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62–239
2000
  
[H.A.S.C. No. 106–29]

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE KOSOVO CONFLICT—THE EFFECT OF THE OPERATION ON BOTH DEPLOYED/NON-DEPLOYED FORCES AND ON FUTURE MODERNIZATION PLANS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

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OCTOBER 19, 1999

  

  

MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman
FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina
BOB STUMP, Arizona
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
JAMES TALENT, Missouri
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada
MARY BONO, California
JOSEPH PITTS, Pennsylvania
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia
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IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina
LANE EVANS, Illinois
ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
TOM ALLEN, Maine
JIM TURNER, Texas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBERT BRADY, Pennsylvania

Steve Thompson, Professional Staff Member
Roger Smith, Professional Staff Member
John Sullivan, Professional Staff Member
Dionel Aviles, Professional Staff Member
Doug Necessary, Professional Staff Member
Noah Simon, Staff Assistant
Peggy Cosseboom, Staff Assistant

(ii)  

C O N T E N T S

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HEARING:
    Tuesday, October 19, 1999, Lessons Learned From the Kosovo Conflict—the Effect of the Operation on Both Deployed/Non-Deployed Forces and on Future Modernization Plans

APPENDIX:
    Tuesday, October 19, 1999

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1999
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE KOSOVO CONFLICT—THE EFFECT OF THE OPERATION ON BOTH DEPLOYED/NON-DEPLOYED FORCES AND ON FUTURE MODERNIZATION PLANS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Military Procurement Subcommittee

    Sisisky, Hon. Norman, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, Military Procurement Subcommittee

WITNESSES

    Ellis Lt. Gen. Larry R., Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans, Department of the Army

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    Esmond, Lt. Gen. Marvin R., Deputy Chief of Staff, Air & Space Operations, Department of the Air Force

    Lautenbacher, Vice Adm. Conrad C., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments, Department of the Navy

    Rhodes, Lt. Gen. John E., Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:
[There were no Prepared Statements submitted for the Record.]

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Documents submitted for the Record.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[The Questions and Answers are pending.]

(iii)  

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE KOSOVO CONFLICT—THE EFFECT OF THE OPERATION ON BOTH DEPLOYED/NON-DEPLOYED FORCES AND ON FUTURE MODERNIZATION PLANS

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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Military Procurement Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, October 19, 1999.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

    Mr. HUNTER. The subcommittee will come to order. Last week, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs briefed the Senate Armed Services Committee on the results of their Operation Allied Force Quick-Look after-action review. This review was initiated to determine those most critical lessons learned, to include recommendations on how to fix the problems or sustain those initiatives we want to preserve.

    It was a major collaborative undertaking throughout the department, involving the commanders in chief, the services, the defense agencies, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, but according to the department, was not intended to be an end-to-end assessment of the Kosovo campaign, but rather the basis for further detailed analysis leading to the preparation of a follow-on final report. The final report will likely be used to prepare two other Congressionally-mandated reports on the successes and the deficiencies of the operation.
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    The first such report is directed by Section 1211 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, and the other by Section 8125 of the DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000. Both reports are to be submitted not later than January 31, 2000.

    These reports are to cover all aspects of Operation Allied Force, ranging from its impact on the ability of U.S. forces to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, to the conduct of joint combined operation, and from the performance of U.S. military equipment in the conflict to adjustments that need to be made to forthcoming budgets and specific programs to address any deficiencies identified. Today's hearing will focus on these last two topics and on the question of whether or not a disconnect exists between DOD's future modernization plans and the kinds of equipment in demand in Allied Force. I recognize that it comes early in the cycle of our normal committee business, but I thought it would be useful to get out in front of the process, especially since the secretary and the chairman did not testify on the Quick-Look before this committee.

    Before I turn my attention to the business at hand, I would like to state for the record the deep appreciation and respect every member of this subcommittee feels for the men and women who serve their country in the armed forces and especially to those two participated in the Kosovo conflict. Although this was a NATO-led campaign, it could not have been won without the contribution—the overwhelming contribution, I might add—of U.S. war fighters, be they soldiers, sailors, and airmen or marines.

    Just listen to some of these statistics: Over 640 U.S. aircraft were employed from 24 bases; 38,000 combat sorties flown in 78 days of around-the-clock operations; 25,000 bombs dropped; almost 8,500 precision-guided munitions used; over 300 cruise missiles launched; and most importantly, zero aircrews lost. Impressive, to say the very least. I would therefore like to thank the witnesses as representatives of all of the men and women who wear the uniform for their outstanding performance in their operation. God bless all of you.
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    There are several topics I would like to address this morning, and each is covered in the background memorandum the staff has prepared for the hearing. I will mention a few at the outset here, but we will discuss all of them as well as others.

    One: Precision munitions. Are our inventories sufficient? And if you look at the requirements that are laid out by the Joint Chiefs and by this Administration for the two-war scenario, it appears that they are not, but we want to have some testimony on that. Are inventories sufficient? Are current platforms with improved smart weapons good enough to maintain the U.S. position as a predominant world power into the 21st century?

    Two: Mission-capable rates. How did the Kosovo campaign affect fleet-wide rates and the rates of the non-deploying forces who could have been called upon to fight a major theater war had one occurred at the same time? What is the general trend in these rates, and what can be done to improve it?

    And maybe, Roger, if you could lift up our mission-capable poster. During a number of briefings, we developed this poster. You might just show that to the witnesses. That is going on. That is the declining mission-capable rates into the Kosovo operation, and, as you can see, we have been dropping off the edge of the cliff for a long time. So your comments on where mission-capable rates are, especially with the stay-behind forces, is especially important to us this morning. Thank you, Roger.

    Low Density/High Demand assets, number three: according to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and I quote: ''Low density assets were absolutely in high demand. We cannot leave home without them, and without them, we cannot leave home.'' Specifically, he was referring to electronic warfare aircraft such as EA–6B intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft such as U–2, the RC–135 rivet joint, the E–3 AWACS, the E–8 Joint Stars, and the predator unmanned aerial vehicle, and the long-range penetrating B–2 bomber. Is the demand for these platforms only going to get higher, and should we be buying more of them?
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    Number four, Task Force Hawk: By all accounts, the deployment of Apache attack helicopters and their associated protection equipment to Albania was not among the operation's highlights. There were doctrine and training problems as well as hardware problems. What hardware deficiencies were exposed by this experience? Why were not the more capable Apache Longbow models deployed? What lessons, if any, from Task Force Hawk were taken into account in the Army's new strategic vision?

    Number five, Strategic Lift: Despite having completed two mobility requirement studies since Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force, lift contingency was not part of the department's current plans for moving forces to major theater wars, and the rapidly evolving requirements for the conflict strained its ability to quickly develop plans that utilize its lift effectively. Consequently, strategic air lift was heavily relied upon to deploy forces to the theater, and strategic sea lift was used sparingly. What are the implications of this situation?

    With us today to address these and other questions are: Lieutenant General Larry Ellis, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans, Department of the Army; Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments, Department of the Navy; Lieutenant General Marvin R. Esmond, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air & Space Operations, Department of the Air Force; Lieutenant General John Rhodes, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

    General Rhodes, General Esmond, and Admiral Lautenbacher, we welcome you back to the subcommittee, and, General Ellis, we welcome you here for your first visit. Before we proceed with your statements, I would like to call on my good friend, Norm Sisisky, our ranking Democrat on the subcommittee for any opening remarks he may have. The distinguished gentleman from Virginia is recognized.
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STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN SISISKY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

    Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be brief. I wish to join in welcoming an impressive slate of witnesses to help us identify and understand what we have learned, or really what we re-learned from our participation in Operation Allied Force, a topic that is as important as it is timely; and I might add, I join the Chairman concerning our warriors in that we owe them a lot.

    But, Mr. Chairman, I hope it can be more than just determining the adequacy of munitions and equipment available to support Operation Allied Force, or for that matter the adequacy of munitions and equipment today to support a contingency tomorrow, and I hope it could also be about following up on lessons learned in the past as a matter of priority. It seems to me we keep re-learning the same lessons with each operation, and one such lesson has to do with low density/high demand aircraft such as the venerable EA–6B tactical electronic warfare aircraft and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft such as the E–3 Airborne Warning and Control System, the EAC Joint Stars, the RC–135, and the U–2.

    From Desert Storm, we learned that the availability of low density/high demand aircraft could not support two simultaneous major regional conflicts. More importantly, we learned that the availability of these low density/high demand aircraft cannot only impact but at times dictate the conduct of tactical operations in a single theater. Sometimes, to our disadvantage, we also learn that modern stealthy aircraft do not reduce the requirement for these highly specialized aircraft. We learned the same lesson from Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, in Southern Watch and Desert Fox in Iraq, and now I am told we have learned it once again during Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia.
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    Mr. Chairman, how many times do we have to re-learn the same lessons before actually we do something about it? Since Desert Storm, the Pentagon response has been to fully fund high density/low demand aircraft programs such as the Air Force F–22 at the expense of important low density/high demand aircraft programs. In almost every case, the low density/high demand aircraft programs have seen planned fleet size reduced and upgrade programs slowed since Desert Storm. If this is the price for the F–22 program, then our colleagues on Appropriations, particularly Mr. Lewis, may be right, and I say this without any prejudice to the F–22. I have been an avid supporter of this aircraft.

    Hopefully, our witnesses today can help us with the seeming inability to follow up on lessons learned generally and the problem of low density/high demand aircraft specifically, and I look forward to your testimony.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HUNTER. I thank you, the distinguished gentleman, and you have brought up a good point, Norman, in the prioritization and the struggles that we have gone through in this epic battle that has been waged over the F–22. One thing that I am reminded as our four services sit before us is that the Joint Chiefs in November did something kind of unusual. They sat here and said that the—they added up the programs, and they said to the effect of we are $20 billion short in annual appropriations.

    And I had never seen the services basically contradict the President's budget. They said the President's budget, using that last year's baseline, is $20 billion short. The Army said they are $5 billion short per year; the Navy, $6 billion short; the Air Force, $5 billion short; and the Marine Corps, $1.7 billion short on top of the pay requirements and fixing the retirement program, which is about two and a half billion. And if you add that up, that is $20 billion.
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    One trap that I hope we do not get into is presuming that we are spending the right amount of money, and therefore we need to slash one program at the expense of the other. Certainly, if we need all of them, we may simply be underfunding defense. I am reminded, my colleagues, that this defense budget that we just passed is roughly $150 billion less than the 1986 defense budget in real dollars. I do not think it has to be $150 billion more, but it could be that the wisdom of our Joint Chiefs in saying ''you need to spend an extra $20 billion per year'' is on target. Having said that, since Operation Allied Force was an air campaign, General Esmond, why don't you lead off, and then we will be followed by Admiral Lautenbacher, General Rhodes, and General Ellis.

    And I do want to comment that we appreciate the ranking member, the gentleman from Missouri, was here a few minutes ago. I know he is coming back, and the Chairman of the Full Committee, the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spence, is with us today. We appreciate your attendance, Mr. Chairman, at this important hearing.

    So General Esmond, the floor is yours .

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MARVIN R. ESMOND, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

    General ESMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be here, and I thank you for the opportunity to appear today and testify on U.S. Air Force significant lessons learned from Allied Force. My opening remarks will briefly address a few key issues regarding what did and did not work in Allied Force. My submitted written testimony will supplement these comments with more extensive details. In addressing what worked, first and most significantly, I must say aerospace power. Operation Allied Force was the first major war in history fought almost exclusively with aerospace power. In 78 days, NATO's combined forces flew over 38,000 sorties, prosecuting the air war over Serbia. The United States Air Force Aircrews and aircraft flew the vast majority of these, delivering over 70 percent of munitions employed in the conflict.
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The aerospace campaign successfully allowed NATO to achieve its overall political objective in the Serbian province of Kosovo.

    Aerospace power worked. Aerospace superiority was achieved and maintained. The allied forces had the freedom to maneuver, vastly exceeding that of the opposing forces. Allied forces enjoyed freedom from Serbian air attack and freedom to attack. Over 14,000 strike missions with no casualties and only two manned aircraft down drove home this truth. There is a significant operation advantage accompanying the possession of air and space superiority. We, once again, had it and benefitted by it.

    Our Air Force modernization investment plan worked. In Desert Storm, only ten percent of our employed strike aircraft were capable of delivering precision-guided munitions, and only eight years later, most of which was during the Cold War draw-down, over 90 percent of our deployed strike aircraft were modernized to carry smart weapons such as joint direct attack munitions and legacy precision-guided munitions.

    The Air Force continues along an aggressive modernization path. Wise investments have given us a family of precision standoff and direct attack munitions platforms, capabilities like AGM–130s, laser-guided munitions, and conventional air launch cruise missiles. As Lieutenant General Mike Short remarked, this should be viewed by the Air Force as a success story for the procurement process, because everything that we have acquired in the last 15 years was a roaring success.

