Tactical and Strategic
The central mission
of intelligence analysis is to warn US officials about dangers to
national security interests and to alert them to perceived openings
to advance US policy objectives. Thus, the bulk of analysts
written and oral deliverables points directly or indirectly to the
existence, characteristics, and implications of threats to and opportunities
for US national security.
of threats, the central analytic task is to peel back substantive
uncertainty about the meaning of past developments and the prospects
for future developments that could endanger US interests. Prescient,
timely, convincing analysis regarding imminent and potential dangers
can be an important force multiplier for US officials by reducing
the likelihood, first, of incident surprise and, second, of inadequate
defensive preparedness for dealing effectively with high-impact potential
In order to identify
and evaluate alternatives to current doctrine and practice of strategic
warning, a clear, even if arbitrary, distinction from tactical warning
can usefully be made.
focuses on specific incidents that endanger US security interests,
such as military attack, terrorism, WMD developments, illicit transactions,
and political crises abroad. Tactical warning analysis is usually
characterized by a search for and evaluation of diagnostic information
about incident, perpetrator, target, timing, and modalities. The goal
is to deter and limit damage by identifying in advance when, where,
and how a declared or potential adversary will forcefully strike
the United States directly, mount a challenge to US forces, personnel,
or interests abroad, or make a menacing weapons breakthrough.
aims for analytic perception and effective communication to policy
officials of important changes in the character or level of security
threats that require re-evaluation of US readiness to deter, avert,
or limit damagewell in advance of incident-specific indicators.
Thus, strategic warning is characterized by inferential evidence and
general depiction of the danger. The issues addressed here are changes
in the level of likelihood that an enemy will strike or
that a development harmful to US interests will take place and changes
in enemy mechanisms for inflicting damage. The goal is to assist
policy decisions on defensive preparedness and contingency planning,
including preemptive actions, to manage the risks of potential threats.
How are the two
aspects of warning analysis related? The ultimate goal of effective
warning is to protect US interests. Incident surprise can amplify
damage. Foreknowledge can reduce it. But not always, absent appropriate
preparedness for dealing with a specific threat, once it is identified.
Moreover, effective strategic warning is often needed to ensure
the subsequent availability of an appropriate level of resources for
detecting and preventing specific attacks and harmful developments.
That is, good strategic warning has the potential to enhance both
tactical warning and preparedness.
In any case, a
strong historical argument can be made that the occurrence of incident
or tactical surprise can be reduced but not eliminated. Even the
best of intelligence services cannot expect to penetrate every plot
or otherwise anticipate every damaging incident. Offensive forcesthe
perpetrators of military or terrorist attacks, for examplelearn
lessons from past attempts about how to achieve surprise, just as
defensive forcesUS intelligence, policymaking, warfighting,
and law enforcement professionalslearn lessons about prevention.
Moreover, simple applications of denial and deception activities and
small innovations in modes of attack by adversarial forces can increase
the likelihood of incident surprise.
onset of dramatic developments abroad that could damage US interestsinternal
strife that threatens friendly governments, economic crises with global
implications, outbreaks of regional warsthe fluidity as well
as the complexity of relationships and rationales of foreign groups
and leaders hinder timely specific warnings.
Finally, it is
no easy matter for analysts who are convinced they have a sound tactical
warning case to galvanize policy officials to defensive action. Distraction
of other calls on policy officials attention, their remembrance
of unavoidable occurrence of warnings that proved to be false or aborted
positives, and their concern about high opportunity costs for what
could prove to be unnecessary defensive measures can cause
rejection or delay of preventive actions to ward off a specific threatening
What role for
analysis if incidents of tactical surprise are inevitable? A robust
strategic warning effort serves as the indispensable analytic supplement
to tactical warningby spurring, in advance of specific, harmful
developments, preemptive and defensive measures that can mute the
negative consequences of tactical surprise.
a Cold War observation about the danger of a surprise Soviet military
can succeed despite robust tactical warning, then defense must utilize
effective strategic warning to prepare to succeed despite surprise.
Think in terms
of the analogy between homeland defense and household defense. A
concerned and resourceful homeowner cannot always know when and how
a burglar or other predator will strike. Despite lack of incident
foreknowledge, however, the homeowner (1) can deter many planned attacks
by investing in ample outdoor and indoor lighting, (2) can abort attempted
attacks with superior door and window locks, and (3) can reduce the
damage should a break-in nonetheless occur through an alarm system,
which will encourage the burglar to grab-and-run, rather than ransack.
