CHAPTER 10

The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries

Alexander L. George

This analysis begins with a discussion of problems of employing deterrence and coercive diplomacy in intra-state conflicts, drawing on those aspects of experience with these strategies during the Cold War relevant for dealing with intra-state conflicts, and adding some reflections on problems of employing these strategies in the post-Cold War environment.

The special characteristics of intra-state conflicts, identified in this analysis, call attention to the need for several types of indirect deterrence and coercive diplomacy. Emphasis is placed on including deterrence and coercive diplomacy within a broader influence framework that considers the utility and sometimes the necessity for coupling these strategies with positive initiatives.

Influence theory also requires that consideration be given to the role of reassurances to adversaries under several well-defined circumstances. An influence framework must also consider the possible utility of a strategy of conciliation (a term preferable to the discredited concept of appeasement). Similarly, the concept of influence theory also includes the strategy of conditional reciprocity, which limits risks of conciliatory efforts and which, also, can be employed in pursuing the ambitious long-range objective of re-socializing “rogue” leaders and “outlaw” states.

Attention is given in this analysis also to the problem of dealing with “spoilers” in intra-state conflicts, those who complicate or attempt to defeat efforts by mediators to end such struggles. The efforts of mediators will be facilitated if they distinguish between different types of spoilers.

* Helpful comments on an earlier draft were provided by Barry Schneider and Brad Roberts.
and devise strategies appropriate for dealing with each type. This is followed with a discussion of a basic requirement for effective use of all the above strategies, namely the need to replace the simplistic assumption that adversaries are “rational, unitary” actors with more specific “actor-specific behavioral models” essential for understanding and attempting to influence different adversaries.

Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: Some Lessons of Experience

From an early stage in the Cold War it became evident that the theory and practice of deterrence and coercive diplomacy should be incorporated into a broader theory of influence. Experience indicated that reliance on deterrence alone was not a substitute for a more rounded and well-conceptualized foreign policy towards adversary states. Deterrence was often a necessary part of foreign policy, but it was not a sufficient basis for dealing with many adversary states or for all situations with a particular adversary. Similarly, reliance exclusively on deterrence as the handmaiden of containment could not suffice. The originator of containment policy towards the Soviet Union, George Kennan, emphasized the need for utilizing positive measures as well as negative measures to reinforce containment.

Deterrence and coercive diplomacy are better conceived as parts of a broader influence theory, one that may often combine threats in some way with positive inducements and with other diplomatic efforts, to be discussed later in detail, to explore the possibility and feasibility of moving towards mutually acceptable ways of reducing the potential for conflict in relations with an adversary.

To do so, as will be indicated in our discussion of the need for “actor-specific” models, requires understanding the adversary’s motives, needs, and goals. This is necessary not only to ascertain whether, how, and what kind of a deterrence, coercion, or accommodation may be possible, but also to assure that the effort to make use of positive incentives to influence the adversary will not degenerate into appeasement. (A discussion of appeasement, or “conciliation” as it might be better designated, will be addressed later.)

Viewed from this perspective, deterrence is often best viewed as a time-buying strategy, one that creates or awaits opportunities to explore
and possibly achieve at least a partial accommodation of interests and at least a substantial reduction of the danger of war.

Unfortunately, deterrence is not always easily achieved when conducting foreign policy even in situations in which it is most needed. There are several sobering examples of the failure of the United States to assert effective deterrence despite substantial warning that an attack might be in the works. Indeed, America’s failure in 1950 to attempt to deter North Korea from attacking South Korea and its inability to mount a strong deterrent effort against Saddam Hussein before he attacked Kuwait in 1990 exemplify a disturbing paradox. The United States responded to these two aggressions with strong military action. However, what the U.S. was willing and able to do after the attacks, it was not able for various reasons to threaten to do beforehand.2

Timely reassessment of existing deterrence commitments or reconsidering the absence of such commitments, are necessary to take account of changes in the situation, in the adversary’s intentions, and with regard to supplementing deterrence with other means of influencing the adversary. The assessment should consider emerging situations – as in U.S. policy in the months prior to the North Korean attack on South Korea – to ascertain whether a deterrence commitment, thus far lacking, should be made.

Experience with efforts to employ coercive diplomacy during the Cold War and thereafter also led to recognition that it, too, should be incorporated into a broad theory of influence. Comparative study of past efforts to employ coercive diplomacy indicates that it is risky to rely solely on threats of punishment for noncompliance with one’s demands and that offering positive incentives as well may be of critical importance. Using a “carrot and stick” approach – as President Kennedy did in the Cuban Missile Crisis and as the United States did in developing the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea – may increase the possibility of a mutually acceptable, peaceful resolution of a war-threatening crisis.

Coercive diplomacy is best viewed as a flexible strategy in which what the stick cannot, or is not likely to achieve by itself, can possibly be obtained by adding an appropriate carrot.

In both deterrence and coercive diplomacy, the offer of conditional, positive inducements must, as with threats, be credible and sufficiently potent to influence the adversary.3
It must be emphasized that offering positive incentives to an adversary, as well as threats, is highly context dependent in both deterrence and coercive diplomacy. There can be no assurance that a combination of carrot and stick will be effective. The outcome depends on many characteristics of the two actors, the nature of the conflict between them, how well carrots and sticks are chosen and employed, and situational variables. For example, if important divisions exist in the leadership group of the adversary, a carrot and stick approach may encourage those leaders who favor some kind of settlement. When important domestic constituents of the leadership of the adversary state favor termination of the crisis, their views and actions may become more influential on decisions if their state is offered carrots as well as sticks.

**Indirect Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy**

The conventional way of attempting to achieve successful deterrence or coercive diplomacy is to attempt to persuade leaders of an adversary state to desist or to comply with demands. This may be characterized as direct deterrence and coercive diplomacy. Most efforts to employ these strategies during the Cold War were direct efforts of this kind. Direct deterrence continues to have a role to play in post-Cold War crises as well.

However, intra-state conflicts have assumed greater prominence in the post-Cold War period. Direct deterrence is less likely to be effective in intra-state conflicts and against non-state actors. This is especially so, as we have learned, against terrorists and suicide bombers, especially those who regard conflict as a zero-sum conflict and who feel they have no other strategies available.

Against such non-state actors and participants in internal conflicts within a state, more attention needs to be given to the possibility of indirect modes of deterrence and coercive diplomacy.

In conventional deterrence and coercive diplomacy, the aim is to persuade the leaders of an adversary state that the costs and risks of a contemplated action or one already underway will outweigh its expected benefits. In contrast to direct deterrence and coercive diplomacy, three indirect forms of these strategies are available for attempting to influence
the leaders of a weak state whose freedom of action and “rational” decision-making are limited. Namely:

1. An attempt may be made to influence the behavior of leaders in a weak state indirectly through a third party which has some influence with those leaders.

2. Indirect deterrence or coercive diplomacy may be exercised by attempting to strengthen the hand of moderates in a divided leadership in the target state.

3. Indirect deterrence or coercive diplomacy may be exercised by encouraging important constituents of the opposing regime to put pressure on their leaders.

Reassurance

It will be helpful at this point to consider whether an alternative strategy of influence, namely reassurance, can be helpful. In judging whether resort to deterrence or coercive diplomacy is appropriate in a particular situation, consideration should be given to trying to reassure the adversary that one is not contemplating actions harmful to its interests.

What can one say on the basis of past experience as to when a strategy of reassurance is preferable to exerting deterrence or using coercive diplomacy? President Harry Truman placed misguided reliance on giving the Peoples Republic of China reassurances of historical U.S. friendship and non-hostile intentions in response to Chinese threats to intervene in the Korean War if U.S. forces went beyond the 38th parallel in pursuit of the retreating North Korean forces. Truman mistakenly relied on reassurances instead of using threats to attempt to deter Chinese entry into the war. Similarly, in 1990 when it appeared that Saddam Hussein might be getting ready to invade Kuwait, President Bush attempted to combine reassurance with deterrence. His administration was able to mount only a very weak deterrence effort, the efficacy of which was further diluted by the effort to assure Saddam Hussein of a United States desire to continue the policy of peaceful relations.
There is a need for more systematic analysis of the conditions and modalities for choosing between deterrence and reassurance, or combining them in an optimal manner. A hypothesis has been advanced that reassurance of some kind might be more appropriate than deterrence when the adversary’s motivation for possibly taking a hostile action is defensive and stems from a sense of weakness, vulnerability, or mistaken concern that hostile actions are about to be directed towards it. An example of effective, appropriate reassurance is that given to the Chinese by the Kennedy administration when Chinese leaders mistakenly believed that the U.S. was preparing hostile action. Clarifying for a concerned opponent that one’s actions are not preparation for hostile action has a rich history in international relations.