    Rapid global mobility was an essential allied force enabler. The air mobility system, to include tankers, simultaneously supported the increase of theater forces from three to ten wings, provided significant air lift support for the Operation Shining Hope humanitarian effort and deployed Task Force Hawk. Allied Force was a major theater war equivalent for portions of the United States Air Force and the air mobility forces rose to that occasion.
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    It is also important to note that the total force structure we rely so heavily upon worked magnificently with our Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve command serving as critical first responders in support of these demanding taskings. Precision engagement worked and will be even better in the future. While we claim to own the night, we are not yet able to say we own the weather. Nevertheless, we have certainly made significant strides in that direction.

    The first ever employment of B–2s and successful joint direct attack munitions with a phenomenal all-weather success against some of the most difficult, most defended targets struck throughout Allied Force. However, we had a limited number of these munitions, hence the weather caused an undesirable lull in the pace of our operations. We are continuing our modernization path, and within the current five-year defense plan, we will have B–1s, B–52s, F–15Es and F–16CGs all ready to employ (GPS) Global Positioning System-guided munitions above and beyond their current capabilities.

    We are also continuing our acquisition efforts to build a more robust GPS weapon inventory. We had impressive sensor strike timeliness, but they were more the exception than the rule. We had cases where imagery from the U–2 was uplinked, downlinked, then analyzed in near real-time. It was then disseminated and passed to strike aircraft with unprecedented rapidity. We effectively prosecuted, dispersed, and concealed air defense systems, enemy aircraft, and other targets of high value with truly impressive organizational flexibility and speed. Nevertheless, we need to continue enhancements in information collection, analysis, and dissemination capabilities management through continued modernization of our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, as well as our ability to get this information to strike aircraft in near real-time through modernization efforts like Link-16 data link.
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    Our communications were more robust than ever built. We literally absorbed virtually all available bandwidth, both commercial and military, by running the most distributed operations and most extensive reach-back effort ever. In comparison to Desert Storm, we had deployed seven percent of the people but used 184 percent of the relative bandwidth. Clearly, we have moved into the information age, doing more through distributed operations supported by communication links. We will continue to need more communications capability to enable our distributed operations and the optimum employment time lines for our all-weather operations.

    Finally, let me say our expeditionary aerospace force framework worked well in Allied Force, and we need to continue the AEF path with our formal evolution to an expeditionary structure. Improvements in communications, sensor-to-shooter operations, and inventories of all-weather munitions are critical to maintaining the capabilities displayed by air and space air power in Allied Force. The path of current modernization, combined with the ability to rapidly gain and maintain air and space superiority, are key highlights of a campaign waged and won predominantly by aerospace forces.

    This concludes my opening remarks, and I would be happy to entertain any of your questions later.

    Mr. HUNTER. You might, just before we move on to the next opening statement, just give us a brief description, General, of the effect on your non-deployed forces in terms of mission-capable rates, because a lot of the systems we saw looked like it drew them down below 50 percent or right at 50 percent. What was the effect on your non-deployed units?

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    General ESMOND. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. We did support much of our front line forces with spares and other parts that were allocated for stateside training forces in order to keep the sea status up at an operable rate, and Allied Force, we were forced to do that.

    Mr. HUNTER. And those were not just training forces. Those were forces that you would have had to deploy in a second regional conflict. Right?

    General ESMOND. That is correct.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. I thank you.

    Admiral Lautenbacher.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. CONRAD C. LAUTENBACHER, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, RESOURCES, WARFARE REQUIREMENTS & ASSESSMENTS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, of the subcommittee, and staff members, I appreciate very much the opportunity to appear before you this morning to have the opportunity to discuss lessons learned from the Navy's point of view in the Kosovo operation. I would like to offer my written statement for entry into the record and offer a few oral remarks to open.
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    I would like to categorize my opening remarks into two pieces. One is some general lessons learned and then more specifics, and I think probably the first most valuable lesson that we have learned and re-learned, as mentioned, is that a force that is manned with intelligent, skilled, motivated, well-trained, and appreciated people is essential to success.

    And on the point of appreciation, we appreciate the support of our Congress and our leadership, particularly the members of this committee, in providing for increased compensation for our sailors and Marines out there. This has been a big, big difference to us in terms of being able to maintain the kind of people we need and will make a big difference in the future in operations such as Kosovo.

    The next general lesson that we learned, I think re-learned again, the value of being forward deployed, forces that are ready that are on station. We come at this from two perspectives. First of all, we were fortunate that we had nine Naval units on station capable of firing Tomahawk missiles that were integrated into the command structure on station and ready to go on call. On the other side of that was the fact that we do not have enough forces to cover all of the three hubs of instability that we have today in the world, and the carrier and the air wing were not there at the time they were needed. They were sent in later as a result of the fact that we are stretched thin in meeting the requirements of the Commanders in Chief (CINCs).

    So the ships that were there that fired Tomahawk missiles were integral to the success. The Roosevelt, however, as it came on station, came in on the fly, launched aircraft as soon as within range of the operation, and immediately became an integral part of that operation. I point out that she flew 3,000 sorties in support of the operation, destroying over 400 tactical targets alone, carried a major part of the workload in the Kosovo engagement zone; and those 3,000 sorties, I might add, were flown without any losses or any accidents, a remarkable tribute to the training and the professionalism of this air wing.
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    The next lesson is that—and it sort of follows, as we move down this post-Desert Storm path—we see the need more and more to be ready for come-as-you-are wars, come-as-you-are contingencies. You have got to be ready on the day it goes, and the Navy and Marine Corps team brings to the theater all of the theater's forces that are on station ready to go for whatever might occur.

    Sort of the fourth general lesson, I think—and it has been mentioned by the opening statements that readiness is very fragile. As we have used our forces since Desert Storm, we have found out that the management of them is critical. If you use them too much, you are going to burn out the people, you are going to wear out the equipment. You are going to have to be able to manage this system much more tightly than we have done in the past.

    As you use your forces, the cost of business goes up as well. So we are working hard to try to provide the right balance for our people as well as for the machines and the hardware that they operate. Part of that is the training. As I said, Roosevelt would have not been able to enter that operation if she did not have the training that was provided by such good facilities as we have at the Atlantic weapons training facility in Vieques. That type of training that goes to end-to-end capabilities from planning all the way down to ordnance delivery and combined fire is absolutely essential to the type of success that you have seen in Kosovo.

    Let me just hit on some of the specifics that were brought up. Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, the Navy's contributions to those were the EP–3, our special mission P–3 aircraft, and our P3–C aircraft. They were very, very heavy tasked. These forces did see some decline in readiness because of their overuse or their higher than anticipated use, you might say. We have been using—some of the supplemental money that we got has been used to improve our capabilities there by adding more aircraft and capabilities to them. I might point out that the Navy had 21 percent of the ISR platforms in the theater and flew 36 percent of the missions. So these aircraft were on station and doing the job for the CINCs.
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    We also found that Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are essential. We used them both in the surveillance role for our Naval forces at sea and for over land. And, again, we have a program in place to upgrade our maritime UAVs, and we are going to support that as hard as we can.

    EA–6Bs, the only jamming aircraft that we have in the Department of Defense, were very heavily tasked. Ten of the nineteen Navy and Marine Corps squadrons were deployed to Allied Force. That is not the normal rotation that we like to see with a deployed cycle. It degrades Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO), and it causes deferred maintenance.

    We appreciate the support we gained in the supplemental which allowed us to improve the money devoted to overhauls, money devoted to improving the capabilities, and we are working on plans within the department to add another squadron so that we can reduce some of the TEMPO on our personnel.

    In the precision-guided munitions area, General Esmond already mentioned, but let me just make the comment that what we saw in this conflict was a need to review the way we do our requirements. As Chairman Hunter already mentioned, the Non-Nuclear Ordinance Requirements (NNOR), or our ordnance requirements for two Major Theaters of War (MTWs), we are short, which we all know, but the requirements are calculated—we are going to have to calculate the requirement differently now. Our traditional methods include calculating those requirements just on the basis of the military utility and difficulty of striking a target. What you see now in today's contingencies is the need to prevent collateral damage both to buildings and human beings, civilians that might be in the area.
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    So you have a whole new framework for calculating requirements for precision weapons. That lesson was learned very strongly in this conflict. And the premium on 24-hour and all-weather munitions, as General Esmond mentioned, the Navy supports that. We are going in the direction of Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW). We are trying to improve our precision delivery of laser-guided munitions as well. Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), a weapon of choice. Over 600 of these weapons have been fired since August of 1998. They are more responsive than ever. They used to be weapons that took days to plan and execute a mission. We have reduced that now to the place where it is hours and sometimes minutes to react with a Tomahawk weapon.

    We believe we are going in the right direction. Our Kosovo supplemental has helped to re-manufacture or have the funds to re-manufacture another 624 TLAMs.

    Mr. HUNTER. Admiral, you might hold on for one minute here. We have got a pending vote on the journal. We probably have about six, seven minutes left on that. Why don't we break at this point, and we will fire back up in about ten minutes. How is that?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes. Thank you.

    [Recess.]

    Mr. HUNTER. Admiral, proceed.

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was just finishing up on my opening comments on the Tomahawk missile. We have used our—or we have been provided funds to re-manufacture 624 TLAMs which makes up for those that we have expended in the last year, and our Tactical Tomahawk program remains fully funded and on track to be on line in the year 2003.
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    There are three more items that I wanted to talk about. Targeting, a critical lesson learned. We have to be faster at it. We have to work on the mobile targets part of this system. We have to fine-tune our systems. One of our programs to improve and optimize our laser-guided bombs, the AT FLIR is very important to us, and we are putting emphasis on that. Procedural changes obviously will help us.

    The foundation of improving targeting, of course, is C–4I. There are many lessons learned in C–4I as General Esmond mentioned. The Navy has been supporting a program called IT–21 for the past several years. That was put to very good use during Kosovo and increased the bandwidth available for communications and data movement between our units. It supported our war fighters in this operation, and we are continuing ahead to ensure that all of our units will be so equipped in the next two years.

    The next lesson that was important to us from the Navy side, allied interoperability. We operated with all of the NATO navies. There were at one time four different carrier groups in there, three from other nations. We had to integrate that force and neutralize the Yugoslavian Navy and ensure the maritime intercept responsibilities were covered. Interoperability with our allies is a critical area that we are working on at this point.

    Now the last point I want to make specifically is as we look through our programs that we have requested support for in Congress, I believe that the Kosovo lessons learned support what we have asked for in our major modernization programs, such programs as the F–18E/F, our Tactical Tomahawk which I have mentioned, our DD–21 which would provide fire support, rapid fire support for ground troops ashore, the LPD–17 that would allow our use of the MV–22, and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) for our operational maneuver from the sea, the network-centric warfare concept which is based on the IT–21, and improving the bandwidth in all areas for communications and data transfer, our requirement for command and control at sea represented in our Joint Command & Control (JCC) ship which will replace our aging fleet command ships in the next several years, and obviously for mobility and lift such as in our programs for TADC–X, our replenishment at sea and our future Maritime Prepositioning (MP) forces. Mr. Chairman, we are constantly reassessing our force structure based on these lessons learned. These examples that I have mentioned this morning only serve to intensify that process. We again thank the Congress for the emergency supplemental money that we had. Many of these lessons learned could not have been improved without that support. There is much more to do. We will definitely need the help of this committee, as we have enjoyed it in the past. We appreciate very much all the help that we have gained from this committee in the past, and we look forward to a continuing positive relationship.
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    Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I am ready to answer your questions.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, thank you, Admiral.

    General Rhodes.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JOHN E. RHODES, COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

    General RHODES. Yes, sir. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee and subcommittee. I would like to thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Marine Corps's lessons learned from Operation Applied Forces.

    Sir, for the Marine Corps, Kosovo was less than a watershed event but more of an affirmation of our current vision on the future of conflict and our Corps's direction to meet the challenges of the next century. Kosovo highlighted that our Nation must be able to project power not only from forward land bases but also from the relatively unconstrained and unencumbered sanctuary of a sea base.

    In your letter, sir, you asked us three questions: what were the lessons learned, what were the effects on the operations our deployed and non-deployed forces, and have you modified our modernization programs to take advantage of these lessons learned. Sir, for the first question, the main lessons learned, for us it is the enduring nature of the four deployed and rapidly deployable forces. If we take the 26 Marine Expeditionary Unit for an example, located aboard the Amphibious Ready Group that operated in both the Mediterranean and the Adriatic, it participated first in Operation Shining hope both in the construction and the security of the Kosovar refugee camps in Feir, Albania. It flew eight combat missions in support of the Allied Force aerial campaign.
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    Those same forces, the ground forces, the Naval forces were strategic theater reserve as well as providing other missions for the technical recovery of downed aircrew and so forth. Those same forces were the same forces that were the initial peace-keeping forces into Kosovo itself, and once that mission was completed, they backloaded, went aboard the ships, and when disaster struck Turkey, they were one of the first of America's assets on line to assist with that disaster.