If concern for security rises sharplysay, the neighborhood becomes
a more accessible and attractive targetstill more protection
can be effected: neighborhood patrols, gated communities, and coordination
of police and resident intelligence.
That said, the
challenges of effective strategic defense are formidable. The homeowner,
like the national security policymaker, has got to be willing to pay
the direct costs of heightened defense without being sure an attack
will ever take place. Assuming a practical limit to expenditures
to prepare for plausible but seemingly unlikely events, how much for
flood insurance, for fire insurance, and so forth? Next, what of
opportunity costsinconvenience, reduced alternative consumption
and savings? And what of resistance to effort and expenditures (even
ridicule) from inside and outside the household? Finally, as the
responsible policymaker, how best to garner diagnostic
information and expert judgment for informed decisionmaking and actiontaking?
The Imperative to Seek
More Effective Strategic Warning
attack of 11 September 2001 is fairly represented in open source commentary
as a tactical surprise--if nothing else, a reminder of the inherent
limitations of tactical warning. Judging whether there was a failure
of strategic as well as tactical warning is a more difficult task,
and depends largely on where one places the goal posts.
Evidence on the
public record indicates that intelligence communicated clearly and
often in the months before 11 September the judgment that the likelihood
of a major al-Qaida terrorist attack within the United
States was high and rising. The public record also indicates that
many responsible policy officials had been convinced, from intelligence
warnings and their other sources of information and analysis, that
US vulnerability to such attack had grown markedly. Both governmental
and non-governmental studies, in recognition of a mounting terrorist
threat, had begun to recommend national investment in numerous protective
measurestougher air passenger scrutiny, greater cooperation
between and among intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and stricter
enforcement of immigration laws, to name three.
The bottom line?
Even after taking account of inevitable hindsight bias that accompanies
bureaucratic recollection of prescience of dramatic events, the public
record indicates (1) strategic warning was given, (2) warning was
received, (3) warning was believed. Yet commensurate protective measures
were not taken. Whether in theory this represents a strategic warning
success or failure by intelligence, the fact is that the national
security components of the Government, intelligence included, failed
to generate appropriate and affordable measures for increased preparedness.
characterize the surprise attending the 11 September terrorist attack
as an instance of inconvenient warning. Top policy officials,
while convinced at one level of engagement with the warning process
of the reality of the threat, did not commit fully to the warning
as perhaps they would have if the judgment reflected their own conclusion.
Thus, they were unwilling to pay the political and economic costs
of direct expenditures, inconvenience, disapproving special interests,
and breaking of bureaucratic rice bowls.
Whatever the ultimate
judgment of the performance of intelligence and policy communities,
the impact of the 11 September attacks on the nations sense
of security warrants a critical examination of the efficacy of strategic
warning doctrine and practice. How can organizational obstacles
to the intelligence professionals responsibilities for perception
and communication of threat and the policy professionals responsibility
for timely decision and action best be removed?
recommendations have two main objectives:
- To reconstitute
strategic warning analysis as a collaborative governmental responsibilityvice
an intelligence functionby engaging the policy community much
more directly in every step of the strategic warning process.
- To expand and
upgrade the analytic resources devoted to strategic warning, in
order to ensure a distinctive intelligence contribution to policy
decision making and action taking in response to warning.
Recommendations for Strengthening
Clarify the Warning Mission
Any critical examination
of the mission of warning analysis should give primacy of place to
avoidance or limitation of damageand not to the unrealistic
standard of avoidance of surprise. In other words, the ultimate goal
of effective warning is to maximize damage limitation not predictive
foreknowledge to reduce incident surprise should be treated as an
extremely important means to the larger goal. Security preparedness
is also a means to the goal of avoidance or limitation of damage.
As indicated by the United States relatively damage-free navigation
of the Cold War, preparedness abets damage avoidance from surprise
attacks mainly through the workings of deterrence. Preparedness
advances damage limitation through erection of the means for appropriate
preemptive offensive and post-attack defensive responses to all kinds
of challenges to US interests.
