IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century

Staff Study
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
One Hundred Fourth Congress


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VII. MASINT: Measurement and Signatures Intelligence

                       Executive Summary


     As part of the Intelligence Community of the 21st Century
study (IC21), the Committee reviewed the Measurement and Signatures
Intelligence (MASINT) discipline for its relevance in the
Intelligence Community's (IC) future.  The results of the study
reaffirmed some long held beliefs about the relatively
unpredictable future -- especially in terms of specific
technologies the Community will have to face.  One truism that
seems to hold is that the sophistication of the technologies
employed in the future weapon system (threats that the IC will be
tasked against) will be radically improved, and perhaps even more
radically different than those we attempt to understand today.  The
resulting need for a more sophisticated IC collection capability is
clear.  Clear also, is the need to unambiguously identify these
specific weapons or capabilities -- often before they are ever
used.  Less clear, but undoubtedly true, is the vital role
conventional technical intelligence disciplines (IMINT, SIGINT,
etc.) will continue to play in the identification and location of
the more dynamic targets.  However, as the sophistication of these
targets increases, or as countries (or transnational players)
employ effective denial and deception techniques, we will need to
employ new capabilities to ensure we can continue to answer the
consumers' questions.  One such capability is MASINT.  This study
concludes that MASINT will take on a more important role than it
does today in providing critical information on these future
threats.  Accordingly, this discipline must be focused and well-managed
to ensure the Community can provide the necessary information to its
various users.  

     The study's major findings include:  

     -    MASINT can provide specific weapon system
          identifications, chemical compositions and material
          content and a potential adversary's ability to
          employ these weapons.

     -    The Central MASINT Office (CMO) has the requisite
          legal authorities to carry out its
          responsibilities.  However, it is not staffed
          commensurate with those responsibilities, and a
          fractured organizational structure limits its
          overall management abilities.

     -    MASINT, as a specific and unique discipline, is not
          well understood by both the IC and user
          communities.  Therefore, the potential of its
          future contributions may be limited.

     -    MASINT is both a true, unique collection/analysis
          discipline and a highly refined analytical
          technique of the traditional disciplines.

     -    MASINT straddles strict disciplinary definitions.  It
          may use collection techniques of, but does not fit
          neatly into any one or all of the more recognized
          "traditional" disciplines of IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, etc.

     -    MASINT is the least understood of the disciplines and is
          perceived as a "strategic" capability with limited
          "tactical" support capabilities.  However, MASINT has a
          potential ability to provide real-time situation
          awareness and targeting not necessarily available from
          the more classic disciplines.  

     -    MASINT is a science-intensive discipline that needs
          people/scientists well versed in the broad range of
          physical and electrical sciences.  Such scientists can
          not typically be professionally developed with the IC. 
          They must come from academia fresh with scientific
          knowledge from experimentation and research.  Nor can
          they continue to be "proficient" in their areas of
          expertise if they remain in government employ for an
          entire career.

     The study's major recommendations include:

     -    The MASINT technical management function should be
          contained within the construct of a multi-intelligence
          disciplined technical collection agency which oversees
          the coordinated employment of all technical collection
          systems.

     -    The IC should create a "U.S. MASINT System" analogous to
          USSS and USIS.

     -    The MASINT manager should be a General Officer or SES/SIS
          and a permanent member of the MIB, NFIB, and other senior
          DCI and DoD boards/panels.  His/Her authorities to manage
          the MASINT community should be equal to those of the
          SIGINT and IMINT managers.

     -    The IC needs to increase emphasis on informing the IC and
          user communities about MASINT capabilities and products. 
          Additionally, the IC needs to make MASINT a formal course
          of professional education for all IC school houses.

     -    MASINT should remain a specific collection and processing
          discipline.  However, MASINT exploitation is becoming
          more critical as threat technologies improve.  Therefore,
          the IC needs to place increased emphasis on MASINT
          exploitation within the traditional technical
          disciplines.

     -    MASINT planning and system development must focus on not
          only technical analysis that is necessary for long term
          signature development, but must also plan, at the outset
          of any capability development/use, the need to satisfy
          immediate "tactical" information requirements.

     -    The IC must be able to tap into any/all U.S. resources,
          including those not specifically within the IC, that have
          the ability to input into intelligence data bases.  This
          includes having better access to, and guidance of,
          national laboratories.

     -    The IC needs a budgeting mechanism that is equivalent of
          "ready cash."  This would provide the ability to readily
          fund fleeting or promising technologies, R&D efforts
          (without penalty for those technologies/or scientific
          breakthroughs that do not bear fruit), or unplanned
          operational opportunities.  This authority needs to be
          analogous to a venture capitalist.

     -    The IC needs to examine the feasibility of pursuing trial
          personnel management programs that provide incentives to
          recruit and maintain the necessary scientific experts.  


        MASINT:  MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE

Study Purpose  

     One can argue that the requirements levied on the Intelligence
Community (IC) in the twenty-first century will not be radically
different than those levied on it today.  The basic information
needs of "who, what, where, when and why" will likely not change. 
However, most can easily agree that the sophistication of the
technologies employed in the future weapon systems (threats) that
the IC will be tasked against will be radically improved, and
perhaps even more radically different than those we attempt to
understand today.  Increasingly, even unsophisticated countries are
gaining access to relatively inexpensive, but high technology
weapons.  Weapons that can be "launched and forgotten," weapons of
mass destruction -- including nuclear, chemical and biological, or
weapons that are difficult to detect or are stealthy.  The
resulting need for a more sophisticated IC collection capability is
clear.  Clear also, is the need to unambiguously identify these
specific weapons or capabilities -- often before they are ever
used.  The IC's ability to specifically locate, identify,
characterize, and determine the intentions of such weapons or
threats is, and will become even more, critical.  Conventional
technical intelligence disciplines -- Imagery Intelligence (IMINT),
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), etc. -- have played, and will
continue to play, a vital role in the identification and location
of such targets.  However, as the sohpistication of these targets
increases, or as countries (or transnational players) employ
effective denial and deception techniques, we will need to employ
new capabilities to ensure we can continue to answer the consumers'
questions.  One such capability is Measurement and Signature
Intelligence, or MASINT.  MASINT is a very scientific and
technically-based discipline that can provide unique contributions
to the IC in terms of specific weapon identifications, chemical
compositions, material content, etc.  Such unique identifications
will be a major factor in answering the future questions of "who,
what where, when and why."  In fact, some believe MASINT will be
the most important "technical INT of the future."

     Despite the clear criticality, both present and future, of the
MASINT discipline, it is the least well known of the technical
collection/analysis disciplines.  Many have questioned the nature
of the discipline:  is it a true collection discipline or is it a
unique product based on specialized analysis?  Few who have had the
opportunity to review MASINT products, however, can dispute their
utility, or the current and growing need for these products.  The
purpose of this study, therefore, was to determine several specific
issues relative to MASINT.  First, was to identify the viability
and need for MASINT-unique collection and processing in the 21st
Century.  Second, was to determine the IC's strengths and
weaknesses in providing such necessary MASINT support.  This was to
include making any recommendations for necessary changes to
systems, architectures, management, technologies requiring
emphasis, etc. to ensure the discipline's viability.  Finally, we
wanted to address the budget implications of attempting to achieve
these goals.

Study Approach

     It should be first noted that this is not a scientific study,
but rather an assessment based on community expert inputs.  To get
substantive input for the study, the staff team sponsored several
round-table panel discussions, numerous individual interviews, and
formal presentations with MASINT Committee members, the Services,
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Arms Control professionals
and former community officials.  The effort was designed to "think
out of the Future Years' Development Program (FYDP) box."  That is,
there was no attempt to indict the past, present, or programmed
organization and efforts, but rather to look "beyond" into the
future.  The team developed an outline and series of questions to
prompt inputs/discussion from each of the invited participants. 
The approach viewed MASINT as a distinct collection discipline even
though the discipline is not well bounded by specific (and unique)
collection and exploitation definitions.  Our effort focused on
identifying the current capabilities and systems trying to
determine their individual contributions and where each
should/could be best employed in the future.  However, the sciences
and rapidly evolving technologies involved eventually focused us
more toward a review of MASINT management, including the abilities
to coordinate and program for new sensors/technologies, to task
sensors, and to use and disseminate MASINT information. 
Recommendations from participants were noted and, to the extent
possible, identified in this report.
  
