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INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY American Military Dilemmas And Doctrinal Proposals

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ABSTRACT

This paper addresses the difficult problems presented to the US military establishment by so-called low-intensity conflict. The author’s objective is to develop counterinsurgency doctrinal concepts. The author provides a foundation for the concepts by analyzing insurgent warfare with particular emphasis on the fundamental differences between insurgencies and conventional European-style warfare. From this analysis, the author develops and describes both the fundamental and operational dilemmas the United States faces when attempting to engage in counterinsurgency. Finally, the author draws upon the entire study to present the four basic elements, and their corollaries, of a counterinsurgency doctrine and resulting force structure implications.
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INTRODUCTION

Frustrated by the historically inconclusive outcome of the Vietnam War, the American military has all but turned its back on the study and preparation for low-intensity conflicts and has concentrated its efforts on worst-case scenarios involving nuclear deterrence and a major war against the Warsaw Pact in Europe or Southwest Asia. The military’s calculated avoidance of serious study in the low-intensity arena should not have come as a surprise to knowledgeable observers. Such “shadow wars” have been anathema to the American military establishment for at least three decades. In the aftermath of the Korean War and before heavy combat involvement in Vietnam, the United States pinned most of its hopes on nuclear weapons in the belief (disputed by some) that “atomic airpower” could deter all forms of war, and, if deterrence failed, could quickly end any conflict large or small. Because “atomic airpower’s” strength lay in technology rather than massive manpower, it was relatively inexpensive—a prime policy requirement of the Eisenhower administration.

When the Kennedy administration sought to achieve some latitude for maneuver between the limited choices of nuclear war or surrender developed during the Eisenhower years, they met surprising resistance from the Army. In addition to building conventional force capabilities, President Kennedy also was intrigued by insurgent or guerrilla warfare and pressed for increased capabilities in these “unconventional” operations. For a variety of reasons, the Army resisted, preferring to prepare for what it saw as the more serious threat—a major war in Europe involving the Soviets.

In the wake of the Vietnam War, the military services have steadfastly dragged their collective feet in any official attempt to objectively and systematically examine and analyze low-intensity conflict in general, and more specifically, what went awry in the Vietnam conflict. Unofficially, several senior level military officers have published books and memoirs, but virtually all pay scant attention to the insurgent portions of the war in Vietnam and concentrate instead on its more conventional aspects. Gen William C. Westmoreland’s memoirs give only lip service to the unconventional aspects of the war. Perhaps the most celebrated analysis by a military officer was produced by Col Harry C. Summers, Jr., of the Strategic Studies Institute at
the Army War College. Summerville’s account viewed the entire war as it had ended, that is, as a conventional invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam. His approach ignored and depreciated the revolutionary basis for the war as well as the guerrilla tactics and insurgent strategies used (even by regular enemy forces) during much of the war, particularly during the critical period from 1965 to 1968. More recently, Gen Bruce Palmer, Jr., produced a thoughtful volume that nevertheless emphasized the conventional aspects of the conflict and offered conventional solutions.

Personal accounts given willingly from many senior-ranking officers (active duty and retired) on the Vietnam War and low-intensity conflict in general can be summarized in the well-worn American military adage, “If they had just turned us loose in 1965, the war would have been over quickly.” Perhaps more significant is the attitude expressed directly to this author in 1985 by a very senior Air Force general officer who said that the American military should not be distracted by “those kind of wars” since we can always just “muddle through.”

This general attitude of indifference to the unique nature of low-intensity conflict flies in the face of a torrent of well-documented literature indicating that low-intensity conflict is the most likely kind of future conflict, is fundamentally different from “conventional” conflicts, and requires something other than conventional countermeasures. Most of this literature has been produced by civilian academics and is thus suspect in many military circles. However even the most hidebound military traditionalist should find convincing evidence in the outcome of the war in Vietnam. The United States was not successful in Vietnam even against a fourth-rate (at best) military power. Regardless of protests to the contrary, it is clear that even without being “turned loose,” the United states military should have been more successful if the conflict in Vietnam was nothing more than a conventional war in disguise.

It is time to take a reasoned, balanced, and very basic look at low-intensity conflict from a military point of view. The purpose here will be to define some commonly misused terms, to examine the nature of low-intensity conflict, to illustrate the unique characteristics of insurgent warfare, to contrast insurgent and conventional warfare, to outline the military dilemmas
encountered in attempting to counter an insurgency, and to explore the essential elements of a counterinsurgent doctrine.

**Low-Intensity Conflict**

The first step, of course, is to define just what it is we are considering. Low-intensity conflict is a dismally poor title for a type of warfare in which thousands die, countless more are physically or psychologically maimed and, in the process, the fate of nations hangs in the balance. The intensity of a conflict depends upon one’s perspective. Any conflict is intense to an individual under fire. Fear, pain, and death are equally harsh to those involved in a grandiose global conflict or a localized scuffle. Worse than being nondescriptive, the term low-intensity conflict is chauvinistic, the product of a proud superpower seeing only its own version of reality. What Americans have titled low-intensity conflicts may have been minor affairs in the life of a superpower. However, to other nations and peoples--those directly involved--they are no small affairs. To those nations, such conflicts have been passionate, all-consuming struggles.

**Filtering Official Views**

The American military considers low-intensity conflict to have four manifestations. They are (1) counterterrorism (which presumes that someone else has terrorism as a part of their low-intensity conflict--even though one person’s terrorist is another person’s patriot); (2) peacekeeping; (3) peacetime contingencies--a euphemism for quick, sharp, peacetime military actions (such as the joint Air Force/Navy air raid on Libya in 1986) that other nations might well equate with terrorism; and (4) insurgency/counterinsurgency. One can dispute the inclusion of some of these terms within the definition of low-intensity conflict. Terrorism, for instance, is a tactic rather than a kind of warfare, and it is a tactic that can be used in any type of conflict. The same holds true for counterterrorism. Peacekeeping missions (e.g., sending US Marines to Lebanon in the early 1980s with such tragic results) have as their objective the prevention of conflict rather than the prosecution of conflict. Finally, direct-action missions tend to be high in intensity but short in duration, a situation particularly unsuitable for the rubric “low-intensity conflict.”
This leaves us with insurgency and counterinsurgency holding relatively legitimate claims to the title of low-intensity conflicts. Sam C. Sarkesian, for one, agrees with this restricted definition and points out that the “primary distinction . . . rests more with the character of the conflict than with its levels of intensity or the specific number of forces involved,” and that “the substantive dimensions of such conflicts evolve primarily from revolutionary and counterrevolutionary strategy and causes.”9 Insurgents are revolutionaries, and counterinsurgency is obviously counterrevolutionary.10 Thus for the purposes of this paper, so-called low-intensity conflict includes only insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Roots of Modern Insurgency

An insurgency is nothing more than an armed revolution against the established political order.11 “Pure” insurgencies are internal affairs and the insurgents are self-sustaining. They do not require assistance from foreign powers.12 In essence, insurgencies are civil wars. In the Vietnam conflict, the United States went to considerable lengths to demonstrate that the conflict was anything but a civil war.13 The fact remained, however, that whether the South Vietnamese government was fighting indigenous Vietcong or North Vietnamese, Vietnamese were fighting Vietnamese.14 The 1954 Geneva Accords mandated this internal struggle for control of greater Vietnam, albeit the accords envisioned a struggle at the ballot box rather than on the battlefield.

