Stand Up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces
Top left
A masked insurgent carries a police flak jacket and rocket propelled grenade launcher after a police station was attacked in Mosul on November 11, 2004. (Reuters)

Middle

Top right

Bottom left
An Iraqi soldier has his eye biometrically scanned before he is issued a uniform and a weapon. U.S. forces are using a “Biometric Analysis Tracking System” (BATS) to record and identify recruits. (Department of Defense photo)

Bottom right
Dust rising from the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra after the June 13, 2007 attack that brought down the mosque's two minarets. (Fars News Agency)
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“As they stand up, we’ll stand down.”

-- George W. Bush, March 22, 2006

In its reports, the military likes to address the “bottom line up front.” The bottom line is that after three months of studying the U.S. effort to develop the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), we cannot assess the operational capability of these forces. We are actually left with more questions than answers. Still, we learned much. We believe ours has been a valuable endeavor, which will contribute to the oversight efforts of our committee and the Congress. This report will contribute to the public debate on arguably the most important issue of our time. Oversight of the training of the ISF, beyond the larger question of American combat presence in Iraq, will be necessary on an ongoing basis. This report is designed to improve that oversight and the efficiency of congressional-executive information exchanges on this issue.

The above quote came from a March 2006 speech in which the President spoke about the importance of the political, economic, and security situations in Iraq. In explaining the centrality of the Iraqi Security Forces as part of the overall strategy, the President said:

When we got in there, it became apparent we had a lot of training to do. We had to really rebuild an army to make sure that people had the skills necessary to fight off those who want to stop the march of democracy. First we trained the army for threats from outside the country. But we realized the true threats were inside the country .... It's the Iraqis' fight. Ultimately, the Iraqis are going to have to determine their future. They made their decision politically; they voted. And these troops that we're training are going to have to stand up and defend their democracy .... It's their choice. And I like to put it this way: As they stand up, we'll stand down.

Our most significant finding, one that is reflected throughout this report, is that the Department of Defense (DOD, the Department) must do a much better job of reporting meaningful information to Congress on its ISF strategies, plans, and progress.

The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (the subcommittee) started its investigation of the Department’s efforts and progress toward developing an independent Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in late February 2007 with the goal of releasing a report to the full Committee on Armed Services by July 2007.

The subcommittee undertook this project because political and economic progress in Iraq “are unlikely, absent a basic level of security.” While Iraqi political progress is essential to long-term stability and security, the resourcing and overall effectiveness of the plan to organize, train, and equip capable and professional ISF are critical to achieving the Administration’s stated aim of “a unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself.”
To support the committee’s congressional oversight responsibilities, the subcommittee’s goals included the following:

- Understanding the Administration’s Iraq strategy and how the ISF development plan supports this strategy;
- Investigating and assessing the capability and professionalism of the ISF;
- Assessing the return on the U.S. investment in the ISF;
- Assessing the plan to transition sustainment funding for security to the Government of Iraq;
- Contributing to full committee deliberations on the 2007 supplemental budget, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Global War on Terror authorization, the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, and the nation’s Iraq policy; and
- Presenting information for public debate, and attempting to influence or improve DOD’s approach to organizing, training, and equipping the ISF.

This report fulfills the last aim on this list, and we believe it illuminates the first four. The subcommittee’s effort will continue to contribute to the House Committee on Armed Services’ deliberations, and also, therefore, to the nation’s security. We contributed to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, adopted by the House in May. Specifically, the committee included measures that expand the authorities and mandate of the Special Inspector General for Iraq, and that explicitly require the Department of Defense to report on the Joint Campaign Plan (signed by the Ambassador to Iraq and Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander), personnel accountability, and the progress of the ISF in terms of operational capability. The subcommittee also contributed to measures not directly related to the ISF investigation.

In pursuing our project, we traveled to Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan and Brussels, as well as to Virginia, North Carolina, Florida, California, Kansas and Missouri. We held four closed briefings, two classified sessions, and five open hearings. The staff submitted two interim reports to subcommittee members. The subcommittee interviewed senior Iraqi and U.S. officials, civilian and military. We also interviewed a number of officials from other nations, as well as military and DOD personnel of various ranks, civilians, contractors, academics, think tank associates, former Members of Congress, and others. We reviewed thousands of pages of documents, classified and unclassified, government and non-government.

We particularly want to acknowledge the courageous members of our military who took the time to talk to us and write to us. Their stories and the information they provided are the most candid assessments of conditions on the ground that we received. When all is said and done, they have to do the most difficult job of executing this complex mission. We, in Washington, can only do our best to understand it and to provide the resources they need. Their participation is critical at every step of the way.

Most people now accept that the assumptions about how challenging the Iraq war would be were seriously flawed. Many people argue that the sudden, and unanticipated, disbanding of the Iraqi military was a mistake, and that extreme De-Ba’athification was also an error. In addition, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Government as a whole, did not adjust its policies, plans, and practices fast enough, or extensively enough, once these errors became
clear. The Department of Defense bears a lion’s share of the responsibility and accountability for developing the Iraqi Security Forces, but challenges facing the other U.S. Government agencies responsible for the stability and reconstruction of Iraq go hand in hand both with problems encountered to date and implementing solutions to those problems.

This report will lay out the factual and analytical support for the following major findings:

(1) **Strategy and Plans**: The President articulated his strategy for Iraq in the *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* and the “New Way Forward.” Even though development of the ISF is central to achieving the Administration’s strategic objectives in Iraq, the plan for doing so has not been well articulated. We find that the classified 2006 Joint Campaign Plan (JCP), and its 2007 revision (in draft), are essential to Congress’s understanding of this strategy and Congress’s oversight of the war. Although experts and the media report a significant strategic shift, it is unclear at this writing whether the JCP has been similarly revised.

(2) **Cost and Value**: The United States has invested more than $19.0 billion to date in developing the ISF and intends to spend more. Return on that investment has not yet been realized. The security forces are not capable of taking over security responsibility, as timelines for transition are repeatedly extended and violence has not significantly decreased across Iraq. The Government of Iraq is not yet capable of fully funding its security forces. Similarly, the Ministries of Defense and Interior are not fully capable of planning, programming, budgeting, or procuring required equipment and services.

(3) **Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)**: Initial assumptions that the Iraqi military and other security forces could be reformed were seriously flawed. When the security forces were largely disbanded, the Coalition had no plan to rebuild them. The Coalition decision to use a private company to build the New Iraqi Army also proved problematic. While the Coalition has organized, trained, and equipped about 350,000 Iraqis to take on the counterinsurgency mission, their operational capability to perform that mission has not been determined. Formal reporting to Congress focuses on the numbers, rather than the quality, capability, and sustainability of all these forces. We find that the quality and capability of the ISF is very uneven. While some Iraqi military units appear to perform well, Iraqi police organizations are of more concern. The Coalition has placed less emphasis on police development and is not monitoring their performance closely enough. Additionally, a counterinsurgency focus requires an effort with a heavy emphasis on law and order and community security. It is unclear whether U.S. Government agencies are as fully engaged in this mission as they must be for success. It is clear, however, that the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP) is now emphasizing U.S. forces taking the lead in securing Iraqis. This operational shift will likely slow transition of security to the ISF, at least in the short term. We find that a plan to adjust the priority of a post-BSP plan for the ISF development is critical.

(4) **Critical Security Enablers**: Logistics, contracting, intelligence, and ministerial capacity have lagged far behind generation of the security forces. While this may be partly by design, these areas must develop significantly in order for the Iraqi forces to operate truly “independently.” We find that ministerial capacity for logistics and personnel accountability are critically deficient.
Advisory Mission and Transition Teams (TTs): While the United States still must plan for conventional wars, irregular warfare and counterinsurgency operations will not go away. It has been proven many times over that this requires planning from the beginning to the end of our campaigns: from peacetime (Phase 0) through stabilization and “enabling civil authorities” (Phases IV and V). Phase 0 and Phase IV, in particular, require a joint and interagency approach for those situations too large for Special Forces and too complex for the traditional State Department and Department of Justice arrangements. We find that the advisory mission in Iraq developed slowly and in an ad hoc fashion. Despite improvement, significant challenges remain. We find that the advisory mission, and TTs in particular, are critical tools for transitioning security responsibility to the Iraqis. The Department of Defense must decide how it will prioritize this mission and then follow through with implementation.

Besides those articulated above, many challenges remain for the Coalition and its Iraqi counterparts. In our conclusion, we make recommendations as to areas in which we believe the Congress should focus additional and substantial oversight attention.

This is the subcommittee’s first report of the 110th Congress. Our efforts since February have been bipartisan, objective, and as thorough as possible given the constraints of geography, time, personnel, and cooperation. Our goal was not to look backward in order to affix blame for past errors. Instead, we sought to examine the current policy and progress on ISF development, study plans for the next months and years, and review challenges our nation faces in this endeavor. As the 9-11 Commission aptly stated, “we were looking backward to look forward.” In the spirit of the Truman Committee during World War II and the previous Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, we sought to come together to bolster national security, support our men and women in the field and their families at home, save taxpayer resources, and enhance the congressional and public debates on a critical national issue. In this consensus report, 16 members of both parties come together to make recommendations for improvement in Department of Defense policy, plans, and practice. We may not always agree with each other, but we do all agree that it is our constitutional duty and responsibility to practice vigorous oversight within the jurisdiction of the committee, consistent with our government’s system of checks and balances. Because the subcommittee does not have legislative authority, many of our recommendations are meant to advise the House Committee on Armed Services (the committee) on actions that should be taken.

We hope this report provides a foundation for better understanding the issues addressed here. We have not interviewed every knowledgeable individual or read every relevant document. New information will undoubtedly come to light. In fact, if this report spurs the Department of Defense or others to bring additional information forward, we will have advanced our goal of better informing the public debate. We know many experienced people work these issues every day. Still, we believe an outside viewpoint is valuable. We believe that it is our constitutional responsibility to continue to learn all we can about the governmental functions for which we authorize the taxpayers’ money and to which we commit our nation’s greatest treasure – the lives and futures of our military personnel. Learning, however, fulfills only half
of our constitutional duty. The lessons we have learned in the course of our investigation now must be put into action.

Finally, we did encounter challenges in this investigation, and we will do an after-action review to learn from those challenges. Perhaps the most surprising and problematic of these was the Department’s unwillingness or inability to cooperate fully, and in a timely way, in responding to our requests for information and witnesses. The Department’s responsiveness to requests for documents and information has improved over the past month. Obtaining the Joint Campaign Plan and Transition Readiness Assessments allows the Congress to conduct more meaningful and effective oversight. However, the Department did not provide key witnesses or sufficient opportunities to travel to Iraq. Still, we believe this investigation constituted a valuable experience both for our subcommittee and for the Department. We have a shared interest in ensuring that Congress has the right information to make informed judgments about the mission of developing the ISF.

We want to thank our fellow subcommittee members and the subcommittee staff. This investigation has been a team effort. We would also like to thank all the members of the House Committee on Armed Services and the committee staff, particularly: Erin Conaton, Robert Simmons, Paul Oostburg, Michael Casey, Stephanie Sanok, Lara Battles, Loren Dealy, Josh Holly, Christine Lamb, Vickie Plunkett, Rebecca Ross, Nancy Warner, Margee Meckstroth, Christine Roushey, and Alicia Haley. Finally, we want to thank our own military legislative assistants, Jesse Klemmpner and Justin Johnson, as well as the rest of the subcommittee MLAs for all their assistance on this study.

We also thank those outside the committee who assisted in this effort, including: the U.S. Government Accountability Office; the Congressional Research Service; the Departments of State and Justice; Army personnel at Forts Leonard Wood, Leavenworth, and Riley; Marine Corps personnel at Camps Lejeune and Twentynine Palms; headquarters staff at Central Command and Special Operations Command; the Army Human Resources Command and the Office of the Chief of Naval Personnel; experts from the U.S. Institute of Peace, Center for Strategic and International Studies, American Enterprise Institute, RAND Corporation, and Project on Government Oversight; the services’ legislative liaison offices; the oversight staffers for other Congressional committees; and Rudy deLeon, Robert Rangel, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, General Wesley Clark, USA (Retired), and former Representative Timothy Roemer.

Most importantly, we would like to thank all the courageous women and men who have worked, and continue to work, with the Iraqi Security Forces. A number of them contributed directly to this investigation. We appreciate those who spoke to us on and off the record, and we hope that we have earned their confidence in entrusting us with their stories.

Marty Meek
Chairman
Oversight and Investigations

W. Todd Akin
Ranking Member
Oversight and Investigations
NOTES PREFACE


2 House Armed Services Committee O&I staff, “Proposal for Investigation (short version)” (unpublished memo, 6 Mar 2007). Approved by Chairman Meehan, including comments of Ranking Member Akin, and endorsed by Chairman Skelton.


4 HASC O&I staff, “Proposal for Investigation.”

5 The House Armed Services Committee reported The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (H.R. 1585) by a vote of 58-0 on May 11, 2007. On May 17, 2007, the bill passed the full House by a vote of 397 to 27. [NDAA 2008, Title XII, Subtitle B, Sections 1221 (Modification of Authorities Relating to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction), 1224 (Report on the Implementation of Multi-National Force-Iraq/United States Embassy Baghdad Joint Campaign Plan and Efforts to Achieve Political Reform in Iraq), 1225 (Report on Training of the Iraqi Security Forces), and Items of Special Interest (on ISF personnel accountability) (Title XII). In addition, staff members consulted with the full committee staff on Title VIII, Subtitle D, sections 831 (Memorandum of Understanding on Matters Relating to Contracting), 832 (Comptroller General Reviews and Reports on Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan), and 833 (Definitions).

6 The trips were taken under the auspices of Codel Meehan, Codel Skelton, and Codel Spratt. In April Staffdel Fenner visited CENTCOM and SOCOM headquarters in Florida, and Staffdel Kruse visited USMC bases in North Carolina and California. Staffdel Fenner, in May, visited Army posts in Kansas and Missouri.

7 For more information, refer to lists of documents and persons consulted attachments to this report.

8 Joint Occupational Planning (Joint Publication 5-00) (26 Dec 2006), IV-34. Figure IV-8 “Notional Operational Plan Phases”: Phase 0 Shaping (Theater and Global), Phase I Deter, Phase II Seize the Initiative, Phase III Dominate, Phase IV Stabilize, Phase V Enable Civil Authorities.

9 For more information, refer to lists of documents and persons consulted attachments to this report.

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Over the past four years, the United States has invested more than $19.0 billion in the organization, training, and equipping of 346,500 Iraqi military and police personnel. This effort has yielded mixed results. Despite making significant progress in generating a sizeable national force, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have not developed as fast as the Coalition planned and, as a result, are not yet ready to take full responsibility for their nation’s security. ISF units are in various states of readiness. Some units are willing and capable of engaging the enemy, while others, particularly the Iraqi Police Service, are less effective. Improved leadership and an indigenous logistics capability are keys to an independent, self-sustaining ISF. This report analyzes the effort to develop these forces, and discusses the challenges the ISF must overcome before it can operate independently to secure and stabilize their country.

- Throughout the course of this investigation, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been unwilling or unable to provide Congress with meaningful information or the witnesses needed to understand the operational capability of the ISF.

  - **Strategy:** The Department only recently provided Congress with the 2006 Joint Campaign Plan (JCP). The subcommittee is aware that there is a revised JCP, which it believes is currently being implemented. This revised plan, at least in the short term, lowers the priority the Coalition places on developing the ISF.

  - **Operational Effectiveness:** The Department only recently began providing Congress with Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs). The Department relies on TRAs to measure progress in the development of the ISF, but these TRAs focus more on operational readiness than operational effectiveness. DOD reporting continues to concentrate on the number of personnel trained and equipped.

- The Department cannot report in detail how many of the 346,500 Iraqi military and police personnel that the Coalition trained are operational today. Of those forces trained by the Coalition, there is strong evidence that some are independently committing sectarian violence and other illegal activity. In addition, the Department cannot account for whether Coalition-issued weapons have been stolen or turned against U.S. forces. The Department must focus on personnel and equipment accountability systems.

- The Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior are not capable of accounting for, supporting, or fully controlling their forces in the field. In addition, these ministries lack the capacity to execute their budgets. Finally, the ISF does not have critical enablers like intelligence and logistics systems and processes that permit independent planning and operations.
• The Coalition started the U.S. advisory mission in an ad hoc way, but now understands its importance. Improvements have been made recently, but much more remains to be done. The Department must now improve selection, training, and utilization of Transition Teams. The Department must also create appropriate incentives to attract the best personnel to Transition Teams and ensure that advisors remain competitive for promotion. While Police Transition Teams are critical to counterinsurgency, their employment has been the lowest priority.

• Areas identified for further research include: Iraqi Police Service, Auxiliary Security Forces, Intelligence, Command and Control, Language and Culture Education, TRA Reports, Logistics, and Provincial Iraqi Control.
1: INTRODUCTION

“The CPA plans to create in the near future a New Iraqi Corps, as the first step in forming a national self-defense capability for a free Iraq. Under civilian control, that Corps will be professional, non-political, militarily effective, and representative of all Iraqis.”

-- L. Paul Bremer, Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator, May 23, 2003

Glad as he was to have a short respite in the US to attend his daughter’s college graduation, Colonel Paul Hughes was a man on a mission. Back in Baghdad, he had already had several productive sessions with senior Iraqi military professionals, and he was eager to return to his important work of planning to rebuild the Iraqi military. He just had time to check the news before he headed to the airport for return to Iraq. "They were saying on Channel Four that the Iraqi army was being abolished." He was shocked he would find out about this earth shattering decision on the news in the United States. As the strategic advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority, Colonel Hughes was charged to plan for the future of the Iraqi military and had been working with a group of Iraqi generals every day about former soldiers they would keep to form an army for the new Iraq’s security and stability. In the stroke of a pen, his fledgling army disappeared. He had to start over-from scratch, with more than 300,000 abruptly unemployed former soldiers to worry about. He had no idea how he would build an army from the ground up, but he had the long flight to ponder his options.

The May 23, 2003 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 2 disbanded the Iraqi military and dissolved the Ministry of Defense (MOD). CPA Order 1 promulgated rules for De-Ba‘athification, which included who could be rehired. The CPA did not disband the police or Ministry of Interior (MOI), but fired significant numbers of members from these organizations. Surprised by CPA Order 2, the U.S. military did not have a plan for rebuilding the Iraqi military, MOD, police forces, or MOI.

On June 25, 2003, the U.S. Army, acting on behalf of the CPA, awarded the Vinnell Corporation a $48.0 million “cost plus fixed fee” contract to train the first nine battalions, or 9,000 recruits, of a 44,000 person-strong “New Iraqi Army” (NIA). Separately, a $30.0 million task order was issued under the existing Logistics Civil Augmentation Program for logistical support to the NIA training program. As early as 2003, the media was reporting problems with the capabilities of those being trained by Vinnell and its subcontractors, including Military Professional Resources, Incorporated (MPRI). As a result, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF-7) contracted the Jordanian military to supplement the training effort. Major General Paul Eaton, overseeing the Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team (CMATT), questioned using contract trainers, saying: “soldiers need to train soldiers. You can’t ask a civilian to do a soldier’s job.” In April 2004, an NIA battalion refused to fight insurgents in Fallujah, and soon thereafter Major General David Petraeus took over the training mission as he became the commander of the new Multi-National Security Transition
Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) (see figure 1). The Vinnell contract was not renewed, and Coalition forces began their efforts to train the Iraqi Army. MG Petraeus tasked his Chief of Staff, Colonel James Greer, to create a plan. The number of military members needed for this mission has continually increased, and the Iraqi security organizations the Coalition is training have continually changed.

**Figure 1: Organizational Chart.**

**COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN FORMING, TRAINING, AND EQUIPPING IRAQI SECURITY FORCES**

Once MNSTC-I trained and equipped Iraqi forces, operational control was transferred to the Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I). MNC-I would conduct unit-level training through an advisory mission and partner Coalition units. The Corps originally drew advisors from units already in Iraq. Later, MNC-I started to levy requirements through Central Command (CENTCOM) for advisors. These advisors, whether “out of hide” from partner units or specifically deployed for the mission, formed Transition Teams, to be embedded with Iraqi military forces and some units of the Ministry of Interior. This mission would traditionally have been classified as Security Assistance managed by the Department of State and conducted with Special Operations Forces (SOF). While SOF have trained the Iraqi Special Forces units and several others, advising the rest of the Iraqi military and police was too large and complex for the small Special Operations Command organization, which was also heavily tasked with other missions. Because SOF could not take on the entire advisory mission, MNC-I Requests for Forces were originally focused on reserve component personnel who
had not recently deployed. Subsequently, the teams have been largely sourced by the active duty Army and Marine Corps, with some individual augmentees and “in lieu of” units from the National Guard, Reserves, and other services.

Administration officials usually speak about the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) as if it comprises only the Army or other armed forces. They overlook the fact that the security forces also include a number of other civil security organizations under the MOI. These civil forces outnumber the Iraqi military. Although some have had other names and have been reorganized, currently these include the National Police (NP, formerly the Special Police), the Border Police, the Facilities Protection Service (FPS, formerly assigned separately to each Ministry), and the Iraqi Police Service (IPS, local police). Although the Department of Defense (DOD) does not traditionally conduct police or border patrol training, it assumed responsibility for some of these forces from the beginning. However, other agencies, which traditionally direct “rule of law” programs, were also involved. The Department of State’s (DOS) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) customarily coordinates U.S. Government contributions to international civilian policing operations. INL was actively engaged in the early effort to restore law and order in Iraq, providing logistics and support to a Department of Justice (DOJ)-led “rule of law” team that traveled to the country in May 2003 to advise DOD’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. To carry out its mission, INL awarded DynCorp International a contract to provide various logistical and advisory services to restore Iraqi civilian police authority. In early 2004, INL utilized its DynCorp contract to establish a police training facility near Amman, the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC). INL would spend approximately $450 million training more than 50,000 IPs and border police there until the facility changed missions in April 2007.

DynCorp remains the primary INL contractor. After the initial contract reached its ceiling of $145.0 million, INL re-competed it. DynCorp was one of three recipients of a new INL contract, awarded in February 2004, which required the company to provide housing, training support systems, and personnel for the civilian police training program. This contract has a potential value of about $1.8 billion.

In a recent review, the Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR) reported a variety of problems with the 2004 contract, noting that “[poor] contract administration by INL and the DOS Office of Acquisition Management resulted in millions of dollars put at unnecessary risk, and property that cannot be accounted for…. Both prior to and in response to the SIGIR review, the Department of State asserted that it had undertaken a number of reforms to strengthen its contract and asset management. In addition, the Department of State is in the process of recompeting its task order with DynCorp.

Another critical aspect of the INL contract with DynCorp is the requirement to provide International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs). IPLOs are police advisors who typically work as part of Police Transition Teams (PTTs) to train local police forces throughout Iraq, with two to four IPLOs generally on each PTT. Although the original recommendation from the DOJ/DOS assessment team was for 6,600 IPLOs, only about 690 contracted IPLOs are currently operating in Iraq. While PTTs are under the authority of a Brigade Combat Team
(BCT) subordinate to MNC-I, the IPLOs fulfill a training mission that belongs to the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT), part of MNSTC-I, and have a contractor chain of command (see figure 1). IPLOs are U.S. civilians with police experience, and are required because the federal government does not have a national police force from which to draw volunteers. DynCorp provides all logistical support for its deployed contractor personnel.

The Department of Justice was the other half of the interagency “rule of law” survey team. Under the umbrella of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), the Department of Justice provides contractor personnel for the organizational development of functional police and corrections personnel, and also conducts public integrity investigations. ICITAP’s team remained on the ground after the initial assessment and, over the past four years, has helped to stand up key components of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice: the IPS, the Department of Border and Port Enforcement, and the Iraq Correctional Service. Currently, the Department of Justice has authorized ICITAP two civilian managers in Iraq to work with CPATT supporting the police training mission, along with approximately 190 contracted senior police trainers and advisors, known as International Police Trainers (IPTs). IPTs have been primarily engaged in training IPS personnel and IPS trainers at police academies, including the JIPTC, rather than in the field. The JIPTC mission, since April 2007, has been focused on training Iraqi corrections personnel.

The Department of Justice contracts MPRI to provide ICITAP personnel. The current contract has a ceiling of $400.0 million. MPRI is to provide advisors, logistics, and administrative support for ICITAP law enforcement programs. Most MPRI advisors conduct training in Iraq and at the JIPTC. Under the contract, MPRI is also responsible for identifying and screening potential advisors. Generally speaking, MPRI recruits from local, state, and federal law enforcement personnel across the United States to find trainers and advisors. Funding for ICITAP’s activities in Iraq originates in MNSTC-I, which provides funds to INL. INL then funds ICITAP through an interagency agreement with DOJ. Lines of authority and responsibility, as with the IPLOs, can be very confusing.

Although the Departments of State and Justice remained heavily involved in the IPS effort through managing major contracts, the Department of Defense assumed the lead role in training the IPS as a result of National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD-36) issued in May 2004. This directive resulted from a confluence of events, including a recognition that the training of Iraqi police forces to that point had been ineffective and insufficient, and that the non-permissive environment and scale of the program was beyond DOS and DOJ resources, experience, and capability. NSPD-36 states that the “Commander, USCENTCOM … shall direct all United States Government efforts and coordinate international efforts in support of organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi security forces,” with policy guidance from the Chief of Mission (the Ambassador).

Pursuant to NSPD-36, CENTCOM established MNSTC-I to undertake the mission to train and equip all of the security forces. MNSTC-I took over authority for CPATT, which was established to oversee IPS training, and CMATT, which had been directing the Iraqi military
training. MNSTC-I recently turned over training of the IPS to the MOI, but continues to advise the MOI, police organizations, and forces in the field.

In addition to U.S. efforts, NATO has established the NATO Training Mission (NTM) under MNSTC-I. NTM provides “training and advisory support to middle- and senior level leaders at locations such as the National Joint Operations Center, Ministry of Defense Headquarters Joint Operations Center, and the Iraqi Staff College.” The Staff College started operating in September 2005.31

The above discussion provides the context for the current state of the ISF – the focus of our investigation. The January 2007 National Security Council’s “Iraq Strategy Review” states that the strategic goal in Iraq is still, “a unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror.” One of the objectives of the strategy over the next 6-12 months is to “continue to strengthen the Iraqi Security Forces and accelerate the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi Government.”32

To meet this objective, the United States continues to support training and equipping the ISF beyond the current force of about 350,000 to attain a new goal of 390,000 MOD and MOI forces by the end of 2007. That goal may increase again. The ultimate goal of the Multi-National Force-Iraq security transition plan is for “Iraqi security self-reliance” in which the government of Iraq is capable of “planning, conducting, and sustaining security operations and forces through its security ministries.”33

Latest DOD reports are that 346,500 have been trained and equipped. The military consists of approximately 154,500 personnel organized as a 10-division army, small special forces, air force, and navy organizations. The MOI forces now number approximately 194,000, with approximately 135,000 Iraqi Police Service, and 59,324 members of the National Police and border patrol, emergency response, forensics, and diplomatic protection units.34 As will be discussed in more detail below, the plan is to develop the ISF so that they can take the “lead” to support transition to “Provincial Iraqi Control,” and eventually to become self-reliant and operate “independently.”

However, as the number of Iraqi forces trained and equipped has increased, the overall violence has not diminished, nor have U.S. personnel been redeployed. Despite the relatively large number of ISF considered trained and equipped, the President decided in January that it was necessary to send additional U.S. forces to stem the rising violence in Baghdad. As the Department of State has noted, a baseline of security is a prerequisite for moving forward on the political and economic tasks essential to achieving conditions for withdrawing U.S. forces.35

The Department of Defense uses three key factors to measure progress in developing capable ISF and transferring security responsibilities to them:36

(1) The number of trained and equipped forces;
(2) The number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed responsibility for security of specific geographic areas; and
The assessed capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and aggregate Transition Readiness Assessment reports.

Before transfer of security responsibilities can occur, ISF units must meet certain standards for operational effectiveness, reliability, leadership, equipment, and sustainment/logistics.

In support of this strategic end, Congress has provided a considerable sum for training, equipping and providing logistics support to the ISF. Between the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and the Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF), Congress has appropriated over $19.0 billion. The Government of Iraq had budgeted $5.4 billion in calendar year (CY) 2006 and has designated $7.3 billion in the CY07 budget for security. Congress is now considering the President’s request for $2.0 billion in ISFF for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Global War on Terror.

Four years after U.S. forces invaded Iraq, significant challenges remain in the U.S. effort to develop the ISF. Iraq’s security forces are not yet ready to assume responsibility for the nation’s security. Nevertheless, many have joined the fight as evidenced by the increasing number of ISF casualties (see figure 2). U.S. military leaders propose that while they may still reach initial operating capability between January and March of 2008, full operational capability will take at least 12 more months. Beyond that time period, the Iraqis will still require trainers and advisers, as well as critical combat enablers including logistics and intelligence support.

Figure 2: Average Daily Casualties.

* Casualty data reflect updated data for each period and are derived from unverified initial reports submitted by Coalition elements responding to an incident; the inaccuracy of these numbers constrains them to be used only for comparative purposes.

Source: MNO-I
The rest of this report is divided into chapters, beginning with a review of “Strategy, Plans, and Reporting.” The subcommittee felt it important to understand both the overall Iraq strategy, and the more specific strategy and plans for developing the security forces. In addition, since understanding these strategy and plans is essential, the Department’s reporting on them and progress against them is an integral part of this discussion. The third chapter reports what we know about the costs and financing of the effort to develop the ISF. We recount here the difficulty in understanding the value gained for the U.S. investment. The next three chapters detail what we learned about both development efforts and progress in U.S. efforts, within the context of sometimes confusing security forces’ organizations and their respective parent ministries. We begin with a chapter on the IPS and MOI, because it is the organization most commonly overlooked. We continue with a discussion of the NP and other MOI organizations, and conclude with a chapter on the armed forces and MOD. These chapters also tell the story of the challenges we continue to face with logistical support for each of these forces. In Chapter 7 we discuss the ad hoc development of the U.S. advisory mission, identifying some successes and highlighting remaining challenges. Finally, our last chapter concludes that this report should not be the final word on the ISF, and identifies “Areas for Further Research or Investigation.”
NOTES CHAPTER 1


3 CPA, Order Number 2.


6 COL James Greer (CENTCOM planner and former MNSTC-I Chief of Staff) (staff briefing, 15 May 2007). LTG (Ret) Jay Garner, “Frontline Interview.”


8 GAO has questioned whether this $30.0m task order was within the scope of the LOGCAP contract. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management Challenges (GAO-04-065) (Jun 2004), p. 17.

9 COL Greer (staff briefing, 15 May 2007).


11 This total does not include building costs of about $150 million. U.S. State Department, JIPTC Slides for Codel Meehan (briefing slides, Feb 2007).


14 SIGIR, Review of DynCorp, p. 2.

15 SIGIR, Review of DynCorp, p. 21.

16 SIGIR, Review of DynCorp, p. 22.

17 M. Brooke Darby (Division Chief, Office of Civilian Police and Rule of Law, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State) (HASC staff briefing, 22 Mar 2007).

18 PTTs are composed of 14-15 persons, including IPLOs, Military Police (or non-MPs assigned to MP slots), translators, and logisticians, and are assigned to train, mentor, and evaluate local IPS personnel at a varying number of police stations. There are approximately 210 PTTs in Iraq, focused in Baghdad and major cities, which leaves some stations in less populated or more stable parts of Iraq unvisited. There are over 1100 police stations in Iraq. M. Brooke Darby (staff briefing), U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007 (Sec 9010, PL 109-289) (Jun 2007).


20 SIGIR, Review of DynCorp, p. 2.


22 M. Brooke Darby (staff briefing, 22 Mar 2007).

23 MPRI is a subsidiary of L-3 Communications (available at: http://www.mpri.com/index.html).

24 O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces, Bruce Swartz testimony.

25 M. Brooke Darby (staff briefing).
The continuing challenge of building the Iraqi security forces.

O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces, Bruce Swartz testimony.

O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces. Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007).


The senior course lasts nine months and the junior course for captains and majors lasts seven months. DOD, 9010 Report (Oct 2005), p. 36.


"Officials now dismiss the 2004-2005 years … as a fruitless ‘rush to transition,’ as one senior defense official here put it, … ‘as they stand up, we’ll stand down,’” … has been all but banished from the Green Zone, as has the notion of measuring U.S. progress in Iraq by the number of Iraqi troops trained or by changes in U.S. casualty counts.”

--Senior DOD Official

INTRODUCTION

An examination of the U.S. strategy for Iraq is important to this study because the plans for the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) must support the overall strategy. This strategic framework is akin to a jigsaw puzzle box lid. It is only by looking at the lid that one figure out how all the “puzzle pieces,” in this case political, economic, and security plans, can fit together to form a coherent picture. Regardless of how the original U.S. strategy for Iraq and its supporting plans may have changed over time, the “desired end state for U.S. operations in Iraq,” first established by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003, essentially remains the same: “a peaceful, united, stable, secure Iraq, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.” Similarly, while the end strength, force structure, and roles and missions of the Iraqi security forces have evolved and the timing for transfer has repeatedly changed, transitioning security responsibility to capable and professional Iraqi Security Forces has always been a central part of the strategy. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the objectives and assumptions of U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

In November 2005, the National Security Council issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) “articulat[ing] the broad strategy the President set forth in 2003 and provid[ing] an update on our progress as well as the challenges remaining.” Prior to the release of the NSVI, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), there was no “clear, comprehensive, and integrated U.S. strategy” for stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq.

The NSVI sets out “three integrated tracks – political, security, and economic – each with separate objectives, but together helping Iraqis to defeat the terrorists, Saddamists, and rejectionists, and secure a new democratic state in Iraq.” The security track calls for clearing “areas of enemy control,” holding “areas freed from enemy influence,” and building “Iraqi Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver services, advance the rule of
The more detailed description of the security track includes several “core assumptions” regarding the Iraqi Security Forces:

[1] … the training, equipping, and mentoring of Iraqi Security Forces will produce an army and police force capable of independently providing security and maintaining public order in Iraq [2] … regional meddling and infiltrations can be contained and/or neutralized [3] … while we can help, assist, and train, Iraqis will ultimately be the ones to eliminate security threats over the long term.8

The NSVI is “conditions-based” and states that “ultimate victory will be achieved in stages.”9 One of the specified conditions for success is the “consolidation of gains in the training of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).”10 The short-term stage calls for “standing up robust security forces to gather intelligence, destroy terrorist networks, and maintain security.”11 The medium-term stage, in security terms, is “an Iraq that is in the lead defeating terrorists and insurgents and providing its own security.”12 In the longer term there is “[a]n Iraq that has defeated the terrorists and neutralized the insurgency” and that is “peaceful, united, stable, democratic, and secure, where Iraqis have the institutions and resources they need to govern themselves justly and provide security for their country.”13

The “New Way Forward” and the Baghdad Security Plan

Continued violence through the fall of 2006 led the President and his senior military and civilian leaders to re-examine the Iraq strategy.14 On January 10, 2007, the President addressed the nation and outlined the “New Way Forward” for Iraq. In his address articulating a new strategy and announcing his commitment of 20,000 additional U.S. combat personnel to Iraq, the President stated that “[o]nly the Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure their people. And their government has put forward an aggressive plan to do it.”15 President Bush also stated that, in increasing U.S. force levels to deploy to Baghdad and embed with Iraqi formations, “[o]ur troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs.”16 President Bush further cited “the Iraqi government plan to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq’s provinces by November [2007].”17

The week before the President’s address, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki announced his new initiative for securing Baghdad, commonly referred to as the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP), under which he reportedly “committed 20,000 [Iraqi] soldiers to the operation [and] would call upon American troops and airpower only when needed.”18 At about the same time as the President’s speech, the National Security Council (NSC) published “Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review” in briefing slide format. The NSC’s summary slides are consistent with the Prime Minister’s announcement and refer to the BSP as “Iraqi-conceived” and “Iraqi-led.”19 The slides identify among the review’s “major strategic shifts” that (1) “Iraqis Are in the Lead in Ensuring Success – U.S. in Support Role;” and (2) “The Primary Mission is Helping Provide Security to the Population.”20 At the operational level, the slides describe a key shift from the “[p]rimary security focus . . . on transferring responsibility to Iraqis; with less focus on population security” to the primary security focus being on Iraqis providing population
security, which is intended to facilitate the transfer of responsibility to the Government of Iraq (GOI).21 Another “key operational shift” is movement away from “gradual transfer of security responsibility to ISF” toward “accelerated transfer of battlespace and Provincial Iraqi Control to Iraqis.”22 At the tactical level, the NSC slides also reflect the Prime Minister’s Initiative (PMI) to expand the Iraqi Army and replenish the Iraqi Security Forces.23 These initiatives will be addressed in greater detail below.

Figure 3: Evolution of the Objectives and Assumptions of U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction Efforts.
The NSC slides also provide further detail on the progress of the ISF and associated challenges. The slides note that “Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have grown in effectiveness, but the levels of violence with which they must cope continue to increase.”

They identify several challenges: (1) “Professionalism and effectiveness are improving but are not yet consistent across the force;” (2) “Some members of the ISF, notably the police, are contributing to sectarian violence;” (3) “Despite more than 300,000 trained and equipped members of the ISF, substantially fewer numbers are present for duty on a given day;” and (4) “Combat losses, desertion, attrition, and leave account for the majority of those absent.”

The summary slides also identify eight strategic objectives that are “achievable in the next 12-18 months,” including “[c]ontinuing to strengthen Iraqi Security Forces and accelerating the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi Government.”

**PLANNING GUIDANCE TO DEVELOP THE ISF**

Several additional documents plan, detail, and guide the development, sustainment, and measurement of the progress of the ISF. In July 2006, GAO reported that “officials in DOD [the Department of Defense] and [the Department of State (DOS)] identified seven classified and unclassified documents that describe the U.S. Government strategy for Iraq in addition to the NSVI.” Those documents include: (1) the May 2004 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36; (2) the August 2004 Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Campaign Plan; (3) the December 2005 MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Baghdad Joint Mission Statement on Iraq; (4) the December 2005 Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Operations Order 05-03; (5) the National Strategy for Supporting Iraq (updated January 2006); (6) the quarterly Department of State Section 2207 reports to Congress; and the (7) the April 2006 Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) issued by the U.S. Ambassador and the Commander of MNF-I.

GAO grouped the documents at the national/strategic level, the operational level, and the tactical level:

- **National/strategic level:** The President and the NSC established the desired end-state, goals and objectives, and the integrated approach incorporated in the NSVI. The May 2004 NSPD 36 made [DOS] responsible for all U.S. activities in Iraq through its Chief of Mission in Baghdad (Ambassador), with the exception of U.S. efforts relating to security and military operations, which would be the responsibility of DOD. The directive also continued the CENTCOM responsibility for all U.S. [G]overnment efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi security forces. MNF-I oversees the effort to rebuild the Iraqi security forces through a subordinate command [Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq] (MNSTC-I). The National Strategy for Supporting Iraq (NSSI) serves as a management tool to match and coordinate U.S. stabilization and reconstruction needs and priorities and provides updates on activities associated with each strategic objective.
• Operational level: The Joint Mission Statement clarified the roles and responsibilities between the Chief of Mission in Baghdad and the Commander of MNF-I and established mission milestones and target dates for their achievement. The August 2004 campaign plan elaborated and refined the original plan for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. In April 2006, Commander of the MNF-I and the Chief of Mission in Baghdad issued a new classified Joint Campaign Plan incorporating the changes in organization laid out in the NSVI.29

• Implementation and reporting level: Operations Order 05-03 incorporates revised missions and objectives for the MultiNational Corps-Iraq, the MNF-I unit responsible for command and control of operations throughout Iraq. This November 2005 order was issued in anticipation of the New Joint Campaign Plan incorporating the NSVI’s new objectives and organizational arrangements, according to DOD officials. The campaign plans and the operations order also established metrics for assessing their progress in achieving MNF-I’s objectives. [DOS’s] 2207 reports track mission activity and funding status by mission objective and funding sector.30

In addition to the documents identified by GAO in July 2006, the subcommittee has identified at least three additional campaign plans related to the development of the ISF. Two are classified: the 2006 Joint MNF-I and U.S. Embassy Campaign Action Plan “Unity, Security, & Prosperity” and the MNSTC-I Campaign Action Plan 2006-2015, dated January 10, 2006. The third document is the unclassified MNSTC-I 2007 Campaign Action Plan.31 Aside from the reported April 2007 revision of the MNF-I/U.S. Embassy JCP,32 it is unclear whether these other documents have been revised or updated.

A Policy Shift?

Understanding the content of these underlying supporting plans is essential to assessing the progress that is being made in developing and sustaining the ISF. For example, one key document, the classified April 2006 JCP, sets the conditions under which the transition of security responsibility to the ISF can be made.33 That document is currently under revision.34 Comparing the new document to the current will allow a better understanding of how the plan has been revised, as well as the factors driving the revisions.

For example, recent news accounts suggest that the critical need for Coalition forces to focus on securing the Iraqi populace in key areas of the country, particularly Baghdad, may have a significant impact on the priority placed on transitioning security to the ISF.35 Reducing the priority of transitioning security to the ISF in order to free Coalition forces to take the lead in establishing security for the Iraqi population represents a shift in policy, if not strategy, from the NSVI, the “New Way Forward,” and the BSP. Significantly, this could also impact when the transition of security responsibility to the GOI will occur.

An April 2007 McClatchy Newspapers article reported: “Military planners have abandoned the idea that standing up Iraqi personnel will enable American personnel to start coming home
soon and now believe that U.S. personnel will have to defeat the insurgents and secure control of troubled provinces.” The article further reports that “evidence has been building for months that training Iraqi troops is no longer the focus of U.S. policy.” The article attributes the shift to the change in command at MNF-I to General David Petraeus. A May 2007 *Washington Post* article describes the yet-to-be released revision to the JCP:

The plan has three pillars to be carried out simultaneously – in contrast to the prior sequential strategy of "clear, hold and build." One [pillar] shifts the immediate emphasis of military operations away from transitioning to Iraqi security forces – the primary focus under the former top U.S. commander, Gen. George W. Casey Jr. – toward protecting Iraq's population in trouble areas, a central objective of the troop increase that President Bush announced in January.