Conversely, another hypothesis holds that deterrence is more appropriate than reassurance when the adversary’s motivation to undertake a hostile action is derived not from an undue, unwarranted preoccupation with threats directed towards it or a pervasive sense of vulnerability, but, rather, from a belief that an opportunity is available for gain or aggrandizement at acceptable cost and risk. A correct image of the opponent and good intelligence is needed to distinguish between the need for deterrence or for reassurance, and for sensitivity to the possibility that elements of both are appropriate in some situations.

**Conciliation as a Strategy for Resolution or Avoidance of Conflict**

Appeasement was a familiar strategy that was often employed in the era of classical diplomacy. It acquired a highly invidious connotation in the Western world as a result of Chamberlain’s abortive effort to appease and re-socialize Hitler into becoming a responsible member of the European state system.

The classic definition of appeasement is a simple one. In the language of diplomacy employed in the European balance-of-power system, appeasement referred to a policy of attempting to reduce tension between two states by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict between them. In this sense, appeasement was regarded as a strategy for eliminating the potential for war in a conflict-ridden relationship between two states.  

276
In contemporary writings on conflict resolution, the terms *conciliation* and *accommodation* are often employed instead of *appeasement*. The latter term has acquired such a bad odor that specialists who write on these matters seem to gingerly steer clear of it.

It is important to recognize that there are a number of significantly different goals and strategies in which some form of conciliation can be employed. Thus, as Stephen Rock notes, conciliation can be (1) a short-term strategy aimed at crisis resolution; (2) a longer-term strategy aimed at crisis prevention; (3) a short-term effort to secure a limited political trade; and (4) a long-term strategy for a significant alteration of the status quo that may lead the two parties into a more peaceful relationship. Thus, different motivations and goals may lead a state to adopt some kind of conciliatory strategy and, indeed, such a policy may have both a minimum short-term goal as well as a longer-range one. Preserving a favorable balance of power was often a principal aim of opposing states employing conciliation earlier in history, but this is not the only goal that can be pursued.

Resort to conciliation does not exclude the possibility, or the desirability, of combining it with deterrent threats in a mixed influence strategy. Whatever the goal and variant of conciliation, it falls under the general umbrella of influence strategy. It should be recognized that when conciliation is part of a mixed influence strategy it can overlap with the strategy of “conditional reciprocity,” to which we will turn shortly.

Actor-specific knowledge is of critical importance in determining whether conciliation of an adversary should be considered. In assessing its possible relevance, attention should be given to three factors: the adversary’s motives and the extent of his desires; the nature of inducements, if any, that can be offered to opponents with different motives; and reasons other than inducements offered that may impel the target to accept or reject the offers. Taking account of these three factors will have important implications for whether and what kind of conciliation is offered.6

Policymakers may consider a strategy of conciliation when confronted by (1) a *revisionist* opponent who advances what it believes are legitimate claims for a change in a status quo situation, (2) an aggressive *expansionist* adversary, or (3) an opponent who is both revisionist and expansionist.

Policymakers must have a correct image of the opponent, his intentions, aspirations, and behavioral style to differentiate among these three situations, but ascertaining the true character of the opponent may be
difficult. In addition to trying to determine whether the adversary is revisionist or expansionist or both, it is important to decide whether one is dealing with an outlaw state whose leaders essentially reject the norms and practices of the international system and are disposed to behave in ways that will undermine the order and stability of the system. Conciliation of such actors is neither desirable nor feasible, given their destructive orientation to the existing international system.⁷

On the other hand, when the adversary is not an outlaw but advances either revisionist or expansionist claims, the basic policy choices are conciliation, deterrence, or some combination of the two. Conciliation need not and often should not attempt to satisfy all of the revisionist or expansionist aims of the other party in a single grand settlement. It may be preferable and less risky to implement conciliation in a careful, incremental fashion. It can be incorporated into a strategy of incremental conditional reciprocity by means of which one secures at each stage compensating concessions or assurances of one kind or another from the adversary.

Until recently, systematic research on past efforts to employ conciliation has been lacking. A major comparative study is now available which compares cases of successful and ineffective efforts to conciliate opponents and provides useful guidelines.⁸ This enables us to formulate a number of questions when deciding between conciliation and deterrence (or some combination of the two) in the face of demands for a change in the status quo.

1. Are the adversary’s objectives revisionist or expansionist? If expansionist, are they perhaps legitimate and of a limited, acceptable character?

2. Will the adversary view concessions as evidence of goodwill, friendship, and recognition of the legitimacy of his revisionist claims, or as evidence of irresolution and weakness and therefore tempt him to seek greater gain?

3. Can the adversary be conciliated in such a way as to avoid giving the impression at home and abroad that one has yielded to blackmail? Will conciliating the adversary result in serious damage to one’s reputation in the eyes of other states and encourage them to advance revisionist or expansionist demands of their own?
4. How can one limit or control the various risks of conciliating another state? By drawing a line as to the extent of concessions that will be made? By appeasing individual claims incrementally? By obtaining credible formal assurances from the adversary that his demands for changes in the status quo are limited? Can tests be devised to assess the scope of the adversary’s intentions?

5. Is the expected benefit of conciliating the adversary limited to the short-term objective of avoiding a crisis or war? Or can short-term conciliation on a specific issue be built into a longer-range strategy of turning the entire conflictful relationship into a cooperative one?

6. Is reliance on deterrence instead of conciliation or coupling the two in a mixed strategy better for coping with the adversary’s hopes for a change in the status quo? Will reliance solely on deterrence induce the adversary to give up hopes and efforts for changing the status quo in the future? Or will it only strengthen his motivation and lead him to prepare for challenging deterrence more effectively in the future? Beyond its possible psychological impact, will a change in the status quo in the adversary’s favor that is being considered significantly alter the relative power balance?

Adopting one of Stephen Rock’s suggestions, four possible situations and scenarios can be identified for analytical purposes, though it may be quite difficult for policymakers to judge which of these four possibilities correctly identifies the case at hand.

1. Either conciliation or deterrence can succeed in a given case, at least in the short run. A possible example is the Falkland Islands crisis, in which the British might have avoided the need to invade the islands and the ensuing war through either a more robust deterrence effort or timely conciliation.

2. Neither deterrence nor conciliation is likely to succeed when an adversary has hegemonic ambitions and is bent on employing military force. An example is Hitler’s determination to go to war against Poland in the autumn of 1939.
3. Only deterrence can possibly succeed, because the adversary would respond to conciliation by generating new demands. A possible example is Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler on the Sudetenland question, which did not prevent him from occupying the rest of Czechoslovakia later.

4. Only conciliation can succeed, either because the defender lacks capability or will or both to mount a robust deterrence effort or, if war breaks out, a willingness to pursue it effectively. A possible example is what Barbara Tuchman regards as England’s “missed opportunity” to appease and thereby retain its American colonies.⁹

Comparative studies of successful and unsuccessful conciliation (such as the recent one by Stephen Rock) can help identify the conditions under which it may be a viable strategy, the risks of the strategy, and ways of coping with the risks.

In sum, although the critique of appeasement is deeply ingrained in the American consciousness, largely because of the experience of the 1930s, there is no reason to believe that concessions never work, that it is impossible to satisfy a dissatisfied state or leader. Certainly, however, careful thought needs to be given to the feasibility of conciliation of various states and non-state actors. As always, the risks of conciliation in any case must be carefully weighed and ways of safeguarding or limiting them are necessary. One way of controlling such risks is the strategy of “conditional reciprocity,” to which we now turn.