Over the decades,
the Intelligence Community has generated many worthy definitions of
warning analysis. The one recommended here puts damage avoidance
and limitation front and center. It also specifies decision-enhancing
assessments as a requisite for a successful intelligence warning
effortthat is, assessments with good potential to help avoid
or limit damage.
seeks to prevent or limit damage to US national security interests
via communication of timely, convincing, and decision-enhancing assessments
that assist policy officials to effect defensive and
preemptive measures against future threats and to take action to defend
against imminent threats.
Decisions on whether
and how to take action and the effectiveness of actions taken remain
the responsibility of policymakers and action takers. The analysts
responsibility is to facilitate decisionmaking and action taking
processes by providing, for example, disciplined depiction of perceived
changes in the likelihood or means of the threat and identification
and evaluation of US options for preempting, blunting, or otherwise
limiting damage from the threat.
Resources for Strategic Warning
Which is the more
important intelligence responsibilitytactical or strategic warning?
A strong argument can be made that the vital role of technical and
clandestine intelligence collection in executing tactical warning
justifies its dominant command on analytic resources. But intelligence
scholars have argued that a government adequately prepared to respond
to hostile action and other damaging events which receives no warning
of a specific incident is better able to limit damage than a government
that receives warning but is inadequately prepared to respond. This
calls into question the extent to which the current division of analytic
resources favors tactical over strategic warning.
The official doctrine
of CIA and other Intelligence Community analytic units is that every
analyst is a warning officer. Probably so, if intent rather than
effect is the standard. At the Agency, at least through the 1980s,
a rough balance prevailed between tactical and strategic, if all forms
of event reporting and crisis management support were generously defined
as tactical warning, and all forms of research and estimative work
were similarly defined as strategic warning.
A major post-Cold
War downsizing of analytic resources in the 1990s seemed to cut much
more sharply into strategic warning analysis and in-depth, mid-term
analysis generally than it did into tactical warning analysis and
overall current policy support efforts. Understandably, the initial
response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks was for intelligence
leaders to effect a sizeable additional shift of total available analytic
resources into the tactical warning effort.
For the Intelligence
Community to meet its professional responsibility to prevent and limit
damage to national security in the uncertain years ahead, leaders
now should expand substantially and quickly its capacity to execute
a more robust strategic warning effort. This includes attention to
(1) doctrinal development, (2) staffing levels for in-depth analysis
generally and thus for strategic warning, (3) career incentives, (4)
continuous leadership engagement, and (5) especially tradecraft training
to ensure that policy officials receive warning analysis they see
Even before 11
September, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, whose position affords
considerable influence over the partitioning of intelligence resources,
called for increased effort to avoid strategic surprise. Deputy Secretary
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz is long on record with charging intelligence
analysts with helping policymakers decide which seemingly unlikely
threats to pay serious attention to. Since 11 September, other
key policy officials have taken actions that indicate they have joined
Strengthen Strategic Warning as Sound Estimative Analysis
as strategic warning officers, regularly make a convincing case for
a judgment that a danger overlooked or understated by policymakers
is likely to occur. Analysts leverage the strengths of the warning
process at its bestmastery of collection guidance, collaborative
multidisciplinary substantive expertise, well-structured all-source
information, sound tradecraft for dealing with uncertainty, awareness
of but some distance from the daily policymaker pressures to get
things done. The analysts produce an assessment about a looming
danger that is prescient, timely, and convincing, and thus provides
a window for effective policy decision and action.
Many of the examples
on the public record of strategic warning as sound estimative analysissuch
as the successful US defusing of India-Pakistan war preparations in
the early 1990sdepend on exploitation of all-source information
that, while not conclusive, is determinative to the accomplished analyst.
As a rule, it is the favorable balance between evidence and inference
that galvanizes responsible policy officials into action.
While the overall
record on making the call is a respectable one, doctrinal
emphasis on specific estimative prediction is a root cause of high-profile
warning failures. The analysts expertise, in effect, is trumped
by the hazards of estimating. Available data on a complex issue is
inherently ambiguous, open to manipulation by denial and deception,
and otherwise subject to misinterpretation. The analysts understanding
of how things usually work on the subject at hand, what one academic
observer calls normal theory, does not adequately account
for seemingly unprecedented or exceptional developments, overlooked
key variables, foreign actors distinctive risk-benefit calculations.