     Secondly, it also needs to be noted that the recommendations
offered below were originally focused on a MASINT management and
operational structure that was generally maintained within the
current IC organization.  And, although these recommendations were
made before the completion of the Intelligence Community Management
staff study, they work well within the construct of that study's
more consolidated community organization.  Specifically within the
context of that study, all references to the "Central MASINT Office
(CMO)" are assumed to be describing a division (or office) within
the Technical Collection Agency (TCA) under the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence for Community Management (DDCI/CM).  If the
TCA construct is not adopted, the CMO references describe the
Community's MASINT management organization assumed to be within the
DIA.

     Finally, in addition to the panel discussions and interviews,
the team reviewed and used the following supporting documents
during the study:

     A.   MASINT Handbook for the Warfighter, prepared by the INCA
          Project Office, November 1994

     B.   CMO Biological and Chemical Warfare Intelligence 
          Collection Strategy Briefing, R. Paul Schaudies,
          Ph.D., November 1994

     C.   CMO Investment Process Briefing, Mr. Dale Helmer, August 94

     D.   CMO MASINT Master Plan, January 1994

     E.   MASINT 2010 Study, October 1995

     F.   Director of Central Intelligence Directive 2/11-1,
          December 1992

     G.   DoD Instruction 5105.58, February 1993

     H.   DoD Instruction 5105.21, May 1977

Background

     A general understanding of the genesis of MASINT and its
official definition is appropriate prior to a study regarding the
future of the discipline.  

     Recognizing the need to ensure proper exploitation of complex,
technically-derived data, the IC classified MASINT as a formal
intelligence discipline in 1986.  At that time, the IC Staff MASINT
Committee was formed to oversee all MASINT activities.  To further
consolidate MASINT management, the Central MASINT office (CMO) was
established in 1993 by the Director, DIA, with specific
responsibilities detailed by the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) and Department of Defense (DoD) Directives.  The CMO is a
joint IC and DoD activity within DIA, that directs and implements
national and DoD policies and procedures on MASINT matters.  With
that quick background, it is useful to identify the IC's current
official definition of MASINT:

     Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) is
     technically derived intelligence (excluding
     traditional imagery and signal intelligence) which
     when collected, processed, and analyzed, results in
     intelligence that detects, tracks, identifies, or
     describes the signatures (distinctive
     characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target
     sources.  MASINT includes the advanced processing
     and exploitation of data derived from IMINT and
     SIGINT collection sources.  MASINT sensors include,
     but are not limited to, radar, optical, infrared,
     acoustic, nuclear, radiation detection,
     spetroradiometric, and seismic systems as well as
     gas, liquid, and solid material sampling systems.  

         Despite this definition, many in the IC (and policy
community) are confused as to what MASINT really is.  Although
MASINT can be described as the highly technical exploitation of
traditional disciplines, the MASINT collection techniques cover
areas not addressed by other disciplines.  In many respects,
there is a clear distinction between MASINT and the other
disciplines.  MASINT can be considered analogous to the
individual who relies on all senses to gain information about his
or her environment.  Where SIGINT is akin to sound, and IMINT to
sight, MASINT is akin to touch, taste and smell.  The areas where
MASINT expands on the traditional disciplines (IMINT and SIGINT)
can be thought of as providing aids to improve upon or add
dimensions and capabilities to the sight and sound senses that
would not otherwise be possible.  Is MASINT a true collection
discipline, or is it actually specialized processing of other
collection disciplines?  Is it a separate field of
specialization, or more appropriately classified as additional
processing and analysis of existing data?  These questions were
a fundamental basis for the study that went into this report. 
Specifically, we tried to determine how to correct this "identity
crisis," while ensuring the community will be served by the truly
unique product MASINT can provide.  

General Conclusions  

         Based on the various inputs, the group identified six
general conclusions that appear to sum up the general issues
relative to MASINT.  Each of the general conclusions are later
broken down into specific conclusions and recommendations.  

  A.   MASINT is difficult to bound by strict
       definitions.  In fact,  MASINT collections
       can, in part, legitimately be labeled as
       SIGINT, Infrared Intelligence (IRINT),
       IMINT, HUMINT, etc.  However, MASINT does
       not fit neatly into any one or all of these
       recognized "traditional" intelligence
       disciplines.  MASINT is both a true, unique,
       collection/analysis discipline and highly
       refined analytical techniques of those
       traditional disciplines.  Despite these gray
       lines of demarcation, MASINT may be the
       "intelligence discipline of the future" --
       that is, MASINT is a discipline that is
       becoming more important in identifying and
       characterizing new and emerging threats,
       particularly as weapon system technologies
       become more complex and capable.  Without a
       robust and focused capability, MASINT's
       support to future needs, such as "brilliant"
       weapons and national information
       requirements (e.g., weapons proliferation,
       arms control, force modernization, strategic
       programs, scientific and technical needs,
       environmental and humanitarian concerns, and
       counter-narcotics/terrorism), may be
       inadequate.

  B.   MASINT is perceived as a "strategic"
       discipline with limited "tactical" support
       capabilities.  But, by application of
       real-time analysis and dissemination, MASINT
       has a potential ability to provide real-time
       situation awareness and targeting not
       necessarily available to the more classic
       disciplines.  Because of these perceptions,
       MASINT does not get the attention of the
       tactical consumers, and has less
       constituency support than the more
       traditional intelligence disciplines. 
       Lacking proper constituency, MASINT sensors
       and analysis will likely not be properly
       supported or maintained.  Results will
       include a lack of targeting templates for
       smart weapons.  

  C.   MASINT, as a specific and unique discipline,
       is not well understood by the IC as a whole. 
       Therefore, although it provides significant
       intelligence products, its contributions, or
       the potential of its contributions may have
       been and will likely be limited.  The full
       extent if its future application to national
       and operational intelligence will not be
       realized.

  D.   Funding levels for the current MASINT
       systems, and those projected into the future
       are not reflective of the importance of this
       discipline to the Nation's general
       intelligence/ dominant knowledge efforts. 
       This is primarily because users do not have
       direct tasking over, and therefore
       understanding of, MASINT sensors.

  E.   The roadmap for specific MASINT technologies
       appears to be fairly well thought out and
       necessary for the 21st century.  However,
       there may be insufficient funding
       flexibility for reacting to, or pursuing
       new, emerging, or fleeting technologies. 
       Additionally, there is a need to ensure a
       balance between the requirements and
       technologies that support military
       battlefield requirements, and the often more
       exacting requirements and technologies that
       are needed for IC national monitoring and
       detection of weapon or agent developments.  

  F.   Although the CMO has the necessary legal
       authorities, it is not properly staffed
       commensurate with its responsibilities. 
       Additionally, a fractured organizational
       structure provides little to no focused
       MASINT management, budgeting oversight,
       tasking control, or coordination of effort. 
       This may potentially cause inefficient
       expenditures of resources and duplicative
       developments.

Specific Conclusions/Findings  

  A.  "MASINT is difficult to bound by strict definitions.  In
  fact,  MASINT collections can, in part, legitimately be labeled
  as SIGINT, IRINT, IMINT, HUMINT, etc.  However, MASINT does not
  fit neatly into any one or all of these recognized
  "traditional" intelligence disciplines.  MASINT is both a true,
  unique, collection/analysis discipline and highly refined
  analytical techniques of those traditional disciplines. 
  Despite these gray lines of demarcation, MASINT may be the
  "intelligence discipline of the future" -- that is, MASINT is
  a discipline that is becoming more important in identifying and
  characterizing new and emerging threats, particularly as weapon
  system technologies become more complex and capable.  Without
  a robust and focused capability, MASINT's support to future
  needs, such as "brilliant" weapons and national information
  requirements (e.g., weapons proliferation, arms control, force
  modernization, strategic programs, scientific and technical
  needs, environmental and humanitarian concerns, and
  counter-narcotics/terrorism), may be inadequate."
  