    As far as the other contributing factors, we had F/A–18 Hornets from Beaufort, South Carolina, along with our Marine wing support group that flew into Tazar, Hungary, set up an expeditionary airfield with expeditionary arresting gear, lighting, runway setups, and as well as the Fresbek landing system, a total of 858 people including the maintenance, security, and air traffic control group for those two squadrons that operated that airfield.

    We had a rapid search capability for our EA–6s which were flying out of Aviano. This whole effort was planned and coordinated through Marine forces located at Norfolk, Virginia. This working, the Marine Corps requirement through the Marine component at Norfolk, proved to be not only responsive but extremely flexible, sir.

    As far as the main effect of our deployed and non-deployed forces, sir, our overall readiness remained about the same. The problem is those that stayed behind paid for those that went forward, and had we had been called upon to do another MTW to use those same assets, we would have been strapped.

    Our cannibalization rates slightly increased on all of our aircraft to go ahead and shift parts and make them immediately available, the aircraft. At the same time, we realized, especially with our EA–6s, that we were flying those over 50 hours a month for a couple of months there, and we had to increase, and the Secretary of the Navy did increase the funding line at the rework facility both for, of course, the Navy and the Marine EA–6s.
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    We wanted to, initially when the call came, to send the Hornets over to Allied Force. We wanted to initially send alpha models, a good aircraft. They got a laser-guided bomb capability, moving target indicator capability, but they could not coordinate it with GPS for drop. We wanted to do that because of Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) of our delta squadrons. Our delta squadrons were required at Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) in Iwakuni. We did send deltas though, finally, and the result of that was that we extended one of our squadrons in Iwakuni, a delta squadron past six months, and one of the delta squadrons that we sent to Hungary had just returned six months prior for the deployment to go back over to Hungary.

    As far as the rapid surge for EA–6s, sir, we have got four or five EA–6 squadrons. Three of those four were committed to support the operations. Of those, we normally had eight aircraft in place at any one time flying out of Aviano in support of the operation, and one time, we had 11 of our 20 aircraft committed to support Allied Force.

    As far as the effects on or modernization program, sir, we would like to move forward rapidly with our funding for the F/A–18 Alpha, the engineering change proposal 583 which will upgrade 24 of our alphas to be about the same level as our Lot 17 Charlies which we now put aboard the carriers that we will make them JDAM, JSOW and Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) capable.

    We would like to go ahead and continue the rapid fielding of our LITENING pod for our AV–8s. That will give them a self-lazing capability. We have three on board now. We will have nine by the end of December 2000. We would like to improve, and we had added some extra money for Secure Internet Roughter Network (SIPRNET). That is the classified internet communications Local Area Network (LAN) for our tactical units, both funded through the Navy with the Navy-wide internet and as well as our base infrastructure; and, sir, on preferred munitions, we would like to definitely not only increase and accelerate, but we would like to increase the training allowances for those preferred munitions so that our aircrews can have a little more experience on training with those prior to going into combat.
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    Sir, Kosovo for us confirmed the growing importance of the littoral regions of the world, the importance of access which wrestle on the twin pillars of presence and forcible entry and the importance of attainable all-purpose forces which can easily shift from one mission to another without a timely delay to retrain and reorganize.

    Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to be able to discuss the lessons learned from Kosovo with the subcommittee, the great support the subcommittee has given us in the past, and, sir, I look forward to answering the questions you may have. Thank you.

    Mr. HUNTER. General, thank you.

    General Ellis.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. LARRY R. ELLIS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS AND PLANS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

    General ELLIS Good morning, Chairman Hunter, Congressman Sisisky, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you on behalf of the Army. I request first that my written statement be entered into the record and that you allow me to highlight some of the key points of my testimony today.

    Mr. HUNTER. Without objection. In fact, all written statements will be taken into the record.
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    General ELLIS. Thank you. First, I am honored to represent America's sons and daughters who volunteer to serve in the United States Army, whether they are soldiers on active duty, National Guard soldiers, Army Reserve soldiers, or our civilian employees. I would like to take a few minutes to address some key aspects of our overall Army readiness, the impact of some emerging lessons learned from Kosovo, and our transformation plan given Secretary Caldera's and our Army Chief of Staff, General Shinseki's recently released vision statement.

    The pace of our Army is greater today than at any period in our history, short of global war. Of the 480,000 soldier strength you authorized for the Army, nearly 123,000 soldiers are forward stationed around the globe in support of our national security objectives. Additionally, another 28,000 soldiers are deployed from their home stations to locations such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Sinai, and East Timor. Daily, our soldiers are putting boots on the ground as America's most visible sign of deterrence to would be adversaries and as reassurance to our allies.

    Our army has the best equipment and best-trained soldiers in the world, and I want to thank the committee for their support in sustaining this unmatched capability; but as you well know, the cost of a quality Army is not insignificant, nor is it without sacrifices by dedicated soldiers who are selflessly serving their country around the world.

    As you are aware, the Army is continuing its after-action review process and developing lessons learned from its operations in Kosovo. From an Army perspective, I would like to address a few of these key points. First, the deployment of Task Force Hawk did not significantly impact the overall mission-capability rates across the Army. The primary combat systems employed in Kosovo were the Apache helicopter and the multiple launch rocket system. These systems were maintained at mission-capable rates at or above the Army's established readiness standards.
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    For the Apache helicopter—

    Mr. HUNTER. What was that rate, General? Do you have the rates?

    General ELLIS. I will read those for you.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

    General ELLIS. For the Apache helicopter, the Army standard is 75 percent. Task Force Hawk maintained a mission-capable rate in excess of 90 percent throughout the deployment while the Army's overall fleet average for the Apache was above 80 percent. For the multiple launch rocket system, the Army standard is 90 percent. Task Force Hawk maintained a mission-capable rate in excess of 90 percent as did the remainder of the Army's fleet. This is extremely significant given these systems were training around the clock as they prepared for combat operations.

    These mission-capable rates can be attributed to the availability of spare parts and to soldiers who worked tirelessly in very austere conditions to maintain some very sophisticated weapon systems. These rates can also be attributed to the Kosovo emergency supplemental funding. I want to personally thank Congress for their support. There is no doubt that had Task Force Hawk been called into the action, the equipment and the soldiers would have been ready.

    Second, I would like to point out that although the combined air campaign is complete, the Army still has almost 7,000 soldiers on mission in Kosovo today. These soldiers continue to represent America's commitment to NATO and our national security objectives. Again, early contingency operation funding is required to sustain the uninterrupted support to these soldiers while continuing to maintain readiness across the rest of the Army.
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    This brings me to my last point. As we looked at the emerging lessons learned from multiple contingency operations, they reinforce the fact that small-scale contingencies will continue to influence the geo-strategic environment for the foreseeable future. This means that the Army must become more strategically responsive across the full spectrum of conflict.

    Therefore, I want to emphasize that Kosovo alone was not the catalyst for the Army's new vision. In essence, Secretary Caldera and General Shinseki's assessment is that our heavy forces must be made more strategically deployable, while our light forces must be made more lethal and survivable. At the same time, we must reduce the logistical footprint of our forces, while ensuring sustainability for extended operations.

    The Army's new vision statement will have a significant impact on the Army and its modernization strategy. We are reviewing our programs. We are assessing requirements needed to support the new force design. The specifics of the implementation plan are still being analyzed.

    To successfully execute the Army's vision and transformation strategy, we will need your support. Specifically, we will need the authorization and funding to include reprogramming authority to rapidly acquire the types of equipment necessary to jump start the first two brigade sets at Fort Lewis, Washington. We will also require an increase in Army top line total obligation authority to provide sufficient modernization funds while protecting our near-term readiness. Finally, we will need your support to defer or terminate programs that may not contribute to the Army's transformation strategy. Implicitly, we need to work closely with the Congress to build the Army, and by that, the active Army, the National Guard, the Reserve forces for the next century.
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    I would like to conclude by thanking the committee for inviting me to speak on behalf of the Army. I am excited about the prospects for our Army as we embark on this transformation. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

    Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, General Ellis, and thanks to all of you for your opening statement.

    General Esmond, you spoke about the success of precision-guided munitions. One thing we are concerned about is the quantity of precision-guided munitions. Now, are not you guys just about out of Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs)?

    General ESMOND. Yes, sir, we ran fairly low, as you are well aware, during this endeavor. We are, thanks to, again, the supplemental and the wisdom of this committee particularly, replenishing that stock pile as we speak, but we are very low at this point.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Let me ask you this question: You know what the two-war requirement is for all concerned (ALCON). You are way under it.

    General ESMOND. Correct.

    Mr. HUNTER. Even with the monies that have been allotted in the supplemental, you are not going to come close to having as much ALCONs as your two-war requirement states you need to have; is that right?
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    General ESMOND. That is correct, the current requirement.

    Mr. HUNTER. How are we going to fix that?

    General ESMOND. We need a funding increase. We are on the road, of course. In order for the road map to be effective, that funding is important to get the JSAM which is a long-range weapon as well, and that is our plan, is to go through a couple of other families of weapons to get the joint munitions.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, I am not talking about just getting new families or upgrading the style or the shape or the efficiency of the weapon, but simply having weapons. You folks are very short of ALCONs. You are short of a number of other types of precision munitions if you match that up against the two-war requirement.

    Let me ask you another question. You know what the two-war requirement is for most of these systems, your precision munitions systems. Do you think those two-war requirements should be maintained?

    General ESMOND. At the current time, Mr. Chairman, obviously, we must maintain those.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So you do not see any reason to lower the numbers or lower the requirement?

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    General ESMOND. No, I see none.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

    Mr. SKELTON. Would the gentleman yield?

    Mr. HUNTER. Sure.

    Mr. SKELTON. May I ask a question at this juncture which bears on this?

    Mr. HUNTER. Sure.

    Mr. SKELTON. This committee and the Appropriations Committee funded some $15 million toward research and development on 500-pound smart bombs. Would you care to comment on the necessity for those or in addition thereto for two-pound smart bombs?

    General ESMOND. That is for me, Congressman Skelton?

    Mr. SKELTON. Yes, sir.

    General ESMOND. Yes, sir. I would be delighted to comment. We see a real necessity for a smaller version of that weapon, a 250-pound version being specifically what we are interested in, again to complement the capability we see in the future with F–22 and joint strike fighter and giving it a near precision capability.
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    Mr. SKELTON. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HUNTER. Certainly.

    We put in extra money in the supplemental for precision munitions, General Esmond.

    General ESMOND. Right.

    Mr. HUNTER. That money, then in the appropriations process, almost the same amount of money was then pulled out of the Fiscal Year 2000 budget. We put it in one place—if you look at Congress as a monolith, we put it in one place and pulled it out of another place. Did you agree with that action?

    General ESMOND. No, sir, we did not.

    Mr. HUNTER. Are you going to ask all the relevant committees to come up with appropriate funding to make that up this next year?

    General ESMOND. Yes, sir. We fully plan to do that.

    Mr. HUNTER. Do you have a road map that fills these precision munitions requirements over the near future?

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    General ESMOND. Yes, we do.

    Mr. HUNTER. What is it? You are going to need a lot of money.

    General ESMOND. We need a lot of money. Without going into great detail, it is, again, that family of precision-guided munitions that I talked about.

    Mr. HUNTER. Yes, but I am not talking about all the family or the development, because I know Admiral Lautenbacher will tell us about the new Tactical Tomahawk, but what he will not be able to tell me is where we are going to get the other 2,000 that we need, whether you call them Tactical Tomahawks or old Tomahawks. He is going to miss his Tomahawk requirement for the next ten years by a factor of 50 percent, and the Navy has made a decision to live with that. So they have made a decision to live with roughly 50 percent of the requirement that they have set, and I want to know how that accrues to the stability and the security of this country.

    So my question is you guys are going to have to have some hard requests for Congress, and they are going to be, I think, fairly urgent requests if you want to get them funded. Are you going to come up with the plan that fully funds quantitatively your precision munitions requirements that you have set for the two-war requirement?

    General ESMOND Yes, sir, we will do that.

    Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask you something else about B–2 and B–52. I was told if you price ALCONs out at roughly $1.4 million apiece, and you price JDAMs out at something like $15,000, $20,000 apiece, that the advantage of B–2 in the analyses in Kosovo was that you could deliver the same amount of explosive on target, precisely placed, for one-one hundredth because you are able to penetrate air defenses with B–2, and you had to stand off with B–52 to launch ALCONs. You could deposit that same amount of explosive on target for roughly one-one hundredth the cost as you could with ALCONs launched, the $1.4 million ALCONs launched from long-range with B–52s. Does your experience or your numbers validate that?
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    General ESMOND. There is a way to calculate, of course, target costs per kill. That figure or that comparison often does not take into account the support requirements to get that aircraft over the target. So I would not hang my hat on that number, but I am certain that there are comparisons like that being made.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, what is your number?

    General ESMOND. The B–2 versus the B–52?

