Terrorism:

Concepts, Causes, and Conflict Resolution

Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution
George Mason University

Advanced Systems and Concepts Office
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Making the World Safer
TERRORISM:
CONCEPTS, CAUSES, AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Advanced Systems and Concepts Office
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

And

Working Group on War, Violence and Terrorism
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution
George Mason University

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Introduction

Dr. Stephen Younger, Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, recently lamented that too much effort has been placed on technological solutions to the war on terrorism, stating "this is not a technology problem" and asserting that "the single most important thing we can do to predict future acts of terrorism is to understand the causes of terrorism." He went on to challenge those trying to come to grips with the post-9/11 threat to think innovatively. This book is a response to his challenge. It attempts to frame a new debate on the nature, causes and solutions to the terrorism threat. The current war, couched in realist terms and being fought largely with military, economic and political power, strives to contain, even destroy the latest iteration of terrorism personified by Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network. Unfortunately, the war as being currently fought probably will not resolve the underlying issues that fomented the devastating attack on the United States, nor will it offer much hope of preventing future outbreaks of terrorism. This is said not to denigrate the courage or sacrifices of thousands striving to cope with the daily threat, nor in any way imply sympathy with Al Qaeda or any others who engage in deadly attacks on innocents. Rather, the statement is made to underscore Dr. Younger's concern that the war is being fought in a single dimension, largely neglecting the long-term causes and the consequences.

To examine new ways of looking at terrorism in hopes of adding to our understanding and thereby increasing our ability not just to combat it, but perhaps to prevent it from rising again, is thus the intent of this book. A fundamental premise centers on the idea that terrorism cannot be isolated from its surroundings; it is at once a form of conflict in itself and, at the same time, a manifestation of a larger set of social and cultural failures. The first embraces those tactical measures, too often brutal and indiscriminate, characteristic of terrorist attacks. The second encompasses the vast range of psychological, social, religious, political and economic causes and goals at the heart of terrorist views of the world. The two cannot be separated; each largely defines the other, both for the terrorists and those struggling to deal with them. It is in hopes of understanding the linkages between the two that this book has been written.

The following pages fuse past and present thinking on terrorism with concepts derived from the field of conflict resolution. Beginning with a definition of terrorism and the implications of various characterizations of terrorists, the study then moves on to a discussion of the basic types and characteristics of terrorism, as well as the operational and tactical imperatives for terrorists to be successful. It concludes with a discussion of the future direction of terrorism. This is followed by an historical outline of terrorism, which, although hardly exhaustive, points out that terrorism neither began nor ended with the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. A brief case study of Middle East terrorism follows to underscore this point. Expanding on the basic concepts
and historical context of the first three chapters, the book next offers a multi-tiered conflict analysis framework for examining the causes and conditions that lead to terrorism. It seeks to provide a useful tool for those attempting to map the current conflict and enhance and facilitate effective responses to the violence. This analytical tool leads to an analysis of the root causes of terrorism. The final chapter pulls many of the ideas previously presented into a discussion of the context and causes of the current war, offering suggestions as to how Bin Laden and his organization might be countered and eventually defeated. The book makes no claim to being definitive in its analysis or its conclusions; rather, it is intended as an intellectual primer in hopes that it may stir debate and perhaps foster new ways of thinking about terrorism. Instead, it tries to analytically step back from the emotional rhetoric so prevalent today and examine terrorism in all its dimensions, in hopes that readers may find the discussions and recommendations eminently pragmatic and shorn of rhetorical or ideological bias. It is understood—indeed, anticipated—that readers will often disagree with the opinions expressed in the chapters; but disagreement should lead to debate and, ultimately, alternatives. It is in that process that Dr. Younger's challenge may be addressed.

The authors of the various chapters in this book represent an eclectic and diverse group, ranging from the professional military to established academic; their biographies can be found in the back. Drawn from George Mason University's Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution and the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the authors bring to their analysis a unique balance of theoretical study and real-world application, both civil and military, in many of the world's bloody conflicts. Some have experienced the horrors of terrorism and war first-hand and have no illusions as to the causes or cures. If the approaches they take may be somewhat outside the paradigms so dominant today, their ideas do not derive from a mistaken sense of utopianism.