    1)  One discussion point focused on whether to maintain
    MASINT as a separate discipline or to break it up into the
    separate disciplines (i.e. Radar Intelligence (RADINT),
    SIGINT, IMINT, etc.).  This discussion focused on whether or
    not to make MASINT professionals organic to the traditional
    intelligence disciplines or keep them separated within the
    distinct discipline.  Some believe that doing away with the
    unique professional MASINT discipline that cuts across the
    other disciplines' collection spectra would be
    counterproductive. They believe better coordinated MASINT
    products are possible when viewed across the various
    collection disciplines.  Their argument for maintaining a
    separate MASINT discipline states that such "cross cutting"
    is providing positive results in terms of all-source
    analysis.  Upon close inspection this is apparently true. 
    However, there is a counter-argument that includes the issue
    of refined "technical" exploitation of the "traditional
    intelligence disciplines" (explained below).  This
    counter-argument focuses on the need to "proliferate" the
    MASINT exploitation potential to other disciplines. 
    Regardless of the whether MASINT remains a distinct
    discipline or not, there is a need to redouble efforts to
    get people of different "intelligence stovepipe" expertises
    together doing true all-source (including non-intelligence
    sourced information) analysis.  

    2)  As touched on above, a counter-argument is that MASINT,
    as a term and as a separate discipline, may not be what is
    needed for the 21st century.  A specific case can be made
    that MASINT is simply more refined, more scientific and more
    technically challenging analysis of existing collection/1/
    (although much MASINT collection is done outside the realms
    of other existing collection disciplines).  However, one
    respondent (favoring maintaining a separate discipline)
    stated, "Frankly, the MASINT odds and ends (e.g., phase
    history data) that could belong to other intelligence
    disciplines would probably not exist today if the MASINT
    phenomenologists had not pursued them."  This may be true,
    but the question still exists which asks "Is MASINT a
    separate collection discipline or is it IMINT, SIGINT,
    HUMINT, IRINT, or other disciplines in their various forms?" 
    Further, if the answer to the latter is "yes," then one has
    to ask whether MASINT is then the more detailed exploitation
    of those available collections.  This argument becomes less
    clear, and the apparent answer to the first question becomes
    "no" when one studies the clearly MASINT-unique collection
    systems, entities and missions such as seismometry, nuclear
    and soil sampling.  

         The argument for subsuming the MASINT discipline
    assumes that the MASINT product is not-so-simply the result
    of more in-depth analysis of the "traditional" intelligence
    disciplines.  For example, although COBRA BALL is clearly a
    MASINT platform, its collection media are multidisciplined,
    and include IMINT (visible and non-visible spectra).  The
    product distinction is more in the resulting analysis and
    use of the data collected via these disciplines' means.  The
    product then, rather than being used for the traditional
    intelligence support functions of counting tanks, locating
    battalions, and targeting ATACMS missiles, is used for
    scientific/technical refinement to do signature and
    capability analysis.  The basic sciences (between MASINT and
    the other disciplines) are not altered or different, but the
    state of refinement is.  Another example is effluent
    analysis based on hyper-spectral collection.  The collection
    is, arguably, IMINT in its various (non-imaging) spectra,
    but the product is fundamentally different analysis of the
    effluent content -- not just the detection (or imaging) of
    presence.  This argument would question whether MASINT
    tasking, analysis and expertise need to be better developed
    within the existing "traditional" intelligence disciplines. 

    3)  Another argument for maintaining MASINT as a distinct
    discipline is captured in the following.  Specifically,
    MASINT seeks to collect metric data and signatures.  Metric
    data are derived from the direct measurement of the
    kinematics performance of targets of interest.  Metric data
    provide information on the dynamic capabilities of targets
    and/or the tactics for their use.  Signature data typically
    are -- or are derived from -- "high-fidelity measurements of
    targets of interest, in the context of their application,
    use or production, to allow the current or future unique
    identification of such targets."  SIGINT, as its name
    implies, is based on the desire to intercept or collect
    signals -- the transmission of information from one place to
    another.  Intercepted signals could contain information on
    a wide variety of topics that overlap information collected
    by IMINT or MASINT means; but the collection is still
    SIGINT.  IMINT endeavors to provide pictorial
    representations of targets and areas of interest -- not the
    spectral analysis of material content.  All three technical
    collection disciplines employ electro-optical (EO) - and
    radio frequency (RF) -- based systems to provide unique
    MASINT, SIGINT, and IMINT collection capabilities.  However,
    and additionally, MASINT also makes use of a wide range of
    other measurement techniques such as seismic, acoustics,
    magnetic, and nuclear, to provide capabilities against
    targets that cannot be prosecuted using EO- or RF-based
    systems.  In summary, intelligence disciplines are
    differentiated on the basis of the type of information being
    collected and extracted through processing and exploitation 
    -- not on the physical basis of the collection system
    employed or the intelligence problem being addressed.  This
    argument attempts to justify the need to maintain MASINT as
    a separate discipline.  This is a good argument and
    position, but perhaps one that is bound by the "current
    think" box.

    Findings/Recommendations (There are several, possibly
    conflicting recommendations which need to be
    discussed/debated)  

    4)  There are several possibilities for ensuring the MASINT
    capability into the future.  The first would be to delete
    the term MASINT from the IC's vernacular.  This option would
    place MASINT collection and exploitation functions within
    the auspices of the other collection disciplines.  This
    would require replacing the term with a deeper
    understanding, and, moreover, appreciation for the fact that
    more exploitable information is available (much within the
    current discipline collections) than what is being used
    today by the "traditional exploiters" (those unique
    collections traditionally identified as "MASINT" not
    withstanding).  This understanding will require the
    employment of scientific and technical people (the current
    "MASINTers") within the traditional intelligence
    organizations (the services, NSA, CIO, etc.), and force more
    "traditional collection" in the areas of sampling, etc.   
    This is to say that specific, technically-astute (MASINT)
    individuals need to do this; it most likely cannot be done
    by people who are experts in the known collection and
    exploitation functions of the traditional disciplines. 
    However, there is a danger in deleting the term, and putting
    "MASINTers" in with the more traditional disciplines.  
    These people may eventually "get lost" in the traditional
    disciplines' focused charters and the technical and
    scientific exploitation will be lost.  This was the reason
    the MASINT discipline was created in the first place. 
    Additionally, deleting the term would force other approaches
    at non-traditional collection such as seismic, thermal, etc.

    5)  The second possibility is to maintain the status quo
    and retain MASINT as a specific discipline.  This does not
    improve the problems we see today with the identity of
    MASINT.  

    6)  The third is a "hybrid" of the two options above.  That
    is, MASINT  should remain a specific collection and
    processing discipline with its core of professionals and
    management staff.  However, the more traditional technical
    disciplines of IMINT and SIGINT should specifically address,
    in their charters, the recognition of the MASINT ability to
    glean additional data from their collections (this would be
    facilitated by the TCA construct).  This would require the
    deeper understanding, and associated dedicated people
    identified in the paragraph above.  Additionally, MASINT
    should be treated just as are the other technical
    disciplines in that the IC should Create a "U.S. MASINT
    System" with associated functional manager (the CMO).  This
    would still be logical within the structure of a TCA. 
    Finally, based on the outcome of the Intelligence Community
    Management staff study, the Committee recommends the MASINT
    functional manager (FM) (the CMO) be subordinated to the TCA
    for logical management.  

    7)  The basic sciences (between MASINT and the other
    disciplines) are not altered or different.  It is the state
    of refinement (of the technical or scientific analysis),
    often the collection source (e.g. the case of soil or
    effluent sampling) and nature of data being pursued that are
    the differences.

    8)  MASINT tasking, analysis, and expertises need to be
    better developed within the existing "traditional"
    intelligence disciplines.  Specifically, the more
    traditional disciplines need to have a better understanding
    and appreciation for the facts that additional exploitable
    (MASINT) information may exist within their current
    collections.  This requires the deeper understanding
    recommended above, but also requires a specific oversight
    organization (the current CMO) to ensure this refined
    analysis and IC direction.  