A recent article by Dr. Frederick Kagan in *The Weekly Standard* notes that a new campaign plan has been developed that represents a “departure from – and not a continuation” of the announced strategy:

The Bush Administration made a mistake by attempting to cast the new strategy that General Petraeus would ultimately design and execute as a minor modification of [General] Casey’s strategy, and by insisting that U.S. units would be partnered with Iraqi Army, National Police, and Iraqi Police units throughout Baghdad. But Generals Petraeus and Odierno learned the lessons of 2006 better than that. American forces are partnered with Iraqi units where possible, but are focused primarily on securing the Iraqi population rather than on pushing the Iraqi Security Forces in the lead, which was Casey’s primary focus. Petraeus and Odierno also knew that securing the population would take most of 2007, which is why they never predicted success by July, as Casey had done.

While the subcommittee has a pending request for the revised campaign plan, and the House Committee on Armed Services has been assured by the Department that it will receive the plan as soon as it is signed by the principals, it appears by these accounts that a revised approach has already been implemented as part of the BSP in February. Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey confirmed that the Coalition is operating under what he described as an interim campaign plan signed by Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus. General Dempsey said that the interim plan did not reflect a “sea change or a significant change in strategy.” He did indicate that, in the balance between protecting the population and transitioning security responsibility to the Iraqis, “the balance had tipped a bit too precipitously to transition and that it didn’t have to be either/or, but certainly, that in the near term, [during the surge], we had to ensure the population was secured.” Given the U.S. investment in the ISF, whether or not transitioning Iraqi forces remains the focus of U.S. policy is a critical question that requires an immediate answer.
EXECUTING THE ISF DEVELOPMENT MISSION

The unclassified MNSTC-I 2007 Campaign Action Plan “provides strategic and operational direction to MNSTC-I for 2007 and early 2008” and provides detail on the planning for the development of the ISF. The Campaign Action Plan identifies four Lines of Operation (LOOs): (1) building and sustaining the institutional capacity of the Ministries of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI); (2) generating capable ISF, which during 2007 will transition to assisting the Iraqi Security Forces with force development; (3) developing professional ISF; and (4) transitioning and transforming MNSTC-I into the Office of Security Cooperation. While “building and sustaining” MOD and MOI capability is MNSTC-I’s “main effort” in 2007, the development of a professional ISF is considered the “Golden Thread” that binds the other three LOOs; developing a professional ISF will ensure [the Coalition’s] efforts endure [emphasis in original].

The 2007 MNSTC-I Campaign Action Plan reports:

During 2006, MNSTC-I completed the force generation of the 325,000-man Iraqi Security Force’s “Objective Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Force” ahead of the original schedule. The “Year of the Police” program successfully accelerated the training and equipping of the Ministry of Interior’s (MOI) Objective Civil Security Force. The generation of effective Iraqi military forces has allowed the Iraqi Army to take the lead in most of Iraq. Improved ministerial capabilities in the MOI and Ministry of Defense (MOD) now allow Iraq to fully control its security forces. In 2007, the transfer of units from Coalition to Iraqi control will be complete. The MOI and MOD are also making substantial progress on the professionalization of the ISF by expanding training, education, and assessment. While the MNSTC-I Campaign Action Plan purports to report progress in the areas identified above, it raises more questions than it answers. For example, the Campaign Action Plan states that MNF-I has generated the objective COIN force of 325,000 personnel. Yet, it makes no mention of the PMI to increase the ISF by 60,000, for which MNSTC-I will fund the training and equipping of 30,000 personnel. Nor does the Campaign Action Plan indicate whether the Iraqi government’s reported force structure review may involve increasing the size of the force beyond the PMI and other reported manning initiatives. Similarly, the Plan reports that the “Year of the Police” program successfully accelerated the training and equipping of the Objective Civil Security Force, but makes no mention of the Department’s own repeated reporting that it has no way of knowing how many of the Coalition-trained police officers continue to serve in the Iraqi Police Service (IPS). Nor does it address the fact that the IPS is over its authorized strength by 60,000 personnel. Moreover, two of the sentences above appear to be at odds with one another. One states that the ministries fully control their forces. The next, however, states that there are forces that have not yet been turned over to the ministries, calling into question the assertion that the ministries are in full control of their forces. A more fundamental problem with the Campaign Action Plan is that it does not adequately characterize how the Coalition would know if it is indeed achieving the strategic
effects planned. While MNF-I put Iraqi forces “in the lead,” it does not know whether this has resulted in a positive effect on Iraqi security. Similarly, MNF-I cannot measure whether or not merely transferring control of security forces to MOD and MOI has improved or diminished Iraqi stability.

The Campaign Action Plan describes MNSTC-I’s “key transition concepts” for 2007:

1. expansion of the Army,
2. logistics self-reliance,
3. deployability as a core competency,
4. management of the institutional training base,
5. infrastructure management,
6. responsible financial management including budget execution.

MNSTC-I will focus its efforts on enhancing ISF logistics and developing ISF leaders to allow the Iraqi government “to put in place the capability to sustain nationwide security operations.” This will involve the development of full operational capability, including “full spectrum air operations to support the COIN fight and establish conditions for the transfer of air sovereignty to the GOI.”

The annexes to the Campaign Action Plan set “key tasks” to achieve “key objectives” for MNSTC-I’s subordinate elements to accomplish in 2007, but provide little detail regarding how those tasks will be accomplished. For example, the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team is tasked with the following objectives for 2007:

1. Improve Ministerial Capability;
2. Assess and Improve Civil Security Force (CSF) Professional Development;
3. Enable Provincial Capability;
4. Complete Generation of Capable CSF;
5. Improve National Police (NP) Capability; and
6. Improve Border and Ports of Entry Capability. These are all critically important tasks and complex goals. Similarly, key objectives and tasks are outlined for the development and sustainment of the MOD forces. In order to understand whether real progress is being made, reporting on details in each of these areas would provide a clearer and more complete picture. Again, it is unclear under the circumstances whether mere transfer of responsibility constitutes a positive or negative development in terms of improving overall security and stability.

AN EVOLVING ISF: END STRENGTH, FORCE STRUCTURE, AND ROLES AND MISSIONS

End Strength and Force Structure

The end strength goal for the ISF has changed dramatically since 2003. In a July 2006 report to congressional committees, GAO outlined the factors that contributed to the evolving requirements for the ISF:

According to senior CPA and [DOS] officials, in 2003 the CPA assumed that Iraq would have a permissive security environment. CPA expected that a relatively small internal security force would replace the disbanded Iraqi Army and would quickly assume responsibility for providing security from
the Coalition forces. However, growing insurgent attacks led to (1) the collapse of Iraqi forces in April 2004; (2) the delay of Coalition plans to turn responsibility for security over to the new Iraqi security forces beginning in early 2004; and (3) the postponement of plans to draw down U.S. troop levels below 138,000 until the end of 2005. In October 2004, [DOS] reported to Congress that the uncertain security situation affected all potential economic and political developments in Iraq and that enhanced Iraqi security forces were critically needed to meet the new threat environment. The Coalition’s military commander and the U.S. Chief of Mission conducted strategic and programmatic reviews in mid-2004 and reached similar conclusions, noting that the hostile security situation required the creation of substantially larger Iraqi security forces with Coalition assistance.53

In addition to changes in end strength, GAO reported that the level of U.S. assistance for the ISF also changed dramatically:

As a result, between 2003 and 2006, the projected Iraq security force structure doubled in size, while U.S. appropriations for support of the Iraqi security forces more than quadrupled. CPA projected the need for a security force of about 162,000 personnel (including 77,000 armed forces and National Guard troops and 85,000 police) in 2003. [At the time of GAO's report, Coalition plans called]54 for 325,000 security personnel to be organized under Coalition direction; including completing the initial training and equipping of the 137,500 in the Iraqi Armed Forces and 188,000 police and other interior ministry forces by the end of December 2006. U.S. assistance appropriated for Iraqi security forces and law enforcement has grown from $3.24 billion in January 2004 to approximately $13.7 billion in June 2006. As GAO recently reported, the insurgency remains strong and resilient in 2005 and early 2006, the intensity and lethality of attacks have been growing, and the insurgency threatens to undermine the development of effective Iraqi governmental institutions.55

Subsequent to the July 2006 GAO analysis cited above, the White House announced in January 2007 that the ISF would again grow.56 Later chapters on finance, the IPS, and the Iraqi Armed Forces offer a more detailed discussion of ISF end strength and levels of U.S. assistance.

In addition to the evolving end strength of the ISF, the force structure has changed. In March 2005, GAO testified before Congress:

The Iraqi security force structure has constantly changed in response to the growing insurgency . . . . Some changes to the Iraqi force structure have resulted from Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq analysis of needed Iraqi security capabilities during summer 2004 and reported in October 2004. The Iraqi government has made other changes to forces under the
Ministries of Defense and Interior to allow them to better respond to the increased threat.57

**Roles and Missions**

Realities on the ground not only caused changes in force structure and end strength, but affected how roles and missions were defined for most ISF components. The Iraqi Army (IA), for instance, which was originally intended to provide security for external defense, is now responsible for conducting Iraq-wide counterinsurgency operations.58 In March 2007 testimony before the subcommittee, GAO described the evolution of the IA’s mission in this way:

The Iraqi army has evolved over the past [three] years from two distinct forces: (1) army units that had the mission of defending Iraq against external threats, and (2) former national guard battalions [first known as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps] that were established to perform constabulary duties such as setting up traffic control points and cordoning off streets in their home areas. In early 2005, the Iraqi government decided to move Iraqi national guard battalions into the Iraqi army and give the army the mission of conducting counterinsurgency operations countrywide.59

Similarly, the IPS, while intended to serve a community policing function, is “often forced to engage insurgents and other anti-Iraqi forces,” even though “their primary mission and training has focused on civilian law enforcement.”60 For example, Iraqi Police are operating with Coalition forces and IA and NP forces at Joint Security Stations and on combat patrols as part of the BSP.61

GAO also reports that the mission of another significant component of the ISF, the NP, is changing. The MOI’s NP force, which has been used as a counterinsurgency force, is transforming into a civil security force.62 The Department reports the NP mission as follows:

The National Police is a bridging force between local police and the Iraqi Army, allowing the Minister of Interior to project police capabilities across provinces. The National Police is also charged with maintaining law and order while an effective community police force is developed. Until October 2006, the National Police was trained and served primarily in a paramilitary role and received little traditional police training. MNSTC-I is implementing a National Police Transformation and Retraining Program to reorient it toward police functions.63

However, even as the NP are reoriented and transformed, eight of nine NP brigades are continuing to conduct COIN operations to support the BSP.64
THE PLAN TO TRANSFER SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY TO THE ISF

Transfer of security responsibility to the ISF and the GOI is central to the “security track” in the NSVI. Acceleration of the transition of security responsibility is a strategic objective in the “New Way Forward.” The process for transitioning security occurs in four phases:

1. **Implement Partnerships.** MNF-I and its Major Subordinate Commands establish and maintain partnerships across the entire spectrum of ISF units, from battalion to ministerial level.

2. **Iraqi Army Lead (IAL).** Process during which Iraqi Army units progress through stages of capability from unit formation to the ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations.65

3. **Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC).** Iraqi civil authorities satisfy the conditions required to assume control and to exercise responsibility for the security of their respective provinces.

4. **Iraqi Security Self-Reliance.** The GOI achieves PIC (or a combination of PIC and IAL) throughout Iraq, and the government, through its security ministries, is capable of planning, conducting, and sustaining security operations and forces.66

The Department reports that the first phase, “implement partnerships,” is complete and the second phase, IAL, “is well under way in many provinces.”67 It is unclear how this process relates to MOI forces.

According to MNF-I, in 2006, three provinces reached Phase 3, PIC, and “acquired full responsibility for their own security. Al-Muthanna province was first [on July 13, 2006], followed by Dhi Qar province on September 21, 2006, and An-Najaf in December 2006. Maysan province began handling its own security responsibilities on April 18, 2007. On May 30, 2007, Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah provinces came under PIC as part of the Kurdish Regional Government's area of responsibility.”68 The Department expects the remaining provinces, except Al-Anbar province, to transition to PIC in 2007. Al-Anbar is expected to transition to PIC in early 2008.69

The decision to transfer security responsibility for any given area includes an assessment of (1) the threat; (2) ISF readiness; (3) local governance capacity; and (4) the Coalition’s “ability to respond quickly to major threats, if needed.”70 Coalition authorities, including the appropriate Multi-National Force division commander, conduct monthly assessments of the provinces with provincial governors, representatives of MOI and MOD and the U.S. and British Embassies. 71 Once a province transfers to PIC, the Coalition provides support in the form of “operational overwatch.”72

While the Department has reported in the past that “the Iraqi Army does not have to assume the lead in a province before Coalition forces may begin to transfer control,”73 it is clear that the capabilities and operational effectiveness of the ISF forces play a critical role in moving provinces toward PIC and the GOI toward Iraqi Security Self-Reliance.
The Coalition uses Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) to assess the capability of the ISF. For the Iraqi Police Service, the Coalition supplements the TRAs with Iraqi Police Station Field Reports (IPSFR) or Police Station Monthly Reports (PSMRs). Transition Teams prepare the TRAs and other reports on the particular Iraqi military unit or police organization they advise. These reports “take into account a variety of criteria similar to but not identical to what the U.S. Army uses to evaluate its units’ operational readiness focused on personnel, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipment, and leadership.” The TRAs include an assessment of objective criteria, such as manning levels and equipment on hand. They also include a subjective evaluation, known as the commander’s assessment, which provides “a narrative that takes into account leadership of the Iraqi unit, the unit’s current operational experience, the unit’s ability to execute intelligence based operations, and life support issues impacting the Iraqi unit.” The narrative gives an overall assessment of the unit, reports the number of months before the unit is expected to be able to assume the lead, and should “explain shortfalls, changes from the previous month and other significant issues.”

Operational readiness, as measured by TRAs, is an important tool that evaluates whether a unit is ready for combat. It does not, however, predict or evaluate combat effectiveness. Nor are TRAs the same as an “after action report,” which U.S. units are required to complete to address the unit’s performance in combat. MNC-I recognized that comparing a unit’s actual operational experience with its transition readiness assessment rating sometimes identified a gap in the utility of the TRAs. For example, MNC-I updated the TRA implementing instructions to add an assessment category on “Operational Effectiveness and Reliability” because some units received high training proficiency ratings, but “turn[ed] in poor operational performances.” The TRAs report operational effectiveness by measuring the Iraqi unit’s ability to plan, execute, and sustain operations, based on the unit’s operational experience and the level of outside assistance it needs. MNC-I recognizes that the reliability assessment in the TRA is “highly subjective” and includes an assessment of: “willingness to deploy and fight in another Area of Operation, militia influence, selective decisions on which missions they will conduct, and doing the bare minimum.” The TRA implementing instructions require that the commander’s assessment highlight deficiencies in either operational effectiveness or reliability.

“My nightmare – the thing that keeps me up at night – is a failure of the Iraqi security forces, somehow, catastrophically, mixed with a major Samarra-mosque-type catastrophe.”

-- Major General Joseph F. Fil Jr.

The assessments are evaluated monthly by the major commands in-theater (MNF-I, MNC-I, MNSTC-I). The TRAs are used to determine whether a unit falls into one of four levels of readiness: at level four, the unit is forming or not operational; at level three, the unit is capable of conducting operations “alongside” Coalition units; at level two, the unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining operations with Coalition support; and at level one, the unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations. The Department reports that “[u]nits in the top three levels are all operational – that is, capable of
(and frequently engaged in) operations against the enemy." Units at level two are “in the lead.” Level two “is the critical achievement that marks the point at which a unit can take over its own battle space. Units at level two can control their own areas of responsibility and, therefore, allow Coalition units to focus elsewhere.” Recall that level two, “in the lead,” is the level of effectiveness usually necessary for transferring a province to PIC. Most IA units are reported to be at level two. Once a province achieves PIC, the Coalition no longer formally assesses the readiness and performance of the ISF units in that province.

Like ISF end strength, force structure, and roles and missions, MNF-I has continued to change the planned timing of the transition of security responsibility to the ISF and the Iraqi government. In March 2007, GAO testified:

In October 2003, the multi-national force commanders outlined a multistep plan for transferring security mission to the Iraqi forces. The plan had the objective of gradually decreasing the number of U.S. forces in conjunction with neutralizing Iraq’s insurgency and developing Iraqi forces capable of securing the country. From the fall of 2003 through April 2006, MNF-I revised its security transition plan a number of times because the Iraqi government and its military and police forces proved incapable of assuming security responsibilities within the timeframes envisioned by the plans.

In January 2007, the President stated that, “[t]o establish its authority, the Iraqi government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November.” In March 2007, MNSTC-I cited January 2008 as the date for transfer. The subcommittee received testimony from a panel of four outside experts who have been studying the development of the ISF. All were in agreement that transition of security responsibility to the ISF by January 2008 was very unlikely. Staff interviews with service members who have either recently served as Transition Team members or as planners indicate those in the field hold a similar view.

**ISF Development: Measuring Progress**

The NSVI identifies as “the most important metrics we track” for security:

> The quantity and quality of Iraqi units; the number of actionable intelligence tips received from Iraqis; the percentage of operations conducted by Iraqis alone or with minor Coalition assistance; the number of car bombs intercepted and defused; offensive operations conducted by Iraqi and Coalition forces; and the number of contacts initiated by Coalition forces, as opposed to the enemy.

The fact that four of the six most important metrics for the security track involve the ISF demonstrates the central role they play in meeting the NSVI's security agenda. As a result, Congress requires quarterly reports that address the training and performance of the ISF and
the progress being made in transferring additional security responsibilities to them. The Administration’s current reporting does not satisfy the requirements Congress has imposed for measuring stability and security in Iraq. Consequently, the committee has proposed additional reporting requirements in its National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Appendix 8 shows the current and proposed requirements).

**FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Finding 1: The 2006 Joint Campaign Plan, and other related plans, identify the conditions under which security responsibility can be transferred to the Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi government.

Finding 2: Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and U.S. Embassy Baghdad have changed the 2006 plan for transitioning security responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Our investigation confirms that they are already executing a revised version to the 2006 Joint Campaign Plan because MNF-I is now prioritizing securing the population over transferring security to the ISF.


Finding 4: Congress has not been briefed on the 2006 Joint Campaign Plan, its subsequent revision, or on the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Campaign Action Plan. It is essential that Congress be fully briefed on all relevant plans to transition security responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces.

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department of Defense to provide Congress by the end of July 2007 the plans, as well as a briefing on those plans and the impact these plans will have on the transfer of responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces. The Department should provide updated briefings immediately as those plans are changed.

Finding 5: Multi-National Force-Iraq has repeatedly changed the end strength and roles and missions of the Iraqi Security Forces in “adapting to conditions on the ground.”

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department of Defense to provide Congress, within thirty days, the current force development plans, and a briefing on those plans. It should also require that the Department immediately notify Congress whenever there is a change to the force development plans for the Iraqi Security Forces, along with the underlying conditions on which those changes are based.

Finding 7: When Provincial Iraqi Control occurs, the Coalition provides “operational overwatch,” but no longer assesses the performance of Iraqi Security Forces within the province.

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department of Defense to provide detailed monthly briefings on the progress being made in the transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) and Iraq Security Self-Reliance, and the factors related to the Coalition's monthly assessment. The monthly briefing should also provide post-PIC data on the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces in those provinces where PIC has occurred.

Finding 8: The Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) are used to measure the operational readiness of Iraqi Security Forces. Operational readiness is a measurement that evaluates whether a unit is ready for combat. TRAs are not the same as “after action reports,” which U.S. units are required to complete and address the unit's performance. Recently, Multi-National Corps-Iraq issued updated TRA implementing instructions that place greater emphasis on evaluating combat effectiveness.

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department of Defense to adjust Transition Readiness Assessments to reflect metrics which have been shown to be important to unit effectiveness through actual operational experience.

Finding 9: The Department of Defense quarterly reports to Congress do not provide a meaningful assessment of progress in the development of the Iraqi Security Forces nor do they adequately reflect progress toward Iraqi self-reliance.

Recommendation: The Department of Defense should more fully comply with the current legal requirements for reporting on performance and progress. It should also comply with the reporting requirements contained in the House-passed version of the committee’s report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 1585 (H. Report 110-146).
NOTES CHAPTER 2

3 “Security is the immediate priority of the Iraqi reconstruction effort. In order for Iraq to make a smooth transition to sovereignty, the people of Iraq must be free from fear of terror and a return to power of Saddam Hussein loyalists. To achieve this goal, trained professional Iraqi security forces under firm civilian control and imbued with respect for political and human rights are necessary.” U.S. Office of Management and Budget/Department of State, Quarterly report to Congress pursuant to Section 2207 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, FY 2004 (Public Law 108-106) (Washington, D.C.: 6 Jan 2004), p. 6.
4 “The following document articulates the broad strategy the President set forth in 2003 and provides an update on our progress as well as the challenges remaining. ‘The United States has no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq’s new government. That choice belongs to the Iraqi people. Yet, we will ensure that one brutal dictator is not replaced by another. All Iraqis must have a voice in the new government, and all citizens must have their rights protected. Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, including our own: we will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more.’ President George W. Bush, 26 Feb 2003.” NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 1.
7 NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 2.
8 NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 18.
9 NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 3.
10 NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 11.
11 NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 3.
12 NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 3.
13 NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 3.
15 President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Washington, D.C.: 10 Jan 2007).
16 President Bush, Address to the Nation.
This operational shift is significant in two ways: (1) the movement from a “gradual transfer” to an accelerated one, and (2) the accelerated transfer of both security responsibility, i.e. battlespace, and Provincial Iraqi Control. NSC, *Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review*, p. 10.


47 “The GOI, with Coalition support, is now executing several Manning initiatives to replenish the force to allow units to be temporarily relieved to refit and retrain, and to increase present-for-duty levels in combat units. These
initiatives will add more than 60,000 personnel to the ISF during 2007.” It is unclear who will carry out the force generation tasks (i.e. organizing, manning, training, and equipping) associated with these initiatives, and who will fund them. U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007 (See 9010, PL. 109-289) (Mar 2007), p. 27.


54 The desired end strength of the Iraqi Security Forces continues to change and grow. Current announced plans put the end strength figure closer to 390,000 personnel. There have been reports that that number will grow even further.

55 GAO, More Comprehensive National Strategy, p. 11.


58 The CPA’s review of its accomplishments states that the “[d]efining mission of the IAF [Iraqi Armed Forces] is the defense of Iraq” and that “[d]omestic use of the IAF is a last resort and under tight control.” Note the contrast between the CPA’s view of the mission of the Iraqi Army with the March 2007 DOD 9010 Report, “The Iraqi Army is central to MOD counter-insurgency operations and strategy.” See, CPA, An Historic Review, p. 9.

59 Joseph A. Christoff, Rebuilding Iraq, p. 10.


63 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 34. See also, DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 34.


65 The Department of Defense reports that “the Iraqi Army does not have to assume the lead in a province before Coalition forces may begin to transfer control.” DOD, 9010 Report (Aug 2006), p. 60.


69 DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), p. 24. The Department appears to be changing its schedule for transitioning to PIC. In its June 2007 report, the Department stated “the remaining provinces are expected to transition to [PIC] no later than March 2008.” DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 29.


THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES


76 Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Transition Readiness Assessment Report Implementing Instructions Update (1 Dec 2006), Chapter 11.

77 MNC-I, TRA Report Implementing Instructions, Chapter 10.

78 MNC-I, TRA Report Implementing Instructions, Chapter 10.

79 MNC-I, TRA Report Implementing Instructions, Chapter 10.

80 MNC-I, TRA Report Implementing Instructions, Chapter 10.

81 MNC-I, TRA Report Implementing Instructions, Chapter 10.

82 MNC-I exercises operational control over Iraqi Security Forces once they have been trained by MNSTC-I. MOI exercises operational control over Civil Security Forces once they have been trained. MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, p. 16.

83 The Department notes for level one: “Considering the need for further development of Iraqi logistical elements, ministry capacity and capability, intelligence structures, and command and control, it will take some time before a substantial number of units are assessed as fully independent and requiring no assistance.” DOD, 9010 Report (Feb 2006), pp. 36-37.

84 DOD, 9010 Report (Feb 2006), pp. 36-37.

85 DOD, 9010 Report (Feb 2006), pp. 36-37.

86 LTG John Sattler (JCS J5, staff briefing).


90 O&I Hearing, Iraqi Security Forces, Non-Government Perspectives.


93 The Defense Reconstruction Office contended that a SIGIR recommendation that MNF-I provide an assessment of its plans and progress in training logistics personnel and the adequacy of MOI logistics budgets fell outside the scope of the statutory language establishing the 9010 report requirement. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plan to Implement Logistics Capabilities (SIGIR-06-032) (28 Oct 2006), pp. iii, 34.

“The Government of Iraq has available assets... but it does not yet have the mechanisms to spend them.”

-- DOD 9010 Report, March 2007

**FINANCE**

**The U.S. Investment**

Since 2003, the United States has invested more than $19.0 billion in the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). This funding primarily has been drawn from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding Source (by fiscal year)</th>
<th>Budget Authority (in billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004 (IRRF)</td>
<td>$5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 (ISFF)</td>
<td>$5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 (ISFF)</td>
<td>$3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 (ISFF)</td>
<td>$5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$19.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While this funding has been executed through Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) for a variety of purposes – including building infrastructure and training centers for the military and police, developing Iraqi logistical capability, and creating an Iraqi leadership structure within the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) – it has been primarily focused on recruiting, training, and equipping the ISF. As the initial force generation mission has begun to wind down, however, spending has been reoriented toward improvement of logistics and sustainment capabilities, without which the ISF will be incapable of operating as an independent force.

As of the end of March 2007, more than $13.4 billion of the funds appropriated to support the ISF had been obligated – that is, legally committed for approved requirements. Almost $6.0 billion in funding remains unspent, though available amounts may be lower due to the lag time between when MNSTC-I decides to use funds for a specific requirement and when those funds are actually obligated against that requirement.
Government of Iraq Contributions and Capacity

The Government of Iraq (GOI) provided about $5.4 billion in security funding for the MOD and MOI in Calendar Year (CY) 2006 and an additional $7.3 billion in CY 2007. While this appears to indicate both a sizeable annual increase and a significant overall commitment, the numbers alone do not accurately reflect the reality of Iraqi expenditures, for two primary reasons.

First, the increase from 2006 to 2007 of $1.9 billion, or 37%, is in large part due to the rapid appreciation of the Iraqi dinar against the U.S. dollar. Iraq’s official budget is presented and executed in Iraqi dinars, not U.S. dollars, and with a constant exchange rate, the actual budget increase is closer to 15%. While still significant, this budget increase will be realized primarily with respect to imported goods and services, for which the appreciated dinar provides greater purchasing power. A comparison of Iraqi budget line items from 2006 to 2007 shows that the most significant increases are by far in the area of salaries. Expenditures for non-financial assets, including capital goods such as weapons, ammunition, and vehicles, actually decline for the MOD in 2007 at both a constant and appreciated exchange rate.

Second, and more troubling, is the inability of the GOI to execute significant portions of its security budget. Through November 2006, the MOD and MOI had spent about 76 and 82 percent, respectively, of their budgeted funds for salaries, but only 1 and 15 percent of funds budgeted for capital goods (see figure 4). This limitation is consistent with budget execution challenges throughout the GOI, leading the Department of Defense (DOD) to acknowledge that “budget execution and corruption problems continue to hamper the GOI’s ability to perform and turn good intentions into results.” Overall, $8.0 billion (25%) of the $34.0 billion GOI budget for 2006 went unspent, and has now been budgeted for expenditures in 2007.

Figure 4: GOI Budget Expenditures.

Source: GAO analysis of Iraqi 2006 budget expenditure as of November 2006, provided by U.S. Treasury.
GOI Capacity

Budget execution, particularly for capital expenditures, is symptomatic of broader capacity issues throughout the GOI. As the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has noted, 30 years of centralized control and neglect toward the Iraqi professional civil service, coupled with rapid turnover of governing authority since 2003, purges of former regime officials, and sectarian-based hiring, has led to the “decay of core functions” in many ministries.14 These deficiencies are particularly pronounced in strategic planning and finance, two areas that are critical to developing, maintaining, and sustaining a competent ISF.15 The Department of Defense has acknowledged the “limited capacity of the MOD and the MOI to execute the planning/acquisition/sustainment cycle” with respect to logistical shortcomings,16 as well as personnel management weaknesses.17

Ministerial capacity development is viewed as the long-term remedy for these deficiencies.18 MNSTC-I is playing a leading role in the capacity development effort with respect to the MOD and MOI.19 Other U.S. Government agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are actively involved as well, working with key enabling organizations such as the Ministry of Finance, which has been identified as a “major bottleneck for executing budgets,” with “bureaucratic and centralized procedures … too strict for spending funds.”20 Outside institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are also involved in broader economic and political capacity-building that will directly affect MOI and MOD capacity. The World Bank, for example, has reviewed the status of the Iraqi procurement system and is working to clarify the legal framework for public procurement.21

The Minister of Finance, Baqir Jabr al-Zubeidi, recently asserted that the GOI has studied this issue and found three primary reasons for the inability of the government to spend its money: lack of security, lack of a civil service infrastructure, and the stringent spending conditions and laws put into place by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to battle corruption.22 He stated that the GOI is taking aggressive steps to overcome the budget execution challenge. These steps include: earlier release of funding to provinces and ministries; new guidelines for increased authority to enter into contract at lower levels of government; penalties for failing to execute budgets; and incentives to spend money and overcome bureaucratic challenges. In addition, he noted that the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program would be a useful tool for the GOI. Results of such initiatives are not yet available.

Corruption

Corruption is frequently cited as a “major impediment to Iraq’s development and growth,” with estimates that it costs Iraq $5.0 billion annually.23 The Department acknowledges that “corruption remains a factor at both the unit and ministerial level,” and the Ministries of Defense and Interior, along with Oil, are subject to the most claims of corruption.24 SIGIR and the Department of State (DOS) Inspector General have noted that, while Iraqi efforts have been made to increase transparency and accountability within the GOI, those efforts have “not been focused” and have lacked “adequate leadership resources.”25 SIGIR recently
testified about reports of “weakened capacity and alleged politicization” within Iraq’s anticorruption bodies – the Board of Supreme Audit, Commission on Public Integrity, and Iraqi Inspectors General – finding that their independence is threatened, their staffs lack sufficient training, and they have been unable to coordinate their overlapping mandates. Still, anticorruption efforts by the United States continue to move forward, coordinated by an anti-corruption working group of which MNSTC-I is a part. In addition, the GOI recently created an Iraqi Joint Anti-Corruption Council which is expected to coordinate and provide a “unified front” for its anti-corruption agencies.

Use of Foreign Military Sales

For the short term, the FMS program is viewed by the GOI and the Department as a viable method for the GOI to bypass its budget execution and corruption problems, allowing the expenditure of the amounts it has budgeted for security, particularly for capital goods. As of March 2007, the GOI had deposited $1.7 billion for procurement of defense articles and services through the FMS program, and had submitted letters of request for additional requirements with a total potential value of $2.5 billion. The goods and services approved and under consideration include sustainment and maintenance contracts, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, construction of logistics bases, aircraft, watercraft, fuel, and medical supplies.

While a useful tool that could have an immediate impact in Iraq, FMS is not a panacea. Though the GOI has primarily opted to begin outfitting the ISF with U.S. equipment, certain major items that it will rely upon may not be U.S. products, which generally are not eligible for purchase under the FMS program. This could lead to a tendency to purchase U.S. equipment over other equally or more useful products, or impair the ability of the GOI to purchase the items it deems most appropriate. In addition, if the intent is to enhance the ability of the GOI to act and sustain itself independently, care should be taken not to allow over-reliance on FMS, to the detriment of efforts at ministerial capacity development.

Planned Future Investments

In addition to the $19.0 billion that the United States invested in the ISF from 2003-2007, the Department has requested $2.0 billion for 2008, which would bring the total U.S. investment to support directly the ISF development effort to more than $21.0 billion. The 2008 request emphasizes modernization, development, and sustainment of the ISF. The planned decrease in U.S. funding, from more than $5.5 billion in 2007 to only $2.0 billion in 2008, is predicated on the GOI assuming “primary financial responsibility” for the ISF by 2008. This, in turn, is based in part on two significant assumptions: (1) that the ISF force structure (as of March 2007) will not change, and (2) that GOI revenue streams from oil production will remain steady, with prices at approximately $50 per barrel, thus allowing the GOI to continue dedicating funds to the ISF at projected levels.

Recent DOD statements have cast significant doubt upon the assumption about force structure. As a result of lessons-learned from the Baghdad Security Plan, the GOI has decided to augment “overstrength manning” of Iraqi combat battalions from 110% to 120%, which will significantly increase personnel requirements. Additional increases are also possible.
pending an ongoing force structure review. The Department acknowledges that it must continue to review and refine its estimates based on conditions on the ground and the capability of the ISF. The GOI will continue to adjust its force structure based on its own perceptions of requirements. This could result in additional ISF funding requirements, beyond the $2.0 billion already requested by the Department for fiscal year (FY) 2008.

### Additional Costs

The amounts described above reflect only the funds appropriated and utilized directly in support of the ISF development effort. As of June 12, 2007, the overall DOD budget for the Iraq war is approximately $450.0 billion, which includes expenditures for ISF support that are drawn from the ordinary operating accounts of the U.S. armed services. For example, funding for the U.S. military personnel involved in the ISF training effort, providing logistical support to the ISF, or embedded with Iraqi units as part of Transition Teams is not part of the $19.0 billion appropriated for the ISF. The Department has stated that it is “impractical” to approximate the financial value of these hidden costs.

Given the inability of the Department to measure the full range of expenditures devoted to the ISF, it is unclear how significant the request for $2.0 billion for FY08 is within the broader scheme of war funding. It is difficult to project how actual U.S. expenditures in support of the ISF may change in future years under a variety of scenarios that could include greater or lesser emphasis on continuing to develop the ISF. In addition, as a fuller accounting of the war develops, it will be essential to calculate total costs in such a way as to allow expenditures to be measured directly against results. In this case, the result being measured is the effectiveness of the ISF. The importance of this is to determine what value the United States has received for its investment.

### ISF Contracting

Contractors have played a significant role in the U.S. mission to develop the ISF, just as they have in the broader U.S. effort in Iraq. In the Iraq area of responsibility (AOR), the Department currently uses almost 2,000 active contracts, employing about 127,000 contractors and subcontractors. This does not include contractors working for other agencies. According to DOD officials, such extensive use of contractors is essential under the current U.S. force structure. The Department also notes that the initial effort to manage those contracts from outside theater was problematic, and did not permit effective management and oversight. This resulted in the Department establishing the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I) in November 2004. SIGIR has reviewed DOD and other agency contracting activities in Iraq from the beginning of the war through June 2006, and, in recent testimony, noted that contract management had “improved … through the consolidation and streamlining processes for contract monitoring implemented by the [JCC-I].”
A variety of organizations have provided contracting support to MNSTC-I in its mission to train, equip, and sustain the ISF. As mentioned, the JCC-I has centralized and coordinated management and authority over contracting in Iraq. The MNSTC-I support division of the JCC-I is the in-theater organization providing contracting support for non-construction projects. As described below, the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Gulf Region Division (GRD) provide primary construction contracting support. The JCC-I conducts “direct” contracting for MNSTC-I, meaning that MNSTC-I orders goods and services based on identified requirements, and the JCC-I executes contracts to procure those goods and services. Beyond what JCC-I manages, MNSTC-I also purchases goods and services from a wide variety of other DOD and U.S. Government entities using “military interdepartmental purchase requests” (MIPRs) and Economy Act orders.

**Interagency Contracting Responsibilities**

The definition of roles and missions for U.S. Government agencies involved in the ISF mission has been a complicating factor in the delineation of contracting responsibility, oversight, and management. Despite the Department’s assumption of the lead role in training the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) from the Department of State in 2004, the Departments of State and Justice (DOJ), which typically fulfill the international civilian police training function, have remained heavily involved in the IPS effort. Their involvement has been primarily through the use of contractor personnel. Since 2004, the Department of Defense has provided more than $1.5 billion to the DOS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) for various aspects of the police training mission, including: (1) operation and maintenance of the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC); (2) international police liaison officers (IPLOs) contracted through DynCorp International; (3) international police trainers (IPTs) provided by the Department of Justice through a contract with Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI) under an agreement with INL; and (4) a variety of other personnel and logistical support services for those personnel.

The Department of State has acknowledged major problems in managing contracts with DynCorp, and asserts that it has taken remedial action to correct those problems. It is clear that the scale of needs for personnel and funding in the police training mission in Iraq were initially far beyond what the small in-theater INL staff was prepared to handle. This led the Department of State to increase the size of its contract oversight staff. In addition, contractors and outside experts assert that challenges continue to arise because multiple agencies are at work in contracting for the training of the ISF, with different roles, authorities, and contracting regulations.

**“Contractors on the Battlefield”**

Another subject of current debate and analysis affecting the ISF effort is the appropriate role of contractors working alongside the military during ongoing operations, commonly known as the “contractors on the battlefield” issue. Use of contractors for training an indigenous military force, such as under the contract awarded to the Vinnell Corporation for training the New Iraqi Army in June 2003, is one example of a role that should be examined in this
broader context.\textsuperscript{58} It is widely acknowledged that the ability to contract with private security companies to conduct training augments U.S. forces, but the use of such contracted services also poses challenges with respect to coordination and integration among U.S. Government agencies, contractor personnel, and other governments.\textsuperscript{59}

\section*{INFRASTRUCTURE}

In November 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requested construction support for the New Iraqi Army from the AFCEE.\textsuperscript{60} Since that time, AFCEE has obligated more than $3.5b on 425 construction projects, totaling 4217 facilities, for the CPA and later MNSTC-I, with the spending of more than $325.0 million still pending.\textsuperscript{61} AFCEE work amounts to more than 90\% of total construction for the Iraqi Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{62} USACE Gulf Region Division (GRD), also reports having executed more than 300 projects in support of the ISF from 2004-2007, ranging from demolition to construction, renovations, repairs, and life support.\textsuperscript{63} While AFCEE and GRD act as contract managers, MNSTC-I also maintains project and program managers to provide oversight of the construction program, to “ensure compliance with mission requirements and resource availability.”\textsuperscript{64}

SIGIR has conducted extensive oversight work in assessing a variety of construction projects associated with the ISF, and notes that while most “have been completed as planned in terms of scope, money, and schedule, a few projects have encountered delays and cost increases.”\textsuperscript{65} As of April 2007, SIGIR had completed 94 project assessments, 96 limited on-site inspections, and 304 aerial assessments of projects throughout Iraq.\textsuperscript{66} In addition, SIGIR had 79 investigations of fraud, waste, and abuse underway.\textsuperscript{67} Reviews have included ISF facilities such as the Baghdad Police College project managed by GRD ($72.3 million), the Tallil Military Base project managed by AFCEE ($119.50 million), and dozens of other facilities including police stations and border forts.\textsuperscript{68}

SIGIR has drawn a number of general conclusions from its specific project reviews. These include the following:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Lack of security has impeded both construction and SIGIR efforts to assess construction projects.\textsuperscript{69}
\item Construction reviews reveal a continuing problem of contractors failing to comply with international standards identified in their contracts.\textsuperscript{70}
\item In many instances, Iraqi recipients of projects have not properly carried out sustainment.\textsuperscript{71}
\end{enumerate}

The sustainment issue, raised in the most recent SIGIR Quarterly Report, is particularly significant as the United States seeks to transition security responsibility to the GOI. As noted by SIGIR, failure to perform proper operations and maintenance on transitioned facilities places the value of the U.S. investment at risk, and could significantly shorten the useful life of the projects.\textsuperscript{72}
SIGIR has also found that certain projects have lacked contractor-required quality control and adequate government quality assurance programs, prompting immediate corrective action in some instances.\textsuperscript{73} Such issues have, at times, had a direct impact on the ISF. For example, a MNSTC-I representative, in addressing the GRD-managed Baghdad Police College project, stated that “the excessive delay in construction has caused significant impairment in the ability of Iraqi Security Forces to complete their mission.”\textsuperscript{74}

AFCEE has identified a number of lessons-learned that it has incorporated over the past four years, some of which mirror SIGIR findings, including:\textsuperscript{75}

\begin{itemize}
\item[(1)] The need for better “up-front” requirements identification and master planning;
\item[(2)] The need for greater on-site oversight, which has led AFCEE to increase its inspectors from 17 in 2003 to 315, many of them Iraqis;
\item[(3)] Initially underestimating the capabilities of small businesses, which have now received 44\% of AFCEE-awarded funds;
\item[(4)] The need for Iraqi construction standards;\textsuperscript{76} and
\item[(5)] The lack of maintenance on completed projects, which may be symptomatic of the lack of a long-term “maintenance culture” in Iraq, leading AFCEE to add extended warranty periods for completed projects.
\end{itemize}

GRD cites security of facilities and personnel as a continuing concern, because ISF projects have generally not been at secured sites, and notes that 19\% of its projects are delayed due to security issues.\textsuperscript{77}

\section*{Findings and Recommendations}

\textbf{Finding 1:} The inability of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to execute efficiently the Iraqi security budget, particularly with respect to capital expenditures, will continue to impede the ability of the Government of Iraq to undertake primary responsibility for the Iraqi Security Forces.

\textbf{Finding 2:} Corruption within the Government of Iraq as a whole, and particularly within the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, continues to drain Iraqi resources.

\textbf{Finding 3:} The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is a significant short-term enabling tool for the Government of Iraq (GOI). While not a perfect substitute for generating inherent capacity within the GOI to carry out the basic functions of governance, such as budget execution and procurement, robust short-term use of FMS can bridge the gap while U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi governmental capacity continue.

\textbf{Recommendation:} In order to continue transitioning responsibility for the financing of the Iraqi Security Forces to the Government of Iraq (GOI), the committee should closely monitor U.S. efforts on three fronts: (1) building Iraqi ministerial capacity, particularly in the realm of budget execution, both at the security ministries
and within other essential organizations, such as the Ministries of Finance and Oil; (2) fighting corruption within the GOI; and (3) utilizing Foreign Military Sales as a short-term bridge to enable the GOI to utilize its security budget efficiently until greater self-reliance is achieved.

Finding 4: The Department of Defense $2.0 billion request for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the Fiscal Year 2008 Global War on Terror request is predicated on a static force structure. The recent initiative to man ISF combat battalions at 120%, and other potential force structure changes, could result in increased U.S. funding requirements, unless the Government of Iraq allocates additional funds to pay for the entire cost of the increase.