This was more
or less the case with the September 1962 Intelligence Community estimate
that judged the Soviet Union would not install nuclear weapons in
Cuba. The US analysts, for example, did not know the extent to which
Nikita Khrushchev as dominant Soviet decisionmaker was misinformed
about the seriousness of US warnings against the introduction into
Cuba of offensive nuclear weapons.
of better-trained analysts, greater leadership engagement, and more
robust warning tradecraft (addressed in sections below) will improve
the success record in terms of making the right call as well as galvanizing
policy officials to timely action. But as with tactical warning,
strategic warning as sound estimative analysis will inevitably produce
what are perceived to be intelligence failures that can
reduce the willingness of policy officials to rely on intelligence
Strategic Warning as Alternative Analysis
Almost by definition,
an effective strategic warning effort should also be focused on threats
to US security interests that are surrounded by considerable, even
impenetrable, substantive uncertaintypotential threats that
may or may not mature. Here, the analysts address a danger they judge
to be plausible and potentially highly damaging, but about the details
of whichtiming, location, modalities, triggers, indicators,
indeed, likelihoodthey retain important doubts.
some issues, such as the threat of Soviet nuclear attack during the
Cold War, because they judge that the danger, however unlikely, could
prove to be so devastating that it has to be better understood. On
other issues, analysts warn when they judge a danger was previously
understated or has increased in magnitude or likelihood, and when
policy officials seek help in refining contingency plans. But, again,
for these strategic warning exercises, the danger addressed is either
judged unlikely under prevailing conditions or is seen as too highly
dependent on poorly understood factors and contingencies to assess
its likelihood with confidence.
analysis, in these circumstances, is a branch of alternative
analysis, in that its tradecraft places emphasis on disciplined
and value-added assessments of threats that, for the most part, are
seen as unlikely or indeterminate. Related forms of alternative analysis--including
High Impact-Low Probability Analysis, What-If Analysis, Gaps in Information
Analysis, and Devils Advocacyshare the requirement with
warning analysis to marshal all-source information, expert insight,
and specialized tradecraft to illuminate developments that analysts
judge to be potentially damaging but unlikely.
of Intelligence in recent years, in response to criticism of its warning
performance, has increased tradecraft training in and production of
alternative analysis. Unfortunately, in some circles, alternative
analysis has picked up a reputation as an exercise in analysis for
its own sake that is largely ignored by policy clients.
analysis rarely should be executed as an end in itself. The goal
of strategic warning as alternative analysis should be to provide
distinctive intelligence support to policy officials as they undertake
the difficult task of deciding whether and how to deal with threats
to US strategic interests before the advent of specific indicators
rings the alarm bell. Here too expansion of analyst ranks and leadership
attention and enrichment of tradecraft are needed to capture the policymakers
Here, too, there
is reason to believe Intelligence Community programs that connect
strategic warning to an enhanced alternative analysis effort will
receive policymaker support. A key proposal of the 1998 Report
of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to
the United States, which was chaired by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
and on which Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz also served, called for expanded
efforts by analysts to address high-impact dangers they thought unlikely.
More specifically the report called on the policymakers to probe analysts
to ensure they were not too quick to dismiss dangers simply because
of a lack of hard evidence or clear precedent.
Assign the Strategic Warning Effort to Regular Analytic Units
Most of an expanded
strategic warning effort should be undertaken by production units
also responsible for tactical warning and other analytic deliverables.
The goal should be to increase the number and warning skills of analystsnot
the complexity of the table of organization. Closeness to substantive
colleagues provides benefits to the warning analyst in terms of policymaker
contacts, databases, and substantive expertise. Multi-function production
units, admittedly, open the age-old danger of current policy support
analysis driving out in-depth analysis by management fiat or implicit
career incentives. Intelligence leaders have to get the word out that
Peter is not to be robbed to pay Paul.
engaged in strategic warning will often occupy the uncomfortable
position of seeming to discredit their colleagues established
assumptions and conclusions about the issue at hand. This would warrant
an important role as well for specialized entities, including the
National Intelligence Officer for Warning, to produce independent
strategic warnings and to provide a temporary base for line analysts
to engage in a strategic warning effort removed from the pressures
of their home unit.
