

**STATEMENT BY
MICHAEL O'HANLON
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION**

**BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**A RELATIVELY PROMISING COUNTERINSURGENCY WAR:
ASSESSING PROGRESS IN IRAQ**

OCTOBER 29, 2003

SUMMARY

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, Other Members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear today to discuss the most momentous—and, increasingly, the most politically contentious—U.S. military operation since Vietnam. We are clearly still at war in Iraq, and the Bush administration deserves criticism for its words and actions that suggested otherwise—Mr. Bush's May 1 triumphant landing on the aircraft carrier, Vice President Cheney's rosy pre-war language about Iraqis greeting GIs with bouquets and dancing, Secretary Rumsfeld's predictions that only a small postwar occupation force would be needed, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz's predictions that Iraqi oil would quickly be able to finance most of the country's reconstruction. That said, in my judgment the administration is basically correct that the overall effort in Iraq is succeeding. By the standards of counterinsurgency warfare, most factors, though admittedly not all, appear to be working to our advantage. While one would be mistaken to assume rapid or easy victory, Mr. Rumsfeld's leaked memo last week probably had it about right when he described the war as a "long, hard slog" that we are nonetheless quite likely to win.

From my personal perspective, one way of assessing the overall success of the campaign in Iraq is to compare it to what I predicted in an article in the journal *Orbis* last winter before the conflict began. In that essay, using various tools of military modeling and combat simulation, I estimated that total U.S. losses could plausibly range from 100 to 5,000. At present, our losses are less than 350; even if we tragically continue to lose soldiers at the rate of the last six months for another one to two years, we will remain on the lower end of that range. By the standards of warfare, that would still be a rather good outcome, assuming of course that we are able to achieve our fundamental goal of a stable and non-aggressive Iraq in the end.

TEXT

How can we tell if we are making progress in Iraq or not? If you already know what answer you want, it is easy to find someone to provide it—a prominent Democrat if you oppose the war and President Bush, a Bush administration official if you prefer good news and the ruling party line. And in fact, you are likely to hear accurate data, but alas highly selective and incomplete data, from both factions in the debate. The character of the public discussion reaffirms the old adage about how easy it is to lie with statistics as much as it casts light on what is really happening in Iraq. How do we move beyond the war of the competing factoids to assess progress? This is important not only for knowing how well the Iraq mission has gone to date, but even more importantly for

monitoring progress—and adjusting policy where necessary, as well as having the verve to sustain it in the face of inevitable difficulties—in the crucial months ahead.

This essay, while only a preliminary and incomplete analysis, attempts to do two things. First, it briefly reviews the commonly cited data in the Iraq debate to underscore just how much both sides have it right—since they both cite real and probably reasonably accurate data—to establish the plausibility of their argument that things are going either well or badly. Second, it then provides a broader set of data, and not just snapshots of the present but trends over time, to suggest a means of monitoring future progress. Finally, in conclusion it suggests a general analytical framework for assessing progress in guerrilla operations that can be applied to Iraq.

To be sure, using quantifiable data to measure progress in a counterinsurgency campaign has its limitations, and they are stark ones. The Vietnam experience should remind us that assessing progress in any counterinsurgency through use of statistical measures is dangerous—the data can be incomplete, wrong, or simply unrepresentative of actual progress in the broader political struggle that any counterinsurgency operation must include. Body counts and estimates of “crossover points” at which one is killing the enemy faster than it can regenerate its ranks are particularly problematic.¹ But by establishing as broad a portfolio of data as possible, scrutinizing it for accuracy, and remembering caveats about how it should be interpreted, one can still do better with data than without it.

THE WAR OF THE FACTOIDS

Is the counterinsurgency and nation building mission in Iraq going well or badly? There is substantial evidence on both sides of this question. That fact, plus the high political stakes in play as a presidential campaign approaches, as well as past controversy about whether we should go to war in the first place, explain why there is such discord in the national debate.

