



Counterproliferation at Ten

*Transforming the Fight Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction*

8-9 December 2003

International Cooperation in Counterproliferation: The Proliferation Security Initiative and Beyond

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Some Thoughts on International Counterproliferation Cooperation

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The views herein are those of the author not necessarily those of SAIC or any of its sponsoring organizations

Overview

- **A definition**
- **Three slices into the issue – with reference to Southwest Asia but . . .**
 - **The traditional**
 - **The heretical**
 - **The revolutionary**
- **A closing remark**

A working definition of international counterproliferation cooperation

- **Fullest range of potential cooperative actions**
 - **Whether bilateral or multilateral,**
 - **Formal or informal,**
 - **Political, military, economic, social, and other**
 - **Aimed at containing the threat of nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons,**
 - **Whether by states, non-state organizations and actors, or non-state organizations and actors with the support of states**

The “Traditional”

- Since 1990s, U.S. working with allies and friends to enhance chem-bio-RDD defense capabilities
 - Both of military forces and of consequence management
 - E.g., Cooperative Defense Initiative in CENTCOM AOR
- Incremental process that needs to continue
 - **With particular focus on cooperation to protect populations from use of WMD – by states, by non-states**
 - **More can and needs to be done cooperatively**
- Why?
 - Eliminate alliance vulnerability
 - Humanitarian reasons
 - Contain global spillover and “me too” effect once CB used by a terrorist group – send opposite signal
 - Provide greater freedom of action to U.S. decision-makers

The “Heretical”

- Oft-remarked that greatest threat to U.S. and global security is access to nuclear weapon by a terrorist group
- **My “scariest scenario”** remains – Pakistan falls to some combination of al Qaeda, the Taliban remnants, internal radical Islamic forces
- Counterproliferation cooperation needs to include:
 - Working with Pakistan government to ensure most effective possible controls on its nuclear weapons
 - Working with other countries to strengthen internal stability in Pakistan
 - Working with other countries for a stable Afghanistan
 - Working with other countries to be prepared to act **if Pakistani nuclear weapons are about to fall into unfriendly hands**

The “Revolutionary”

- Create an **enforceable international taboo against the first use of WMD** -- by a state or a terrorist group
 - Or support for such use by a non-state group
- What: “all hands” will be against the first-user – state or terrorist and state-supporters
- How to respond: everything on the table – as long as proportional to the outrage
- How to pursue: build to a UN Security Council undertaking
- What’s Lost: hypothetical but illusory U.S. right to first use of nuclear weapons
- What’s gained: **strengthened deterrence against use**
 - And should that fail, heightened prospect of decisive global response – *to send the right message to all onlookers*
 - Or **increased legitimacy for U.S. response**

Counterproliferation is too important to be left only to the counterproliferation community

Preventing proliferation is too important to be left only to the non-proliferation community

Rather with “Counterproliferation at Ten”, it’s time to begin taking an integrated approach that blends all available tools to prevent or contain the threat of WMD proliferation or use

– and be prepared to look again at each community’s long-held beliefs