    Mr. HUNTER. Yes, in terms of costs for explosive on target.

    General ESMOND. Well, cost per pure explosive cost per weapon on target—

    Mr. HUNTER. In other words, you have told me there are some other variables that have not been calculated in. Have you calculated those in?

    General ESMOND. We have not at this point. I do not have those with me, but I can get those, sir, for the record.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Because I would think it probably takes a lot of money to keep the B–52 flying as well. I mean that number may go above 100 to 1.

    General ESMOND. Possibly.
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    Mr. HUNTER. All right. Could you try to get that for us, if you could?

    General ESMOND. Sure. I would be glad to.

    Mr. HUNTER. If you think the equation is incomplete, if we could make it complete, that would be good, sir.

    Admiral Lautenbacher, you know what my question is going to be to you. Right? I think the Navy has made a dangerous calculation here, because you guys weighed in on this committee or this subcommittee, put in money to restart Tomahawk line, not in prejudice to Tactical Tomahawk because they are made by the same company; and we full-funded our Tactical Tomahawk development, but we pulled your Tomahawk people in, and we said we are 50 percent low of what you say we need. Do you have any road map to get there? They said no. We said, well, how can we possibly do it? They said the only way to possibly do it quantitatively to fill up the Tomahawk requirements is to restart the Tomahawk line. We said is it a good bird? They said extremely good bird. They said it worked great. We said, okay, what is it going to cost to do it? I think it was $30 million to restart the line. We put that in.

    Your folks then lobbied on the Hill to kill that. I guess you thought it was some kind of a threat to Tactical Tomahawk. The upshot is that you have put yourself in a position where you cannot possibly have enough Tomahawks for the next ten years, meeting not our requirement but your requirement. Why is that?

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    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. We are in the difficult business of allocating shortfalls, Chairman Hunter, and we are trying to balance the risk as best that we can. We have taken a look at our expenditures of Tomahawks in the last—since Desert Storm basically. We have taken a look at the highest and the lowest, looked at the inventories to speculate on what we think we can deal with, given the total level of resources that we have.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, we are not speculating. We are not speculating. We are dealing with the number that you put together and told us we needed as a Nation, that we should not go below in terms of Tomahawk inventory.

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. You are now telling us you are going to be roughly at 50 percent of what you think we need for the next ten years, not as an oversight, but as a deliberate policy. Is that not dangerous?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. There is risk involved in all of the decisions that we have to make. All of our weapons levels are below NNOR requirements. That is a Navy term, our ordnance requirement levels at this point, and that is a fact of life that we deal with. So the question is trying to balance it across the shortfalls that we have to deal with.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, have you looked at the shortfalls across the board?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, sir. I think if you looked at the rest of our munitions requirements, you will see the same thing that you have talked about in Tomahawk.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Have you got a plan to address that problem?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. We have a—

    Mr. HUNTER. If you come to us and tell us that you have got a shortage and you need to fill it, we will fill it.

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, sir. We are working as hard as we can to put as much money that is available into these accounts.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, that is not my question. My question is—and I asked this question of General Esmond—do you have a plan to fill up your munitions bins, emphasis on Tomahawk, with the required number of systems that you say, not us, but you say we need to fill your own requirement?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. We have a plan to do that.

    Mr. HUNTER. In what year will that happen in the next century?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Beyond our five-year defense plan.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

    General Rhodes, as usual, you have been—I think you have been most candid, because Marines have less to lose, I guess.
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    General RHODES. Or less to begin with, whichever way you want to look at it.

    Mr. HUNTER. Yes. Tell us about this cannibalization rate.

    General RHODES. Yes, sir. It is basically, as everybody else has said, a limited number of resources, and when you increase the demand on those resources, you have got to pay a bill price, and there are start-up times, and there are stock piles. If you work down the stock pile or if you are in a time sensitive issue, it may be more advantageous to take a perfectly good part off an airplane that is awaiting either other parts or a phase maintenance situation to go ahead and use that part to place it on an airplane that would bring it up and operational.

    So we are robbing—we in some cases robbing Peter, who was already broke, to pay Paul so that Paul could go fly another day; sir, and we are catching up with that now and to be honest, the second half has pumped some money into this program and is helping the Naval forces overcome our price that we have been paying for the cannibalization.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Can you give me your mission-capable rates for AV–8B?

    General RHODES. Yes, sir. Today, it is 52 percent, our mission-capable rate for AV–8Bs. We have got basically 44 bare firewalls, meaning without engines. Thirty-three of those are for the 408s. Eleven of those are for the 406s. The four deployed AV–8s are in good shape. We are making sure they have got the parts, they have got the engines. We are paying that price, again, out of the leave-behind aircraft sir. Fifty-two percent overall for our operational force.
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    Mr. HUNTER. What do you think is reasonable for a mission-capable rate? What is your goal?

    General RHODES. We want it above 75 percent, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

    General RHODES. I think all of us would say that we want our equipment—

    Mr. HUNTER. That was about your service-wide average about five years ago.

    General RHODES. Yes, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. About 75. Okay.

    General Ellis, according to the last analysis I got, you are $3.5 billion short of basic ammunition. Have you looked at that?

    General ELLIS. Not specifically. I know that we are short on some ammunition, but that shortfall has been there for a period of time.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. You know you have used a lot of—and I saw the Army leadership's press releases and their statements. They have used a lot of buzz words about being leaner but meaner, going lighter but stronger, more effective but less logistically demanding. That costs a lot of money. I mean building a system that is more lethal but is lighter than the system you have got or less logistically demanding is extremely expensive. It involves enormous R and D expenditures and pretty sizable procurement expenditures. I would hope that that is not a euphemism for rendering units less effective.
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    Now, you know the reason I say that is I saw lots of buzz words like that in the Army testimony. If you read DOD testimony just before Korea was invaded from the north in 1950, our people talked about a military that was leaner and meaner and tougher, and we had the best people there because all the rest of them were gone, and in the end, we got pushed down the peninsula by a third-rate military, and our bazookas bounced off the Russian tanks.

    I would hope you look at—you have got a fairly small procurement budget and have had for the last four or five years. Have you got any specific programs in terms of switching over from your present prime tank, for example, to a different piece of armor? Is that going to be a part of this operation?

    General ELLIS. No, rather, it is a fairly comprehensive review, and when you talk about leaner and meaner, what we have really done, we have structured our Army for the MTWs, the major theaters of war, which primarily requires heavy forces. Over the last ten years or so, we have had 35 deployments into small-scale contingencies, and as we look at the threat, it appears that this is going to be the way of the future. So what we have tried to do is to structure our Army, and this is a transformation strategy so that we can operate across the full spectrum from the very low end to the high end.

    Mr. HUNTER. I agree. I agree with that idea, but my point is, you know, it is like the Navy talking continually talking about littoral warfare, but we keep building boats, submarines, and we keep building these DDGs. So we have had some great rotary club speeches, but we have not gone out and built a littoral fleet. Now, you folks are talking about having light lift and the fast projections into theaters of war, and yet if you look at the chemical biological threat, for example, that is evolving, that means you are going to have fewer soft bodies outside of Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) or outside of tanks, because you are going to have an environment that protects those people.
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    You are also going to have to have lots of clothing. You are going to have to have these cleansing houses or cleansing stations where a guy can go to take his clothing off after he has been exerting himself in it for a while, because a human body cannot handle that for very long. In a way, you are going to have factors that actually make the Army heavier in a way.

    General ELLIS. I do not think so. We are talking about a medium force, which essentially makes a heavy force a little bit lighter, and the light force, we are going to heavy it up a little bit. So the light force will, in fact, go to some type of a vehicle that they currently do not have.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So the medium force is not going to have a lot of heavy tanks. It is going to have wheeled vehicles?

    General ELLIS. It will have—undefined at this point. It will have a carrier, is what we have described in terms of a requirement. So it may be wheel or track, but it will be a carrier for a medium force. In other words, we want to provide for them some survivability and some lethality which we do not have in the light forces, we have in the heavy forces.

    Now, what we have done is we have gone through concepts analysis agency, and we have run some models and fought this fight to see if, in fact, it was feasible, and we are currently continuing that analysis.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. I appreciate that, General Ellis. Any additional information you have got, we would like you to supply it for the record on how you are going to make this evolution work. In the meantime, I would like you to tell us for the record how you are going to address the last shortage number that I saw for the Army which was $3.5 billion short of your required ammunition, $3.5 billion, how we are going to get from where we are today up to at least close to that level, what your blueprint is over the next several years. Okay?
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    General ELLIS. I will provide that for the record.

    Mr. HUNTER. I appreciate that.

    Mr. Sisisky.

    Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I assume what the chairman has done, really, in asking these questions is that the bottom line is we are going to need more money. That is basically what I asked in my pre-remarks to your remarks. There is no question about the low density and high demand. That has been that way for all of these things. Now, you know, we had the JSTARs, and we are supposed to have 19, and we ended up with 13. Of course, the Congress added the fourteenth and the fifteenth. We need to get four more. I think that is the requirement, and where are we going to get the money?

    UAVs, the type of thing that we need in UAVs, the B–2, just to fix the B–2 is going to cost a lot of money. Now, somewhere along the line either we drop something, and that is why I raised the question, or we are just going to have to get more money. Now, you know, it is easy to say we will just get efficient, and, you know, we will run the Department of Defense like a business, but it is pretty difficult to do. I have always said particularly with 535 members of a board of directors, it really is hard to do, but all of these things, we are going to take into account. General Esmond, would you like to comment on the things that I talked about in my opening remarks?
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    General ESMOND. Yes, sir. Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity, and as Chairman Hunter remarked, I think all of our service chiefs came last November and asked for, in our case, $5 billion and we got half of that, not considering the pay and reduction increase. So you are absolutely right. The bottom line is we are managing shortfalls, and we are trying to do the best we can with those priorities.

    I think in our case road maps are important. The PTM road map, our requirement for two MTWs, how we size, we currently obviously see a world situation indicating we are going to be involved in more of these small-scale contingencies. So we are above and beyond, in some cases, the MTW or at least managing back and forth. So your point is very well taken. There is a requirement for increased bottom line.

    Mr. SISISKY. All right.

    General Ellis, I think you said there were 123,000 U.S. army troops stationed overseas; is that correct?

    General ELLIS. That is correct.

    Mr. SISISKY. And another 28,000 who are Temporary Duty (TDY) or whatever?

    General ELLIS. Well, not necessarily TDY, but they are deployed to contingencies. We have got seven what we call major contingencies ongoing, and then there are a host of others.
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    Mr. SISISKY. Well, that is 151,000 all together, which is probably a little over 30 percent, if I figure right, of your troops. How many recruits do you do a year?

    General ELLIS. This year, we brought in right at 80,000.

    Mr. SISISKY. So 80,000. The one thing you did not ask for—you talk about new equipment, do you need more soldiers?

    General ELLIS. The answer is yes, we would like to have more soldiers.

    Mr. SISISKY. Well, nobody ever says that. You know, I listen carefully, and that is why I brought it up. I remember asking the question to General Ramo. There is the chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee sitting over there that, you know, we talked about readiness and being able to deploy people, and I specifically asked the question. Somewhere in your shop, somebody must have figured how many more soldiers you needed, and he said right then and there we do not need any more; and that is why I am delighted, because it just makes sense. You cannot keep deploying and using the 80,000.

    You know, so that is 320,000 out of 400,000. So you cannot keep doing that. You are going to work these guys and women to death. I mean it just makes sense, and it just seems to me that somewhere in the budget presentation, Mr. Chairman, that you know, we have got to figure in personnel too, and I think the Army obviously needs it more than any group. And you know when you cut back on the number of ships, and we have done that, obviously, but you are still working them harder. The Air Force and the number of wings that are curtailed, but somebody has got to look at the number of people that we have in the service.
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    And with that, I will come back.

    Mr. HUNTER. The distinguished chairman of the full committee is recognized.

    Mr. SPENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you gentlemen for being here. I have listened to what you have said, and it has more or less confirmed what I have thought all along, and that is that the biggest lesson we have learned from Kosovo is that we do not have the size force nor the assets to deter and defeat two distant major theater of wars.

    I have asked that question of the CINCs, of various people for a long period of time, and I have been getting the same answer. From the standpoint of the Marine Corps, the Commandant has been saying we are not even sized to fight but one war at a time. People do not realize the last time we had a major theater war was, I guess, the Desert Storm, Persian Gulf. We have cut back on the size of the force about, what, 40 or 50 percent in the Air Force and Army, 30 percent in the Navy, 12 percent in the Marine Corps. That is the last experience we have had with one of those.