Clearly the Iraq mission today is encountering difficulties. Four terribly tragic bombings dominated the August news, killing the U.N.’s top administrator in Iraq and one of the country’s most important moderate political leaders. A Governing Council member, Akila al-Hashimi, was assassinated in September. Rocket and truck bomb attacks the past few days in Baghdad have killed Americans, come uncomfortably close to harming a top American official visiting Iraq at the time, and displayed a capability for coordinate action that had not been frequently witnessed before.

In addition, oil outflows have been slow to resume in quantity and remained below pre-war levels six months after the fall of Saddam. Economic opportunity in Iraq remains mediocre for most; street violence and vigilante justice remain serious problems with little sign of improvement since April. If current trends continue, it will soon be the case that twice as many Americans will have died since May 1, when President Bush landed on the aircraft carrier to declare major combat operations over, than during the overthrow of Saddam. Attacks on U.S. forces have also increased in number of late. Increasing ambushes of supply convoys and greater use of improvised explosive devices by Iraqi insurgents were among the more disturbing trends of the late summer and early fall period.² And according to comments in early October by Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, head of U.S. ground forces, in Iraq, “The enemy has evolved. It is a little bit more lethal, little bit more complex, little bit more sophisticated and, in some cases, a little bit more tenacious.”³

¹ For a good critique of how these kinds of metrics were misused in Vietnam, see Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*.

² See for example, Jessica Mathews, “Iraqis Can Do More,” *Washington Post*, September 29, 2003, p. 19.

³ Theola Labbe, “Enemy Is ‘More Lethal,’ U.S. General Says,” *Washington Post*, October 3, 2003, p. 15.

It seems hard to believe that, could he have known in advance how difficult the postwar period would be, Mr. Bush would have made his famous celebratory landing on a U.S. aircraft carrier on May 1 and triumphantly declared the end of major combat operations—an attempt at careful phraseology that could not hide the fact that the president seemed to be taking a victory lap and calling the war over, when it clearly was not.

That said, on the prognosis for Iraq's future, the Bush administration is at least partly and perhaps even mostly right. Negative headlines need to be quickly countered with good news, of which there is an abundance. This is not to whitewash the situation. Rather, it is to paint a balanced picture and establish a proper benchmark for measuring future progress.

Most of Iraq is now generally stable, and the curfew in Baghdad has been lifted in time for Ramadan. By October's six-month anniversary of the fall of Saddam, national electricity levels had reached pre-war levels and were approaching that objective in Baghdad. Several thousand small businesses had reportedly opened by September, a modest number in a country of Iraq's size, to be sure, but a very healthy step in the right direction. Iraq also had an independent central bank and new currency by October.⁴

Most Iraqi towns had their own indigenous ruling councils; the national Governing Council had been named and in turn chosen a cabinet. Nearly all of Iraq's 400 courts were functioning; all 65 institutes of higher learning and all 240 hospitals, as well as almost all primary and secondary schools and 1,200 health clinics, had also opened.⁵

Attacks on American forces remain numerous, and October has been a tough month for U.S. troops. But overall trends in American casualties are not worsening with time. Many hundreds of Iraqi resistance fighters, and almost three-fourths of the leaders on the famous deck of cards, are now dead or captured. Iraqi security forces numbered 60,000 personnel by early October, including police and army and border guards and a civil defense corps—with steady progress underway towards achieving a total near 200,000 within a couple years.

GAINING A MORE COMPLETE PICTURE OF POST-SADDAM IRAQ

Both the positive spin and the negative spin of what is happening in Iraq are largely anecdotal—compilations of convenient facts with little analytic framework for putting them together. How do we know which news, the good or the bad, is more important? How do we detect trends? And how can we assess the importance of being so exposed internationally, with little help from key friends and allies, in the mission in Iraq?