**Conditional Reciprocity**¹⁰

The policy of conditional reciprocity for re-socializing outlaw states is not unfamiliar in diplomacy. An adaptation of it was employed for a less ambitious goal in the Agreed Framework of 1994 between the United States and North Korea.¹¹

Great Powers have frequently been confronted by ambitious states that are not socialized into the norms of the international system and pose a threat to its orderly workings and stability. Addressing this problem at the outset of his book, *A World Restored*, Henry Kissinger held it to be of
critical importance for the stability of the international system that all major states and their leaders hold a common concept of “legitimacy,” which he defined as “international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and method of foreign policy.” Kissinger referred to states that rejected the norms and practices of the existing international system as “revolutionary” states. "Revolutionary” or “outlaw” states differ from “revisionist” states, which seek merely to rectify the status quo and do not reject the norms and practices of the international system.

Rogue leaders and their outlaw states refuse to accept and abide by some of the most important norms and practices of the international system. Leaders of such states may seek to dominate and reshape the system to their own liking, and may aim at global or regional hegemony. Some resort to practices such as terrorism, taking as hostages citizens or official representatives of other states.

Great powers traditionally have accepted some responsibility for maintaining an orderly international system. Their incentive to find ways of coping with the threat to order by revolutionary powers, outlaw states, and rogue leaders is understandably accentuated when their own important national interests are threatened by the aims and behavior of such actors.

It should be noted, however, that there exists no clear and commonly accepted definition of an outlaw or rogue state. These concepts have no standing in international law, and the United Nations works imperfectly to single out such offenders and deal with them. In fact, members of the international community may disagree among themselves whether the behavior of a certain state justifies its being regarded as an outlaw and treated as a pariah. Even behavior that violates a particular norm may be condoned by some as an understandable way of pursuing legitimate grievances or ambitions.

Much of the task of recognizing and coping with outlaws, then, is undertaken by individual states, usually one or more of the Great Powers, which have a stake in preserving the system that they helped to create and that they subscribe to, as well as in protecting interests threatened or damaged by an outlaw. At the same time, it should be recognized that efforts by one or more states to cope with outlaws do not always win agreement and support from other states. Re-socialization of the rogue leader then becomes all the more difficult.
What strategies are available for dealing with revolutionary and outlaw states and their rogue leaders? Which strategies have been tried in the past and with what results? At present, there does not appear to be any systematic, comparative study of these questions that would provide today’s policymakers with theory and empirical knowledge of this phenomenon.

It is not difficult to make a list of possible strategies. Some of the possibilities are the following:

- Military action, coercive pressures, or covert action, or all three, to replace the outlaw regime with a more acceptable government or to eliminate its rogue leader.

- Containment, which, if pursued effectively and long enough, might help to bring about, as it did in the case of the Soviet Union, changes in ideology and the internal composition of the regime that lead to moderation in its foreign policy orientation and behavior.

- A strategy of rewards and punishments designed to bring about fundamental changes in behavior and attitudes, a form of behavior modification via diplomacy. Such a behavior modification strategy probably must be accompanied by containment that prevents the outlaw state from achieving flagrantly expansionist aims.

It should be noted that conciliation is not listed as a strategy for dealing with outlaw states. When an outlaw state not only rejects important norms of the international system, but also seeks major changes in the status quo, conciliation of even its legitimate and seemingly reasonable demands is unlikely to contribute to re-socializing it into accepting the norms of the international system. In fact, such a strategy is much more likely to reinforce the rogue leader’s ambitions and strengthen his predisposition to challenge the system.

This appeared to be the case, for example, of Saddam Hussein of Iraq, who saw concessions and conciliatory actions as signs of weakness or who, at least, had little hesitancy about attacking former allies when they did not suit his plans and ambitions.

Nevertheless, limited conciliation may have to be resorted to occasionally as a time-buying strategy for determining the true character of the adversary, strengthening one’s capabilities, or generating domestic and international support for resisting the outlaw more effectively later.
In this connection, the strategy of *conditional reciprocity*, demanding some meaningful change in policy and behavior in return for each concession or benefit, is safer and likely to be more effective than pure conciliation in achieving re-socialization in the long run. In scholarly writings, conditional reciprocity is usually treated as a tactic to be employed in negotiating a particular issue or in encouraging changes in one or more of an adversary’s policies.

Here, however, we point also to its strategic use as part of a long-range effort for bringing about fundamental change in the nature of the outlaw state and its leadership, that is, the gradual replacement of its antipathy to the norms and practices of the international system with attitudes and behavior more supportive of that system.

In other words, conditional reciprocity may be used as a lever for implementing a long-range strategy of behavior modification that has the objective of re-socializing the outlaw state and reforming its rogue leadership. At the same time, one should keep in mind that conditional reciprocity can also be used, as in developing the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea, for the lesser objective of inducing a change in the policies of another actor.

In any case, the strategy of re-socializing and the levers it employs must be conceptualized in a sophisticated way and carefully implemented. This is easier said than done, in part because we have as yet virtually no systematic analyses of past efforts of this kind.

**GRIT: Graduated Reciprocation Tension-Reduction**

Nonetheless, it is possible to differentiate the use of rewards and punishments in a strategy of re-socialization from the use of rewards and punishments in two other strategies: (1) GRIT, or graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction; and (2) “tit-for-tat,” which have different and more limited aims than the re-socialization strategy.

GRIT is not a strategy for re-socialization and reforming outlaw states. Rather, it has the much more limited aim of removing distrust between states and thereby paving the way for a relaxation of tensions. GRIT attempts to do so by taking a series of meaningful conciliatory actions, which may include concessions, carefully chosen to impress on the
adversary that one genuinely desires to bring about an improvement in the relationship. These conciliatory actions are intended to encourage the adversary to replace his distrust with a more trusting, open attitude that will result in a relaxation of tensions, thereby creating an opportunity for dealing with some of the underlying disagreements that divide the two sides.

Unlike conditional reciprocity, GRIT initiates conciliatory actions without demanding that the adversary respond to the first conciliatory action with one of his own. And in contrast to the strategy of behavior modification, which rewards the subject only after he makes the desired change in behavior, GRIT offers its conciliatory actions beforehand, to induce a change in the adversary’s perceptions and attitudes.

Given the striking differences between GRIT, conditional reciprocity, or behavior modification, policymakers have a clear choice between options that differ both in the objective sought and in the way in which they offer positive inducements for that purpose. The risks of GRIT, should it fail, are supposedly limited by choosing conciliatory actions that, though meaningful in the eyes of the adversary, do not give away anything of major importance. Further implementation of GRIT is abandoned if, after several conciliatory gestures, the adversary gives no sign of adopting a more trustful attitude and desiring to cooperate in a relaxation of tensions.16

In principle, therefore, GRIT is not to be confused with the practice of offering bribes to secure the more ambitious aim of a change in the adversary’s policies and behavior. Neither is offering a reward in advance of a change in behavior (i.e., a bribe) consistent with the principle of behavior modification. Conditional reciprocity, on the other hand, can be more flexible than behavior modification: it can encompass initiating a positive action in order to elicit an appropriate reciprocating move from the adversary. But if the adversary does not reciprocate, it is highly questionable whether additional positive moves would be consistent with the strategy of conditional reciprocity.

This somewhat abstract conceptual discussion of several alternative strategies is useful only up to a point in policymaking. There are uncertainties in gauging whether the adversary is likely to be more receptive to one approach than to another or, indeed, to any of them. Policymakers may have to operate without reliable knowledge of the opponent’s receptivity and likely response. And it may be difficult to correctly interpret the adversary’s response. Intelligence sources and
diplomatic communication may be helpful in reducing these uncertainties, but are not likely to eliminate them. As with other strategies discussed in this chapter, conditional reciprocity, too, requires good actor-specific behavior models of the adversary.

Thus, willingness to experiment and rely on trial and error may be necessary. However, the differences among the strategies should not be ignored or blurred in practice. For example, it is possible that at various times the Bush administration’s policy of friendship toward Saddam Hussein prior to his attack against Kuwait blurred the important differences among GRIT, bribes, conditional reciprocity, and behavior modification. To the extent that blurring occurred, it further complicated the already difficult task of evaluating the efficacy of the policy of friendship and taking appropriate corrective measures.

**Eye-for-an-Eye Strategies**

As for the time-honored, if not always effective, practice of “tit-for-tat,” it received fresh attention during the Cold War as a possible strategy for eliciting cooperative behavior between actors who recognize that their mutual interests call for cooperating to avoid the worst possible outcome for both, but who cannot easily do so because they are caught in a “prisoners’ dilemma” (PD) situation. The relationship between a Great Power and the outlaw state it is attempting to reform, however, is not at all similar to the relationship between actors caught in a prisoners’ dilemma. The PD game is built on the premise that in a given situation the two sides recognize their interest in cooperating to avoid the worst possible outcome of their interaction; the challenge of the game for them is to act toward each other in ways that secure the better outcome that both prefer. The results of a computer simulation devised by Robert Axelrod indicated that in repeated plays of the PD game, the tit-for-tat strategy performed best in achieving cooperation. This strategy bears a resemblance to some forms of conditional reciprocity in calling for each side to reward a conciliatory move by the other with a conciliatory move of its own and responding to a hostile move with a negative one of its own until the two sides eventually converge in trading only positive moves; hence, “cooperation” is established.\(^1\)
Behavior Modification Strategy or Conditional Reciprocity

However, unlike tit-for-tat, which is a symmetrical game, re-socialization or an attempt to modify behavior is an asymmetrical game in which one actor attempts to bring about fundamental changes in the attitudes as well as the behavior of the other. The use of rewards and punishments after the adversary has taken some action, in re-socialization strategy, has to be much more refined and more finely calibrated than in tit-for-tat.

Efforts to use conditional reciprocity on behalf of the re-socialization objective are more likely to make headway when leaders of the “opposing” state have begun to question the results of their antipathy to certain norms and practices of the international system and, having become somewhat disenchanted with their earlier policies, are now willing to question the assumptions on which those policies were based.

Consideration needs to be given to building into the practice of conditional reciprocity “tests” designed to find out whether the leaders of the opposing state are genuinely moving toward abandoning earlier hostile attitudes and are ready to accept the norms and constraints of the international system. If they are not, the conclusion may be justified that the opposing leader cannot be re-socialized and that the only alternatives are containment or efforts to bring about their replacement by more tractable leaders.

In employing conditional reciprocity as a lever, what one “gives” the “outlaw” state and what one demands in return require sophisticated strategic planning. A series of incremental steps must be planned or improvised, as in the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea, yet the strategy must be implemented flexibly on the basis of monitoring and feedback. There must be awareness of the risks of the strategy and ways of minimizing and controlling those risks, and sensitivity to indications that the strategy is not working and needs prompt reassessment.18

What, then, are some of the risks of the strategy of conditional reciprocity and ways of minimizing them? It is not yet possible to derive firm answers to this question from studies of historical cases in which something like the strategy of conditional reciprocity was employed. In
the meanwhile, by drawing on general principles of behavior modification and learning theory, some hypotheses can be formulated as to the risks of the strategy and possible ways of minimizing or avoiding them.19

1. Concessions and benefits bestowed should not be linked merely with general injunctions to improve behavior; they should not be provided simply on the basis of the “outlaw’s” vague assurances of better behavior. Rather, benefits offered but not yet given should be coupled with a demand (however, diplomatically conveyed) for quite specific changes in behavior that the outlaw state understands and agrees to. This approach is consistent with a cardinal principle of the psychological technique of behavior modification, which emphasizes that the therapist must identify for the subject the specific behavior that is to be extinguished and the more appropriate, acceptable behavior that should replace it. (Of course, it is possible that the “outlaw” state will refuse to accept the linkage of benefits to be received with some or all of the behavior changes demanded.)

2. Benefits should not be bestowed on an “outlaw” state in advance for reciprocity at some later date. Doing so violates another basic principle of behavior modification, which emphasizes positive reinforcement by means of a reward after the subject has performed required behavior and rejects the alternative practice of offering a bribe in advance to elicit the required behavior.20

3. The concessions and benefits bestowed on an “outlaw” state should be capable of being withdrawn or at least terminated if its leaders renege on their part of the reciprocal arrangement. If the concessions are not reversible, they should be in the nature of acceptable losses and the “outlaw” state should be punished in some other way for its delinquency.

4. Insofar as possible, concessions and benefits should give leaders of the “outlaw” state and its people a stake in continuing the process of conditional reciprocity and an awareness of the advantages of accepting and participating in the international system. (This is probably what Henry Kissinger had in mind
when, during the détente of the early 1970s, he spoke of weaving a “web of incentives” to encourage Soviet leaders to enter into playing a more “constructive” role in international affairs).

This analysis has provided a provisional sketch of conditional reciprocity, its general requirements, and some of its risks. It should be obvious that this strategy is not assured of success and that its chances of succeeding may depend on a slow, incremental, patient application of conditional reciprocity. In addition, we must recognize three complicating factors that may jeopardize efforts to pursue this strategy or a formal agreement such as the Agreed Framework with North Korea which lays out a sequence.

1. The Great Power may need the outlaw state’s support to orchestrate an effective balance of power against an aggressive third party. A possible example of this is the Bush administration’s reluctance to take a tougher policy towards Saddam Hussein prior to his invasion of Kuwait because it needed Iraq to balance Iran.

2. The Great Power may mistake tactically motivated good behavior by the outlaw state as evidence of a strategic change for the better in that state’s orientation to the norms of the international system.

3. Even a coherent, well-conceptualized long-range policy for attempting to re-socialize the outlaw state may not be implemented consistently for various reasons. For example, the Great Power may be distracted by other foreign policy problems; obtaining and maintaining domestic and international understanding and support for the long range re-socialization policy may be difficult; bureaucratic officials may fail to implement policy fully or to correctly understand the policy laid down by top policymakers; and intra-administration disagreements on specific policies toward the outlaw state may undermine a more purposeful and consistent use of rewards and punishments. (These difficulties of implementation, of course, are not unique to the task of carrying out a policy of re-socialization; they are also encountered in the conduct of foreign policy more generally.)
I noted earlier the absence of any systematic scholarly study of past efforts to reform outlaw states and to draw their leaders into acceptance of the norms and practices of the international system. The several hypotheses provided in this chapter about the requirements and modalities of re-socialization need to be assessed through comparative studies of past efforts of this kind, some successful and others not. The absorption of Kemal Ataturk’s Turkey into the international system is an example of successful integration of what was regarded initially, particularly by the British, as a possible outlaw state, or at least, as one situated outside the international community. In the contemporary era, efforts to deal with North Korea, Iran, Vietnam, and Cambodia will be worth studying from this standpoint.

The Nixon-Kissinger détente policy probably constitutes an example of a flawed version of the strategy of re-socialization insofar as its objectives included the long-range one of encouraging the Soviets to mend their ways and enter into a new “constructive relationship” with the United States. The development of a more constructive relationship between two superpowers was to serve as the foundation for a new international system, what Nixon vaguely referred to as “a stable structure of peace.”

However, as many commentators noted, Nixon and Kissinger do not appear to have clearly conceptualized or elaborated what they had in mind in this respect. To be sure, the grand strategy for achieving this long-range objective combined rewarding the Soviets for good behavior with punishing them for unacceptable behavior. In other words, it was a carrot-and-stick strategy that attempted to employ, although imperfectly, behavior modification and conditional reciprocity.

The conciliatory component of the strategy offered the Soviet Union a number of benefits it prized: the possibility of greater trade and more access to western credits, grain, and technology; and the possibility of enhanced international status and recognition as a superpower equal to the United States; and the possibility of agreeing to the Soviet’s longstanding desire for more formal recognition of the territorial changes in Eastern Europe and acceptance of the Soviet Union’s dominant position in that area.

In return, Nixon and Kissinger hoped that once the Soviet Union acquired a strong stake in the détente process it would act with restraint in the Third World lest it jeopardize benefits it was receiving from the
evolving relationship. In the meantime, when the Soviets misbehaved in the Third World, Nixon attempted to react sharply. In this context, U.S. leaders urged on the Soviets in general terms the necessity to adhere to a new set of norms and rules of conduct for restraining competition and avoiding conflict throughout the world. The underlying premise, presumably, was that if these efforts were effective, not only would such norms and rules evolve over time, but they would eventually be internalized by Soviet leaders and shape their behavior thereafter.

The strategy of re-socialization in this case was flawed both conceptually and in implementation. Aside from attempting to weave a web of incentives to induce restraint in Soviet foreign policy – or, as one commentator put it, to create a new type of Soviet self-containment – it was not clear what reshaping of the international system Nixon and Kissinger had in mind.

The détente policy foundered for other reasons as well. The two sides did not hold the same understanding of détente, and they held divergent expectations of its benefits. And the Nixon administration was not successful in achieving and maintaining domestic understanding and support for what it was trying to accomplish.

The more recent substantial change in Soviet foreign policy and in its orientation to the international system associated with Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” evolved more in line with George Kennan’s 1947 “Mr. X” analysis, which held that effective containment supplemented with rewards and punishments for a period of years could eventually bring about internal changes in the ideology and domestic system of the Soviet Union that would result in a mellowing of its foreign policy.

As an example of a failed attempt to reform a rogue leader, one should look closely at Neville Chamberlain’s policy toward Hitler. Sometimes forgotten or overlooked is the fact that Chamberlain did not aim only at appeasing Germany’s legitimate claims, but also hoped to bring Germany as a responsible actor into a reconstituted European system. As already noted, the Bush administration’s policy toward Saddam Hussein prior to his invasion of Kuwait reflects another unsuccessful, and in many respects, poorly conceived and implemented effort to re-socialize and reform him.

Other states and rulers that have been and still seem seriously at odds with the existing international system include the Iran of Ayatollah
George’s successors, Khaddafi’s Libya, Syria, and North Korea. It would be desirable to include in a comparative study an analysis of the policies the United States has employed to deal not only with the threats it perceives these states and their rulers pose for its own interests, but also with their challenge to the norms and practices of the international system.

More systematic knowledge regarding the uses, limitations, and risks of the strategy of attempting to reform an outlaw state is not merely of historical or theoretical interest. Rather, it has considerable relevance for contemporary U.S. foreign policy. For example, in early 1992 the administration formally reviewed U.S. policy toward Iran in order to consider adopting a strategy of constructive engagement that would entail lifting some economic sanctions. According to the New York Times, the policy review, completed in April, concluded that any gesture that “might be politically meaningful in Tehran – lifting the ban on oil sales to America, for example – would have been politically impossible at home.

On the other hand, a reward small enough to be painless in American political terms, such as lifting the ban on exports of carpets and pistachios, would have seemed too petty to Tehran.” The policy review’s conclusion that the time was not propitious for adopting a new policy is said to have been influenced by the earlier failure of constructive engagement toward Iraq.

According to the New York Times, “even those analysts who defend the use of incentives to moderate behavior are bewildered about how to treat Iran,” recognizing that the Iranian government’s moves to curb radical elements and to expand ties with the West may be only a tactical maneuver that could be reversed when Iran succeeded in reconstructing its economy.22

Dealing With “Spoilers” in Mediating Intra-State Conflicts

A problem often encountered by mediators in civil wars conflicts is that one or more of the contending local actors attempt to disrupt such efforts. A major source of risk encountered by mediators comes from “spoilers” – leaders and parties who believe that a peaceful resolution of the conflict threatens their power and interests. Such spoilers may resort to violence to undermine efforts to mediate the conflict. When spoilers
succeed, as they did in Angola in 1992 and in Rwanda in 1994, the results are catastrophic. However, not all would-be spoilers succeed. In Mozambique, one of the local parties, the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) delayed meeting its commitments, threatening to boycott elections and to resort once again to war. In the end, however, it accepted losing an election and disarmed. In Cambodia, peace efforts eventually overcame resistance from the Khmer Rouge.

An important difference between the success and failure of spoilers is how well international actors mediating such disputes play their role. A recent comparative study of such conflicts by Stephen Stedman emphasizes the importance of distinguishing different types of spoilers and identifying appropriate strategies for dealing with each type.

Efforts to create peace in civil conflicts often creates spoilers because rarely in such conflicts do all internal leaders and parties see the terms of an emerging peace settlement as acceptable. Not every civil war easily finds a solution that satisfies the demands of all parties.

Stedman’s analysis of a number of such conflicts identifies different types of spoilers. Successful management or mediation of spoiler problems is facilitated by recognition that they differ in their goals and in the level of commitment to achieving their goals. Three types of spoilers can be identified: “limited,” “greedy,” and “total.” Limited spoilers have limited goals, for example, redress of a grievance, a share of power or a preference for how political differences will be allowed expression after the conflict is ended, and a concern for their basic security thereafter. However limited their goals, they may be non-negotiable to begin with and buttressed by a willingness to endure heavy sacrifice on their behalf.

The “greedy” spoiler tends to hold goals that are sensitive to cost and risk calculations; their goals may be limited but capable of expanding or restricting in the face of expected costs and risks.

At the extreme is the “total” spoiler who pursues extreme or total power, more or less exclusive recognition of his authority, and goals and preferences that are immutable. Total spoilers tend to see things in all-or-nothing terms and reject pragmatic compromise.

Spoiler types, therefore, present different problems for peacemaking. Limited spoilers may be included in a settlement if their limited demands can be accommodated. Greedy spoilers can also be accommodated if their
limited goals are met and they are constrained from pushing for additional advantages. Total spoilers are difficult to satisfy by compromise arrangements; if they make what appears to be a concession or acceptance of a compromise, it is likely to be tactical in an effort to gain an opportunity later for total success.

This identification of types of demonstrates once again a central theme of this analysis, namely the importance of having reasonably valid “actor-specific” models of adversaries in order to enhance the possibility of coping with them. Different strategies must be adopted by would-be mediators for dealing with each type of spoiler.

As Stedman notes, custodians of peace processes in civil conflicts have pursued three different general strategies in efforts to manage spoilers. These strategies, varying from conciliation to coercion, were: (1) inducement, that is giving a spoiler what it wanted; (2) socialization, or attempting to change the behavior of the spoiler to make it more willing to adhere to a set of norms the mediator is attempting to establish; and (3) coercion, or punishing spoiler behavior and/or reducing its capacity to subvert the effort to establish peace.

Several different coercive strategies have been employed. Coercive diplomacy has not been used very often, an exception being NATO’s air strikes against Bosnian Serbs in 1995. The use of force to defeat a spoiler has also been attempted infrequently, as for example when the U.N. tried to defeat the forces of Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid in 1993.

Stedman identifies two more common varieties of coercion. A “departing-train” strategy, based on the finding that the spoiler’s demands are unacceptable, conveys that the effort to establish peace will go irrevocably forward, leaving the spoiler behind if it forgoes joining. The “withdrawal” variant of coercion comes into play when the spoiler clearly wants an outside international presence involved in the peace process. “Withdrawal” works by threatening to punish such a spoiler by making credible threats to withdraw international support and outside peacekeepers.

Stedman holds that a correct diagnosis of spoiler type is critical for the choice of an appropriate strategy for dealing with it. The utility of these strategies, and problems that may be encountered in attempting to utilize them, are discussed and illustrated in five systematically compared case studies:
The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries

1. “Threatened Withdrawal” in Rwanda;
2. The “Departing Train” strategy in dealing with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia;
3. The use of “inducement,” later against the State of Cambodia;
4. The failure of “inducem ent” vis-à-vis UNITA in the Angolan Civil War;
5. Successful “inducement” vis-à-vis RENAMO in Mozambique.

In concluding, Stedman emphasizes that his study is a first step in developing a typological theory of spoiler management and makes a number of suggestions for additional work. To this, one might add that the analytical framework for such studies might be expanded to consider more explicitly the possible role of deterrent or threatened retaliatory threats in dealing with spoilers. Indeed, in Stedman’s analysis, the line between coercion and deterrence occasionally appears to be blurred. What he does provide is a convincing demonstration of the importance of identifying different types of spoilers, the need for sound actor-specific knowledge of would-be spoilers, and the importance of matching strategies with spoiler types.