    My main concern with Kosovo militarily all along was that if we were engaged in that operation, and something big-time broke out somewhere else, we would be in bad shape. I think that is borne out by what people have been saying. We have had to fight Kosovo. We had our assets from all over, as you have testified to. We shot off cruise missiles and deferred ammunition like the 4th of July, lines running out, and I asked the question, what would have happened if something had broken out somewhere else and we had weapons of mass destruction to contend with and all of the rest of the big-time threats which we did not have in Kosovo.
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    The admiral had to bring the carrier from the Pacific around to the Adriatic, as you have said. All of these things are so obvious. We are undersized, and we are underasseted to fight two of these distant wars. So I think you have helped us to make that case, and we have got to pursue it, as the chairman has said, and try to fund the size force we need.

    And General Ellis is talking about more troops. There again, we are still bound by that Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) back there, and we are still cutting back on the size of the force. What it is? 75,000 out of the guard and reserves, even in a time when we are supposed to be trying to rebuild the force. I think the new chief of staff of the Army has come forth and asked for more people and the commandant of the Marine Corps. The new commandant has also said the same thing.

    We need to do that. So I think the lesson that we have learned in all of this is we have got to do more to rebuild our force to be able to carry out the national strategy. I do not have any questions other than that. Thank you.

    Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton.

    Mr. SKELTON. Admiral, regarding the lack of Tomahawk missiles, is the Navy not endeavoring to procure some advanced Tactical Tomahawk missiles that are not yesterday's technology but are better than what we had? Tell us about that.

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, we are. We are basically in between an older version and a new version called the Tactical Tomahawk. This will have a lot greater range, will be less expensive, so it will be more cost effective in terms of the money that we spend. It will be flexible targeting. You will be able to preplan up to 15 missions, perhaps. You will have a two-way data link. You will be able to get battle damage assessment. You will be able to have a video link, and you will be to have very long range, and you will be able to loiter time.
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    The promise for the future in responding to mobile targets or relocatable targets in a rapid manner is unprecedented. This will give us a great advance in capability. We believe it is the right decision at this point to go for that technology.

    Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

    General Ellis, in December of 1995, the Americans crossed the river and went into Bosnia. In January of 1996, Lieutenant General Ted Stroupe was sitting in the seat which you now occupy and said that the Army should be no less than 520,000, and then, of course, it has gone down since that time, and if anything, the operation tempo has increased. At some point, it appears to this country lawyer that there will have to be a request for additional authorization and funding for people. Is that being discussed or considered?

    General ELLIS. Sir, that has also been looked at as we looked at our transformation strategy. There is definitely an operational pace issue in the Army. We call it the Rule of Threes. Because we are involved in so many small-scale contingencies, as we have gotten one unit in the contingency, we have got a unit recovering from the contingency, and we have another unit preparing to go to the contingency. So when you do that, it fairly rapidly uses up all of our available forces.

    As I indicated earlier, we have been involved in 35 small-scale contingencies in the last ten years. So that is the reason we need some additional people to help in the operation pace of the force. If we do not, then I think we will start to see some impact in the readiness in terms of recruiting across the rest of the force. I think we will have some fairly broad implications if we are not careful, and we are certainly looking at that as a major issue.
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    Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman.

    Let me just ask a follow up to your question to Admiral Lautenbacher. Admiral Lautenbacher, you are going to have the Tactical Tomahawk which is going to be a great new Tomahawk for less money. Right? But you are not going to have very many of them, are you?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. It will take us a while to build up the inventory. There is no question about that.

    Mr. HUNTER. Does 2010 sound about like the right date to meet your requirement?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Under current funding, it probably will take us that long to reach inventory levels, yes.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So you are going to go for ten years with less than what you say you need to handle the two-war contingency. Do you think that is prudent?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Well, we still have a reasonable supply of the older Tomahawks.

    Mr. HUNTER. That includes the older Tomahawks. The total supply is going to be about 50 percent of what you need for the next ten years. Do you think that is prudent?
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    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I think based on the level of resources that we have to deal with, we have done the best that we can to balance across the various ammunition categories and ordnance categories. Obviously, I would feel much for comfortable if I had more weapons in the inventory. There is no question about that.

    Mr. HUNTER. Do you think it would be smart for us to provide you enough money to have more?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, sir. I would certainly like to have more weapons. There is no question about that.

    Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Mr. Saxton.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I would like to associate myself with the remarks and the concerns of the chairman and the Chairman of the Full Committee as well as the ranking members on the other side. Obviously, they have expressed our concerns relative to levels of funding, numbers of people, shortages of various types of munitions, and those are all real concerns.

    Let me move to a couple of other subjects, however, and before I do, let me say we very much appreciate your positions. We know that if you could write a plan and hand it to us, and if we could fund it, that you would be happier and we would be much more comfortable as well. We appreciate that.
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    Let me ask, General Ellis, you mentioned the success that you had with regard to the Apache and the mission capable rate that obviously was very good. Were any of the Apache helicopters in theater, the later variety, the Long bow? And if they were not, why did not we deploy the Long bow in the theater?

    General ELLIS. The first answer is there were no Long bows. At the time of the Kosovo operation, we had fielded one battalion of Long bows, and they were in the field for three months, and they were at Fort Hood, Texas. The mission, as we saw it, and the threat in Kosovo, we had no problem with the alpha model performing that mission. It was more than capable in our minds.

    The second thought is if, in fact, we had a major theater war, we would like to have the Long-bow prepare to go to that major theater of war. What we try not to do is take our eye off of the MTW as we continue to work these small-scale contingencies, and that is the mission as given to us that we have got to be prepared to do, and so the most capable system being the Long-bow, we felt would be better employed in the major theater of war if in the event that should happen. So we had sufficient alpha models, we thought, to meet the requirement in Kosovo.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

    General Esmond, the folks in this room would be very surprised if I did not ask a request about C–17. So let me do that.

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    Mr. HUNTER. We feel better.

    Mr. SAXTON. We feel better? Okay. The current buy of or the commitment, I guess I would say, of 120, we are moving programmatically toward the completion of that full buy. My understanding is that there is a desire to buy an additional 12 to 15 aircraft for special ops, and I have also heard from reliable sources that we may wish to go an additional 45 beyond that at some point. Could you comment on the long-term desires and plans in this regard?

    General ESMOND. Yes, sir. I would be delighted. We are currently conducting a study that will be out in 2000 to redefine or more clearly define as we see the need growing for lift what our lift requirements are for the short-term future. C–17 is an important part of that study. We do believe, based on its performance, and it currently enjoys a great amount of success and reputation for its performance in Kosovo because of its not only intertheater but intratheater capability, that there will be an increase. What that is specifically, we have not determined. We know the Special Operation Forces (SOF) are seriously looking at its capability to provide long-range delivery of forces and assets.

    Mr. SAXTON. Well, let me ask this question: Has it been determined that the special ops mission that is currently done with one 141s will need replacement at some point, and that that replacement will not come out of the initial buy of 120 aircraft?

    General ESMOND. Yes, that has been determined.

    Mr. SAXTON. So it has then been determined that there will be a request to go beyond 120?
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    General ESMOND. Of some asset, that is correct. Yes, sir.

    Mr. SAXTON. Okay. And then beyond that, the notions of what might happen become less clear?

    General ESMOND. Less clear at this point.

    Mr. SAXTON. Okay. Thank you. General Esmond, let me turn to another subject. The use of GPS is becoming more and more common with regard to a variety of uses, one of which you mentioned, and that was, of course, smart munitions. Can you discuss the GPS system in terms of its vulnerability of attack or survivability, I guess to put it in a more positive way?

    General ESMOND. I can discuss in some detail, not in this session but perhaps in a discussion with you or as a question for the record, but its vulnerability, we are just now fully understanding the total vulnerability, what that is and if it indeed vulnerable. We are undergoing again some studies to determine because of our reliability on that system what those vulnerabilities are. We know there are some. We have not totally understood the full magnitude of those vulnerabilities at this point.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, General. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Taylor.

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    Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions at this time.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, feel free to ask any questions that you want to ask.

    Mr. Thornberry.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    It seems to me that the review and assessment period after an engagement may be just about as important as the conduct of the engagement itself, because the lessons that we take away are going to determine how we are able to operate in the future. Historically, of course, the French learned from World War I that offensive warfare was impossible, and the Germans learned a different lesson, and it had a big impact on what happened next.

    And I guess I want to say first that I am concerned if our primary assessments of Kosovo are that all of our plans are right on track, and we are doing okay, because if we just use this assessment period to validate what we have already got in the pipeline, I am not sure we are learning very much. I am not sure we are being critical enough, and being critical of ourselves is very important to being prepared for the future.

    I do think that whether it was based on Kosovo or a series of engagements, the Army's indication of the way that it wants to transform itself is a step, an important step in the right direction, and I hope that it has greater success than the proposal a couple of years ago to create some mobile combat groups which got some discussion, but then it turns out the difficulty in making change happen overwhelmed the idea. This is off to a better start, but still I do not underestimate the difficulty.
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    I guess I would like to have each of you have a brief comment on two questions. One is each of you has talked about from your service lessons learned. I would like to know to what extent you have looked at this review and assessment across the services from a joint perspective. In other words, to what extent have you looked at a target that F–16s hit and thought about whether that maybe something that a Navy platform could hit? To what extent have we looked at this from the broader scope and in a joint perspective? To what extent is the assessment done there? Second, I would like for each of you to tell me what you think the greatest single defect is in our capability, and do not be afraid the cross services there too. I suspect you may not, but I would like to know what you think our greater single defect or vulnerability is coming out. And whoever wants to start off is great.

    General ESMOND. I will be glad to start, Congressman Thornberry. There is, as you probably know, an ongoing joint assessment chaired by Assistant Secretary of Defense Emory and General Ralston, the Vice Chairman, and that will be published in the near term.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. But is that bringing together your individual service assessments, or is that really looking at it from a who could do this better sort of thing?

    General ESMOND. It is really looking at it from a joint perspective. We all, as services, have brought our input, and it has been filtered in that joint process to then, with the CINC, General Clark, understand how effective we could have been or should have been or were in the joint employment of combat power. That is an ongoing process, by the way, that each of us conducts to understand which—and that is a responsibility of the CINC, and the unified command to understand which weapon system, which capability is best suited to be employed in a given threat environment, and it is not necessarily a service decision to make that call.
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    We do advise, and, through our component commanders and the CINC and his joint force commander staff, then make that decision. We continually evaluate which weapon, again, is best suited for the target, but we also do the same process in our requirements process. I think you have seen—hopefully you have seen—an advancement in how we collectively worry about interoperability and interchangeability of our capability of fight on the battlefield, and I personally am very proud of our progress in that regard with, I might add, Congressman Skelton and others who are so instrumental in getting into that joint mind-set.

    As to a single defect, again, I think we have talked around that issue today, and my biggest concern is, again, funding and people, and those are two top line issues that we have to—I personally as the ops deputy for the Air Force worry about. When I saw for the first time in my 30-year career the force stretched as thin as I have ever seen it between Operation Southern Watch and Northern Watch which was active, the Korean peninsula and shooting in Kosovo, that was for the Air Force in Kosovo almost a MTW level of effort. So that balance and that shortfall that we were managing was critical at that point.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. But what about a more narrow specific capability that concerns you?

    General ESMOND. Again, I would put my finger perhaps on or vulnerabilities as we go into an information age that relies on both offensive and defensive capabilities, and that occupies a great deal of my time, to think about how we protect ourselves and we conduct attack in that arena.

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    Mr. THORNBERRY. And just one brief comment, and then I will be quiet and let you all continue. I understand from some published reports that Admiral James Ellis has said in an after-action report that the length of the war could have been cut in half if we had made better use of information warfare and that a Naval briefing has said that, as a matter of fact, information operations were probably the greatest failure of the war, which is just one possibility in the questions I am asking.

    Go ahead, General Rhodes.

    General RHODES. Yes, sir. I would have to say I agree with General Esmond on the assessment portion, but my only caution would be, as was pointed out earlier, let us not take all the lessons learned from one particular episode. In other words, Kosovo had competition with certain other ongoing activities, certain other OPTEMPO issues, certain other strategic lift issues, and a set of forward deployed forces whether they were afloat or forward based. So to go ahead and say which specific platform would be best for each particular target, you could say that in a pure sense, but the availability and the competition for resources may not have allowed us to do that pure theoretical diagnosis.

    As far as the largest single defect, sir, I think we are all working underneath the same thing, where our requirements far exceed our resources. I see that our current system, the Planning Program and Budgeting System (PPBS), and the acquisition system does not allow us to capitalize of recent innovations without putting at danger our present programs and future direction, and so I am not sure how we get inside that cycle and take advantage of the lessons learned to start new programs and to beat that acquisition time frame that we are currently required to have.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Would the gentleman yield on that?

    Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. Is that a systems problem? Is our present acquisition system keeping us from being able to get at new technologies and exploit them without endangering others? Or is it a dollar problem you are speaking of?

    General RHODES. I would say it is both, sir. I think most would say high-tech turns, what, to be generous every two years, and what program have we ever, you know, thought about, developed, defended, resourced, and executed within two years? Very difficult. And then once you try to do that, you either need an increase in the top line or you put your other programs at risk, and once you rob Peter to pay Paul, and once you put your other program at risk, it upsets the apple cart a hell of a lot.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. But assuming you have solved the funding problem—

    General RHODES. That would make life much easier.