There are no definitive answers to these questions, of course, but a few rules of thumb can increase the odds of seeing things clearly. First, track all data of relevance regardless of whether one is selling optimism or pessimism. Two, track it over time, so that trends can be detected. And third, with as much information in hand as possible, attempt to place it in perspective—to use some kind of broader argument about how to succeed in counterinsurgency operations that can help make the disparate data more than the sum of the confusing and contradictory parts. This latter effort will require subjective judgment and lead to disagreement, of course. But it is better to debate using serious arguments about how counterinsurgency campaigns are won and lost than selective factoids.

⁴ Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Help Iraq to Help Itself," *Wall Street Journal*, September 29, 2003.

⁵ See for example, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, "Iraq Six Months Progress Report: Talking Points," October 9, 2003, available at www.cpa-iraq.org and www.defenselink.mil.

The attached tables, which will be updated and expanded on the Brookings website in coming weeks and months, are a first cut at compiling and presenting key data more systematically. It organizes data into two broad categories, both critical in a successful counterinsurgency—security and economics. We attempt to display information for as broad a set of useful indicators as data availability allows. In the security sphere, it is necessary to try to assess progress in the counterinsurgency, progress in reducing crime rates, and progress in building Iraqi security services. In the economic realm, it is necessary to have information relating both to quality of life—availability of water, electricity, cooking gas, and so on—as well as to employment and economic recovery. Some types of information are now more readily accessible than other kinds, meaning that our tables are incomplete works in progress.

A third category of effort in counterinsurgency, politics, is harder to track using quantitative data. That is especially because Iraq now has local governments throughout almost all the country as well as a Governing council, so future progress will be dependent more on how well they do their jobs and how quickly they establish legitimacy among the population than on increases in their ranks. An imperfect proxy for this is polling data showing how the Iraqi population feels about the foreign presence in its country and about the general direction of political life within the country. Here the verdict remains mixed. Polls show that a clear majority of Iraqis want coalition forces to stay and believe that life will gradually improve in the post-Saddam era. But the majority also feels frustrated and worried about internal political trends—and a sizeable minority with the potential to do great harm opposes the basic course of events in Iraq.

Beyond the information already outlined above, where the news is either clearly good or clearly bad, a few other matters where the news is mixed warrant further elucidation and explanation. To begin, in the security sphere, crime rates are too high in Iraq, but they are neither worsening nor appreciably higher than in a number of crime-prone societies in the world. Second, Iraqi security forces are nowhere near adequate in number, or for that matter in quality, but their ranks are now quickly increasing.

Within the economic domain, electricity levels are finally recovering but are still not where they should be, particularly in Baghdad. Employment levels nationwide remain too low. Although a number of businesses have been created, and market activity is much more lively, available data do not yet show a substantial increase in employment levels. Nor can they demonstrate that Iraq yet has a notably healthier economic base that will eventually survive the departure of the large foreign presence and its associated large but artificial economic stimulus.

The way in which many of these trends go in the coming months will say much about Iraq's prognosis. But how do we evaluate progress in a situation where some data remain promising and other data troublesome, as is quite likely to prove the case? To get beyond an analysis that amounts to little more than a ledger of good and bad—that is, to get beyond the debate of the factoids—a broader analytical framework for understanding counterinsurgency is needed.

PRINCIPLES FOR SUCCESSFUL COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

In conducting a counterinsurgency, one ultimately needs to defeat dedicated guerrillas while reducing the proclivity of others to join their ranks. In theory, if the insurgent loss rate exceeds its pace of recruiting, time should be on the side of the counterinsurgency. In practice, as we learned in Vietnam, measuring these two respective trends is very hard. Accurate determination of the Viet Cong “crossover rate” where losses exceeded new recruits was extremely elusive.

But the weight of evidence in Iraq still gives grounds for optimism—and not just

because, viewed over the course of its history, the United States has tended to be fairly good at counterinsurgency.⁶ First, the tragic truck bombings of August did not recur in September, as we have taken overdue steps to protect high-value targets from such standard terrorist tactics. Even the synchronized truck bombings of October 27, as terrible as they were, did not collectively cause a higher casualty toll than most of the individual bombings of earlier months. And the September assassination of a Governing Council member, Akila Hashimi, has led to better protection for top Iraqi officials -- again, something we should have done sooner but are doing now. Similarly, even though insurgent tactics have evolved and improved as General Sanchez noted, U.S. casualty rates have not increased since their summer highs.