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to review and refine its Fiscal Year 2008 requirements within 60 days, and to continue to update its funding needs for the Iraqi Security Forces on a priority basis, with changes communicated to the relevant committees immediately.

Finding 5: To date, over $19.0 billion in U.S. funding has been appropriated in support of the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Additional funds drawn from other accounts have also contributed directly to the ISF effort. The Department has not calculated an approximate value garnered with this funding.

Recommendation: The committee should require the U.S. Government Accountability Office to report on the value received to date for the U.S. investment in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Such a report should utilize information provided by the Department of Defense with respect to total ISF spending to date, approximate values for other funding that has contributed directly to the ISF effort, and measure ISF unit readiness and operational effectiveness as detailed in Transitional Readiness Assessments and other documentation.

Finding 6: The standup of the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq helped provide centralized and coordinated management and authority over contracting in Iraq, but interagency management and oversight of contracts continue to pose challenges.

Recommendation: The committee should scrutinize and monitor the agencies working together to develop the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to ensure that they have appropriate interagency processes in place to provide unified management and oversight for contracts. The committee should also require the Administration to submit a report, within 60 days, to the committees of jurisdiction on what steps it is taking to manage contracts with multiple agency equities. This report should also identify complications posed by the use of private security contractors in support of ISF training, if any.

Finding 7: The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s work visiting, assessing, and reporting on construction projects across Iraq has provided actionable insights into the quality of construction and value received on U.S. investments.

Recommendation: The Congress should expand the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) mandate in Iraq to cover all Iraqi Security Forces-related funds, regardless of fiscal year, and ensure that SIGIR’s termination date is extended beyond the current standard, as provided for in the House-passed version of the committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008, H.R. 1585 (H. Report 110-146).
Finding 8: Security issues have caused delays and increased costs on many infrastructure projects.

Recommendation: The committee should continue to require the Department of Defense to find more effective ways to manage security problems at ongoing job sites and to more effectively plan for security contingencies in future projects and contracts.
NOTES CHAPTER 3

3 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/22.
5 According to LTC Quentin McCorvey (MNSTC-I J-8 (Comptroller)), there is generally a lag of at least 60-90 days between the time when MNSTC-I commits to making certain expenditures and when those commitments become legal obligations under contracts or orders managed for MNSTC-I by other organizations, such as the Joint Contracting Command – Iraq.
7 The $7.3b budgeted for the security ministries in 2007 is 18 percent of Iraq’s total 2007 budget.
9 O&I Briefing, ISF Cost and Financial Transition.
10 O&I Briefing, ISF Cost and Financial Transition.
11 Joseph A. Christoff, Stabilizing Iraq, p. 9.
16 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 25. For more information, refer to chapters 4 and 6.
18 SIGIR defines capacity development as “an activity or multiple activities that lead to the transfer of knowledge, skills, and abilities across a range of functions over a period of time;” and notes that it is “an essential prerequisite for sustainment.” SIGIR, Status of Ministerial Capacity, p. 3.
19 For more information, refer to chapters 4 and 6.
20 Citing comments from participants at a USAID training conference for officials from the Ministries of Finance, Planning, Oil, Electricity, and Water Resources. SIGIR, Status of Ministerial Capacity, p. 10.
26 Stuart W. Bowen Jr. (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction), Statement Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs (22 May 2007).
28 The FMS program is regulated by the Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 90-269 (1968), and administered jointly by the Departments of State and Defense. It essentially allows government-to-government purchases of weapons, defense articles, services, and military training, with the Department of Defense serving as an intermediary and handling procurement, logistics, delivery, and often product support and training.

29 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/22.
30 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/22.

33 O&I Briefing, ISF Cost and Financial Transition.
35 O&I Briefing, ISF Cost and Financial Transition.


38 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/22. For additional discussion of force structure, refer to chapter 6.
39 Amy Belasco (Defense Budget Specialist, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service), RL33110 (update).
40 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/22. MG Kathleen Gainey (formerly Deputy Chief of Staff, C-4, Resources and Sustainment, MNF-I) issued fragment orders to track all supplies provided by Coalition forces to ISF. GAO believes that during the summer of 2006, MG Gainey also requested an assessment of all logistics support provided by CF to ISF. The subcommittee has requested a copy of this assessment if it exists. If it does not, the subcommittee requested an opportunity to interview MG Gainey. To date the subcommittee has not received an official response about the assessment or the opportunity to interview MG Gainey.
42 O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces.
43 O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces.
45 Stuart W. Bowen Jr., Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
46 LTC Quentin McCorvey, MNSTC-I J8, refers to these organizations as “enabling agencies,” because MNSTC-I does not have its own internal contracting assets. They include the Army Corps of Engineers (Gulf Region Division), the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, the Army Tank Automotive and Armaments Command, and more than a dozen others. U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, “Memorandum for Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq, subject: Audit of the Management of the Iraq Security Forces Fund – Phase II” (15 Feb 2007), p. 6.
50 A MIPR is “an order issued by a DOD Component to the same or another DOD component to procure goods, services, or equipment.” DODIG, “Memorandum for Commander,” p. 11.
Under the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1535, “goods and services may be procured from other Federal agencies” under certain circumstances. DODIG, “Memorandum for Commander,” p. 11.

O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces.


O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces.

O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces.

O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces.


For a discussion of initial efforts to stand up the NIA, refer to chapter 6.

O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces.

Paul Parker, Director, AFCEE (briefing slides, 8 Jun 2007), p. 9. AFCEE is now known as the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment.

AFCEE provides support under a Memorandum of Agreement with MNSTC-I, which was recently revised and renewed for an additional five years. Paul Parker (briefing slides). See also, “Memorandum of Agreement Between AFCEE and MNSTC-I” (13 May 2007). See also, Office of the Inspector General, CPA, Task Orders Awarded by the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence in Support of the Coalition Provisional Authority (Report Number 04-004) (28 Jul 2004).


At the request of Chairman Skelton, SIGIR, GAO, and other representatives of the Inspector General community recently promulgated a definition of “waste” as it relates to reconstruction efforts in Iraq. According to this definition, waste involves taxpayers “not receiving reasonable value for money in connection with any government funded activities due to an inappropriate act or omission,” often due to mismanagement or inadequate oversight. They have not assessed “waste” as he requested as of this writing. SIGIR, Quarterly Report (30 Apr 2007), pp. 3, 200.


Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Border Post, As Sul, Numbered #20, #23, #29, and #37, Sulaymaniyyah (SIGIR PA-05-021 ...024) (31 Jan 2006), p. 148.

See, SIGIR, Baghdad Police College.

SIGIR, Baghdad Police College, p. 71.

Paul Parker (briefing slides), pp. 18 -19.

AFCEE states that there were no Iraqi construction standards when they began work, and that local contractors were very unfamiliar with international codes, but efforts are underway to adopt and update uniform standards. AFCEE Director Paul Parker acknowledges that new standards are not always met yet, but asserts that they are steadily improving. Paul Parker (briefing slides), p. 19.

4: The Iraqi Police Service and Ministry of Interior

“Although early on, the CPA and CJTF-7 decided to make the IPS the primary Iraqi internal security agency and began a process of handing over responsibility for urban security to the force, neither the CPA, CJTF-7, Washington, nor London ever gave the IPS the priority it deserved.”

-- RAND, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (2005)

Introduction

The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) is the largest of the civil security forces that are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and is considered “the foundation of the Ministry of Interior Security Forces.” The IPS, which is reported to include 135,000 personnel, consists of “patrol, traffic, station and highway police, as well as specialists, such as forensic specialists” who are “assigned throughout Iraq’s 18 provinces.” The IPS “mission is to enforce the law, safeguard the public, and provide internal security at the local level.” They are the local “beat cops” who are intended to carry out a community policing function. However, they are also currently being used for counterinsurgency and combat patrols.

Administration reports to Congress reveal troubling issues that demand additional focus and oversight by the Coalition. Despite the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) declaration of 2006 as the “Year of the Police,” the development of the IPS is not the priority it should be, particularly given the importance of police in counterinsurgency. Transferring responsibility for the IPS to the Government of Iraq (GOI) after a single year of focused effort on force generation appears to have been premature and ill-advised for the following reasons: (1) lack of personnel and equipment data, (2) lack of visibility into the vetting process, (3) inability to determine whether police personnel have received appropriate training, (4) lack of familiarity with community policing in Iraqi society, (5) immaturity of the MOI and the lack of capacity to support the IPS in the field, (6) lack of maturity in the judicial and penal systems to support the police work, (7) unclear chain of command between the Ministry of Interior and
the provincial governments, and (8) substantial shortage of Coalition personnel mentoring and assessing the performance of the IPS.

**Pre-War Police Force and the Need for Reform:**

Before the war, the Iraqi police “were perceived to be corrupt and brutal implementers of oppression.” A May 2003 assessment by the Coalition Provisional Authority’s International Police Assessment Team (CPA Police Assessment) reported that the Iraqi “populace normally describes the police as corrupt, unprofessional and untrustworthy” and found:

> The Iraqi Police, as currently constituted and trained, are unable to independently maintain law and order and need the assistance and guidance of Coalition Force assets (or similar follow on force) to accomplish this task. This is a result of years of neglect, coupled with a repressive command structure that prohibited training, proactivity, initiative and stifled attempts toward modernization of a police force. Unless redesigned and redeveloped, the Iraqi Police will not constitute a suitable, viable, and sustainable police service that can engender public trust and confidence. The [Iraqi Police] requires reform and restructuring. The previous philosophy, training, expectations and structure are fundamentally unsuited to a new, free Iraq.

A 2005 RAND report describes the situation similarly and critiques the CPA for not acting upon their assessment:

> When the CPA formally abolished all the other Iraqi security institutions, the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) was thrust into the front line of both public safety and counterinsurgency. This was a mission for which it was not postured, trained, or equipped. Under Saddam, the police had a secondary status; all serious internal security tasks were handled by other security and paramilitary entities. Not only did the Coalition expect the police to move from being a neglected, secondary player to being a professional police force, it encouraged the police to do so in the face of an extreme level of violence that no democratic police force in the world would have likely been able to face.

The CPA did not disband the Iraqi police forces entirely as it did the Iraqi Army (IA). The CPA decided to remove many members of the pre-war police force who were closely tied to the previous regime. In addition, many pre-war police officers did not return to duty. This left a residual force of about 30,000. The CPA Police Assessment recommended a “thorough vetting of existing personnel” and “extensive retraining of those who survive this attrition process” before engaging “in extensive capacity building and development” needed “to instill the knowledge base and appreciation for human rights necessary for a professional, sustainable and acceptable police service.”
Community-policing concepts were alien to the fledgling police force for a number of reasons. In testimony via video teleconference before the House Committee on Armed Services in June 2004, General David Petraeus, then-Commander of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), opined that it would take a “generational change” before the Iraqi police would be able to perform “Western policing” because they played a “very minor role” in policing prior to the war and there was a “tremendous amount of corruption in the system.”

Moreover, the Iraqi “police force was a quasi-military institution heavily steeped in military tactics, doctrine, discipline and philosophy – concurrently staffed with active military personnel who were tightly controlled from Baghdad.” These challenges in establishing the IPS may have been further exacerbated when the CPA chose to decentralize the command and control of the residual force to the provincial governments. The Inspectors General (IGs) of the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (DOS) found that the decentralization decision “diluted the cohesion and effectiveness of the residual force.”

The CPA Police Assessment further found that “[f]ollowing the conflict, most of the police infrastructure was badly damaged, stolen or destroyed” during the looting, which occurred after the invasion. The assessment concluded that “[t]he reform of the police is a long-term program that will require considerable international assistance through financial, in-kind contributions and in terms of qualified police personnel to train, mentor and advise their Iraqi counterparts. Reform will take many forms: vetting, screening, training, deterrence, mentoring and monitoring.”

We found no pre-CPA plan for reform or development of the police or MOI. The coauthors of RAND’s Developing Iraq’s Security Sector report had served in the CPA. They stated:

For all aspects of reconstruction, including security, it was expected that Coalition forces and personnel would hand over control to functioning Iraqi ministries by June 2003. Right up until the point of ORHA’s [Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance] deployment to Baghdad in April 2003, it was thought that the predominately Non-Ba’ath Party makeup of the police force meant that these personnel would be able to maintain law and order and Coalition forces would not need to get involved in policing to any great extent. Thus, plans for the reform and reconstruction of justice and police functions were based on the expectation of functioning bureaucracies, leaving Coalition personnel to perform a reform and advisory role.

The Coalition was not able turn over the policing function to the Iraqis. Instead, the CPA was faced with the task of developing a new IPS that would have the public’s trust and confidence and would operate in an impartial manner under the rule of law. The IGs suggest that “[c]reating this force from the brutal and corrupt remnants of the Saddam regime police would probably have required dissolution of the entire force and slow rebuilding into a force that echoed the new democratic ideals of Iraq. The security situation, however, dictated rapid infusion of police into cities and governorates, a requirement that mandated an accelerated training program.”
The CPA originally developed a training program that included classroom and field training with “newly-graduated cadets … paired one-on-one with a senior Iraqi Police Service (IPS) Field Training Officer, who would function as a mentor.” International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) would oversee the program. Deteriorating security conditions and shortages of both experienced IPS Field Training Officers and IPLOs prevented meaningful implementation of the CPA plan and ultimately resulted in transfer of the responsibility from the Departments of State and Justice to the Department of Defense.

**STRATEGY AND COIN:**

The Coalition views the development of a professional, impartial local police force committed to the rule of law as central to the strategic goal of “a unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror.” However, the Coalition has not appropriately prioritized this mission. This, despite the fact that of the top four challenges in Iraq that General Petraeus recently identified, “continuing the development of capable Iraqi Security Forces, relatively free of ethnic and sectarian bias” was second in importance only to securing the Iraqi population. He noted “[t]he Iraqi Army has made much progress, but is uneven, and the police remain a challenge.”

General Petraeus, who oversaw the recent revision and publication of the Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, also commented on the role of the police in the counterinsurgency effort:

> The counterinsurgency doctrine clearly states that host police and army forces are a key part of the equation, as are special operating forces, and other security elements. Iraqi Army, Police, and Special Operations Forces, together with U.S. forces currently on the ground or deploying to Baghdad … total approximately 85,000 – though, to be sure, not all of those are the same level of effectiveness, and some of the Police undoubtedly are of limited effectiveness.

In Al-Anbar, the Marines see the effort to develop the IPS as a positive, if not essential, step in the counterinsurgency. “The Iraqi Police initiative in Al-Anbar to date provides the Coalition the most direct method of Sunni engagement for the populace.” They also described the contribution the IPS is making:

> Iraqi Police Service was not designed similarly to fight an insurgency but is an essential element to fighting the insurgency. This required the Coalition and Iraqi Army Forces to set conditions that would allow the Iraqi Police to conduct day-to-day operations. Coalition and Iraqi units also provided quick reaction forces for the Iraqi Police in emergency situations. Today, there are many locations throughout Al Anbar where our Iraqi Police have established security to a level for allowing schools to open for the first time in years.
The subcommittee also received testimony that once police are able to operate effectively, they make an enormous intelligence collection contribution and help shape more precise military operations.

Despite recognizing the role of community policing in counterinsurgency, it does not appear that MNF-I is focused on developing the IPS or exploiting their potential contributions for this mission. As will be discussed below, this lack of focus is evidenced by the rapid transfer to MOI of the tasks related to IPS force generation, including vetting, training, mentoring, and assessing performance. It is also evidenced by the considerable shortage in the number of transition teams mentoring and advising the IPS, which, in turn, limits the Coalition’s visibility into how well the IPS are operating. As a result, the Coalition is not utilizing a key strategic enabler effectively. An effective police force bolsters the legitimacy of the government. On the other side of the coin, the insurgent and terrorists’ ability to use ISF uniforms works to undermine public confidence and support in Iraqi forces.

**FORCE GENERATION AND TRACKING:**

As mentioned earlier, the May 2004 National Security Presidential Directive-36 (NSPD-36) gave U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) the responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping all Iraqi Security Forces, including the IPS. MNSTC-I completed a “Troop to Task” study in June 2004 that reviewed “the per capita police-to-population ratios in neighboring Islamic countries and determined that the force-strength target should be 135,000.”

The Department reports that by the end of 2006, which the Coalition had named the “Year of the Police,” the Coalition had met its force generation target of 135,000 IPS personnel “trained and equipped.” The Department also reports that the MOI has “assumed control of most force generation tasks [including basic and specialty skills training and individual equipping] and [has] developed a plan to continue routine replenishment of the force.” Replenishment is necessary because the IPS experiences “significant attrition of personnel who have been through Coalition training.” In December 2006, Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bulani announced that as many as 12,000 police officers had been killed since March 2003. According to the Department, MNF-I (MNSTC-I’s parent command) “estimates that the MOI will require 32,000 new police annually to replenish the ranks.” The Department of Defense also reports that “provincial and local governments have hired tens of thousands of additional police outside the train-and-equip program, which has more than offset this attrition.” However, the Department reports that it does not know about the vetting or training status of locally hired police.

For several reasons, it is important to look beyond the report of the number of IPS personnel trained and equipped. Most significantly, neither the Department nor the Iraqi Government can tell how many of the 135,000 IPS personnel who have been trained by the Coalition are
still serving in the IPS. Testimony before the subcommittee from a former Police Transition Team (PTT) member who served in Baghdad in 2006-2007 illustrates the problem. Chairman Meehan, referring to his trip to the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC), asked:

But the notion of not knowing who you are training, whether they show up for work, how long they stay, whether they move up in the ranks, or whether they were … Iraqi Police officers or Al Qaeda, was very concerning. The witness, Lieutenant Cadetta Bridges, responded:

Yes, sir. That process is very frustrating to us. I have worked alongside the 463rd MP [Military Police] Commander and we would see the recruiting process, sir, from start to end. And I can tell you if we sent over 80 IPs to Jordan or Baghdad Academy, we could not account, but, I will say, for maybe 50 percent of those IPs at the end of the 8-week training, and we just could not get a pulse on what activity was happening at the school that allowed us not to … battle-track these IPs. We vetted them, sir. We would go to the recruitment center and ensure that these civilians would go through the process, take the test, the doctor says they are good to go …. We wait for them to go to training, we can’t find them at the end of the course …. we send 80, we can only account for 40, and I don’t even want to impress upon you the badging process, sir. The Marines Corps witnesses at the same hearing described how they are responding to this challenge in Al-Anbar province:

Colonel Coates: In the recruiting process nobody was admitted into it unless they have the proper ID card or papers. We vetted and we conducted biometric identification of everybody in that process, and, because Al Anbar is unique, most of them would only join if they could go to their home areas or hometowns. That was one of the conditions. That was the appeal of the police force, that they could stay home rather than be nationally assigned. The other thing was that they preferred to go to the JIPTC Academy and they found it to be very professional, but [also] because they were in the Sunni Province, Jordan was a very appealing place to go. When they returned, we had handlers assigned. We picked them up at the Baghdad or Al Asad [Airport]. [They] were Coalition-escorted or - driven to their police districts, to police stations, and almost in all cases the PTT [Police Transition Team] team was there to receive them to make sure they were processed at the station. So we also maintained our own rostering and tracking of all those assigned because we tied it to the payroll process. If you do not have a graduation certificate with the identification and a hiring order … your name was not added to the that payroll.
Several additional force generation-related problems, which the Department itself reports, include: (1) the Department cannot tell “how many of the 306,000 MOI employees on the ministry’s payroll are present for duty on a given day”;\textsuperscript{57} (2) there are now many “extra” IPs. Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey and Major General Kenneth Hunzeker informed members of a congressional delegation that the number of IPS personnel had unaccountably grown from the planned 135,000 end strength to 195,000\textsuperscript{58} (which is in line with the DOD reporting that all provinces, (except Al-Anbar) have “more personnel than agreed,” some of whom may be ghost employees);\textsuperscript{59} (3) “Many of these ‘extra’ police are put on the job with minimal or no training,” which makes it possible, despite the Coalition’s efforts, that the IPS may be a largely untrained force;\textsuperscript{60} and (4) there is uneven coverage in terms of programmed Coalition-trained IPs in the provinces. That is, of the 135,000 planned personnel, some provinces have more IPs than authorized. Others have a shortage of Coalition-trained police.\textsuperscript{61}

**Vetting Process for Recruiting IPS Personnel:**

Responsibility for recruiting IPs has been transferred to the Iraqis. Consistent with MNF-I past practice, they reportedly use the following standards for recruiting police:

1. Minimum age of 20,
2. Completed secondary school with the ability to, read, write and communicate in Arabic,
3. No affiliation with the Ba’ath Party,
4. No reported history of human rights violations or history of mistreatment or abuse of other persons,
5. No criminal history involving violence, theft, or violating the public trust,
6. Physically and psychologically fit to accept responsibilities,
7. Each applicant’s uncorrected vision must not exceed 20/200 in either eye with normal color vision.\textsuperscript{62}

Given the nature of the current security conditions and limited governmental capacity, several other considerations must be involved in the vetting of IPS personnel. To avoid inducting criminals, terrorists, and insurgents into the IPS, the DOD and DOS Inspectors General urged the use of “the most rigorous possible review of each applicant’s records.”\textsuperscript{63} The IGs identified the challenges to the vetting process: inaccessible personnel and police records; the Coalition’s limited ability to conduct thorough background checks; the impracticability of using polygraph techniques; and cultural and language barriers.\textsuperscript{64} The IGs recommended that the Coalition determine the extent and quality of the records that were available and enter into an agreement with MOI to access relevant records.\textsuperscript{65} The IGs also recommended that the vetting of police candidates be turned over to MOI early because they thought MOI was able to do more thorough vetting than that being done by Coalition authorities.\textsuperscript{66}

The Department, which provides Congress with only limited reporting on the vetting process, noted in July 2005 that the Coalition was planning to turn the vetting of police candidates over to MOI by November 2005. This would take place after MNF-I established, trained, and deployed Iraqi “vetting teams.”\textsuperscript{67} The Department is now reporting that Iraqi local officials
have hired tens of thousands of additional IPs, presumably, without a standard vetting process.\(^{68}\) The IGs note that the transfer of vetting responsibility was complete as of February 2006, but expressed concern that “the vetting system may be suspect.”\(^{69}\)

There are also concerns that vetting is not addressing militia infiltration of the IPS.\(^{70}\) In November 2006 the Department reported:

Militia influence exists in the Iraqi Police Service, particularly in Baghdad and several other key cities, but no figures on the number of former or active militia members on the rolls exist. Because of the decentralized nature of the militias, a database on militia members is not maintained, and there is currently no screening process specifically designed to ascertain militia allegiance.\(^{71}\)

For the MOI, overall, the Department reports:

Corruption, illegal activity, and sectarian influence constrain progress in developing MOI forces. Although the primary concern of the GOI [Government of Iraq] remains the Sunni insurgency, tolerance of and influence exerted by Shi’a militia members within the MOI are troubling. Militia influence affects every component of the MOI, particularly in Baghdad and several key cities.\(^{72}\)

In March 2007, the Department reported that the GOI screened 280,000 MOI employees by checking fingerprints against Saddam-era criminal and Ba’ath Party records. Of 8,000 possible derogatory matches, the Iraqis took action against roughly 3,400 personnel.\(^{73}\)

Information collected from U.S. personnel who have served on PTTs with the IPS also indicates that better vetting is needed.\(^{74}\) PTT members report that there is extensive and often overt militia infiltration, as well as blatant sectarianism in terms of members of specific sects who are targeted by police personnel of other sects. PTT members say that they have reported these problems in Transition Readiness Assessment reports. Their view is that, more often than not, neither MOI nor Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) takes remedial action. If action is taken, it usually results in the transfer or promotion of problem actors, not their removal, a problem recognized by General Dempsey in his testimony before the subcommittee.\(^{75}\) The Department of Defense, itself, reports problems with militia infiltration and criminal activity.\(^{76}\) There also have been numerous accounts of IPS involvement in insurgent and criminal activity.\(^{77}\)

Two additional problems with the vetting process are the lack of proper identification and low literacy rates.\(^{78}\) The Marines have developed a literacy program in Al-Anbar province to allow prospective candidates to meet the basic requirements.\(^{79}\) The Department reports that as March 2007, “more than 58,000 police candidates have been screened for literacy, 73% of whom passed and were allowed to enter basic training.”\(^{80}\) PTTs and other U.S. personnel in the field continue to say that illiteracy among Iraqi recruits is one of their biggest problems.\(^{81}\)
Training:

Pre-operational training for Coalition-trained IPS personnel occurred mostly at JIPTC,\(^{82}\) the Baghdad Police College (BPC) and several regional academies around Iraq.\(^{83}\) Most Coalition-trained IPS, with no previous police experience, took a 10-week basic police course, with a “curriculum focusing on rule of law, human rights, and policing skills in a high-threat environment.”\(^{84}\) The training package has had to adjust as the security situation deteriorated. The result, as described in the Army’s PTT Training Support Package Instructor Guide, is that the basic training curriculum has shifted “towards officer survival skills [and] reduced the amount of law enforcement training the recruits received.”\(^{85}\) PTTs “supplement the training of the police recruit” with “in-service training.”\(^{86}\) Trainees with previous police experience took a three-week course, known as the Transition Integration Program (TIP).\(^{87}\) TIP aims to retrain veteran police officers “instilling modern police techniques, respect for human rights, and democratic policing principles.”\(^{88}\) TIP was also designed to identify personnel who were unsuitable for police service, as well as to identify “leaders, instructors, and field training officers.”\(^{89}\)

According to the Department, with the exception of the BPC and the JIPTC, the majority of the Iraqi police academies had transitioned to Iraqi control as of December 2006 and the transition of administrative and training functions had occurred “with relative ease.”\(^{90}\) The JIPTC, CPATT, and Marines report that “[t]he construction of an Al Anbar Police Academy has begun and is expected to be operational by this summer.”\(^{91}\) Instructors treated Al-Anbar recruits poorly “because they were not from Baghdad and [these recruits] were looked down upon especially because they were from Al Anbar.”\(^{92}\) As a result, police recruits from Al-Anbar province preferred to train at the JIPTC rather than the BPC. There could be a concern, since JIPTC stopped police basic training, if all police training is segregated by sect because all other training is more local.

The Department reported that it had met its nationwide goal of training 135,000 IPS personnel by December 2006; the distribution of the personnel throughout the country, however, has not gone “according to original program goals, leaving some provinces with more than their programmed allocation and some with less.”\(^{93}\) The Department reports that “[t]o meet local needs and dynamic requirements, the MOI authorized provincial governors to hire additional Iraqi Police Service officers, but the MOI and the governors are responsible for the additional officers’ training and equipment.”\(^{94}\) The Department does not report on the training received by the locally hired IPS personnel, nor does it report on the training of IPS for police stations, districts, or provinces that are not mentored by PTTs or in provinces where there is already Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC).

IPS Organization:

The Department provides the committee little reporting on the IPS organization, but other sources give some insight into the composition of the IPS. According to a September 2006
“Quicklook Assessment of Iraqi Law Enforcement,” conducted by Blackwater USA under contract to the Irregular Warfare Support Program at the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO):95

The IPS is made up of the IPS Department at the MOI and 18 Provincial Police Departments. Each Provincial Police Department has a provincial headquarters police station, commanded by a Provincial Director of Police (PDOP). The IPS is further divided into 147 Police Districts across the breadth of Iraq. Each district has varying numbers of police stations.

The Quicklook Assessment describes the activities of the IPS in this way:

The IPS investigates crimes ranging from low-value thefts to more serious crimes, such as murder, that take place within their jurisdictional boundary. These crimes are normally high-volume crimes that require immediate attention to maintain the public confidence in the police force. IPS investigators at the police station or the district level conduct investigations according to local priorities. Crimes that require additional resources are referred to the Major Crimes Unit (MCU), or support from the MCU is requested.97

The Army’s Combat Studies Institute describes the IPS’s organization, as of November 2006, as follows:

The service was divided up into police precinct-equivalents, each of which operated out of a single police station. Police stations came in three sizes: a small station commanded by an IPS major, staffed with 76 policemen with patrol shifts consisting of ten patrolmen; a medium station, also commanded by an IPS major, staffed with 112 policemen with patrol shifts made up of 20 patrolmen; and a large police station, commanded by an IPS lieutenant colonel, with 240 policemen and patrol shifts of 40 patrolmen each. All stations, despite their size, were organized into four patrol shifts and a detective bureau. Above the station-level was the police district headquarters, which usually corresponded to the governmental or city district, the echelon of government just below the provincial level. Each district headquarters controlled all the police stations within the district’s geographical area and also doubled as a police station itself. The district was commanded by an IPS colonel and had 35 policemen assigned to it. Above the district, the IPS had a headquarters which corresponded with each province or major city, with the grade of major general.99

**IPS Performance**

As will be discussed in a subsequent chapter, there are 222 field-deployed PTTs operating at the police station, district, and provincial levels. There are only 149 station-level PTTs to
cover more than 1100 police stations. The PTTs’ mission is to advise and mentor the IPS. The Department reports that “PTTs travel to stations to mentor the Iraqi police and conduct joint patrols with them. These joint patrols promote active community policing to improve the reputation of – and confidence in – the police by the Iraqi people.” PTTs assess the performance of the IPS using Transition Readiness Assessments, which they provide to MNC-I on a monthly basis. The Department reports that “[t]his process evaluates the ability of the police to perform core functions required for effective law enforcement and community policing.”

Despite this evaluation system, there is no comprehensive evaluation of IPS performance due to an insufficient number of PTTs. As the Department recently reported:

“Costs and risk preclude deploying enough PTTs to cover all of Iraq’s police stations; at any time, only 5 of Iraq’s 18 provinces have sufficient PTTs to conduct the full range of activities described above [coaching, joint patrolling, evaluating performance]. Continued PTT presence and participation at Iraq Police Service stations are needed to improve police readiness and to sustain progress in reforming community policing.”

Although there is limited information on the IPS, the PTTs who are operating in the field report that their respective police stations perform poorly, lack discipline, and are in a state of disarray. The Department does not report any plan to address the shortfall in the number of PTTs. Unlike the IPS, where transition teams cover about 14% of Iraq’s police stations, the Department reports that the Iraqi Army has transition teams embedded with “most battalions and brigade and division headquarters.” The Iraqi Police Service is at least as large as, if not larger than, the Iraqi Army.

**Operational Effectiveness**

The PTTs are responsible for assessing the operational effectiveness of the IP units. PTTs use several tools to assess the effectiveness of the IPS. These tools include: (1) Iraqi Police Field Station Reports (IPFSRs), or Police Station Monthly Reports (PSMRs), which include both objective measures and the commanders’ subjective assessment; (2) the ISF Detention Oversight Assessment Checklist, which documents “incidents of detainee abuse, unlawful detentions, and unacceptable living conditions that might undermine Rule of Law;” and (3) Training Readiness Assessments (TRAs), which are “the primary document used by the Coalition to determine the readiness of the ISF.”

Although not used to report effectiveness, PTTs can also use the Police Essential Task List (PETL) to train and track IPS progress. The PETL identifies “the essential tasks that every Iraqi police organization must be able to execute.”

TRAs are the only formal method for reporting operational readiness to the Coalition. As discussed above, the Department reports that the shortage of PTTs limits coverage of the IPS in 13 of 18 provinces, which prevents the Coalition from assessing the performance of the
IPS for a substantial portion of Iraq. Moreover, in those provinces under PIC, the Coalition does not routinely assess performance.

**Logistics and Equipment:**

The Department reports that the IPS has received roughly “83% of critical equipment and is expected to receive 100% by the summer of 2007.” The IPS in Baghdad and nine other key cities have received “100% of authorized vehicles and weapons.” The IPS “is equipped with AK-47s, PKC machine guns, Glock pistols, individual body armor, high-frequency radios, small and medium pick-up trucks, and mid-sized SUVs.”

The Department also reports that “due to the immaturity of the MOI’s equipment accountability system, there are no reliable figures on how much of [the IPS] equipment remains in service.” Interviews with former PTT members suggest that no one knows how much of this equipment the IPS has retained. The Marines’ testimony before the subcommittee bears this out:

> The delays and problems with equipping the police were eventually overcome and large amounts of gear and equipment were delivered to the IP in Al Anbar during that last half of 2006. Although large portions of this equipment that was given to the Iraqi Police [are] currently unaccounted for and [are] not at police stations.

PTT members say that IPS personnel barely have uniforms and do not have IPS identification badges. Consequently, their weapons are often confiscated at checkpoints by the members of the IA, National Police (NP), or Coalition forces. Others reported equipment problems including non-secure IPS radios that can be easily monitored by adversaries and unintentionally jammed by Coalition equipment, and operate only within line-of-sight (distance limited).

A recurring issue involves access to fuel. There were many reports that the IPS cannot get fuel from the Ministries of Oil and Interior. The Marines reported:

> Fuel was also an issue that grew as the police gained more vehicles. MOI did not have a plan to provide fuel support for the IP in Al Anbar. Even if a plan and appropriate funding were available, Al Anbar did not have secure facilities for holding and distributing this fuel. Additionally, the lack of it across the province created a large black market for fuel. Corruption within the police often resulted in the police stealing and selling their own fuel, often from their own gas tank.

PTT members also reported that IPS non-armored vehicles are very susceptible to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and even small arms fire.
Command and Control Issues:

The decentralization of command and control of the IPS may have been intended to eliminate excesses of the Saddam era, but the Department acknowledges that “command and control for the provincial police is unclear. The decentralized nature of the Iraqi Police Service often results in conflicting guidance and directives coming simultaneously from the central ministry and the provincial government.” Now that the IPS is partnering with the IA and the NP, those issues are likely exacerbated. This is mirrored on the U.S. side since the PTTs are responsible to their PTT chain, the Military Police (MP) brigade and the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in their area. The MP brigade is responsible to the division and MNC-I. The PTT IPLOs are responsible to MNSTC-I and the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT). No one at MOI seems responsive. Finally, according to PTT interviews and Marine testimony, there is a dearth of support in getting supplies and making appropriate personnel changes from MOI.

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

In addition to the IPS, the MOI is responsible for the NP, Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE), and other smaller forces which will be discussed in the next chapter. Within the MOI, these Civil Security Forces (CSF) are aligned with different departments. The Deputy Minister of Support Forces is responsible for the DBE, Ports of Entry Forces (POE), and the Facilities Protection Service (FPS). The Deputy Minister of IPS Affairs and Security is responsible for coordinating issues among the 18 provincial IPS. The NP is an independent directorate that is supported directly by MOI headquarters. See Table 2 in Chapter 5 for reported end-strength of non-IPS MOI forces.

The MOI is currently led by Minister of the Interior Jawad al-Bulani, considered to be an improvement over his predecessor, now-Finance Minister Bayan Jabr, who is reputedly motivated largely by sectarianism. Minister al-Bulani must lead the MOI to confront these challenges and other capacity issues if the Iraqi civil security forces are to be a capable, professional police force that the public respects and trusts. In chapter 5, we discuss the NP Transformation Plan (NPTP). In recognition of the need to improve capability and professionalism, MNSTC-I has stated that building and sustaining MOI institutional capability is its “main effort” for 2007. MNSTC-I has embedded a Transition Team at the MOI (the MOI-TT), composed of more than 100 advisors. The MOI-TT works with ministry officials to develop and assess a variety of specific functions such as “developing and implementing plans and policies, intelligence, personnel management, logistics, communications, and budgeting.” As of May, the monthly MOI-TT assessment of MOI’s capacity is that it is “effective” in only 2 of 15 categories; the others 13 are rated as “ineffective” or “effective with limitations.”

As previously described, the MOI, like the GOI as a whole, has experienced severe budget execution problems. According to the Department, financial reporting at the MOI is
“inconsistent,” which “results in difficulty for the MOI to budget centrally and execute funds effectively and transparently.” A GAO analysis reveals, for example, that as of November 2006, the MOI has spent 82% of its salary budget for calendar year 2006, but only 49% of its budget for goods and services, 15% of its capital goods budget, and 11% for capital projects. Personnel management and logistics also continue to pose severe challenges to the MOI.

**MOI Logistics Plans**

The plans to transition control of logistics operations to the MOI are outlined in the MNSTC-I 2007 Campaign Action Plan. The key tasks in this plan are:

2. Transition contracting capability to the [MOI], and
3. Develop and implement national maintenance contracts.

The MNSTC-I 2007 Campaign Action Plan also outlines the following risks to execution of logistics transition to the MOI:

1. Accelerated growth [of MOD forces] and transition may exceed ability of MOD and its forces to adapt logistically.
2. Accelerated weapons fielding, and the fielding of new systems, could outpace ISF accountability systems, technical competency of operators, or logistical capability.
3. Failure of GOI to execute its budget.
4. Failure of the ISF to account for and maintain capital assets and equipment.

To date, the GOI has not yet approved the MOI Logistics Concept of Support. MNSTC-I has identified the following challenges to carrying out these plans:

1. Lack of MOI funding,
2. The complications of an MOI structure which has multiple logisticsians,
3. Iraqi leadership not distributing down to [unit] levels,
4. Limited Iraqi stocks,
5. Lack of knowledge on logistics and vehicle processes, and

CPATT and MOI have also developed a MOI Logistic Handbook, which addresses allocations of resources, shaping of logistics policy, and procedures to provide the support for current and future MOI operations. The annex to this handbook includes a national MOI logistics concept timeline for: acquisition, distribution, accountability, and maintenance. MOI expects to complete actions in the timeline described in more detail below by July 2007. However, there are no milestones given for the “distribution” category. Some of the important milestones in the other categories are:
(1) Acquisition  
a. Develop procurement MOUs/MOAs [Memoranda of Understanding/Memoranda of Agreement] with provinces (April 2007)  
b. Publish national acquisition and contracting policies (July 2007)  

(2) Accountability  
a. Reconcile provincial property books (May 2007)  
b. Publish MOI national accountability procedures (July 2007)  

(3) Maintenance  
a. Implement spare parts replenishment plan (February 2007)  
b. Transition CF [Coalition forces] maintenance contracts to MOI (May 2007)  
c. Transition province maintenance plan to the MOI (May 2007)  
d. Publish national maintenance plan (Jul 2007)  

It is not known if the GOI has approved the use of the MOI Logistics Handbook or if MOI has met any of the milestones in the national logistics concept.

**MOI Logistics Organization**

The MOI has direct control of the central ministry forces of NP, DBE, POE, and now, the FPS. MOI headquarters exercises oversight for logistics operations for the NP. The DBE and POE operate independently and separately from the headquarters, and local commanders are responsible for logistical support for units in their region and areas of operation. The IPS operates under control of provincial authorities under the power granted to them by the Iraqi Constitution. Consequently, the MOI must establish close cooperation and coordination with provincial authorities to ensure logistical support to the IPS. The Provincial Director of Police (PDOP) is responsible for all logistics functions for the IPS within his province. As a consequence of the unique relationship between MOI and the IPS, there is “a perception that the IPS has no obligation to follow directives from the MOI headquarters.” The Special Inspector General for Iraq believes that MOI will face difficulty implementing logistics plans because it does not directly control the IPS.

With the exception of the NP, which has a concept of logistics support similar to the military, all other civil security forces are supported by a logistics system based on a civilian model under which contractors provide services on a reimbursable basis rather than by organic units. MNSTC-I asserts that the MOI as a whole is 75% self-sufficient in logistics operations. This relatively high level of self-sufficiency is primarily due to the status of the IPS logistics operations, which face fewer hurdles because they operate in smaller geographical areas.

**Coalition Logistics and Equipment Support for MOI**

The Coalition has been responsible for procurement and distribution of the initial issue of individual equipment, vehicles, and weapons for the MOI. To date, the Coalition has provided over $2.0 billion worth of equipment to the MOI forces, and the MOI was supposed to be fully equipped by early 2007. The Coalition also funded and controlled six contractor-
operated warehouses. One warehouse at the BPC was transferred to MOI control on December 31, 2006. MNSTC-I plans to transfer control of the remaining five by July 2007.143

The Coalition has supplied the MOI with vehicles that have closed-engine modern electronics, which Iraqi mechanics do not know how to service. In order to maintain these vehicles, the Coalition has let short-term contracts with maintenance companies for both service and spare parts, which are extremely difficult to procure on the local economy. The MOI-TT is working with the ministry to train mechanics to increase technical capability. The NP is supposed to use organic units for logistics support, but the maintenance system is not sufficiently mature, so MNSTC-I has established the Baghdad Area Maintenance Contract to repair NP vehicles in the short term.144 This maintenance contract, and the others that the Coalition has funded, are set to expire in mid-2007, at which time it is expected that MOI will assume responsibility for maintenance.145

According to the MOI Logistics Concept of Support, the Coalition has had to provide a “substantial” amount of fuel to the MOI forces because of problems with the cumbersome request process, lack of MOI delivery capability, and subjective distribution system.146 The Coalition also has been responsible for forecasting, procuring, and issuing most of the ammunition for the ministry.147 Since the MOI has limited capability for movement of supplies, the Coalition has provided transportation of force-generation equipment and supplies using Coalition forces and contractors.148

**MOI Logistics and Equipment Issues**

Key challenges for equipping the MOI and developing an MOI logistics system include the lack of approved plans and the lack of reliable reporting on the status of these forces. Both of these challenges can partly be attributed to the fact that responsibility for plans and reporting is not centralized within the MOI. Furthermore, the MOI logistics directorates lack capacity and have some of the lowest TRA ratings of any of the ISF ministerial organizations.149

The biggest problem for the MOI forces among all the TRA categories evaluated is maintenance of vehicles, communications equipment, and weapons.150 As mentioned earlier, one reason for these maintenance problems is that the Coalition has issued equipment with advanced electronics. This equipment requires a high level of technical skill, as well as advanced diagnostic tools to maintain.151 There are limited sources of spare parts in Iraq for Coalition-provided equipment. The Iraqis have been forced to use cannibalization as the primary source of repair parts because the Coalition efforts to provide spares via short-term contracts or the MOI use of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) have been insufficient.152 As a result, GAO and others report that a large number of IPS vehicles are inoperable.153 Although one solution to the vehicle maintenance problem is a plan to build a central maintenance facility in Baghdad, it is not clear how vehicles from all parts of the country will be transported to this facility.154 MNSTC-I believes that a key source of these maintenance problems is that MOI is not willing to accept responsibility for either accountability or maintainability of equipment. Moreover, MNSTC-I contends that there has been no enforcement of individual accountability or serviceability of equipment.155
The operational readiness of some equipment and infrastructure systems suffer because maintenance supplies, spare parts, and sustainment funding were never provided by the Coalition and are not currently provided by the GOI. MNSTC-I has supplied thousands of individual weapons to the MOI forces, but has issued only a few of the authorized cleaning and spare parts kits. The Advanced First Responder Network (AFRN), which is a secure radio network that supports emergency response by linking MOI forces operating in 15 cities, suffers from problems with equipment incompatibilities with other communication systems, inconsistent power, and difficulty replacing parts. Spare parts were not included in the original contract. The GOI provided funds from the Development Fund for Iraq for an AFRN sustainment contract managed by the U.S. Government, which expired on December 31, 2006. MNSTC-I then provided funds for a “bridging” contract to sustain the network until the MOI could award its own follow-on contract. The MNSTC-I contract was supposed to expire on March 31, 2007, but it is not known if MOI has assumed responsibility for sustainment of the AFRN.