This book could not have been produced without the encouragement of the Directors of both the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office and the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, whose dedication to intellectual integrity resulted in a too often rare collaboration between the worlds of academia and policy at a time of national crisis.
Terrorism Definitions and Typologies

William G. Cunningham, Jr.

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the phenomenon commonly referred to as terrorism in order to develop a definition and typology of terrorism. If you are familiar with the literature on this subject, then you realize that this is a fool’s errand. There is little agreement on what constitutes and who practices terrorism even among academics; never mind the myriad of intelligence agencies, militaries, judicial systems and governmental decision making bodies that deal with this subject at the sharp end. This topic is very subjective and it largely depends on an individual’s perceptions and experiences that determine what they think about it. One may relate to the victim or one may relate to the perpetrator, particularly if the perpetrator is from one’s own ethno-national, religious or ideological group. As noted terrorism scholar Bruce Hoffman suggests, “If one identifies with the victim of the violence, for example, then the act is terrorism. If, however, one identifies with the perpetrator, the violent act is regarded in a more sympathetic, if not positive (or, at the worst, ambivalent) light; and it is not terrorism” (Hoffman, 1998, p.31). Perception is one of the core problems in defining terrorism.

In light of this ambiguity, one of the goals of this chapter is to develop a level of objectivity in dealing with this contentious and emotional subject. The other important goals are to explore this troubling phenomenon in order to explain and understand it. I caution the reader that this does not mean that we intend to justify or rationalize it. On the contrary, there are no justifications for using such means for any ends. We seek to explain and understand terrorism in order to come to terms with it and to create and implement policies that will counter it effectively and eliminate the underlying causes that give rise to it. Terrorism, as a form of political violence, has been a problem for hundreds of years. It cannot be eliminated but it can be understood, managed and at times, resolved.

The Problems of Defining Terrorism

By nature terrorism is a complicated and emotionally laden phenomenon. Many disciplines study terrorism including most social science disciplines, history, law, journalism and in interdisciplinary fields such as conflict resolution. Intelligence agencies, militaries and law enforcement examine terrorism in the executive branch,
while legislative and judicial branches in governments and international governmental organizations (IGOs) around the world are also concerned with this troubling phenomenon. This is one of the factors that have led to such definitional confusion over the topic. People view it from their own institutional perspective, disciplinary framework or personal experiences. We examine it through our parochial lenses, whether academic, governmental or experiential. We focus on different aspects of the problem —legal, operational, theoretical and experiential—and we exalt the importance of different issues and concerns. As Charles Kegley notes: “Here let it simply be observed that in addressing terrorism, we are dealing with a value-laden subject that resists precise definition and whose description is often motivated by the desire to condemn, not to offer detached analysis” (Kegley, 1990, p.13). Consequently, we often define terrorism in terms of how we would approach counterterrorism.

There are four predominant models of how terrorism is conceived that frame counterterrorist responses: (1) a crime that should be handled by law enforcement and the judicial system; (2) a form of warfare best suited for a military response; (3) a liberation struggle conducted by oppressed minority, political or religious groups whose desires for self determination or power should be accommodated; and (4) a violent reaction to a complex set of socio-economic, political, cultural and possibly religious variables that have both long term preconditions and short term precipitant causes that need to be addressed with a multifaceted intervention to eliminate underlying causes and cycles of violence. One can readily see that how one frames the problem will help to determine both the desired response, as well as how one defines the problem. The first two models deal with terrorism as a criminal or military problem and are often the approaches of governmental counterterrorist policies. The third model assumes identification with the terrorists and those who seek to change the status quo. By contrast, the first two models seek to maintain the status quo. The fourth model reflects an understanding of the political and socio-economic variables that interact to create the complexity of political violence and terrorism.

This chapter seeks to explore these models and the debates around the important questions that arise regarding definitions and typologies of terrorism. There are three key themes and questions that permeate the literature on defining terrorism. We will use them to frame this analysis.

1. What elements constitute terrorist acts? (What is terrorism?)
2. Who perpetrates terrorist acts? (Who are terrorists?)
3. Why do they use terrorism as a tactic or strategy? (What motivates them to use this type of violence?).