Although “pure” insurgencies are civil wars, the situation becomes less clear-cut when outside powers intervene in some manner. Often such intervention is only in the form of supplying materiel aid to one side or the other, or providing professional revolutionaries (e.g., the Cuban revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara in Bolivia) who can organize and discipline “what might otherwise be a haphazard affair easily crushed by the government in power. Intervention has been common as the major powers “fished in troubled waters” in the hope of gaining advantage in the perceived zero-sum game of international power politics. When intervention draws the attention of an opposing power, an insurgency can quickly be cast as a major power confrontation. The fact remains that insurgencies are, at base, internal affairs--unless the role of one or both sides is co-opted by an intervening power.15
Insurgent warfare did not originate in Vietnam, of course. In the twentieth century, insurgent conflicts have been scattered throughout the third world and have been primarily the result of real or perceived gross inequities in political and economic power, combined with the perception of minimal opportunities for political reform and economic upward mobility. During the colonial era, these grievances often were combined with nationalistic stirrings and were manifested in anticolonial movements. In the postcolonial period, the same grievances have led to struggles to overthrow regimes often far more inept, corrupt, and repressive than their colonial predecessors.

Conditions are ripe for insurgencies in many areas of the third world. Typically, developing third world nations display stark contrasts between incredible poverty for the bulk of the population and fabulous wealth for the ruling elite. Further, a middle class, which can be both a stabilizing influence and a perceived conduit for upward mobility, is often very small or virtually nonexistent in many areas. Of concern to the United States is the fact that these same areas of potential insurgent conflict often sit astride or near important trade routes or trade-route chokepoints (e.g., straits of Hormuz and Malacca, Suez and Panama canals), or they contain important deposits of raw (and often rare) materials vital to industrialized economies.

The upshot is that insurgent warfare is a fact of life in the third world. Further, it seems likely that insurgent struggles will inevitably draw some level of American interest and involvement due to the intrinsic value of these areas, or due to our perception of their importance to the international balance of power.

Characteristics of Insurgent Warfare

Every insurgency has its unique characteristics. However, successful insurgencies have had certain characteristics in common that constitute the basis of insurgent warfare doctrine. Four characteristics are particularly significant to the American military: (1) the protractedness of such struggles, (2) the central role of the insurgent political infrastructure, (3) the subsidiary
role of insurgent military forces, and (4) the use of guerrilla tactics in military operations. We will address each of these in turn.

Protractedness

Insurgencies are almost always protracted struggles. It would be highly unusual for rebels attempting to overthrow an entrenched government to achieve a quick victory. Time, however, becomes a two-edged sword in the hands of an insurgent, and both edges cut into support for the government. On one hand, the rebels require time to build their political support and military strength relative to the government they seek to overthrow. On the other hand, insurgents use time as a weapon in itself to weaken that same government. Every day that an insurgent movement continues to exist (not to mention its continued operations and growth) discredits the government and its ability to govern effectively and control its own destiny. Every day that an insurgent movement continues to exist tends to add legitimacy to the insurgent cause and can eventually create an air of inevitability surrounding its eventual victory.

In Vietnam, both France and the United States found that their enemies used time as a potent weapon. The Vietminh and later the Vietcong/North Vietnamese protracted these struggles, waiting for the French and Americans to tire of the endless bloodletting and abandon their efforts.

Ho Chi Minh, architect of the French and American frustrations in Vietnam, considered time to be the ultimate weapon in the insurgent arsenal.

Time is the condition to be won to defeat the enemy. In military affairs time is of prime importance. Time ranks first among the three factors necessary for victory, coming before terrain and support of the people. Only with time can we defeat the enemy.\(^{16}\)

Mao Zedong, considered by many to be the godfather of modern insurgent warfare theory, promoted the concept of a protracted, three-phased conflict. Mao’s concept began with the establishment of secure base areas and the creation of a political infrastructure; progressed
through guerrilla attacks on the government and actions to build popular support and change the “correlation of forces”; and culminated in a more conventional war seeking quick and decisive victory. Based on his experiences in China, Mao knew such a struggle could continue for years if not decades. His concept included the flexibility to move from one phase to another in either direction depending upon the situation at hand. Quick victory was not important because time and the continuing insurgency would, in Mao’s view, eventually bring victory to the rebel cause. In this light, Mao’s famous dictum that guerrilla forces facing a stronger enemy should “withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws” becomes significant far beyond mere tactical doctrine.

Political Infrastructure

Although the military aspect of the struggle may ebb and flow, the source of insurgent strength--a covert political infrastructure--remains constant. This infrastructure, the bitter fruit resulting from the perceived political and economic inequities sown much earlier, is the most important ingredient in the insurgent recipe for success. The political infrastructure performs at least six major functions vital to the survival, growth, and eventual success of the insurgency: (1) intelligence gathering and transmission; (2) provision of supplies and financial resources; (3) recruitment; (4) political expansion and penetration; (5) sabotage, terrorism, and intimidation; and (6) establishment of a shadow government.

Accurate and timely intelligence is vital to insurgent success in both political and military actions. Well-placed agents within the government and the military can provide information that, at once, can make government counterinsurgency actions ineffectual and increase the effectiveness of insurgent actions. Even those agents or sympathizers who are not well placed within the government or its military can provide significant information to the insurgent command structure simply by observing government troop movements or reporting the unguarded conversations of minor government officials overheard in social or business settings.

Insurgent sympathizers provide their military forces with essential supplies that are readily available within the society under attack. They can obtain simple medical supplies
(disinfectants, bandaging materials, etc.) and clothing in small amounts without suspicion. For those supplies not readily available, “taxes” voluntarily paid by sympathizers and coerced from those intimidated by the insurgents provide the means to obtain such needs from foreign sources or corrupt government officials.

If the proselytizing efforts of the insurgent underground succeed and the infrastructure spreads through the population, the government is weakened. In addition, as it spreads through the society, the infrastructure taps into a larger and larger manpower pool from which to draw recruits (volunteers and “conscripts”) for the rebel armed forces. This phenomenon explains why it is possible for the size of the rebel military forces to increase in spite of heavy casualties inflicted by government forces. Indeed, if the government concentrates its attention on subduing the insurgent military threat, it provides the infrastructure with the opportunity to grow unimpeded; thus exacerbating the government’s military problem.

Members of the underground often hold positions from which they can effectively conduct sabotage operations against government resources and installations. Moreover, because they are embedded deep within the general population, clandestine insurgent cells can effectively engage in or abet acts of terrorism designed to intimidate targeted factions of the population. These activities further weaken support for the government (especially if the perpetrators are not apprehended) and weaken the will of the population to resist insurgent efforts.