The Need for Actor-Specific Behavioral Models

The abstract, general models of deterrence and coercive diplomacy rest on the assumption that the adversaries towards whom they are directed are rational, unitary actors. Such abstract models are not strategies in themselves, but merely the starting point for constructing specific, operational strategies that may be appropriate for dealing with specific adversaries in specific situations. Strategies of deterrence and coercive diplomacy are, therefore, highly “context-dependent.” As used in social science research, this term indicates that the phenomenon of interest is affected by complex causation. That is, many variables and the interaction between them combine to explain or predict outcomes that result from efforts to employ deterrence and coercive diplomacy.

Abstract models based on the assumption that one is dealing with a rational unitary adversary identify only the general logic that must be induced into the adversary’s calculations for the strategy to be successful.
For example, decision-makers at the top may not make their decisions only on the logic of a situation. They may share power and have to strike compromises that reflect the power arrangement that could skew the overall decisions made. Decision outcomes can be affected by logic, psychological dynamics, bureaucratic politics, or organizational procedures. Therefore, abstract decision models assuming rational unitary actors do not indicate what the policymakers on one side must do to induce that “logic” into the adversary’s calculation of costs and risks. To achieve the desired result, policymakers have to convert the abstract notion of deterrence or coercive diplomacy into a specific strategy for inducing the adversary to believe that the costs and risks of pursuing a course of action outweigh the hoped for benefits.

The general logic of deterrence is that the adversary be persuaded that the costs and risks of an initiative he may be considering outweigh its expected benefits. The general logic of coercive diplomacy is that the adversary be persuaded that the costs and risks of continuing an initiative already undertaken outweigh its expected benefits.

As already noted, both of these two concepts assume that the adversary is a rational, unitary actor. However, both components of this assumption are likely to seriously oversimplify, thereby greatly complicate, the task of formulating and applying effective strategies of deterrence or coercive diplomacy.

Consider first the limitations of the assumption of a rational opponent. The adversary may, in fact be a small group of individuals who differ from one another in values, beliefs, perceptions, and judgment. To be sure, the calculus of deterrence rests upon the assumption of a rational opponent who can be deterred from a given course of action if made aware of the costs and risks of pursuing it clearly outweigh the benefits to be gained thereby. For the deterring power to act solely on the basis of such a general assumption may lead to grave error in designing and implementing a deterrence strategy. Not all actors in international politics calculate utility in making decisions in the same way. Differences in values, political culture, attitudes toward risk taking, and so on, may vary greatly. There is no substitute for specific knowledge of each adversary’s mind-set and behavioral style, and this is often difficult to obtain or to apply correctly in assessing his intentions or predicting his responses.
The possibility of effective deterrence or coercive diplomacy, therefore, requires a more differentiated behavioral model of the opponent. The general notion of a rational opponent must be replaced by an “actor-specific” model of the opponent’s way of calculating costs and risks and deciding what level of costs and risks are acceptable in striving for desired gains. This also requires policymakers to estimate the value an adversary places on obtaining those benefits which influence the level of costs and risks he is willing to accept. The greater the value the adversary attaches to an objective, the stronger his motivation to pursue it and, therefore, the stronger the credible threat must be to persuade him to desist.

Attributing “irrationality” to an opponent when he acts at odds with the coercer’s expectation of rational behavior is a questionable way of filling the vacuum of knowledge about his approach to rational behavior. What is needed and often very difficult to develop is a more differentiated understanding of the opponent’s values, ideology, culture, and mind-set. This is what is meant by an “actor-specific behavioral model of an opponent.”

Policy specialists and academic scholars have no difficulty in agreeing on the need for a better understanding of the adversary’s behavioral style. They both emphasize the necessity to try to see events and, indeed, one’s own behavior from the perspective of the adversary. In a conflict situation, one’s self-image often exercises a subtle influence in shaping one’s foreign policy. Such a self-image, however, is seldom the same image of you perceived by the adversary that influences his perceptions, calculations, and behavior in ways that make conflict avoidance or crisis management more difficult. Only by being alert to these conflicting images of the self can one diagnose an emerging situation accurately and select appropriate ways of influencing an adversary. Faulty images of each other are a source of serious misperceptions and miscalculations that have often led to major errors in policy, avoidable catastrophes, and missed opportunities.25

Consider now the limitations of the assumption of a “unitary” actor. This assumes that the opponent is a single, homogenous actor, that there are no significant differences among the members of the ruling elite that influence and complicate the ruler’s estimates, calculations, decision-making, and conflict behavior. The assumption of a unitary actor implies that the top leaders have effective control over all subordinate actors. This
is a beguiling assumption to make since it dangerously simplifies efforts to use deterrence or coercive diplomacy.

When the assumption of a unitary actor is incorrect, it can contribute to faulty efforts to influence adversaries. Such an assumption can also contribute to the erroneous belief that the adversary operates with an uncomplicated approach to rationality.

Faulty assumptions that the adversary is a rational, unitary actor often occur in inter-state conflict situations. During the Cold War and since, when one has little information about an adversary’s mind-set, it is common practice to attribute to rivals a sort of basic, simplified rationality, to see the rival leaders as a mirror image of one’s own, decision-makers who ought to perceive the logic of a situation pretty much the same way as does the deterring side. If, in fact, the adversary regime’s behavior turns out to be flagrantly at odds with one’s expectations of a rational actor, one is tempted to regard the rival leadership as irrational as well as dangerous.

This is not to say that faulty assumptions about an opponent can be easily replaced by sophisticated actor-specific behavioral models. At the same time, however, one must forgo the temptation to regard efforts to develop better actor-specific models as unpromising, if not hopeless. At the very least, even imperfect actor-specific models can be useful, if only to make policymakers aware of relevant uncertainties as to the correct image of the opponent and the need for caution in efforts to employ deterrence and coercive diplomacy, or other strategies that have been discussed.

Simple assumptions that one is dealing with a rational opponent are particularly damaging when one is dealing with non-state actors, such as local warlords, terrorists, or rivals in intra-state conflicts and civil wars. Several characteristics of such non-state actors and their implications for counter-terrorist policy can be identified:

1. Non-state actors may lack many identifiable or valuable assets that can be located and targeted in efforts to deter or coerce them;
2. Non-state actors’ mind-sets, goals, motivations, and behavioral patterns may be especially difficult to ascertain. As a result, efforts to formulate coercive strategies directed towards them are likely to lack adequate understanding of how non-state actors make cost-benefit calculations. When reliable information
The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries

on terrorist motivations is lacking, the coercing power may develop simplified stereotypes of them that emphasize fanaticism and irrationality, particularly when their acts of terrorism are highly destructive.

3. Non-state actors generally lack well-developed decision-making structures, well-defined and reliable lines of authority, and command and control. In some cases, there may be competing power centers within the non-state apparatus. As a result, leaders of non-state actors may have imperfect control over operational units and, therefore, efforts to employ coercion against non-state leaders may not lead to desired changes in the behavior of their subordinates.

4. Coercive efforts against a multi-headed adversary, in which sub-actors have divergent interests, may have the unexpected result of strengthening the hand of the most radical elements. Coercive threats and actions against terrorists may lack credibility and efficacy insofar as some terrorists may not regard force as punishment, but believe it enhances their legitimacy and increases their support.

5. Non-state actors and terrorists often have stronger motivation than does the coercing state. Asymmetrical motivation may also favor some state supporters of terrorism, although such sponsors are locatable and may have other interests that limit such support, and make them more susceptible to pressure or inducements by the coercing power to terminate or significantly limit their support for terrorists. To be sure, non-state actors and terrorists may be largely autonomous and may have ambiguous or complicated relations with states that provide some support. This possibility can be taken into account in devising coercive strategies and offers of conditional inducements to state sponsors of terrorism. But it may be difficult to tailor such efforts to specific situations in which there is considerable uncertainty as to relations between sponsors and terrorists.

6. Efforts to coerce a non-state actor indirectly, by persuading states friendly to the non-state actor to exert pressure against it,
may work sometimes, but such efforts of indirect coercion are often difficult and may be counterproductive.

7. Non-state actors and terrorists are often adept in finding ways of exploiting constraints under which coercing states must labor. They can manipulate international opinion, exploit domestic constraints in coercing states, use “human shields” to deter actions against them, and counter efforts to coerce them by engaging in unpredictable or unconventional ways such as by detaining peacekeepers or humanitarian actors as hostages.

Implications for Policy

What are the general implications of the preceding analysis for U.S. foreign policy? In the first place, the distinction must be kept in mind between concepts of deterrence and coercive diplomacy and the various strategies each of these concepts can take. Concepts indicate only the general logic of deterrence and coercive diplomacy. Concepts do not tell us what must be done in various situations with regard to specific adversaries in order to achieve deterrence or successful coercive diplomacy. For this purpose, policymakers must convert the concept into a particular strategy considered to fit the adversary and the situation at hand.

Second, the effectiveness of deterrence and coercive diplomacy is highly context dependent. That is, outcomes of these strategies are influenced by many variables and the interaction between them. As a result, to choose a particular variant of the strategy and to tailor it to a specific situation and a particular adversary is laden with considerable uncertainty.

There is simply no single or simple set of “rules” for dealing with this problem. This lesson was clearly stated by former President George Bush in an address at West Point towards the end of his administration on January 5, 1993:

... when the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to be effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the
potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice. There can be no single or simple set of fixed rules for using force . . . Each and every case is unique.

Similar conclusions have been drawn by other experienced policymakers and analysts as to whether any useful “decision rules” or specific guidelines can be formulated and agreed upon for dealing with the challenges and dilemmas of using force or threats of force in support of diplomacy. General Colin Powell, for example, also emphasized that there can be “no fixed set of rules” in answering this question.27

The question arises whether and how scholarly analysis of the problem of making effective use of deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and other strategies can be helpful to decision-makers. If every case is unique, as President Bush and others have emphasized, can useful lessons of a general kind be drawn from past experience and, if so, how can they be employed by policymakers in addressing new situations?

Scholars who address this task believe that useful lessons can be drawn from systematic study of each of the many generic problems repeatedly encountered in the conduct of foreign policy. This applies not only to generic problems such as deterrence and coercive diplomacy that are of particular interest here, but also to crisis management, war termination and, indeed, crisis avoidance, mediation, and cooperation. To the extent scholars are successful in doing so, their findings contribute to bridging the gap between theory (another word for “generic knowledge”) and the practice of policymakers.

In past interviews with policy specialists this author quickly discovered that whenever the word theory was used, their eyes would quickly glaze. However, when the term “generic knowledge” was substituted for theory they nodded approvingly. Why? The answer, quite simply, is that policy specialists know that certain generic problems, such as deterrence and coercive diplomacy, repeatedly arise in the conduct of foreign policy. They thus are favorably disposed to efforts to develop generic knowledge of each of these tasks.

Of what value in policymaking is such generic knowledge? How ought it to be used in making decisions? Generic knowledge is most useful when it takes the form of conditional generalizations derived from analysis of past cases. Such generalizations identify the conditions under
which, for example, deterrence or coercive diplomacy is likely to be effective and when it is likely to fail.

Such conditional generalizations, it should be emphasized, are *not* prescriptions for action. Their relevance and value is, rather, that they can help policymakers *diagnose* new situations. The proper analogy here is the relationship of knowledge to practice in clinical medicine. In medicine, before powerful drugs were developed, a doctor attempted to diagnose the patient’s problem before prescribing for it. Policymakers, like doctors, must diagnose a new situation as aptly as possible before deciding how to deal with it. Helpful in making such diagnoses is generic knowledge of deterrence and coercive diplomacy that identifies the conditions under which, judging from past experience, deterrence is likely to work or not work. Armed with such conditional generalizations, policy specialists are better able to judge whether such “favoring” conditions are present or can be created in the case at hand.

Generic or theoretical knowledge should therefore be useful to those intelligence and policy analysts within the government who are responsible for diagnosing emerging situations for the benefit of decision-makers. However, I would like to emphasize here, as in previous writings, the fact that a gap exists between even the best generic knowledge (or theory) of deterrence and coercive diplomacy and practice and this gap cannot be eliminated, it can only be bridged.

One must have a realistic view of the limited, indirect, but still quite important, impact that generic knowledge about such strategies as deterrence and coercive diplomacy, or of activities such as crisis management or war termination can have on policymaking. Generic knowledge is best viewed as an input to policy analysis of specific situations within the government. Generic knowledge is an *aid* rather than a *substitute* for judgments that decision-makers must exercise when choosing a policy.

In other words, it is a mistake to view theory or generic knowledge as capable of providing policymakers with detailed, high-confidence prescriptions for action in each contingency that arises. Such policy-relevant knowledge does not exist and is not feasible. Rather, as noted above, we must think in terms of the analogy with traditional medical practice, which calls for a correct diagnosis of the problem before
prescribing a treatment. In accord with this analogy, I have argued that the major function and use of theory and generic knowledge is to contribute to the diagnosis of specific problematic situations with which policymakers must deal, rather than to provide prescriptions or general “decision rules” for action. Like the medical doctor, the policymaker acts as a clinician who strives to make correct diagnosis of a certain problem before determining how best to deal with it.\textsuperscript{29}

It is in this way that the unique nature of each situation, which President Bush emphasized in his West Point speech, can be diagnosed and better understood in order to decide whether and how force or threats of force may apply.

Thus far, I have called attention to two types of knowledge relevant for policy analysis of emergent situations in which consideration is given to employing deterrence, coercive diplomacy, or other strategies discussed in this chapter (reassurance, conciliation, conditional reciprocity). These are, first, the somewhat abstract conceptual models of the strategy and, second, generic knowledge of the strategy. To this, the third type of knowledge emphasized throughout the chapter is actor-specific behavioral knowledge of the adversary in question.\textsuperscript{30}

What remains to be emphasized is that these three types of policy-relevant knowledge do not suffice. Policy analysts must also make use of specific information about the situation provided by intelligence and journalistic sources in order to diagnose the situation and prescribe appropriated options. The job of policy analysis is to provide an analytic judgment as to what is likely to be the best policy option and the uses and limitations of alternative options. The policymaker, however, has to exercise a broader political judgment as to what is most appropriate or more acceptable in the circumstances.

As Charles Hitch, who organized and led the Economics Department at the RAND Corporation repeatedly emphasized, even the results of the best systems analysis should be regarded as an aid to the preparation of policy decisions and not a substitute for the “judgment” of the decision-maker. One of the most important judgments a policymaker must make concerns the trade-off between the analytical quality of the policy to be chosen and the need to obtain sufficient support, domestic and often international, for the option finally chosen.
Another familiar trade-off problem arises from having to decide how much time and policymaking resources to allocate to an effort to select the best possible policy option.

A third trade-off problem arises from having to decide how much political capital and influence resources to expend in an effort to increase the level of support for an option finally chosen.31

The contributions of these three types of knowledge and specific intelligence to policy analysis and the role of the policymaker’s judgment of trade-offs is depicted in Figure 1.

![Diagram](image-url)

**Figure 1:** Ways in which the three types of knowledge together with specific information about the situation contribute to the policy analysis that precedes the various judgments policymakers must make.

Finally, I have emphasized in this chapter the need to place deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and the possible use of military force into a broader influence theory, one which encompasses the possible use of
strategies of reassurance, conciliation, and conditional reciprocity. These strategies are alternatives that may recommend themselves in situations in which resort to deterrence, coercive diplomacy, or military force is laden with considerable uncertainty and risk.

At the same time, deterrence and coercive diplomacy, although often difficult to implement, remain helpful strategies in certain situations and against certain opponents. Despite their limitations, these strategies have a role to play, however restricted or complicated, in many post-Cold War contexts.

The policymaker needs both the velvet glove of diplomacy and the iron fist of armed forces, both carrots and sticks, to achieve state ends. In some cases, conciliatory means will suffice. In others, both positive and coercive incentives are necessary. In still others, only force or its threatened use can achieve the desired outcome.

The Bush administration’s new emphasis on a declaratory policy that threatens preventive actions, involving either preventive war or preemption, considered for use against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, should be seen as an effort to reinforce deterrence and coercive diplomacy in some situations as well as to replace unqualified reliance on such policies.  

Notes  


Other important recent works on coercive diplomacy and coercive strategies include Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric Larson, *Air Power as a Coercive Instrument* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1993); Lawrence Freedman, ed., *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1998); Peter Viggio Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1999). The normative, political, and policy dilemmas associated with use of coercive diplomacy are incisively analyzed by Bruce W. Jentleson, *Coercive Prevention*, Peaceworks No. 35, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, October 2000). I do not discuss in the present chapter the important constraints on the ability of U.S. policymakers to employ deterrence and coercive diplomacy more effectively. There are occasions in which domestic and/or international constraints on the use of force made it advisable for U.S. leaders to begin with economic sanctions and/or coercive diplomacy even though they were not expected to be effective, but in order to move later, as in the war against Iraq in 1990, to the use of military force. Eric Larson provides an excellent discussion of the variety of domestic constraints on the use of coercive strategies by the United States and notes how these constraints can be exploited by adversaries in Chapter 4, in the book edited by Byman, Waxman, and Larson, noted above. See also the excellent contribution by Robert Art in Art and Cronin, eds., *op. cit.*


6. Rock discusses these considerations in some detail in *Appeasement in International Politics* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000).

7. For a detailed analysis of the problems of dealing with so-called “rogue” states, see Robert S. Litwak, *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000); also Chapter 4, “Reforming Outlaw States and Rogue Leaders,” A.L. George, *Bridging the Gap*. 305
8. Stephen R. Rock has provided the first analytical systematic study of historical experience with efforts at appeasement in a variety of contexts. He employs an incisive analytical framework for comparing cases of effective and unsuccessful efforts at appeasement. These cases are successful British appeasement of the United States, 1896-1903; unsuccessful British appeasement of Germany, 1936-1939; ineffective Anglo-American appeasement of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945; ineffective U.S. appeasement of Iraq, 1989-1990; possibly effective appeasement of North Korea, 1988-1994. *Appeasement in International Politics* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000).

9. Barbara Tuchman, *The March of Folly* (New York: Knopf, 1984), Chapter 4. A related, fifth scenario is suggested by Stephen Stedman (in a personal communication): a situation in which appeasement might have succeeded at an early stage in the dispute but became more difficult because reliance on deterrence or force hardened the adversary’s position.


11. For a discussion of the Agreed Framework, see Litwak, *op. cit.*, John Lewis Gaddis notes that George Kennan coupled the strategy of containment he recommended for dealing with the Soviet Union with a version of what might be called behavior modification. Gaddis notes in this connection that Kennan recommended that modifying Soviet behavior required both positive and negative reinforcement; it was important to reward the Kremlin for conciliatory gestures as it was to oppose aggressive moves. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 71. Quoted in Robert S. Litwak, *op. cit.*, 10.


13. Yehezkel Dror’s *Crazy States* (1971) provides suggestive observations but eschews empirical analysis of past experience. Charles Doran, *The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and its Aftermath* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), deals with the task of assimilating defeated hegemonic powers back into the international system and should be consulted for hypotheses in studies of the problem of re-socializing outlaw states.

14. A former official who was in the government in 1984-85 when the Reagan administration was attempting to coerce Khaddafi into stopping assistance to terrorists recalled in an interview that the administration sent naval forces into the Gulf of Sidra in a deliberate effort to provoke him; the administration hoped to shoot down his planes,
thereby humiliating and discrediting him so that he might be ousted. For a detailed account of the Bush administration’s last minute effort before the cease-fire of February 28 to use two specially prepared deep penetration bombs to “get” Saddam in one of his hardened bunkers, see *U.S. News and World Report*, “Triumph Without Victory,” 3-6. An incisive, balanced analysis of the option of assassinating rival leaders is provided by Stephen T. Hosner, *Operations Against Enemy Leaders* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2001).

15. The distinguished psychologist, Charles Osgood, originated the strategy of GRIT many years ago in his *An Alternative to War and Surrender* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962).


18. Helpful for this purpose would be a list of explicit indicators that the adversary does not accept the norms of the international system and subscribes to and is preparing to achieve the goal of regional hegemony.


20. Precisely this objection was raised by members of the National Security Council (NSC) in April 1987 to proposals by Ross Perot that the Reagan administration make conciliatory actions toward North Vietnam to show “good faith,” overcome its leaders’ distrust of the United States, and thereby encourage Hanoi’s cooperation in locating American POWs and MIAs. NSC officials objected on the grounds that such actions would be granting “concessions without performance.” In an interview, one former NSC staff member added, “History has shown that concession prior to performance is death. They’ll take and take. We’ve learned that over 25 years.” Patrick E. Tyler, *New York Times* (July 5, 1992).


25. Examples of questionable or incorrect images of an opponent include Washington’s image of Saddam Hussein and the role it played in several failed strategies and policies adopted towards him prior to his attack on Kuwait, Stalin’s incorrect image of Hitler prior to his attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, Truman’s incorrect image of China’s threat to intervene in the Korean War in the fall of 1950, the different images of the Soviets held by top-level U.S. policymakers engaged in efforts to assess Khrushchev’s threat against Berlin. Contrast these and other cases with President’s Kennedy’s correct image of Khrushchev in the Cuban Missile Crisis. (For a more detailed discussion, see *Bridging the Gap*, 126-130.)

26. Examples and analysis of these characteristics of non-state actors and terrorists, and of the difficulties they create for deterrence and coercion against them are provided in a number of excellent studies. See particularly several studies by analysts of the RAND Corporation: Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric Larson, *Air Power As A Coercive Instrument* (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1999), see especially Chapter 6, “Coercing Nonstate Actors: A Challenge”; Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Michele Zanina, with a Foreword by Brian Michael Jenkins, *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1999).

An important contribution to this subject is Martha Crenshaw, "Coercive Diplomacy and the Response to Terrorism," in Art and Cronin, eds., *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War* (tentative title). See also additional items cited in Footnotes 2 and 3.


See also the detailed analysis and proposals in Chapter 9, “Preventing Catastrophic Terrorism,” in David A. Hamburg, No More Killing Fields: Preventing Deadly Conflict (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). This book builds upon and significantly extends the work of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, which Dr. Hamburg co-chaired with Cyrus Vance.


29. The importance of the diagnostic use of theory and generic knowledge for policymaking has been emphasized in all my previous publications beginning with Alexander George’s Propaganda Analysis (1959), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (1971). Richard K. Herrmann also emphasizes the diagnostic value of policy-relevant theory in “Policy-Relevant Theory and the Challenge of Diagnosis: The End of the Cold War,” Political Psychology Vol. 15, No. 1 (March, 1994), 111-142.

30. Many writers have emphasized the imperatives of what is referred to here as “actor-specific behavioral models.” Post-mortems conducted after a major intelligence failure usually give particular emphasis to the need for better “images” of adversaries in order to avoid “surprise.” Recent efforts to develop novel approaches to this task include Richard K. Herrmann and Michael Fischerkeller, “Beyond the Enemy Images and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research After the Cold War” International Security Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), 15-450; and Caroline F. Ziemke, “Strategic Personality and the Effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence: Deterring Iraq and Iran,” IDA Paper P-3658 (September 2001) Alexandria, Virginia: Institute of Defense Analysis.

31. These and other trade-offs in high-level policymaking that complicate purely rational decision-making are discussed in Chapter 2 of A.L. George, Bridging the Gap.

32. Preventive war and preemption are general concepts that need clarification and operationalization. “Preventive war” involves a decision in peacetime to launch an attack, hopefully with the benefit of strategic or at least tactical surprise. In contrast, “preemption” can take several different forms: (1) an attack which is based in the belief that the opponent has already made a decision to initiate war, is making appropriate
preparations, but has not yet initiated the attack; (2) an attack based on the belief that an enemy attack is being launched and is in its early phase; (3) an attack based on the belief that an enemy attack is on the way and that its effectiveness can be diminished and/or that retaliation for it can be better assured by preemptive strike; (4) an attack based on the belief that an enemy attack is underway which may not have been authorized by top opponent leaders but is undertaken by subordinates - i.e., the possibility of “accidental war.”