The answers to these questions will help to frame both our definition and typology of terrorism. We will first explore these three themes then we will develop a comprehensive definition and typology of terrorism. A typology of terrorism is necessary to supplement our definition because of the complex and diverse nature of the subject.

The first question, what elements (variables) constitute terrorist acts (single events or incidents—tactics and terrorism campaigns—strategy), addresses the important parameters question. We need to identify the parameters of what is
considered terrorism and importantly, what is not considered terrorism. Important questions related to this topic are:

- What elements constitute an act of terrorism?
- What is terrorism’s relationship to crime?
- What is terrorism’s relationship to war?
- What distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violent political conflict or low intensity warfare such as guerilla warfare, civil war or revolution?
- What is the relationship of the victim(s) to the target and to the attacker?

### Table 1: Terrorism, Crime, War and other forms of Political Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Independent Variable</th>
<th>Terrorism’s Relationship to Variable</th>
<th>Secondary Independent Variables</th>
<th>Types of Activities / Contrast to Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>Crime is viewed as economically motivated rather than politically motivated.</td>
<td>Organized Crime</td>
<td>Terrorizing victims for money or revenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Individual Crime</td>
<td>Murder for personal motive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>War is usually perceived as more legitimate and purposeful than terrorism. It is instrumental and not symbolic violence. There are rules and laws of war to be followed by belligerents. Civilians and non-combatants should not be targeted.</td>
<td>Just War</td>
<td>Self defense. Used against tyranny or an aggressor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Legal War (declared inter-state)</td>
<td>Terrorism is not undeclared war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>War Crimes</td>
<td>Terror and illegal acts committed during war by legal combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Intra-state between recognized belligerents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guerilla War</td>
<td>Guerilla’s hold territory, fight combatants not civilians, wear uniforms, openly carry weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Insurgency / Low Intensity War</td>
<td>Targets governmental control and power – may illegally target non-combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Violence</td>
<td>Terrorism is form of political violence. It is politically motivated to induce change by producing fear. It is illegal and not recognized as a legitimate form of political violence.</td>
<td>Revolution</td>
<td>Mass overthrow of system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Riots – Mass Violence</td>
<td>Temporary, spontaneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Target is single focus / act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>State Repression</td>
<td>Pervasive state terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Equivalent of War Crimes by illegal non-combatants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In their work on political terrorism Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman analyzed hundreds of definitions of terrorism in order to discover key elements and commonalities (Schmid and Jongman, 1988). The five elements that they found in definitions of terrorism with greater than 40 per cent frequency were: *violence or force* (83.5%); *political* (65%); *fear or terror* (51%); *threat* (47%); and *psychological effects and anticipated reactions* (41.5%) (Schmid and Jongman, 1988, p. 5). Accordingly, our
general understanding of terrorism involves an act in which (1) violence or force is used or threatened; (2) it is primarily a political act; (3) it is intended to cause fear or terror in order to achieve (4) psychological effects and reactions. While this provides us with an objective understanding of what constitutes terrorism, it is too broad to be an operational definition. The question that begs to be answered is what are the particular qualities of terrorism that differentiate it from other, perhaps legitimate forms of political violence? Although there is no single answer to this question, some general statements can be made. First, the victims of terrorist attacks are usually civilians and not combatants. Terrorists do not usually target armed police or soldiers who have the capability to fight back, although some groups have been known to do so. Second, the perpetrators are not recognized combatants—they do not carry arms openly nor do they wear recognizable uniforms or insignia prior to or during attacks. Third, terrorists do not recognize the rules and laws of war—their acts are by definition violations of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilians in Time of War (1949). Fourth, terrorist acts are by nature symbolic and not instrumental—the act itself is not sufficient to bring about the desired change. Fifth, the immediate victims of the attack are not necessarily the intended targets—the intended target is the wider audience. It is the reactions of the wider audience, reactions of fear and terror, which are sought to influence governments to bring about the desired change.