    Mr. HUNTER. Are you saying it is real tough? It is tough for us to fast field technology?

    General RHODES. Yes, sir, it is. It is tough to fast field technology.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Would you recommend having a system that allows you to fast field some things?

    General RHODES. Yes, sir, I would recommend that we look at that closely.

    Mr. HUNTER. Bypass a lot of the procurement regs, which is I think what somebody said that you would have to do.

    General RHODES. I think one needs to look at the procurement regs and see are they against—do they hinder an intelligent, honest move. Yes, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. Particularly, the way technology is changing so quickly, the regs have not kept on. I think that is a very good point.

    General RHODES. Agreed.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. Admiral.

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, sir. Thank you. As far as looking across services, I think we do that, and I agree with my cohorts here, and I just add a personal example as the deputy Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) in Desert Storm to General Horner and the deputy component commander to General Schwartzkoff. I sat sort of in the infancy of what I call the joint operations that we experience today, and I think if you looked at the way we operate today, I mean, there is just no comparison at all. We work together very well. There is no doubt about using the right weapons for the right targets, whether it is an Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, whatever it is. The joint command and control structure that has been set up does a great job of determining how to deal with that.
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    Now back in the Pentagon in the front end, the advent of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the working together of the chiefs of the services and the vice chiefs of the services to bring requirements up in a joint way to ensure we are not doing unnecessary overlaps or duplication and bring it up rationally has made a great difference, and I think you will see the continuation of that spirit with the Kosovo lessons learned.

    As far as the greatest single defect, I have to say that the stretching of our forces is the greatest single defect that I see. I mean we were working very hard to cover all of the commitments that we were required to cover for our national defense effort, and that put a strain on people and forces.

    Information operations, let me just add there is another side to that. The comment you made from Admiral Ellis is it looks like a very negative comment. This is a glass half full too, because the amount of—the way we used bandwidth data processing, video teleconferencing, moving data around, distributed command centers, there was great advancements made in the use of operations information sorting to improve our ability. That does not mean that we cannot get better and that we ought to work harder at it, and we should, but there is a positive side to what Admiral Ellis said.

    With that said, that is all I have, sir. Thank you.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. General.

    General ELLIS. Yes. Concerning the joint lessons, learned, I would say that process is fairly well institutionalized, I believe, now across the defense establishment. I certainly can start inside the Army, and we are masters at the afteraction review process. I mean we have mastered it, and that process goes up through the components to the combat commanders, and as a ops dep, we have sat in on the joint lessons learned and discussed those out of Kosovo and continue to discuss those. So I think that process is working.
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    In terms of the a deficit in capability, I would first like to address the issue on the fast fielding. That is an issue right now in terms of our process of acquisition. Technology is turning faster than our acquisition process, quite frankly. So by the time we get through the acquisition process, we have moved on to a new stage in technology, and we are constantly chasing ourselves. So we certainly could use some help in streamlining the process, at least a review of our acquisition process.

    The second point I would say in terms of a deficit in capability—

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. If the gentleman will yield on that, so you folks would like to have some type of a fast field system to be able to get technology quickly?

    General ELLIS. Absolutely, and that was one of the comments I made in my statement as we tried to field the two brigades out at Fort Lewis, for example. For example, in using that as an example, General Shinseki is trying to get a carrier for those troops out there. By the time we go through the acquisition process, it will take us about six years, and so he will be gone, and then another chief comes in, and we will start this process over, which is a frustration not only for you but also for us.

    You have got to go through the O and R. Then you have got to go through the testing, and then you have got to go through the procurement, and it is a very stilted process, and we would like to have some way to move that.

    Mr. SISISKY. Even under the new acquisition law? Of course, it is not new anymore, but I keep thinking of it as being new. But that is true under the laws we have now?
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    General ELLIS. Yes, sir. It is.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me add one. And even under the advanced concept development program, we still have a ways to go is what you all are telling us?

    General ELLIS. Yes, sir. Right. The other point I would make in terms of a deficit in capability, for the Army, I would have to say it is strategic responsiveness, the ability to get to the fight. We talked about the C–17. We have also talked about fast sealift, but the Army, we are dependent upon sister services to get us to the fight. I have no doubt if we get to the fight we can win, and we will win the Nation's wars. Someone must get us there. So it is a combination of air, sea, or prepositioned equipment to get to the fight.

    So in terms of a deficit for the Army, it is the strategic mobility or the strategic responsiveness issue, which I think you saw a piece of in the Kosovo operation.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. SAXTON. We are going to try to get you some more lift, General. I just wanted to make that point.

    General ELLIS. And I want to—I think I need to clarify it may be more than lift. It may be a combination of both air, sea lift, and preposition. In fact, in order to get there and to be responsive, the best way to do that is be on the ground, and the next best way to do it, quite frankly, is to be prepositioned, and then in my mind a third best way is to strategically deploy to the fight. So it is a combination of those in order for us to be strategically responsive, and we are looking at this in terms of this new transformation strategy.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Bateman.

    Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting the Readiness Subcommittee be an interloper at this hearing which has certainly been a very interesting one for me.

    I could take whatever time you all would allow me and talk about that pail of milk that was spilled and the way we became involved in Kosovo. I think the way we stumbled into it after months of bluster produced a tragic result in terms of the primary objective of our being there at all, but that is not your responsibility. You are not accountable for that. I am concerned about the personnel equation. Congressman Skelton and I have for some years been pointing to what we saw as being a shortfall in the end strength of all of the services. You have more or less confirmed our view on that today. The thing we have not addressed, though, is that in an all volunteer force, we are having difficulties maintaining the present authorized end strength, and so we can talk about we need more personnel, but in an all volunteer service, we have got to do some things about filling up all the billets that are presently authorized. And I think that is a problem all of us are going to have to give a lot of thought to.

    One of the things that maybe is a lesson to have been learned, and, again, this is not at your level of responsibility, but maybe we have got to rethink when and why we get committed and make deployments, and if we are stretching our forces too far, then maybe the national command authority is going to have to take that into account as to whether we, in fact, get involved where our national security interests may be not directly immediately threatened. And so I think we cannot do anything about that, but the national command authority can do something about that and needs to be thinking in those terms when they make these decisions about where to deploy and why we are deploying.
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    The final thing I have, and maybe you can comment on this, there has been a fair amount of discussion in the media and various defense journals about target selection and fighting the war by committee and whether or not the commander, General Clark, was unduly constrained in making military decisions without more delay and consultation with a committee or with political leadership than served the interests of successfully conducting a military operation. Is that something that has been looked at and that you all can comment on?

    General ESMOND. I can begin, Congressman Bateman. I think Congressman Sisisky said earlier there is a problem with committee decision making. It is difficult any time you get more than one involved. We have, fortunately, over the years practiced and trained in many ways with our NATO partners in the Air Force in places like Red Flag and other exercises that bring us all together. So that was not the first time we had been involved in that kind of decision making.

    To see it actually work, personally, and again this is a personal observation, I was pleased that it worked as well as it did. The process, while somewhat encumbered, recognized reality, and we had to understand the dynamics that were involved and the speed within which we could operate and get that done. We, frankly, had not done that for real ever before. So it was precedent setting in some ways.

    Given that, I think there are certainly places that we can improve. We gained a great deal of experience, and I fully expect us to improve that process, but it is a natural frustration. Whether it was real or not, I am not qualified to comment on.

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    Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman.

    Gentlemen, we have talked about our standard is a two-Major Regional Conflict (MRC) scenario. I had, arguably, at least a part of a MRC in Kosovo. What I want to ask each of you, and start with General Rhodes, is your understanding the assets that you used in Kosovo, that you had on station in Kosovo, and the other commitments that we have around the world, stable continuing commitments, what would have been the shape of your respective service units that would have been used for the second contingency had one arisen?

    General RHODES. We are out of Schlitz when it came to EA–6Bs.

    Mr. HUNTER. Do what now?

    General RHODES. We were out of Schlitz when it came to EA–6Bs.

    Mr. HUNTER. Is that right?

    General RHODES. We were tied up completely. We gapped the CINCPAC requirement at Iwakuni for a year. We will recover on EA–6Bs until September of '00 of filling that requirement.

    Mr. HUNTER. So you would have had no EA–6Bs for the second operation?
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    General RHODES. It would have been tough. It would have been tough, sir. The second would be that our F–18 deltas who were covering also a CINCPAC requirement, we had six squadrons. We increased our OPTEMPO, PERSTEMPO tremendously to cover the Kosovo requirement, and again what are the implications on those not only material condition but on the people and on retention. It would have been tough to sort that out and tough to cover the rest of our commitment, sir. So I think our C4–ISR and some of our aircraft systems would have been very, very difficult.

    As far as the rest of the missions, for the Marine Corps, we were covered with our standard deployment for deployed forces on the Naval forces that were over there, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. General Esmond.

    General ESMOND. Sir, again, our LD/HD assets were the key assets, our low density/high demand assets, ISR.

    Mr. HUNTER. Why not you go over those?

    General ESMOND. JSTAR—

    Mr. HUNTER. What you would have had left for the second MRC?

    General ESMOND. Again, we would have had to swing some of those forces. We did not have much left in terms of commitments. We had dedicated forces that were pointed toward the Korean peninsula, and they were available, but as far as actually executing to the east or the west, we would have had to take some assets from Kosovo, make some critical, again, prioritizations to determine which direction we would send them. Now, that, again, will increase the risk or reduce the time that it would have taken to come to a successful conclusion, but we would have had to make those kinds of calls. We were at that level.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So you did not have an RMC-capable force left after deployment to Kosovo. You would have had to go and reach into the Kosovo operation and bring resources back to engage in a second MRC.

    General ESMOND. In terms of low density/ high demand, we would have had to make those kinds of decisions. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Low density/high demand. Go on. Tell me about your other platforms one by one and what you had left to go to a second MRC.

    General ESMOND. Again, we had forces dedicated to both the Korean peninsula and to Southwest Asia, the two MTWs, MRCs that would have been available to respond. Now, to augment those capabilities, we would have had to, again, take whether it is F–15Es, F–16CGs, F–15Cs, B–2s, B–1s, B–52, we would have had to again make some judgments as to how much of those capabilities we would leave in Kosovo and continue to fight there or move to one of the other two MTWs.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So you would have had to swing some tactical aircraft as well as long-range aircraft? Because we have always talked about having to swing the bombers. Right?

    General ESMOND. Correct.

    Mr. HUNTER. But you think that this has shown us that we are going to have to swing tactical aircraft also?
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    General ESMOND. If we go above and beyond two MTWs, that is correct.

    Mr. HUNTER. Air lift?

    General ESMOND. Lift is certainly in that category.

    Mr. HUNTER. In what category?

    General ESMOND. In having to swing.

    Mr. HUNTER. So you do not have enough lift left after your first MRC, that is Kosovo? You do not have enough residual air lift to handle a second MRC?

    General ESMOND. We would have to swing that. That is correct. We would have to make it available again to the second MRC. The same with tanker assets.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. I might tell my colleagues we have got a vote on the continuing resolution for extending appropriations until October 29th. That is a vote I knew that Norm would be interested in, and we have got about ten minutes left on that.

    Admiral Lautenbacher.

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, sir. The same with the HD/LD are ISR assets were completely tied up in that theater, as well as the EA–6B force that General Rhodes mentioned. So there would have been—we would have had to shift forces, swing forces. You would have had to withdraw forces to be able to handle that part.
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    Mr. HUNTER. But if you withdraw forces, if you assume you are using the right number of forces to begin with to handle the first MRC, what you are really saying is you will have an inadequate number of forces left in the first MRC. Right?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. You would have to change your strategy.

    Mr. HUNTER. By definition?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. Is it accurate to say then, Admiral Lautenbacher, that you do not have enough assets to handle two MRCs simultaneously?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Fighting with way we fought the Kosovo, that is true, the Kosovo operation.

    Mr. HUNTER. General Esmond, is that accurate? If we define the number of forces as what it takes to handle two MRCs simultaneously, we do not have enough.

    General ESMOND. That is correct, and that is reflected in the assessment of that by the Joint Chiefs.

    Mr. HUNTER. General Rhodes.

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    General RHODES. Yes, sir. As the Commandant previously stated, we are kind of a one-plus MRC force with everything there.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

    Mr. SISISKY. Can I go back to the first question that I asked?

    Mr. HUNTER. Yes, sir.

    Mr. SISISKY. What are we learning? We are learning the same things. If we are short of EA–6Bs in next year's budget, is another wing of them going to be in the Navy? Is tankers going to be in your budget? Are JSTARs going to be in there? What are we really learning except that we are still short of these things, and we are not doing anything about it? If I read you.

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. May I respond?

    Mr. SISISKY. Yes.