Second, the most numerous element of the insurgency facing U.S. troops is made up of former Saddam loyalists or Baathists—and they are a limited lot. Moreover, they are diminishing with time as coalition forces attack and arrest them. For example, in the region north of Baghdad now run by Gen. Ray Odierno's 4th Infantry Division, some 600 fighters have been killed and 2,500 arrested in recent months, most of the latter remaining in custody. Not all of these are Baathists, to be sure, but with such attrition rates, a group of fighters that probably numbered 10,000 to 20,000 at peak strength will decline significantly over time -- especially because it has no appealing ideology with which to attract more members (unless we so mishandle the operation as to make anti-Americanism that rallying ideology -- a prospect that remains unlikely at present, given our plans to intensify reconstruction efforts and turn over power to Iraqis quickly.) Around Tikrit, Hussein's hometown, and other parts of the northern "Sunni triangle," for example, former regime loyalists have been sufficiently weakened that they need reinforcements from other parts of Iraq to continue many of their efforts.

Despite a dubious decision by Ambassador Paul Bremer to disband the Iraqi army and ban even mid-level Baathists from positions of influence, the Bush administration generally has a sound strategy of trying to exonerate most Iraqis who cooperated with the former regime while punishing only the top leadership. As for the latter, most Baathists from the famous deck of cards are now off the street. Many second-tier loyalists of the former regime are also being arrested or killed daily.

Common criminals are numerous, especially since Saddam opened the prisons last year. But they are unorganized and are increasingly meeting their match in coalition troops and a growing Iraqi police force. Meanwhile, the growing numbers of Iraqi security forces are already helping with patrols and protection of fixed infrastructure—making the overall operation more indigenous and thus presumably more legitimate in Iraqi eyes, while also reducing the number of missions putting U.S. troops at acute risk.

Jihadists, including members of Ansar al-Islam and possibly al Qaeda, are a serious problem, and perhaps the greatest reason for long-term worry. But there are means to deal with them. First, we can improve border security to force the jihadists to enter Iraq in smaller numbers, a policy already being put into effect. Second, we can train Iraqi border guards to help—again, a policy that is being implemented, even if the intended total number of Iraqi border agents may now be too small (less than 10,000, numbers more appropriate for patrolling intra-European borders than Iraq's much rougher and longer frontiers). Third, to the extent that the Baathist resistance can be contained and stability and a decent quality of life restored to the country, coalition forces will be more likely to benefit from human intelligence—that is, from Iraqis providing information about the identities, locations, and plans of terrorist elements. This last piece is of course a tall order, and is another way of saying that success will develop its own momentum—if we can get to the point where we are widely perceived as succeeding.

⁶ See Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace* (2002).

There is no nationalist ideology likely to appeal to most Iraqis of the type western powers faced in Algeria, Vietnam, and elsewhere. Most Iraqis do not feel openly hostile to the U.S.-led foreign presence according to polls; indeed, some 70 percent are optimistic about the country's future prospects.

In addition, in these counterinsurgency operations, American troops are following much better practices than they did in Vietnam. Firepower is generally being used quite carefully, even if mistakes such as the accidental killing of some 10 Iraqi policemen in September are sometimes made, and even if the coalition's initial raiding tactics were sometimes culturally insensitive. Regional commanders are hiring Iraqis to help with recovery and reconstruction, a key kind of foreign assistance effort that Congress must continue to support. Moreover, while insurgents have displayed the full range of standard terrorist tactics -- truck bombings, assassinations, use of remotely detonated explosives, mortar and rocket attacks -- they are neither very sophisticated nor organized at the national level.