Finally, the insurgent infrastructure can establish its own government as a rival to the authority of the government under siege. This is an effective ploy if certain geographic areas are effectively under the control of the insurgents. A shadow government challenges the legitimacy of the established government by virtue of its announced political program (calling for solutions to the grievances that produced the insurgency), its control in certain areas, and its steadfastness in spite of attempts by the government in power to destroy the insurgency. Further, a shadow government can provide a “legitimate” conduit for support from friendly foreign powers.

The rebel political infrastructure feeds on the perceived grievances that led to the birth of the insurgent movement. The infrastructure is difficult for the government to attack because it is
essentially “bulletproof.” One does not attack a three-person insurgent cell in a Saigon high school with heavy bombers or artillery. Moreover, if the infrastructure is well constructed (e.g., small cells with limited knowledge of other cells), the government will have great difficulty in rooting out and destroying the infrastructure by nonmilitary means (i.e., counterintelligence activities and police actions).19

Subsidiary Role of the Military

The importance of the insurgent political infrastructure is mirrored in the comparatively diminished importance of insurgent military forces. Without question, rebel military actions play a primary role in an insurgency. But the success of rebels on the battlefield is not crucial to the success of the insurgent movement. Insurgent forces can lose virtually every battle and still win the war. In effect, the insurgents have an “unfair” advantage. The government can lose if its forces lose on the battlefield, but the government does not necessarily win if its forces win on the battlefield. Government forces must win on the battlefield and destroy the insurgent political infrastructure.20

Clausewitz described insurgent warfare perfectly when he said, “war is... a political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means.”21 Although theorists consider insurgent warfare to be “anti-Clausewitzian,” such warfare is the very embodiment of the Prussian master’s most famous dictum. Insurgency represents the total integration of political and military factors, but with political factors always in complete domination. In the Vietnam War, it is now clear that the Vietcong and North Vietnamese fully understood the Clausewitzian concept and implemented it through the “dau tranh” (struggle) strategy, which fully integrated political and military elements. Political dau tranh and military dau tranh were pictured to rebel recruits as the jaws of a pincer or as a hammer and anvil. As Pike has noted, to the enemy in Vietnam, “the dualism of dau tranh is bedrock dogma. Neither can be successful alone, only when combined--the marriage of violence to politics--can victory be achieved.22 Pike goes on to note that

the basic objective in dau tranh strategy is to put armed conflict into the context of political dissidence. Thus, while armed and political dau tranh may designate
separate clusters of activities, conceptually they cannot be separated. Dau tranh is a seamless web.23

Guerrilla Tactics

The fourth characteristic successful insurgencies have in common is the use of guerrilla tactics by insurgent military forces. Guerrilla tactics are the classic ploy the weak use against the strong. Unlike conventional or European military operations designed to win a quick victory, guerrilla tactics are designed to avoid a decisive defeat at the hands of a stronger enemy. Although conventional forces are constructed around the mobility of large units, guerrilla forces base their operations on the mobility of the individual soldier.24 Operating in small units, guerrillas avoid presenting themselves as tempting targets for government forces, which usually have vastly superior firepower at their disposal. Guerrillas fight only when it is to their advantage to fight, often quickly concentrating a superior force against an isolated government unit, attacking and then disappearing as quickly and mysteriously as they appeared.25 Rarely do forces using guerrilla tactics attempt to hold terrain, for to do so invites destruction by superior enemy forces.

Often associated with a particular type of military organization (e.g., Brigadier Orde Wingate’s Chindits or the “Green Berets”) or with so-called irregular forces,* guerrilla tactics can be used by almost any kind of force with the proper training. In Vietnam between 1969 and the Easter offensive in 1972 when regular units of the North Vietnamese Army comprised the bulk of the enemy’s forces, roads were never clogged with men and their equipment as they moved into position to attack. Even these “regular” forces would somehow secretly move from sanctuary areas, concentrate, attack, and then fade back into their forces sanctuaries. As late as 1975 during the all-out “conventional” invasion of South Vietnam, Gen William E. DePuy notes that in the area west of Saigon “the deployment, without detection, of a combined arms force of more than 30,000 men in terrain largely devoid of cover or concealment should go into the book of professional military records.”26

* Armed individuals or groups that are not members of regular armed forces.
The benefits of a guerrilla war are manifold. First, insurgent military actions shift government attention away from the activities of the insurgent political infrastructure so that it can continue to grow and spread with minimal opposition. Second, guerrilla attacks harass, demoralize, and embarrass the government and its forces. Third, successful guerrilla actions can elicit draconian reprisals from a frustrated government. Although reprisals can take a heavy toll on insurgents, they always exact a fearful price in blood from uncommitted bystanders. As a result, such reprisals are often counterproductive because they further alienate the population from the government.

If successful, rebel operations using guerrilla tactics can achieve several favorable results. People choose to support the insurgents or to take a neutral stance because the government is unable to protect itself or the people. Government forces experience fatigue and war weariness as the struggle becomes more protracted and the government seems not to be making any headway against the guerrilla forces. Troop desertions from the government ranks increase while the underground infrastructure continues to expand, thus compounding the government’s problem almost exponentially. Eventually, the correlation of forces changes in favor of the insurgents. Insurgent forces mass into large units using conventional tactics and administer the coup de grace in rapid order.

Contrasts with conventional Warfare

When taken together, the unique aspects of insurgent warfare indicate that such struggles are fundamentally different from the conventional or the European model of warfare. Rather than a large war writ small, insurgent warfare is at least as different from conventional war as we imagine conventional war to be different from nuclear war. At least three fundamental differences are apparent.

Perhaps the most important difference is that in an insurgency, both antagonists have the same Clausewitzian “center of gravity,” that is, the same hub of power and the same factor upon which everything ultimately depends. The center of an insurgency’s strength and the key to its
survival and growth is the covert political infrastructure deeply embedded in and permeating the general population. Without some support from the people, or at least their neutrality in the struggle (neutrality is a net benefit to the insurgent and is, in effect, passive support), the underground infrastructure would be quickly exposed and eliminated. Without an infrastructure, the insurgency has no political arm, is devoid of its intelligence apparatus, and bereft of its principal source of military manpower and logistical support. At the same time, the besieged government’s power also ultimately depends upon the support and loyalty of the general population. In the long run (and insurgencies certainly qualify as long-run situations), no government can survive without the acquiescence of the people--least of all a government actively opposed by an attractive and aggressive insurgent movement. And thus the centers of gravity for each side in an insurgency are located within the general population. For the insurgents it is their infrastructure and its active and tacit supporters. For the government, it is their supporters. Both groups comingle and are virtually indistinguishable.

In conventional warfare, military professionals have long accepted the concept of centers of gravity, and that the basic military objective in war is to conduct operations that lead to the destruction of the enemy’s center of gravity while at the same time protecting one’s own vital centers.28 However, the existence of comingled centers of gravity calls this basic military doctrine into serious question. Using traditional military means—fire and steel on a target—to destroy the enemy’s center of gravity may well also destroy one’s own vital centers.

