://www.pmg.org](http://www.pmg.org)H > (12 August 2005).

⁹³ See, *inter alia*, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996), particularly Chapter 11, paragraph 200: "The primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people. . ." < [Hhttp://www.info.gov.za/domuments/acts/index.htm#1996](http://www.info.gov.za/domuments/acts/index.htm#1996)H > (25 March 2005). Cawthra interview, 22 June 2004. See also Rocky Williams, "Defence in a democracy: the South African Defence Review and the redefinition of the parameters of the national defence debate," in *Ourselves to Know*, ed. R. Williams, G. Cawthra and D. Abrahams (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2003), 212. Williams reflects some of the diversity of the debate by taking issue with the "primacy" of the (military) prime function in his article.

⁹⁴ Williams, "Human Security."

⁹⁵ Ibid

⁹⁶ Len Le Roux, "The South African National Defence Force and its involvement in the Defence Review process," in *Ourselves to Know*, ed. R. Williams, G. Cawthra and D. Abrahams (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2003), 155-6.

⁹⁷ Based on the author's interviews with a wide range of South African scholars and former officials possessing first-hand experience in these events.

⁹⁸South Africans had widely differing expectations on almost any issue – including security - and to make matters worse, a relatively large number of government officials at all levels had little preparation for their new roles and responsibilities. But the new leaders of South Africa were determined to consult widely on major issues to avoid the abuses of the previous era. Cawthra, “South Africa,” 142-3. See also, “Ready to Govern: ANC Policy Guideline for a Democratic South Africa,” adopted at the National Conference, May 1992 < <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/readyto.html> > (25 March 2005); Le Roux, “The South African National Defence Force,” 154-63; and Mills, “The South African National Defence Force,” 80-2. ⁹⁹<<http://www.gov.za/documents> > (25 March 2005)

¹⁰⁰ There was more than a little irony in Nathan’s authorship. His earlier prominence as an anti-war activist in the waning years of the *apartheid* era would not have seemed a propitious qualification to define a new security establishment with a powerful conventional military. But he and his colleagues succeeded in crafting a document that called for a substantial national Defence Force, unambiguously subordinating the new military establishment to strong civilian control with substantial accountability to the nation.

¹⁰¹Laurie Nathan, *The changing of the guard: armed forces and defence policy in a democratic South Africa* (Cape Town: HSRC Publishers, 1994)

¹⁰²See Le Roux, “The South African National Defence Force,” 156-8.

¹⁰³ *South African White Paper on Defence* (Pretoria: Department of Defence, Printed by 1 Military Printing Regiment).

¹⁰⁴The *White Paper* explicitly stated that the [armed forces] comprise “. . .an important security instrument of last resort. . .[but not] the dominant security institution.” Ibid, 3,4.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 4. Virtually the same ideas, in the same wording, had appeared in South Africa’s Interim Constitution of 1993, and would be reflected in the final Constitution of 1996.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, Chapter 2.

¹⁰⁸ Le Roux, “The South African National Defence Force,” 159

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 158-68.

¹¹⁰ *South African Defence Review*, 1998 (Pretoria: 1 Military Printing Regiment, 1998), vi.

¹¹¹ The Le Roux/Williams partnership had all the elements of a novel. Le Roux, the consummate professional staff officer from the old South African Defence Force, phlegmatic and intellectual, worked with a core staff of senior officers from the four military services. Williams was an effusive and colorful character, who had served as a clandestine ANC agent in the *apartheid* era South African military before leaving to study for a doctorate in the United Kingdom. Williams now argued radical options against the more conventional approaches emphasized by Le Roux, the career Air Force staff officer. Both sought to reconcile the even more radical views of participants like Laurie Nathan, and both strove to make the ultimate document acceptable to a very diverse constituency, a requirement that demanded considerable political acumen. Le Roux interview, 11 March 2004; Heitman interview, 23 June 2004.

¹¹²Ibid; Le Roux, “The South African National Defence Force,” 163-7. Thandi Modise and Zou Kota, both members of Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Defence, were noteworthy contributors to these efforts. Information provided to the author in a private communication from Helmoed-Römer Heitman, May 2004.

¹¹³ Among other things, the *Review* clearly implied that South Africa would retain a significant indigenous arms production capacity to meet its strategic requirements. Ibid, Chapter 13.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, Chapter 1, paragraphs 27-8; Chapter 7, paragraph 1.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, Chapter 7, paragraph 1.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, Chapter 7

¹¹⁷ Ibid, Chapters 5, 6 and 12.

¹¹⁸ *White Paper on Defence*, 19.