Much can obviously still go wrong. A few more key assassinations or devastating truck bombings of the type witnessed in August and a sense of pessimism about the prospects of the U.S.-led effort could snowball, making it easier for extremist Iraqis to incite the public to violence. A few stretches like that of the last few days would not be helpful, especially if bunched together closely in time. More delay in the economic recovery could have similar political effects. Many Shia may tilt in fundamentalist directions. More likely, Sunni Arabs, less than 20 percent of the population but accustomed to having their own kind run the country, could resist a democratic form of government in which their influence (or at least their access to the spoils of power) may appear less than it was under Saddam.

But, once one accepts we are still at war, and attempting something that is among the most complex missions ever undertaken by the United States, the state of affairs in Iraq and recent trends in that country do not look so disconcerting. Things are getting gradually better even as we progress towards an exit strategy that should further defuse extremist sentiment. We have gotten fairly good at counterinsurgency and nation building. Ironically, that is a legacy the Clinton administration bequeathed the Bush administration that is helping the latter enormously right now. And the Iraqi insurgency is unlikely to have the broad appeal that makes certain guerrilla movements succeed in history. But all of these conclusions are subject to revision as further events and information roll in—and we would all do well to view the latter with open minds regardless of where our views on Iraq stand at present. This mission is too important to allow to fail, and if it does show signs of failure we must react and adjust promptly.

55 MOST WANTED IRAQIS STILL AT LARGE

Month	Iraqi 55 most wanted: Individuals still at large
April	40
May	28
June	23
July	19
August	16
September	15
October through Oct. 27	15
Total as of Oct. 27	15

ATTACKS ON U.S. TROOPS CIVILIAN DEATHS IN BAGHDAD

Month	Typical number of daily attacks on U.S. troops	Baghdad civilians dead in questionable circumstances by U.S. troops ⁷
May	6 to 30 ⁸	11
June	10 to 25 ⁹	24
July	20 to 25 ¹⁰	20 ¹¹
August	15 to 20 ¹²	27 ¹³
September	N/A	12 ¹⁴
October	20 to 35 ¹⁵	N/A

N/A= Not available.

NON-U.S. TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS

Month	Non-U.S. troop contributions in place
May	40,000 ¹⁶
June	12,000 ¹⁷
July	13,273 ¹⁸
August	16,000 ¹⁹
September	22,000 ²⁰
October	24,000 ²¹

⁷ Human Rights Watch, "Hearts and Minds: Post-War Civilian Deaths in Baghdad Caused by U.S. Forces," Report. October 2003 Vol. 15. No. 9. Appendix I: Reported Civilian Deaths in Baghdad, May 1st-September 30". p. 49

⁸ Jim Garamone, "Number of Attacks in Iraq Constant, Enemy Tactics Change," *American Forces Information Service News Article*, October 6, 2003.

⁹ Dana Milbank., "Bush Acknowledges Troops Face Danger; Assessment of Iraq Mission Toned Down," *Washington Post*, July 11, 2003.

¹⁰ Dana Priest, "Rumsfeld Touts U.S. 'Success'; Defense Chief Says Attacks Will Not Deter Forces in Iraq," *Washington Post*, September 06, 2003.

¹¹ Two of the deaths included in July are based on complaints filed with the police during that month.

¹² Dana Priest, "Rumsfeld Touts U.S. 'Success'; Defense Chief Says Attacks Will Not Deter Forces in Iraq," *Washington Post*, September 06, 2003.

¹³ One death included in August is based on a complaint filed with the police during that month

¹⁴ One death included in September is based on a complaint filed with the police during that month. Two undated deaths have been included in this month's casualty toll.

¹⁵ Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Attacks on Troops on Rise, Commander Says," *Washington Post*, October 23, 2003.

¹⁶ Peter Slevin and Vernon Loeb, "Plan to Secure Post war Iraq Faulted; Pentagon Ignored Lessons From Decade of Peacekeeping, Critics Say," *Washington Post*,. May 19, 2003.

