MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference - Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on the Transition to and from Hostilities

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force addressing the Transition to and from Hostilities.

Our military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to be the last such excursion in the global war on terrorism. We may need to support an ally under attack by terrorists determined to replace the legitimate government; we may need to effect change in the governance of a country that is blatantly sustaining support for terrorism; or we may need to assist an ally who is unable to govern areas of their own country – where terrorists may recruit, train and plan without interference by the legitimate government.

Our armed forces are extremely capable of projecting force and achieving conventional military victory. However, we have learned that sustainment of military success must be accompanied by concomitant location of enemy leaders, location of weapons including WMD, interruption of terrorist’s finances, and interdiction of couriers providing communication so as to truly progress in the global war on terrorism. These latter challenges cannot be ensured during hostilities unless there has been effective intelligence preparation of the battlespace in the years – not weeks or months – preceding hostilities.

Furthermore, we have and will encounter significant challenges following conventional military success as we seek to ensure stability, democracy, human rights and a productive economy. Achieving these ends would be facilitated by successful shaping activities in the years before the outbreak of hostilities, as well as exploiting the capabilities not traditional to our armed forces in the period following hostilities.

To enhance the effectiveness across this spectrum of pre- and post-conflict issues, the 2004 Summer Study shall focus on the following issues:

1. Understanding and shaping the environment: the gathering of long-lead intelligence and effective preparation of the battlespace — in the absence of an immediate threat — requires diligence, foresight and preparation.
Long-lead intelligence preparation of the battlespace will involve terrestrial sensing, tagging and tracking in concert with HUMINT, SIGINT, and open sources; and the application of sophisticated means of data tracking in cyberspace. Are there gaps in our technology? How can we assess our 'intelligence readiness', as we now assess our military readiness, in selected regions where hostilities may occur?

Shaping is extremely complicated, requires significant cultural understanding and a long attention span, well in advance of hostilities.

The handoff from long-term shaping efforts to shorter term DoD interests can significantly impact the intensity of hostilities and its aftermath.

- Likewise, the post-hostility environment is likely to be affected significantly by details of the war prosecution such as collateral damage and treatment of combatants and civilians alike.

How can our capabilities in shaping, language and cultural understanding be enhanced by technology?

2. **Force protection during transition**: Increasingly, US military forces rely more on speed and mobility than hardening to achieve their objectives. In the transition to the post hostilities phase, forces become much more stationary, and become easier targets for residual resistance. What technologies, and tactics, techniques, and procedures can provide force protection during transformation from maneuver warfare to peace keeping operations such as a garrison force charged with establishing order?

3. **Disarmament and destruction of munitions stocks**: The deposed regime may leave behind many dangerous devices; e.g. conventional munitions and WMD, and other legacies. What capabilities are needed to address disposal, as well as environmental and security issues associated with these unwanted devices?

4. **Intelligence exploitation in the aftermath**: Rapid, decisive battlespace victory can produce a rich vein of captured documents, materiel, and human sources, but their exploitation, today, is personnel-intensive and requires good language skills coupled with substantive and cultural understanding. What approaches can more swiftly and economically process said collection?

5. **Stabilizing the civilian population**: There will be inevitable need to address problems of refugees and displaced persons, mortuary assistance, food
supply, housing and health care. DoD will likely be charged with these challenges: what preparation, training and technology can be applied to facilitate these elements of infrastructure?

6. Re-establishing the rule of law: One important step in establishing order is the need to reconstitute a constabulary force. Improvements are needed in our methods for vetting applicants, tracking them and their behavior, and avoiding friendly fire incidents between them and our own forces. Improved technologies are desirable for their selection, training, and interoperability with US forces.

Furthermore, the use of precision munitions results in much less damage to the enemy's military infrastructure and armed forces. Therefore, the post-hostility phase will likely face large numbers of motivated individuals with military training who view the US as an enemy. Are there techniques and technologies which can identify those who will or will not present an insurgency threat in the post hostilities phase? Can something be done in the pre hostility phase which will minimize or even eliminate post hostility phase insurgency and terrorism problems?

7. Rapid rebuilding of basic infrastructure: This requires reliable communications and interim power and potable water sources. How rapidly can these be inserted? Might there be opportunity for establishing subsequent monitoring capabilities?

After the initial effort, it is critical to put in place the infrastructure, economic enablers, and a political/legal structure to establish a successful post-war economy, a representative and democratic government, and a stable social structure. What can and should DoD do to further these goals? What other agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations should be involved? How should DoD work with them?

In responding to the above challenges, it must be recognized that transitioning to and from hostilities requires such a wide range of capabilities that many are not integral to the Department of Defense (DoD). It is important to manage the transitions in such a way that those capabilities are exploited fully despite organizational boundaries. Sound capability management requires DoD to identify those capabilities resident within other US government agencies, those inherent within DoD and those needing development by the DoD or others. Where the capabilities are external to DoD, provision for their transfer to DoD control if appropriate should be pre-arranged and tested in joint exercises.

This study will be co-sponsored by me as the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), and Under Secretary of Defense
Dr. Craig Fields and Mr. Phil Odeen will serve as co-Chairmen. Dr. Jerry McGinn and COL Kevin McLaughlin will serve as co-Executive Secretaries. LTC Scott Dolgoff, USA, will serve as the Defense Science Board Secretariat Representative.

The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the “Federal Advisory Committee Act,” and DoD Directive 5105.4, the “DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program.” It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into any “particular matters” within the meaning of section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as procurement official.

Michael W. Wynne
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