  B.  "MASINT is perceived as a "strategic" discipline with
  limited "tactical" support capabilities.  But, by application
  of real-time analysis and dissemination, MASINT has a potential
  ability to provide real-time situation awareness and targeting
  not necessarily available to the more classic disciplines. 
  Because of these perceptions, MASINT does not get the attention
  of the tactical consumers, and has less constituency support
  than the more traditional intelligence disciplines.  Lacking
  proper constituency, MASINT sensors and analysis will likely
  not be properly supported or maintained.  Results will include
  a lack of targeting templates for smart weapons."  

    1)  As stated previously, MASINT is, in some cases, the
    more scientific analysis product of the more traditional
    collection disciplines.  Because of the highly technical
    means utilized, most MASINT systems' focus has been on the
    longer-term (i.e., not "real-time") analysis of data to
    determine characteristics, signatures, target templates,
    etc.  With the advent of modern processing techniques and
    capabilities, MASINT systems have an increased potential for
    doing their analysis in near real- or real-time.  Such
    potential MASINT contributions to the requirements of
    tactical customers is poorly known -- and in some cases not
    being pursued.  

         One example of MASINT contributions to real-time
    identification is the application of MASINT signature data
    for non-cooperative target identification (NCTI).  Today,
    U.S. systems have a capability to identify hostile fighter
    aircraft based on MASINT techniques.  However, it is poorly
    known that this analysis was done by MASINT resources. 
    Because of the "unknown sources" for such capabilities,
    constituency concerns can arise during budget formulations
    when the participants have a poor or no understanding of
    MASINT (or other intelligence) applications.  Decisions
    whether to fund intelligence sensors or additional
    technologies -- such as NCTI -- on offensive weapons can be
    skewed, based on these lack of understandings.  For example,
    funding debates that are "pro-intelligence" (versus
    "operational") may be short-lived and the original
    contributing capability (e.g., a MASINT sensor) is the
    loser.  It must be continuously recognized there is a basic
    difference between the general sensor approach for
    "warfighting" and the specific, often more sophisticated,
    sensors necessary for intelligence collection and
    knowledge-making.  Intelligence sensors must have the
    ability to measure and define fully the target threat or
    signature needed.  Therefore, these must have full spectral
    coverage, dynamic range, etc.  The resulting "battlefield
    sensors" employed by users often can be more simply designed
    to recognize the presence of a threat based on the
    signatures provided by intelligence.  The importance of this
    thought cannot be underestimated.

    2)  Despite its "strategic" intelligence past, MASINT has
    a critical and growing role in future real-time "warfighter"
    support.  Specifically, MASINT "sensors" have unique
    capabilities to detect missile launch, detect and track
    aircraft, ships, and vehicles, do NCTI and battle damage
    assessment, and detect and track fallout from nuclear
    detonations.  Often, these contributions are the first
    indicators of hostile activities.  The shootdown, for
    example, of the two EXOCET-equipped Mirage F-1s during the
    Gulf War was attributed to a MASINT collection and analysis. 

    3)  MASINT, or the "MASINT applications" of SIGINT and
    IMINT (etc.), will become more important in providing the
    future inputs for smart weapons target templating.  That is,
    MASINT is critical for providing future weapons with the
    signatures (fingerprint) of the targets they are seeking (IR
    signatures for example).  

    4)  MASINT sensors are often the same systems as
    "warfighting systems."  The difference is often only the
    level of sophistication of the data analysis.  A specific
    example is the use of data available from operational radars
    incidental to the targeting functions for which these radars
    were built.  AEGIS radar returns contain data that can
    provide significant metric data for assessing weapons system
    performances.  

    Findings/Recommendations

    5)  MASINT planning must focus on not only the technical
    analysis that is necessary for long term signature
    development, but must also plan, at the outset of any
    capability development/use, the need to satisfy immediate
    information requirements for the tactical consumer.  This
    means that MASINT planners must coordinate with the
    information users at the inception of a program to
    determine, at a minimum, the needs to be satisfied, the
    format for display of the information required, and
    addressing human factors issues such as amount of data,
    timeliness of data, etc.

    6)  MASINT systems should be provided with the capability
    to communicate with/broadcast directly to customers just as
    do the "traditional intelligence disciplines."  This should
    include an assessment of the utility of broadcast systems
    such as the Tactical Information Broadcast Service (TIBS)
    and other data links.  The specific implementation of this
    recommendation should be developed by the DDCI/CM's
    Infrastructure Support Organization (see Intelligence
    Community Management staff study).  

    7)  MASINT culture must be changed to think of analysis in
    terms of seconds and hours AS WELL AS its current months and
    years.  This requires school house concentration on MASINT
    curriculum, and an everyday appreciation with the
    traditional disciplines.  This also demands that users be
    involved and informed relative to MASINT capabilities.  

    8)  Specifically identified MASINT systems are not the only
    sources of MASINT data.  Targeting radars, for example, can
    provide ancillary data useful to the national
    collection/analysis efforts.  CMO must have 1) insight not
    only to specifically identified MASINT systems, but also to
    those offensive weapons systems (radars for example)
    capabilities that can contribute to technical and scientific
    (MASINT) information data bases; 2) when necessary, have the
    wherewithal to request/suggest/ask for tasking authority for
    these systems.  Additionally, CMO should have a funding
    ability to provide "seed" money to determine or improve
    MASINT exploitation of existing weapon system data.  This
    will require a "rethink" that "intelligence and its sensors"
    are not something strictly unique, but rather "intelligence
    and its sensors" are the totality of information available
    to the U.S. government.  The national defense psyche must
    not continue in the "we" (operations)/"they" (intelligence)
    construct.  

    9)  CMO needs a better understanding of user needs, not
    just stated requirements.  This demands that the
    intelligence and user communities (particularly the MASINT
    community in this case) coordinate and talk more.  The
    security barriers to effective communication  must be broken
    down.  (They are to some extent, but this must be expanded.)

  C.  "MASINT, as a specific and unique discipline, is not well
  understood by the IC as a whole.  Therefore, although it
  provides significant intelligence products, its contributions,
  or the potential of its contributions may have been/will be
  limited.  Its future application to national and operational
  intelligence will not be maximized."

    1)  Despite the formal definition, MASINT remains an
    intelligence discipline enigma.  It is more diverse and
    unique than the more focused IMINT and SIGINT disciplines. 
    It is characterized by some as having some similar sources
    and methods (of the more classic disciplines), but much more
    complex, particularly with respect to analysis than those
    others.  MASINT has many of the collection characteristics
    of the other technical disciplines, however, it is the
    unique exploitation and unique techniques that distinguish
    MASINT results.  One respondent stated that MASINT products
    are the intelligence bits remaining after the expected
    results of collection are removed.  Another stated that
    MASINT provides alternatives that supplement "conventional"
    collection to provide "the rest of the story."  

          Some would say it is the unique data retrieved from
    additional processing -- the technical and scientific data
    -- that can set the MASINT discipline apart from the host
    intelligence discipline."  However, MASINT collection and
    processing are not limited to the phenomena of the
    electro-magnetic (RF) spectrum.  Significant MASINT
    information is derived from seismic sensors, acoustic
    sensors, nuclear radiation sensors and material/effluent
    sampling.  This identity crisis becomes troubling when there
    is a choice to be made, particularly in funding issues. 
    Some state there is no identify crisis for MASINT, that
    there is, instead, a need for IC and customer education. 
    This education need does, indeed, reflect the identity
    crisis discussed above.  

    2)  The CMO and INCA have developed a guide called the
    MASINT Handbook for the Warfighter.  This document has been
    printed and distributed to "demystify the world of MASINT." 
    This handbook is a critical start toward educating the
    community and users in the art of MASINT.  It needs to be
    "standard issue" throughout the IC.