¹⁷ Ann Scott Tyson, "Troop Morale in Iraq Hits 'Rock Bottom,'" *Christian Science Monitor*, July 7, 2003.

¹⁸ "International Participation in Iraq. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs July 23, 2003," *Coalition Provisional Authority*, Briefing material given to author by CPA/DoD during visit to Iraq September 22-25, 2003.

¹⁹ "Iraq Status Update: 18 September 03: Stability Contributors. *U.S. Department of Defense*. Briefing material made available by CPA/DoD to author during visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003.

²⁰ Dana Milbank and Colum Lynch, "Bush Fails to Gain Pledges on Troops Or Funds for Iraq: National Guard. Reserve May Plug Holes," *Washington Post*, September 25, 2003.

²¹ Jonathan S. Landay, "U.S. Makes New U.N. Bid for Iraq Help," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 14, 2003.

TRAINING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Month	Iraqi security forces on duty			
	Police	Iraqi Civil Defense Corps	Army (400,000 under Saddam ²²)	Border patrol
May	7,000-9,000 ²³	N/A	0	N/A
June	N/A	N/A	0	N/A
July	30,000 ²⁴	N/A	0	N/A
August	34,000 ²⁵	N/A	0	2,500 ²⁶
September	37,000 ²⁷	2,500 ²⁸	0	N/A
October	40,000 ²⁹	6,000 ³⁰	2,100 ³¹	4,700 ³²

N/A= Not available

²² Alex Berenson, "The Struggle for Iraq: Security Force; Iraqi's New Army Gets Slow Start," *New York Times* September 21, 2003.

²³ Scott Wilson, "Bremer Shifts Focus to New Iraqi Economy; U.S. Occupation Chief Cites Progress on Restoring Order," *Washington Post*, May 27, 2003.

²⁴ *Coalition Provisional Authority*, CPA Daily; Key Facts Security. 17 July 2003.(www.cpa-iraq.org.)

²⁵ *Coalition Provisional Security*; Results in Iraq: 100 days Toward Security and Freedom., "Highlights of the Renewal of Iraq and the End of Saddam's Regime," August 8, 2003.

²⁶ Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul L Bremer III, U.S. Presidential Special Envoy to Iraq. Briefing. Baghdad, Iraq August 23. 2003.

²⁷ Alex Berenson, "The Struggle for Iraq: Security Force; Iraqis' New Army Gets Slow Start," *New York Times*, September 21, 2003.

²⁸ Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Commander, Coalition Ground Forces, Baghdad, Iraq. Briefing, September 4, 2003.

²⁹ "The Struggle for Iraq: Six Months; Iraq Math: Visible Gains Minus Losses," *New York Times*, October 10, 2003.

³⁰ Thomas E. Ricks. "Reduction in U.S. Troops Eyed for '04: Gradual Exit Strategy Tied to Iraq's Stability," *Washington Post*, October 19, 2003.

³¹ Ibid.

³² "Transcript of President Bush's Radio Address to the Nation for October 4, 2003," *White House Office of the Press Secretary*.

U.S. TROOP LOSSES

	Month	U.S. troop losses since May 1, 2003 ³³	
April	Fatalities ³⁴ (all kinds)	Fatalities in hostile incidents	Fatalities in non hostile incidents
May	40	9	31
June	29	15	14
July	47	35	12
August	36	14	22
September	27	14	13
Through Oct. 27	34	25	9
Total as of Oct 27	213³⁵	112³⁶	101³⁷

POLLING BAGHDAD PUBLIC OPINION³⁸

Question	Findings
Will Iraq be in a better condition five years from now than it was before the U.S.-led invasion? ³⁹	Better off: 67% Worse off: 8%
Is Iraq better off now than it was before the invasion? ⁴⁰	Better off: 33% Worse off: 47%
Was ousting Saddam worth the hardships endured since the invasion? ⁴¹	Yes: 62% No: N/A
Would you like to see U.S. troops stay longer than a few more months?	Stay longer: 71% Not stay longer: 26%
Are there circumstances in which attacks against U.S. troops can be justified?	Yes: 19% No: N/A Sometimes justified: 17%
Have you been afraid at times to go outside your home during the day within the past four weeks?	Yes: 60% No: N/A

N/A= Not available.