¹¹⁹ South African scholars like Rocky Williams and Peter Batchelor have called attention to this apparent contradiction. It also was publicly recognized in 2003 by the Commanding Officer of the South African Army who implicitly criticized the limitations of the *White Paper on Defence*. See Batchelor and Willett, *Disarmament and Defence*, 135-7; Rocky Williams, “Defence in a democracy,” 205-23; and S. Nyanda, “The South African National Defence Force and Peace Missions in Africa,” paper presented at the African Dialogue Series, University of Pretoria, 27 February 2003.

¹²⁰ Particularly in Chapters 3, 4 and 8

¹²¹ Particularly in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.

¹²² Particularly in Chapters 2 and 3.

¹²³ Rocky Williams, "Defence in a democracy: The South African Defence Review and the redefinition of the parameters of the national defence debate," in *Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa*, ed. R. Williams, Gavin Cawthra, D. Abrahams (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2003), 205-23.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 222.

¹²⁵ *South African National Defence Force Military Strategy* (Pretoria: 1 Military Training Regiment, November 2002).

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹²⁷ The announcement was made at a South African arms exhibition (DEXSA-98). "South African gets ready to announce fighter trainer winner," Reed Business Information Ltd., 14 October 1998; "\$5.2bn military deal defended against backdrop of regional war," *Financial Times* Information, Southscan, 1 December 1998.

¹²⁸ The specific items in these "Strategic Packages" ultimately were to include twenty-eight JAS-39 *Gripen* multi-role fighter aircraft manufactured by a BAE Systems/Saab consortium in Sweden, twenty-four BAE KM 120 *Hawk* lead-in fighter trainer aircraft manufactured in the UK, thirty Agusta A-109 Light Utility Helicopters (most of which would be assembled in South Africa), four Meko A200 patrol corvettes manufactured by the German Frigate Consortium in Germany, three Class 209 1400 patrol submarines manufactured by the German Submarine Consortium/Ferrostaal in Germany, and four Westland *Super Lynx* 300 maritime helicopters manufactured in the United Kingdom. Dan Henk, *South Africa's Armaments Industry: Continuity and Change after a Decade of Majority Rule* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, forthcoming)

¹²⁹ David Botha, *Offsetting the Costs of SA's Strategic Defence Package* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Occasional Paper 75, 2003), 5. The future costs of the program were estimated the time to be up to an additional US\$5 billion. Cabinet Decision on Strategic Defence Procurement, 15 September 2000, < [Hhttp://www.gov.za/papers/procurement/cabinet.htm](http://www.gov.za/papers/procurement/cabinet.htm) > (5 June 2004). US dollar costs are reflected in the 1999 Rand/Dollar exchange rates.

¹³⁰ David Botha, "The Arms Deal Controversy," *African Security Review* 12, no. 3 (2003): 99-103.

¹³¹ The fact that the documents were under review was mentioned by Minister of Defence Lekota in an April 2005 address to the National Assembly. The context of Lekota's remarks also seemed to suggest that the revised documents would reflect South Africa's growing involvement in regional peace operations. See < [Hhttp://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05041116151001.htm](http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05041116151001.htm) > (12 October 2005).

¹³² Beginning in the 1970s, South Africa recruited and deployed several effective battalion-sized non-white military units (typically officered by whites), though the total numbers were small. See, for instance, Kenneth W. Grundy, *Soldiers without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983); and Jan Breytenbach, *The Buffalo Soldiers* (Alberton, South Africa: Galago, 2002). Helmoed-Römer Heitman also calls attention to the military forces organized and controlled by the South Africans in Southwest Africa (now independent Namibia). Most of the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) was comprised of locally recruited non-whites, and by the late 1980s, was officered by non-whites up to the company level. The Southwest Africa police counterinsurgency unit was almost entirely non-white as was the home guard. Heitman says that South Africa's Vorster Administration had firmly settled the issue of non-white officers in the South African Armed Forces: they were to enjoy the same perquisites and authority as their white colleagues. Heitman, private communications with the author, 12 June 2004 and 20 April 2005.

¹³³ These states were the *apartheid*-era ethnic homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei.