The status of equipment and logistics support to MOI forces is poorly understood because of a lack of adequate reporting. Monthly MNF-I reporting provides information on less than half of the approximately 1100 IPS stations. With a lack of reporting comes a lack of accountability. Much of the equipment provided by the Coalition to the MOI forces is unaccounted for or is not assessed for its state of operational readiness. The NP has the highest percentage of authorized equipment reported “on-hand.” This can probably be attributed to the centralized command and control of these forces. In contrast, the IPS and other MOI forces have a very low rate of on-hand equipment. The IPS report roughly only 50% of issued pistols, machine guns, and body armor are on-hand and only about 25% of handheld and vehicle radios issued remain on-hand. Even lower rates of equipment accountability are reported for the POE, with, for example, less than 1% of the several thousand pistols issued reported to be on-hand. One contributing factor to this problem is that the IPS often have their weapons confiscated at checkpoints by other members of the Iraqi Security Forces or Coalition forces because MOI has not issued them identification badges. Another factor may be the diversion of MOI equipment to insurgents by corrupt MOI officials. MNF-I recognizes that the reporting for MOI forces (particularly the IPS, POE, and DBE) is inadequate, but it is not clear what MNF-I or MOI are doing to make improvements.

The MOI does not sufficiently support its forces in the field, especially the IPS. The Coalition is currently responsible for procuring and distributing ammunition to all MOI forces. There have been reports that police stations either fail to request ammunition when they run out or they request excessive amounts of ammunition. In any case, many stations lack sufficient ammunition. The MOI is starting to take responsibility for ammunition replenishment to the NP, and is resorting to FMS to procure these supplies. However, the Coalition complains that for unknown reasons the MOI consistently denies these requests for ammunition, resulting in the Coalition supporting them. The Coalition provides ammunition to all the other MOI forces. Since the Coalition is providing stocks of ammunition and repair parts for weapons, the MOI only has to procure personal supplies, general materials, and fuel. The MOI’s plan is to use FMS to procure repair parts, but to date only 1% of the
requirement has been met through this means. As to fuel, there are conflicting reports about the amount provided to MOI forces by the Coalition. As mentioned earlier, the Coalition has had to provide a substantial amount of fuel because the MOI has been unable to provide for its forces. Some PTT members state that they had to provide fuel for their IP units so they could go on joint patrols. On the other hand, other MNF-I data show that while fuel delivery to MOI forces is a key problem, the Coalition provides very little fuel, only an emergency supply. Regardless of which organization is supplying fuel, the reports show that the MOI forces received less than one-third of their requested fuel amounts for January through April 2007.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Iraqi Police Service

Finding 1: The Coalition views the development of a professional, impartial local police force committed to the rule of law as central to the strategic goal of “a unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror.” The Coalition has not appropriately prioritized this mission.

Finding 2: The Coalition Provisional Authority recognized early in 2004 that the Iraqi police force was in need of substantial and long-term reform in the following areas: vetting, screening, training, deterrence, mentoring, and monitoring.

Finding 3: Despite early recognition of the centrality of police to the strategy, it was not until 2006 that Multi-National Force-Iraq announced the “Year of the Police,” and focused efforts to generate, train, and mentor the Iraqi Police Service.

Finding 4: Though there is strong evidence that many of the police are operationally ineffective, and their organization is riddled with corruption and sectarian influence, as of March 2007 (13 months after the “Year of the Police” began), the Coalition turned over vetting, screening, and basic training to the Ministry of Interior.

Finding 5: Transferring responsibility for the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) to the Government of Iraq after a single year of focused effort on force generation appears to have been premature and ill-advised for a number of reasons. Multi-National Force-Iraq lacks (1) IPS personnel and equipment accountability data, (2) visibility into the vetting process, (3) an ability to determine whether police personnel have received appropriate training, and (4) familiarity with community policing in Iraqi society. Other factors include: immaturity of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and its lack of capacity to support IPs in the field, undeveloped Iraqi judicial and penal systems which cannot yet support the police, and an unclear chain of command between the
MOI and the provincial governments. Finally, the Coalition has a substantial shortage of personnel mentoring and assessing the performance of the IPS.

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to adopt a new strategy for the development of the Iraqi Police Service as soon as possible.

Finding 6: The Department reports that tens of thousands of Iraqi Police Service personnel have been hired outside of the Coalition’s train-and-equip program.

Finding 7: As of March 2007, neither the Coalition nor the Ministry of Interior is able to monitor effectively who is serving in the Iraqi Police Service, and whether these personnel have been properly vetted or trained.

Finding 8: Neither the Coalition nor the Ministry of Interior can properly account for equipment issued to Iraqi Police Service personnel.

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to devise a strategy to monitor the Iraqi Police Service at the provincial and ministerial level. This will require an effective personnel management and tracking system.

Finding 9: As of March 2007, shortages in the number of Police Transition Teams “limit” the opportunity to advise and mentor the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) in 13 out of 18 provinces, and they prevent any meaningful overall assessment of IPS capabilities and performance.

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to increase the numbers of Police Transition Teams, throughout Iraq, and to resource these as a high priority.

Finding 10: Some Iraqi police officers are committing or abetting acts of violence. Militia infiltration of Iraqi police units remains a significant problem.

Finding 11: Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq assesses the Ministry of Interior as being only partially effective in performing key ministry functions, such as developing and implementing plans and policies, intelligence, personnel management, logistics, communications, and budgeting.

Ministry of Interior

Finding 1: Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces will not make significant contributions to the security and stability of Iraq until the logistics system, and the MOI and provincial institutions responsible for logistics support, improve.

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to evaluate the effectiveness and resourcing of the Ministry of Interior-Transition Team, and provide its findings in its September report to Congress.
Finding 2: There is inadequate reporting on the status of equipment issued and logistical support provided to Ministry of Interior forces.

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to reassess how and when it expects Ministry of Interior forces to contribute to stability and security given the immaturity of the logistics support system.

Finding 3: Ministry of Interior forces cannot account for a significant amount of Coalition-issued equipment.

Recommendation: The committee should recommend that Multi-National Force (MNF-I) assist the Ministry of Interior to improve the reporting and property accounting systems for civil security forces. MNF-I must find ways to motivate ministerial, provincial, and local authorities to take responsibility for property accountability.

Finding 4: The Government of Iraq has not yet approved the Ministry of Interior logistics plans that were developed in November 2006.

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to determine the reasons for low rates of on-hand equipment and then rectify the problem within 60 days.

Finding 5: The level of reporting on the Ministry of Interior (MOI) logistics development effort does not match the significance of these efforts, and Congress is not adequately informed about progress toward MOI self-reliance.

Recommendation: The committee should direct the Department to determine the reasons for the delay in approving these logistics plans and to report the findings to Congress within 60 days.

Recommendation: The committee should direct the Department to provide monthly reports starting immediately to Congress on its progress in equipping the Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces and transferring responsibility and control of logistics operations to the MOI. These reports should include:

1. Details of Multi-National Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I) plan(s) and progress in executing the plan(s) to train logistics personnel for the MOI;
2. The adequacy of the MOI budget to support its logistics capability and an assessment of MOI’s ability to execute this budget;
3. Progress against the event tracker for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) Logistics Action Plan as monitored by the MNSTC-I J4 logistics support operations office and reported monthly to MNF-I at the Logistics Action Working Group;
4. Progress on retention of logisticians in these position;
5. Assessments of the MOI and the Civil Security Forces abilities to maintain logistics operations and capabilities after accepting control and responsibility from the Coalition; and
6. An update on the national logistics timeline and report on progress to meet the milestones.
NOTES CHAPTER 4


2 The term “Iraqi Security Forces” includes armed forces controlled by the Ministry of Defense and the civil security forces controlled by the Ministry of Interior. The civil security forces include the Iraqi Police Service, which is the subject of this chapter, as well the paramilitary National Police, the Directorate of Border Enforcement forces, and the Dignitary Protection force. Another large force, the Facilities Protection Service (FPS), was recently placed back under the jurisdiction of the MOI after having been previously assigned to the various ministries the FPS protect. MOI does not have command and control of the FPS. U.S. Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007* (Sec 9010, PL 109-289) (Mar 2007).

3 This is the figure routinely reported in the Department of State’s *Iraq Weekly Status Report* (15 Nov 2006 through 30 May 2007, available at: http://www.state.gov/p/nea/tr/trp/iraqstatus/2006/c18335.htm). However, as will be discussed in this chapter, the Department of Defense has repeatedly reported that it does not have reliable data on the number of personnel serving in the Iraqi Police Service. LTG Dempsey and MG William Hunzeker recently commented to members on a congressional delegation that the IPS was 60,000 personnel above strength. LTG Dempsey (Commander MNSTC-I), “Iraqi Security Forces Update” (briefing to Codel Spratt, Baghdad, Iraq: 28 May 2007). DOD, *9010 Report* (Mar 2007), p. 32. DOD does not report on the different IPS forces separately.


6 Headquarters Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5)* (Dec 2006), pp. 6-19.

7 “There is currently no reliable data” on how many of the Coalition-trained personnel continue to serve. “Additionally, the MOI has hired a significant number of police beyond those trained by MNSTC-I.” DOD, *9010 Report* (Jun 2007), p. 31. See also, DOD, *9010 Report* (Mar 2007), p. 30, Equipment Accountability.


9 See DOD, *9010 Report* (Mar 2007), p. 32, noting that locally-hired police, which have been reported to be in the tens of thousands, “are put on the job with minimal or no training.”

10 LTG Dempsey testified: “...with police, what we have learned is there is no history in Iraq, and I might even say in the region – because I have traveled extensively in the region – of police that are what you and I would describe as a force that live to protect and serve the population. Police forces in the region are notably corrupt. And they get that way because, as they say, they live at the point of corruption.” See, U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Development and Operational Capability of the Iraqi Security Forces* (110th Cong., 1st sess., 12 Jun 2007).


14 See, DOD, *9010 Report* (Mar 2007), p. 33, “Cost and risk preclude deploying enough PTTs to cover all of Iraq’s [more than 1100] police stations; at any time only 5 of Iraq’s 18 provinces have sufficient PTTs to conduct the full range of activities,” including assessing operational readiness.


18 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq's Security Sector, p. xii.
19 General Petraeus testified that at least 30,000 of the older members of the police force would be offered a severance payment to allow them to retire. DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, 9. U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Training of the Iraq Security Forces (108th Cong., 2nd sess., 17 Jun 2004).
20 DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 9.
21 DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 9.
22 CPA and MOI, Police Assessment, p. 4.
23 HASC Hearing, ISF Training.
24 CPA and MOI, Police Assessment, p. 4.
25 The IGs found the decentralization “[c]onsistent with the CPA goal of erasing troublesome aspects of the Hussein regime” but also found that it “further diluted cohesion and effectiveness of the residual force.” DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 9.
26 CPA and MOI, Police Assessment, p. 5.
27 CPA and MOI, Police Assessment, p. 5.
29 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq's Security Sector, p. 11.
30 RAND authors report an ISF acceleration program in late summer 2003, nicknamed “30k in 30 days,” which mandated a rapid increase in the numbers of ISF, notably Iraqi police. DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 55. Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq's Security Sector, p. 16.
31 DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 56.
32 DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 56.
33 DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 56.
34 “Perhaps no task is more critical than developing a modern, professional police force that enjoys the confidence of all Iraqi peoples,” said Caldwell.” “Hunzeker praised the Iraqi Police and expressed the importance of the police to Iraq. ‘No tool is more important to a burgeoning democracy than a well trained police force capable of establishing the rule of law in Iraq and protecting the Iraqi people,’ he said.” William B. Caldwell and Kenneth W. Hunzeker, statements at Combined Press Information Center event (7 Feb 2007, available at: http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=9761&Itemid=128).
37 LTG Petraeus, Answers to Advance Policy Questions, p. 3.
38 LTG Petraeus, Answers to Advance Policy Questions, p. 15.
40 O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS.
41 O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS.
44 DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 9. Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). But see, Center for Army Lessons Learned, 07-16: Zero to Blue, Chapter 2, Section 2, which suggests that U.S. cities were also used as a basis for comparison (available at: https://call2.army.mil/new/toc.asp?document=2689).
45 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 25. According to interviews with PTT members, these forces are minimally equipped. They reported not having badges, having their weapons confiscated, having soft-sided, non-armored vehicles, austere stations, and non-secure radios that work only on a line-of-sight basis and are jammed by Coalition C-IED gear. Confidential staff interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007).
The continuing challenge of building the Iraqi security forces

47. DOD, *9010 Report* (Mar 2007), p. 25. PTT members reported that the Iraqis experience high casualties and absenteeism. Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007).
49. The report does not provide separate numbers for how many of the replenished forces are for the IPS. DOD, *9010 Report* (Mar 2007), p. 27.
51. O&I Hearing, *Development of the IPS*.
53. O&I Hearing, *Development of the IPS*.
54. Lieutenant Bridges is the Commander Headquarters Detachment, 372d Military Police Battalion, U.S. Army National Guard.
55. As discussed, *infra*, other Police Transition Team members have also identified problems with the proper badging of the IPS and the effect it has on their ability to perform. They claim to have seen a warehouse full of badges, but they couldn’t get them for the IPs. One PTT made their own for their Iraqi police. They said it made a huge difference in morale. Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). O&I Hearing, *Development of the IPS*.
56. O&I Hearing, *Development of the IPS*.
57. DOD, *9010 Report* (Mar 2007), p. 30. The November 2006 DOD quarterly report stated that 180,000 police were thought to be on the MOI payroll at that time. See also, O&I Hearing, *Development of the IPS*. “When I MEF arrived in Feb 2006, the police force in Al Anbar had approximately 2143 assigned policeman with an additional 1599 in training. However, a large number of these 2143 policemen were not working.”
59. That is, payroll numbers are higher than the actual number of Iraqi police officers on hand. In some instances, the inflated numbers reflect the retention of police officers on the rolls who have been killed in action or severely wounded so the officers or their families can retain their pay and benefits. In other instances, it may be due to corruption. DOD, *9010 Report* (Mar 2007), pp. 28, 32. O&I Hearing, *Development of the IPS*.
61. O&I Hearing, *The Development of the Iraqi Security Forces*, where LTG Dempsey testified that there are “between 60,000 and 75,000 policemen on the payroll over the authorization and untrained by us.”
64. DOS and DOD, *Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training*, p. 23.
68. DOD, *9010 Report* (Nov 2006), p. 31. O&I Hearing, *The Development of the Iraqi Security Forces*, where LTG Dempsey testified that there are “between 60,000 and 75,000 policemen on the payroll over the authorization and untrained by us.”
70. Note that certain militias were encouraged to be a part of the ISF. Other militias were not. “Let me talk to you about militias in general. And I think we’ve got – I got to sharpen the language a bit, because there are some militias that are recognized even as far back as the CPA orders, captured again in the TAL, the Transitional Administrative Law, and even in the constitution they’re recognized. Those militias – Badr Corps, Peshmerga – there’s places that they can be accounted for in those legal documents. And we’ve actually assimilated a good number of them into the security forces. Then there’s militias that are not recognized militias. So we’ve got to be careful about the use of the term. And you mentioned one of them, Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM).” LTG Dempsey, DOD news briefing (24 Mar 2006, available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1172).

71 DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), p. 34.
72 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 32. The chairman and ranking member of the O&I subcommittee recently asked Secretary Gates for additional information regarding reports that the Prime Minister was purging the leadership of another MOI police force because the leaders were taking action against militia activity. PTT members have said in interviews that local police are only directed to pursue Sunni targets. See also, Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). See also, Confidential staff interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007).
73 Of the 230,000 employees screened, 5,300 were possible derogatory matches, resulting in 74 dismissals. DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 33. DOD, 9010 Report (Aug 2006), p. 46.
76 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 34.
78 “The basic requirements established by MOI for an Iraqi policeman were fairly simple by U.S. standards but difficult for many Iraqis. The largest disqualifier was basic literacy. Another large disqualifier was a lack of proper identification. The national identification card (Jensia card) was required for each applicant as proof of citizenship and proper age. However there had not been an operating Jensia office in Al Anbar since March 2003. This created a large number of fake or fraudulent Jensia cards at every recruiting drive.” O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS.
79 O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS.
82 The Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) was scheduled to end basic-level training by April 2007, “although the Department of State is looking at options to keep it open, to train limited numbers of Iraqi police officers in leadership and specialized courses, after the DOD funding for the facility ends.” The U.S. controlled portion is only training Iraqi corrections officers. DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 32.
84 At first, basic training was an 8-week course, but that was deemed insufficient and was lengthened to 10 weeks. The training includes 32 hours of human rights training. DOD, 9010 Report (May 2006), p. 61.
85 USA MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 84.
86 USA MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 84.
88 USA MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 85.
89 USA MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 85.
91 “Unlike most other provinces within Iraq, Al Anbar does not have its own Police Training Academy. This made the training for new police recruits very difficult for all police within Al Anbar. Most Iraqis from Al Anbar were not comfortable leaving their homes for a longer period of time. The logistics of safely moving large
numbers of Iraqis to and from schools outside of Al Anbar each month was difficult at best.” O&I Hearing, 
Development of the IPS.
92 O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS.
93 The MOI authorized provincial governors to hire additional IPS personnel, who may or may not have received 
95 Blackwater USA, Quicklook Assessment (25 Sep 2006), p. 5.
96 The MCU is not part of the IPS. According to MNF-I, “[t]here are Major Crimes Units within Provincial 
Police Departments, however the Ministry of Interior maintains a central Major Crimes Unit organization for 
crimes on a national level and when crimes affect more than one province.” See, MNF-I website.
97 Blackwater USA, Quicklook Assessment, (25 Sep 2006), pp. 4-5.
98 The Department of Defense reports there are more than 1100 police stations. See, DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 
99 John J. McGrath, Iraqi Security Forces: An Order of Battle, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute 
100 For additional information, refer to chapter 7 on Transition Teams.
106 O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS. Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, 
108 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 30, reporting 135,000 IPS trained by the Coalition and 135,800 Army 
personnel trained by the Coalition. But see O&I Hearing, The Development of the Iraqi Security Forces, where LTG 
Dempsey testified that there are “between 60,000 and 75,000 policemen on the payroll over the authorization 
and untrained by us.”
109 The Army’s PTT Instructor Guide states that “[i]t can easily take 2-5 days to properly complete this report” 
but also praises the report as an excellent planning tool for training and infrastructure planning purposes. USA 
110 USA MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 126.
111 USA MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 127.
112 USA MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 130.
115 DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), p. 34.
116 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 33. “DOD and MNF-I may not be able to account Iraqi security forces’ 
receipt of about 90,000 rifles and about 80,000 pistols that were reported as issued but were not recorded during 
earlier phases of the train-and-equip program for Iraq.” U.S. Government Accountability Office, Securing, 
117 O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS. Weapons caches are often turned over to the Iraqis without either 
forensic analysis performed (unexploded IEDs) or recording serial numbers (weapons). Confidential staff 
technical interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007).
118 Some Police Transition Teams reported that they were making their own badges and that this improved 
morale. Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007).
119 Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007).
120 O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS. Confidential staff interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007).
121 Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007).
123 PTTs reported that once they trained a leader, that leader was transferred, but trying to get a problematic 
leader removed was an even bigger challenge. 372d National Guard Military Police (staff briefing, 21 May 2007). 
O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS.
The subcommittee has requested a copy of the MOI Logistics Action Plan, only recently having learned of its existence. These include contracts for vehicle maintenance, spare parts, and warehouse operations. Each of the MOI forces has its own logistics structure and command and control organizations. For more information, refer to section on MOI logistics organization. For various reasons including hoarding, corruption, sense of seniority, and privilege. Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). Confidential interviews with TT veterans (Fort Riley, KS: 16 May 2007).


Ministry of Interior, Concept of Support, Logistics Function – Current (Nov 2006).


MOI, Concept of Support.

GAO, Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities, p. 11.

List of equipment provided to MOI forces by MNSTC-I (15 Mar 2007) in response to Request for Information by U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Example numbers: 148,914 9 mm pistols but only 6,932 out of 172,213 authorized cleaning kits; 160,898 AK-47 rifles issued but 0 out of 150,459 authorized cleaning kits.
Additionally, only 20% of issued radios and body armor are reported to be on-hand for the POE forces. SIGIR and GAO have reviewed DOD accountability for equipment it has provided to MOI and MOD security forces and found that DOD cannot ensure all equipment has been issued to the ISF nor can it account for equipment after it has been issued to the ISF. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, Transition Readiness Assessments by MOI Transition Team (May 2007), pp. 20-23. See also, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Draft Report – Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure that U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces (GAO-07-711) (Jun 2007). See also, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (SIGIR-06-033) (28 Oct 2006).

Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). See also, Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007). See also, Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007).


Confidential staff interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007).

MOI, Concept of Support.
5: NATIONAL POLICE, BORDER PROTECTION SERVICE, AND THE FACILITIES PROTECTION SERVICE

“Unprofessional, and, at times, criminal behavior has been attributed to certain units of the National Police.”

-- DOD 9010 Report, August 2006

“There continues to be evidence that FPS personnel are unreliable and, in some cases, responsible for violent crimes and other activity.”

-- DOD 9010 Report, March 2007

INTRODUCTION

Since its inception in 2004, the National Police (NP) have been riddled with corruption and sectarian influence, and members have participated in illegal activities. As a result, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) has focused its NP efforts on transforming and retraining these units. The Border Protection Service (BPS) is large but does not garner much attention, and the Facilities Protection Service (FPS) is an unknown quantity, largely because of its decentralized organization and lack of embedded Transition Teams (see table 2).

Unlike the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) was never dissolved. One reason for this was that Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) hoped to turn over responsibility for internal security and policing as soon as practicable. Originally, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) was to be the MOI force designed to provide a responsive capability to internal threats. As will be explained in the following chapter, the ICDC was later transferred to the control of the Ministry of Defense and incorporated into the Iraqi Army.

This chapter addresses the Ministry of Interior and its security forces other than the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), which is the focus of the preceding chapter.

The Iraqi Civil Security Forces (ICSF), under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, include (1) the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) which is primarily provincial, traditional “law and order” police forces, (2) the Iraqi National Police Force which is organized along military lines
and operates as a paramilitary force with a counterinsurgency mission, and (3) other supporting police forces, such as the Iraqi Border Police and the Customs Police.

Table 2: Ministry of Interior Organization Levels.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL POLICE</td>
<td>26,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BORDER ENFORCEMENT</td>
<td>28,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERU</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORENSICS</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIGNITARY PROTECTION</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>59,924</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NATIONAL POLICE**

The CPA recognized the need for a “high-end” paramilitary police force in early 2004.9 However, the National Police (NP), originally called the Special Police Forces,10 lack a “charter” in CPA orders that established other security organs. The National Police include special police commando brigades and public order brigades. The special police commando units were an Iraqi Minister of Interior initiative created without Coalition assistance.11 Public Order units were to act, “… as a bridging force to restore and maintain law and order in cities where the police force [had] not yet been established or [would] be reconstituted due to insurgent activity.”12

The MOI tasked these forces with “providing a national rapid-response capability to counter armed insurgency, large-scale civil disobedience, and riots.”13 Additionally, the MOI created a mobile capability in the 1st Special Police Mechanized brigade to provide route security along the highway between the International [Green] Zone and Baghdad International Airport.14 By September 2005, the MOI Special Police Forces had grown to 12 public order battalions, 12 special police command battalions, 2 mechanized battalions, and an emergency response unit.15 In August 2005, the Special Police Forces were renamed the National Police Forces.16 The May 2006 DOD 9010 Report to Congress recounts how this transpired:

The Minister of Interior signed an order to reorganize and merge the Police Commandos, the Public Order and Mechanized Police, and the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) to form a single force, the Iraqi National Police, on April 1, 2006. The National Police are organized with a National Police [Command] Headquarters, under which will fall the 1st and 2nd National Police Divisions, the 1st National Police Mechanized Brigade, and the ERU. These two divisions were formed from the Commando Division and the Public Order Division.17
National Police Transformation

During 2005 the U.S. Government reported positively on the NP.\(^\text{18}\) This changed in May 2006 when the DOD 9010 Report to Congress alluded to “[a]llegations of detainee abuse, and extrajudicial police actions.”\(^\text{19}\) The Ministry of Interior, concerned about a pattern of unprofessional and even criminal behavior on the part of many National Police units, started pulling National Police brigades out of counterinsurgency operations for retraining.\(^\text{20}\) The centerpiece of this program, called the National Police Transformation Plan, was a three-week training course focused on civil policing skills and respect for human rights and the rule of law.\(^\text{21}\) In addition to the May MOI transformation, in October 2006 MNF-I took a National Police brigade offline because of its ties to Shi’a sectarian violence.\(^\text{22}\)

On October 5, 2006, U.S. Military forces removed the entire 8th brigade of the 2nd National Police Division from duty and arrested its officers after the brigade was implicated in a raid on a food factory in Baghdad and the kidnapping of 26 Sunni workers of which seven were executed. This was among the first public manifestations of a CPATT program to remove all the National Police brigades from service for limited vetting and reorientation.\(^\text{23}\)

Later in 2006, a new Minister of Interior, Jawad al-Bulani, refined the transformation plan toward a new mission.

Although they are called police, the National Police have been trained primarily for military operations, and have received little traditional police training. They have proven useful in fighting the insurgency, but frequent allegations of abuse and other illegal activities have diminished the Iraqi public’s confidence in the National Police. For these reasons, the Government of Iraq decided to conduct a four-phased transformation of the National Police into a police organization that provides the Government of Iraq with cross-province policing capability.\(^\text{24}\)

The four phases of the revised NP Transformation Plan include:

- Phase I – Inspections and vetting;
- Phase II – Standardized collective training;
- Phase III – Will begin 90 days after North Atlantic Council endorses Italian-led training programs that will be based on the tactics, techniques, and procedures of Italy’s Carabinieri; and
- Phase IV – Involves positioning to train on contingencies such as security for pilgrimages, natural disasters, and national emergencies.\(^\text{25}\)

In a December 2006 interview, the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) commander, specified some of these elements:
Minister of Interior [al-Bulani]'s got a program of national police transformation, where we're pulling them off line a brigade at a time, taking them to Numaniyah, which is southeast of Baghdad, taking them through a four-week police training program, re-vetting the leaders to include all kinds of background checks ... We've actually seen some pretty significant change in those units that go through that process and a fairly whole-scale change of leaders in those units.26

A May 2007 update on the transformation revealed that MOI dropped 2,700 NPs from the rolls.27 It was not clear to MNSTC-I whether those dismissed were terminated because of unauthorized absence or because of performance. The Ministry also replaced five of nine brigade commanders. Again, it is unclear if they were relieved for performance-related reasons or because of sectarian biases. Additionally, MNSTC-I did not indicate whether these commanders have been relieved or transferred.

**National Police Force Structure**

Lieutenant Colonel John McGrath’s *Iraqi Order of Battle* gives the locations and designations of the NP brigades. Four of the brigades were formerly part of the disbanded 1st SP division (1, 2, 3, 7). The other four were part of the Public Order division (4, 5, 6, 8).28

NP brigade headquarters are predominantly in the vicinity of the capital, and all but one brigade are currently operating in greater Baghdad.29 The 1st and 2nd brigades’ headquarters are in northern Baghdad. The remaining headquarters are located as follows: 3rd brigade headquarters is in Samarra, 4th brigade in Salman Pak, 5th brigade in Camp Justice (Baghdad), 6th brigade in Mashtal (Baghdad), 7th brigade in southwestern Baghdad, 8th brigade in Walid, and the 1st NP mechanized brigade in western Baghdad.

Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) is supporting the Prime Minister’s Initiative (PMI) to generate a 10th NP brigade.30 It will be a division-size force made up of Army and National Police forces and will be used to protect reconstruction of the Samarra Shrine.

**DEPARTMENT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT (DBE)**

The Border Police were originally organized into 36 battalions.31 When they were established, a Department report noted:

The BTTs’ members are trained in various specialties, including logistics and communications, and provide critical assistance to the border force commanders in the areas of personnel management, intelligence, operations, budgeting and equipment accountability/maintenance.32
CPA Order 26 created the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), including the Port of Entry security forces (POE), and Ambassador Bremer placed it within the MOI. His order gave broad authority to the DBE, including responsibility for the border police, customs police, immigration police, and coastal patrol. These functions had been performed by 100,000 men under Saddam Hussein. The CPA staffed the department with 10,000 officers. The department currently has an authorized end-strength of 33,000 personnel with 28,360 trained and equipped and formed in 42 battalions as of May 2007. The Coalition has repeatedly reported concerns that foreign fighters and weapons are crossing Iraq's borders at a constant and dangerous rate.

**OTHER COMPONENTS**

CPA Order 27 established the Facilities Protection Service (FPS) on September 4, 2003. It allowed the individual ministries, including the Ministry of Defense (MOD), to raise their own guard forces, subject to the administrative guidance of the MOI. These forces were not part of the MOI, with the exception of that ministry's own FPS. The CPA order permitted other ministries to employ contract security forces for this purpose. Ministries with larger budgets and vulnerable facilities, such as oil and electricity, exercised this option. By the time the CPA transferred sovereignty to the Iraqis in June 2004, there were nearly 75,000 members of the FPS. Recent reports estimate that there are about 145,000 FPS personnel working for 27 ministries.

MNF-I reported that the FPS personnel are not part of the ISF train-and-equip requirements. As a result, the number of trained and equipped ISF members does not include FPS. Consequently, MNF-I does not expect to fund training and equipping of the FPS. In response to a subcommittee query, MNF-I provided the following:

The FPS was originally established in 2003 by Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 27 to protect fixed infrastructure and facilities controlled by the various government ministries …. CPA Order 27 [directed MOI] to establish standards for training FPS personnel, and issue administrative orders that would be binding on all ministry FPS forces.

In practice, the FPS remained a loose confederation of mainly contract security guards … at the 27 Iraqi ministries. Increasingly, many ministries have resisted central authority over their guard forces, particularly as the political parties that have gained control over many of the ministries have used the FPS as an employment opportunity for loyal militia.

To reassert authority over the FPS, the Iraqi government took action to consolidate all FPS personnel under the MOI into single force of approximately 110,000 employees. Although the MOI has assumed responsibility to train and vet the FPS, the Ministry of Finance has not yet
transferred funding responsibility to the MOI, and most ministries are resistant to cede control over their forces without a new law or directive by the Prime Minister requiring that they do so.44

PERSONNEL, RECRUITING, TRAINING, AND TRACKING

Recruiting

While it is not entirely clear how the MOI first recruited the NP, it appears that the ministry pieced it together from Saddam-era Sunni commandos and Shi’a militia. One expert has found that “Badr Brigade [Shi’a] militiamen were organized into commando-style units, which were incorporated into the Iraqi National Police.”45

While CPATT is currently working to “replenish” the NP units with replacement personnel, MOI is responsible for the actual recruiting and vetting of new NPs.46 It is not clear how the ministry is doing this.

Training

The DOD 9010 Report covering the period before the October 2005 Iraqi Referendum to approve the constitution details the MNSTC-I training for the Special Police commandos:

New recruits to the Special Police Commandos, who typically are seasoned military veterans, undergo six weeks of intense training at the Special Police Commando Academy in Northern Baghdad. Each training cycle is designed to accommodate 300 to 500 students. The syllabus spans weapons qualification, urban patrolling techniques, unarmed combat apprehension, use of force, human rights and ethics in policing, introduction to Iraqi law, vehicle check points, and improvised explosive device characteristics and recognition.47

MNSTC-I developed a similar six-week syllabus for the Public Order units at the Civil Intervention Force Academy at Numaniyah Military Base.48 Although it is unclear what initial, general training the Mechanized Police received, the battalions were put through a training course specific to their vehicles at Camp Taji. This training covered vehicle operations, communications and vehicle maintenance.49 The Special Police reached its force structure goal by October 2005.

As opposed to the reporting on the NP, the Department has provided little information on the training for the DBE. This department operates three academies with a total capacity of 800 students.50 The training provides:
An introduction to law enforcement, human relations, human rights, weapons qualification, combat life-saving, vehicle searches, Iraqi border law, arrest and detainee procedures, and small unit patrolling.51

Currently, DynCorp is recruiting veteran U.S. Border Patrol agents to fill a State Department contract to send 120 volunteers to help train Iraqi border enforcement officers.52

Tracking

NP Transition Teams (NPTTs), formerly called SP Transition Teams (SPTTs), track members of the NP. The data in DOD reporting does not give an accurate picture of the manning of the NP. Table 2 tracks the total number of personnel who have moved through the training pipeline, not the number of personnel currently available for. In fact, these numbers include absent-without-leave (AWOL) personnel. Additionally, MOI personnel reporting does not include the approximately 145,000 Facilities Protection Service guards working in the 27 GOI ministries.53 If tracking for the NP is problematic, DBE and FPS tracking is worse.54

LEADERSHIP

TTs include leadership evaluations of NP and BPS units in their TRAs. The last DOD 9010 Report indicated there were 39 NPTTs and 28 BTTs.55 Like their MiTT counterparts, these TTs serve to “help professionalize the forces, improve operational effectiveness, and provide links to Coalition combat enablers.”56 Another of their functions is to “[p]rovide daily mentoring on proper police procedures as well as preventing human rights violations.”57

Upon NATO approval, MNSTC-I plans for the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) to conduct NP training based on the tactics, techniques, and procedures of Italy’s carabinieri.58

OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

The NP operational effectiveness is hampered by the absenteeism mentioned earlier. In addition, the operational effectiveness of all MOI forces is hindered by sectarian, primarily Shi’a, influence. In a December 2006 interview, Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey was asked if he “[c]ould quantify at all the sectarian influence in the ministries? The general replied:

If you're talking about the forces … what we've got is … reams, really, of anecdotal evidence, and then there are some specific cases where we have actually either caught individuals in the act or groups in the act. And the number of those instances is rather low. Now – except for one particular group, and that's the national police. We believe that – and I've said in
previous engagements – about 20 to 25 percent of them probably needed to be weeded out.\textsuperscript{59}

While the NPTP is essential in the long run, in the short term it creates a shortage in effective strength. The MOI has a very limited capability to deploy any of its NP battalions. These battalions have not even completed deployment training, much less exercised this capability.\textsuperscript{60}

**FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Finding 1: Corruption, illegal activity, and sectarian influence are serious problems that constrain progress in developing the National Police.

Finding 2: The Ministry of Interior and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq are addressing this problem through the National Police Transformation Plan.

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to include an assessment of the National Police Transformation Plan in its September report to Congress.

Finding 3: Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq reports that it has trained and equipped 26,314 National Police; however, the number who remain operational is not known.

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to report how many National Police members remain in the force and to account for the difference between the “trained and equipped” numbers and the operational numbers.

Finding 4: Given the size of the border and the reported extra-territorial threat, 33,000 personnel is probably too small a force for the Department of Border Enforcement.

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to submit a report on Department of Border Enforcement force structure assumptions.
NOTES CHAPTER 5

3 The subcommittee did not learn much about the Department of Border Enforcement. The Facilities Protection Service was only recently subordinated to MOI.
9 Andrew Rathmell et al, *Developing Iraq’s Security Sector*, p. 49.
11 John J. McGrath, *Order of Battle*, p. 78.
21 MNSTC-I, “Iraqi National Police Unveil Quick Look.”
The continuing challenge of building the Iraqi security forces


59 “DOD News Briefing with LTG Dempsey from Iraq.”

60 One NP battalion of 27 has been trained for counterinsurgency and is evaluated as having considerable limitations in training, deploying, sustaining, and controlling subordinate forces. Multi-National Force Iraq, *MOI Transition Readiness Assessments* (unclassified, May 2007), p. 38.
6: THE ARMED FORCES AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

“Given the persistence of the violence by insurgents, terrorists and militias, the Iraqi forces will require continued training, development and equipping to be able to progressively assume missions from Coalition forces.”

-- DOD 9010 Report, June 2007

INTRODUCTION

The Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) have seen a dramatic increase in size since their inception and have shown some improvement in operational effectiveness since the nadir of Fallujah in April 2004. However, 1) it is difficult to assess the competence of the IAF as a result of imprecise and unclear reporting by the Department of Defense (DOD); 2) after four years, the IAF still rely heavily on the Coalition for rudimentary logistics, transportation, and fire support capabilities; and 3) the IAF has yet to become a truly national force because of religious, sectarian, and ethnic divisions, along with other cultural factors. The four-year history of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) has seen a number of organizational changes, redesignation of missions, and component mergers. This was largely the result of mistaken assumptions concerning how challenging the security environment was going to be after the invasion and during the subsequent occupation. While the wisdom of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer’s decision early on to formally dissolve the Iraqi military is still being debated, planners did not anticipate that the burden for providing security would largely fall on Coalition forces.

A RAND study on the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA) experience in developing the ISF describes the disintegration of the Iraqi Army:

The situation on the ground in Iraq during April 2003 differed fundamentally from what had been expected. During the final phases of major combat operations, it became clear that even those Iraqi military units with which the Coalition had been in contact were not going to exist as formed units . . . used to assist with internal security. All Iraqi conscripts deserted, and the officer corps returned to their homes; Iraqi military facilities were comprehensively looted.

Furthermore, the Administration did not foresee the capacity of the Sunnis to organize effective opposition. They were also slow to come to grips with the rise of what soon became
an insurgency, which swiftly deteriorated into serious civil unrest, if not civil war. The RAND study summarizes these events in the early weeks after the fall of Baghdad:

The relatively rapid constitution of former regime elements insurgent networks in the weeks after the invasion, combined with the outbreak of nationalist and religious resistance in Sunni areas and an influx of foreign fighters, meant that the assumption of a smooth and rapid transition to post-combat operations proved false.

IRAQI ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT MAY 2003 – MAY 2004

In May 2003, Ambassador Bremer issued CPA Order 2, dissolving the entire 400,000-member Iraqi military and Ministry of Defense (MOD). The cornerstone of Ambassador Bremer’s plan for replacing it was originally called the “New Iraqi Corps (NIC),” later the “New Iraqi Army (NIA).” Bremer had announced the recruiting effort for the NIC in the context of a jobs-creation program, and initial plans called for fielding the first division within a year. The NIA, chartered in CPA Order 22, originally intended to have three divisions numbering 40,000 soldiers, one-tenth the size of the old army. This was to be an external threat-oriented, professional force with responsibilities for border protection, securing roads and installations, and clearing mines and unexploded ordnance. Officers from the old army who had participated in the “leadership tiers” of the Ba’ath Party were excluded from its ranks.

U.S. Special Operations Forces, that traditionally had performed the foreign internal defense mission, were stretched thin, and CPA had to search elsewhere for trainers for the Iraqi recruits. U.S. Army Colonel Frederick Kienle describes the rationale for using contractor support in his American Enterprise Institute piece, “...with insufficient conventional military forces available in Iraq, the task of building an Iraqi Security Force was outsourced to U.S. civilian contractors.”

In his book, *Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success*, Dr. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies outlines how the CPA organized this effort:

The first efforts to create Iraqi military forces began in July-August 2003, and the Coalition formally established the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) in August 2003 and made an initial Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) appropriation in November. The effort was led by Walter Slocombe, who became Iraq’s de facto minister of defense, and Major General Paul D. Eaton, who became the Commanding General of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team [CMATT].

CMATT would eventually grow to about 200 personnel representing a broad range of Coalition countries. Vinnell Corporation won a $48.0 million, one-year contract to assist with training and other support. It, in turn, subcontracted to Military Professional Resources,
Incorporated (MPRI) for training and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) for recruitment.\textsuperscript{16}

The initial program called for this NIA to be recruited and trained over a three-year time period, by August 2006. This was later accelerated to May 2004, just prior to the handover of sovereignty to the Government of Iraq (GOI). In August 2003 the first battalion of NIA recruits started a nine-week training course and graduated in October.\textsuperscript{17} The very difficult month of April 2004, which included the first “Battle of Fallujah” during Operation Iraqi Freedom, tested the capability of these military personnel. In many instances, they fled the battlefield, and that, among other factors, caused a rethinking of plans of how best – and how quickly – to train capable, professional ISF.\textsuperscript{18}

Another component of the security forces was the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) which was envisioned as an organization of locally recruited small units, working under Coalition forces, providing disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, fixed-site security, and convoy security.\textsuperscript{19} Ambassador Bremer announced plans for the ICDC on July 20, 2003, during Sunday television interviews.\textsuperscript{20} The ICDC was to have one battalion associated with each multi-national division, although the requirement eventually grew to one battalion in every province.\textsuperscript{21} The divisions trained their own ICDC battalions, as was the case with the 4\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division.\textsuperscript{22} To the extent the training was standardized, it lasted about three weeks,\textsuperscript{23} but in some cases it was as short as one week.\textsuperscript{24} Some U.S. commanders spent Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to equip their ICDC personnel.\textsuperscript{25} ICDC members were mostly non-military and they enlisted with the understanding that they would serve in the areas from which they were drawn, not deployed outside their traditional tribal, ethnic, or sectarian areas.\textsuperscript{26}

Soon after the April 2004 Battle of Fallujah, with the return to Iraqi sovereignty and the dissolution of the CPA in June 2004, interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi renamed the ICDC the Iraqi National Guard (ING).\textsuperscript{27} He placed it ostensibly under the Ministry of Defense, although it continued to work in support of Coalition forces. He also created the Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF), originally known as the Iraqi National Task Force (INTF) division. The INTF had been formed in response to the debacle with the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion failure in combat in Fallujah. While being moved to participate in that April 2004 siege, some battalion members refused to fight other Iraqis and the unit returned to Taji.\textsuperscript{28}

The INTF division was trained specifically to conduct counterinsurgency operations throughout the country. Members were recruited nationally from ICDC soldiers who were willing to fight other Iraqis.\textsuperscript{29} This division would later become the Iraqi Army’s 1\textsuperscript{st} Division.