    3)  As stated briefly above, the MASINT "identity crisis"
    is also apparent when there are budget cuts to be made.  As
    one respondent noted, MASINT is the "soft underbelly," which
    is "easily cut" during budget cut drills.  Whenever there
    are cuts to be made within the IC (i.e., GDIP), MASINT
    (particularly Research and Development (R&D) funds) are some
    of the first to be targeted. 

    4)  There was much discussion on the need to improve formal
    initial and continuing education within the IC/2/ for MASINT
    professionals.  Formal scientific/technical, mathematical
    and engineering skills are critical backgrounds for MASINT
    professionals who do the detailed exploitation of MASINT
    data.  Training for these backgrounds is not typically done
    within the IC; it is more a function of academia.  To get
    the necessary professionals, the IC must be able to recruit
    "MASINTers" from the professional (research/laboratory) and
    academic worlds.  Continuing education needs to be both
    "in-house" and fostered within the private/professional
    sectors.  

    5)  MASINT has no formal/viable method (i.e., metrics) for
    evaluating MASINT contributions to the IC or user
    communities.  That is, there is no formal method for
    determining whether MASINT analysis and products are
    satisfying the needs of the customers.  This was
    specifically characterized by the unbalanced MASINT results
    of the recent Community-wide Capabilities Analysis.  There
    is a need to develop a metric or set of metrics to determine
    the impact of MASINT products toward stated knowledge goals. 

    Findings/Recommendations

    6)  The services and agencies need to do a better job of
    educating the user and, moreover, the IC, on the
    capabilities, applications, and specifics of MASINT.  MASINT
    (familiarity) should become a formal course of professional
    education for all IC school houses.  Existing courses, that
    include MASINT content, should be increased in scope and
    duration.  Specific tailored courses should provide a
    curricula that cuts across the spectrum of general user
    overviews to in-depth analytic instruction.   

    7)  The MASINT User's Handbook should be required reading
    within the IC.  Additionally, recommend the MASINT User's
    Handbook be developed in both all-source and unclassified
    versions.  

    8)  Continuing IC education should emphasize the unique
    collection and products of MASINT, and more specifically,
    the MASINT (technical and scientific) applications of
    individual "traditional" disciplines.  That is, IC
    professionals within the IMINT and SIGINT fields should be
    made more aware of the contributions MASINT analysis can
    make to existing IMINT/SIGINT collections.  They need to be
    made aware that additional information may be gleaned from
    existing collections once the "expected information has been
    stripped away."

    9)  Education, particularly continuing education, of the IC
    cannot be overstated.  The CMO has developed an updated
    video tape that highlights MASINT contributions.  This video
    tape is an information sharing source that should be
    exploited to the extent possible.  The IC should share this
    tape with all IC components and users.  This tape, or like,
    should be shown at the school houses and at operational
    intelligence organizations to publicize the contributions of
    MASINT collection and analysis.

    10)  CMO should pursue an adjunct training capability, with
    trained instructors, like that of NSA to ensure MASINT
    training is conducted and maintained.  This training
    facility should be reviewed for both "in-house" and
    exportable training efforts.  CMO should be a "clearing
    house" for developing such training materials, including
    "for credit" courses.  Funding for this should be a CMO
    responsibility, with the necessary resources  programmed and
    provided.  

    11)  There is a need to develop and maintain evaluation
    criteria (metrics) to gauge MASINT customer needs
    satisfaction.  The National Intelligence Evaluation Council
    (NIEC -- within the recommendations of the Intelligence
    Community Management staff study, the NIEC is an
    organization subordinate to the DCI and responsible for
    evaluating the Communities satisfaction of requirements)
    should develop both evaluation criteria and a program for
    measuring MASINT product effectiveness.  This is necessary
    to determine future needs and the ability to satisfy those
    needs.  

    12)  CMO needs to provide more community emphasis on
    educating the user (warfighter and policy makers) on the
    utility of MASINT products and services.  Specifically, the
    service War Colleges, for example, need to increase the
    blocks that teach intelligence to all future leaders of the
    Armed Forces.  MASINT must be a formal block of instruction
    in such courses.  Again, without a basic understanding of
    what the product can provide, the customer typically has no
    appreciation of the need for MASINT and the associated
    expenditures of funds.  Without such an appreciation, the
    discipline may be under-utilized.  

  D.  "Funding levels for the current MASINT systems, and those
  projected into the future are not reflective of the importance
  of this discipline to the Nation's general intelligence/
  dominant knowledge efforts./3/  This is primarily because users
  do not have direct tasking over, and therefore understanding
  of, MASINT sensors."  

    1)  R&D is the lifeblood of MASINT.  However, MASINT R&D
    funding is one of the most vulnerable to being cut within
    the GDIP program.  Low obligation rates and lack
    appreciation for R&D's future contributions make this an
    easy target which is often hit during cut drills/actions.  

    2)  Funding levels are considered by the group as
    relatively reflective of the current need.  CMO's long range
    technology plan, with associated expected costs, is good,
    but does not allow for the unknowns of scientific
    breakthroughs or unforeseen technology needs.  The disparate
    organizational "ownership" of the funding does not allow for
    coordinated/effective expenditure of the available funds.  

    3)  MASINT requires, in many cases, single (to several)
    technical collections systems, this forces paying "prototype
    costs."  This is a cost intensive effort that needs to be
    acknowledged up front.  Pure scientific research is the
    bread and butter that must be funded at a continuing level. 
    There is a need for level-effort-funding like that of the
    laboratories, that is not cut for convenience. 
    Additionally, the MASINT community must do better in terms
    of coordinating efforts with the national laboratories.  

    Findings/Recommendations

    4)  MASINT resources and funding needs must be better
    managed and coordinated between the services, agencies, and
    laboratories.  CMO must be provided (or assume) better
    insight into each of the MASINT programs.  This should
    include providing recommendations into MASINT system POM
    builds.  However, the recommended DDCI/CM's Community
    Management Staff (CMS) should construct the coordinated
    budget.

    5)  MASINT R&D efforts must be better coordinated to ensure
    proper level of effort and minimize redundancy.  CMO should
    be given authority to have specific insight into the
    national laboratory and ARPA developmental and research
    efforts, and should have the ability to focus or request
    research and experimentation.  This should include a
    level-of-effort funding program, controlled by CMO to do
    required research or to assist a promising technology.  CMO
    should be given the authority to directly obligate funding. 
    This recommendation is greatly facilitated by the TCA and
    Technology Development Officer (TDO) organizations under the
    DDCI/CM.

    6)  CMO should be given additional budget authority to
    control a "to be determined" amount of funding to be applied
    to existing intelligence and operational systems to
    determine/improve their MASINT data collection potentials. 

    7)  CMO must be directed to specifically prioritize MASINT
    systems (agency and service included) for funding purposes. 
    Such authority must recognize that CMO does not have
    jurisdiction over "multi-role" platforms (those that can
    accomplish "MASINT collection" as incidental to their
    primary tasks).

  E.  "The roadmap for specific MASINT technologies appears to
  be fairly well thought out and necessary for the 21st century. 
  However, there may be insufficient funding flexibility for
  reacting to, or pursuing new, emerging, or fleeting
  technologies.  Additionally, there is a need to ensure a
  balance between the requirements and technologies that support
  military battlefield requirements, and the often more exacting
  requirements and technologies that are needed for IC national
  monitoring and detection of weapon or agent developments."

    1)  CMO has developed a technology roadmap, complete with
    projected cost data.  This effort appears to be logical and
    complete with necessary analysis.  However, the roadmap does
    not provide well for the unknown.  That is, there are always
    the possibilities and probabilities for future new and
    emerging technologies or requirements that cannot be
    specifically planned for.  There is a need to be able to
    capitalize on these unforeseen breakthroughs.  This is the
    need to "plan for the unknown."

    2)  Relative to "intelligence versus operations," there
    appears to be a specific coordination problem with MASINT
    versus counter-proliferation efforts against weapons of mass
    destruction and, more specifically, chemical and biological
    weapon (CW/BW) proliferation.  Current efforts are not well
    coordinated and resources are scattered throughout the U.S.
    government.  For example, the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Nuclear Policy has significant resources available for the
    defense of or counter proliferation efforts against CW/BW
    weapons.  CMO has little to no insight or direction into the
    "intelligence-related" activities.  Additionally, without
    better insight, the CMO's MASINT roadmap will pursue
    duplicative efforts.  