A second unique feature of insurgent warfare is that insurgent military forces win when they do not lose. Although forces using guerrilla tactics often “lose” in small tactical engagements, their dispersed nature and their focus on small unit actions are designed to avoid anything approaching a decisive defeat.29 Their very survival in the face of often vastly superior government strength adds to their credibility. Conversely, conventional military forces lose when they do not win. The failure to decisively defeat a military force over which they have great advantages in firepower discredits the government’s military and the government as a whole.

The kind of military warfare conducted by insurgents is the antithesis of conventional warfare. Conventional military forces have continually sought, particularly over the past two
centuries, ways to concentrate forces in time and space to achieve quick and decisive victories. Insurgent military forces take the opposite approach by dispersing in space and protracting in time in order to avoid decisive defeat. While conventional forces attempt to achieve victory by acting faster than the enemy can react, insurgent guerrilla forces seek victory by acting longer than the enemy can react. While conventional forces attempt to provide their enemy with insufficient time, guerrilla forces try their enemy’s patience—time becomes a weapon.

The third fundamental difference is on a more technical level. The flow of logistical support for the insurgent’s military force is the reverse of the support pattern in conventional warfare. In conventional warfare, logistical support proceeds from rear areas toward and to the front lines. In short, logistics flow in the same direction that the fighting forces attempt to advance. Insurgent military forces, on the contrary, are largely supported by their infrastructure within the target population. Schematically, the direction of “advance” and the flow of logistics are in opposite directions.30

Although the unique logistical pattern of insurgent warfare may, at first blush, seem to be a minor technical matter, in actuality it is a factor of fundamental importance to the military portion of counterinsurgent actions. The insurgent logistical flow challenges traditional notions and means of interdiction which, in conventional warfare, attempt to isolate the battlefield from the enemy’s sources of supply. To the extent that the infrastructure is the source of rebel military logistics, traditional interdiction efforts (air attacks on rear area lines of communication, etc.) will be ineffective (except perhaps in cases where an insurgent military force may be receiving some degree of logistical support from external sources).

Military Dilemmas

Insurgent warfare presents a number of dilemmas for the American military. All of the dilemmas are tightly interwoven, which causes analytical difficulties. To alleviate this problem, the dilemmas can be placed in two broad categories. The first category includes three dilemmas that are so fundamental they pertain even when the United States is not involved in an ongoing
insurgent struggle. The second category, operational dilemmas, comes to the fore when the United States is considering direct involvement in a specific insurgency.

**Fundamental Dilemmas**

Fundamental dilemmas span the gamut of concerns ranging from grand strategy issues to force application problems. The first of these three fundamental dilemmas addresses military force structures for very different kinds of wars.

**Worst or Most Likely Case?** The first fundamental dilemma is a question of the kind of war for which the American military should prepare and the training, force structure, and equipment required. The American practice has been to prepare for the “worst case,” that is, prepare for, and thus deter, the kinds of wars no one can afford to fight, let alone lose. In the post-world war II era, two kinds of wars have been the preoccupation of worst-case planners. The first, of course, is a nuclear war involving the formidable arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union pitted against each other in an apocalyptic exchange that conventional wisdom indicates would yield no winners and that could extinguish human life itself. Nuclear Armageddon is followed closely as the ultimate worst-case scenario by the case of a full-scale conventional war in Europe pitting the forces of NATO against the forces of the Warsaw Pact. Such a struggle would have innumerable consequences, not the least of which is the prospect of the war escalating to the nuclear worst case.

Other conventional war scenarios are also important to worst-case planners (another invasion of South Korea, for example), but these cases seem to be small-scale versions of the European case. The force structure, equipment, and training appropriate for the European case also seem appropriate for these cases. Forty years of worst-case planning has yielded obvious results. The US military has developed a formidable nuclear deterrent force and keeps it in a high state of readiness in hopes of deterring any kind of nuclear exchange. Potent conventional forces are present in Europe (and elsewhere) and also are maintained in a high state of readiness. Elaborate plans for the rapid reinforcement of Europe (and elsewhere) are constantly being tested and refined. In short, American military strategy revolves around the nuclear and conventional
Because the United States (and our allies) has spent so much effort and treasure attempting to deter nuclear war and a major conventional war in Europe, we would like to believe that the absence of war in these cases is due to our deterrent efforts, though we know full well we cannot prove a negative consequent. Whether or not proof can be offered, the general consensus among expert observers is that these two worst cases have become, because of our efforts, the two least likely events the United States might ever have to face.

However, the least likely cases, for which we are well prepared, appear to be very different from the most likely cases: insurgent warfare in the third world. As noted earlier, conditions are ripe for revolutionary warfare in many areas of the third world; in fact, numerous such struggles are going on at this writing. Unfortunately for the United States, the forces, training, equipment, and techniques appropriate for conventional or nuclear warfare are not necessarily appropriate or effective for waging counterinsurgent warfare.

And thus the first fundamental dilemma for the American military concerns how to balance the weight of effort devoted to preparing for the worst cases and the most likely cases. Even a cursory examination of the American military force structure reveals that precious little effort and attention have been devoted to the problems of insurgent and counterinsurgent warfare. Those who believe that insurgent wars are the most likely kind of conflict rue this situation and worry that while the United States prepares for a climactic clash with the Soviet Union, it will suffer a “death of a thousand cuts” in third world upheavals. Conversely, those who focus on the worst cases fear that any resources diverted from those dour subjects will increase the danger of catastrophe. Thus the dilemma can be codified in the question, how much effort can be diverted from the worst cases to the most likely cases before the worst cases become significantly more likely?

**How to Deter.** The second fundamental dilemma concerns how to deter insurgent wars. This is hardly an exclusively military problem, just as this study has shown insurgencies are not exclusively military conflicts.
Insurgent military forces generally fight using guerrilla tactics. Because guerrilla forces are almost always outmanned and outgunned—why else would they adopt guerrilla tactics?—they are particularly difficult to deter militarily. Thus, strengthening a third world government’s military forces may have only a marginal impact in deterring guerrilla forces, but may be required to wage a successful counterinsurgency.

True deterrence, if it is possible at all in such situations, will be achieved only through nonmilitary means. Increasing the intelligence and paramilitary (police) forces designed to attack an insurgent covert infrastructure may have a much greater deterrent effect, perhaps convincing potential insurgents that their rebellion must be delayed for lack of their most crucial ingredient. This course of action, it would seem, might be temporarily effective but in the long term may prove futile. True deterrence will likely require cutting into the insurgent’s basis for legitimacy, that is, eliminating the perceived grievances that give rise to rebellion. Fundamental political and economic reforms by the government could rob the insurgents of their raison d’etre. Unfortunately, such reforms could also alienate the elites who have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and who are the primary supporters of the government.