**IAF: Development May 2004 to Present**

After the National Security Presidential Directive 36 was issued on May 11, 2004, the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) took the lead for Coalition efforts to train, equip, and organize Iraqi Security Forces. However, assessment of the performance and
capabilities of the ISF rests with the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). In addition, MNC-I has operational control over the Military Transition Teams (MiTTs). MNSTC-I and MNC-I are subordinate commands to the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I).

In July 2004, MNF-I formally stood up MNSTC-I and began implementing a comprehensive plan to transition security responsibility to the Iraqis. This plan called for training and equipping about 271,000 ISF including military and police. In addition to beginning to oversee this expansion of the ISF, the early months of MNSTC-I coincided with the consolidation of two disparate elements into the Iraqi Army. In September 2004, MNF-I arrested a senior member of the Iraqi National Guard, General Talib Al-Lahibi, on suspicion of having links with insurgent groups. Then in December 2004, the Iraqi Defense Minister announced that the ING, which was having problems withstanding insurgent attacks, would be disbanded in January 2005 and incorporated into the army. That same month, the Minister of Defense formally made the Iraqi Intervention Force part of the army as well.

As the security environment changed in 2005 and 2006, the requirement for ISF evolved until the goal became approximately 135,000 MOD personnel for what became known as the “objective counter-insurgency force,” not including police. Then, on October 31, 2006, the Iraqi Defense Minister announced plans to go beyond the prime minister’s previously announced plan. It called for adding 12,000 personnel to the Iraqi military in order to replace personnel losses and to increase the manning of combat units to 110% to improve present-for-duty strength. The new MOD proposal increased the size of the army by an additional 18,700 personnel. This will result in the creation of three new Iraqi Army (IA) division headquarters, an additional five brigade headquarters, 20 combat battalions, and one special operations battalion. This initiative is expected to take a year to complete.

Later in 2006, the Iraqi Government and the Coalition increased these goals, raising the 12,000 “replacements” figure to 30,000 and the 18,700 figure for new units to 24,000. On May 28, 2007, MNSTC-I briefed a congressional delegation in Iraq on a new 2007 growth plan. It showed a projected increase in the manning of combat units to 120%, which represents a total growth of 60,000 personnel over and above the 135,000 personnel already authorized for the objective counterinsurgency force. It is unclear who will train and equip the new soldiers, or bear the cost.

**FORCE STRUCTURE**

The IAF, which include the Joint Headquarters (JHQ), the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC), the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy (including Marines) are under the control of the MOD.

The total number of MOD military personnel is about 154,000, of which about 152,000 are in the Army and Special Forces. Table 3 depicts the “end strength” of the various Iraqi components that the United States and Coalition partners have “trained and equipped” as reported in the Department of State May 23, 2007 *Iraq Weekly Status Report*. The number of
Iraqi Army personnel who are present for duty at any time, however, will be less than the authorized strength due to casualties, desertion, and leave. This data does not bring to light the current operational capability, unit readiness, or exact number of personnel still serving.

Table 3: Ministry of Defense Personnel Levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY (including Support Forces)</td>
<td>150,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAQI SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES</td>
<td>1,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>1020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>1,148</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>154,588</td>
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“The actual number of present-for-duty soldiers is about one-half to two-thirds of the total due to scheduled leave, absence without leave, and attrition.”

-- DOD, 9010 Report (March 2007)

One of the challenges the IAF faced was to move from a force focused on external threats, referred to as the “current” force concept, to a force that is focused on defeating an insurgency, or the “objective” force concept. The Department considers this transformation of the Iraqi Army complete.44

MOD forces consist primarily of a 10-division army, and a small navy and air force. Pending the planned expansion of the IA, there are 36 brigade headquarters and 112 combat battalions, and two special operations battalions.

Prior to its dissolution in May 2003 by CPA Order 2,45 the former MOD was populated by uniformed military personnel.46 The CPA established the new MOD in March 2004, with 250 employees under which it reinforced the principle of civilian authority over the military.47

The JHQ is the organization that will assume MNSTC-I’s current role “when ready.”48 DOD reporting, however, describes the JHQ planning and coordination processes as “immature” and “currently hampered by bureaucracy, lack of trust and understanding, lack of experience with strategic planning, and dependence on Coalition support and funding.”49 MNSTC-I recognizes these deficiencies and has tasked the JHQ-Transition Team (TT) with helping the Iraqi headquarters address its shortcomings.50 Additionally, MPRI, a defense sector company specializing in institutional capacity building, has provided advisors to the MOD in almost all of its directorates.51
Table 4: Ministry of Defense Organization.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ministry of Defense Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi Armed Forces Joint Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Army (Iraqi Ground Forces Command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Nine infantry divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- One mechanized division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support Units (includes 9 Motor Transport Regiments and 3 Logistics battalions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strategic Infrastructure Force (3 brigade headquarters commanding 17 battalions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- One brigade commanding a counter-terrorism battalion, a commando battalion, a support battalion, and a special reconnaissance unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- One Training Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Three Transport Squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Two Reconnaissance Squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- One Patrol Boat Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- One Assault Boat Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- One Marine battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense University</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) is the IA’s operational headquarters. Established in May 2005, it currently provides command and control for eight of the 10 Iraqi Army divisions, its support establishment, and the Strategic Infrastructure Force. According to the State Department’s most recent report to Congress, the 5th and 7th IA Divisions “remain under MNF-I operational control” and are “on track for transition to Iraqi control by the summer of 2007.” The units under the IGFC’s command and control still require substantial Coalition logistics and sustainment.

Iraqi Army

The IA consists of nine light infantry divisions and one mechanized division. Each light infantry division has between three to five light infantry brigades. Within each brigade there are two to five light infantry battalions. The 9th Mechanized Infantry Division is outfitted with T-72 main battle tanks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. MNSTC-I made a decision to develop ground forces lacking fire support: heavy mortars, artillery, or aircraft capable of close air support. In fact, it considered this capability “counterproductive” to its efforts,
stating that, “counter-insurgency warfare does not rely on artillery or jets.”

Originally, the CPA had planned to withhold even tanks from the Iraqi Army. In an interview with The Financial Times in June 2004, the director of defense policy for CPA said, “Iraq will have a lightly-armed standing army and no heavy field artillery ... if tanks and attack aircraft were needed, Iraq will have to rely on US-led forces.” It was at Interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s insistence that an armored (tank) capability was added, making its debut in the January 2005 election.

Some experts believe that the composition and the recruiting of the IA units will challenge the Army’s ability to be a truly national force that can be deployed Iraq-wide. In his prepared testimony before the subcommittee, Dr. Cordesman described the effects of recruiting methods on the ethnic composition of Army and National Guard units:

While the nationally recruited divisions are more representative of Iraq’s ethno-religious composition, the even-numbered divisions were originally formed as National Guard units, to be deployed in their respective local regions. These units continued to be more ethnically and religiously representative of their region, not of Iraq as a whole.

In his Combat Institute Studies monograph on the order of battle of the IA, Colonel John McGrath gives details on each of the ten Iraqi divisions:

**Figure 5: Map of Iraqi Army Division Locations.**
The 1st Division was originally formed from the battalions of the Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF). The 2nd Division’s battalions are former ING units, and most are manned predominately by Kurdish troops, some being former Peshmerga militia units. The 3rd Division’s brigade headquarters and battalions are from the original 3-division NIA. The 4th Division’s battalions are former ING units, recruited locally. It is ethnically diverse and has operational control of a number of Strategic Infrastructure Battalions protecting oil pipelines. The 5th Division’s brigade headquarters and battalions were components of the NIA.

While most of the 6th Division’s battalions are former ING units, some with their origins in the ING’s predecessor, the ICDC, the division headquarters was not formed until August 2005. The 7th Division was raised in early 2005 to replace disbanded Sunni-dominated ING units which proved unreliable. The 8th Division is composed of former ING units, some of which were formed as early as 2004, but the division headquarters did not assume control of its area of operations until January 2006. The 9th (Mechanized) Division has the entire IA armored (tank) capability. It is ethnically diverse. Some of the battalions of the 10th Division are manned by Shi’a militia.

**Iraqi Air Force**

The CPA envisioned an Iraqi Air Force with only surveillance and reconnaissance, and a light transport capability. MNSTC-I also chose not to equip the Iraqi Air Force with fixed-wing jet fighters or attack (bomber) aircraft. In fact, it considers the assets unnecessary and incapable of influencing the counterinsurgency fight.

Throughout 2005 and 2006, the Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAF-TT) focused on establishing capabilities in two areas: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and in fixed-wing transport. The Iraqi Air Force squadrons tend to be atypically small. U.S. Air Force C-130 squadrons, for example, are equipped with between 12 and 16 aircraft. Iraq’s fixed-wing transport squadron operates what a DOD report describes as three “1960s vintage C-130E aircraft.” In its June 2007 9010 Report to Congress, the Department noted that the “MOD has requested an additional three Excess Defense Article C-130s from the [U.S. Government] to bring the squadron size to a more optimal level [6 aircraft].” Each of the two ISR squadrons is equipped with four to six light tactical observation aircraft. The Iraqi Air Force squadrons are small. U.S. Air Force C-130 squadrons, for example, are equipped with 12 to 16 aircraft. Additionally, the Iraqis are training and equipping three light utility helicopter squadrons with the missions of light transport and casualty evacuation. For 2008, MNSTC-I has tasked the CAF-TT with assisting the Iraqis in developing a light attack capability. MNSTC-I plans on filling this requirement with light turbo-prop aircraft. The mission for the post-Objective counterinsurgency (COIN) Air Force points toward external defense, but does not yet identify the resources in terms of fighter and interceptor aircraft to carry it out.

In the longer term, MNSTC-I is indeed concerned with transferring responsibility for control of Iraq’s national airspace to the Iraqis. This will require assisting them in building the necessary infrastructure in the form of radar surveillance systems and command and control.
facilities. Additionally, MNSTC-I has tasked CAF-TT with training Iraqis on the processes for national airspace control, as well. In his testimony before the subcommittee on June 12, 2007, Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey stated that this transfer was a long way off and would require at least several years. While the MNSTC-I 2007 Campaign Action Plan supports generating “full spectrum air operation capabilities,” it makes no mention of the future acquisition of modern jet fighter aircraft to defend the national airspace.

**Iraqi Navy**

The Navy, while small, is strategically significant. More than 95% of the GOI’s income is generated by the export of oil through terminals on two oil platforms in the Persian Gulf. Although the Iraqi Navy took the lead in protecting the platforms in February 2006, it still relies heavily on Coalition naval forces. The Iraqi contribution is resident in a patrol squadron and a naval infantry battalion (Marines). The patrol squadron operates five 27-meter Chinese-made Predator craft that were originally ordered by Saddam Hussein in 2002 under the oil-for-food program. They were not allowed to enter Iraq due to their military capabilities, until the United States purchased the boats from the Chinese ship-builder and transferred them to the Iraqi Navy. In his testimony before the subcommittee in June 2007, General Dempsey referred to a British off-shore support vessel, the **HMS Belvedere**, which obviates the need for Iraqi boats to travel back to Umm Qasr for resupply and refuel. In fact, the Naval Transition Team (NaTT) is led by the Royal Navy with U.S. Navy participation. The naval infantry battalion’s mission is to defend the two oil platforms. There is also an assault boat squadron with 24 small fast boats that perform riverine patrol. There is also a small diving detachment tasked with underwater survey, explosive ordinance and IED disposal, and minor engineering tasks. Future MOD plans for the Navy include the acquisition of four 54-meter, Italian-built Fincantieri patrol vessels.

**Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF)**

The ISOF capability resides in an Iraqi special operations brigade, separate from the IGFC, reporting to the JHQ through the Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Command (INCTC). The brigade, according to the March 2007 DOD 9010 Report to Congress, “is organized into a counter-terrorism battalion, a commando battalion, a support battalion, and a special reconnaissance unit.” The MOD is planning to form another commando battalion headquarters with regionally-based companies in Basrah, Mosul, and Al-Asad.

U.S. Special Operations Command briefed a staff delegation that ISOF units were “equal to or better than peer units in other countries in the region.” U.S. SOF in Iraq have been training their Iraqi counterparts since 2003, having participated in the establishment of what are now the counter-terrorism and commando battalions. Additionally, U.S. SOF support the Coalition TT for the INCTC. ISOF generally have been regarded as a success story in the transition of security responsibility to the ISF.

The Iraqi counter-terrorism battalion focuses on high-level terrorists and terrorist organizations. Additionally, it conducts hostage rescue operations. The commando battalion
conducted raids, airfield and port seizures, and reinforces and supports Iraqi counter-terrorism battalion operations. The support battalion provides the ability to maintain and sustain the ISOF during continuous combat operations. The reconnaissance company conducts around-the-clock surveillance of insurgent activities. This small unit operates in a clandestine manner, collecting information on enemies. This information is used to focus direct action operations by the Iraqi counter-terrorism or commando battalion. The training and development detachment conducts the screening and assessment of candidates and conduct follow-on specialty training.95

Other Components

The Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command (ITDC), under the JHQ, is responsible for the Tactical Training Command (TTC), overseeing six regional training centers and three training battalions, and the National Defense University (NDU) which operates the institutions for professional development.96 NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) provides functions similar to MNSTC-I for the ITDC, and has also supported the ITDC in establishing of the Lessons Learned Center and the Defense Language Institute.97 The Support Command, which commands the regional support and garrison support units, will be discussed below.

PERSONNEL: RECRUITING, TRAINING, AND TRACKING

Recruiting

Although the CPA’s putative end state had been “to create an Iraqi military that reflects the ethnic and religious fabric of Iraq,”98 the reality of Iraq’s demographics has made this an aspirational goal, which in many instances has proved to be unrealized.99 In his prepared testimony before the subcommittee on March 28, 2007, Dr. Cordesman examined some of the sectarian divisions in the military forces and the lack of proportionate Sunni representation:

Sectarian issues are less serious in the regular military forces under MOD control than in the MOI forces, but still presented a broad set of problems. According to the Director of National Intelligence’s February 2006 report, many elements of the Iraqi security forces remain loyal to sectarian and party interests. Sectarian divisions within the armed forces reflect the fact many units were created along geographic lines. Sunnis, Shi’ites and Kurds mostly served in geographic areas familiar to their groups. These divisions were even more notable at the battalion level, where battalion commanders tended to command only soldiers of their own sectarian or regional backgrounds. According to the Brookings Institution’s Iraq Index, Sunnis made up less than 10 percent of the existing forces in 2006.100 Ed O’Connell, a senior analyst with Rand [sic], said that the Iraqi military was chiefly built along sectarian lines. He added: “There have been recent efforts to recruit the Sunni, but no one wants to die, so that has been largely unsuccessful.”101
Training

In March 2007, DOD reported to Congress that Coalition forces had trained and equipped approximately 136,400 MOD personnel. More recent briefings reflect the Prime Minister's initiatives to include 110% manning of combat units, which bring the trained and equipped strength up to 154,126 personnel as of May 2007.

The ITDC is charged with overseeing the training of all branches of the IAF as well as the development of a warfighting doctrine. The TTC has five subordinate branches, including the Training Center Directorate, Branch Schools Directorate, Training Facilities Directorate, Tactical Doctrine Center, and the Lessons Learned Center. The TTC is charged with overseeing and managing the development and operation of training and education instructions, plans, and policies. All basic and intermediate skills training is conducted through this command. The NDU provides advanced military education. Leaders of the IAF pass through this institution at selected points in their career as they progress through the ranks. The NDU consists of the National Defense College, the Joint Staff College, the Military Academies, the Defense Language Institute, and the Defense Strategic Studies Institute.

Tracking

It is important to note that the data in table 3 track the total number of personnel who have moved through the training pipeline, but the number of personnel currently available for daily operations is less clear. This number does not account for other types of attrition, such as those personnel killed or seriously wounded in action, or desertions. The DOD June 2007 9010 Report explains that a rationale for the force expansion in the Prime Minister's Initiative(s) “is that only 65 percent of authorized personnel are present for duty in fielded units at any time.” In his June testimony before the subcommittee, General Dempsey also clarified the plan to man combat units at 120% to compensate for scheduled leave, absence without leave, and attrition.

Leadership: Non-Commissioned Officers, Junior Officers, and Senior Officers

Producing a large body of individually trained and equipped personnel was a necessary part of building the IAF, but it is insufficient – and of limited value – without developing its leaders. The 2007 MNSTC-I Campaign Action Plan established “lines of operations” (related activities necessary for achieving a desired end-state) for this effort.

The most useful and revealing data on the state of IA leadership is in the classified narrative portion of the TRAs. Although MNSTC-I believes its reporting tools adequately capture the capability of the Iraq's military leadership, at least one expert disagrees. In his appearance
before the subcommittee, Dr. Cordesman made the following general observations on non-commissioned (NCOs) and junior officers:

Serious problems in leadership by inexperienced and/or inadequate Iraqi officers and NCOs are downplayed or ignored. These problems are compounded by a U.S. command ethic whose de facto impact is to seek good news, and not receive bad news, from embeds and the advisory teams.108

Despite efforts at improvement, leadership remains a major problem for the IAF – the NCO level on the battlefield to Iraq's highest military staffs. General Dempsey recognized this problem explicitly in testimony before the subcommittee in June:

The big challenge in 2008 will be finding an adequate number of leaders to lead this institution that is large and increasingly capable. We've been growing young second lieutenants through the military academies for about three years, but it's really difficult to grow majors, lieutenant colonels and brigadier generals. It simply can't be done overnight. So we've had to rely heavily on officer recalls and retraining programs. However, the pool of qualified recalls is beginning to thin out. Several generations of Iraqi leaders were culled out by the Saddam regime and the Iran-Iraq war, and many fine Iraqi military and police leaders have been killed and wounded in the ongoing fight. We're working with both the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Interior to address this challenge.109

**Non-Commissioned Officers**

A well-noted deficiency in the IAF has been the lack of professional NCOs. In the Saddam-era Army, officers performed the small-unit supervision normally associated with NCO duties in the American or British armies. MOD and CMATT have recognized this problem and have designated 2007 as the “Year of the NCO.”110

The Iraqi NCO corps is growing, but there is a shortage of NCOs in the training establishment because every soldier is needed at the front – this has a detrimental effect on the security force's ability to sustain improvements in training and development. General Dempsey noted that the Coalition's plan for training Iraqi NCOs is evolving to ensure that enough of them remain as trainers for new soldiers. He also noted that the relentless demands of daily combat have prevented the slow, steady training necessary to build up an experienced NCO corps, and that the Iraqis “would like to have a U.S.-style NCO corps, but they realize it's a long way off.”111

MiTTs reported that Iraqi NCOs were ill-prepared to carry out basic leadership responsibilities within their units. This is a result of different cultural assumptions, a lack of experience, a tendency to go to commissioned officers for problem-solving, and a lack of respect from soldiers. Inadequate training and lack of experience among NCOs hampers the IA’s operating efficiency.112
Cultural differences lead to different approaches to planning, as well. MiTTs have difficulty convincing Iraqi NCOs to use the standard Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), a technique that ensures the most thorough examination of circumstances when planning missions. Another cultural challenge is overcoming Iraqi officers’ sense of entitlement. Reportedly, officers do not value their NCOs.\textsuperscript{114}

Finally, Iraqi soldiers have a strong tendency to go to commissioned officers to solve every problem. If officers try to solve these problems themselves, soldiers cannot develop respect for their NCOs.\textsuperscript{115}

**Junior Officers**

Veteran TT members, while praising Iraqi battalion and brigade commanders as competent, voiced concern about the inadequate performance of junior officers.\textsuperscript{116} Company commanders and lower ranking officers generally lacked knowledge of modern military technique and practice, for several reasons:

- Failure to adjust to attempts to modernize the military. This was particularly true for veterans, whereas new recruits adapted well.\textsuperscript{117}
- Fear of punishment, as a result of the inhumane treatment meted out by the Saddam-era military;\textsuperscript{118}
- Rigid centralization of the old IA, which ensured that only battalion and brigade officers would be responsible for missions;\textsuperscript{119}
- Lack of discipline and failure to follow standards, which deprives enlisted soldiers of role models and leads to loss of morale.\textsuperscript{120}

**Senior Officers**

According to General Dempsey, “the higher up you run in the echelons of command, the more vulnerabilities in leadership become evident.”\textsuperscript{121} There is evidence that some senior officers have been complicit with Shi’a militias.\textsuperscript{122} In spite of Prime Minister’s pledge that the GOI would engage illegally armed groups, regardless of sectarian affiliation, there are signs that the GOI may not be fulfilling this commitment. U.S. commanders have voiced concern about the removal of senior officers who have fought successfully against the Jaysh Al-Mahdi (JAM), the militia associated with Moqtadah Al-Sadr.\textsuperscript{123}

The Department acknowledges that “political forces in Iraq have influenced senior military appointments on the basis of sectarian affiliation.”\textsuperscript{124}

Due to greater military experience among Sunnis and Kurds, these groups are over-represented in senior leadership positions. Shi’ites were adequately represented at the battalion level, but less so at higher echelons. The reason was primarily the military experience required for higher levels of command, which a greater number of Sunnis and Kurds had earned in the old regime's army and the Peshmerga, respectively.\textsuperscript{125}
In addition, the media has reported that the Iraqi Army 5th Division commander, Brigadier General Shakir Al-Kaabi, was suspected of cooperation with the JAM in the arrests of Sunnis, and of being linked to Shi’a death squads. U.S. officers had expressed grave concerns about General Al-Kaabi, and were frustrated in their attempts to have him removed.\textsuperscript{126}

**OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS**

Although the IAF continue to show some improvement in operational effectiveness, it is still difficult to assess their competence as a result of imprecise and unclear DOD reporting. MNSTC-I has measured progress in the development of the IA by touting the raw numbers of personnel provided individual basic and skills training and equipment. More recently, the emphasis has shifted to the number of Iraqi units, primarily infantry battalions, that are “in the lead,” or capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Coalition “enablers.”\textsuperscript{127} Despite increased numbers, Iraqi military forces have a limited capability to plan and execute logistical tasks; lack an effective command structure; and, in cases where ISF are located in relatively peaceful areas, lack combat experience.\textsuperscript{128}

Infiltration of the IA, while perhaps not quite as pervasive as in the Iraqi Police Service, has emerged as a matter of serious concern. Although there is no objective measure of this problem in DOD reporting, recent media reports suggest that there has been extensive JAM infiltration of Iraqi units (such as the 5th Division Diyala).\textsuperscript{129} Journalists witnessed American advisors patting down IA soldiers for cell phones prior to a patrol because they feared the Iraqis would alert their contacts in the militia.\textsuperscript{130} In addition, a TT chief with the IA 6th Division said, “I have to operate under the assumption that within this unit there are people loyal to Jaysh Al-Mahdi and actively working for Jaysh Al-Mahdi.”\textsuperscript{131} Partner planning and command and control are difficult when the Coalition has to hide operational preparations from the IAF.

Additional problems that diminish operational effectiveness include:

- Absenteeism;
- ISF units that are under-equipped for their assigned missions; and
- The inability of MOD to reliably provide installation support, regular classes of supply (including fuel and ammunition), and quality of life, such as pay.\textsuperscript{132}

According to the June 2007 DOD report to Congress, 101 of the 139 Iraqi Army combat battalions were operating at some level of capability while 38 were still being formed.\textsuperscript{133} The extent of the Department’s assessment of the IAF’s operational capability did not go beyond the declaration that, of the 101 battalions “conducting operations, 95 of them were “in the lead in counter-insurgency operations in their areas of responsibility.”\textsuperscript{134}

The imprecision of this measure was the target of Dr. Cordesman’s March 2007 subcommittee testimony:
As the number of Iraqi units has grown, they have played a steadily larger and more important role in field operations, but with far less real world success and independence than the Department of Defense has claimed in its reports and testimony to Congress. Far too many of such claims have been more cosmetic than real. Many units "in the lead" have demonstrated little or no real mission responsibility or capability, and were extremely dependent on MNF-I command, planning, and support. In practice, they could only act under the leadership of embedded advisors and/or in cooperation with partner units.\footnote{135}

It should be noted that units that are “in the lead” are not fully independent and still require substantial Coalition assistance with “enablers” such as fire support, logistics, and intelligence. Many also need U.S. force protection to operate.\footnote{136}

Additionally, an “in the lead” appraisal could equally apply to a seasoned combat veteran battalion or to a battalion in a quiet garrison environment. More meaningful readiness data requires unit-specific assessments in categories contained in TRAs, such as personnel, command and control, training, sustainment, logistics, equipment, and leadership. TRAs remain classified, and DOD reporting to Congress does not capture the trends embodied in the subjective, narrative portion of these assessments.\footnote{137}

Neither the numbers of battalions “in the lead” nor the peacetime readiness indicators in the TRAs are necessarily valid measures of the operational effectiveness in fighting an insurgency. They do not take into account the ability of units to provide security for the civilian population in their areas of responsibility, or mission effectiveness.\footnote{138}

\begin{center}
\textit{Only 32\% of Iraqis ‘feel safe and secure outside [their] neighborhood.’}
\end{center}
\footnote{9010 Report (June 2007)}

\textbf{Ministry of Defense Capacity}\footnote{139}

As described in a previous chapter, the GOI has experienced severe budget execution problems.\footnote{140} According to the Department, “MOD suffers from a lack of strategic policy development and implementation, and an inefficient procurement and budgeting process. A culture of distrust coupled with incompetence in certain key areas has made committing and obligating funds very difficult.”\footnote{141} MOD spent 76\% of its calendar year (CY) 2006 budget for salaries by November 2006, but only 24\% of its budget for goods and services, 1\% of its budget for capital goods and projects, and 32\% of its overall budget of $3.4 billion.\footnote{142}

Additionally, personnel management and logistics also continue to pose severe challenges to the MOD.\footnote{143}

The MOD must confront these challenges and other capacity issues if the IAF are to achieve and sustain independence and long-term success. In fact, building and sustaining institutional capability is MNSTC-I’s “main effort” for 2007.\footnote{144} MNSTC-I has an embedded an MOD-TT
of approximately 50 civilian advisors, primarily contractors, along with six U.S. military personnel, and 12 civilian advisors from other Coalition countries. A similar team operates at JHQ. These teams provide “mentoring support” to senior MOD officials, “developing their capacity to manage key ministerial functions, such as personnel management, budgeting, logistics, intelligence and security, acquisitions and contracting, plans and policies, communications, and inspections and investigations.” Ultimately, MNSTC-I will have achieved its objective for MOD when the Ministry is “capable of directing, supporting, and sustaining their forces in support of the conduct of counter terrorist/counter insurgency operations, and when a ‘Defense Management Process’ capable of planning for the future development of the ISF is in place.” The MOD has a long way to go, as TRA reporting shows that the MOD is not regarded as “effective” in any category.

**Equipment and Logistics**

When the Coalition began developing ISF in 2003, it decided that this effort would be dedicated almost exclusively to generating combat units. The generation of combat support and combat service support units as well as the logistics system, was intentionally postponed until most of the combat forces were trained and equipped and put into action. The Coalition planned to fill the gap in necessary logistics support until Iraqi logistics institutions, units, and infrastructure could be generated. Now that most of the MOD and MOI security forces have been trained and equipped, the generation of logistics capability has become a major focus.

The Department summarizes the present state of ISF logistics capabilities and the importance of the MOD and MOI forces becoming self-reliant in controlling and sustaining their logistics operations in the following statements:

| “The most significant shortcoming in both MOD and MOI forces’ capabilities is in planning and executing logistics and sustainment requirements.” |
| “Failure to develop logistics capability could lead to a prolonged U.S. and Coalition presence and potentially unravel progress and investments made up to this point.” |

**MOD Logistics Organization**

MNF-I is building a logistics organization within the MOD and capabilities within the IAF that are able to support counterinsurgency operations. The MOD Concept of Logistics Support, which is the guiding document for logistics, outlines the development of maintenance, transportation, supply, and health logistics capabilities.

The MOD logistics organization consists of the following components from the ministerial level to the unit level:
MOD Director General Acquisitions, Logistics and Infrastructure (DG, AL&I): Directs and funds the raising, training, equipping and development of the IAF. Manages and controls IAF acquisition, logistics, and infrastructure operations.

MOD Joint Headquarters – M4: Responsible for sustaining the IAF logistic functions including maintenance, transport, supply, infrastructure and procurement contract management.

Support Command: Not operational at this time. Will be the execution and planning arm of the M4 staff for planning operational level actions and supporting tactical logistics. Will provide command and control over the Taji National Depot, Regional Support Units (RSU), and the National Ammunition Depot (NAD).

Taji National Depot (TND): Both national depot and fourth-line of support. The central hub for all logistics (supply, maintenance, transportation, Defense Reutilization Marketing Offices (DRMO), cannibalization, calibration) support to the IAF.

National Ammunition Depot (NAD): The fourth-line ammunition support facility for the IAF.

Regional Support Units (RSU): The third-line logistic capability including vehicle and weapon maintenance, supply warehousing and third-line transportation (future). There are five RSUs at Taji, Al Kasik, Habbaniyah, An Numaniyah, and Kirkish Military Training Base (KMTB).

Garrison Support Units (GSU): Provides life support and a central issue facility to dependent ISF units. There will be 80 GSUs.

Logistic Battalions and Motorized Transportation Regiments: Integral support to brigade or division.

Headquarters Support Units (HSUs): Integral support to battalions.

These logistics units and organizations provide the following support functions:

The provision of logistics support at the lowest levels is expected to be the purview of the Headquarters and Service Companies (HSC), which provide limited health, maintenance, supply, and transportation support to the Iraqi Army battalions, brigades, and divisions, and Motorized Transport Regiments (MTR), which provide additional transportation, maintenance, and vehicle recovery support to each of the Iraqi Army’s infantry divisions. [Mid-level] logistics support is expected to come from a national depot, five Regional Support Units (RSU), and numerous Garrison Support Units (GSU). The national depot, located at Taji, provides facilities for the receipt, storage, accounting, and issue of maintenance capability to overhaul vehicles.
and other equipment. RSUs are to provide regionally focused supply, maintenance, and contract support for the Iraqi military, while GSUs are to provide base support for each Iraqi military installation. A Support Command provides command and control of the national depot and RSUs, while the Iraqi Joint Headquarters logistics staff [M4] provides logistics input to plans and orders. Finally, atop the logistics structure is the Office of the Director General of Acquisition, Logistics, and Infrastructure, which is expected to direct the overall logistical capability and the acquisition of capital equipment, develop ministerial policies and procedures, and manage the budget.157

**MOD Logistics Plans**

The plans to transition control of logistics operations from the Coalition to MOD (and MOI) are outlined in the MNSTC-I 2007 Campaign Action Plan.158 In recognition of the importance of developing self-reliant GOI logistics capabilities, this plan is entitled, “The Year of Logistics and Leaders.” For the transition of capabilities to the MOD, the following key tasks are proposed:

2. Develop a plan to build, sustain and transition depot level logistics capabilities159 at the [Taji National Depot] TND and the National Ammunition Depot (dated 4 Dec 2006).
3. Transition contracting capability to the [MOD].
4. Develop and implement national maintenance contracts.160
5. Assist move to self-performing life support system.
6. Pursue binding [Ministry of Oil] MOO/MOD fuel allocation and delivery agreement.161

Also outlined in this action plan are the following risks to execution of logistics transition to the MOD:

1. Accelerated growth [of MOD forces] and transition may exceed ability of MOD and its forces to adapt logistically,
2. Accelerated weapons fielding, and the fielding of new systems, could outpace ISF accountability systems, technical competency of operators, or logistical capability,
3. Failure of GOI to execute its budget,
4. Failure of the ISF to account for and maintain capital assets and equipment.162
Building a Logistics System for the IAF

The U.S. military has one of the most sophisticated logistics systems in the world, which makes it both costly and complex. While the Coalition may not be trying to mirror the U.S. system for MOD exactly, even implementing a simplified version is a challenge for the GOI.

Arguably, a logisticsian or a maintenance mechanic requires a higher level of education and skill than a combat soldier. The literacy rate in Iraq is only 40% and it is difficult now to find Iraqi citizens who are qualified to be trained as logisticians. Language barriers – both a shortage of linguists and a lack of manuals in native languages – also contribute to the difficulty in training logisticians and mechanics. The authorization level for MOD logistics organizations is 53,182 personnel and MNF-I reports that as of May 2007 42,043 personnel for these organizations have been trained. However, the number of personnel in logistics units is less than 20,000, and many of these units are not active. For example, the manning level of personnel at four out of five RSUs is less than 50%. One source of this problem is Iraqi commanders diverting logistics personnel to combat roles after training. For unknown reasons, there is also a retention problem; however, MOD is offering incentives to keep skilled technicians and mechanics. MOD is also pursuing a change in current personnel regulations to allow skilled laborers to join the IAF as civilian workers.

MNSTC-I is developing automated logistics and modern maintenance systems for the MOD that require reliable and clean electrical power, computer systems and networks, climate-controlled environments, and modern tools and diagnostic equipment. None of these are readily available in Iraq. For example, electrical power supply is well below demand (as shown in Figure 6) and most locations in Iraq have electrical power for only a fraction of the day.

**Figure 6: Monthly Electricity Demand and Available Capacity.**

*Monthly Average Megawatts (MW)*

The U.S. military logistics system is based on concepts of preventative maintenance, personal responsibility, and immediate attention to problems. Preventative maintenance is not part of the Iraqi culture, as they tend to wait to perform repairs or just forego repairs and cannibalize the equipment instead. SIGIR states that MNF-I officials informed MOD in 2006 that the Coalition would not provide any supplies or funds to sustain IA operations in 2007, except in emergency situations. It is likely that this was an attempt by MNF-I to exert pressure on MOD to assume responsibility for IA sustainment. Subsequently, the MOD has taken on responsibility for life-support contracts, and most of their fuel supplies, and is starting to award contracts for vehicles, parts, and individual clothing and equipment. A combination of Coalition funds and GOI-funded Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is used to outfit MOD forces with modern equipment. This includes weapons and vehicles that will replace the current heterogeneous mix that is a result of the effort to stand up Iraqi combat forces quickly with the most readily available equipment. The cost to purchase, maintain, and replace this equipment, as well as to sustain the logistics system that the Coalition is building for MOD, may be more than MOD budget can support. This may be why the National Maintenance Contract, which MNF-I established to provide maintenance for the MOD vehicle fleet and other equipment and was supposed to be transferred to the GOI in March 2007, is still funded by the Coalition. Although the level of U.S. support for the ISF is forecast to decrease in fiscal year (FY) 2008, it is not yet clear that the GOI is budgeting enough to maintain MOD logistics operations.

As previously noted, there are indications that MOD will not be able to spend its logistics budget in a timely manner. Although the long-term plan is for the MOD to develop its own acquisition and contracting capability, FMS between the United States and the GOI are currently being used as an interim measure to expedite equipment, supplies, and contract purchases. Despite this measure, there are still delays in spending. The MOD goal is to spend its entire $1.6 billion CY06 FMS budget by June 2007, but as of May 2007 only 10 out of 46 FMS cases for a total amount of $400.0 million had been approved. The Coalition is working with MOD to accelerate the required submission of letters of acceptance for FMS.

Over the past fifteen years, the U.S. military logistics system has been largely dependent on contractors for combat service support. Only about 25,000 out of the approximately 130,000 U.S. forces in Iraq are performing primarily logistics functions. A greater number of logistics personnel are civilian contractors. The United States is applying this model of contractor dependency to the logistics support system for the IAF. Contractors under Coalition management are used for maintenance, training, warehouse and depot operations, transportation, and other logistics functions. Current planning documents for the MOD (and MOI) logistics systems specify the continued use of contractor support. Despite the fact that these planning documents were written in collaboration with and approved by the MOD, MNF-I has recently stated that the Iraqis prefer not to use contractors and are expected to move to “self-reliance.” SIGIR indicates that MOD has always considered contractor logistics support an interim measure. CMATT estimates that this move will require training
of approximately 10,000 additional IAF logisticians, but at present there is no authorization for these forces. The IA is planning to begin introducing soldier-provided life support in July 2007.

The IAF and MOD also depend on other GOI ministries for critical support. This report has raised questions about the adequacy of the MOD budget provided by the Ministry of Finance, particularly with the announced intent to grow the IAF and to establish the Iraqi Air Force and Navy. The other key dependency is on the Ministry of Oil (MOO). The Coalition has carefully monitored fuel supply and distribution as a means to track the MOD self-reliance, stating that the decrease in fuel transferred from the Coalition to MOD forces, shown in Figure 7, is an example of the increasing self-reliance. Although almost all fuel for the IAF is now delivered by the MOD, the monthly allocation provided by the MOO is less than half of the requirement, and fuel supply remains one of the biggest supply problems. The recently announced increase in the size of the MOD forces will exacerbate this fuel supply problem.

Figure 7: Fuel Provided to Iraqi Security Forces by Coalition Forces.

Meeting Logistics Transfer Timelines

There have been numerous references to the transfer of most, if not all, logistical functions and responsibilities to the MOD by January 2008, including:
• Full transition of logistics capabilities such as Motorized Transportation Regiments (MTRs), RSUs, GSUs, TND, and the Support Command to the MOD are expected by January 2008.\textsuperscript{191}

• Full transition of sustainment responsibilities such as Class I Life Support, Class II and IV uniforms and building supplies, Class III Fuel, Class V Ammunition, Class VII Vehicles, Class VIII Medical Supplies, Class IX Repair Parts, and Transportation to MOD by June 2007.\textsuperscript{192}

• Transitioning control of IAF logistics units to MOD control is supposed to occur from May through December of 2007.\textsuperscript{193}

• “The National Ammunition Depot at Taji is currently guarded and operated by a [245-man Coalition-funded] contract that is due to transition to Iraqi funding in May 2007.”\textsuperscript{194}

• Transfer of the National Maintenance Contract to MOD funding (via FMS) and control. The current contract expired March 31, 2007.\textsuperscript{195}

• GOI will assume responsibility for maintaining the inventory for the Authorized Stockage Level (ASL) supplies after MNSTC-I fills the initial inventory by September 2007.\textsuperscript{196}

• “ISF logistics is steadily improving towards the self-reliance deadline of 31 December 2007.”\textsuperscript{197}

• “MNSTC-I has asked the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to …. fully transition the logistical sustainment capabilities required to successfully support the IAF by January 2008.”\textsuperscript{198}

• MNF-I’s goal to transition a sustainable and maintainable logistics operation to the MOD by January 1, 2008.\textsuperscript{199}

As mentioned earlier, some transfer of logistics functions has already taken place, with the MOD assuming responsibility for life support, ammunition, and most of the fuel supply.\textsuperscript{200} However, MNF-I has recently revised what responsibilities it expects the Iraqis to assume by the end of 2007. The logistics operations that will be transferred by the end of 2007 are now said to be only an initial operating capability.\textsuperscript{201} Although MNF-I expects MOD to take the lead at that time, the Iraqi military will require continued support, advice, and mentoring from the Coalition. By the end of 2008, MNF-I expects that the MOD will have full independent capacity for logistics operations.\textsuperscript{202} Nevertheless, MNF-I also estimates that both MOD and MOI will require Coalition logistics support for at least three more years.\textsuperscript{203}

In some cases, it is questionable whether the Coalition is making the necessary assessments of the maturity of MOD capabilities in determining the appropriate time to transfer responsibilities. The hand over of responsibility for ammunition procurement and supply is an example of a premature transfer. Although MNF-I uses this “hand over” as an example of progress in transitioning responsibility to the MOD, after transfer in December 2006, there was a precipitous drop in meeting IAF’s ammunition requests.\textsuperscript{204} For the period January through April 2007, the MOD met only 13 of 81 requests. Before the Coalition handed this responsibility over to the MOD, nearly all requests were being met. While it is important to transfer responsibility as soon as possible in order to avoid the tendency for IAF and MOD to become dependent on Coalition support, the state of MOD’s ability to assume this responsibility must be properly assessed to avoid failures in providing combat support services to Iraqi forces.
U.S. Military Support for ISF Logistics

It is difficult to assess how much logistics support is given directly by U.S. military forces to the IAF because they often conduct joint operations. MNC-I apparently tried during the summer of 2006 to make this assessment, but to date no information about this assessment has been provided.\textsuperscript{205} It is essential to know how much logistics support is provided to the IAF by the Coalition. This information will indicate the potential for a draw-down of deployed U.S. military logistics personnel, and for the reduction in U.S. funding provided to the IAF after the MOD becomes logistically self-reliant.\textsuperscript{206} However, the simple fact that there are only about 25,000 U.S. military logistics personnel in Iraq means that the transfer of logistics support to the MOD will have a relatively small impact on the number of U.S. military personnel to be redeployed.\textsuperscript{207}

As mentioned earlier, the Coalition provides most of its logistics support for the IAF through contracts and contractors. The types of support provided include:

- The National Maintenance Contract, which provides equipment maintenance, supplies, and training of maintenance personnel at TND, all five RSUs, and five (of 80) GSUs.
- Nearly all third- and fourth-line transportation missions to support force generation and sustainment.\textsuperscript{208} MNF-I assists in transporting equipment from sea and air ports of entry to the National Depot. Recent movements of new equipment have been contracted, executed and tracked by the MOD without assistance, but these are a small part of the total amount of materiel transported.\textsuperscript{209}
- MNSTC-I has oversight for limited warehouse (400 contractors) and distribution support (1,400 contractors), and vehicle maintenance support (250 contractors) in two regions.\textsuperscript{210}
- MNSTC-I is providing the initial inventory for Authorized Stockage Level (ASL) at the TND.\textsuperscript{211}

Adequacy of Equipment and Tracking of Equipment

Although the numbers of trained and equipped IAF are often cited as progress in standing up the MOD forces, these numbers essentially describe the number of soldiers that have completed basic training and have been issued individual equipment such as uniforms, body armor, and firearms. Since the emphasis of the IAF mission is counterinsurgency, the Coalition and the MOD are equipping the IAF with lightly armored combat and patrol vehicles and unarmored support vehicles. The current inventory of vehicles and weapons were obtained by a combination of procurements, donations, and capture of existing Saddam-era caches and is a diverse blend of equipment types and age.\textsuperscript{212} It is a challenge for the IAF to maintain this mixed fleet because some vehicles are past useful service life, few IAF mechanics know how to service them, and spare parts are hard to obtain. MNF-I recognizes the problems with maintaining this equipment and is working with the MOD to achieve a more homogenous “pure fleet” by purchasing replacement vehicles and weapons.\textsuperscript{213}
On the other hand, pure fleeting has its own challenges. For example, the planned replacement of AK-47 rifles and other individual weapons from Warsaw Pact countries with M16 rifles has benefits and drawbacks. The ammunition for the M16 is different from that of most of the weapons used by insurgents and there may be less chance it will be stolen. Another advantage is that the M16 is not fully automatic, which will reduce the ability to “spray,” rather than aim, when firing at targets. However, the M16 is more expensive and requires more training and care than the AK-47.

