

## 2. Status of the CPRC's 1996 Findings and Its Approach to Assessing Future Progress

This section contains a summary of the status of the CPRC's 1996 findings and recommendations, an overview of the progress in addressing the counterproliferation ACEs (in terms of investments by the CPRC-represented organizations), and a brief description of the CPRC's basic approach for assessing future progress in meeting the policy and strategy objectives for countering NBC/M proliferation and NBC terrorism as embodied in the ACEs.

### 2.1 Summary of the CPRC's 1996 Findings and Recommendations

The key CPRC finding of last year was that the seriousness of the NBC/M proliferation threat and the need to enhance capabilities to counter it were being recognized throughout the DoD (including OSD, the Joint Staff, Services, and CINCs), the DOE, and U.S. Intelligence. Citing the many accomplishments documented in last year's report, it was clear to the CPRC that "countering proliferation" had indeed become an established and institutionalized priority within each of the CPRC-represented organizations. The CPRC made several recommendations to continue and strengthen the interdepartmental response to countering proliferation, and the progress made to date on implementing each of these recommendations is summarized below.

***Approval of the Counterproliferation-Related Budgets of the CPRC-Represented Organizations.*** To continue the progress being made in strengthening U.S. capabilities, including initiatives leading to rapid fielding of essential capabilities and improved integration and management oversight of counterproliferation-related programs, the CPRC urged Congress to approve the President's FY 1997 and out-year budgets of DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence related to countering proliferation. Congress approved most of the President's FY 1997 budget request and supplemented it in key areas. The President's FY 1998 budget request is nearly \$5.4 billion in combined DoD and DOE counterproliferation-related activities and programs, a 15% increase over the FY 1997 request. The CPRC-represented organizations continue to treat nonproliferation and counterproliferation needs and requirements as a high priority item in their budget development processes. (Details of the U.S. Intelligence budget for countering proliferation are provided in the Intelligence Annex to this report.)

***Continue the CPRC Program Review Process.*** Recognizing that countering proliferation is a continuing challenge that will have to be addressed for the foreseeable future, the CPRC thought it prudent to continue the CPRC program review process beyond its statutorily mandated term, which was set to expire at the end of FY 1996. Congress extended the authority of the CPRC through FY 2000 in the 1997 NDAA. Furthermore, in recognition of the growing potential threat of paramilitary and terrorist NBC threats, Congress expanded the authority of the CPRC to review DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence R&D and acquisition activities and programs developing capabilities and technologies for countering these threats.

***Continue Close Coordination of R&D and Acquisition Programs among DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence.*** Planning, coordination, and other activities related to management

oversight expanded significantly in response to CPRC recommendations. The newly established CPRC Standing Committee is serving as a proactive vehicle to ensure continued close cooperation among the CPRC-represented organizations and coordination of their R&D, acquisition, and management activities which have characterized their integrated response in meeting ACE priorities to date. In addition to the Standing Committee, CPRC Action Officers, representing a variety of organizations within the DoD (including OSD, the Joint Staff, Services, and DoD Agencies), DOE, U.S. Intelligence, NSC, and OMB meet regularly to address interorganizational issues related to countering NBC/M proliferation and NBC terrorism. Many CPRC Action Officers also serve on other interagency organizations, like the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technical Working Group (NPAC TWG) and the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) of the National Security Council's (NSC) Interagency Working Group on Counterterrorism, further enhancing interdepartmental and interagency coordination.

***Establish a Joint DOE, DoD, and U.S. Intelligence R&D Initiative in Chemical and Biological Defense.*** DOE, in conjunction with DoD and U.S. Intelligence, established the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program to leverage DOE's extensive expertise in the chemical and biological sciences resident in the National Laboratories. Based on a joint DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence tour of the eight DOE National Laboratories (organized by ATSD(NCB)'s Deputy for Counterproliferation) conducted last summer and through thorough interdepartmental and interagency coordination, several projects were identified for FY 1997 funding. These projects leverage and fill gaps in ongoing DoD and U.S. Intelligence R&D programs and were selected based on their ability to expedite the development and rapid fielding of advanced capabilities to meet the chemical and biological defense and counterproliferation needs of DoD (including the CINCs, Services, and DoD Agencies), U.S. Intelligence, and other users from the nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and counterterrorism communities. (See Section 6.2 for additional information.)