What Role for an Intervener? The third fundamental dilemma is that of determining the best role for the military forces of an intervening nation in an insurgent war. In the Vietnam War, the United States was criticized for taking over the bulk of the hard fighting until the decision was made in 1969 to abandon the American combat effort and concentrate on the so-called Vietnamization program. Critics claimed that the United States military became a central player in what was essentially a civil war that could only be resolved by the South Vietnamese themselves. On the other hand, the United States normally would not consider sending regular combat forces to such a conflict if the forces of the government under siege could handle the insurgency. It is difficult to imagine sending combat troops unless the military situation had actually reached a crisis point. In such circumstances, if American troops do not shoulder some of the combat burden, the besieged government could quickly be overwhelmed by the insurgent forces. Other roles are available for American forces, depending upon the state of affairs. If the United States intervenes before a crisis stage is reached, training and advisory duties might be
most appropriate, assuming that the American military can tender the appropriate training and advice. Providing security forces (as opposed to offensive forces that seek out the enemy) would free friendly troops to go into the field and seek out the enemy.

**Operational Dilemmas**

The three fundamental dilemmas outlined previously should be resolved even before the United States contemplates intervention in an insurgent struggle. Once the decision to intervene is made, however, operational dilemmas come to the fore; at least three directly concern the military. However, it is impossible (as all of the foregoing essay has demonstrated) to separate military problems from the struggle as a whole. Each of the three military operational dilemmas has a corresponding political dilemma, and each is linked to the other by a general concept. The matrix that follows illustrates the intertwined relationships between military and political dilemmas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY DILEMMA</th>
<th>LINK</th>
<th>POLITICAL DILEMMA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Leverage</td>
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<td>Objectives</td>
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<td>Time</td>
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**Assistance, Reforms, and Leverage.** The first American military activity performed when intervening in an insurgent action (assuming a crisis is not at hand) generally consists of providing military equipment, training, and combat advisers to field units of the host government’s armed forces. Experience indicates that the host government’s military forces often require major reorganization and widespread reform if the materiel and financial aid they receive is to be used advantageously rather than squandered in the field and siphoned off through corruption. The corresponding problems on the political side of the struggle are the political and economic reforms required to undercut the legitimacy of the insurgency. American attempts to retrain, reorganize, and reform the host government’s military and civilian structures are usually confronted by entrenched and often corrupt (by American standards) bureaucracies with vested
interests in maintaining the status quo. In short, attempts to correct the underlying problems that played a major role in spawning the insurgency will reach fruition only with considerable difficulty.

The linking principle governing the success of military assistance and political/economic reform is the amount of American leverage that can be brought to bear. As long as the host nation’s elites and entrenched power structures believe that thwarting the insurgency is a paramount American interest, the United States will have very little leverage with which to force the required reforms. Unfortunately, the very fact that the United States commits its resources to train, advise, and reform provides prima facie evidence that the United States believes its vital interests are at stake. As a general rule, the amount of leverage available to the United States is inversely proportional to the amount of resources it has committed to the struggle. The situation becomes even worse if American troops enter combat in large numbers and American blood is spilled.

Objectives and Command/Control. If the United States commits its military forces to direct combat against insurgents, the troubling dilemma of military objectives in a “limited” war becomes a serious concern. Military objectives should flow from political objectives, and American objectives in such struggles have usually been sharply restricted. However, such struggles are limited wars only from the American viewpoint. From the viewpoints of both the besieged government and the insurgents, the war is an unlimited struggle fought for an unlimited objective (total political power). Insurgencies are civil wars, and, once the shooting begins, civil wars are almost never settled by compromise. It may be that limited American objectives and counterinsurgent warfare are incompatible concepts.

The problem of objectives is further complicated by the fact that the struggle to destroy the insurgent covert infrastructure (essentially a nonmilitary or paramilitary function) is of greater consequence than the struggle against the insurgent military forces. Both struggles must be won if the insurgency is to be successfully countered, but the insurgent center of gravity (and primary target of counterinsurgent operations) is its infrastructure. As a result, American and allied overall priorities may be incompatible with military priorities.
The link between military and political objectives is command and control. Simply put, the question concerns who should command and control the entire American effort to combat an insurgency. Given the importance of destroying the insurgent infrastructure and adequately addressing the popular grievances that gave birth to that infrastructure, one would think that control of the overall effort “in-country” should rest in civilian hands. However, when American lives are at stake, military leaders strongly resist and resent close control and “interference” by those they consider amateurs in military affairs.\(^{33}\)

More fog and friction is added to the command and control problem when one considers the sensibilities of the host government. The United States would be only an intervener, while the host government would be in jeopardy. Reason would dictate that the host government should retain control of the allied effort. However, when the United States intervenes, it quickly becomes the dominant partner and acts the part. In Vietnam, the allied command and control issue was never truly settled--leaving the Americans and South Vietnamese in an uneasy alliance.

**Time, Public Support, and Image.** The third American military dilemma concerns time, public support, and image. Time is the ally of the insurgent; the longer an insurgent survives, the stronger its chances of growing. Meanwhile, as time drags on, the American military position is weakened by declining support, impatience, and war weariness at home, particularly if there is no perceived progress in the struggle.\(^{34}\) Maintaining public support is clearly a responsibility of the political side of the equation and involves factors far beyond the battlefield--although military progress is a key ingredient. The connection between the duration of the struggle and public support is the image of the insurgency presented to the American body politic.

Two images are of great import in maintaining public support. The first is the image of a war that is being won--progress that is clearly evident to all. This is a difficult image to portray in a nonlinear war. In a war with no clearly defined front lines, there is no clear-cut march to victory that can be easily and simply displayed on maps for newspaper readers and television viewers. Whatever the manner of its presentation, the image of success must be convincing and
able to withstand temporary setbacks such as the Tet offensive during the Vietnam conflict.

The second image is of a war worth fighting. The impression that the besieged government the United States supports is worthy of the blood and treasure being expended is the key element in justifying intervention. The opposite impression can be more common because in all likelihood it was governmental corruption and ineffectiveness that led to the insurgency in the first place.

Although the list of general and specific dilemmas presented in this section is probably far from definitive, it is clear that a counterinsurgency strategy must deal with them individually and collectively. The matrix of operational dilemmas illustrates again the intertwined military and political characteristics of counterinsurgency, just as earlier sections of this paper illustrated the same phenomenon for the insurgency. The linking factors between specific military and political dilemmas are significant because they illustrate commonalities and suggest possible approaches for a comprehensive counterinsurgent strategy.

**Elements of Counterinsurgent Doctrine**

Before we examine the essential elements of a counterinsurgent doctrine, a caveat needs to be discussed. To simplify the analysis, the study at hand has considered insurgency from a purist’s viewpoint. A pure insurgency is a “home-grown” rebellion—a civil war—virtually free from outside influence. But insurgencies are not pure. Like all wars, insurgencies are deadly, complex, and messy affairs. Reflecting the interdependent world in which they occur, insurgencies often involve more major actors than just the leading antagonists. This is even truer in the age of superpower politics in which each side vies for influence, support, and a favorable correlation of forces.