Despite Coalition efforts, many IAF units still lack the equipment needed for a counterinsurgency mission. Though the IAF and U.S. forces in Iraq are roughly the same size, there is a great disparity in the amount and types of their equipment. For example, the U.S. force has more than 20,000 armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), but the IAF have only 2,647 and their current goal is only 3,609. Some of the HMMWVs used by the IAF have only “Level II” or base “Level I” armor, which does not have the higher level of ballistic protection that is provided by the upgraded HMMWVs used by Coalition forces. There are similar disparities in quantities and level of protection for tactical trucks, armored personnel carriers, route clearance vehicles, and counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) equipment. The IAF also lack artillery and close air support, as well as airlift and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

The MOD’s current plan to enhance the IAF’s equipment relies increasingly on FMS to purchase additional armored vehicles, C-IED equipment such as robots and electronic countermeasures, and U.S.-made weapons. The near-term procurement plan does not appear to achieve the goal of “pure fleeting” the equipment. Consequently, the challenges of maintaining the heterogeneous mix of equipment will persist in the short term.

Some experts have suggested that the Coalition has not issued the IAF some equipment, such as heavily armored vehicles and heavy machine guns, because of concerns about their loyalty and reliability. While this may be a prudent and justified measure, the estimates of when security responsibility can be transferred to the IAF need to reflect the fact that these units are not fully equipped to take on the counterinsurgency mission. Whatever the reason for the delay in providing this equipment, the IAF cannot be expected to be prepared to conduct joint missions with their more heavily equipped Coalition partner units or, more importantly, to conduct missions by themselves, until they are better equipped or until threat levels are significantly reduced.

SIGIR and GAO have reviewed DOD accountability for the equipment it has purchased and provided to MOD and MOI security forces. These reviews found that the Department cannot ensure all the equipment has been issued to the ISF nor can it account for equipment after it has been issued to the ISF. GAO found that the lack of a centralized record system before October 2005 led to large discrepancies in the reported quantities of equipment issued to the ISF before that date. The number of weapons and personnel protection equipment reported by the MNSTC-I commander was more than twice the quantity recorded in the MNSTC-I property book. SIGIR has noted that MNF-I and MOD are taking steps to improve equipment accountability. The MOD has published a manual to describe how
equipment should be maintained and audited, and MNF-I has ordered MNC-I units to conduct full inventories of IA equipment.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding 1: Department of Defense estimates show uncertainty in the number of operational Iraqi soldiers.

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to develop a system for more accurately accounting for Ministry of Defense personnel trained and equipped by the Coalition, and those who are operational. The Department should use this new system to more accurately report operational numbers in its 9010 Reports.

Finding 2: Units operationally controlled by the Iraqi Forces Ground Command still require substantial support from Coalition forces.

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to develop a metric that accurately captures an Iraqi unit's ability to operate independently.

Finding 3: The composition and the recruiting of Iraqi Army (IA) units will challenge the Army's ability to become a truly national force that can deploy Iraq-wide. According to the Department, IA unauthorized absence rates exceed 50% when units were directed to deploy to combat areas outside their normal areas of operations.

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to study and report to Congress on whether efforts improve the deployability of the Iraqi Army are likely to succeed, given IAF history and other cultural factors.


Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to include a re-evaluation of this goal in its September report to Congress.

Finding 5: The Prime Minister's initiative call for an expansion of the Iraqi Armed Forces to about 60,000 personnel above the “objective counterinsurgency force,” of which approximately 40,000 are not yet trained and equipped.

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to provide Congress with a report on the U.S. costs of this expansion by 30 July 2007, including whether this will exceed the President's fiscal year 2008 supplemental request for $2.0 billion.
Finding 6: The IAF suffers from sectarian influence and militia infiltration.

Recommendation: The committee should require the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence to report on the extent to which sectarian and militia influence are at work in the Iraqi Armed Forces, and possible options to counter them.

Finding 7: Despite efforts at improvement, leadership remains a major challenge for the Iraqi Armed Forces, from the non-commissioned officer level on the battlefield to Iraq's highest military leaders at the Ministry of Defense.


Ministry of Defense

Finding 8: The Ministry of Defense suffers from a lack of strategic policy development and implementation and an inefficient procurement and budgeting process. A culture of distrust, coupled with incompetence in certain key areas, has made committing and obligating funds very difficult.

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi National Force-Iraq to re-evaluate its advisory mission to the Ministry of Defense and report its findings in its September report to Congress.

Finding 9: Transition Readiness Assessment reporting shows the Ministry of Defense is not regarded as “effective” in any category of capacity.

Finding 10: There are only two U.S. Government civilian advisors at the Ministry of Defense (MOD); as a result MOD civilians are not provided direct mentoring by their U.S. counterparts.

Finding 11: The Ministry of Defense (MOD) faces many impediments to developing a modern military logistics system including: lack of a literate workforce, insufficient infrastructure, high costs for equipment and maintenance, and cultural practices that are incompatible with a preventative maintenance philosophy. This is exacerbated by modeling MOD logistics on the U.S. system, which relies heavily on contract support and modern automation. These impediments have delayed, and will continue to delay, transfer of logistics responsibilities to the MOD.

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to re-evaluate what appear to be overly optimistic dates for transfer of responsibility to the Ministry of Defense and report its findings in its September report to Congress.

Recommendation: Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should re-evaluate the sophistication and complexity of the logistics system and equipment it is providing to the Ministry of Defense, and Multi-National Force-Iraq should report these findings in its September report to Congress.
Finding 12: The fiscal years 2007 and 2008 Department of Defense budget requests reflect the importance of developing Iraqi Security Forces logistics capability with about 70% of the total Iraqi Security Forces Fund budgets allocated for this purpose in both fiscal years. Lack of a fully capable logistics system is a primary reason for Iraqi Armed Forces units not achieving a Transition Readiness Assessment Level 1 status, which is necessary for transfer of security responsibility to the Ministry of Defense.

Finding 13: The Government of Iraq is not allocating sufficient funds to support the Ministry of Defense logistics and equipment needs.

Finding 14: The use of Foreign Military Sales by the Government of Iraq as an interim measure to purchase equipment, supplies, and contract support for the Iraqi Armed Forces is falling behind schedule.

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to assess the adequacy of the Ministry of Defense’s budget for maintaining, and further developing, its logistics system to achieve Transition Readiness Assessment Level 1 status for the Ministry of Defense and its forces and report its findings in its September report to Congress.

Finding 15: As a consequence of the Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) preference for an organic (soldier-provided) versus contractor (U.S. model) logistics system, the MOD will require more time to plan for and train additional military logistics specialists. This will also delay transfer of logistics responsibilities to MOD.

Finding 16: The transfer of logistics responsibilities to the Ministry of Defense will have little impact on the number of U.S. forces in Iraq.

Finding 17: The transfer of logistics responsibility to Ministry of Defense has resulted in decreased capacity to get supplies to Ministry of Defense forces in the field. The Coalition is starting to acknowledge that full transition of logistics to the Ministry of Defense will take longer than originally anticipated.

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to analyze and examine reasons for the apparent inability of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to take responsibility for logistics functions and take remedial action. The Department should also assess the implications for Iraqi Armed Forces combat capability when MOD is unable to provide adequate logistics support after transfer of responsibility and report its findings within 60 days.

Finding 18: The Iraqi Armed Forces will not be able to take on the counterinsurgency mission until they receive additional equipment or until the level of violence subsides.

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to report on Ministry of Defense’s capability to equip the Iraqi Armed Forces (IADF) adequately and on the IADF’s ability to perform the roles and missions expected of them within 60 days.
Finding 19: The level of reporting on MOD logistics development efforts does not match the significance of these efforts, and Congress is not adequately informed about progress toward Iraqi self-reliance.

Recommendation: The committee should direct the Department of Defense to provide monthly reports to Congress starting immediately on the progress to equip the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) and to transfer responsibility and control of logistics operations to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). These reports should include:

1. Details of Multi-National Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I) plan(s) and progress in executing the plan(s) to train IAF logistics personnel for the MOD,
2. The adequacy of the MOD budget for its logistics capability and an assessment of MOD’s ability to execute this budget,
3. Progress against the “event tracker” for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) Logistics Action Plan as tracked by the MNSTC-I J4 support operations office and reported monthly to MNF-I at the Logistics Action Working Group,
4. Progress on retention of Iraqi logisticians in logistics positions.
5. Assessments of MOD and IAF abilities to maintain logistics operations and capabilities after accepting control and responsibility from the Coalition.
NOTES CHAPTER 6

13 CPA, Coalition Provision Authority Order 22.
16 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, p. 34.
18 AEI, “Creating an Iraqi Army from Scratch,” p. 3.
21 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, p. 38.


This increase was designed to offset temporary personnel losses created by attrition and monthly leave. “Iraq Defence Minister Says Army to Increase Number of Troops,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, Iraqi TV Station Al-Iraqiyah.

Growth was intended to place additional forces in the most heavily-contested provinces and allow commanders to pull units off-line periodically to rearm, refit, and retrain. Major General William B. Caldwell, IV, MNF-I – Iraq Press Briefing (press briefing, 2 Nov 2006).

The three new division headquarters included an 11thDivision headquarters in Baghdad and two Strategic Infrastructure Division headquarters. MG William B. Caldwell, IV (press briefing).

The three new division headquarters included an 11thDivision headquarters in Baghdad and two Strategic Infrastructure Division headquarters. The 154,588 total for the MOD forces in table 3 reflects the recruiting and training of the personnel called for in these two initiatives. MG William B. Caldwell, IV (press briefing).

DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), 27.


This number includes the 10% manning increase to replace/replenish troops. It also includes the Prime Minister’s 30,000-person expansion initiative. U.S. Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status Report (23 May 2007, available at: http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/iraqstatus/2006/c18335.htm).


Personnel in unauthorized absence status are not included in these figures.

Army numbers include special operations forces and support forces.

This number does not include the approximately 144,000 Facilities Protection Service personnel working in 27 ministries.


CPA, Order Number 2.


Staff discussions with MRI (22 Jun 2007).


It is important to note that in the initial fielding plan, five army divisions would be tied to the regions from where they were recruited and the other five would be deployable throughout Iraq. This was partially due to the legacy of some army divisions being formed from the National Guard units and has caused some complications in terms of making these forces available for operations in all areas of Iraq, and the military becoming a truly national, non-sectarian force.

Reflects current structure. Does not include additional divisions that may result from the Prime Minister’s expansion initiative.


Strategic Infrastructure Battalions guard oil pipelines and petroleum processing facilities.
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication-02), p. 101, defines “command and control” as “[t]he exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces, in the accomplishment of the mission.”

Iraqi light infantry divisions have authorized end strengths of between 9,000 and 10,000 personnel. Actual manning is considerably less.


Nicholas Pelham, “Iraq’s Minister Told Only U.S. Can Impose Martial Law.”


MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, Annex D.


MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, Annex D.


O&I Hearing, Development and Operational Capability of the ISF, LTG Dempsey testimony.


O&I Hearing, Development and Operational Capability of the ISF, LTG Dempsey testimony. The British intend to leave HMS Beledere there for “a couple of years.”


“Iraqi Navy Protects Country’s Oil Platforms.”


92 USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History (Tampa, FL), p. 122.
93 HASC, “Staff Delegation Fenner Trip Report” (20 Apr 2007).
100 While Saddam’s conscript army reflected the demographics of Iraq’s population, one informed source cites that 70% of its officers were Sunni. Jeremy Sharp (Congressional Research Service), The Iraqi Security Forces: the Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences (18 Jan 2007), p. 12.
110 O&I Hearing, Non-Governmental Perspectives, Anthony Cordesman testimony.
111 O&I Hearing, Development and Operational Capability of the ISF, LTG Dempsey. LTG Dempsey testified that MNSTC-I is starting to use AFIS fingerprints and HRIMS database as well as retinal scans.
114 O&I Hearing, Non-Governmental Perspectives, Anthony Cordesman testimony.
115 O&I Hearing, Development and Operational Capability of the ISF, LTG Dempsey testimony.
116 O&I Hearing, Development and Operational Capability of the ISF, LTG Dempsey testimony.
117 O&I Briefing, Personal Experiences of U.S. Military Advisors on Transition Teams (TT) (110th Cong., 1st sess., 19 Apr 2007).
118 O&I Briefing, Personal Experiences of U.S. Military Advisors.
119 O&I Briefing, Personal Experiences of U.S. Military Advisors.
120 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007).
121 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007).
122 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007).
123 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007).
124 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007).
122 David S. Cloud and Damien Cave, “Push in Baghdad is Short of Goal, Commanders Say,” The New York Times (4 Jun 2007), p. A16. Joshua Partlow, “Maliki’s Office is Seen Behind Purge in Forces,” The Washington Post (30 Apr 2007), p. A1. See also, 11 May 2007 letter to Secretary Robert M. Gates from the chairman and ranking member requesting information regarding Partlow’s Washington Post article that reported that Prime Minister Maliki’s office is responsible for the improper arrest and removal of senior Iraqi Army and National Police officers and may be “sabotaging the military to achieve sectarian goals.” Brigadier General Dana Pittard, the commander of the Iraq Assistance Group, is quoted in the article as saying “[t]heir only crimes or offenses were they were successful against the Mahdi Army. . .I’m tired of seeing good Iraqi officers having to look over their shoulders when they’re trying to do the right thing.” As of June 25, 2007, no response to the letter has been received.
123 David S. Cloud and Damien Cave, “Push in Baghdad is Short of Goal, Commanders Say.”
125 O&I Hearing, Non-Governmental Perspectives, Anthony Cordesman testimony. In Iraq, MiTT members briefed Codel Meehan participants that most senior officers have moved their families out of the country (19 Feb 2007).
132 To be clear, Iraqi security forces have almost no indigenous combat support and combat service support capability.
135 O&I Hearing, Non-Governmental Perspectives.
137 While some standards are based on a percentage of capability for the “stoplight” color-coded assessments of Iraqi units in areas such as personnel, leadership, and training, there is still a wide latitude for individual judgment and subjective appraisals by the Transition Teams. Parameters are not defined in regulation. See, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Transition Readiness Assessment Report Implementing Instructions Update (Baghdad, Iraq: 1 Dec 06).
139 Despite repeated attempts, the subcommittee staff has been unable to contact anyone who has served on the MOD-TT. The subcommittee was refused a request for an April 2007 staffdel, which would have included meetings with MOD-TT members and ministry officials. As soon as staff was notified that the April staffdel was postponed until mid-June, staff had made email requests to OSD LA for video teleconferences (VTCs) with MOD-TT members in theater. On June 6, 2007, Chairman Meehan received an acknowledgement of receipt from Secretary Gates to letter requests sent to him on May 16, 2007 for VTC with current MOD-TT members and on May 17, 2007 for staff interviews with former MOD-TT members. Despite the Secretary’s assertion that these requests would be addressed as soon as possible by the ASD LA, the subcommittee never heard anything further on these requests. The subcommittee did receive an immediate response from MPRI to a request to interview some of their employees who are or were employed as MOD-TT members. The subcommittee staff was able to secure interviews, without DOD assistance, with MPRI representatives who are knowledgeable in this area, but the opportunity came too late for inclusion in this report. Despite repeated requests, the subcommittee staff was unable to contact anyone who served on the MOD-TT. The staff was eventually able to secure interviews, without DOD assistance, with MPRI representatives from the MOD-TT, but the opportunity came too late for inclusion in this report. Measuring DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 38.
140 Supra, chapter 3.


O&I Hearing, Cost and Financial Transition.


DOD, FY07 Emergency Supplemental Request, p. 41.

Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces ... those aspects of military operations that deal with the design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of material; movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; acquisition of construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; and acquisition of furnishing of services. U.S. Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02) (5 Jan 2007).

The Ministry of Defense Concept of Support is a two-part document. The Strategic Concept was approved by MNF-I and MOD in early March 2006 and the Operational Concept was approved in October 2006.


The lines of logistics support are: 1st line is tactical support that is integral to an Army battalion of Navy or Air Force Squadron; 2nd line is tactical support that is integral to a larger formation such as an infantry brigade or division; 3rd line is operational support provided to a brigade, division or other formation by separate external organizations such as Regional or Garrison Support Units; 4th line is operational support provided by a national level organization such as the Taji National Dept.

DRMO is the organization responsible for redistribution or disposal of excess or damaged military equipment and supplies.


Depot logistics capabilities include central supply and major maintenance and overhaul facilities.

For MOD these include the National Maintenance Contract at TND and other smaller contracts for maintenance of vehicles, weapons, and other equipment.


MNSTC-I has developed a literacy course to increase the pool of candidates for logisticians. GAO, Preliminary Observations on ISF Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities, p. 6.


Briefing by MiTT members (Codel Meehan, 30 Mar – 2 Apr 2007).


Life support is primarily the provision of food and water. MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9.

O&I Briefing, Logistics and Equipment.


For a discussion of Foreign Military Sales and its use by the Government of Iraq, refer to chapter 3.


The FMS program is regulated by the Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 90-269 (1968), and administered jointly by the Departments of State and Defense. It essentially allows government-to-government purchases of weapons, defense articles, services, and military training, with the Department of Defense serving as an intermediary and handling procurement, logistics, delivery, and often product support and training.

The continuing challenge of building the Iraqi security forces

213 OSD, Justification for the ISFF and ASFF, p. 5.
219 The current plan is to purchase lightly armored vehicles manufactured in the U.S., Russia, Poland, and Brazil. The planned quantities of U.S. weapons that will be purchased are insufficient to replace all the existing Warsaw Pact weapons.
223 SIGIR, Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities, p. 8.
7: TRANSITION TEAMS AND THE ADVISORY MISSION

“Transition Teams are seasoned Coalition leaders with relevant experience in maneuver, intelligence, support and sustainment skills who live, work and train with the Iraqi unit .... There is little doubt that the Transition Team program is an essential pillar in building Iraqi security self-reliance.”

-- General George W. Casey, Jr., October 2006

INTRODUCTION

A central part of America's current military strategy in Iraq is its large and complex military advisory effort, a mission that the military did not anticipate in March 2003. The lack of planning and preparation was evident in the military's ad hoc approach to the initial selection, training, and organization of advisors. However, U.S. forces in the field learned from their experience and came to realize the critical importance of this effort. Continued improvement in all aspects of the advisory mission is essential for a successful outcome in ongoing counterinsurgency operations.

In summer 2006, the Army's Vice Chief of Staff, General Richard A. Cody, said that the military's advisor mission in support of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) was the most important mission the Army has, and that mission needed to be resourced accordingly. Improving the operational capability of Iraqi military and police units is done primarily through the efforts of Transition Teams (TTs). These teams typically operate far from secure forward operating bases, with poor communications and uncertain force protection. Composed of over 6,000 advisors in more than 500 teams, TTs operate at all levels of Iraqi units in all major subordinate commands with approximately 347,000 Iraqi personnel. The Department views the officers and soldiers serving on Coalition Transition Teams as a vital part of the Coalition-ISF partnership. They serve as a conduit for Coalition enablers and, according to General George Casey, bring Iltizam Mushtarak [United Commitment] to the forefront of operations.

As ISF personnel move to their units, Transition Teams and partner units, directed by Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), oversee and mentor operational training in counterinsurgency mission essential tasks. While Iraqi units build collective proficiency at platoon, company, and battalion levels, they take on greater roles in combined operations until they are capable of independent tactical action. When the relevant Iraqi and Coalition commanders are confident that the Iraqi units are capable of leading security operations, the Iraqi unit is assigned its own battlespace and appropriate missions. Partnership continues at higher levels, with Coalition units providing tactical enablers (e.g., fire support, aviation support, medical evacuation, and intelligence) as Iraqi units develop.
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions, which include training and advising foreign military forces, were historically conducted by the U.S. Special Operations Command. However, with other demands on the Special Operations Forces, the lion’s share of the mission to advise and train the ISF has fallen to the conventional forces.

**Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations**

The Iraq Study Group recently observed that, “despite early missteps, the embedding of American military advisory teams has worked in Iraq and needs to expand.” The advisory mission is part of a larger stability operation in Iraq. The Defense Science Board reported in *Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DOD* that foreign stability operations are a core activity for the Department of Defense (DOD), noting that the U.S. military has engaged in these operations since 1846. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States has conducted stability operations, on average, every two years. In fact, U.S. forces engages in stability operations more frequently than combat operations, and stability operations cost more than these operations. Furthermore, the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* found that the United States must develop the capacity of foreign militaries as partners in conducting military and security operations in the future.

“Unfortunately, the Army – and often the Department of Defense as a whole – has a poor history of placing the proper emphasis on the advisory teams it embeds in Host Nation forces, tending toward an ad hoc approach …. Some have argued that the Army and the Marine Corps have repeated many of the [Vietnam era] mistakes while implementing combat advisory efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past five years. The teams have been selected from Guard, Reserve, and Active Duty Forces on an ad hoc basis; the quality of the training they have received has varied widely …. Doctrine for the mission is lacking; indeed, even the size and composition of the teams headed to Iraq and Afghanistan varies considerably …. The need for well-trained, professional combat advisors is unlikely to go away any time soon. It is long past time for the Army to institutionalize and professionalize the manning and training of combat advisors in permanent Army force structure.”

-- Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, USA

In November 2005, the Department directed that such operations be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities. Stability operations include helping rebuild indigenous institutions such as security forces. The 2005 DOD policy requires that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensure that U.S. Armed Forces have the training, structure, processes, and doctrine necessary to train, equip, and advise large numbers of foreign forces in a range of security sectors, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Toward this end, the Department established the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) in 2006. JCISFA captures and analyzes security force assistance lessons from contemporary operations in order to advise combatant commands and the services on
appropriate doctrine and practices, and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare for and conduct security force assistance missions effectively.\textsuperscript{16}

There is a growing recognition among experts, including Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and U.S. Army Major General (Retired) Robert Scales, that the U.S. military needs to create a permanent advisory capacity.\textsuperscript{17} The 2005 DOD policy recognizes the need for such a capability, but implementation has lagged. To achieve such a capability, the Department must rapidly establish comprehensive requirements for such an advisory program, and the services must be able to implement those requirements.

Of course, plans, processes, and resources are not enough to ensure a successful military advisory program. An advisor career needs to be an attractive option for talented officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs).\textsuperscript{18} The Department’s “Human Capital Strategy” calls for a career advancement philosophy to foster innovation by encouraging career paths, such as an advisor track, that develop the unique skills needed to meet counterinsurgency missions.\textsuperscript{19}

**FORCE STRUCTURE FOR TRANSITION TEAMS**

The October 2003 Request for Forces (RFF) to staff the Advisor Support Teams (ASTs) initiated the advisory mission in Iraq. The Army assembled the first teams in 2004 from conventional Coalition forces operating in Iraq, with personnel taken "out of hide" from units already there. The ISF training mission further evolved with an initiative in the spring and summer of 2004 that used one of the Army’s seven institutional training divisions to train and advise the Iraqis. In 2005, the advisory mission matured as the ASTs evolved into the TTs, which were drawn initially from the Reserve Components and were referred to as “external” teams.\textsuperscript{20} In April 2005 they began to operate under the control of the Iraq Assistance Group (IAG), with TTs embedded in ISF units at the division, brigade, and battalion level. The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) also started a TT program in early 2004 in Al-Anbar province. The Corps sources most of its TTs from the regimental combat team (RCT), so they are referred to as “internal” teams.\textsuperscript{21}

The IAG, under the command of MNC-I, is responsible for receiving, training, employing, sustaining, and recovering “advisory-ready” TTs throughout their lifecycle to meet ISF support requirements.\textsuperscript{22} In March 2007, operational control of TTs shifted to the Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) responsible for the battle space within which each TT operates.\textsuperscript{23} The IAG has responsibility for training and administrative control of non-USMC TTs.\textsuperscript{24} The IAG fulfills the following functions:

1. Coordinating TT movement to, within, and from Iraq;
2. Identifying TT equipment requirements (RFFs) and determining team assignments;
3. Managing TT personnel, processing awards, and accounting for equipment; and
4. Providing oversight for TT training.
For 2008, the Marine Corps will provide roughly 104 Transition Teams in Iraq. Where possible, the Marine Corps integrates its Transition Teams within its combat battalions and sources most of its Transition Teams from the battalion with which the Transition Team will deploy. The Iraq Security Force Cell (ISFC) in the Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) headquarters performs an IAG-like function. The ISFC receives and assigns Transition Teams to Marine regimental combat teams.

TTs are not part of a conventional U.S. military formation; they are unique units carrying out a variety of military and police missions. In addition to the Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) that are embedded with Iraqi Army (IA) units, there are Police Transition Teams (PTTs), National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs) (formerly Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs)), Border Transition Teams (BTTs), and teams advising the Iraqi Navy and Air Force. Ministry teams advise officials in the MOD and MOI on developing the capacity of these ministries, as discussed earlier. Finally, there are teams in garrison support units for logistics, administration, and medical operations.

While MiTTs and NPTTs generally live with Iraqi units, most PTTs and BTTs live on forward operating bases, rotating to various local police or border stations each day. Unlike MiTTs, which stay with their IA combat units, PTTs work within police districts and provinces, often crossing BCT battlespace. BTTs, like MiTTs and NPTTs, are linked to BCTs in the area for which the brigade is responsible.

TTs play a major role in helping their Iraqi units to become tactically, operationally, and logistically self-sustaining. TTs do this by:

- Advising, coaching, teaching, and mentoring the ISF in intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics, and infantry tactics;
- Developing and improving Iraqi leaders;
- Supporting Iraqi units’ training and
- Assisting with logistics and battlefield enabling effects, such as medical evacuation, and close air and artillery support.

The MNF-I Police TT program began informally as the Police Partnership Program (P3) initiated by Colonel Richard Swengros, currently the Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police Training School. The Army instituted a formal PTT program in the summer of 2006. The process for the selection, training, and deployment of advisors to the Iraqi police differs significantly from that of military advisors. Unlike Army MiTTs, which are taken from different military units and assembled at Fort Riley, Kansas, the typical Army PTT consists of an intact Military Police (MP) squad that is supplemented by several International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) and one or more host-nation interpreters. IPLOs are contracted to provide civilian law enforcement expertise to the PTT. PTTs conduct a multi-tiered system of training and development for the entire Iraqi police structure – from the individual Iraqi police officer at a station through the chief of police and his staff. A key training tool for PTTs is the Iraqi Police Force Station Report (IPFSR) which is used to assess the condition of the police unit they are advising. In addition, PTTs use Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) with a police essential task list (PETL) containing 150
training tasks, printed in Arabic and English, to measure the effectiveness of their training. Using the PETL assessments, PTTs provide a variety of classes to improve the performance of their police units.34

Size and Composition of Transition Teams

The size and composition of TTs depend on the type of unit they advise. Teams generally have 10-15 military personnel, most of them senior NCOs or mid-range officers. The division MiTT chief is a colonel, brigade chiefs are lieutenant colonels, and battalion chiefs are majors. The teams are composed of a mix of personnel with combat and combat support specialties that include operations, intelligence, logistics, communications, engineering, and supply (see Table 5).

Some experts believe that the size of the teams is inadequate to the mission and variety of tasks that they must perform. TT veterans also have raised concerns about the size and composition of the teams. One brigade team leader said that the standard MiTT staffing (10-12), with each member trained for a distinct role, does not work well in actual operations, which could result in mission failure.35 MiTTs and NPTTs conduct a wide range of tasks that go beyond operations and training. These include sharing intelligence, processing and supervising prisoners, coordinating medical evacuations, and conducting regular logistics runs for supplies.36 TT members, while selected for a specific function based on their occupational specialty, do not necessarily perform their assigned functions when deployed. In one case, an individual selected as a mechanic deployed as a communications specialist. In addition, some TTs do not have personnel assigned at the appropriate rank. A returning team chief reported that another chief was not the ranking officer on his team. In another case, the team’s rank structure was too high.37 In addition to skills and rank, size is an issue. According to some current members and veterans of TTs, there was nearly unanimous agreement that teams are too small. Commanders typically required nine soldiers to patrol in three HMMWVs. When a soldier is unable to patrol, the MiTTs rely on other units to supply a replacement or the team does not leave its base.38

While the MiTTs, NPTTs, and BTTs are better resourced, the Department reports that due to “cost and risk” there is a shortage in the number of PTTs available to advise and mentor the IPS. “[A]t any time, only 5 of Iraq’s 18 provinces have sufficient PTTs.”39 This raises at least two concerns. First, given the Department’s position that “[c]ontinued PTT presence and participation at Iraqi Police Service stations [is] needed to improve police readiness and to sustain progress in reforming community policing,” the IPS may not be receiving the advising and mentoring it needs. Second, PTTs assess the performance and operational readiness of the IPS units for the Coalition. The lack of coverage in the majority of provinces means that the capability and performance of the IPS is largely an unknown; most IPS units are simply not assessed.40

Returning TT members and After Action Reports indicate that teams should be reorganized to better reflect the specific needs of the Iraqi forces.41 TTs would be more effective with a greater number of interpreters, and logistics, administrative, civil affairs, and detainee specialists. In response to questions from the Senate Committee on Armed Services prior to
his confirmation as the Commander of the MNF-I, General David Petraeus acknowledged that the size and composition of the MiTTs is inadequate to meet mission requirements:

Despite the success achieved by the embedding of transition teams, the current [MiTT] size is insufficient to meet all operational requirements and permit an optimum level of support. The commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq has initiated a plan to enhance MiTTs to increase their effectiveness. Based on conditions within each multi-national division (MND) area of responsibility, primarily relating to levels of violence and ISF capacity for independent operations, MiTTs are being augmented by assets controlled by the respective MND Commanders. [U.S.] brigade combat teams are the primary resource providers for these enhancements. Enhanced MiTTs have the ability to advise ISF units down to company level.

Teams augmented by their BCT typically include 20-25 members. General Petraeus believes that the current size, structure, and number of PTTs (see Table 6) is appropriate for the missions to which they are assigned, but pledged to reassess the sufficiency of PTTs to determine whether augmentation is required.42

Table 5: Example of Battalion Level MiTT Structure.43

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Key Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team Chief (Major)</td>
<td>Leader of the team; coordinates subordinates’ efforts; primary advisor to the Iraqi unit commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff/Maneuver Officer (Captain)</td>
<td>Second in command; primary advisor to the Iraqi unit’s operations officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA Effects Officer (Captain)</td>
<td>Coordinates the use of Coalition fires, i.e. artillery and close air support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA Effects NCO (Sergeant First Class)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Officer (Captain)</td>
<td>Assists Iraqi staff in developing and analyzing enemy information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence NCO (Sergeant First Class)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Officer</td>
<td>Primary advisor to the HQ service company on sustainment functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics NCO (Sergeant First Class)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications NCO (Sergeant First Class)</td>
<td>Trains and advises Iraqis on communications and computer equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medic/Corpsman (Sergeant First Class)</td>
<td>Renders medical aid to injured team members and Iraqi forces. Conducts medical training for Iraqi forces.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6: Example of Police Station Level PTT Structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Key Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team Chief</td>
<td>MP squad or platoon leader (depending on number of stations). Mentors and assists Iraqi station commanders in working with community, government agency, and tribal leaders; teaches and coaches Iraqi police officers; enhances and improves readiness of police station operations; and facilitates logistics and equipment requests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Team Chief</td>
<td>Assists team chief, oversees daily station operations, collects data for IPFSR; supervises investigations, community policing, patrol plans, and police training tactics; with IPLO advisor, conducts training of station section chiefs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medic</td>
<td>Provides medical care to the PTT. Also performs health and welfare checks on prisoners. Trains Iraqi police on medical tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security (9)</td>
<td>MP squad members who train and coach Iraqi police patrol officers and provide force protection for the PTT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Intelligence Specialist</td>
<td>Mentors Iraqi police in investigative functions for major crimes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Advisors (3-5)</td>
<td>IPLOs provide continuity for the PTTs; assist district, station, and shift commanders and police officers with training and management. IPLOs do not participate in combat missions. IPLOs also train and coach Iraqi police staff sections on personnel and logistics procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel/Logistics Advisors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguist</td>
<td>Civilian interpreter (Iraqi or U.S. citizen).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND SELECTION

TT members are expected to possess the ability to assess, train, mentor, advise, liaise, and fight. This requires skills in collaboration, communication, cultural sensitivity, counterinsurgency, force protection, tactical specialties, and combat and team support (e.g., team interaction, getting supplies, etc.). MNC-I is responsible for generating the requirements (RFFs) for TTs. Ideally, team members are selected on the basis of their military specialty, experience, military education, and recent assignments. Team chief selection is intended to be based on recent combat experience, as well as brigade- and division-level operations and staff assignments. The Iraq Study Group recommended that “the most highly qualified U.S.

“We started this thing with not the B Team, but the D Team! I replaced non-promotable captains, reservists, and guardsmen with no operational experience. We had retirees out of the Army 5-10 years. One major was a Vietnam Vet, retired policeman …. He had been told he was going to teach classes …

Quality of manning is the most fundamental MiTT challenge facing us today. To ensure the success of this mission, we must have the best and brightest our military has to offer.”

-- Former MiTT Leader, April 2007
officers and military personnel should be assigned to the embedded teams, and American teams should be present with Iraqi units down to the company level. The United States should establish suitable career-enhancing incentives for these officers and personnel.

Selection of Transition Teams

The sourcing of TTs has evolved since 2004. Originally “internal” teams were drawn largely from units already in Iraq. When MNF-I instituted the current TT program in 2006, external teams were created by selecting individual augmentees from units across the Army, Air Force, and Navy, and then assembled and trained at Fort Riley, Kansas. The Marine Corps continues to use its “internal teams.” Most TTs are drawn from the Army and Marine Corps.

Initially, the Army’s personnel selection process for the advisory mission was not well planned or executed. Army interviews with senior officers from the 98th and 80th Training Divisions, who were involved in the initial deployments, confirm that the selection was ad hoc and resulted in sending trainers who generally had not previously deployed and had little or no combat experience. In short, those initially selected by the Army were not the best qualified.

The Army reports that it is addressing this problem. Trainers at Fort Riley believe they are now getting highly qualified senior officers and NCOs for the teams. A greater number have combat experience. These officers and NCOs bring a wide range of combat and combat support specialties to the teams including operations, intelligence, logistics, communications, engineering, fire support, and medical and garrison operations.

The Army’s Human Resources Command (HRC) assumed responsibility for sourcing Army teams in March 2006. IAG sets TT requirements (RFFs) for the Army which are validated by Army Headquarters and Forces Command Operations. HRC fills the requirements by selecting the “best available qualified” individual (emphasis added).

The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces

In a perfect world where talent was abundant and HRC could do more than fill potholes, I’d say a selection process with an interview would be in order.

-- Former TT Chief

“One Army officer who has served in Iraq and would be well qualified for an advisory role told me recently that he was asked to become an ROTC instructor at home but not an advisor in Iraq. Those he sees being sent to help Iraqis tend to have "marginal career prospects." "No one is diverted from a school or command," he told me. "No one is sent after a successful command." Another experienced Army officer with a Special Forces background – exactly the kind of advisor we should be sending – actually tried to volunteer. He recalls being told by a personnel officer: "Boy, I would hate to waste you with an assignment like that. With your background and file quality, there are so many other billets I could assign you to."

-- Max Boot, Los Angeles Times
In addition to specific skills, leadership is crucial to a TT’s success. An Army study reported that the greatest personnel challenge for the TTs has been the selection of the right chief and deputy. TT leaders have to be able to function in an environment where there are overlapping lines of authority. It takes a special type of leader to handle this responsibility, and conventional units do not foster this skill. Because advisory teams are usually far from higher command, the leader must be able to resolve challenges quickly and equitably. They must be comfortable with uncertainty. Conventional leaders are uncomfortable with things they cannot control, so they seek to control everything within their operational area. Unconventional leaders, on the other hand, thrive on uncertainty. Unconventional units, like Special Operations Forces (SOF), use individual talent to offset any negative effects from that uncertainty. MiTT commanders need SOF-like skills, as do their NCO deputies.

Fielding this kind of leader requires appropriate incentives. While professionally rewarding, TT service is not currently viewed as career enhancing. General Petraeus, in addressing a recent Army symposium on security assistance, said advisors must be professionally rewarded, and that the Army’s effort to select qualified advisors is improving. In addition to the role now played by the HRC, efforts are under way to ensure that the pool from which individuals are drawn is more selective.

The advisor role demands skills that emphasize influencing, coaching, and mentoring. JCISFA found that an individual’s ability to influence, and therefore to achieve results indirectly, is best done by demonstrating value and credibility to the indigenous force. Advisors must also have a temperament that builds and keeps rapport by communicating understanding, respect, and trust. These skills, critical to being an advisor, are not those that the Army typically emphasizes in its TT leader selection. HRC’s process focuses on skills associated with command and tactical operations, not advising foreign militaries or working and fighting in

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"Not every good commander or staff officer is going to make a good advisor; we breed A-type take-charge personalities because it’s a personality we require to conventionally succeed; an Advisor has to be able to go into a lower gear and take a long term look .... As an advisor, it’s not your success you should be worried about, it’s not about you .... the really good work is the type where the ISF partner unit takes charge and develops the initiative to make their own decisions based on their goals and needs." — Former TT Chief

"What you had was a lot of people over there alone and unafraid, making things happen or failing to make things happen based on their own personalities and initiative. Basically it was whatever the Army could throw at it. You had a number of individuals who did great work over there, who volunteered to go over and who extended over there. They were able to adapt to the environment and found it challenging based on their own personality. You also had other individuals over there, though, who were frustrated and bitter and who simply couldn’t adapt to the situation. It was a function of temperament and personality, which is something we as an Army don’t really measure and track." — Colonel Sean Ryan, USA, Deputy Director Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
unconventional environments. A detailed review of an officers’ file is conducted and HRC interviews candidates. If HRC is not looking for the right skills, however, there is no guarantee that the selection will result in a leader who is equipped to be an advisor.64

TRAINING OF TRANSITION TEAMS

Initial TT Training Efforts

Training of TTs began at the same time the Army deployed the first external advisory teams to Iraq in 2005, and today, the TT program continues to evolve. As attention to TTs increased, the Army began specific training at several locations, including Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Hood, Texas; Camp Atterbury, Indiana; and Camp Shelby, Mississippi. The 80th Division, one of the first Army units deployed to train and advise the ISF, found in its pre-deployment survey that the training being provided for U.S. advisors was not realistic.66

A May 2006 Army study made several critical observations and recommendations about the training program which focused on cultural awareness, advisor fundamentals, and language capability.67 The study reported that much of the cultural awareness training emphasized the most rudimentary Middle Eastern customs and prohibitions without regard for the specific region in which the team would operate. In addition, advisors did not comprehend their role as facilitators and mentors. Former TT members confirmed that there were serious deficiencies in their training in 2005 and 2006. Some training assessments indicate that while language and cultural awareness instruction has improved, it needs even more attention.68

Current Training

Army TT training was consolidated at Fort Riley, Kansas, on June 1, 2006. The 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division took over the TT training mission in October 2006. The Brigade is responsible for the creation, integration, pre-deployment preparation, and training of TTs, with the exception of PTTs. By March 2007, about 850 soldiers were in training, and about 1,400 others had completed it. The Army trains mobile training teams for its PTTs at the Military Police School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. USMC teams train at Twentynine Palms and Camp Pendleton in California, and Camp Lejeune in North Carolina.69 Air Force units performing these duties receive no specific PTT training outside what a unit may do on its own.70

Army training for MiTTs, NPTTs, and BTTs, as well as support unit teams, consists of five phases:

(1) Personnel take an online basic Arabic language program and receive Army handouts on adviser skills;
(2) The follow-on 60-day course at Fort Riley includes culture, language, advisor skills, and survival, lifesaving, and counterinsurgency training;
Teams deploy to Camp Buehring, Kuwait, for up to 10 days of theater orientation and live-fire training;

Soldiers receive briefings from top Army and Iraqi leaders on the conditions they will face at the Phoenix counterinsurgency (COIN) Academy at Camp Taji, north of Baghdad; and

Finally, teams spend up to 10 days for “relief in place” and “transfer of authority” (RIPTOA) with the team they are replacing in order to maintain continuity in the relationship with their Iraqi unit.

The Marine Corps uses a “block training” concept:

Blocks I and II, which last 30 days, occur at a unit’s home station and include individual level combat skills, as well as language and culture training. Blocks IV-A includes specific TT training, which some receive at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California, and others at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The TT is assigned an interpreter in order to familiarize the team with cultural norms and the challenges associated with mentoring and advising forces who speak a foreign language.

“Lane” training: includes training for mounted route reconnaissance, cordon and search operations, and civil/military operations using role players assuming Iraqi personas.

Block IV-A training culminates in a TT mission rehearsal field exercise.

The TT role is also integrated into the pre-deployment training for combat battalions, culminating in a battalion-level mission rehearsal field exercise.

Overall, though initially deficient, the military has significantly improved its training emphasis on advisory skills, language, and culture. Nevertheless, according to some, this training still focuses too much on “shooters who can advise,” instead of “advisors who can shoot.”

In contrast to other TTs, the effort to train PTTs with common standards has only recently been undertaken. Prior to spring 2007, PTT specific training was ad hoc. Most PTT veterans reported that they received no specific police advisor training. Recognizing the need for formal PTT training, the Army Military Police School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, created a PTT training package. Personnel who will instruct Army PTTs attend a one-week program at the MP School, then take the training back to their unit. This training, which only began in March 2007, emphasizes the role of the police advisor and the challenges they will face, Iraqi police structure and operations, and PTT best practices and lessons learned. IPLOs do not participate in this military training, but instead attend a two-week DynCorp training course near Fredericksburg, Virginia, before deploying and being teamed with U.S. military personnel in Iraq. They typically have short deployments and may be moved from PTT to PTT.
COMMAND AND CONTROL AND OPERATIONS

MNSTC-I and MNC-I are both subordinate to MNF-I, and both play a role with respect to TTs. MNSTC-I leads Coalition efforts to train, equip, and organize the ISF. However, TT assessments of ISF readiness and operational performance are reported to MNC-I, because MNC-I has operational control over the TTs. MNSTC-I is responsible for TTs advising the Iraqi Navy and Air Force.