***Increase International Cooperative Efforts to Counter Proliferation.*** To expedite and more efficiently and effectively meet the challenges posed by the global proliferation problem, the CPRC continues to encourage and endorse expanded cooperation with international partners in countering NBC/M proliferation and NBC terrorist threats. DoD is continuing to work with friends, allies, and potential coalition partners in Europe, the Pacific region, and the Middle East to develop common approaches on counterproliferation and NBC defense. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) is continuing to develop a core, integrative set of capability enhancements and force improvements to counter NBC/M threats, particularly for forces operating beyond the NATO periphery. DOE continues to work closely with international organizations, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials. International cooperative activities demonstrate that the U.S. is not alone in its concerns for the defense dimension of NBC/M proliferation. The CPRC-represented organizations remain committed to building international partnerships with allies and friends whose security and national interests are threatened by NBC/M proliferation.

***Review and Reprioritize the Counterproliferation ACEs.*** As discussed in Section 1.3, the review and reprioritization of the ACEs was completed by the CPRC Action Officers under the auspices of the CPRC Standing Committee. While this year each CPRC-represented organization

prioritized the ACEs based on their specific mission needs, there was unanimous agreement on the modified ACE list as a whole. Furthermore, in recognition of growing concerns about NBC terrorism as a significant national security threat and the disturbing trends of rogue states to protect and conceal their NBC/M infrastructure elements, ACEs dealing with countering NBC paramilitary and terrorist threats and countering NBC/M and underground facilities and infrastructure elements were increased in priority.

## **2.2 Progress in Addressing the Counterproliferation ACEs**

DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence have each made serious commitments to address the threat posed by the proliferation of NBC/M and NBC terrorism. Table 2.1 summarizes the FY 1998 investments planned by DoD and DOE for each ACE priority. U.S. Intelligence's FY 1998 investments are discussed in the Intelligence Annex. The combined DoD/DOE investment for FY 1998 is nearly \$5.4 billion compared to just under \$4.7 billion in FY 1997, a 15% increase. DoD's investment for FY 1998 is almost \$4.9 billion, which compares favorably with last year's investment of just under \$4.3 billion (more than a 14% increase). DoD budgets the bulk of its counterproliferation investment in the areas of air and missile defense (DoD ACE priorities 4 and 7); supporting the inspection and monitoring of arms control agreements (DoD ACE priority 15); maintaining a robust passive defense to enable sustained operations in an NBC contaminated environment (DoD ACE priority 9); detection and characterization of BW agents (DoD ACE priority 1); and prompt mobile target detection and defeat (DoD ACE priority 12).

DOE's investment for FY 1998 is \$489.4 million, up 19% from FY 1997 and up 25% from FY 1996. DOE's nonproliferation focus results in concentration of its investment in tracking, protecting, and controlling nuclear weapon related materials and components (DOE ACE priority 1); supporting inspection and monitoring activities of arms control agreements (DOE ACE priority 5); defending against and managing the consequences of covert delivery and terrorist NBC threats (DOE ACE priorities 2 and 4); detection, identification, and characterization of BW agents through its new Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (DOE ACE priority 3); and supporting export control activities (DOE ACE priority 9).

While the higher priority ACEs generally receive greater investment, the distribution of investments among the ACEs shows some variability. This is due to a variety of factors, including variation in the state-of-the-art and maturity of key enabling technologies, differing development stages of program evolution, unequal opportunities for near-term (versus longer term) payoffs, and due to the fact that some ACEs simply will require greater investment than others (e.g., those requiring extensive R&D). Consequently, it is difficult to judge progress in the counterproliferation ACEs simply by looking at the budget numbers. It requires a closer look at the accomplishments and planned milestones of all the programs addressing each of the ACEs – the subject of Sections 5 - 8 of the report.

It must also be noted that several DoD and DOE programs related to countering proliferation respond to multiple ACE priorities. In these cases, budget values listed in Table 2.1 are included under the ACE priority corresponding to the primary thrust of the program. (In the activity and program descriptions provided in Sections 5 - 8 and in Appendices C and D, the ACE