The Vietnam War is a case study in just how muddled such a struggle can become. The research now available reveals that the struggle for control of South Vietnam began in the late 1950s as an insurgency—a rebellion against an authoritarian, largely corrupt, elitist, and
religiously prejudiced regime. Although the record is not absolutely clear, the insurgents were
given some degree of assistance by North Vietnam very early on in the struggle. The United
States more than matched the North Vietnamese effort with an ever-increasing flow of supplies
and advisers. By 1965, both North Vietnam and the United States had combat troops in South
Vietnam. By 1968, the United States had virtually taken over the war from the South Vietnamese
armed forces. Following the wholesale destruction of the insurgent Vietcong forces in the 1968
Tet offensive, the North Vietnamese virtually took over the enemy’s portion of the war. Finally,
the United States withdrew after a massive--and belated--buildup of South Vietnamese forces
(Vietnamization), and the issue was eventually decided by North Vietnam’s conventional
invasion of South Vietnam in 1975.

In a broad sense, the United States had been involved in two wars simultaneously in the
same place. One war was mostly an insurgent struggle; the other war was a struggle between
North and South Vietnam. But even the North/south struggle had the characteristics and passions
of a civil war for control of the greater Vietnamese nation. The two wars in which the United
States was embroiled were at once separate and interwoven. They were fought by regular and
irregular forces using conventional and guerrilla tactics. It was, indeed, a messy, muddled, and
confusing conflict, and one from which we must heed this warning: There is no reason to believe
that future insurgencies will be any more “pure” in their insurgent warfare characteristics than
was the Vietnam War. Thus as the study turns to proposals for counterinsurgent doctrine, the
reader must bear in mind that the doctrinal proposals that follow are based upon a purist notion
of insurgent warfare.

To be useful, the foregoing analysis must suggest some cautious first steps that can lead
to a fully developed counterinsurgency doctrine upon which to base American strategy. There is
some urgency in this matter. Pike maintains that the enemy’s strategy in Vietnam has no known
successful counterstrategy. 35 If true, this is certainly a dangerous and unacceptable situation in
light of the likelihood of such conflicts. However, the evidence currently available does suggest
some basic counterinsurgency doctrinal concepts.
A Three-Pronged Strategy

The most clearly evident concept is that any successful counterinsurgency strategy must incorporate a three-pronged approach. The government must excise the sources of popular unrest, must identify and destroy the covert infrastructure, and must defeat the insurgent military forces. Each of these tasks is critical.

Making the required reforms to excise the grievances upon which the rebellion is based can be a lengthy undertaking. Even if the governing achieves success quickly, the effects of redressing grievances are evident in preventing a recurrence of an insurgent movement once the problem at hand is under control. Of course reform does have “real-time” effects. Reforms may demoralize insurgent guerrilla fighters as they see the cause for which they are willing to risk their lives co-opted by their enemy. Reforms may also have a positive effect upon those who are “neutral” in the struggle, in effect strengthening the government position.

The most significant “real-time” benefit of genuine reform lies in weakening the rebel infrastructure. Because genuine government reforms undercut the basis of the insurgency, they make it much more difficult for the infrastructure to spread its influence. Destroying a well-organized infrastructure is a time-consuming task that can be hastened significantly by timely and effective political and economic reforms.

Circumstances may dictate that the more immediate task is to defeat the insurgent military threat, which, if unattended, might quickly overwhelm the host government long before reforms are implemented and the covert infrastructure is destroyed. In other words, defeating the insurgent’s military forces can buy time for the remainder of the counterinsurgency efforts to take effect. The impact of military victory is short term and, in fact, does little good if reforms are not forthcoming and the infrastructure continues to operate and expand. If the infrastructure remains healthy, defeated military forces can be replaced with surprising speed.36

Corollary. Command and control of a counterinsurgency effort requires far more than just military expertise and, therefore, should be vested in nonmilitary leaders. Two of the three
prongs of a counterinsurgent strategy are nonmilitary. Instituting political and economic reforms requires diplomatic leadership and leverage, political acumen, and economic expertise. Rooting out the covert infrastructure is a paramilitary function requiring police and criminal intelligence techniques. Only the defeat of the insurgent military forces requires traditional military forces, skills, and firepower. However, if a crisis stage evolves, defeating the enemy’s military forces becomes an overwhelming priority; and temporary military leadership of the overall effort may be appropriate until the crisis subsides -

**Human Intelligence**

Population control and intelligence gathering are key factors in the implementation of a successful counterinsurgency strategy. Guerrilla fighters are exceedingly difficult to find and engage in battle, a fact which places more emphasis on superior intelligence operations. Additionally, the identification and destruction of the covert insurgent infrastructure requires criminal intelligence operations (identification, correlation, tracking, and apprehension).

Population control is a key factor because both military and police intelligence functions must focus their efforts on human intelligence techniques. Electronic intelligence, overhead imagery, and other technologically sophisticated techniques often are not very useful in finding soldiers who make minimum use of electronic communications, move in very small groups on foot, and are difficult to distinguish from the general population. The same holds true for the identification of members of the covert infrastructure--the problem is to separate the wheat from the chaff, a task not well suited to technologically sophisticated intelligence-gathering means.

The intelligence task is much more difficult if population movement is not tightly controlled. A key ingredient when working against the infrastructure is the knowledge of who is whom and who is supposed to be where--and identifying aberrations to the pattern. This can be done much more effectively in a controlled environment. Further, population control presupposes a high degree of security within the controlled area. With effective control and security, those who are intimidated by the infrastructure may feel confident enough to aid in identifying insurgent agents.
Corollary. The concept of population control should be combined with the time-honored military concept of a secure base of operations. Sealing off and securing limited base areas will provide security for offensive operations and for population control within the secured areas. Expanding the base area cordon sanitaire after the area has been cleared and “pacified” will expand the area of government control and reduce the area in which insurgent forces can operate.

Importance of Time

The most important factor in countering an insurgency is time--just as time is the most important tool in the insurgent’s kit. There are several aspects to an intervener’s effective use of time.

(1) If the United States is to intervene in an insurgency, we must do so as early as possible, preferably long before the situation has become a crisis for the host government. Rather than the “first step down the slippery slope to war,” early intervention with advisers and materiel assistance should be frequently offered, freely given, and viewed as preventive medicine. If the insurgency is already at the crisis stage, the situation may be irreversible. By the time a crisis is reached, the insurgent infrastructure may be so widespread and entrenched, and the military situation so deteriorated, that recovery costs and time would exceed the tolerances of an impatient American body politic.

(2) Any counterinsurgent strategy must rely on sudden and decisive actions. Any sort of graduated response plays to the strength of an insurgency by, in effect, buying even more time for the insurgents.

(3) All counterinsurgent operations must be designed to “turn back the clock” on the insurgents and thus buy time for the host government to implement reforms.

(4) A time limit (perhaps unstated but obvious to the host government) must be set on any heavy combat involvement by American forces. An open-ended commitment destroys American
leverage with the host government. One might argue that if the insurgents are convinced there is a specific American time limit, they could simply lie low and wait until the Americans leave. However, the object of an American effort is to get the host government to the point that it can defend itself and destroy the insurgency. If the insurgents lie low, they play into the hands of the host government.

**Corollary 1.** A key to success in early intervention is the provision of advice, training, and equipment appropriate to the situation. Advice and training must be based on the conditions at hand rather than mirror preconceived notions influenced by preferred worst-case scenarios. Third world physical and social environments and the nature of insurgent wars place a premium on simple and durable equipment that requires minimum maintenance, training, and support. Further, the equipment must be inexpensive enough that it can either be purchased by third world countries facing serious economic difficulties or given gratis by the United States to third world nations.