The TT command structure has proven problematic. According to a 2006 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) study, advisor teams operate under multiple chains of command simultaneously, causing confusion of roles and authority when they should have a clear chain of command. Advisor teams:

- Are administratively controlled by the IAG;
- Have a command relationship with the next higher level TT;
- Support their Iraqi counterpart, which is operationally controlled by the next higher level Iraqi formation or by a Coalition unit; and
- Are operationally controlled by the BCT in whose battle space they operate.

The PTTs have sometimes been controlled by the local BCT, and at other times by the MNC-I MP Brigade. PTTs and MP companies are currently administratively controlled by the 89th MP brigade and under the tactical control of a BCT, which are both subordinate to a division and then to MNC-I. The 89th MP brigade serves as MNC-I’s “Executive Agent for Iraqi Police Training Readiness,” and has responsibility for synchronizing the PTT effort across the entire theater of operations. CPATT provides logistical support to the Iraqi police. The MP brigade and PTTs only coordinate with CPATT to acquire logistical support. The Army MP school PTT instructor guide notes that command and control (C2) “relationships are a challenge for MPs at all levels and can be difficult.”

**Internal versus External Teams**

A CALL analyst and some former TT leaders argue that for TTs to be effective, they cannot be controlled by the conventional forces operating in their area. The situation is particularly difficult for internally sourced TTs, which have little independence of action. According to one former advisor, however, internal TTs are actually advantaged by their relationship with the unit that fielded them. A former MNC-I commander agreed that internally sourced TTs may be more effective because team members are already working together prior to assuming their mission, and are part of the larger Coalition unit operating in the same area.

External teams have reciprocal weaknesses and strengths. They have to develop a relationship with partner Coalition units, but they also have more independence. This strengthens their position as a liaison/advisory team between Iraqi and Coalition forces. Externally sourced teams also have no vested interest in making “things look rosy” in assessing the Iraqi units’ progress for higher level commanders. Finally, and more fundamentally, external teams can
prioritize the advisory mission, which may not always be consistent with the BCT’s operations.89

As stated previously, in March 2007, the Army followed the Marine Corps’ lead in giving BCTs operational control of the TTs in their battlespace, but without explicitly addressing how this affects the independence of the teams or how it affects the strategic use of TTs. Returning TT members provided mixed views on this decision. Some stated that the new chain of command will clarify the relationship between the teams and other U.S. forces:90

For the majority of my time in Iraq, I was under the IAG [and MiTT] chain of command. Just as I was departing theater, on 1 March 2007, this changed to where the battalion MiTT was responsible to the maneuver Brigade Combat Team – effectively removing the brigade and division MiTT from my chain of command. I believe that this is an exceptionally poor decision. I think this decision was made based on an effort to provide unity of effort between the U.S. and the Iraqi forces. While I think that this unity of effort is important, it wrongly interprets the effort toward which we should unify. Given our intent of removing Coalition forces from Iraq and turning over the control of Iraq to the Iraqi Security Forces, the unity of effort must go to the Iraqi Security Forces. Because we established the IA first as a collection of small units, we have trained them to rely on the [U.S.] in order to address their issues. I spent much of my time in Iraq teaching and reinforcing the use of the Iraqi chain of command. I believe, therefore, that the chain of command for MiTT teams needs to replicate that of the IA units they advise.91

**Measuring TT Effectiveness**

In a committee hearing on MiTTs in Iraq and Afghanistan in December 2006, Members asked how the effectiveness of the TTs is measured. DOD witnesses agreed that the proficiency of the Iraqi army unit with which the MiTTs are partnered should be an indicator, but were not able to offer any definitive set of effectiveness measures.92 The success of team operations actually depends on a number of variables that are outside of the control of individual TTs, including the size and the skill composition of the team, their training, the quality and reliability of their equipment, the level and quality of support from their Coalition partner unit, and the competency and motivation of the Iraqi unit they are advising. Given the variables, the question of how to evaluate the performance of a TT is a difficult one.

Discussions with two former TT chiefs illustrate some of the issues that need to be resolved in measuring effectiveness:

- According to a TT chief who returned from Iraq in March 2007, gauging the success of an advisor team requires measuring the progress of the ISF unit with which it is embedded, taking into account the specific challenges faced by that unit. TRAs are not an effective measure because they reflect a shortsighted view that is useful only in gauging dependency on Coalition forces. What ISF units need is something that helps
them develop a vision for their unit, while highlighting issues to their chain of command.93

- Another former TT chief, a current instructor at Fort Riley, observed that the effectiveness of an advisor team should not be measured based on the number of insurgents killed or illegal weapons seized. Instead, success should be based on how a team approaches its Iraqi counterparts and helps them free their organization from ties to militias, or encourages them to talk with local citizens to facilitate dialogue and trust between citizens and the ISF. He concluded that a TT’s success “should be measured in the trust the common Iraqi citizen has for their Iraqi Security Forces.”

Having the proper equipment is another variable that can affect TT operational effectiveness. Army TTs generally have enough of the right equipment, but are not always trained on key items used in theater due to shortages in the United States.94 Upon deployment, TTs generally relied on other U.S. forces in their area for support, but had mixed experiences obtaining needed equipment and supplies.95 USMC units train and deploy with their equipment set.96

The advisory mission in Iraq is essential to making the ISF self-reliant. It is also a significant investment of people, time, and resources. Such an important mission requires an assessment of effectiveness. However, there are no measures of performance for these TTs or for the variables that affect their performance. In the absence of such measures, the military’s ability to account for the results of its investment and to fully apply the lessons learned from these TTs to future advisory missions will be severely limited.

**FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Finding 1:** The Department of Defense has recognized that stability operations, including developing indigenous security forces such as the Iraqi Security Forces, are a core U.S. military mission. However, the services lack sufficient standing military advisory capability to meet current, and potential future, requirements for this mission.

**Recommendation:** The committee should require the Secretary of Defense to report on how the Department will implement its stability, security, transitions, and reconstruction operations policies for enhancing the role of military advisors within 60 days. The report should include a proposed structure and size of a joint advisory capability.

**Finding 2:** Military advisors placed with the Iraqi Security Forces in 2004 and 2005 were not fully qualified for the mission due to an ad-hoc selection process that did not prioritize the advisory mission. Improvements have been made, but challenges remain in assuring that selection criteria are appropriate. Current selection procedures emphasize availability, occupation, and operational experience over advisory skills and temperament.
Recommendation: The committee should direct the Service Secretaries to take steps to improve the selection of military advisors by emphasizing advisory skills and temperament. They should also create special experience identifiers in order to better track individuals throughout their career for further advisor assignments. Finally, the services should develop an incentive package and ensure advisors remain competitive for promotion. The Military Personnel Subcommittee should study this issue in more depth.

Finding 3: Initial training of advisors for the Iraqi Security Forces was inadequate in preparing soldiers for the conditions they would encounter and for the role they would play as advisors. While improvements have been made to the training, an even greater emphasis on language, culture, and advisor skills is needed.

Finding 4: Military Police units began deploying to Iraq as advisors to the Iraqi Police in 2005, yet training for these units did not begin until March 2007. The rigor and quality of this training has not yet been assessed.

Recommendation: The committee should require the Secretary of Defense to assess the effectiveness of advisor training, and identify options for improving the content and delivery of that training across the services. The Secretary should also assess the appropriateness of using Military Police personnel as advisors to civilian police units. The Secretary should report to the committee on these assessments within 90 days.

Finding 5: The composition and size of non-Police Transition Teams is not optimal.

Recommendation: While the Army is moving to expand the size of Military Transition Teams, it should also determine the optimal composition of all Transition Teams, taking into account the varied mission requirements they encounter. In addition, Multi-National Force-Iraq should study Police Transition Team size and composition. The Army and Multi-National Force-Iraq should report to the committee on these issues within 75 days.

Finding 6: Multiple chains of command for Transition Teams (TTs) complicate the TT mission. Changes to this structure are now being implemented, but it is not yet clear whether the changes have solved existing problems.

Finding 7: Multi-National Force-Iraq does not specifically measure Transition Team effectiveness. As a result, the military's ability to account for the results of its investment and to fully apply the lessons learned for Transition Teams to future advisory missions will be severely limited.

Recommendation: The committee should direct Multi-National Force-Iraq to conduct a comprehensive review of the effectiveness of the Transition Team command and control structure and determine appropriate measures of Transition Team effectiveness, and include this information in its September report to Congress.
NOTES CHAPTER 7


4 U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007 (Sec 9010, PL 109-289) (Jun 2007), p. 30. See also Steve Bowman, Congressional Research Service, e-mail message (13 Apr 2007); “In addition to U.S., the United Kingdom, Korea, Poland, El Salvador, Australia, Denmark, and Italy are also providing transition teams.” See also “Allied Joint Forces Command Naples Fact Sheet” (28 May 2007): NATO’s Training Mission to Iraq is assisting in establishing an ISF military training and education capability.


8 Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is an umbrella term for programs developed by the United States to support a host nation’s program of internal defense and development. In order to support FID operations, the United States employs a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments to help host governments protect their societies from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.


12 The Defense Science Board Task Force Report also noted that since the end of the Cold War, 80% of supplemental appropriations for operations have been for stability operations, and 20% have been for combat operations. In addition, the U.S. military has not yet learned to use technology to reduce the cost of stability operations, as it has for combat operations. At the same time, technology has significantly amplified the capabilities of insurgents to disrupt U.S. operations.


14 Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl commands the 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas, which trains Transition Teams for Iraq and Afghanistan. Nagl led a tank platoon in Operation Desert Storm and served as the Operations Officer of Task Force 1-34 Armor in Khalidiyah, Iraq (Sep 2003 – Sep 2004). He was a member of the writing team that produced the Army’s Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. These views are his own. Institutionalizing Adaptation – It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps, Center for a New American Security (Jun 2007).


17 Krepinevich, the Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, noted the shift of rival militias and non-state entities toward irregular warfare. He suggests considering creating an “Advisor Corps” – a cadre of officers and NCOs that can train indigenous and allied forces in peacetime while serving with newly trained indigenous force units in wartime. He noted that without a standing Advisor Corps, the Army “… is forced to strip its own units for officers and NCOs to fill this requirement, while confronting officer and
NCO shortages. It comes as no surprise that oftentimes the soldiers sent by the Army to serve as advisors are the men it can most easily afford to do without. Nor is this sort of duty looked upon favorably by the Army’s best young officers and NCOs.” Andrew F. Krepinevich, Testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee – The Future of U.S. Ground Forces: Challenges and Requirements (17 Apr 2007). Institutionalizing the advisor program in the Army is a major step, “…the ground forces of the future will be made up of more than just brigades. We will need a very strong corps of trainers, advisors and military assistance groups capable of being sustained for decades in regions of the world where new allied armies will be created or improved. We will need many more specialized units to assist in nation building such as special operating forces, civil affairs, military police and engineers.” Robert H. Scales Jr., Statement for the Record before the Senate Armed Services Committee (17 Apr 2007).


“I MEF Transition Team” (staff briefing, 25 Apr 2007).


Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007).


The Marine Corps will provide 32 military transition teams, 18 border transition teams and 50 police transition teams for OIF. The Marine Corps will no longer mentor the National Police in FY 08. Marines interviewed indicated that the Marine Corps places a priority on the Transition Team mission reflected, for example, by the fact that the battlespace commander normally will decide who will serve on the TT in the battlespace he controls. “II MEF Transition Team Brief,” (briefing to Staffdel Kruse, 25 Apr 2007), p. 5.

COL Steve Davis, COL John Stone, and LTC David J. Barnes (USMC II MEF, interviews with staff, 25 Apr 2007).

U.S. Customs and Border Protection personnel have trained Iraqis to protect their borders and build Iraqi institutions. These units are known as Customs and Border Protection Teams (CBPTs), and are augmented by U.S. Customs agents. A significant proportion of these teams are staffed by Coalition partners. DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), pp. 32-49. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (information available online at: www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom).

For additional information on ministerial capacity, refer to chapter 2.

Staff briefing by the 372d National Guard Military Police BN (21 May 2007). Confidential staff interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007).


“Iraq Assistance Group and Transition Teams, Questions and Answers.”


The IPFSR replaced the Police Station Management Report (PSMR) and is the primary document and analytical tool for assessing the readiness, training, and overall capabilities of the IPS. The document consists of hundreds of resources and systems questions to objectively assess the capabilities and capacities of the IPS. U.S. Army Military Police School, Police Transition Team Training Support Package, Instructor Guide v3, pp. 117-125.


Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007).


GAO, Oral Briefing.
Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007).


GAO, Oral Briefing.


Codel Skelton staff notes (unpublished memo, 26 Mar 2007).

USA MP School, PTT Training Support Package, pp. 103-117.

Some USAF PTTs, Security Forces Squadrons, have indigenous military, intelligence personnel.

“Iraq Assistance Group and Transition Teams.”

“Human Resources Command,” (staff briefing, 10 May 2007).

Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007).

Originally, teams were sourced by units already in Iraq – then called “out-of-hide,” now referred to as “internal” teams. “External” teams are sourced from personnel outside Iraq.


Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007).

Colonel Ingram (briefing for Codel Skelton, 26 Mar 2007).

Colonel Ingram briefing.

U.S. Army Human Resources Command (staff briefing, 9 May 2007).

GAO, Oral Briefing. HRC (staff briefing).

Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007).

CALL, Transition Team Initial Impressions Report, p. 3.

Thomas Odum (Analyst, Joint Readiness Training Center) (email to staff, 11 Apr 2007).

Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007).

In contrast, the Army in Vietnam sent the message that advising was not an important assignment. David Petraeus in Security Assistance: U.S. and International Historical Perspectives, p. 10.


Human Resources Command (staff briefing, 9 May 2007).


CALL, Transition Team Initial Impressions Report, pp. 3-4.

GAO, Oral Briefing.

Staffdel Lewis, including staff from the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, visited Fort Riley in February, while Codel Skelton (including Representatives Davis, Gingrey, and Conaway) and O&I staff visited in late March 2007.

Confidential staff interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007).


Block III is primarily logistics.
Previously, each Marine Expeditionary Force provided training for the TTs they sourced. Since the TT mission has grown, the Marine Corps is now taking a Marine Corps-wide approach to providing training. The Security Cooperation Education and Training Center (SCETC) at Quantico, Virginia now oversees the training and has established an Advisor Training Group. The Marine Corps may in the future move all Block IV-A training to Twentynine Palms. George J. Flynn, “USMC Transition Team.”

“Block IV-A (Advisor Team Training), USMC Pre-Deployment Training Program,” (briefing to Staffdel Kruse, 23 Apr 2007), p. 11. This includes: language instruction, foreign weapons familiarization, and counter-interrogation and resistance training. In addition, selected combat skills are reinforced. This includes: convoy operations, vehicle egress, electronic warfare, and improvised explosive device defeat and detection. Due to the small size of transition teams and the security requirement that all convoys include at least three vehicles, all Marine transition team members receive combat driver training. Ordinarily, officers would not receive this type of training. House Armed Services Committee, “Staffdel Kruse to USMC Bases Trip Report” (unpublished memo), p. 2.

The ISF unit would normally be a squad or platoon-size unit depending on the operation. Training is “scenario-based” and includes meetings and negotiations with Iraqi role players. In a typical scenario, a TT participating with role players in a local shura, or council, could be required to “evade to a safe area following an attack.” “Block IV-A USMC Pre-Deployment Training,” p. 15. The Marine Corps plans to further tailor the TT training so that lane training will better correspond with each type of TT (police, border, or military). SCETC Director (comments, 11 Jun 2007).

This is designed to “prepare, evaluate, and mentor” transition teams and includes basic offensive and defensive infantry tasks, mounted and foot-mobile operations and interaction with role players acting as the local population. The Army does similar role-playing. “Block IV-A USMC Pre-Deployment Training,” p. 13.

If an actual TT is not available to participate in this “Mojave Viper” exercise, a unit representing a TT is incorporated into the training, so that the battalion experiences interacting with a TT in its area of operations as part of the pre-deployment program. SCETC Director, 11 Jun 2007.

Confidential staff interviews with USAR TT members (Apr 2007).

Richard Swengros (interviews with staff, 14 May 2007). Confidential staff interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007).

U.S. MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 3.


CPATT, subordinate to MNSTC-I, is responsible for TTs in Iraq’s Interior Ministry.

CALL, Transition Team Initial Impressions Report, p. 4.

The twobriefers agreed that there is confusion about the TT chain of command. Both agreed that a better understanding at the command levels of the role and mission of MiTTs would be useful. U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Briefing on Iraqi Security Forces, Personal Experiences of U.S. Military Advisors on Transition Teams (TT) (110th Cong., 1st sess., 19 Apr 2007).


BG David Quantock (staff briefing, 13 Jun 2007).

Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007).

GAO, Oral Briefing.

Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007).

Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007).

Other returning TT members said that the new chain of command may affect teams’ ability to effectively work with Iraqi forces by, for example, reducing the degree to which teams can operate independently from other U.S. forces in the area. GAO, Oral Briefing.

Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007).

93 He suggested that TTs do a more extensive qualitative report by function, along the lines of the Quarterly Training Briefs (QTB) used by the U.S. Army to highlight strengths, weaknesses, events, or resources needed to sustain a unit strength or improve a weakness.

94 USMC TTs, on the other hand, typically train with their equipment set. House Armed Services Committee, “Staffdel Kruse to USMC Bases Trip Report” (unpublished memo).

95 GAO, *Oral Briefing*.

96 “Staffdel Kruse Trip Report” (unpublished memo).
“Measure what you value, rather than value what you measure.”

As we said at the outset, we end this investigation with more questions than when we started. The Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) value should be measured by their operational capability and the contribution that capability can make to overall stability in Iraq. To date, Multi-National Force-I (MNF-I) measures little more than the quantity of Iraqi Security Forces generated. Thus, we are left with the sense that the Department does not provide Congress with measures that are useful in evaluating the progress being made in developing the Iraqi Security Forces. Moreover, we are concerned about whether the Department is even attempting to measure progress adequately for a large portion of the Iraqi Security Forces, notably, the Iraq Police Service. We intend to work with the Department to establish a better approach for providing more meaningful information to Congress and the public.

Our findings and recommendations reveal that the Department has not provided sufficient information on the Iraqi Security Forces, which hindered the subcommittee’s ability to assess the force comprehensively and which interferes with the committee’s ability to set policy for the Department. It also means that the Congress cannot assess the Iraq strategy. Ultimately, this limits Congress’ ability to exercise its constitutional responsibility to be good stewards of taxpayer money, raise and support armies, and oversee the responsible employment of the women and men of our nation’s military.

While our study provides a foundation for understanding the Iraqi Security Forces’ development efforts, much work remains. Below are areas that we believe need additional study and scrutiny:

The Iraqi Police Service: Our findings and recommendations reflect our view that the Coalition should make IPS force development a higher priority than it currently is. The Coalition must also plan for the transition of the police advisory mission to the Departments of State and Justice once the security conditions improve.

Three strategic areas related to the Iraqi Police Service should garner additional attention as soon as possible. First, the Coalition’s IPS advisory mission and the larger interagency “rule of law” program must be more directly linked. If Iraq’s detention and criminal justice systems are not functional, their local police cannot succeed. Second, the Coalition must devote more attention to Iraqi detention policies and practices, as well as to the conditions in detention facilities. Because the Coalition turns prisoners over to the Iraqi system, it is the Coalition’s duty to ensure measures are in place to prevent abuse. Finally, IPS development is critically important in the execution of the counterinsurgency mission. The police are the government’s first line of security that protect the individual at the community and local level. We will know that Iraqis have trust and confidence in the police, and by extension their
government, when they feel safe enough to return to their neighborhoods, to send their children back to school, to shop at their local markets, and to walk their streets without fear. Consequently, success hinges on the Coalition’s plans, priorities, and practices matching counterinsurgency doctrinal imperatives.

**Auxiliary Security Forces:** Auxiliary security forces are operating in Iraq outside of the framework for the ISF. These are non-governmental Iraqi forces that the Coalition is working with to combat insurgents. We do not know the nature, size, and scope of these forces. Neither have we explored how these forces fit within ISF development plans and the Coalition’s overall strategy.

**Intelligence:** Intelligence and counter-intelligence are critical to national security, operational security in Iraq, and success in counterinsurgency. We did not delve as deeply as we would have liked into the intelligence we are providing Iraqi forces or the intelligence we are deriving from our advisory effort, particularly from our PTTs. Our initial impression, though, is that the Coalition is not utilizing PTTs to the extent it should be. A cursory examination of this issue reveals that PTTs do not generally have the ability to collect intelligence. When PTTs do collect intelligence, there are no organizational structures or processes to fully integrate and disseminate this information. Our sense is that we are missing an opportunity to exploit important intelligence resident in Iraqi communities.

**Command and Control Relationships:** There are a number of issues with respect to command and control related to the ISF that bear further examination: (1) MOD/ MOI effective control of forces in the field; (2) operational control exercised from Joint Security Stations and the Baghdad Operations Center; (3) Coalition and ISF joint operational planning; and (4) complexities in the Transition Team chains of command.

**The Advisory Mission:** Our investigation suggests that the Department needs to prioritize the advisory mission as it implements stability, security, transition, and reconstruction policies. Establishing the Joint International Center for Security Force Assistance appears to be a step in the right direction, but at this time there is no consensus among the services or senior military officers as to whether the Department needs to study and adequately resource this mission. There is also no consensus on which Command or Service should take on primary responsibility. Regardless, the options for institutionalizing this mission need to be studied, decisions need to be made, and actions need to be taken before the military is faced with another mission of this kind.

**Language and Cultural Education:** Given the centrality of language and culture in advisory missions, we should examine what steps the Department and services are taking to build capability in this area. Moreover, this investigation confirmed that language training and cultural education, while related, are different disciplines requiring separate efforts.

**Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Reporting:** Our initial review of the TRA data showed they are inconsistent with the Department’s reporting to Congress on the Iraqi Security Forces. In addition, the TRAs are internally inconsistent; monthly summaries make
findings that are not supported in unit level reports. Consequently, the TRAs require further study.

**Logistics:** Our investigation showed that, despite the recognition that creating and sustaining an organic logistics capability is a critical deficiency for the Iraqi Security Forces, more oversight is required to ensure the development of this capacity. Further scrutiny should include examination of: (1) MOD and MOI Logistics Action Plans, (2) the turnover of the National Maintenance Contract, (3) restrictions on the use of Iraqi Security Forces Funds to purchase parts and supplies outside of the Coalition, (4) accounting for captured weapons that have been turned over to Iraqi Security Forces, (5) continuing Coalition logistics support to the ISF, (6) Government of Iraq approval of the MOI Logistics Concept, (7) MOI and MOD budgets and their execution, (8) the first responder system maintenance, (9) equipping of the Objective Civil Security Force, and (10) Foreign Military Sales cases that the Iraqis are using to support their forces.

**Provincial Iraqi Control:** Once a province transitions to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC), the Coalition conducts “operational overwatch” for that province. Further study is required to determine whether the Coalition adequately monitors or assesses the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces when conducting operational overwatch. A second, unexplored, area is the role Provincial Reconstruction Teams play after PIC in working with and monitoring the ISF performance in their provinces.

This bipartisan report serves as a foundation for ongoing and future oversight of the development and progress of the Iraqi military and police. We are aware that Congress has called for an independent assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces; we hope this report will inform that assessment.  

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**NOTES CONCLUSION**

1 This theory is derived from the management philosophy of W. Edwards Dunning. A clear explanation is provided in Paul K. Mueller, “NC State’s Teachers, Students Work for Continuous Improvement,” *News Services* (29 Aug 2003), “when you value what you measure … the number can become an end in itself …. When you measure what you value, on the other hand, you first ask what the real goals are – establish what you value …”

2 See, FY2007 Supplemental (Section 1314) as passed (Public Law 110-28), 2) e (2) Assessment of the Capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces. See also, “Independent Commission to Assess Iraqi Security Forces” (press release, 21 June 2007).
APPENDIX 1: RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER 2: STRATEGY, PLANS, AND REPORTING

• The committee should require the Department of Defense to provide Congress by the end of July 2007 the plans, as well as a briefing on those plans and the impact these plans will have on the transfer of responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces. The Department should provide updated briefings immediately as those plans are changed.

• The committee should require the Department of Defense to provide Congress, within thirty days, the current force development plans, and a briefing on those plans. It should also require that the Department immediately notify Congress whenever there is a change to the force development plans for the Iraqi Security Forces, along with the underlying conditions on which those changes are based.

• The committee should require the Department of Defense to provide detailed monthly briefings on the progress being made in the transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) and Iraq Security Self-Reliance, and the factors related to the Coalition’s monthly assessment. The monthly briefing should also provide post-PIC data on the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces in those provinces where PIC has occurred.

• The committee should require the Department of Defense to adjust Transition Readiness Assessments to reflect metrics which have been shown to be important to unit effectiveness through actual operational experience.

• The Department of Defense should more fully comply with the current legal requirements for reporting on performance and progress. It should also comply with the reporting requirements contained in the House-passed version of the committee’s report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 1585 (H. Report 110-146).

CHAPTER 3: FINANCE, CONTRACTING, AND INFRASTRUCTURE

• In order to continue transitioning responsibility for the financing of the Iraqi Security Forces to the Government of Iraq (GOI), the committee should closely monitor U.S. efforts on three fronts: (1) building Iraqi ministerial capacity, particularly in the realm of budget execution, both at the security ministries and within other essential organizations, such as the Ministries of Finance and Oil; (2) fighting corruption within the GOI; and (3) utilizing Foreign Military Sales as a short-term bridge to enable the GOI to utilize its security budget efficiently until greater self-reliance is achieved.

• The committee should require the Department to review and refine its Fiscal Year 2008 requirements within 60 days, and to continue to update its funding needs for the Iraqi Security Forces on a priority basis, with changes communicated to the relevant committees immediately.
• The committee should require the U.S. Government Accountability Office to report on the value received to date for the U.S. investment in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Such a report should utilize information provided by the Department of Defense with respect to total ISF spending to date, approximate values for other funding that has contributed directly to the ISF effort, and measure ISF unit readiness and operational effectiveness as detailed in Transitional Readiness Assessments and other documentation.

• The committee should scrutinize and monitor the agencies working together to develop the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to ensure that they have appropriate interagency processes in place to provide unified management and oversight for contracts. The committee should also require the Administration to submit a report, within 60 days, to the committees of jurisdiction on what steps it is taking to manage contracts with multiple agency equities. This report should also identify complications posed by the use of private security contractors in support of ISF training, if any.

• The Congress should expand the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) mandate in Iraq to cover all Iraqi Security Forces-related funds, regardless of fiscal year, and ensure that SIGIR's termination date is extended beyond the current standard, as provided for in the House-passed version of the committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008, H.R. 1585 (H. Report 110-146).

• The committee should continue to require the Department of Defense to find more effective ways to manage security problems at ongoing job sites and to more effectively plan for security contingencies in future projects and contracts.

CHAPTER 4: THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

Iraqi Police Service

• The committee should require the Department to adopt a new strategy for the development of the Iraqi Police Service as soon as possible.

• The committee should require the Department to devise a strategy to monitor the Iraqi Police Service at the provincial and ministerial level. This will require an effective personnel management and tracking system.

• The committee should require the Department to increase the numbers of Police Transition Teams, throughout Iraq, and to resource these as a high priority.

Ministry of Interior

• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to evaluate the effectiveness and resourcing of the Ministry of Interior-Transition Team, and provide its findings in its September report to Congress.
• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to reassess how and when it expects Ministry of Interior forces to contribute to stability and security given the immaturity of the logistics support system.

• The committee should recommend that Multi-National Force (MNF-I) assist the Ministry of Interior to improve the reporting and property accounting systems for civil security forces. MNF-I must find ways to motivate ministerial, provincial, and local authorities to take responsibility for property accountability.

• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to determine the reasons for low rates of on-hand equipment and then rectify the problem within 60 days.

• The committee should direct the Department to determine the reasons for the delay in approving these logistics plans and to report the findings to Congress within 60 days.

• The committee should direct the Department to provide monthly reports starting immediately to Congress on its progress in equipping the Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces and transferring responsibility and control of logistics operations to the MOI. These reports should include:
  (1) Details of Multi-National Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I) plan(s) and progress in executing the plan(s) to train logistics personnel for the MOI;
  (2) The adequacy of the MOI budget to support its logistics capability and an assessment of MOI’s ability to execute this budget;
  (3) Progress against the event tracker for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) Logistics Action Plan as monitored by the MNSTC-I J4 logistics support operations office and reported monthly to MNF-I at the Logistics Action Working Group;
  (4) Progress on retention of logisticians in these position;
  (5) Assessments of the MOI and the Civil Security Forces abilities to maintain logistics operations and capabilities after accepting control and responsibility from the Coalition; and
  (6) An update on the national logistics timeline and report on progress to meet the milestones.

CHAPTER 5: NATIONAL POLICE, BORDER PROTECTION SERVICE, AND THE FACILITIES PROTECTION SERVICE

• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to include an assessment of the National Police Transformation Plan in its September report to Congress.

• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to report how many National Police members remain in the force and to account for the difference between the “trained and equipped” numbers and the operational numbers.

• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to submit a report on Department of Border Enforcement force structure assumptions.
CHAPTER 6: THE ARMED FORCES AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

- The committee should require the Department to develop a system for more accurately accounting for Ministry of Defense personnel trained and equipped by the Coalition, and those who are operational. The Department should use this new system to more accurately report operational numbers in its 9010 Reports.

- The committee should require the Department to develop a metric that accurately captures an Iraqi unit’s ability to operate independently.

- The committee should require the Department to study and report to Congress on whether efforts improve the deployability of the Iraqi Army are likely to succeed, given IAF history and other cultural factors.

- The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to include a re-evaluation of this goal in its September report to Congress.

- The committee should require the Department to provide Congress with a report on the U.S. costs of this expansion by 30 July 2007, including whether this will exceed the President’s fiscal year 2008 supplemental request for $2.0 billion.

- The committee should require the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence to report on the extent to which sectarian and militia influence are at work in the Iraqi Armed Forces, and possible options to counter them.

- The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to report on the progress of its initiative, “The Year of the Leader,” in its September report to Congress.

Ministry of Defense

- The committee should require Multi National Force-Iraq to re-evaluate its advisory mission to the Ministry of Defense and report its findings in its September report to Congress.

- The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to re-evaluate what appear to be overly optimistic dates for transfer of responsibility to the Ministry of Defense and report its findings in its September report to Congress.

- Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should re-evaluate the sophistication and complexity of the logistics system and equipment it is providing to the Ministry of Defense, and Multi-National Force-Iraq should report these findings in its September report to Congress.
• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to assess the adequacy of the Ministry of Defense’s budget for maintaining, and further developing, its logistics system to achieve Transition Readiness Assessment Level 1 status for the Ministry of Defense and its forces and report its findings in its September report to Congress.

• The committee should require the Department to analyze and examine reasons for the apparent inability of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to take responsibility for logistics functions and take remedial action. The Department should also assess the implications for Iraqi Armed Forces combat capability when MOD is unable to provide adequate logistics support after transfer of responsibility and report its findings within 60 days.

• The committee should require the Department to report on Ministry of Defense’s capability to equip the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) adequately and on the IAF’s ability to perform the roles and missions expected of them within 60 days.

• The committee should direct the Department of Defense to provide monthly reports to Congress starting immediately on the progress to equip the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) and to transfer responsibility and control of logistics operations to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). These reports should include:

  (1) Details of Multi-National Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I) plan(s) and progress in executing the plan(s) to train IAF logistics personnel for the MOD,
  (2) The adequacy of the MOD budget for its logistics capability and an assessment of MOD’s ability to execute this budget.
  (3) Progress against the “event tracker” for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) Logistics Action Plan as tracked by the MNSTC-I J4 support operations office and reported monthly to MNF-I at the Logistics Action Working Group.
  (4) Progress on retention of Iraqi logisticians in logistics positions.
  (5) Assessments of MOD and IAF abilities to maintain logistics operations and capabilities after accepting control and responsibility from the Coalition.

CHAPTER 7: TRANSITION TEAMS AND THE ADVISORY MISSION

• The committee should require the Secretary of Defense to report on how the Department will implement its stability, security, transitions, and reconstruction operations policies for enhancing the role of military advisors within 60 days. The report should include a proposed structure and size of a joint advisory capability.

• The committee should direct the Service Secretaries to take steps to improve the selection of military advisors by emphasizing advisory skills and temperament. They should also create special experience identifiers in order to better track individuals throughout their career for further advisor assignments. Finally, the services should develop an incentive package and ensure advisors remain competitive for promotion. The Military Personnel Subcommittee should study this issue in more depth.
• The committee should require the Secretary of Defense to assess the effectiveness of advisor training, and identify options for improving the content and delivery of that training across the services. The Secretary should also assess the appropriateness of using Military Police personnel as advisors to civilian police units. The Secretary should report to the committee on these assessments within 90 days.

• While the Army is moving to expand the size of Military Transition Teams, it should also determine the optimal composition of all Transition Teams, taking into account the varied mission requirements they encounter. In addition, Multi-National Force-Iraq should study Police Transition Team size and composition. The Army and Multi-National Force-Iraq should report to the committee on these issues within 75 days.

• The committee should direct Multi-National Force-Iraq to conduct a comprehensive review of the effectiveness of the Transition Team command and control structure and determine appropriate measures of Transition Team effectiveness, and include this information in its September report to Congress.
## APPENDIX 2: ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFCEE</td>
<td>Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRN</td>
<td>Advanced First Responder Network</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>AST</td>
<td>Advisor Support Team</td>
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<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<td>Brigadier General</td>
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<td>Battalion</td>
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<td>Border Police</td>
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<td>Baghdad Police College</td>
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<td>BSP</td>
<td>Baghdad Security Plan</td>
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<td>BTT</td>
<td>Border Transition Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-IED</td>
<td>Counter – Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>CALL</td>
<td>Center for Army Learned Lessons</td>
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<td>Congressional Budget Office</td>
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<td>CBPT</td>
<td>Customs and Border Protection Team</td>
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<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<td>Civilian Police Assistance Training Team</td>
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<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
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<td>Full Operational Capability</td>
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<td>GSU</td>
<td>Garrison Support Unit</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
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<td>HMMWV</td>
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<td>NDU</td>
<td>National Defense University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIA</td>
<td>New Iraqi Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPTP</td>
<td>National Police Transformation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPTT</td>
<td>National Police Transition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSI</td>
<td>National Strategy for Supporting Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSVI</td>
<td>National Strategy for Victory in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTM</td>
<td>NATO Training Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;I</td>
<td>Oversight and Investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCIE</td>
<td>Office of Compliance, Inspections and Examinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORHA</td>
<td>Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSC-I</td>
<td>Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDOP</td>
<td>Provincial Director of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETL</td>
<td>Police Essential Task List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIC</td>
<td>Provincial Iraqi Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMI</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POE</td>
<td>Port of Entry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Private Security Companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSMR</td>
<td>Police Station Monthly Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTT</td>
<td>Police Transition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QTB</td>
<td>Quarterly Training Brief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIPTOA</td>
<td>“Relief in Place” and “Transfer of Authority”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFF</td>
<td>Request for Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSU</td>
<td>Regional Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIB</td>
<td>Strategic Infrastructure Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Special Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPTT</td>
<td>Special Police Transition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>Stability, Security, Transitions, and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td>Transition Integration Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TND</td>
<td>Taji National Depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRA</td>
<td>Transition Readiness Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>Transition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTC</td>
<td>Tactical Training Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE</td>
<td>United States Army Corps of Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX 3: GLOSSARY OF TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1227 Reports</strong></td>
<td>Department of State quarterly reports to Congress on Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9010 Reports</strong></td>
<td>Department of Defense quarterly reports to Congress on Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>De-Ba’athification</strong></td>
<td>Policy announced in CPA Order 1 in May 2003 eliminating the party’s structures and removing its leadership from positions of authority and responsibility in Iraqi Society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Anbar Province</strong></td>
<td>The largest Iraqi governorate, in terms of geographic size; primarily Sunni. Located in western Iraq. Its control has been contested by insurgents in cities such as Fallujah, Ramadi, and Haditha. Marines’ area of responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, December 2006)</strong></td>
<td>Doctrinal publication; articulates counterinsurgency principles for the Army and Marine Corps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baghdad Police College</strong></td>
<td>Iraqi Police Service training academy in Baghdad. Poor construction of its new and renovated facilities were the subject of a September 2006 SIGIR report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Battle(s) of Fallujah</strong></td>
<td>Attempt by Coalition forces to gain control Fallujah in April 2004 following the killing of Blackwater contractors. Also can refer to November 2004 Operation Al-Fajr, sometimes called the “Second Battle of Fallujah.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brigade Combat Teams</strong></td>
<td>Basic maneuver unit of the U.S. Army. A Brigade Combat Team consists of a maneuver brigade and its attached fire support and logistics support units. Home of the Phoenix COIN Academy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Camp Taji</strong></td>
<td>Joint U.S.-Iraq base complex 27 km northeast of Baghdad. Being developed as major logistics hub for the Iraqi Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Carabinieri</strong></td>
<td>Italian national police force which performs some paramilitary functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Critical Security Enablers First Responder Network</strong></td>
<td>Capabilities include: close air support, logistics, command and control, and intelligence. Iraqi Government communications system linking police, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Internal Defense</strong></td>
<td>Participation by civilian and military agencies of the U.S. government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full Operational Capability</strong></td>
<td>Capability attained when all units and/or organizations in the force structure schedule to receive a system have received it and have the ability to employ and maintain it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Intelligence</strong></td>
<td>Category of intelligence derived from human sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Iltizam Mushtarak”</strong></td>
<td>Motto of the Iraq Assistance Group. Arabic for “United Commitment.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initial Operating Capability</strong></td>
<td>First attainment of the minimum capability to effectively employ a weapon, item of equipment, or system of approved specific characteristics and which is manned or operated by an adequately trained, equipped, and supported military unit or force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraqi Armed Forces Joint Headquarters</strong></td>
<td>Headquarters exercising strategic command of the Iraqi Joint Forces. Also provides military advice to the Ministry of Defense. Will assume MNSTC-I’s current responsibilities when ready.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraqi Security Force Cell (MND-W)</strong></td>
<td>Headquarters staff element of Multi-National Division – West (Marine Expeditionary Force) that provides similar administrative support functions as Iraq Assistance Group, for U.S. Marine Transition Teams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade</strong></td>
<td>Operational component of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Command. Composed of a counter-terrorism battalion, a commando battalion, a support battalion, and a special reconnaissance unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Staff College</td>
<td>Institution, supported by NATO Training Mission - Iraq, which provides professional education to mid-grade Iraqi Army officers, focusing on planning military operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized Police</td>
<td>National Police brigade equipped with BTR-94 armored personnel carriers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial Capacity</td>
<td>Ability of a governmental ministry to perform key functions such as: developing and implementing plans and policies, personnel management, and budgeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Essential Task List</td>
<td>Organizational framework and list for developing those tasks a unit must perform in order to accomplish its mission. Used for planning unit training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Police Transformation</td>
<td>Multi-phased transformation plan for the Iraqi National Police designed to correct deficiencies in the areas of providing civil protection to citizens in accordance with the rule of law and international standards of human rights. Resulted from reports of abuses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Nonpermissive” Environment</td>
<td>Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies lack control of the security situation and capability to assist in operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective Counterinsurgency Force</td>
<td>Manning, training, and equipment levels planned for the Iraqi Joint Forces that MNF-I assessed in 2005 as being capable of defeating the insurgency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Readiness</td>
<td>The readiness of a unit/formation, ship, weapon system, or equipment to perform missions or functions for which it is organized or designed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshmerga</td>
<td>Kurdish militia forces, legitimized by both the Transitional Administrative Law and the Iraqi Constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quicklook Assessment</td>
<td>Preliminary evaluation phase of the National Police Transformation and Retraining Program for Iraqi National Police units, consisting of inspections and personnel vetting for criminal or terrorist links.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimental Combat Team</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps terminology for a unit of similar size and capability to an U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Year of the Police”</td>
<td>2006 effort by MNSTC-I to improve the quality of the Iraqi Police Service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 4: TIMELINE OF MAJOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY EVENTS IN IRAQ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 Mar 2003</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is launched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Apr 2003</td>
<td>U.S. forces occupy Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Apr 2003</td>
<td>Liberation Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Apr 2003</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority created by CENTCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Apr 2003</td>
<td>The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) awards a contract to DynCorp International to provide logistics and advisory services to support activities intended to restore civilian police authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 2003</td>
<td>President Bush declares all major combat operations to be over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 May 2003</td>
<td>Ambassador L. Paul Bremer named Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 May 2003</td>
<td>CPA Order 2 disbands the 400,000 member Iraqi military and Ministry of Defense (MOD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Jun 2003</td>
<td>Operation Desert Scorpion to curtail organized Iraqi resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Jun 2003</td>
<td>The Army awards the Vinell Corporation $48.0m to train a 44,000-person “New Iraqi Army” (NIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Jul 2003</td>
<td>American officials appoint the interim Iraqi Governing Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Aug 2003</td>
<td>The Department of Border Enforcement is created by CPA Order 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Feb 2004</td>
<td>INL and DynCorp negotiate a new contract to provide housing, training support systems, and personnel to support the civilian police training program in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Mar 2004</td>
<td>The Iraqi Governing Council signs an interim constitution (Transitional Administrative Law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Mar 2004</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense headquarters is established by CPA Order 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 2004</td>
<td>Four American contractors are killed by Iraqi mobs in Fallujah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2004</td>
<td>An NIA battalion refuses to fight insurgents in Fallujah; LTG David Petraeus takes over the training mission with MNSTC-I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Apr 2004</td>
<td>President Bush agrees to a UN proposal to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May – Jun 2004</td>
<td>Coalition forces designate Iyad Allawi Interim Prime Minister of Iraq; the United States officially transfers power to the new Iraqi Interim Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 May 2004</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD-36); DOD to assume the lead in training the Iraqi Police Service (IPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jun 2004</td>
<td>CPA dissolves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 2004</td>
<td>MNF-I formally creates Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2004</td>
<td>The Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) Campaign Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct - Nov 2004</td>
<td>U.S. personnel regain control of Samarra from insurgents and initiate Operation Phantom Fury, an all out invasion of Fallujah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Jan 2005</td>
<td>The Iraqi National Guard (ING) is disbanded and incorporated into the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jan 2005</td>
<td>Iraqi elections are held to elect a transitional 275-seat National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar – Apr 2005</td>
<td>The National Assembly convenes for the first time and names Jalal Talabani President and Ibrahim al-Jaafari Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2005</td>
<td>The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) is established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Oct 2005</td>
<td>The Iraqi Constitution is approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2005</td>
<td>The National Security Council issues the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2005</td>
<td>The Multinational Corps-Iraq issues Operations Order 05-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2005</td>
<td>The MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Baghdad issue the Joint Mission Statement on Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2006</td>
<td>The National Strategy for Supporting Iraq is issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jan 2006</td>
<td>1st Iraqi Military Academy graduation; LTG Peter Chiarelli assumes command of MNC-I from LTG John Vines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Feb 2006</td>
<td>Insurgents bomb the Shi‘a Al-Askariya Shrine in Samarra, igniting sectarian violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2006</td>
<td>Human Resources Command (HRC) assumes responsibility for sourcing Army Military Transition Teams (MiTTs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2006</td>
<td>The Joint Campaign Plan is signed by Ambassador Khalilzad and General George Casey, Commander MNF-I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Apr 2006</td>
<td>Nouri al-Maliki selected as Iraq’s first permanent Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May 2006</td>
<td>Iraqi Army Command and Control Center opens in Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May 2006</td>
<td>The first permanent government of Iraq is sworn in under the leadership of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Jun 2006</td>
<td>Operation Together Forward I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jun 2006</td>
<td>First graduation of junior course, Iraqi Joint Staff College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Jul 2006</td>
<td>First graduation of senior course, Iraqi Joint Staff College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Jul 2006</td>
<td>MNF-I moves more soldiers to Baghdad in an effort to curtail violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2006</td>
<td>255 of 258 Border forts completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2006</td>
<td>The Iraqi government announces its initiative to increase the planned size of the army by approximately 18,700 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2007</td>
<td>President Bush announces that the ISF would again grow beyond 325,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2007</td>
<td>The MP School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, recognizes the need for PTT training and creates a training package for MPs being deployed (Mar 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jan 2007</td>
<td>President Bush announces that 20,000 additional combat personnel will be sent to Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Feb 2007</td>
<td>LTG David Petraeus replaces Gen. George Casey, Jr. as MNF-I Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Feb 2007</td>
<td>Operation Fardh al Qanoon (Baghdad Security Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2007</td>
<td>The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations starts its investigation of DOD’s efforts and progress toward developing a capable and professional Iraq Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2007</td>
<td>Admiral William Fallon replaces Gen. John Abizaid as head of Central Command and Ryan Crocker replaces Zalmay Khalilzad as US Ambassador to Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2007</td>
<td>Revision to Joint Campaign Plan is drafted; “interim” JCP is operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 2007</td>
<td>“Surge” force fully in place</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 5: TRA and PSMR Forms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Status (Number of Errors)</th>
<th>Police Station Monthly Report (PSMR) (Version 0606.A)</th>
<th>Date:</th>
<th>Click Here</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FFID: NOFFID</td>
<td>Station / Facility Name: 0</td>
<td>Station / Facility Type: 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province:</td>
<td>Police District: 0</td>
<td>City: 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mill Grid Ref:</td>
<td>Facility Co-_located With: 0</td>
<td>Next Higher HQ: 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Station Commander:</td>
<td>Rank: 0</td>
<td>Station / Facility Status: 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTT Team Leader:</td>
<td>Phone: 0</td>
<td>Phone: 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Resources**