Tradecraft Training and Research
warning analysis often focuses on depicting plausible future developments
that would contradict the prevailing judgment of analysts as to the
likelihood, timing, modalities, or security implications of a potential
threat, effective execution requires special skills in alternative
analysis tradecraft. This includes disciplined assessment of the
following factors (the italicized hypothetical text illustrates
how strategic warning tradecraft would critically examine the judgment
that the short-term stability of a pro-US regime is underwritten by
the loyalty of its security forces):
Evidence and inference that support alternative views about what drives
the situation (key variables).
These and related
analytic skills for disciplined assessments of seemingly unlikely
dangers are key to distinguishing strategic warning analysis from
exercises in worst-case speculation. As addressed in detail below,
the analysts strategic warning effort is most likely to generate
timely action if policy professionals have an analytic stake in all
steps of the processfrom selection of priority warning issues
to co-ownership of indicator lists. Policymakers would be more likely
to engage in such close collaboration if intelligence analysts develop
specialized expertise that generates distinctive analytic value-added
for the difficult decisionmaking processes of strategic planning.
That said, a research
initiative is much needed to expand the armory of warning analysis
tradecraft. Whereas much has been written about the causes of warning
failure, a search for a science or even a theory for strategic warning
success is well beyond reach. What can be developed are doctrinal
and skills refinements that give all participants in the strategic
warning processcollectors, analysts, policy officials
increased confidence in identifying, weighing, and tracking threats.
For the most part, tradecraft developments that serve to improve the
quality and policy utility of warning as alternative analysis would
also improve performance of warning as sound estimative analysis.
area for more robust analytic tradecraft would be techniques for evaluating
the authenticity and diagnosticity of information.
- Regarding authenticity,
use of denial and deception (D&D) is usually central to the
planning of US adversaries, because of its effectiveness in compensating
for other power weaknesses. From obsessive operational security
to distractive reports about planned attacks overseas, D&D
probably increased the odds for success for the 11 September terrorists.
The Intelligence Community has made important strides in understanding
how a less powerful opponent can use D&D against the United
States. The main frontier for improving warning analysis is conversion
of this awareness into practical analytic tradecraft for identifying
and countering an adversarys manipulation of intelligence
and open source information.
- Regarding diagnosticity,
the rapid expansion of both classified and open source information
can be a burden as well as a benefit to the warning analyst. More
than ever, powerful yet practical tradecraft is needed to distill
information that serves as reliable signal from the
mass of collected information that is distracting noise.
Sharper analyst insight on what new information is central to reducing
uncertainty must then be used to rationalize intelligence and open
source collection efforts.
Encourage Warning Analysts to Engage in Action Analysis
Also to ensure
that policy clients take strategic warning seriously, analysts have
to be better prepared to address with distinctive intelligence value-added
the so-what of their assessments. This includes addressing
not only the likely implications of a threat to US interests but also,
in cost-benefit terms, measures the United States can take to reduce
the likelihood and magnitude of potential damage.
Managers and senior
analysts regularly join in policymaker efforts to identify and evaluate
alternative measures the United States can take to avoid or limit
damage from developments that would harm security interests. This
form of action or opportunities analysis is usually delivered in oral
forumsincluding telephone exchanges, in-office briefings, teleconferences,
and Interagency Working Groups and other decision-oriented meetings.
The analysts professional role in action analysis is to identify
and evaluate; policymakers retain the professional responsibilities
to recommend and choose.
especially strategic warning analysts, have got to be well trained
in the doctrines and skills associated with this professional division
of laborin effect, a replacement for the previously imbedded
doctrine that sets a wall of separation between intelligence analysis
and policy-support activities in any guise. Once analysts sense that
policy clients have bought into the need to review defensive preparedness
and contingency planning in response to a strategic warning effort,
the analysts can best ensure continued contact and guidance by directing
their substantive and tradecraft expertise to these so-what
The main intelligence
asset that analysts bring to the table for action analysis is their
expert knowledge of the history and culture, political and leadership
dynamics, and back-stage agents of influence of the countries and
organizations that threaten US interests. While this substantive
expertise is also central to the risk analysis phase of strategic
warning, the goal in action analysis is to help US policy officials
determine how best to divert, deter, disrupt, and generally leverage
a threatening foreign entity.