**Corollary 2.** The United States must not be stampeded into full-scale combat intervention. The deeper the crisis, the more crucial it is that firm understandings and guarantees concerning reforms, command and control, and strategy be negotiated between the United States and the host government. If the crisis is grave, the more difficult and time consuming it will be to stem the insurgency. Above all, it must be made clear to the host government that the objective of American combat intervention is to buy time for the host government to get its house in order so that it can combat the insurgency on its own.

**Corollary 3.** American counterinsurgent strategy must be based on a limited commitment of American resources. The more resources that are committed, the more difficult it is to place a time limit on American commitment and the less leverage the United States has in forcing the host government to implement reforms. All assets should be as mobile as possible and thus capable of quickly withdrawing from the struggle. Emphasis must be placed on operational forces rather than their support elements (reduce the “tooth-and-tail” ratio). Further, to the greatest extent possible, American operations (military, paramilitary, and civilian) should be conducted from existing facilities or quickly and cheaply constructed “bare-base” facilities.
Constructing large, expensive, and permanent facilities increases sunk cost, making American withdrawal more difficult and sending a signal to the host government that the United States is in the fray for the long term, whatever the actions of the host government. The more obvious it is to the host government that the American commitment can be quickly terminated, the better.

**Corollary 4.** If the United States intervenes, we must be fully prepared to intervene with a totally integrated; well-trained; and sharply honed team of civilian, paramilitary, and military advisers and forces. These forces must have a well-thought-out and fully operational command and control structure. Should operations commence suddenly and decisively rather than gradually, then there is no time to slowly assemble a force that would learn on the job. Trial-and-error learning techniques waste time and destroy credibility.

Further, forces and their command structure must be “packaged” for deployment based upon the situation at hand. Early intervention, for example, might require only the deployment of civilian, paramilitary, and military advisers. Later intervention might require full combat capability in addition to civilian and paramilitary forces.

**Offensive Agility**

The overall purpose of offensive military operations is to turn the tables on the insurgent military forces. Offensive operations should concentrate less on killing guerrilla soldiers (with its inevitable collateral damage and bystander deaths) and more on demonstrating that government forces can go anywhere at anytime making insurgents unsafe everywhere. Rather than the crushing and clumsy blows of the broadax, offensive military operations should be rapier-like thrusts designed to keep guerrilla forces dispersed, preoccupied, distracted, and harassed at every turn. Success in these purposes will buy time for the host government to grow stronger while weakening the insurgency.

**Corollary.** In counterinsurgent warfare, massive firepower and large-unit operations can be counterproductive. The mobility and agility of smaller units (the same qualities that make guerrilla forces successful) are the key elements in successful operations against guerrilla forces.
The advantage comes from adding superior speed and range to mobility and agility, primarily through the use of air power.

**Force Structure Implications**

Doctrinal concepts in the previous section have force-structure implications. Clearly, the civilian, paramilitary, and military elements of an intervening force require specialized training. All three must be practiced in integrated operations. All three must be constantly updated on intelligence (current and background) about a myriad of places that might require American intervention. These realities form a compelling argument for a permanent counterinsurgency force structure or, at the very least, a permanent command structure. On the military side of the structure, light infantry forces supported by large elements of air power would compose the bulk of the military forces. It might also be advantageous to use specially trained military police units for portions of the paramilitary function. Special operations forces also come to mind as appropriate, but the reader must not err by equating special operations with counterinsurgency. Special operations forces provide very specific capabilities that can be used in virtually any sort of struggle from counterterrorist operations to a major NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict.

Arguing for a standing counterinsurgency force structure brings the discussion back to the most fundamental of the dilemmas caused by insurgent warfare: for what kind of war should the United States prepare? How much force structure can be devoted to the “most likely” cases--and what impact will such a redirection of resources have on the likelihood of the “worst cases?”

Developing an appropriate counterinsurgency force structure presents a multitude of problems, more so when one considers integrating its civilian components. These and many other issues must be addressed in additional research efforts. Hopefully, this paper will be nothing but the opening round fired in a barrage of research and analysis devoted to various aspects of “nonlinear” revolutionary warfare in the third world. It is a subject too long ignored by the American military and shunned by academe.
NOTES

1. Robert Prank Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907-1964* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1972) Futrell quotes Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson in testimony before Congress in January 1957 as saying, “There is very little money in the budget . . . for the procurement of so-called conventional weapons . . . we are depending on atomic weapons for the defense of the Nation. . . . Our basic defense policy is based on the use of such atomic weapons as would be militarily feasible and usable in smaller war, if such a war is forced upon us.”(232) Although the leaders of other Services did not necessarily agree, Air Force Gen Thomas D. White commented in 1957, “just as nuclear delivery capability constitutes a deterrent to general war, so can this total firepower deter local war. The right measure of this total firepower can, in turn, resolve local conflict if we fail to deter the aggression. . . .”(234)

2. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Army resistance to Kennedy’s orders for increased unconventional capability, and the Army’s passion to preserve its “system,” are the basic themes of Krepinevich’s well-documented work.

3. At this writing, neither the Army nor the Air Force has published an official history of the war. Note that in the same amount of elapsed time after World War II, first-class and exhaustive official histories had already been published.


8. These “mission categories” are outlined in “Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine,” a draft manual currently in coordination, produced by the Center for Low-Intensity Conflict (CLIC), Langley AFB, Va.

9. Sam C. Sarkesian, “Low-Intensity Conflict: Concepts, Principles, and Policy Guidelines,” in *Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology*, ed. Lt Col David J. Dean (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986), 12. Sarkesian goes on to say in the same paragraph, “In brief, these include unconventional operations, protractedness, and high political-psychological content directly linked to the political-social milieu of the indigenous area. Limited conventional wars and acts of terrorism are outside the boundaries of low-intensity conflicts. Revolution and counterrevolution are the major categories.”
10. It is possible, of course, for insurgents to seek only limited concessions from the government rather than the overthrow of the government itself. However, if the insurgency has developed into a widespread shooting war, compromise and concessions may be a forlorn hope, and settlement may require the capitulation of one side or the other (i.e., successful revolution or counterrevolution). In short, when the shooting starts, the time for evolutionary change has probably ended. It is also possible for a counterinsurgent strategy to co-opt the insurgents’ revolutionary demands (‘a la Bismark’s tactics used against the German socialists). In this sense, a counterinsurgent strategy can be revolutionary in its nature. In spite of these possibilities, the generalized notion of equating insurgency with revolution and counterinsurgency with counterrevolution remains reasonably accurate and useful.


12. Cable, *Conflict of Myths*, 5. This is as opposed to partisan warfare. Partisans work in conjunction with and rely upon an external military force for support. At this juncture, such distinctions may not seem significant. However, the difference is crucial to those attempting to combat either insurgents or partisans. Partisan vulnerabilities lie in their lines of communication and supply to their supporting external forces, thus suggesting interdictive countermeasures. Insurgents do not have the same vulnerabilities.

13. See, for example, the following two State Department white papers: “A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam’s Effort to Conquer South Viet-Nam” (Department of State Publication 7308, 1961); and “Aggression from the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam’s Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam” (Department of State Publication 7839, 1965)

14. The war in Vietnam may or may not have satisfied the tests of international law required to be deemed a civil war. From a military viewpoint, however, legal tests were irrelevant. Vietnamese fought Vietnamese with all the passion, ferocity, and tenaciousness that make civil wars such bloody and uncompromising struggles.

15. The situation in Vietnam was confused and contentious. What began as an insurgency in the South was eventually taken over by the North Vietnamese, but it remained a struggle between Vietnamese for control of Vietnam. Although the United States was a dominating force in comparison with the South Vietnamese government it supported, it is arguable whether or not the United States actually took over the war in South Vietnam. In any case, the United States began giving the war back to the South Vietnamese in 1969.


19. For a description of the compartmented secrecy of an insurgent underground, see Tang, *A Viet Cong Memoir*, particularly chapter seven.

20. Pike, *PAVN*, has an excellent description of this “unfair” advantage as it was manifested in Vietnam. See, in particular, pages 222-30.


22. Pike, *PAVN*, 216-17. Pike goes on to explain that although translated as “struggle,” dau tranh has a much deeper and almost mystical meaning for the Vietnamese. Pike quotes a North Vietnamese defector as saying, “Dau tranh is all important to a revolutionary. It shapes his
thinking, fixes his attitudes, dictates his behavior. His life, his revolutionary work, his whole world is dau tranh. (213)

23. Ibid., 233.

24. This apt description of the fundamental differences in mobility is described in Marshall Andrews’s foreword to Bernard B. Fall’s classic Street Without Joy, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Company, 1964), 11.

25. In the Vietnam War, for example, the summary of responses to a 1968 National Security study memorandum noted that “three fourths of the battles are at the enemy’s choice of time, place, type and duration. CIA notes that less than one percent of nearly two million Allied small unit operations . . . resulted in contact with the enemy. . . .” Quoted in The Lessons of Vietnam, ed., W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell (New York: Crane, Russak & company, 1977), 92.


27. Clausewitz, On War, 595-96.

28. Military professionals do not necessarily agree on what the enemy’s center(s) of gravity is (are). At times the focus has been on a place such as the enemy’s capital city (e.g., Moscow in 1812 or Richmond in 1862). Many Army personnel believe the enemy’s army itself is the ultimate center of gravity (e.g., in the tradition of Ulysses S. Grant’s campaign in Northern Virginia, 1864-65). Airmen have claimed that the enemy’s “economic web,” which produces the wherewithal of modern warfare, is the “vital center” of any modern industrialized state and thus adopted strategic bombardment doctrine prior to World War II.

29. In Vietnam, over 90 percent of all Vietcong and North Vietnamese attacks were at less than battalion strength. Thomas C. Thayer, “We Could Not Win the War of Attrition We Tried to Fight,” in Thompson and Frizzell, The Lessons of Vietnam, 92.


31. See, for example, National Security of the United States, published under the seal and signature of President Ronald Reagan (Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1987). In a 16-page section of this document concerning defense policy (19-34) less than two pages are devoted to low-intensity conflict; and low-intensity conflict is listed last in importance, ranking behind strategic deterrence, arms control, conventional deterrence, space, and intelligence.

32. In Vietnam, for example, the American political objective was simply “the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack.” (Department of State Bulletin, 26 April 1965.) No mention was made in this policy statement suggesting “victory,” destroying the enemy, unconditional surrender, etc. In fact, the United States went to great efforts to encourage a negotiated settlement, including the offer of economic development assistance to the enemy. American military objectives were equally constrained and did not contemplate victory in the conventional sense. Military objectives were perhaps best expressed in Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s question to Gen William Westmoreland, “How many additional . . . troops would be required to convince the enemy he would be unable to win? [Emphasis added.]” Gen William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1980), 183.

33. Much of the literature about the Vietnam War written by military authors emphasized the theme of civilian “meddling” in military affairs. For example, see Adm U.S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978); Col (later Lt Gen) Dave Richard Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978); and Air Marshal

34. The perception of progress may well be the most important factor in maintaining public support for a protracted conflict. I have written more fully about the concept of perceived progress in “A Matter of Principles: Expanding Horizons Beyond the Battlefield,” in *Air University Review*, January-February 1985, 24-29.


36. Although worlds apart, there is a surprising similarity in this concept and strategic bombardment doctrine in World War II. In that war, airmen saw the destruction of enemy air forces as an “intermediate objective” that would allow bombers to destroy enemy industry, which was their principal objective. Destruction of enemy air power without destroying their industry would allow the enemy air forces to be quickly replaced. See Maj Gen Haywood S. Iansell, Jr., *The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler* (Atlanta, Ga.: Higgins-McArthur/Longino & Porter, Inc., 1972), 83.

37. If military police forces compose the bulk of the paramilitary effort, a change to a predominantly military command structure might be in order since two of the three prongs of the strategy would be under military command.
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• “Policy and Strategy Foundation for Low-Intensity Warfare.” Jerome W. Klingaman. Public release. Addresses the need for establishing a policy framework on the internal dynamics of revolution to serve as a foundation for developing defense strategies, doctrines, and force structures for this type warfare. (This paper was originally presented on 21 June 1986 to an international forum on Low-Intensity Warfare in Paris, France.) (AU-ARI-CP--86-2)

• “Nuclear Winter: Asymmetrical Problems and Unilateral Solutions.” Lt Col Fred J. Reule, USAF. Public release. Through analysis of the asymmetries of nuclear winter, this study uncovers the nature of the problem we face and why joint efforts to solve it are in the best interests of both superpowers. (AU-ARI-CP-86-1)

• “Study War Once More: Teaching Vietnam at Air University.” Maj Suzanne Budd Gehri, USAF. Public release. A penetrating look at how Air University’s professional officer schools teach the lessons from the Vietnam War and a comparison of their approach to those employed by civilian institutions of higher learning. (AU-ARI-CP-85-7)

• “Project Control: Creative Strategic Thinking at Air University.” Lt Col David S. Dean, USAF. Public release. A unique review of a little-known strategic research project conducted at Air University during the early 1950s. (AU-ARI-CP-85-6)


• “Some observations on Islamic Revolution.” Dr Lewis B. Ware. Public release. A knowledgeable look at Islamic fundamentalist revolutions, their roots, and their implications. (AU-ARI-CP-85-4)


• “Marlborough’s Ghost: Eighteenth-Century Warfare in the Nuclear Age.” Lt Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF. Public release. An essay examining the similarities between limited warfare in the eighteenth century and the age of nuclear weapons. (AU-ARI-CP-85-2)

• “Air Power in Small Wars: The British Air Control Experience.” Lt Col David S. Dean, USAF. Public release. A brief examination of the concept of “air control” as practiced by the RAE in the Middle East between the two world wars. (AU-ARI-CP-85-1)