Due to terrorism's violent and usually political nature, many analysts and researchers explore terrorism's relationship to war. War can be conceived of as a form of power based problem solving or conflict resolution. It is a violent form of resolving conflict and it reflects a winner take all, zero-sum competition. It is a violent means to a political end. Terrorism is distinct from true warfare in several respects. First, warfare is instrumental; it is a means to an end that has some reasonable prospect of being fulfilled. By contrast, terrorism is largely symbolic; the act itself signifies a larger meaning, a communicative act to a target audience, but it has little hope of actually accomplishing the ends it sets out to achieve. Second, in the current international state system, only nation-states have a legitimate and lawful ability to declare and wage war. Most terrorist groups are sub-national organizational units and not nation-states (we will examine state sponsored terrorism later) and therefore cannot lawfully use force. Third, the very nature of terrorist acts violates the norms, rules and laws of war. Even guerilla groups operate as organized armies and they often obey the rules of war by not targeting civilians. Their purpose is to take and hold territory as in conventional warfare. Bruce Hoffman (1998, p. 34) notes:

Accordingly, in theory, if not always in practice, the rules of war … not only grant civilian non-combatants immunity from attack, but also;

- Prohibit taking civilians as hostages;
- Impose regulations governing the treatment of captured or surrendered soldiers (POWs);
- Outlaw reprisals against either civilians or POWs;
- Recognize neutral territory and the rights of citizens of neutral states; and
• Uphold the inviolability of diplomats and other accredited representatives.

Terrorists do not accept or follow the laws of war. Instead, they target civilians and other non-combatants as a means of causing and spreading terror. Brian Jenkins notes that terrorism’s relationship to war is closer to war crimes than legitimate military operations: “Why should persons not explicitly granted soldiers’ status be given greater leeway to commit violence than soldiers have? Under the laws-of-war approach, terrorism would comprise all acts committed in peacetime that, if committed during war, would constitute war crimes” (Jenkins in Kegley, 1990, p. 29).

If terrorism can be conceived of as the moral if not legal equivalent of war crimes, we need to understand the relationship that terrorism also has to ordinary crime. Brian Jenkins explores this below.

Terrorism differs from ordinary crime in its political purpose and in its primary objective. … Likewise, not all politically motivated violence is terrorism. … Terrorism is not synonymous with guerilla war or any other kind of war and it is not reserved exclusively for those trying to overthrow governments (Jenkins in Kegley, 1990, p. 30).

The primary difference between terrorist acts and ‘ordinary’ crime is the political motivation of terrorists. Criminals may and often do terrorize their victims. However, their purpose is not to terrorize but to extract property, money or other tangible assets for personal enrichment or satisfaction. Terrorism is motivated by larger political causes and the acts are symbolically carried out in order to further that cause. Although most terrorist acts are violations of criminal statutes they differ qualitatively from ordinary crime by their underlying motivation. Furthermore, many terrorist groups commit ‘ordinary’ criminal acts such as bank robberies, extortion and fraud in order to support their organization financially. This is not to say that it is inappropriate to use law enforcement, criminal codes, judicial and legal processes and penal systems to deal with the problem of terrorism. Most governments respond with some levels of police and legal interventions to terrorism. However, the problem with using the criminalization approach is that it only deals with the after effects and not the underlying causes of terrorism. It is a potent and useful tool for counterterrorism, but it should not be the only tool that governments rely on to deal with terrorism.

If terrorism is not a legitimate or recognized form of warfare and it is not the same as ordinary crime, it must have distinguishing features that define it as a distinct form of political violence. Key distinctions include targeting policies and operational practices, as well as levels of legitimacy and popular support for both the terrorist group and their cause. One of the key factors in determining the legitimacy of political actors and actions is determining their level of popular support. Mass political movements like revolutions and civil wars have often been seen as a legitimate form of political expression if the rebelling party has popular support and a perceived legitimate cause and stake in the political system. However, they can be perceived as illegitimate if they represent minority viewpoints or are directed by external powers or agents.
not a mass political movement firmly grounded in the strength of numbers of supporters. Fromkin discusses this issue: “Revolution, like war, is the strategy of the strong; terrorism is the strategy of the weak. It is an uncertain and indirect strategy that employs the weapon of fear in a special sort of way in which to make governments react” (Fromkin in Kegley, 1990; p. 56). Fromkin defines strength and weakness here as a function of popular support. Power for revolutions is derived from a mandate from the masses and not the fringe political beliefs of terrorists. Minority fringe actors who call for wider rebellion often use terrorism; without popular support for the actors’ goals, this call often goes unheeded.