### Personnel & Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required</th>
<th>Coalition Supported</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
<th>Trained</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M13 / M16: Total Personnel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>M45 (10): Station Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M16: # TIP Trained Personnel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>M46 (10): Station Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M16: Basic Academy Trained Personnel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M18 / M17: Executives</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>M17: Station-employed IPs (KIA/WIA This Calendar Year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M15 / M18: Mid-Level Managers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>M17: Station-employed Civilians (KIA/WIA This Calendar Year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M14 / M15: First-Line Supervisors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M16: Special Skills Trained Personnel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Equipment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required</th>
<th>Coalition Supported</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
<th>FMC</th>
<th>AFRN Radio Equipment</th>
<th>Coalition Supported</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
<th>FMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M18: Vehicles</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>M117: Base Station Radios</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M19: Patrol Boats</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>M119: Vehicle Radios</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M19: Motorcycles</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>M120: Hand Held Radios</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M101: Pistols</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>UHF Radio Equipment</td>
<td>Coalition Supported</td>
<td>On Hand</td>
<td>FMC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M102: Rifles</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>M117: Base Station Radios</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M103: PKC/PKM Light machine Guns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>M119: Vehicle Radios</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M104: Pistol Ammunition (9 MM)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>M120: Hand Held Radios</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M105: Rifle Ammunition (7.62 X 39)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>M118: UHF Radio Repeater</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M106: Light Machine Gun Ammunition (7.62 X 54)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>HF Radio Equipment</td>
<td>Coalition Supported</td>
<td>On Hand</td>
<td>FMC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M19: Ballistic Vests</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>M117: Base Station Radios</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M19: SAPI Plates (Pans)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>M119: Vehicle Radios</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M19: Winter Coats</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Info Technology Equipment</td>
<td>Coalition Supported</td>
<td>On Hand</td>
<td>FMC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M10: Uniforms &amp; Accessories</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>M108: Computers (With Monitor)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M19: Iraqi Police ID (Badges)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>M109: UPS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M100: Temporary Police ID / Weapons Card</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>M110: Printers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M108: Generators</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>M125: Cell Phones</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Facilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Protection</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO-GO</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Utilities</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO-GO</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Habitation</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO-GO</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M239 (5): Response Team Armory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M133 (5): Facility Connected to Public Sewer Sys</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M127 (2): Furniture / Furnishings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Communications**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO-GO</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Facility Armory</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO-GO</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M116 (5): Landline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M139 (4): Armory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Casualties**

| M15 / M60: Total Personnel | 0 | 0 | |
| M16: # TIP Trained Personnel | 0 | 0 | |
| M16: Basic Academy Trained Personnel | 0 | 0 | |
| M18 / M17: Executives | 0 | 0 | |
| M15 / M18: Mid-Level Managers | 0 | 0 | |
| M14 / M15: First-Line Supervisors | 0 | 0 | |
| M16: Special Skills Trained Personnel | 0 | 0 | |

**Comments (Facilities & Force Protection):**
### Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO-GO</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO-GO</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M19 (6): Budget</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>M20 (8): Headquarters Budget &amp; Budget Oversight</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>M26 (5): HQs Performs Intelligence Collection Management &amp; Dissemination</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M29 (10): Police Possess Basic (Tactical) Investigative Questioning Skills</td>
<td>M34 (3): Exploit Available Data Sources and Develop Leads</td>
<td>M37 (6): HQ Performs Criminal Analysis to Support Police Operations</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M30 (8): Recruit and Manage Confidential Informants</td>
<td>M35 (8): Conduct and Manage Criminal Investigations</td>
<td>M38 (5): Maintain Information System</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M31 (10): Police Possess Ability to Write Basic Reports</td>
<td>M36 (6): Assemble and Manage a Case File</td>
<td>M39 (8): NOC, NJOC, PJCC, &amp; JCC operating in a synchronized system</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M33 (9): Maintain the Chain-of-Custody of Evidence</td>
<td>M42 (3): Use crime tracking and analysis information in planning operations</td>
<td>M43 (6): Reporting Procedures</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command &amp; Control</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>M44 (8): NOC, NJOC, PJCC, &amp; JCC operating in a synchronized system</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M39 (6): Roll Call Formation at SH (Orders, Briefing, Inspection, Accountability)</td>
<td>M42 (3): Use crime tracking and analysis information in planning operations</td>
<td>M43 (6): Reporting Procedures</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M40 (4): Perform synchronized tracking - maintain operational picture</td>
<td>M44 (8): NOC, NJOC, PJCC, &amp; JCC operating in a synchronized system</td>
<td>M41 (6): Operations / Dispatch Center - Assess the Service Call system</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M41 (6): Operations / Dispatch Center - Assess the Service Call system</td>
<td>M44 (8): NOC, NJOC, PJCC, &amp; JCC operating in a synchronized system</td>
<td>M41 (6): Operations / Dispatch Center - Assess the Service Call system</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station Training</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO-GO</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO-GO</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M61 (6): Apprenticeship / Sponsorship Process</td>
<td>M69 (10): Collective Training - Joint Exercises with Coalition Forces</td>
<td>M68 (9): Station Defense - ERP - if constituted - Exercises</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M66 (8): Sustainment Training</td>
<td>M70 (13): Process for Tracking Training</td>
<td>M71 (3): HQ's process for tracking subordinate training programs</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M67 (7): Rule of Law - Justice Integration (PETL) Training</td>
<td>M72 (1): Force Protection Checklist / SOP / TTPs / Battle Drills (written or unwritten)</td>
<td>M73 (1): Force Protection Checklist / SOP / TTPs / Battle Drills (written or unwritten)</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M68 (9): Station Defense - IP Ground Force Drills</td>
<td>M74 (11): HQ Designates and Synchronizes subordinate QRF deployments</td>
<td>M75 (7): Station Defense - IP Ground Force Drills</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M76 (3): Response Team / Guard Force Command and Control</td>
<td>M77 (9): Station Defense - IP Ground Force Drills</td>
<td>M78 (9): Station Defense - IP Ground Force Drills</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics &amp; Maintenance</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>M80 (9): Station Defense - IP Ground Force Drills</td>
<td>M81 (3): DHQ or PHQ HQ has procedures for use of the ERF (if constituted)</td>
<td>GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M82 (5): Equipment Accountability - Receipt Procedures</td>
<td>M83 (2): Maintain Equipment Readiness Status</td>
<td>M84 (4): Maintain a Maintenance Tracking System</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M85 (2): Maintain Equipment Readiness Status</td>
<td>M86 (2): Maintain Equipment Readiness Status</td>
<td>M87 (2): Maintain Equipment Readiness Status</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>M90 (9): Station Defense - ERP - if constituted - Exercises</td>
<td>M91 (3): DHQ or PHQ HQ has procedures for use of the ERF (if constituted)</td>
<td>GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computers</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>M117 (5): Voice Communications Maintenance Management</td>
<td>M118 (5): Voice Communications Maintenance Management</td>
<td>GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>M119 (5): Voice Communications Maintenance Management</td>
<td>M120 (5): Voice Communications Maintenance Management</td>
<td>GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M47 (5): Respond to a Complaint?</td>
<td>M50 (3): Apprehend the Suspect?</td>
<td>M51 (7): Collect &amp; Prepare Evidence (documentary, testimonial, forensic) for Trial?</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M48 (3): Identify if a crime has occurred (dispute or crime?)?</td>
<td>M52 (4): Apprehend the Suspect?</td>
<td>M53 (3): Intercept the Suspect?</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M49 (1): Identify the suspect?</td>
<td>M54 (3): Intercept the Suspect?</td>
<td>M55 (3): Intercept the Suspect?</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Operations</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO-GO</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO-GO</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M67 (7): Operations - Information Operations (IO) Other Than Public Affairs</td>
<td>M68 (9): Station Defense - ERP - if constituted - Exercises</td>
<td>M69 (3): Conduct &amp; Evaluate Performance Appraisals of Subordinates</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel / Finance</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>M70 (9): Station Defense - ERP - if constituted - Exercises</td>
<td>M71 (3): DHQ or PHQ HQ has procedures for use of the ERF (if constituted)</td>
<td>GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M6 (6): Personal Records Maintenance?</td>
<td>M13 (5): Assigned Personnel (On Hand This Pay Period)?</td>
<td>M14 (5): Assigned Personnel (On Hand This Pay Period)?</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M7 (2): Are Station Personnel Properly Trained, Training Arranged?</td>
<td>M14 (5): Assigned Personnel (On Hand This Pay Period)?</td>
<td>M15 (5): Assigned Personnel (On Hand This Pay Period)?</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M8 (3): Staffing Adequate to Manage the Personnel &amp; Finance Departments?</td>
<td>M16 (5): Assigned Personnel (On Hand This Pay Period)?</td>
<td>M17 (5): Assigned Personnel (On Hand This Pay Period)?</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M9 (9): HQG Verifies Subordinate Personnel Accountability?</td>
<td>M18 (5): Assigned Personnel (On Hand This Pay Period)?</td>
<td>M19 (5): Assigned Personnel (On Hand This Pay Period)?</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>NO-GO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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### Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comments (Training):</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comments (Logistics):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments (Operations):</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments (Personnel):</td>
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</table>
### Detention Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GO</th>
<th>N/D</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M53 (8): Detention Ops - Health, Welfare, and Medical Care</td>
<td>M56: What is the Stations Detention Facility Capacity?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M54 (7): Detention Ops - Legal / Human Rights</td>
<td>M56: How Many Detainees Are Being Held - On Average?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M55 (9): Detention Ops Tracking System</td>
<td>Qty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Public Affairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GO</th>
<th>N/D</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M18 (6): Community Engagement Plan</td>
<td>Qty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Internal Affairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GO</th>
<th>N/D</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M21 (12): Investigate IA Complaints from the Community</td>
<td>M23: Number of Sustained Community Complaints Directed at the Station (CY)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M22 (5): Supervise Subordinate Station IA Complaints from the Community</td>
<td>M23: Total Number of Community Complaints Directed at the Station (CY)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comment Block - Types of IA Complaint Categories:**

### SYSTEMS

#### Medical - Station Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M24: Size of the Medical Space (Infirmary, Dispensary, Etc.) is square feet?</td>
<td>M24: How Many Physician Assistants or Nurses are Assigned?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M24: How Many Beds are in the Medical Space?</td>
<td>M24: How Many Doctors Are Assigned to the Station?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M24: How Many Station Employees Were Treated Within The Last Month?</td>
<td>M24: How many Station IPs are Combat Life Savers (Current Validation)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M24: How Many Functional / Complete CLS Bags are Present at Station?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments:**

### Medical - Local Capabilities (Outside the Station)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M25: What is the Distance (in Km) to the Nearest Local Clinic?</td>
<td>M25: How Many Clinics or Hospitals are closer that refuse to treat IPs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M25: What is the Distance (in Km) to the Nearest Local Hospital That Treats IPs?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments:**

### EFFECTS

#### Neighborhood Law Enforcement Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M58: Number of escorted (with CF) IP Patrols Conducted During The Past Month?</td>
<td>M59: Number of Station Attacks (Station or Station Personnel) this Calendar Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M58: Number of Unescorted IP (w/o CF) Patrols Conducted During The Past Month?</td>
<td>M59: Number of AOR (Not Station) Attacks on General Population this Calendar Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M58: Average Number of Escort (with CF) Patrols Conducted During Any Given Night Shift?</td>
<td>M59: Civilians in AOR (Not Employed by IPS) KIA this Calendar Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M58: Average Number of Unescorted (w/o CF) Patrols Conducted During Any Given Night Shift?</td>
<td>M59: Number of Militia Organizations Currently Active in the Station AOR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**List names of Active Militia Organizations:**

**Comments (Effects):**

### Station Area of Responsibility Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M28: Population Within the Stations Jurisdiction?</td>
<td>M28: Estimated Unemployment Rate Within the Stations Jurisdiction?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M28: Provide the % Estimated Breakout of Ethnic Religion Demographics Within Stations Jurisdiction Below:</td>
<td>M28: Average Annual Income (Iraqi Dinars) Within Stations Jurisdiction?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab-Sunni</td>
<td>Arab-Shia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PTT TL’s Subjective Assessment of Station Overall TRA Level (M139):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Projected # of Months Until Station Transitions To Level</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projected # of Months Until Station Transitions To Level</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projected # of Months Until Station Transitions To Level</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Projected # of Months Until Station Transitions To Level**

**PTT Team Leader’s Justification of Subjective Assessment:**

**Not Rated**

**Comments:**

---

THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 166
### Station Transition Readiness Assessment

#### Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources Assessments</th>
<th>تقييم المصادر</th>
<th>63%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>الأفراد</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>القادة</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>التدريب</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>البحوث والتجهيزات</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>السرايا</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>الفوائض والآليات</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>الأدوات اليدية</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>التكنولوجيا المعلوماتية</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>الاتصالات</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>الدعم الفني</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>التدريب بالمركز</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>الأفراد</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>الشؤون العامة</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>الميزانية</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>الشؤون الداخلية</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>التحقيقات</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>العمليات المدنية</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>الرقابة والسيطرة</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>القيادة والأركان</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>العمليات المدنية</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>القيادة والسيطرة</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>القيادة والسيطرة</td>
<td>70%</td>
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#### Systems

<table>
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<th>Systems Assessment</th>
<th>تقييم البرنامج</th>
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<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
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<td>Intelligence</td>
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<td>Investigations</td>
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#### Effects

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<tr>
<td>Insurgency / Crime - Adversary Activity</td>
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</table>

#### Overall Assessment

| Objective Metrics Assessment | تقييم التحقيق المطلوب | 4 |
| PTT Team Leader's Subjective Assessment | تقييم رئيس الفريق المطلوب |     |

#### Projected # of Months Until Station Transitions to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>مبلغ 2 (80%≥)</th>
<th>مبلغ 1 (85%≥)</th>
<th>مبلغ 0 (75%≥)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>Capable</td>
<td>(285≥)</td>
<td>(265≥)</td>
<td>(235≥)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>Capable w/ Support</td>
<td>(270≥)</td>
<td>(240≥)</td>
<td>(210≥)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3</td>
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<td>(250≥)</td>
<td>(220≥)</td>
<td>(190≥)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4</td>
<td>Incapable/Forming</td>
<td>(200&lt;)</td>
<td>(175&lt;)</td>
<td>(150&lt;)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
## UNCLASSIFIED

**THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES**

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### Figure 1: Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Report Form for the Iraqi Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Transition Readiness Assessment</th>
<th>Report Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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#### 1. Personnel

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>REPORT</th>
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</thead>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Overall**: Available **50%** of compliant personnel.

- **75%** of the personnel are able to conduct training exercises.
- **50%** of personnel are able to conduct operations with minimal assistance.
- **75%** of personnel are able to conduct operations with significant assistance.
- **50%** of personnel are able to conduct operations with no assistance.

#### 2. Command & Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>REPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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#### 3. Sustainment/Logistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>REPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</tbody>
</table>

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- **75%** of personnel are able to conduct operations with significant assistance.
- **50%** of personnel are able to conduct operations with no assistance.

---

### 4. Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>METL</th>
<th>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>REPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

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#### 5. Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>REPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</table>

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### 6. Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>REPORT</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

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---

### 7. Performance Capability Assessment:

- **A Level 1 unit** is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining countermobility operations.
- **A Level 2 unit** is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining countermobility operations with significant assistance.
- **A Level 3 unit** is partially capable of conducting countermobility operations in conjunction with coalition units.
- **A Level 4 unit** is forming and possesses the capability to conduct countermobility operations.

This Unit is currently assessed at Level __________ and will be ready to assume IAML in __________ months. IAML is assessed at Level __________ overall.

---

### Source

UNCLASSIFIED

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**THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES**

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# APPENDIX 6: TRANSITION TEAM SURVEY FORM

## TT Interviews

### Notes Database

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<td>Rank</td>
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<td>Military Occupational Specialty</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Role on TT Team</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.6</td>
<td>Dates of In-Country Service</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
<td>Location in Iraq</td>
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<td>Iraqi Partner Unit</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>Contact Info</td>
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<td>PSM Contact</td>
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<td>1.12</td>
<td>Recommended by</td>
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</table>

## Question

<p>| |</p>
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</thead>
</table>

## 2. Key Takeaways and Key Quotes

### 2.1 Key Takeaways from Interview

## 3. Mission & Operations

### 3.1 What was your MiTTs/PTTs mission while deployed? Was this mission different than the mission the team organized and equipped for?

### 3.2 What were the major operations and/or typical activities the unit conducted.

### 3.3 Were you given the necessary authority and assets to conduct your mission, or did you feel that echelons above your unit maintained too much control?

### 3.4 Were the roles of the Iraqi unit commander and MiTT Commander clearly defined and did the relationship work as intended; were conflicts effectively managed?

### 3.5 What was the capability and effectiveness of command and control at the battalion and below levels versus the brigade and above levels?

### 3.6 Were Rules of Engagement clearly defined and how did they affect your ability to perform your mission?

### 3.7 What was the capability, effectiveness, and availability of intelligence at the battalion and below levels versus the brigade and above levels?

### 3.8 To what extent did you believe that your requirements for Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) were met?

### 3.9 Did you get timely information from the use of ISR assets such that it enhanced your unit’s ability to conduct operations?

### 3.10 Which ISR assets (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, satellite, airborne, ground based) were most responsive and useful (timely and accurate)?

### 3.11 Did you request and receive ISR support as needed - all the time, some of the time, none of the time?

### 3.12 What surveillance assets do you wish you had more of or more support time from? What did not work effectively? Why?

### 3.13 In conducting operations in the urban environment, how well were you able to remain in contact with other ground forces? If communication was a challenge, what equipment is needed to resolve this issue? Where were the major interoperability problems?

### 3.14 Once in theater who was responsible for the operational control of the transition team and assessing it’s performance?
### 4 Internal vs. External Sourcing of Transition Teams

4.1 Generally based on your experience what proportion of the transition teams in Iraq at the time of your service had been externally versus internally sourced?

4.2 How does the training of the transition teams differ from the training of combat and combat support forces going to Iraq and what if any differences are there between the training of internally and externally sourced teams?

4.3 What are the advantages and disadvantages of internal versus external transition teams?

### 5 Role & Functioning

5.1 MiTTs are assigned to Iraqi Army Battalions, Brigades and Divisions, should they be assigned to company level units?

5.2 MiTTs typically follow a standard staffing pattern e.g. 10-12 in number, with each member trained for a distinct role; does this pattern work in actual operations?

5.3 To what extent are MiTTs actual role advisory/training vs. being a liaison to Coalition Forces?

5.4 Is the number of members on a team sufficient to perform both the advisory and training role?

5.5 Are the members of MiTTs performing roles they were trained and slotted for or are they wearing many hats - with what impact?

5.6 Are there a sufficient number of Arabic interpreters available to the MiTTs if not what has been the impact, and are remedies are anticipated of underway?

5.7 To what extent is the MiTTs operational model based on the Special Forces advisory teams' model?

5.8 MiTTs train and deploy together to a particular Iraqi unit and stay for a tour of one year and rotate out, is this an effective model or should portions of teams rotate in and out so that experience and know how are passed along to newcomers?

5.9 How have the original concept and plan for embedding advisors/trainers with Iraqi units worked; what has had to change and what further changes are anticipated or needed?

5.10 How and when is the effectiveness of the team measured before and during its deployment to Iraq?

5.11 To what extent have the MiTTs actually been able to train ISF in the midst of combat operations?

5.12 Did any legal issues relative to the Geneva Conventions, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and Iraqi and U.S. domestic law arise during your tour on the MiTT/PTT, if so could you describe?

### 6 Selection & Training

6.1 There were reports that military personnel initially sent to train the ISF had little to no experience in training, combat, or operations in Iraq - is that the case and has it changed?

6.2 Did you find that our most highly qualified personnel being assigned to these teams?

6.3 Are career-enhancing incentives in place to reward service in Transition Teams as recommended by the Iraq Study Group? If so, what are they?

6.4 What are the selection criteria for MiTT members and how has it changed since the inception of the program?

6.5 To what extent is the training curriculum for embedded trainers and their partner units based on training & methods successfully used by the Special Forces in the past?

6.6 How effective was the cultural awareness and language training and are recent changes sufficient to meet needs identified in the field?

6.7 How well did the training prepare the MiTTs to use technology available to them?

6.8 What improvements can be made to the training?

6.9 What is the current situation in terms of recruiting advisor/trainers and being able to select individuals who are suitable for the advisor/trainer role?

6.10 What is the basis for criteria used in recruiting and selection of advisors/trainers and how has the criteria been validated?

6.11 How is the training for teams assigned to Iraqi Police units different or similar to training for MiTTs?
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<td><strong>7.2</strong></td>
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APPENDIX 7: HEARINGS AND BRIEFINGS

Hearing: Status of Iraqi Security Forces (Full Committee)  March 6, 2007

LTG Martin Dempsey, USA
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

Ms. Mary Beth Long
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs
Department of Defense

Briefing: Iraqi Security Forces Logistics and Equipment  March 9, 2007

Ambassador Robin Raphel
Deputy Inspector General
Special Inspector General for Iraq

Mr. William M. Solis
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team
U.S. Government Accountability Office

COL Guy T. Cosentino, USA
Deputy J5 & Chief, Strategy, Plans, and Assessments
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq


COL Joseph P. Disalvo, USA
Iraqi Divisions Chief
J5 (Joint Staff Plans and Policy)

Mr. Joseph A. Christoff
Director, International Affairs and Trade Team
United States Government Accountability Office
Briefing: Iraqi Security Forces, Cost and Financial Transition  

Mr. Mark T. Kimmitt  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  

Mr. John P. Roth  
Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)  
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)  

Mr. Joseph A. Christoff  
Director, International Affairs and Trade Team  
U.S. Government Accountability Office  

BGen Robert E. Schmidle, Jr., USMC  
Deputy Director for Resources and Acquisition, J-8  
Joint Chiefs of Staff  

COL Joseph P. Disalvo, USA  
Iraq Division Chief, J-5 (Joint Staff Plans and Policy)  
Joint Chiefs of Staff  

Hearing: Iraqi Security Forces, Non-Governmental Perspectives  

Dr. Anthony Cordesman  
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy  
Center for Strategic and International Studies  

Mr. Robert Perito  
Senior Program Officer  
United States Institute of Peace  

Ms. Olga Oliker  
Senior International Policy Analyst  
RAND Corporation  

Dr. Frederick Kagan  
Resident Fellow  
American Enterprise Institute
Panel I: The Department would not allow Panel I briefers to speak on the record.

COL Jeffrey Ingram, USA
Brigade Commander 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (1ID)
Fort Riley, Kansas (MiTT BN)

COL Payne, USA
Transition Team Brigade Team Chief

LTC(P) Angelito (Lee) Gutierrez, USA
Instructor
Fort Riley Kansas (MiTT BDE)

MAJ Joshua J. Potter, USA
Director of Cultural Influence and Counterinsurgency (DCC)
Foreign Security Forces Training Group
1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (1ID)
Fort Riley Kansas (NPTT BN)

CPT Roberto Gomez, USA
Company Commander, Advisor Training Company
Fort Riley, Kansas (MiTT BDE-Comms)

Col Tom Greenwood, USMC
Director, Marine Corps Command and Staff College

LtCol Bill McCullough, USMC
Battalion MiTT Leader

Panel II:

MAJ Russ Washington, USAR
Mosul Northern Iraq, (March 2006-March 2007)

Mr. Josh Watson,
Former Captain, USAR
Tal Afar, Northwestern Iraq, (July 2005-July 2006)

1LT Dean White, USARNG
MiTT Syrian Border (July 2005- March 2006)

Note: The Department would not allow 1LT White to speak on the record.
Hearing: Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces  

Panel I:

Ambassador Anne W. Patterson  
Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs  
U.S. Department of State

Mr. Bruce Swartz  
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Criminal Division  
U.S. Department of Justice

Mr. Gary J. Motsek  
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support)  
U.S. Department of Defense

COL Anita M. Raines, USA  
Chief, Logistics Services Division  
J4 Directorate, Joint Staff  
U.S. Department of Defense

Panel II:

Dr. Deborah D. Avant  
Director, Institute for Global and International Studies  
George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs

Mr. Doug Brooks  
President  
International Peace Operations Association

Mr. Gerald Burke  
Major, Massachusetts State Police (Retired)  
Former Senior Advisor, Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police Service

Hearing: Training of Iraqi Security Forces and Employment of Transition Teams  

Note: In place of operational commanders, the Department provided the witnesses below.

Mr. Peter Velz  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Middle East)  
Office of the Secretary of Defense

BG Michael Jones, USA  
Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs (Middle East)
Joint Chiefs of Staff

**Hearing: Training and Development of the Iraqi Police Service**

*May 24, 2007*

**Panel I:** Witnesses not provided.

**Panel II:**

COL Richard Swengros, USA  
Assistant Commandant  
U.S. Army Military Police School

Col Robert J. Coates, USMC  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Experimentation Group  
First Marine Expeditionary

LtCol Robert E. McCarthy, USMC  
Executive Officer  
Fifth Marine Regiment

Lt Col Brad Felling, USAF Reserve

1LT Cadetta Bridges, USANG  
Headquarters Detachment Commander  
372nd Military Police Battalion

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**Hearing: Development of Iraqi Security Forces**

*June 12, 2007*

LTG Martin Dempsey, USA  
Former Commander  
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
APPENDIX 8: REQUIRED CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS

IRAQ-RELATED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

- SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS: Required periodic reports regarding actions taken pursuant to authorization for use of military force against Iraq.

- SEC. 2207: Required report on proposed use of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.
- SEC. 3001(i). INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY: Required quarterly reports by Inspector General of the Coalition Provisional Authority.

- MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ: Required quarterly assessments of ISF training and timetables and detailed descriptions of a number of other factors critical to stability and security in Iraq, including U.S. military requirements. (Later known as the 9010 Reports).

- SEC. 1227(c). REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES POLICY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ: Required quarterly reports regarding the diplomatic, political, economic, and military mission

Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY 2007 (Public Law 109-289)
- SEC. 9006: Required quarterly reports regarding Commanders Emergency Response Program funds.
- SEC. 9007: Required quarterly reports regarding purchase of heavy and light armored vehicles for force protection purposes.
- SEC. 9008: Required quarterly reports regarding use of DOD operations and maintenance funds to provide support to coalition forces.
U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act for FY 2007 (Public Law 110-28)

- Sec. 1314: Required reports regarding progress of the Government of Iraq in meeting a series of political, economic, and security related benchmarks established, as well as U.S. strategy to assist in meeting those benchmarks.
- SEC. 3303(a): Required the Secretary of Defense to provide quarterly reports containing individual transition readiness assessments by unit for Iraq security forces.
- SEC. 3303(b): Required the Office of Management and Budget to submit quarterly reports on the use or proposed use of the Iraq Security Forces Fund on a project-by-project basis, as well as the estimated total cost to train and equip Iraq security forces.

PENDING REPORTING REQUIREMENTS


- ACCURACY OF TRACKING PERSONNEL DATA ON IRAQI SECURITY FORCES: Would require periodic reports regarding personnel accountability for the ISF.


- SEC. 1224. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES-IRAQ/UNITED STATES EMBASSY BAGHDAD JOINT CAMPAIGN PLAN AND EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL REFORM IN IRAQ: Would require a report and periodic updates detailing the status of the implementation of the Joint Campaign Plan.
- SEC. 1225. REPORT ON TRAINING OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES: Would require quarterly reports assessing the ISF.
APPENDIX 9: DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

___ “30 militants reported dead as Iraq raids start; Government: 20,000 troops, backed by U.S. forces, committed to Baghdad,” 6 Jan 2007 (available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16489616/from/at).
Block IV-A (Advisor Team Training), USMC Pre-Deployment Training Program. Briefing slides. 23 Apr 2007.


“Head of U.S. Military Advisers In Iraq Sees Slow Progress Training ISF.” Inside the Army, 7 May 2007.

Headquarters Department of the Army. Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5), Dec 2006.


“Iraqi Recruits to be Tested on the Streets.” Chicago Tribune, 14 Sep 2003.


“Joint Chiefs of Staff Response to Request from Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.” 6 Feb 2007.

Joint Occupational Planning (Join Publication 5-00), 26 Dec 2006.


Response to GAO Blue Line Questions. 4 Dec 2006.


Transition Readiness Assessments, Feb - May 2007 (Classified).


The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces


Ryan, Sean. Security Forces Assistance in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations.”


Gaugli Ashur Police Station (SIGIR PA-06-092), 26 Apr 2007.


Border Post, At Sal, Namedehel #20, #23, #29, and #37, Sulaymaniyah (SIGIR PA-05-021 . . . 024), 31 Jan 2006.


Fact Sheet on Major U.S. Contractors' Security Costs Related to Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Contracting Activities (SIGIR 06-044), 30 Jan 2007.

Review of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Unmatched Disbursements (SIGIR 06-043), 30 Jan 2007.

Improper Obligations Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 2) (SIGIR 06-040), 30 Jan 2007.

Status of Medical Equipment and Other Non-construction Items Purchased for PHCs (SIGIR 06-039), 30 Jan 2007.


Follow-up on SIGIR Recommendations Concerning the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) (SIGIR 06-036), 29 Jan 2007.


Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq (SIGIR 06-034), 29 Oct 2006.


Interim Audit Report on Inappropriate Use of Proprietary Data Markings by the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Contractor (SIGIR 06-035), 26 Oct 2006.


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I write separately to express additional views regarding the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) unwillingness to fully cooperate in this investigation of the Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) development and progress. OSD’s lack of responsiveness extended to virtually every request the Subcommittee made.

The Services, on the other hand, supported the Subcommittee’s requests without hesitation and the Joint Staff’s cooperation improved substantially over time. The Joint Staff, however, often found itself in the unenviable position of having to stand in for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the combatant command the President made responsible for developing the ISF. The Joint Staff also had to stand in for the field.

The nature of our requests to OSD was neither extraordinary nor unreasonable, particularly from a Subcommittee of the Department’s committee of jurisdiction. Our requests were bipartisan and straightforward and none of them were burdensome or arcane.

Iraq is the most pressing issue before Congress. The development of the Iraqi Security Forces and the transition of security responsibility to the ISF have been central to our strategy in Iraq. The difficulties the Subcommittee experienced in obtaining the information we required to examine the development of the Iraqi Security Forces is bewildering and cannot go unobserved.

We asked for witnesses for hearings and briefings. We requested, at the most, no more than 10 or 15 pertinent planning documents and monthly copies of reports that were already being produced within the Department. We submitted requests for additional information from the field and questions for the record following our hearings and briefings. We asked for travel both in theater and in the United States. In addition, the Ranking Member and I inquired by letter on two occasions asking for additional information clarifying media reports regarding significant issues involving the ISF.

Witnesses

The Subcommittee sought to receive testimony from three kinds of Departmental witnesses: (1) senior military and civilian officials who could testify regarding the Department’s policy, plans, and progress in developing the Iraqi Security Forces and transitioning security responsibility to the Iraqi government, (2) action officers involved in the planning process; and (3) service members who have been on the front lines in training and advising the ISF.

Senior Witnesses: OSD experienced great difficulty in identifying and providing suitable senior military and civilian witnesses to discuss ISF plans, policy, and the progress made thus far in ISF development. For example, the Subcommittee requested witnesses from the four intersecting organizations that oversee ISF development and performance: the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), the Iraq Assistance
Group (IAG), and the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT). Each of these organizations plays a distinct role in training, assessing, and supporting the ISF development mission. OSD informed the Subcommittee that no witnesses from those organizations would be made available for our hearing because OSD would not bring personnel out of the field to appear at a congressional hearing. Nor would they be available via video teleconference, even though the Committee received testimony via video teleconference from Iraq in the past (June 2005) and each of the commanders of these organizations have been available recently to participate in press video teleconferences (at least 23 times since January).

In an attempt to work with OSD, we suggested that General George Casey and Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, as the former commanders of Multinational Forces-Iraq and Multinational Corps-Iraq, who currently serve locally at the Pentagon, would be suitable witnesses. OSD denied that request. We also suggested that officials from CENTCOM’s headquarters in Tampa, Florida should be able to testify. OSD denied that request as well. Instead, OSD decided that Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey would be made available to testify when he returned from Iraq and was in town on other business, late in our project. Brigadier General Dana Pittard, the IAG Commander, responded directly to the Subcommittee request and stated that he felt precluded from being able to appear before the Subcommittee because General Dempsey would be appearing. General Dempsey and General Pittard had distinct responsibilities relative to ISF development and were not in the same chain of command. Hearing from both was important and would have informed our final report.

The same issue arose in connection with the Subcommittee’s hearing on the development of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS). The Subcommittee asked for witnesses who could testify on IPS policy, planning, and development. OSD responded that General Dempsey was “the only witness” who could testify for the Department and he was not available for that hearing. Consequently, the Subcommittee received no senior-level testimony at its hearing on the development of the Iraqi Police Service. I find it remarkable that no one at CENTCOM or the Pentagon could provide testimony to the Subcommittee regarding the development of a force General Petraeus considers central to the counterinsurgency effort.

More Junior Witnesses: The Subcommittee asked to receive action officer level testimony, i.e., below general officer level (ranging from non-commissioned officer ranks to field-grade rank for diversity’s sake), because we intended to examine issues in depth and wanted witnesses who could speak to those issues in detail, rather than have to take questions for the record. In addition, the Subcommittee sought testimony from Operation Iraqi Freedom veterans who recently served as Transition Team members. Specifically, we wanted to hear first hand how the Transition Team program was working for various kinds of teams. We also wanted to hear how well advisors felt they had been prepared to serve as ISF mentors, a mission that evolved over time, as had the Transition Team training program.

At first, OSD refused outright and went as far as sending an OSD General Counsel official to one of the Subcommittee’s closed briefings to instruct witnesses that they were not authorized to
participate in the briefing because the briefing was being transcribed. OSD took this action notwithstanding the fact that the Army and Marine Corps had selected witnesses to participate in the briefing and had flown them across the country at taxpayer expense to speak to members. OSD directed that some of those service members not even be present in the hearing room. Perhaps the saddest moment came when OSD prevented the testimony of a 1st Lieutenant Army reservist because he came to the briefing proudly wearing his uniform and despite the fact that his commander had put him on official orders to be there.

OSD attempted to promulgate a new policy to support its position, outlining who the Department would provide as witnesses both for our briefing and for all other hearings and briefings before Congress. The policy, which was originally attributed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as his policy, reportedly has been disavowed. OSD made no attempt to explain or excuse this series of events that denied the Subcommittee access to the witnesses it requested and prevented service members the opportunity to share their experiences with Congress. Furthermore, I find it absolutely shocking that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs made no effort to reach out to anyone on the Subcommittee to inform us of this new policy. I continue to be troubled that this policy was not applied evenly across the Congress, even immediately following its conception, leading me to believe that it was a punitive measure aimed solely at the Subcommittee.

**Other Requests**

**Document Requests:** The Subcommittee’s requests for documents went unanswered for months. The document request response continues to be incomplete. In March, the Subcommittee staff requested a briefing on the 2006 Joint Campaign Plan. When that request went unanswered, the Ranking Member and I submitted a formal letter, requesting that the documents be provided by March 30, 2007. OSD delayed responding to our request for the 2006 Joint Campaign Plan, predecessor plans and any subsequent revisions, while the OSD General Counsel reviewed the request. In late April, OSD finally instructed the Joint Staff to provide a response.

The Joint Staff attempted to do so, but experienced difficulty in obtaining the requested documents from CENTCOM, which is not in their chain of command. As a result, the document request remains incomplete. After more miscommunication and delay at the Pentagon, the Joint Staff delivered parts of the 2006 Joint Campaign Plan to the Subcommittee beginning May 23, 2007, the same day *The Washington Post* reported extensively on the content of the new plan. Other media reports also suggested that a new plan was already being implemented. General Dempsey recently confirmed that Coalition forces are operating under an “interim” campaign plan. The “interim” campaign plan has still not been provided to the Subcommittee.

The Subcommittee experienced similar difficulties in obtaining unit-level Transition Readiness Assessments. OSD took no action on the HASC Chairman’s January request for weeks, forcing the Chairman to repeat his request a second time and to ask the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in person for his assistance. The Ranking Member and I echoed the request in March. The Joint
Staff provided an Executive Summary starting in early April but did not provide TRAs until further staff meetings and negotiations into the beginning of May. The Joint Staff, then, started providing transition readiness assessments, but it took numerous meetings and weeks of negotiations.

**Questions for the Record and the Requests for Information:** OSD did not respond in a timely way to questions for the record or to our requests for information from the field. Many of the questions for the record remain unanswered. We received no response to our request for information.

**Responses to Correspondence:** The Ranking Member and I inquired by letter whether there had been a shift in policy regarding the role U.S. and Iraqi forces are playing in establishing security in Iraq and in preparing for the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces. OSD responded that there has been no change in “policy or emphasis with regard to training Iraqi forces.” This letter is not responsive. It does not answer our question. If the letter purports to say that there has been no change with regard to the plans to transition security responsibility, then it is at odds with General Dempsey’s recent testimony before the Subcommittee. General Dempsey testified that Coalition forces are operating under a new “interim” campaign plan, that an assessment has been made in theater that “the effort to transition had probably put the population at an unacceptable risk,” and that the emphasis, at least during the surge, is on security rather than transition.

OSD has not responded to a second letter the Ranking Member and I wrote regarding reports that the Office of the Prime Minister may be involved in the improper arrest and removal of senior ISF leaders.

**Travel in Theater:** OSD canceled an already approved staff trip to Iraq preventing, perhaps, the most productive tool available to the Subcommittee. Seeing progress first hand would have been an invaluable contribution to our investigation. I understand that logistics considerations resulting from the surge caused cancellation of the trip, but that decision significantly limited our ability to judge independently the progress that was being made.

CENTCOM proposed that, since we could not obtain the witnesses we requested from the theater, it could support a staff delegation in mid-June and an eight-member, four staff person congressional delegation in late June. Neither materialized.

The Services supported travel in the United States without hesitation.

**Meeting Requests:** Once staff travel to Iraq was prevented, the Subcommittee staff sought to overcome that impediment by asking for additional briefings and meetings and by asking for staff-level video teleconferences. None was supported.

The staff also requested, in mid-May, to meet with former transition team members who had advised and mentored the Ministries of Interior and Defense. We asked for the meetings by June
1st. Secretary Gates provided a June 6, 2007 interim response. Only on June 20, after our report was largely complete, were we contacted about making arrangements for the meetings. The Army and the Air Force were each tasked by OSD to respond, but they were not tasked until a month after our request was sent and two weeks after our deadline.

**Cumulative Effect**

The Subcommittee was able to learn a great deal and develop a record regarding the development of the Iraqi Security Forces largely without the support of OSD. However, had the Subcommittee had better and more timely access to the documents and witnesses we requested, we would have been able to better assess the progress and impediments to the development of the ISF. Congress must continue its constitutionally mandated role of oversight, whether or not the Department of Defense wants to participate. The Congress and the American people would be better served if the Department didn't continue its current strategy of obfuscation, delay and denial.
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES