Thank you for inviting me to discuss my report with your Committee.

The relationship between Iraq and the rest of the world has been complicated and dangerous for three decades, a dilemma that has confounded the international community through much of recent history. Three wars, devastating sanctions, and an endless progression of international crises have ended or ruined thousands of lives. The region and Iraq are both complicated and unstable, and obviously very dangerous. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have added to the uncertainty and risk posed by an unpredictable and clearly aggressive regime in Baghdad.

This report is not simply an accounting of the program fragments we have examined in the aftermath of the recent war and ongoing conflict, nor is it my aim merely to describe the status of a program at a single point in time. The complexity and importance of this question deserves a more synthetic approach, in my view. Instead, the objective of this report is to identify the dynamics of the Regime’s WMD decisions over time. I want to identify the area under a curve, not just a single point on a trend line that may be going up or down. This problem deserves calculus not algebra, and thus the report I have prepared attempts to describe the Iraqi WMD programs not in isolation, but in the context of the aims and objectives of the regime that created and used them.

I have also insisted that the report include as much basic data as reasonable and that it be unclassified. Since the tragedy that has been Iraq has exacted such a huge cost for so many for so long, I feel strongly that the data we have accumulated be presented in as thorough a manner as possible to enable others to draw their own conclusions. Certainly I have a concept of the dynamics that underlay the course that Saddam followed with WMD and this is conveyed in the report. Others, including Iraqis, may examine this and conclude otherwise.

Structure. The report consists of six chapters and includes at the end a timeline showing key events that bear on the Iraqi WMD program.

Aiming to introduce the reader to the Iraqi frame of reference, the report begins with an analysis of the nature of the regime and its aims in chapter one. As compared with most countries, fathoming the intentions of the regime is made easier in Iraq, because it really boils down to understanding one person—Saddam Husayn, who was the Regime. The highly personalized nature of the Iraqi dictatorship under Saddam, with its multiplicity of security organs and unclear, often overlapping lines of authority progressively created a governmental system of operating alien to those steeped in the norms of western democracies. An understanding of the workings of the Iraqi system of governance is important, so that evidence—or lack of evidence—can be evaluated within
the frame of reference of Baghdad and not the frame of reference of Washington, London, or Canberra.

For example, given the nature of Iraqi governance, one should not look for much of an audit trail on WMD. Even Saddam’s most senior ministers did not want to be in a position to tell him bad news or make recommendations from which he would recoil. The most successful and long-lived advisors were those who could anticipate his intentions. Hence, there was a very powerful role for implicit guidance. This was particularly the case for the most sensitive issues—such as actions that related to human rights and weapons of mass destruction. This dynamic limits the evidence that one might expect to find, i.e. little documentation and senior advisors who could honestly say they never had instructions on certain matters. This, of course, makes it risky to draw conclusions about the absence of evidence, a continuous problem in Iraq.

Further obfuscating the picture is the fact that Baghdad had long experience in dealing with inspection by western outsiders. From the experience of dealing with UN inspectors the Iraqis learned a great deal about what signatures we looked for. Iraqis generally knew a lot more about us than we did about them. For various reasons, their ability and desire to conceal their intentions and capabilities were quite good.

Beyond a discussion of how the Regime operated, the report also provides a sense of Saddam’s goals, aspirations and political vision, as a means to better understand his decisions about WMD, their development, use, destruction, and role in the future realization of his political-military aims for the Iraqi nation. We have tried to understand his objectives and how he developed and used power. After the 1991 war, Saddam established as his prime objective (after survival) the termination of UN sanctions on Iraq, and he weighed all policy actions and steps for their impact on this overarching objective.

Saddam committed the brightest minds and much national treasure to developing WMD. Moreover, Saddam saw this investment as having paid vital dividends. Senior Iraqis state that only through the use of long-range ballistic missiles and the extensive use of chemical weapons did Iraq avoid defeat in the war with Iran. There is also a second, less obvious instance where the regime attributes its survival to possession of WMD.

In the run-up to the 1991 war, Iraq loaded, dispersed and pre-delegated the authority to use both biological and chemical weapons if the coalition proceeded to Baghdad. The Regime believes its possession of WMD deterred the US from going to Baghdad in 1991. Moreover, it has been clear in my discussions with senior Iraqis that they clearly understand that they blundered in invading Kuwait before completing their nuclear weapons program. Had they waited, the outcome would have been quite different.

Finally, Saddam also used chemical weapons for domestic purposes—in the late Eighties against the Kurds and during the Shi’a uprisings after the 1991 war.
In this chapter, aspects of Saddam’s decision-making were examined by the identification of several key inflection points, when Saddam made a choice affecting WMD. Several such points have been identified and dissected to see the dynamics of these decisions. These points noted in the timeline attached to the end of the report, portions of which are included at the end of individual chapters. The timeline is a useful tool through which to retain the ability to assess Iraq’s WMD decision-making from Saddam’s perspective and seeing WMD in that context.

This tool was also useful in tracking his strategy and tactics toward the United Nations and the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. Saddam’s personal direction of much of Iraq’s relations with the UN reflected his approach to influence and is described in some detail—again illuminated through examination of key decision points.

Overall, the hope is that not only will we see what Saddam decided to do with WMD, but why. This may be instructive for future policy considerations and certainly future intelligence considerations.

Chapter Two is an extensive analysis of Iraq’s financing and procurement, a bid to identify the resources available to Baghdad and examine how they were allocated. We made it a high priority to obtain complete information from the Oil Ministry and State Oil Marketing Organization. These data were extremely valuable in obtaining an understanding of how the regime operated and its priorities.

Our investigation makes clear that a top priority for Saddam was to escape the economic stranglehold of UN sanctions. Sanctions limited his ambitions in many ways, and took an enormous toll on Iraqi society. The disintegration of the middle class, civil infrastructure, the health system, and the blight on the hope of young Iraqis were clear through the nineties. The UN Security Council, in attempting to mitigate the effects of sanctions on innocent Iraqis created the Oil for Food Program (OFF). It is instructive that the Regime rejected the opportunity to export oil for civil goods until conditions were so bad that they threatened the survival of the Regime.

Chapter Two makes clear the range of steps the Regime took to erode support for, and the efficacy of, the UN sanctions program. The steps the Regime took to erode sanctions are obvious in the analysis of how revenues, particularly those derived from the Oil-for-Food program, were used. Over time, sanctions had steadily weakened to the point where Iraq, in 2000-2001 was confidently designing missiles around components that could only be obtained outside sanctions. Moreover, illicit revenues grew to quite substantial levels during the same period and it is instructive to see how and where the Regime allocated these funds.

ISG’s investigation also makes quite clear how Baghdad exploited the mechanism for executing the Oil-for-Food program to give individuals and countries an economic stake in ending sanctions. The Regime, following a pattern that Saddam has applied throughout his career, offered rewards and a rationale for accepting them, successfully
arguing its case that the sanctions were harming the innocent, and that the moral choice was to elude and diminish them. It is grossly obvious how successful the Regime was. It is also grossly obvious how the sanctions perverted not just the national system of finance and economics, but to some extent the international markets and organizations.

The Procurement and Finance section notes that a sizeable portion of the illicit revenues generated under the Oil for Food program went to the Military Industrial Commission (the government-run military-industrial establishment). The funding for this organization, which had responsibility for many of the past WMD programs went from approximately $7.8 million in 1998 to $350 million in 2001. During this period of growing resource availability, many military programs were carried out—including many involving the willing export to Iraq of military items prohibited by the Security Council.

The remaining four chapters deal with the different types of WMD programs which Iraq had previously worked. The first of these, the Delivery System chapter, describes the work Iraq had been pursuing with respect to both missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

Iraq continued to work on missile delivery systems in the wake of the Gulf war. Saddam drew a distinction between long range missiles and WMD—a distinction not drawn in the UN resolutions. Iraq’s missile development infrastructure continued to develop under sanctions, and included work on propulsion, fuels, and even guidance systems. As more funding became available following the implementation of the OFF program, Saddam directed more missile activities. In the later years, more foreign assistance was brought in—including both technology and technical expertise. While it is clear that Saddam wanted a long range missile, there was little work done on warheads. It is apparent that he drew the line at that point…so long as sanctions remained. However, while the development of ballistic missile delivery systems is time consuming, if and when Saddam decided to place a non-conventional warhead on the missile, this could be done very quickly. The CW and BW warheads put on Iraqi missiles in 1990 and 1991, for example, were built in months.

A couple of points are of interest from the Iraq missile efforts. One is that they did not bide by the range limits set in UN Security Council Resolution 687. The range capabilities of the ballistic missiles they were developing exceeded the stated limits. Iraq also used components from SA-2 engines that they had expressly been prohibited. Iraq also produced fuel that was not declared. They also tested UAVs in excess of the range limits.

Iraq missile developers became so confident that others would violate the sanctions that they designed new missile systems which depended upon the import of guidance systems. Further, they drew upon the foreign expertise that was readily available for such areas as propulsion.

The chapter on nuclear programs reviews the program up to the 1991 war and describes the activities of the scientists and engineers following the war. The analysis
shows that despite Saddam’s expressed desire to retain the knowledge of his nuclear team, and his attempts to retain some key parts of the program, during the course of the following 12 years Iraq’s ability to produce a weapon decayed.

Sanctions and inspections lasted longer than Saddam anticipated. The inspections were also more intrusive than expected. Therefore, retention of weapons material put at risk his higher immediate objective of escaping sanctions. Nevertheless, Saddam’s son-in-law and chief weapons development manager, Husayn Kamal directed that design information and very limited physical material be hidden from inspectors. These concealment efforts were successful until Husayn Kamal himself fled to Jordan in 1995.

There were also efforts to retain the intellectual capital of nuclear scientists by forbidding their departure from Iraq and keeping them employed in government areas. However, over time there was decay in the team. Unlike the other WMD areas, nuclear weapons development requires thousands of knowledgeable scientists as well as a large physical plant. Even with the intention of keeping these talented people employed, a natural decay took place and the time it would take for Iraq to build a nuclear weapon tended to increase for the duration of the sanctions. The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission utilized the same people in a range of projects during the 1990s and addressed technical problems akin to those in nuclear weapons development. These efforts, however, cannot be explicitly tied to an intention to revive a weapons program.

Despite this decay, Saddam did not abandon his nuclear ambitions. He made clear his view that nuclear weapons were the right of any country that could build them. He was very attentive to the growing Iranian threat—especially its potential nuclear component, and stated that he would do whatever it took to offset the Iranian threat, clearly implying matching Tehran’s nuclear capabilities. Saddam observed that India and Pakistan had slipped across the nuclear weapons boundary quite successfully. Those around Saddam seemed quite convinced that once sanctions were ended, and all other things being equal, Saddam would renew his efforts in this field.

The chapters dealing with CW and BW tell somewhat different stories. In the chemical weapons area, the Iraqis had long experience with production and use of mustard and nerve agents. In Baghdad’s view, these weapons saved Iraq from defeat in the war with Iran and, in combination with BW capabilities, helped deter the United States from deposing the regime in 1991.

Following the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi CW activity shifted from production to research and development of more potent and stabilized agents. In contrast to the nuclear field, CW work requires not thousands of scientists, but hundreds. The top expertise was developed among a few dozen scientists and chemical production engineers.

Once inspections began in 1991, Iraq chose to yield most of its weapons and bulk agent as well as the large facilities that were widely known to exist. As in the other WMD areas, Saddam sought to sustain the requisite knowledge base to restart the program eventually and, to the extent it did not threaten the Iraqi efforts to get out from
sanctions, to sustain the inherent capability to produce such weapons as circumstances permitted in the future.

Over time, and with the infusion of funding and resources following acceptance of the Oil for Food program, Iraq effectively shortened the time that would be required to reestablish CW production capacity. Some of this was a natural collateral benefit of developing an indigenous chemical production infrastructure. By 2003, Iraq would have been able to produce mustard agent in a period of months and nerve agent in less than a year or two. We have not come across explicit guidance from Saddam on this point, yet it was an inherent consequence of his decision to develop a domestic chemical production capacity.

Iraq denied it had offensive biological weapons programs to inspectors in 1991, and secretly destroyed existing stocks of weapons and agent in 1991-1992. Iraq decided to retain the main BW production facility, but under guise of using it to produce single-cell protein for animal feed. These decisions were taken with Saddam’s explicit approval. Saddam clearly understood the nature of biological weapons. He personally authorized their dispersal for use in 1991 against coalition forces, Saudi Arabia and Israel. He clearly took steps to preserve this capability and was successful until 1995.

Preservation of Iraq’s biological weapons capabilities was simpler than any other WMD area because of the nature of the material. First, the number of experts required is quite small, perhaps a couple dozen. Then too, the infrastructure to produce agent can be readily assembled from quite simple domestic civilian plants. Moreover, little, if any, activity would be necessary to keep this option “on the shelf”.

Some activity that might have been related to a biological program has been examined closely, including work with a bio-pesticide, bacillus thuringiensis. While this work could have been related to advancing Iraqi anthrax knowledge, information is inconclusive. This work could and certainly did sustain the talent need to restart a BW program, we can form no absolute conclusion on whether this work represented active efforts to develop further anthrax programs or not. Given the developing infrastructure in Iraq in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, such a reconstitution could be accomplished quite quickly.

Other aspects of the Iraq BW program remain cloudy. For example, it is still difficult to rule on whether Iraq had a mobile BW production effort or made any attempts to work with small pox as a weapon.

What is clear is that Saddam retained his notions of the use of force and had experience that demonstrated the utility of WMD. He was making progress in eroding sanctions and, had it not been for the events of 9-11-2001, things would have taken a different course for the Regime. Most senior members of the Regime and scientists assumed that the programs would begin in earnest when sanctions ended---and sanctions were eroding.
A variety of questions about Iraqi WMD capabilities and intentions remain unanswered, even after extensive investigation by ISG. For example, we cannot yet definitively say whether or not WMD materials were transferred out of Iraq before the war. Neither can we definitively answer some questions about possible retained stocks. Developments in the Iraqi Intelligence services appear to have been limited in scope, but they were certainly never declared to the United Nations. What did they really represent and was there a more extensive clandestine activity with another set of technical experts? We cannot say for certain.

Opportunities to develop new information are decreasing. However, I must mention that we just came into possession of a large number of documents recently accumulated by coalition forces. The number of these documents is approximately equal to the total received since the end of the war, and it will clearly take many months to examine what has been found and provide an initial summary of what they contain.

Then, too, we continue to receive a continuing stream of reports about hidden WMD locations. When such reports are judged sufficiently credible, ISG conducts an investigation. In fact, just two weeks ago a source provided a partially filled nerve agent container from a 122 mm rocket. This, like others recovered, was from old pre-1991 stocks. Despite these reports and finds, I still do not expect that militarily significant WMD stocks are cached in Iraq.

A risk that has emerged since my previous status report to Congress is the connection of former regime CW experts with anti-coalition forces. ISG uncovered evidence of such links and undertook a sizeable effort to track down and prevent any lash-up between foreign terrorists or anti-coalition forces and either existing CW stocks or experts able to produce such weapons indigenously. I believe we got ahead of this problem through a series of raids throughout the spring and summer. I am convinced we successfully contained a problem before it matured into a major threat. Nevertheless, it points to the problem that the dangerous expertise developed by the previous regime could be transferred to other hands. Certainly there are anti-coalition and terrorist elements seeking such capabilities.

It is my hope that this report will offer a generally accurate picture of the evolution and disposition of WMD within the former Regime. I am quite aware that the Iraqis who participated in these programs will be reading this report and ultimately will comment upon it. I hope they learn from it and do not find too many errors.

I spent hours with many of the Iraqi participants—both before the war as deputy chairman of UNSCOM in the 1990’s and after the war when many were in custody. Many of these individuals are technocrats caught in a rotten system. Some wholeheartedly participated. In either case, Saddam channeled some of the best and brightest Iraqi minds, and a substantial portion of Iraq’s wealth toward his WMD programs. It has, of course, been very difficult to discern the truth from these
participants, given the mix of motivations that inescapably color the statements of those who remain in custody. It is sometimes very difficult to recognize the truth.

This applies especially to Saddam himself, who was a special case in all of this. We had the opportunity to debrief him, but he naturally had limited incentives to be candid or forthcoming at all. Nevertheless, many of his statements were interesting and revealing. In the end, only he knows many of the vital points. Even those closest to him had mixed understandings of his objectives. In fact, there was uncertainty among some of his closest advisors about WMD and whether it even existed. It is ironic that when he had the weapons, they saved him. When he did not have them, he was deposed.