Terrorism, as used by non-state actors, is a revolutionary strategy. Its purpose is to influence and destabilize political systems and to overthrow governments. It is usually employed by the weak to attack the strong. The history of terrorism in the 20th century shows it to be a very unsuccessful strategy. At the root of terrorism strategy is the Asset to Liability Shift Theory. This theory hypothesizes that governments view colonies, national territories and such, as assets and it is in their interest to defend them if necessary. It further assumes that a campaign of terror will cost the government valuable lives and money in defending these assets against a sustained terrorist campaign. After suffering significant losses the asset will become instead, a liability and the government will decide to forfeit the asset and cut their losses. Hence, the objective is to destabilize the territory and make it ‘ungovernable’. Subsequently, the governmental power will withdraw and remove the perceived threat to their ethno-national, religious or ideological identity. Terrorists believe that during a successful campaign the government will overreact and become oppressive in order to combat the terrorists. The populace will then see the government for what it really is and rise up in revolt. That is the theory at least. In practice however, it rarely works.

A final distinction is made regarding the operational disposition of terrorist acts. While we have discussed the targeting of non-combatants, we have not revealed the tactics most favored by terrorists. Brian Jenkins notes that: “Terrorists operate with a limited tactical repertoire. Six basic terrorist tactics comprise 95 percent of all terrorist incidents: bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnappings, barricade and hostage situations and hijackings” (Jenkins in Kegley, 1990, p. 36). These acts are usually carried out by a small handful of operatives who are supported by an organization that is usually comprised of less than 100 active participants. Although the terrorists may have support from sympathizers to their cause, particularly if they claim to represent an ethno-national group, it is still regarded as relatively minor political activity and not reflective of mass political movements that are capable of changes at the systemic levels.

To summarize our understanding of what constitutes a terrorist act: it is a violent act or threat of violence against civilians or non-combatants in order to further a political cause by the psychological affects of the terror created by the act. Furthermore, the act is symbolic and not instrumental in that it is an illegitimate and often unrealistic means to a political end. The target of the attack is used as a symbol to send a message to political leadership in order that they may decide to accede to the terrorists’ demands, if any. It is an illegitimate form of political violence that differs in significant ways from both war and crime. The tactics employed are usually, but not limited to bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnappings, hijackings and hostage situations
With this understanding of what the act entails, we now turn to the actors who commit terrorism.

The second question, who perpetrates terrorist acts or who practices terrorism, asks the important identity question. This question is the most contentious in the literature because there are a wide variety of individuals, groups and nation-states that allegedly engage in terrorism. Who is labeled a terrorist is largely a function of the observer. Not only does the term cover a wide variety of activities by a divergent set of actors, but also the term itself has become pejorative. One does not go around referring to oneself as a terrorist. As Gary G. Sick points out, “The cliché that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ is no less true for being trite” (Sick in Kegley, 1990, p. 52). Therefore, because the label is pejorative and highly subjective, it is largely perception and the perspective of the observer that determine it. The way out of this dilemma is to examine the behavior or acts of ‘terrorists’ and objectively apply our definition. If the act fits the definition then it has passed the first test. If the act does not fit the definition then we may be observing some other phenomena. The second test is to strive for intersubjective meaning. Essentially this entails wider agreement on perceptions and understanding of the act among many observers. The important thing to keep in mind here is that, because perception is the key variable, one must not fall into the trap of labeling one’s enemy’s terrorists and one’s friend’s freedom fighters.

Many analysts discuss the problem of who are ‘terrorists’ and who are ‘freedom fighters’, however few go beyond their understanding that it is largely a matter of perception. The same act can be perceived by an observer to be terrorism while it is perceived by another observer as ‘striking a blow for freedom’ or whatever preferred cause. Most analysts do not delve deeper and ask how this problem emerges. They simply accept that it is a matter of perception and a problem without a solution. Because this is one of the most contentious areas of terrorism definitional research we need to address this problem in more detail.