    3)  There is a critical difference between battlefield
    support to military operations (SMO) MASINT requirements,
    and those requirements for detecting, for example, the early
    stages of a weapon or chemical agent development.  Much
    MASINT and, indeed, all other disciplines' emphasis is
    placed on SMO.  However, the criticality of developing and
    maintaining extremely sensitive sensors for ensuring the
    Nation's ability to monitor, detect, characterize and
    classify developmental weapons/efforts, such as biological,
    chemical and nuclear, cannot be overemphasized.  There are
    specific requirement differences, for example, in designing
    battlefield chemical detectors that "simply" identify the
    presence of agents, and the more sophisticated sensors
    designed to provide the in-depth collection and analysis for
    knowledge of the characteristics of these agents.  This
    requires a balance of emphasis to ensure that "non-SMO"
    intelligence requirements are met.  

    Findings/Recommendations 

    4)  CMO should be provided with a level-of-effort budgeting
    capability.  That is, CMO should request, and Congress
    should provide (via legislation) for, a budgeting mechanism
    that is that equivalent of "ready cash" or venture capital. 
    This account should be used to pursue new or unexpected
    technologies, react to unforeseen requirements, etc.  Such
    a funding mechanism is becoming increasingly critical as
    technology turnover times decrease. CMO should have the
    specific authorized ability to direct funding against, or to
    pursue such promising technologies or R&D efforts (without
    penalty for those technologies/or scientific breakthroughs
    that do not bear fruit).  This authority needs to be
    analogous to a capital venturer.  

    5)  As with the "tactical" systems, CMO should have direct
    insight and influence over Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
    efforts -- most specifically on the intelligence related
    issues.  There is a great potential to more closely
    coordinate efforts and provide a more cohesive national
    defense.  A CMO specialist should be assigned to
    organizations working WMD programs to improve the cross-flow
    of information on current and planned
    capabilities/operations.  Barring this, CMO should be a
    formal invitee to any/all discussions that focus on this
    area. 

    6)  Bistatics (RF) need more attention.  Bistatic RF
    solutions are poorly understood/appreciated within the
    traditional disciplines.  This area needs more study and
    resources put against it.  Bistatic solutions provide a
    unique opportunity to provide real-time NCTI and for
    reducing friendly fire losses.  

    7)  CMO needs a continuous, broad review of all government,
    and to the extent possible, commercial developments to
    determine the most logical and cost effective MASINT
    potentials.  

    8)  The community must maintain proper emphasis on both SMO
    and "non-SMO" aspects of collection and analysis.  The often
    more sophisticated and difficult processes of intelligence
    collection and processing for detailed knowledge of weapons
    systems, material content, molecular compositions, etc.,
    require markedly different sensors and techniques which the
    IC must pursue.  Such collection and analysis capabilities
    cannot be overemphasized.  It is these techniques that
    provide the knowledge base for developing the battlefield
    SMO systems.  

    9)  Promising technologies which need current and future
    emphasis include:  

      a.   Target signature data bases.  These data bases
      will be the future "targeting systems" for smart/brilliant
      weapons.  These data bases will also provide the potential
      "countermeasures knowledge" for development of future
      defensive systems.  These data bases need improvement and
      application (and perhaps maintenance) at the "shooter"
      level.

      b.   Continual, coordinated sensor development (as
      science and technology advances) in space, air ,sea, and
      ground.  There is a need to ensure all developments --
      whether they are "intelligence" or "operations," and
      despite the medium in which they are intended to be
      employed, are coordinated to determine their information
      production potentials.   

      c.   Refined signal processing that is applicable to
      all intelligence disciplines.  Technology advances that
      are worked in one area of the IC must be shared throughout
      the community.  Far too often an agency or organization
      creates a collection or processing technique or capability
      that has much potential for other in the IC.  There needs
      to be a vehicle whereby such developments can be shared. 

      d.   Multi-sensor/data integration between diverse
      intelligence disciplines and within disciplines.  Again,
      there is much to be gained from synergistic collection and
      analysis.  This must become the "business norm" throughout
      the IC.  

      e.   Wide area surveillance technologies employing
      target signature identification methods.  Such
      technologies hold the promise of improving automated
      recognition algorithms for improving analyst productivity.

      f.  MASINT system direct integration with other
      intelligence collection and operational (warfighting)
      sensors.  Again, the concepts of multi-discipline
      intelligence analysis and the immediate (tactical) use of
      such available information will be crucial to future needs
      satisfaction.

      g.  Multi-spectral signatures.  Current and future
      generations of smart weapons; Theater Ballistic Missile
      Defense (TBMD), including SCUD hunting, will need improved
      specific signature identification (data bases) for target
      weapon systems.  This can be done via a number of
      signature specifics such as acoustic, seismic, thermal and
      RF emanations.  There is a need to integrate such
      information data bases into U.S. weapons systems.  

      h.  MASINT support to Information Warfare.  Intelligence
      support to Information Warfare (IW) is a growing field. 
      The potential utilities of MASINT systems need to be
      studied and evaluated for their IW potential.  

  F.  "Although the CMO has the necessary legal authorities, it
  is not properly staffed commensurate with its responsibilities. 
  Additionally, a fractured organizational structure provides
  little to no focused MASINT management, budgeting oversight,
  tasking control, or coordination of effort.  This may
  potentially cause inefficient expenditures of resources and
  duplicative developments."

    1)  As stated earlier, MASINT as a discipline was created in
    1986, with attendant start up of the MASINT Committee. 
    Three directives provide guidance relative to the MASINT
    discipline.  Specifically, the DCI Directive 2/11 gives CMO
    the authorities to provide for the "common concern (re:
    MASINT) on behalf of the Intelligence Community."  The
    Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5105.21, as amended,
    empowers the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) with the
    conduct of MASINT, and DoD Directive 5105.58 provides the
    CMO with authorities for MASINT within DIA.  These
    directives proscribe specific responsibilities (for CMO) and
    MASINT management duties.  Some of these duties include:
    providing direct and advisory tasking; developing MASINT
    policy; coordinating plans and architectures; and
    programming and budgeting.  However, CMO's authority does
    not expressly extend to the use of CIA human intelligence
    assets for the collection and analysis of MASINT.  

          When first created, the CMO worked (organizationally)
    directly for the Director, DIA as the executive agency for
    MASINT.  As a result of several DIA reorganizations, CMO's
    position within DIA has moved to within the Collections
    branch, organizationally subordinate to the National
    Military Intelligence Collection Center (NMICC).  However,
    the GDIP Staff, which is directly subordinate to the
    Director of Military Intelligence Staff and which is not
    directly in the CMO's chain of command, has a direct
    influence on the CMO's authorities.  Specifically, the GDIP
    Manager, who is responsible for recommending GDIP resources
    for inclusion in or exclusion from the President's budget,
    orchestrates the budget process, allocates fiscal guidance,
    directs reductions and reallocations, and approves the GDIP
    budget.  The GDIP Manager is assisted by three Defense
    Intelligence Functional Managers (FMs) for Collection,
    Processing, and Infrastructure.  These FMs are charged with
    the preparation, supervision, and monitoring of GDIP
    programs and budgets within their areas of responsibility. 
    The Director of the NMICC is also the GDIP FM for
    Collection.  This puts the Collection FM and management
    staff directly above the CMO in the current organizational
    structure to represent MASINT and other
    disciplines/functions.   This organizational construct
    limits CMO's actual influence over MASINT system
    development, tasking/operations, and programmatics.  The
    MASINT Panel participants unanimously voiced opinions that
    the CMO is virtually powerless to direct and coordinate the
    MASINT effort.  Additionally, CMO only has direct control
    over approximately 1/4 of the total MASINT funding./4/  The
    remainder is within the service and agency accounts.  (It
    should be noted that much of this remainder pays for systems
    that not strictly MASINT systems or operations - therefore,
    much of this should not be the purview of the CMO.)