³³ Monthly estimates based on casualty reports made available in *CNN Special Report "Forces: U.S. & Coalition/Casualties"* (<http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/iraq/forces/casualties/>) Up until May 1, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom caused 138 troop casualties. Of those, 114 were the result of hostile action, and 24 the result of non-hostile action. *Department of Defense*, "Operation Iraqi Freedom U.S. Casualty Status" (<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/>)

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Department of Defense: "Operation Iraqi Freedom U.S. Casualty Status" <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/>

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ The Gallup polls cited are of 1,178 adults and were conducted between Aug.8 and Sept.4, 2003. They both have a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points." Will Lester. "Poll Finds Baghdad Residents Glad to Be Rid of Saddam," *Associated Press*, September 24, 2003. Will Lester, "Poll Suggests Most in Baghdad Don't Want Troops to Leave too Quickly," *Associated Press*, October 13, 2003.

³⁹ Will Lester. "Poll Finds Baghdad Residents Glad to Be Rid of Saddam," *Associated Press*, September 24, 2003.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

CRIME RELATED DEATHS IN BAGHDAD

Month	Homicide in Baghdad ⁴²	Annualized homicide rate per 100,000 citizens ⁴³ (For comparison Washington DC rate: 45.82 ⁴⁴)
May	462	145.92
June	626	197.64
July	751 ⁴⁵	237.12
August	872	274.48
September	667 ⁴⁶	210.6
October	N/A	N/A

N/A= Not available.

NATIONWIDE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

Month	Unemployment rate nation wide
May	N/A
June	N/A
July	N/A
August	>50% ⁴⁷
September	60% ⁴⁸
October	50-70% ⁴⁹

N/A= Not available

⁴² Neil MacFarquar, "The Struggle for Iraq: Life in Baghdad; Open War Over, Iraqis Focus on Crime and a Hunt for Jobs," *New York Times*, September 16, 2003. Number of deaths that occurred under suspicious circumstances and therefore is believed to have been a result of crime as stated by Baghdad Central Morgue

⁴³ Based on an estimated population of 3.8 million people. (Source: United States State Department, "Background Note: Iraq")

⁴⁴ The Baghdad murder rate can be compared to that of Washington DC. FBI Uniform Crime Report estimates that the capital has an annual homicide rate of 45.82/100,000 residents.

⁴⁵ Neil MacFarquar, "The Struggle for Iraq: Life in Baghdad; Open War Over, Iraqis Focus on Crime and a Hunt for Jobs," *New York Times*, September 16, 2003. The number for the previous July, one of that year's most fatal months, was 237 deaths.

⁴⁶ "Unspeakable Savagery on the Streets of Baghdad," *Irish Times*, October 10, 2003.

⁴⁷ Ann Scott Tyson, "Iraqis Sample Free Enterprise," *Christian Science Monitor*. August 19, 2003.

⁴⁸ "Who'll Help Us? We Ourselves, Mostly - Rebuilding Iraq," Special Report. *Financial Times*, U.S. Edition, September 13, 2003.

⁴⁹ Director of Employment, Fatin Al-Saeda, Iraqi Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. U.S. Department of Defense Briefing October 23, 2003. *M2 Press Wire*. The number referred to in the matrix is a rough approximation of the employment situation. As noted by Ms. Al-Saeda: "There are no employment statistics for Iraq."