This problem is twofold. First, humans look for meaning and attempt to understand behavior by identifying causes of behavior; this is known as behavior attribution (Wilmot and Hocker, 2001, p.28). Psychologists understand that behavior (B) is a function of personal dispositions (D) and situational factors (S). The behavior attribution equation therefore, is B = D + S. What this means is that our behavior is a result of who we are (our personal dispositions–our ‘personality’) and the situations (circumstances and environment) that we find ourselves in. For example, an individual acts differently in a job interview than while out to dinner with friends, even though their personality does not change. When we search for meaning in behavior we often commit what is known as the fundamental attribution error. Essentially what this means is that when we examine our own negative behavior we attribute causes to the situational factors rather than to our personal dispositions. When we examine other people’s negative behavior we tend to attribute it to their personal dispositions rather than to the situation. Conversely, when we do something positive we tend to attribute it to our own dispositions, rather than to the situation. For example, there are two peers who both apply for a promotion and neither one of them achieve it (perceived behavior). Each will tend to blame situational factors (e.g. the promotion criteria were unfair) for their own failure and they will blame personal dispositions for the behavior of the other person (e.g. they are incompetent or otherwise unfit for promotion). The fundamental attribution
error is used to fool ourselves into believing that we are not to blame for our own misbehavior and that others are entirely to blame for theirs. We use it to protect our positive self-esteem and self-identities and to reinforce negative images and stereotypes of others. This is part of the reason why people who commit terrorist acts are viewed as criminals by some observers and as patriots by others. How we attribute behavior is related to our perceptions of self and other, as well as our need to create systems of enemies and allies.

The second problem is that psychologists have discovered that humans have a deep-rooted psychological need to dichotomize and to establish a system of enemies and allies (Volkan, 1990, p. 31). This phenomenon happens on individual and group levels. This is especially important with regard to the formation of ethnic or national group identities, particularly if our sense of identity is under threat (Volkan, 1990). Humans need to maintain positive self and group identities and we begin to view members of our in-groups as allies and members of out-groups as enemies. We project our negative images onto our enemies in order to save positive images for our own group and ourselves. Identification with these ethnic or national groups largely determines how we relate to people within our in-groups and with those of our out-groups. Therefore, we tend to think of ourselves as incapable of such atrocities as terrorism or war crimes; or if we do commit them and we are able to acknowledge it, the situation demanded that we act in this manner. For our enemies, we expect them to act this way because of their inherent personal or cultural flaws. This is how the fundamental attribution error combines with enemy system theory to make terrorism a subjective experience. As Hoffman notes, “On one point, at least, everyone agrees: terrorism is a pejorative term. It is a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to one’s enemies and opponents or to those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore” (Hoffman, 1998, p.31). Because the term is exploited and used to demonize one’s enemies, an objective use of the term based on an acceptable definition is an appropriate goal not only of scholars, but also of counterterrorism practitioners and decision makers. If we cannot do anything to change how these micro level processes work, at least we can understand how and why they operate.

What this means for our understanding of terrorists is that we proscribe our enemies as terrorists and we excuse our own or our friends’, terrorist behavior based on the situation. This is how we can define gross violations of human rights as either terrorists (our enemies–Al Qaeda) or freedom fighters (our friends–anti-communist insurgents). However, before we dismiss this as mere psychological trickery, we must recognize that not only do we operate this way, but our enemies do as well. This is why some Palestinians were recorded dancing in the streets on September 11th. They perceived the perpetrators of those acts as (1) allies and not enemies and (2) the situation (the struggle for a Palestinian state, Israeli-American hegemony, etc.) excused this egregious behavior. The view from Washington is very different to say the least. The perpetrators of those acts are not only seen as (1) enemies, but (2) their behavior is a result of their personal attributes (they have been demonized as evil). While this does not explain why people commit such indefensible acts, it does explain how we perceive and define such acts based on who we are as observers and our relationships to the victims as well as the perpetrators. We must keep this in mind if we are to develop
objective definitions and typologies of terrorism that will assist us in our search for meaning and effective policies to deal with this phenomenon. Michael Stohl offers an approach to the problem that has logical merit.