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. For the EA–6B, we are working very quickly on what we call an Analysis of Alterations (AOA) to look at the next to follow-on to the EA–6B. We have plans to push together another squadron. We will have to add more people. This goes back to our people issue before, so that we can take the load off of those airplanes. We want to augment that force as fast as we can. I think we have more momentum and a serious effort to try to improve the force structure in the EA–6B area, as well as our EP–3, we have budgeted for more aircraft or we are trying to. We do not have as many as we need. Hopefully, we will come to you with plans to improve our position in those areas.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, gentlemen. We are going to have a quick vote here, and we have a few wrap-up questions here. So take a little break. We will be back in 10.

    [Recess.]

    Mr. HUNTER. We will resume here, and, Admiral Lautenbacher, you were finishing up on what residual force you would have left to deploy to a second MRC.

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, and as I mentioned, our EA–6B, the jammer force and the ISR forces that we have, we were basically totally engaged or close to that point in Kosovo.

    Mr. HUNTER. So not only did you have inadequate assets with respect to EA–6B to go to a second theater, you had no assets in that area?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. We still had some squadrons back in the—we had 20 planes, something like, left.

    Mr. HUNTER. You had practically no assets area left in that particular area?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, sir. That is true.

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    Mr. HUNTER. And the Marines had similarly almost no assets left. How about your tactical birds, your attack aircraft?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. On the tactical, we were able to maintain our air wing rotation. It stayed relatively the same because we did not surge a carrier beyond our normal rotation schedule. So we had three carriers out. We could have surged another three carriers fairly quickly. Beyond that, then, you know, the time lines go farther and farther.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did you have any differential in mission-capable rates on the non-deployed carriers or non-Kosovo-deployed carriers as a result of forward loading into the Kosovo theater assets?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I looked at this based on your question. The F–18 force, because we were in a regular rotation pattern, did not change much from our normal situation. So our main strike force was in pretty good shape. The F–14 picture was a little bit different. There was a degradation in the F–14s. The E–2s, that part of the air wing, there was a degradation because of the way we were using them. That MC rate had gone down in the last six to seven months, I think because of the impact of our operations.

    Mr. HUNTER. About what did the E–2C rate bottom at?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Let me give that to you here. The non-deployed E–2 rate was down to like 38 percent, and that is the FMC. Yes, that is FMC. If you are looking at MC rates, it was 60.

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    Mr. HUNTER. Now distinguish the two. What are you talking about?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. We have two measures, mission capable and full mission capable.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So your full mission capable was 30-something.

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I think you were showing us the mission capable rates, so I will stick to just mission, not FMC.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. For mission capable, your non-deployed aircraft E–2Cs were at 60 percent?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Right.

    Mr. HUNTER. And what were the deployed, Kosovo-deployed E–2Cs?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. The Kosovo-deployed were slightly higher at about 67 percent. Now, they are both below goals. They are both about ten below, eight to ten points below our goals. Now, there were some variations. I am giving you the last data that I have. There were days when, obviously, they were lower. This is a saw tooth curve. It does not stay constant every day.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. But the trend during this period that we were operating in Kosovo had been down. The SH–60s had the same issue. While we were able to maintain the deployed MC rate, the non-deployed behaved as you suggested. This was the one type that behaved perhaps the way you would think it would, our SH–60 aircraft. The deployed rate remained roughly pretty good, but the non-deployed went down.

    Mr. HUNTER. What did the non-deploy go down to?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Let me see what we have got here. The non-deployed rate was down at 60 percent, and that is ten points below the desired level. It is ten points below the requirement for non-deployed SH–60s, and the deployed was about 77 percent which is three points below the goal. So it was pretty close. We had been skirting the goal.

    Mr. HUNTER. Now, the goal was what again?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. The goal was 80.

    Mr. HUNTER. Eighty. So you were three points low on deployed aircraft, Kosovo-deployed aircraft. Non-deployed aircraft, you were down—if you were down to 60, you were quite a bit short of 80.

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    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. But 70 is the non-deployed goal. We divide our goals because, you know, we have this natural readiness bathtub that we have explained before.

    Mr. HUNTER. I understand. Now let me ask you this question: If you are talking two MRCs, and you are deployed at one MRC at 77, and you do that at the expense on the non-deployed birds which are somewhere in the 60s, that means when they have to, if they should have to deploy to a second MRC, they are virtually 20 percent short.

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. We have to bring them up in a rapid period of time.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, how are you going to bring them up? All the shortages I have seen in terms of engines missing and spares unavailable and all the other things that make an aircraft unavailable, how are you going to bring those up in a short period of time?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. The same way we bring up the airplanes we deploy on a normal cycle, because they are always at a lower level. You have to build them up to a cycle.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, I understand that. We just sat in on the readiness rates in which we were told by your service that it takes literally years to get some of these parts and these spares. So outside of cannibalization where you take parts off of other aircraft, I do not know how you are going to bring up the non-deployed birds real quickly.

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    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. There is some ability to do it for a certain level of the force, but obviously you are not going the bring them all up. You are going to have a point where you cannot do that, no question.

    Mr. HUNTER. General Ellis, you told us at least in one area that is the attack helicopter, Apache attack helicopter, the deployment of those birds did not have a large effect on the residual force. Of course, we did not use them either. Right? So I think that pretty much answers that question in terms of your service.

    Gentlemen, here is what I would like you to do, if you could. I would like you to give us for the record, and as quickly as possible, a description of the shortfalls in equipment with respect to mission capability in the non-deployed forces that were a result of the Kosovo deployment laid against the two MRC requirement. In other words, if the requirement is a two-MRC requirement, understanding what you had to take to fulfill the Kosovo requirements, how short were you with the remaining non-deployed assets in terms of having a fully equipped second MRC force? What is the shortfall? Is that pretty clear? I think we need that. Now, you are not making any determinations about priorities or where the money goes or what we do with the constrained budget, but just how short are we? I think that is real important for us because you have got some real numbers there and some real analyses I think you can look at and give us a pretty good answer.

    Do you not think, General Esmond, that is a pretty important thing for us to have?

    General ESMOND. Absolutely. That is an important thing for us both to understand. I will have to take that for the record.
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    Mr. HUNTER. To your knowledge, do you folks know if we have got any analysis in that area that is fairly close to completion? Has anything been done? Here is a two-MRC requirement, here is what we used in the one MRC. How short were we of having to do the other MRC?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I am not aware of any answer to that particular question.

    General ELLIS. The CINCs do some work in that area in the realm of the jammer, and I know that is looked at as we run scenarios against the two-MRC, so we typically will run one and then two MRCs. So there may be some work done in the joint arena on that.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Let me just go over some other questions for the record here that I think may be important here. Did you mention in response, I think, to a Sisisky question what are the Department's future plans for Joint Stars funding?

    General ESMOND. I mentioned the requirement. I think we answered that. I do not know if it was to his satisfaction.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Then the requirement has not changed?

    General ESMOND. No. Correct.

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    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. The Director of Operations for U.S. Air Force in Europe stated the U–2 is a backbone of the airborne ISR fleet, collecting 80 percent of the imagery in the Kosovo. Do you anticipate, the Air Force anticipate new requirements for this manned ISR aircraft as a result of the Kosovo operation? Any new requirements?

    General ESMOND. I do not think, Mr. Chairman, I can anticipate any new requirements. It was very successful. I think ISR in general, as Admiral Lautenbacher suggested, is in demand. We see clearly the need for ISR assets and, Global Hawk is going to be a part of that future, but we will continue to modernize U–2.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. You say you mentioned Global Hawk.

    General ESMOND. Global Hawk is an extension of our ISR road map.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, I think we had $25 million in for procurement of Global Hawk in the authorization. The appropriators I think cut it down to 15. Did you folks communicate with them as to the importance of Global Hawk during this conference?

    General ESMOND. I cannot speak for everyone. We thought we had our case made, but I can only assume our acquisition folks made that case.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. But your position was that you needed the 25?

    General ESMOND. I believe that is correct, Mr. Chairman. Yes.
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    Mr. HUNTER. okay. Can you find out for sure on that?

    General ESMOND. Sure.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Let me ask you also, General, we built B–2 during and designed B–2 during the Cold War, and the idea was to have a strategic penetrator, although a lot of us argued it would be a great conventional system at the same time. We now have used it in a non-strategic way in Kosovo, and at least the figures that I saw, the fact that you would drop a JDAM, a $15,000 JDAM on the same target with the same accuracy, same amount of explosive as a $1.4 million air launch cruise missile from a B–52, that is a one-one hundredth of the cost. That is fairly impressive. I mean I think that is something that has resonated with the Air Force when they looked at the numbers and the costs. Have you folks thought about maybe looking at and developing a penetrator, a B–2-type penetrator, perhaps without all the Cold War requirements, the strategic requirements, but nonetheless with the ability to get in close and basically be a large bus for JDAMs at a lower cost?

    General ESMOND. Our bomber road map does consider future strategic, as you say, capabilities or bomber capabilities global. We prefer to say capabilities, and we are looking at what might be best suited to take on that task, but as far as a larger platform than the B–2 to carry JDAM forward and be a penetrator, we have not specifically looked at that requirement, if I understand your question.

    Mr. HUNTER. Yes. In other words, do you think you may need more of those less expensive ones if you could get them?
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    General ESMOND. Sure. If we could find something that could satisfy a requirement like that, but again, we have the B–2 that is available and carries 16, as you know, JDAMs and does a great job. So there is in terms of strategic targeting and campaign analysis a level at which we no longer would need as much as that precision, and then, quote, dumb bombs can take over the preponderance of targeting, but that analysis is ongoing in any campaign, and we continue to look for when the time is right to make that transition.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. You know we have got a number of small companies that have proposed something that is a little bit like JDAM, and that is to simply strap on wings and tails and guidance systems on these thousands of dumb bombs that we have where you would build a $10,000 asset as opposed to, say, a JSOW, which is I do not know how much that is, how much they are supposed to cost, but I think fairly expensive. Are you folks looking at that to fill your munitions shortages?

    General ESMOND. Yes, we are. We are looking at those capabilities and what their vulnerabilities are, like electronic countermeasure resistance and so on and so forth, but that is a wonderful opportunity that has great potential.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Let me ask you to give some personal attention to that, because the last time we had a small company in town that has down that. It is called Lay Systems, and they had gone down, and they had gone down and done a preliminary test at Eglin with the Air Force grudgingly funding this test. It cost them something like $100,000. They had three guys and a pickup truck. They validated the 60-mile standoff. It was like a JDAM with a 60-mile standoff. They validated that, and they said in the test they had not just validated accuracy requirements, obviously because these guys were just getting into this. The Air Force came in and explained to me for two or three hours how this was mission impossible. They did not want to do this, and I think the next requirement was spending something like either $800,000 or $1 million to validate this requirement, less than the cost of one cruise missile. Mission impossibility, they did not want to do it. Could you let me know, go back and look at that and let me know what the Air Force's position is, just seeing if we can do so more things with these dumb bombs that we could strap on guidance systems, strap on wings, give them a little bit of standoff? If we can do that for pennies, that would seem to be the smart thing to do.
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    General ESMOND. Absolutely. I would be delighted to do that. As I recall, Mr. Chairman, our only or one of our major concerns was Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) vulnerability or susceptibility to jamming, but I would be glad to give you an update on that.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. I thought the big vulnerability was JSOW lobbyists, but that is one of the difficult attacks to deflect, I know. I am being facetious. I know that you folks are concerned about other things.

    But I mean you have massive munitions short falls. You have not no plan to fill them up. I mean I do not see any funding plan to fill them up. I think we have got to address that. I do not know how we do that, but I think we have got to address that.

    For the Army, for General Ellis, I think General Cody talked about this in earlier briefings, but what is being done to improve hardware deficiencies in the Apache that were exposed by Task Force Hawk? Have the improvements been budgeted?

    General ELLIS. We have reviewed. In fact, we took General Cody's testimony. We reviewed each of those issues. We are working them. In the case of the hardware you are referring to, we have it programmed in '05.

    Mr. HUNTER. '05?

    General ELLIS. '05. The second generation flare, you are referring to?
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    Mr. HUNTER. What is that?

    General ELLIS. Second generation flare?

    Mr. HUNTER. Yes.

    General ELLIS. Yes.

    Mr. HUNTER. That is one.

    General ELLIS. So it is in the plan and for '05.

    Mr. HUNTER. Would you like to have it earlier if you had the money?

    General ELLIS. I would.

    Mr. HUNTER. We will all be gone by then.

    General ELLIS. Oh, I know. The constant issue is the trade-off. Yes, I would like to have it all earlier.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

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    General ELLIS. But it is a trade-off of that versus something else.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, let me go over a couple of other weaknesses. Sixty-five percent of the Hawk pilots, Task Force Hawk pilots had less than 500 flight hours. No pilots were qualified in the co-pilot gunner position, and you had inadequate command and control in electronic warfare survivability, as well as—and that is forward-looking infrared radars in the aircraft. That was the fourth inadequacy. What are you doing on those other ones?