ELECTRICITY AND FUEL

Time	Electricity		Oil production nationwide	Fuel supplies available to population			
	Nation wide	Baghdad	Crude Oil ⁵⁰	Diesel ⁵¹	Kerosene ⁵²	Total Gasoline (Prod. & Imp. ⁵³)	Total LPG (Prod. & Imp. ⁵⁴)
Estimated pre-war level	4000M W ⁵⁵	2500M ⁵⁶	2.1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
May	N/A	300MW ⁵⁷	0.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
June	N/A	707 MW ⁵⁸	0.675	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
July	N/A	1082 MW ⁵⁹	0.925	6.5 ⁶⁰	4.75 ⁶¹	13.5	1875
Aug.	N/A	1283 MW ⁶²	1.445	10.25	6.2	14.0	2525
Sept.	N/A	1229 MW ⁶³	1.55 ⁶⁴	10.5 ⁶⁵	4.95	16 ⁶⁶	3025
Oct.	4417 ⁶⁷	N/A	1 ⁶⁸	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Stated Goal:	N/A	2500MW by October ⁶⁹	3.1 ⁷⁰	14.9 ⁷¹	7.7 ⁷²	15 ⁷³	4,100 ⁷⁴

N/A= Not available.

⁵⁰ Millions of barrels per day ("Iraq Status Update: 18 September 03: Progress on Priorities: Fuel Status Update," *U.S. Department of Defense*. Briefing material made available by CPA/DoD to author during visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003.

⁵¹ Millions of liters/week. Ibid.

⁵² Millions of liters/week. Ibid.

⁵³ Millions of liters/week. Ibid.

⁵⁴ Millions of liters/week. Ibid.

⁵⁵ "CPA Daily 8 July 2003," *Coalition Provisional Authority*, (www.cpa-iraq.org)

⁵⁶ "Iraq Status Update: 18 September 03: Progress on Priorities: National Power Update; Power/Baghdad," *U.S. Department of Defense*. Briefing material made available by CPA/DoD to author during visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003.

⁵⁷ "Talking Points – Iraq Six Month Progress Report – Oct 9, 2003. *U.S. Dep. of Defense*.

⁵⁸ "Iraq Status Update: 18 September 03: Progress on Priorities: National Power Update; Power/Baghdad," *U.S. Department of Defense*. Briefing material made available by CPA/DoD to author during visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Based on two week estimate. "Iraq Status Update: 18 September 03: Progress on Priorities: Fuel Status Update," *U.S. Department of Defense*. Briefing material made available by CPA/DoD to author during visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003.

⁶¹ Based on two week estimate. Ibid.

⁶² "Iraq Status Update: 18 September 03: Progress on Priorities: National Power Update; Power/Baghdad," *U.S. Department of Defense*. Briefing material made available by CPA/DoD to author during visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003.

⁶³ Based on two week estimate. "Iraq Status Update: 18 September 03: Progress on Priorities: Fuel Status Update," *U.S. Department of Defense*. Briefing material made available by CPA/DoD to author during visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003.

⁶⁴ Based on two week estimate. Ibid.

⁶⁵ Based on two week estimate. Ibid.

⁶⁶ Based on two week estimate. Ibid.

⁶⁷ Thom Shanker, "Wolfowitz's Hotel Is Attacked in Baghdad," *New York Times*, October 26, 2003

⁶⁸ Associated Press, "Oil Flow from N. Iraq Stops After Brief Start," *Washington Post*, October 19, 2003.

⁶⁹ "Iraq Status Update: 18 September 03: Progress on Priorities: National Power Update; Power/Baghdad," *U.S. Department of Defense*. Briefing material made available by CPA/DoD to author during visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003.

⁷⁰ Millions of liters/week. "Iraq Status Update: 18 September 03: Progress on Priorities: Fuel Status Update," *U.S. Department of Defense*. Briefing material made available by CPA/DoD to author during visit to Iraq September 22-25 2003.

⁷¹ Millions of liters/week. Ibid.

⁷² Millions of liters/week. Ibid.

⁷³ Millions of liters/week. Ibid.

⁷⁴ Millions of liters/week. Ibid.