One thing needed
here is more extensive analyst training in the instrumentalities of
US power and influence and in decisionmaking processes regarding their
use. Agency analysts have come a long way from the point some 20
years ago, when a CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence observed that
his analysts knew how every government in the world workedexcept
their own. But a continued shyness toward including action analysis
in written assessments probably reflects analysts insecurity
about their understanding the policymaking process as well as about
the ethics of their selective engagement in the process.
Strategic Warning Issues Carefully
If the goal is
to provide distinctive analytic values that policymakers incorporate
into their national security decision making and action taking, the
strategic warning effort will be resource intensive. In the CIA context,
the analysis will usually require a multidisciplinary team of analysts,
well connected to the collection community, analytic colleagues in
other agencies and peer-level policy staffers. The National Intelligence
Officer for Warning would serve to provide guidance on tradecraft
and process, and to ensure access to and credibility with key policy
officials and Agency leaders. The Sherman Kent Centers Global
Futures Partnership and the DIs Strategic Analytic Group would
help to arrange for contributions to in-depth strategic warning efforts
from non-governmental substantive and methodological experts.
The resource requirements
for effective strategic warning efforts, thus, will dictate careful
selection of topicsin a sense a triage approach. As
a rule, topic selection should favor the national security threats
deemed potentially most damaging rather than those viewed as most
likelythat is, the plausible developments whose consequences
well-informed policymakers fear most. Again, the main value of an
expanded strategic warning effort should be damage limitation not
This is not a
call to avoid working on what was described earlier as strategic warning
as sound estimative analysis. What is to be avoided are disguised
training exercises, where the warning mission is used
for analysts to build their credentials on a subject with nothing
much new to convey to well-informed policymakers who already have
the dangers addressed well in mind.
for selection of topics on developments that could do the most damage
to US security interests include the prospects for a collapse of political
stability in Mexico (or in Pakistan or Egypt or China); and for the
outbreak of regional warfare in the Middle East or in South Asia.
Catastrophic terrorism, environmental or humanitarian disasters that
have a global reach, and economic and societal breakdowns in Russia
or Japan might also be topics on which strategic warning analysis
could play a major role in identifying, assessing, and monitoring
major potential threats to US security interests.
strategic warning resources are still scarce, policymakers should
play a major role in topic selection, to ensure their active participation
in the warning analysis process. That is, a production units
main policy clients should be polled on what developments they fear
mostthat keep them awake at night.
gain confidence in the utility of a strengthened strategic warning
regime, and closer ties between the warning and policy planning process
are thereby established, more of the initiative for topic selection
can reside with intelligence producers. Even then, validation of
topic selection should be obtained from the policy clients whose active
participation is required for an effective strategic warning effort.
is not to forfeit the responsibility of the intelligence professional
to call policymakers attention to dangers they seem to be overlooking
or understating. But rather to increase the likelihood the busy policymakers
attention will be gained when the intelligence professional issues
Expand Policymaker Role in Warning Analysis
the strategic warning and contingency planning processes have demonstrated
considerable variation over the decades, depending in good measure
on the centrality and urgency of the threat addressed. At one extreme,
during the Cold War, the intelligence analysis and policy planning
cycles regarding estimating and countering future threats from Soviet
nuclear weapons development were closely tied and timed both to the
Department of Defense yearly procurement planning schedules and to
Congressional budgetary calendars.
such as the Vietnam War, produced more ad hoc relationshipsbut
lines of communication that regularly put intelligence community assessment
and policy community planning on the same page, even if not always
At times, strategic
warning analysis and contingency policymaking develop useful lines
of connection on certain issues through the efforts of individuals
in both camps who actively seek it and institutions such as Interagency
Working Groups that are charged with effecting it.
That said, strategic
warning on most issues, most of the time has largely been an intelligence
function, the practitioners of which hope will be taken seriously
in policymaking. And contingency planning has essentially been a
policy function, the practitioners of which hope to garner useful
Intelligence Community support. While the record shows a mixture
of successful and unsuccessful connections, policy community criticism
of strategic warning comes across more vividly in the record than
Two common complaints
by key policy officials about strategic warning effortsbefore
11 September 2001were (1) inadequate influence over the timing
and focus of National Intelligence Estimates and other assessments,
and (2) concern that periodic warning reports showed inadequate sensitivity
to the wrenching shift in defensive resources that would be required
if the warnings were taken seriously.