¹³⁴ The agreements that mediated the transition to majority rule in 1994 obliged the new South African government to integrate the additional personnel. The two "liberation armies" were the ANC's *Mkhonto we Sive* – MK, and the Pan African Congress' Azanian People's Liberation Army – APLA. The self-defence force of the Inkatha Freedom Party was incorporated (not integrated) into the system on a preferential basis. For details, see Jakkie Cilliers, *The South African Army in Transition* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Monograph Number 26, 1998). For discussion of the human costs of this process, see *inter alia*, Ian Liebenberg and Rialize Ferreira, "Loyal service and yet "demobbed" – Demobilization and the economic reintegration of South Africa's demobilized military personnel," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 37, no. 3-5 (December 2002): 299-317; Rialize Ferreira. "The integration of the armed forces into

the South African National Defence Force: a sociological investigation,” in *Armed Forces and the International Diversities*. Ed. Leena Parmar (Jaipur, India: Pointer Publications, 2001), 82-110.

¹³⁵ “Ageing Military to Get More Recruits,” *Southscan* (London), 29 September 2005.

¹³⁶ For a discussion of the overall process, see Garth Shelton, David Monyue, Ann Pullinger, Matthew Simonds and Rocky Williams, *Demobilization and Its Aftermath I: A Profile of South Africa’s Demobilised Military Personnel* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Monograph No. 59, August 2001); and Ian Liebenberg and Marlene Roefs, *Demobilization and Its Aftermath II: Economic Reinsertion of South Africa’s Demobilised Military Personnel* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Monograph No. 61, August 2001). For some of the human aspects, see Rialize Ferreira, “The integration of the armed forces into the South African National Defence Force: a sociological investigation,” in *Armed Forces and the International Diversities*, ed. L. Parmar (Jaipur, India: Pointer Publications, 2001), 82-110; and Ian Liebenberg and Rialize Ferreira, “Loyal service and yet “demobbed” – Demobilization and the economic reintegration of South Africa’s demobilized military personnel,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 37, no. 3-5 (December 2002): 299-317.

¹³⁷ “Ageing Military to Get More Recruits,” *Southscan* (London), 29 September 2005.

¹³⁸ See Lt.Col. A.W. Tapfumaneyi, “View on regional peacekeeping” Toward a SADC peacekeeping force, SARDC, 1999, available at < [Hhttp://www.sardc.net/Editorial/sadctoday/v2-6-04-1999/v2-6-04-1999-10.htmH](http://www.sardc.net/Editorial/sadctoday/v2-6-04-1999/v2-6-04-1999-10.htmH) > (26 January 2005); and Mark Malan, *Resolute Partners, Building Peacekeeping Capacity in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 21, February 1998). The combined regional exercises up to 2004 included: *Blue Hungwe* (in Zimbabwe, 1997); *Blue Crane* (in South Africa, 1999); *Airborne Africa* (in South Africa, 2001 and 2004, in Botswana in 2002); *Tanzanite* (in Tanzania, 2002); *Rainbow Trek* (in South Africa, 2003); *Nicussy* (in Mozambique in 2004).

¹³⁹ Author’s interview with Major Max Ngkapha, Director of Protocol, Botswana Defence Force, Sir Seretse Khama Barracks, 6 June 2005. This exercise was organized under the French-sponsored RECAM program. It was conducted in the area around Maun (in northern Botswana) and involved about 3000 military personnel organized into three multi-national battalions with company-sized contingents from Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

¹⁴⁰ Based on the author’s extensive interviews with US military personnel that also participated in the humanitarian relief operation.

¹⁴¹ Abel J. Esterhuysen, “Educating for Professionalism: A New Military for a New South Africa,” a paper read at the 72d meeting of the Society of Military History, the Citadel, Charleston SC, 24-27 February 2005.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 9-11.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 17-20.

¹⁴⁴ Information provided by Len Le Roux, Head of the Defence Sector Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, in a private communication, 7 October 2005. Le Roux noted that the phase at the Senior Joint Staff Course includes a week-long seminar facilitated by his Institute for Security Studies.

¹⁴⁵ For more detail, see Lindy Heineken, “Preparing for Operations Other than War: How Equipped is the SANDF to Deal with the ‘Soft Missions’?” *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* XXIV, No. 1 (June 2002); and T. Neethling, “The South African Military and Peacekeeping: Reflections on Conditions, Capacity Building and Prospects,” *Scientia Militaria* 31, No. 1 (2003).

¹⁴⁶ See < [Hhttp://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05041116151001.htmH](http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05041116151001.htmH) > (12 October 2005).

¹⁴⁷ According to Heitman, in 2005 the South African National Defence Force contingent in Burundi equated to a “Battalion Group” (in this case a ground force battalion augmented with VIP protection and other elements). The South African deployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo included a Battalion Group (reinforced battalion) along with separate Air Force and Medical Service assets. Heitman, personal communication, 20 April 2005. For a useful overview of these missions, see Vanessa Kent and Mark Malan, *Decisions, Decisions: South Africa’s foray into regional peace operations* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Occasional Paper 72, April 2003). For an assessment of the South African role *vis a vis* the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see particularly Lt.Col. Naison Ngoma (Zambian Army, retired), *Hawks, Doves or Penguins? A critical review of the SADC military intervention in the DRC* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Paper 88, April 2004).