    2)  The CMO has true functional management over only those
    MASINT funds within the GDIP.  Because CMO is a management
    organization, most of its funds are actually obligated by
    the Services or Agencies.  For example, 84% of the GDIP
    MASINT funding is obligated by USAF (this equates to 30% of
    the USAF's GDIP TOA), and USAF provides 93% of the manpower./5/
    These are important statistics in light of previous
    recommendations.  Further, some respondents stated that
    CMO's direct authority over GDIP-only funds tends to focus
    CMO's efforts on GDIP issues.  That is, CIAP and other
    (TIARA) programs do not get proper CMO attention because CMO
    does not have insight or leverage into these programs (the
    "Golden Rule" applies - "he who owns the gold rules"). 
    Therefore, such programs may suffer a lack of community-wide
    direction.  CMO needs insight into all "national" (CIAP) and
    "tactical" (TIARA) systems, missions and developments.  

    3)  The CMO's Mission Area Assessment identifies, as a
    critical need characteristic for future MASINT systems, a
    centralized/coordinated direction and oversight./6/  Under the
    current construct, the Services and Agencies have control of
    over 75% of all MASINT resources./7/  CMO has no direct control
    or oversight of these resources, rightfully so in some
    cases.  But the fact remains, the CMO's ability to provide
    quality centralized management is hampered by organizational
    and budgetary barriers.  

    4)  There is "no one in charge" of MASINT.  An in-depth
    review of the MASINT "chain of command" reveals that it is
    difficult, if not impossible, to find a congruent chain of
    command for the MASINT "system of systems."  That is, there
    is no continuous chain of responsibility flowing from the
    Director, DIA, through Director CMO to the
    Services/Agencies, to the collection systems, to the users
    and back.  Despite the official DCI and DoD responsibilities
    and authorities assigned to the CMO, very little authority
    is actually applied in reality.  This can be directly
    attributed to the fractured chain of command, limited CMO
    manning, and organizational construct under DIA  denies CMO
    from  providing a real community leadership role.  CMO must
    actually assume the authorities (with additional billets
    described later) which it has been charged. 

    5)  The Director, DIA -- not the Director, CMO -- is the
    real spokesman for MASINT at the Military Intelligence Board
    (MIB).  This contrasts unfavorably with the Director, NSA
    and the Director, CIO, who are the (logical) spokespersons
    for their technical disciplines.  The panel voiced concern
    that the Director, DIA is often forced to "choose" between
    MASINT issues and all other issues without having the
    technical expertise in the MASINT area.  As an example,
    although budget cuts are worked in a formal process, MASINT
    R&D is considered by some as the GDIP budget's "soft
    underbelly," liable to be the first to take funding cuts
    (before, say, operational systems or manpower billets).  It
    was acknowledged that some of the R&D cuts are due to poor
    execution of funds -- although execution rate determinates
    can be misleading.  Nonetheless, CMO should have the real
    voice in MASINT matters to ensure that balanced,
    well-considered, logical decisions are made.

    6)  With specific regard to the budgeting process, because
    the DIA GDIP Management Staff has significant authority in
    the current organizational structure over CMO,  some
    respondents criticized that policy decisions often that do
    not reflect the professional thinking within the CMO. 
    Additionally, since DIA is not an acquisition organization,
    CMO must transfer allocated funds to the services to work
    specific technology issues.  This is done through the DIA
    comptroller.  The process is slow and cumbersome, and does
    not provide the CMO the flexibility they need to ensure
    thoughtful technologies and reactive operations.  Finally,
    because CMO's R&D budget must use the GDIP budgeting
    accounting process, obligation rates often lag behind the
    established "norms."  Accordingly, these funds can be easily
    targeted for reduction even though their need is real.  

    7)  Because of prior position cuts, until very recently, the
    CMO has been left without the necessary leadership (General
    officer or SES-level) that has the real authority to
    coordinate the MASINT community.  

    8)  Based on panel respondent estimates, the CMO is
    understaffed, both in real terms based on current billets
    authorizations, and based on real need.  Currently, the CMO
    is authorized 30 DIA billets -- 27 of which are filled; 6
    CIA billets -- 5 of which are filled; 2 each Army and Navy
    billets - none of which are filled; 1 Air Force SES position
    -- the individual for this position was just recently hired;
    and 15 officer billets for the Consolidated MASINT Technical
    Collection Office (CMTCO) -- 14 of which are filled./8/)
    Although a specific number needs refined analysis, several
    respondents discussed numbers of approximately 75-100
    authorized CMO billets as being more in line with the tasked
    mission of the office.  The current limitation of people
    relegates the CMO into an organization that is reactive in
    nature and "bound by the in-box."  Additionally, CMO is not
    manned or postured to do material development.  This
    development, in most cases, should be, and remains, the
    purview of the Services and Agencies.  However, CMO should
    have oversight and coordination authorities for these
    programs.  Additionally, partly because of size and IC
    organizational structure, CMO is not aware of all
    MASINT-related programs conducted throughout the USG.  This
    is particularly true of multi-, hyper- and ultra-spectral
    sensing being pursued by various agencies.

    9)  The MASINT Committee and its subcommittees (which
    predate the CMO) exist primarily as a means of cross-flowing
    information between agencies and services.  This committee
    is analogous to the SIGINT committee.  Several participants
    questioned whether these committees (and subcommittees) are
    only necessary because CMO is not properly sized/staffed to
    meet its responsibilities./9/  However, a number of respondents
    stated these committees are extremely useful and should be
    maintained.

    Findings/Recommendations 

    10)  The Director, Central MASINT Office has the necessary
    legal authority to carry out the functions of a coordinated
    MASINT program.  However, because of a lack of personnel,
    grade and organizational structure, the Director, CMO does
    not have the real authority to carry out his/her
    responsibilities.  To ensure community-wide coordination of
    efforts, CMO's charter under DCID 2/11-1 should specifically
    include the management oversight of all MASINT budget builds
    including CIA MASINT programs.  This charter should also
    provide the Director, CMO the authority to "determine" the
    systems are or can be a MASINT contributors.  This would be
    to determine what systems could provide MASINT collection,
    and which could be logically managed within the MASINT
    program."  This CMO authority concept may not be well
    received by the Services and Agencies, but is actually CMO's
    assigned task today.  

    11)  The Director of CMO needs to be a General Officer or
    SES-level position, with not only the statutory or executive
    order authority to be the spokesman for, but the real
    authority for MASINT, as is the Director, NSA for SIGINT. 
    The Director, DIA has recently hired a new SES as the
    Director, CMO.  As of the writing of this report, any new
    titles/responsibilities/authorities to be granted this
    person are unknown.  However, the Director CMO, needs to be
    a permanent member of the MIB, NFIB and other senior DCI and
    DoD boards/panels as the representative for MASINT.  His
    authority to establish MASINT community direction,
    standards, etc, should be on par with those of Director, NSA
    and Director, CIO (or the new NIMA).  Director, CMO should
    also be a formal member of a senior steering committee that
    can vet MASINT issues applicable to the entire IC.  (The
    Intelligence Community  Management staff study recommends a
    construct for this to occur.) 

    12)  A MASINT management reorganization will be painful, but
    is necessary to ensure the viability of this critical future
    discipline.  Such a reorganization should focus on joint
    units, offices, and organizations.  Such an organization
    should be within the TCA (see the Intelligence Community
    Management staff study).  Specifically, MASINT management
    requires a "stand alone" capability like that of NSA -
    though all would agree, not the size.  This should requires
    the equivalent of a U.S. MASINT System (USMS) like the U.S.
    SIGINT System or the U.S. Imagery System.  If there is no
    consolidation of the IC structure (i.e. a TCA) the CMO may
    need to be an organization independent of the DIA structure,
    but not necessarily independent of the Director, DIA.  For
    "care and feeding" purposes, the CMO can continue to exist
    within DIA, but must be an organization that reports
    directly to the Director, DIA, not the staff elements of
    DIA.  Additionally, the CMO must have the authority to use
    existing (DIA) budgeting organizations (on an "outsourcing
    basis") to facilitate their obligation and transfer of funds
    as necessary.  CMO could also be organized outside of DIA
    directly responsible to the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
    Command Control Communications and Intelligence.  In either
    case, CMO needs to be responsible for all USG MASINT efforts
    (just like NSA is for SIGINT), and responsible to the DCI
    and SECDEF for satisfaction of MASINT information needs.  In
    either case, the CMO must be given the real authority to
    take on the responsibilities laid out in existing charter. 

    13)  The CMO should be given the NSA-equivalent of the
    "SIGINT seal of approval."  (Under the TCA construct, this
    becomes a mute issue.)  That is, CMO should be given a U.S.
    MASINT System (USMS) lead status with the ability to provide
    real guidance relative to programming, research and
    development, standards, tasking and operations.  CMO should
    have more authority over service and agency developments and
    acquisitions (this should be a chairman of the board
    construct).  This is not to undermine service/agency Title
    10 authorities, but rather to provide a coordinated approach
    to resource expenditures.  Again, this may not be well
    received by the services/agencies, but is actually CMO's
    assigned task today.  In conjunction with, and through the
    authority of the DDCI/CM's Infrastructure Support
    Organization (ISO), the CMO should establish MASINT system
    standards, with the services/agencies (the consolidated NRO)
    developing the material solutions.  

    14)  Increase the size of the CMO.  A specific number needs
    further analysis, however, respondents argue that a staff of
    at least 75-100 people is needed.  This number is based on
    an independent (e.g. no TCA) organization.  Refined numbers
    for a division within the TCA will have to be determined. 
    However, a TBD percentage of these billets should be
    military, with the services providing their experts to the
    organization.  In the joint environment, the Director, CMO
    needs to facilitate the "cross-pollination" of services,
    organizations, and agencies to ensure the long term needs of
    customers can best be satisfied.  Additionally, the CMO
    should have representatives assigned to the theater CINCs
    just as does NSA, DoD HUMINT, etc. 

    15)  The role of the MASINT Committee should be further
    reviewed for adequacy/need.  Most study participants voiced
    a good deal of support for the MASINT Committee, stating
    that it provides a useful forum for the Agencies and
    Services to voice their concerns, opinions and positions as
    (CMO) policy decisions are developed.  They believe this
    allows for infusion of some much needed objectivity into the
    MASINT decision process.  However, there is a question of
    what the Committee's true charter is, particularly when
    viewed in the light of a stronger, more robust (also read:
    joint) CMO.  There is no readily apparent savings or added
    value to dissolving the MASINT Committee, but the committee
    construct as a whole should be viewed for future relevancy. 

    16)  CMO must be able to state and maintain the necessary
    management positions (both popular and unpopular) relative
    to MASINT budget/programmatic recommendations and decisions. 
    Such decision must be further incorporated within the CMS
    budget process (again, see the Intelligence Community
    Management staff study for further discussion).  Such
    coordinated budgeting can only happen if CMO is given and
    takes more direct control of the entire MASINT effort from
    budget through policy formulation.  

Additional Thoughts

  A.  MASINT is a science-intensive discipline.  Its one true
  characteristic is the need for practitioners well-versed in the
  broad range of physical and electrical sciences.  These people
  cannot be honed from military service schools in one or two
  years.  These people need to come from academia fresh with the
  scientific knowledge from experimentation and research.  Nor
  can they continue to be "proficient" in their areas of
  expertise if they are maintained in government employ for an
  entire career.  Such scientists must have portability.  That
  is, they must be able to leave government employment and rejoin
  the ranks of academics in order to maintain their scientific
  knowledge.  The IC needs the personnel equivalent of commercial
  off-the-shelf technology (COTS).  As part of the overall IC
  management initiatives, we discussed examining the feasibility
  of pursuing trial personnel management programs that provide
  incentives to recruit the necessary scientific experts for the
  IC's needs.  Such programs need to be pursued with the full
  understanding that such experts may not spend a 20-30 year
  career in government employment.  The Committee recognizes the
  magnitude of such a proposal, and stops short of attempting to
  enact this recommendation into law.  However, the we believe
  plans, such as limited government pensions, movement of private
  pensions and savings plans into (and out of) the federal
  retirement plans,  bonuses, etc., hold the promise of helping
  to ensure the Community can retain these experts for national
  service.  We also believe there is a need to address the issue
  of being able to rehire retired military experts.  Although
  costly, the returns in terms scientific knowledge would be well
  worth the investment.

  B.  For intelligence collection/support systems, there is a
  continuum that runs from those systems that provide pure
  intelligence collection and those that provide pure operational
  (i.e., SMO) support.  In reality, all U.S. IC systems fall
  within the two extremes.  There is a need to "plot" where
  individual systems fall, determine the IC strengths, its
  weaknesses (the holes) and use existing systems to cover the
  holes before setting off to build new systems or capabilities. 

  C.  The intent of this report is not to "oversell" MASINT,
  but rather to call attention to some areas of concern,
  weakness, and, in fact, strengths.  MASINT is not the most
  critical intelligence source for U.S. customers today. 
  However, for any one particular incident or collection
  opportunity, no discipline always is.  True all-source
  collection and analysis is critical.  This report does try to
  emphasize that MASINT is a critical discipline that has the
  unique potential of being more so in the future.  MASINT
  provides information that other sources cannot.  This is not
  to say it is specifically a niche field, but can satisfy niche
  requirements.   

  D.  The group identified (via various inputs) some recurring
  thoughts that would identify the MASINT system's greatest
  needs.  These deserve reiterating:

         -    Educate people on what MASINT is and is not.

         -    MASINT can be used for immediate battlefield survival
              (tactical support).

         -    MASINT information is critical for national information
              needs (national survival) by providing information on the
              weapons of mass destruction and chemical and biological
              proliferation/use.  There is a need to more clearly tie
              CMO's structure into the "national" (CIA) structure.  

         -    Smart/brilliant weapons will, increasingly, depend on
              MASINT information.

         -    MASINT development must be focused on sensor to shooter
              and sensor to seeker head.

         -    MASINT provides the potential for unambiguous
              discrimination for identification of friend and foe (for
              preventing fratricide).

         -    Underground targets will be a future because of U.S.
              successes in DESERT STORM.  This will add to the
              importance of MASINT exploitation.

         -    Requirements:  there is a need for a "National MASINT
              Requirements Tasking Center" similar to the National
              HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center (NHRTC)."

         -    The services are justifiably concerned that any
              management/organizational changes may adversely affect
              warfighting capabilities.  Any changes resulting from
              IC-21 must factor those concerns, and a proper balance of
              centralized management/coordination versus operational
              needs must be found.

         -    There is absolute need for tasking and planning
              interactions between all players for all planning, R&D,
              system development, tasking, employment, etc.

         -    There needs to be a joint collection manager MOS/AFSC
              within the services, or, at a minimum, there needs to be
              an effective training block/course for all personnel
              assigned to work in collection management positions.  How
              can we develop an JCMT without it?

Conclusion

         There are a number of varied thoughts relative to the future
of MASINT.  Whether it remains a specifically-named intelligence
discipline or not is less important than ensuring the viability of
the technically and scientifically derived information from the
many collection sources.  User knowledge and insight as to what
the MASINT product can provide for the future battlefield or for
national objectives is imperative.  Strong leadership is necessary
to steer this "intelligence discipline of the future" into the
next century.





                    ------------------------------

                               FOOTNOTES

     /1/MASINT panel #3 discussions; individual responses to MASINT
questionnaire

     /2/MASINT Panel #1, #2, and #3 discussions and individual
interviews.

     /3/Panel respondents, MASINT panel # 1, 2 and 3 discussions.

     /4/MASINT Panel #2 and #3 discussions, and with CMO

     /5/USAF MASINT briefing

     /6/MASINT 2010, Planning the U.S. MASINT System for the 21st
Century

     /7/MASINT panel #2 and #3, discussion with acting Director, CMO,
Mr. Jim Fahnestock

     /8/CMO figures.

     /9/MASINT panels 1, 2, and 3 and personal interviews.


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