This cliché confuses what terrorism is with the terrorist actor. An actor is a terrorist when the actor employs terrorist methods. While one may wish to argue that the particular ends justify particular means that does not alter what those means are. … Until we are willing to treat one man’s terrorist as everyman’s terrorist, we will make very little progress in either our understanding of the problem of terrorism or begin to take steps to effectively reduce its occurrence (Stohl in Kegley, 1990, pp. 89-90).

Until we recognize the confusion between actors and acts, we will not be able to come to terms with this phenomenon. Those who perpetrate terrorist acts are terrorists, whether they are allies or enemies and whether they are sub-national groups or governments.

The second part of the answer as to who practices terrorism is a level of analysis question. The assumption here is that a wide variety of actors—from individuals (Carlos Illych Ramirez -the Jackal; the Unabomber) to groups (Tamil Tigers, Provisional IRA, Hamas) to institutions (Gestapo, KGB, SAVAK) and finally to governments and states (Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge, the Taliban)—practice what we define as terrorism. It is assumed that a variety of non-state actors use terrorism as a tactic or strategy. There are two core issues regarding who practices terrorism. The first is how to classify groups that engage in terrorist activities. The second is whether nation-states (governments) practice terrorism or if their terroristic behaviors are defined by some other category of political violence. Some analysts observe that the behavior of governments is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the levels of violence and objectives that non-state actors exhibit. Non-state actors seek to change the status quo, while state actors seek to maintain it. Charles Kegley poses the following question: “Is ‘functionary’ or establishment terror to be justified because it seeks to preserve the status quo, whereas revolutionary terror is to be condemned because it seeks political change?” (Kegley, 1990, p. 19). During the Cold War when priorities were different and fighting Soviet hegemony was paramount, friends who practiced state terrorism were ignored (the Shah’s Iran, Somoza’s Nicaragua, Marcos’ Philippines) while the state terrorism practiced behind the Iron Curtain was vilified. Falk highlights this view below.

My argument is that it is futile and hypocritical self-deception to suppose that we can use the word terrorism to establish a double standard pertaining to the use of political violence. … Terrorism, then, is used here to designate any type of political violence that lacks an adequate moral and legal justification, regardless of whether the actor is a revolutionary group or a government (Richard A. Falk in Kegley, 1990, p. 39).

Falk’s argument revolves around a disputed concept in terrorism research. There are some analysts who prefer to term internal state repression ‘terror’ in order to...
distinguish it as a separate but related form of political violence. Hoffman takes this approach below.

But these state—sanctioned or explicitly ordered acts of internal political violence directed mostly against domestic populations—that is, rule by violence and intimidation by those already in power against their own citizenry—are generally termed ‘terror’ in order to distinguish that phenomenon from ‘terrorism’, which is understood to be violence committed by non-state entities (Hoffman, 1998, p. 25).

However, if we are to come to terms with this troubling phenomenon we need to eliminate double standards. Rather than muddy the waters and term such state performed violence as ‘terror’ or ‘human rights violations’, we should call them acts of terrorism and include them in our definition and typology. Nation-states are included as actors in our typology and the table below.

**Table 2: Contingency Levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Analysis</th>
<th>Terrorist Actors</th>
<th>Level of Systemic Threat</th>
<th>Perceived Threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global-Ecological</td>
<td>International Terrorist Group</td>
<td>Global-Ecological</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-societal / International</td>
<td>International Terrorist Group</td>
<td>Systemic-Worldview</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Terrorist Group</td>
<td>Transnational (regional)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal / National</td>
<td>Nation-state Government</td>
<td>National-Government</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Terrorist Group</td>
<td>National-Revolutionary</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Terrorist Group</td>
<td>National-sub-revolutionary</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Terrorist Group</td>
<td>National-Separatist</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Terrorist Group</td>
<td>Sub-national-Autonomous</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group / Organizational</td>
<td>Regional Terrorist Group</td>
<td>Single Focus (issue)</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Unaffiliated Individual Terrorist</td>
<td>Interpersonal</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third question is why do people, groups or governments choose terrorism as a tactic or strategy? This is a very complicated question and it is addressed elsewhere in this book in more detail. However, we will offer a few ideas from the literature in order to understand the phenomenon more fully. Most of the literature on terrorist motivation comes from psychology and social psychology and they address micro level issues. Models of terrorist motivation range from the psychodynamic to the behavioral. The psychodynamic approach began with a search for a ‘terrorist personality type’ and it developed a lot of descriptive material and profiles of particular terrorists. However useful these may be when examining or investigating single cases, they have not proven their ability to create more generic models of terrorist behavior. As opposed to the psychodynamic proclivity to find a certain ‘terrorist personality type’, behaviorists such as Maxwell Taylor argue that this is not a useful approach (Taylor, 1988). Taylor found no common personality types among the terrorists he has interviewed. Further, he does not believe that terrorists represent an abnormal group in society. Taylor prefers to uncover the environmental conditions that create the atmosphere that gives
rise to terrorism. He also focuses on the relevant rewards that reinforce the terrorist’s lifestyle of violent behavior.