**Table 2.1: Investments in the Counterproliferation ACEs**

ACE Priority			Counterproliferation ACEs	Counterproliferation Related Investments for FY 1998 [\$M]		
DoD	DOE	US INTELL		DoD	DOE	US INTELL*
1	3	1	Detection, Identification, and Characterization of BW Agents	191.1	19.0	
2	6	3	Detection, Characterization, and Defeat of NBC/M Facilities with Minimal Collateral Effects	83.8	-***	
3	8	4	Detection, Characterization, and Defeat of Underground Facilities with Minimal Collateral Effects			
4	-	2	Theater Ballistic Missile Active Defense***	3,217.5	-	
5	2	5	Support for Special Operations Forces and Defense Against Paramilitary, Covert Delivery, and Terrorist NBC Threats	151.1	41.1	
6	4	6	Provide Consequence Management	21.5		
7	-	7	Cruise Missile Defense	18.1	-	
8	7	8	Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination of Actionable Intelligence to Counter Proliferation	0.8*	-.*	
9	-	13	Robust Passive Defense to Enable Sustained Operations on the NBC Battlefield	364.9	-	
10	-	9	BW Vaccine RDT&E and Production to Ensure Stockpile Availability	64.5	-	
11	-	14	Target Planning for NBC/M Targets	5.7	-	
12	-	11	Prompt Mobile Target Detection and Defeat	178.0	-	
13	1	15	Detection, Tracking, and Protection of NBC/M and NBC/M-Related Materials and Components	3.0	297.2	
14	9	12	Support Export Control Activities of the U.S. Government	16.2	16.5	
15	5	10	Support Inspection and Monitoring Activities of Arms Control Agreements and Regimes	569.9	115.6	
				<b>• TOTALS:</b>	<b>4,886.1</b>	<b>489.4</b>

\* Please see the Intelligence Annex to this report.

\*\* Activities included in DOE National Laboratories "Work for Others" programs.

\*\*\* includes funding for National Missile Defense (The projected pace of NMD technical advancement is limited by the progress of technology, not by funding.)

priority listed first in the tabular summaries represents the primary thrust of the activity or program.) For example, while programs developing BW detection systems clearly support robust passive defense capabilities (i.e., DoD ACE priority 9), their primary thrust is addressing DoD ACE priority 1. Likewise, several active defense systems under development have some capability to defend against cruise missiles, but, since their primary focus is ballistic missile defense, they are included under DoD ACE priority 4. The ACEs, like the CINCs' counterproliferation required capabilities, primarily focus on theater missile defense where the NBC/M proliferation threat is more immediate and substantial. However, as longer range NBC/M threats proliferate, National Missile Defense (NMD) will take on added counterproliferation significance. The NMD program

both benefits from and enriches (through technology sharing and synergy) the technology base for theater missile defense. Finally, there is considerable overlap in DoD technologies and capabilities to detect, characterize, and defeat NBC/M and underground facilities, hence contributions in DoD ACE priorities 2 and 3 are difficult to distinguish. The CPRC acknowledges that the investment breakout represented in Table 2.1 is necessarily subjective. It, nevertheless, provides a useful means, in broad terms, to characterize the commitments of DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence in meeting the challenges posed by the counterproliferation ACEs.

### 2.3 An Approach for Assessing Future Progress

The key objectives of the CPRC’s interdepartmental coordination process is to ensure that R&D and acquisition activities and programs address national policy and strategy objectives and provide a timely response to meeting the challenges posed by NBC/M proliferation and NBC terrorist threats. This logical sequence is illustrated in Figure 2.1, which also identifies the key ingredients guiding the CPRC’s program review process (i.e., national policy and strategy objectives, the CINC’s counterproliferation required capabilities, the ACEs, and departmental budgeting activities). The CPRC’s program review process seeks to: i) determine if current program requirements are sufficient to meet current and future threats; ii) determine if current programs are adequate to meet requirements; iii) assess current and future capabilities; iv) identify current capability shortfalls and anticipate future shortfalls; v) continue to define and prioritize the ACEs to guide investments in addressing remaining shortfalls; vi) identify candidate areas for progress (or program options) for consideration within departmental budgeting activities to address current and near-term capability shortfalls; and vii) define new requirements for future programs to




Figure 2.1 Goals and Objectives of the CPRC Program Review Process

address longer term anticipated shortfalls. The approach is designed to produce a more forward looking and better integrated response to counter NBC/M proliferation and terrorist threats.

The CPRC’s annual review process is designed to tie activities and programs to key policy and strategy objectives for countering proliferation, while articulating a clear threat-response linkage between NBC/M proliferation and NBC terrorist threats and the interorganizational response established to counter these threats. This structured methodology, illustrated in Figure 2.2, is the mechanism by which the CPRC seeks to fulfill its responsibilities to: i) optimize funding and ensure the efficient development and timely deployment of effective technologies and capabilities to counter NBC/M proliferation and terrorist threats; ii) eliminate undesirable redundancies in R&D and acquisition programs; and iii) establish priorities for projects and funding. In this way, the CPRC seeks to ensure the credibility of the multi-tiered approach to countering proliferation and, in parallel, ensure that each of the key counterproliferation functional areas and operational objectives, defined in Section 1.2 and embodied in the ACEs, are adequately and prudently addressed.




Figure 2.2 The CPRC Program Review Process