    General ELLIS. They are all being addressed. In the case of the experience, that is directly tied, obviously, to flying hours and as we graduate pilots, they are assigned. Of course, the number that were assigned to the unit in Europe happened to be the number that were assigned. What we do in the Army, the forces that were first to be employed were the regional forces. So the pilots that were in the units were the pilots that were in the unit.

    So we have gone back and looked at that as a means of trying to improve the experience base. One way to do that is fly more. To fly more costs more.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

    General ELLIS. And so that is one of those things we must graduate ourselves into.

    Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask you another question, General, because you brought this up, and I think is a great statement you made. You said it takes six years to develop the system. It takes a long time, and yet technology is moving very quickly. We cannot field technology quickly. We did an analysis here a couple of years ago, and that year, you folks got something like $8.4 billion in procurement. That was the Army procurement number, approximately.
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    At the same time, your shoppers, that is your acquisition personnel, received $2.7 billion in pay. Now, what that means is if you bought a $10 million helicopter or weapon system, you gave $3 million, a third of it almost in pay to the shoppers that went out and bought it from the private sector. You are paying a third of your payments, of your procurement, in payroll, and this is not for R and D, no metal bending, no engineering, but just for the acquisition people, the shopping network that you use.

    That is far above any private industry. I mean if that was General Motors, there would be heads rolling in 15 minutes, and yet it seems the more people you have got, the longer it takes you to get something. Have you guys looked at that?

    General ELLIS. I am not familiar with the numbers. I will tell you the acquisition policy is across all the services. We probably look like all the other services. I am not trying to pull them into it.

    Mr. HUNTER. Go right ahead.

    General ELLIS. It is just a matter of law, and we are following the law and the policy.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, they are just slightly below you in terms of efficiency or in terms of ratio of shoppers to procurement. I think the Air Force had the best ratio, but it was overall, together the four services spend $15 billion a year in payroll for their shoppers to buy roughly 48—depending on whose numbers you use, 48 to 55 billion in equipment. So if we could just take some of the payroll we are paying the shoppers and just buy equipment with it, we would be in great shape.
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    We have been trying to cut them down, but what that tells me is the more people you put into the system, the longer it takes you to get something. I mean it is just taking you forever to get this equipment in the field. I bet if you doubled the number of shoppers you had, it would be 12 years, and I think you should look at that. You are depriving your troops today of ammunition, of spare parts, of a lot of things you need to have because we are a very inefficient procurement system, and, you know, we cut I think 22,000 shoppers out of the system last year. God bless them. They are fine folks, but for every person that we have there, you could fund two riflemen or two tank drivers or whatever. So I think that is a major problem. Let me ask all of you if you think that we should create by legislative vehicle, a fast field mechanism that would allow you to get the waive procurement regulations to get equipment into the field quickly if you thought it was an urgent thing, an important development to get new technology into the field, a fast field system. What do you think? General Ellis, we will start with you.

    General ELLIS. Well, absolutely. That is a major concern of ours, and we are constantly struggling with it. I think what has happened is our acquisition system has just become bureaucratic. It is bogged down. There are rules.

    Mr. HUNTER. And we made some of them, a lot of them.

    General ELLIS. Yes, you did.

    Mr. HUNTER. I know.

    General ELLIS. And then we are constantly told here are the rules and you cannot get past the rules, and so it becomes very cumbersome.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Admiral Lautenbacher.

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. A couple of caveats: I am not the acquisition expert.

    Mr. HUNTER. That is a good thing not to be.

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. So I am speaking from the other side of this. I think that we already have some systems—we have some pieces in our system which allow us to do rapid acquisition. I am not sure we are using them correctly. So I would like to think about this a little bit more before jumping in and saying that we need a new law to do this, but I would like to take the question for the record if you want to pursue it.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, let me ask you this: Let us change the question a little bit. We just had this readiness hearing that Chairman Bateman held. I mean it takes forever to get a spare part into an aircraft. So here we live in this age when you can do these nice video conferences with people on the other side of the world, everybody can talk to everything in real-time. We have got extremely complicated machine tools and computerized systems that theoretically can make things very quickly, and yet it takes us forever to get you guys spare parts to get this miserably low—you might hold that up, Steve—mission-capability rate up.

    Now, the real test to whether or not your spare parts acquisition system is working in this. Do you think that is success?
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    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I do not think that is success. I think part of that is lack of funding, as well as the time it takes to buy the parts, and a lot of it are vendor bases that with going away and parts that are just military alone-type parts.

    Mr. HUNTER. But here is the deal: But there is one thing beyond that. I mean if Chairman Bateman says what is it going to take, and you guys say it is going to take ''X'' billion, and he puts ''X'' billion in, and next year, we have a hearing, and we say how mission capability has not gone on, and they say because it takes a long time for this stuff to work. Now you have to fund parts before you can—I agree with you, that if you do not fund a part, it is not going to get there, but what I am concerned about is the parts that we fund and a year later they are still not available.

    Now, I understand the vendor base goes away on a lot of these systems, and so what I am thinking of is why do we not have some kind of a system where we have somebody with a lot of power, a lot of juice, either civilian or uniform, who is a spare parts czar, and if you go up through the pipeline, if you are the Top Gun school out there in Nevada and you have got four F–18s that do not even have engines out of your 22 or whatever, and you cannot seem to get them forever, and you ask for them, you request them, and it takes a long time to get them and you go past your develop-dead date. You are able to get this supersystem, and you are able to call them up, and they can get this stuff for you through a very streamlined system where they lean heavily on the private sector and maybe are able to waive regulations that otherwise would slow it down.

    In other words, get spare parts quickly. We do not get spare parts quickly even when we have the money for them. Now, that is bad, do you not think?
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    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. Have you got any ideas on how we get the spare part from funding once funding is procured, from funding to aircraft in less than a year and a half?

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Off the top of my head, I do not have any good ideas to offer at this point.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. If you could look at that and maybe provide something for the record on that. So the question is fast field either new systems or spare parts.

    General Esmond.

    General ESMOND. Mr. Chairman, we are certainly in favor of acquisition reform and turning technology in as rapid a fashion as we can into capability, and we think we have a pretty good cycle to do that. A lot of those shoppers you referred to are required in some cases by law, and so there is some growth in that side of the house, and there has been.

    We look for ways to skinny that down as best we can and become as efficient as we can, but nevertheless, the process itself is a cumbersome process. It is a bureaucratic process in some cases. The spare parts issue, again thanks to your personal hard work and a lot of hard work by some of the committee members here, we have been able to fully fund our spare parts accounts because of supplementals and other budget measures, but, again, that supply and that purchase and supply system is a bit cumbersome. We, again, look for ways and have explored just-in-time procedures using industry and studying their capability to do the same thing, but we continue to look for revolutionary ways to do that and do it as fast as we can.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Yes. There has to be ways to get that stuff faster. You know, Mr. Sisisky pointed out that he committed the crime of buying a foreign car here recently, and he said he needed a part for the thing, and he called up Mercedes or whoever. I always say Norm spends more on his ties than I do on my pickup trucks, but he said he got it airmailed out within two days, something like that. If that would have been a part for a F–18, it would have been two years.

    General ESMOND. But, frankly, again, our bins have been fairly bare, and filling those up while we can make the call and perhaps in some cases a supply system exists to deliver it, it has not been in the bin until recently.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Well, maybe when you give us this delta between what we need for two full MRCs. Considering what we actually used to Kosovo, maybe you could address this with respect to spare parts also.

    General Rhodes, any comments on fast field of parts or new equipment?

    General RHODES. Sir, I think most of that material has been covered. I would like to take it for the record and provide a more definite answer.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

    General RHODES. The only thing I would also point out is we program the best we can for the budget for the spare parts. What we found as we looked at it was not only is there a lesser—I should say a smaller number of parts providers, some of the costs have dramatically risen in just one year.
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    I know when I had get an aircraft wing, a rotor head increased in cost 300 percent in one year. That is very difficult when you lay out your money in a five or six year plan, and you think you are doing a good job, and then all of a sudden you get a price increase of that magnitude.

    Mr. HUNTER. Yes, I agree with you. You know, it is hard to handle those things, and we ought to try to have some mechanism in place that allows us to work around it sometimes.

    But let me go back to General Esmond. General Esmond, I have here that in Fiscal Year '98, the Air Force deliberately underfunded its spare parts requirements in order to better fund underfunded modernization programs.

    General ESMOND. Again, managing shortfall.

    Mr. HUNTER. So you met the enemy, and they are you to some degree?

    General ESMOND. In a finite budget environment, that could be true, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Just one last question. Thank you for all the time that you folks have dedicated to this hearing. Ninety-five percent of the Air Force's aerial refueling fleet was in use somewhere around the world during OAF. One thing that came to my cognizance during this operation was that when you try to check on what allied refueling capability is, essentially there is not any. Is that right? Or that it is negligible. We own almost all the refueling capability in the world.
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    Based on its OAF experience, has the Air Force re-evaluated its requirement for additional re-engined KC–135 tankers?

    General ESMOND. We have a plan to re-engine, and we continue to evaluate that requirement, Mr. Chairman, not necessarily particularly due to Operation Allied Force, but we did see that force stretched thin. As a matter of record, much of that was not necessarily platform-oriented as much as it was crew-oriented, and so there is a people side of that equation as well.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Does the Marine Corps, General Rhodes, envision adjustments to its future KC–130T budgetary requirements?

    General RHODES. Sir, we are looking, of course, at the replacement of the Ts with the Js. The Js give us a smaller crew which is easier to recruit and maintain. It gives us better maintainability.

    Mr. HUNTER. How much smaller, the crew?

    General RHODES. A two-person crew versus—two person in the cockpit crews do need a load master, but you do not need necessarily a flight engineer and a navigator and a load master and a pilot and a co-pilot. So we are looking at a pilot and a co-pilot and one combination of whether it is a load master or flight engineer or whatever, but we do not need the navigator, and we do not need the others. The other is it has more give than the Ts do and our current F and Gs. In other words, you can give away more gas than our current aircraft do.
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    Mr. HUNTER. C–130s, the C–130Js overall, you folks laid a strong requirement for them last year.

    General RHODES. Yes, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. In fact, the extra ones we put in the budget, we put in for the Marine Corps.

    General RHODES. Yes, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. What is your mission-capable rate for C–130s as a class, General?

    General RHODES. Again, that is—if you are talking to the Marine Corps, internally that is kind of a low density/high demand. We have only really got two and a half squadrons of those, and I say the two and a half squadrons are the older models and the active force. The Ts are in the reserves, which is kind of ironic. Our nose birds are in the reserves. The birds are a little bit over 40 years old. They are going to fluctuate, sir, and it is going to fluctuate between about 50 percent and 70 percent depending on the day you look at them and the OPTEMPO for those birds.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you very much. Gentleman, is there anything additionally that you would like to leave with the subcommittee?

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    General RHODES. I would like to, sir, say one thing about Congressman Skelton's $15 million for a light-weight Precision Guided Munitions (PGM). I strongly support that. We have a PGM right now that has got a five-meter CEP, but if it is 1,000 pounds, it does a hell of a lot more than five meters worth of damage, and in the environment that we see we are going into, and we are concerned about collateral damage, etc., we support his effort to try to work with smaller PGMs, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thanks.

    Gentlemen, anything else? Yes, sir, Admiral Lautenbacher.

    Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes. I would just like to say that we really appreciate the support of this committee and particularly your personal time and attention to our issues. It is greatly appreciated, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, we are not doing enough. I think one thing that has come out of this hearing is we are short money. We are dramatically short money. Your chiefs took a major step forward in laying out the five billion extra for the Army each year, six for the Navy, five for the Air Force, 1.7 for the Marines. The Marines led it off. We appreciated General Krulak. Have you gotten any calls from him later?

    General RHODES. Yes, sir. He is also driving one of those big foreign cars now.

    Mr. HUNTER. You know, that is sad, is it not? We got him to quit driving a foreign LMSR, remember?
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    General RHODES. Yes, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. He is going to have an American-made ship, but he had to go to a foreign car.

    General RHODES. That, he did, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. But he had a lot of courage as did all your chiefs by coming forward last year and laying this out. I think the case is for even with all the efficiencies and lessons learned, in some cases there is no substitute for money. I think the tragedy here is that we have come down to massively reduced force levels, 18 Army divisions to 10, 24 fighter air wings to 13. We have come down from 546 ships to now I think 324 and dropping, and the tragedy is that with the reduced force structure, the reduced force structure is not as ready as the larger force structure is. Intuitively, you would think we would be, we truly would be leaner and meaner, we would have better training, we would have lots of ammo, we would be full up, and we are not, and that I think is a tragedy that could hurt us in the future.

    Thank you for your testimony, and we have laid a lot of requirements on you for additional information, and please get those back to us as soon as you can. We appreciate you being here, and the subcommittee is adjourned.

    [Whereupon, at 1:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X
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October 19, 1999
[This information is pending.]