¹⁴⁸ The intervention force included some 600 troops from South Africa and some 380 from Botswana. South African Brigadier General Robbie Hartlief commanded it. His deputy was a Botswana Defence Force colonel. Rakgole interview, 4 March 2004. For analysis of this intervention – and the political crisis

that provoked it – see, *inter alia*. Theo Neethling, “Military Intervention in Lesotho: Perspectives on Operation Boleas and Beyond,” *The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution* 2.2 (May 1999) available at: < [Hhttp://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/22_2neethling.htm](http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/22_2neethling.htm) > (20 July 2005); and “Combined Task Force Boleas,” available at: < [Hhttp://www.mil.za/CSANDF/CJOps/Operations/General/HBoleas/Boleas-1.htm](http://www.mil.za/CSANDF/CJOps/Operations/General/HBoleas/Boleas-1.htm) > (20 July 2005).

¹⁴⁹ For insightful commentary on the implications of this intervention for South Africa, see Kent and Malan, *Decisions, Decisions*, 3-4.

¹⁵⁰ This was termed “Operation *Maluti*.”

¹⁵¹ “Civil-Affairs” is a US Army military specialty designed to interface between combat units and local civilian societies. Personnel with this specialty have been extensively used in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2002, proving particularly important to post-conflict operations to restore civil society and maintain good relations between military occupation forces and local communities.

¹⁵² R. K. Jele, “Peacekeeping in the context of the DoD military strategy,” a paper presented at the Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria, 2004.

¹⁵³ Williams, “Human Security.”

¹⁵⁴ Even as late as 2005, the South African military establishment still was struggling with resource issues stemming in large part from the personnel rationalization and affirmative action programs inherited from the agreements that mediated the transition to majority rule. See Wyndham Hartley, “Arms package faces critical risk as funds dry up,” (Johannesburg) *Business Day*, 2 February 2005.

¹⁵⁵ In 1997 US dollar values, this represented a reduction from \$4.9 billion to \$2.0 billion. Greg Mills, “The South African National Defence Force: Between Downsizing and New Capabilities,” *Naval War College Review* LII, no.1 (Winter 1999): 87.

¹⁵⁶ Jakkie Cilliers, *Defence Acquisitions-Unpacking the Package Deal* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Occasional Paper 29, 1998)

¹⁵⁷ Heitman, personal communication, 20 April 2005; Wyndham Hartley, “African Peace Burden Cannot be SA’s Alone Warns Lekota,” (Johannesburg) *Business Day*, 16 February 2005.

¹⁵⁸ “South Africa to withdraw over 300 troops protecting political leaders in Burundi following peaceful elections last month,” *UN Integrated Regional Information Networks*, 7 September 2005.

¹⁵⁹ In April 2005 the Minister of Defence defended this acquisition by citing the intended role of the new aircraft in peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and similar missions. See < [Hhttp://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05041116151001.htm](http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05041116151001.htm) > (12 October 2005). The A400M is a new generation military transport to be built in the future by a consortium of European producers, of which Airbus and EADS are key members. The acquisition of the A400M apparently will provide substantial opportunity for South African arms producers, who believe they will play an important role in the design, production and maintenance of the worldwide A400M fleet in the future. (As this is written in mid 2005, the aircraft exists only on the drawing boards, lacking even a functional prototype.) This arms acquisition decision is based on an uncertain delivery schedule and appears to have bypassed the Department of Defence procurement process altogether. In 2005 it was being managed by the Department of Trade and Industry, an unusual situation for a military acquisition program. Nic Dawes, “No plane, no gain?” *Mail and Guardian*, 9 December 2004; Alan Holloway, Vice Chairman of AMD and Managing Director, ANSYS, personal communication with the author, 4 April 2005.

¹⁶⁰ “6000 troops for SADC Brigade,” *SouthScan* (London) 29 September 2005.

¹⁶¹ Author’s interview with Colonel (Professor) Louis du Plessis, Director of the Centre for Military Studies, University of Stellenbosch, 15 June 2005.

¹⁶² South Africa has, however, maintained non-regular forces in its “reserve force volunteers.” In 2005 it deployed a small number of these in a for peacekeeping duties in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Henri Du Plessis, “Troops to Keep Peace in DRC,” *Cape Argus* (Cape Town), 24 January 2005.