Most explorations of terrorist motivation begin with frustration—aggression theory that is based on the stimulus—response hypothesis. It is hypothesized that terrorists choose terrorism because they have become frustrated at the fact that their political causes will not be realized and that this represents a significant and unacceptable frustration of their goal seeking behavior. However, this is too simple and it ignores the fact that many frustrated political activists do not choose terrorism as a default strategy if they become frustrated at their lack of political progress.

One of the most important psychological concepts that shed light on terrorist behavior is cognitive dissonance. Humans seek consistency in terms of values, behavior and their environmental conditions. When people experience a difference between what they perceive and what they desire (cognitive dissonance), they seek to reduce this dissonance by reducing this gap through actions, filtering information or altering perceptions. Cognitive dissonance is the experienced discrepancy between preferred and actual states. It produces anxiety, fear and the desire to eliminate the discrepancy. For example, a young man grows up in a cultural heritage that is rich in traditions, history and former glories, but it is passed its peak and is not the dominant worldview or value system. This man believes that his cultural system, including its religion, should not only be the dominant worldview, but also the one true faith. This man would experience cognitive dissonance between his preferred and actual states with regard to his cultural and religious identity. He would seek to reduce this dissonance by filtering out information, changing his perceptions or through actions designed to bring about his preferred state of affairs. With popular support from those members of his group who share similar cognitive dissonance, this personal dissonance grows to become group level grievances and discontentment. This transforms the underlying psychological elements into macro-level phenomenon such as relative deprivation. This relative deprivation is the perceived difference between value expectations and value capabilities (Gurr, 1970). Relative deprivation can be viewed as a form of group cognitive dissonance, which often leads to the mobilization of groups for political action (elections, popular uprisings, riots and revolutions). If there are no widespread or group experiences of relative deprivation but rather a few people experience cognitive dissonance, then those few will seek to eliminate the dissonance through adaptive or maladaptive means. Maladaptive means could include forming a terrorist organization and carrying out terrorist acts. In this case terrorism is their strategy for reducing the gap between their preferred and actual states. It is their means of creating social change because they lack the legitimacy that mass support creates. However, not all people who experience cognitive dissonance or relative deprivation choose to commit terrorist acts. Some people take the adaptive route to their dissonance and choose political mobilization and peaceful processes (e.g. elections). Choices will depend on individuals, groups and their environment.

In general, non-state actors are motivated to change the system and state actors are motivated to preserve the status quo and maintain the political system. It is chosen as a strategy out of fear and weakness. Political leaders and governments that choose to terrorize do so out of a fear of loosing or never obtaining complete control. They lack legitimacy and popular support and they rule by intimidation and fear. Non-state actors
choose terrorism as a strategy out of weakness and a lack of legitimacy. If they operated from a powerful base with popular support and perceived legitimacy they would not need to spread fear but could choose more legitimate forms of political expression, such as elections or possibly revolution, if the system did not adapt to the changes that they desired and could reasonably achieve.

One of the great mysteries of terrorist motivation is why certain people and groups choose it and others in similar circumstances do not. Understanding the personal motivation of individual terrorists is also important. Peter A. Olsson explored the conversion of victims into terrorists and has written about the personal pathway model. Olsson believes that terrorists often perceive themselves to be the personification of a victimized ethnic group’s fantasized liberation; they try to regain what has been lost. Olsson defines this model with four primary elements:

1. Early socialization into a violent environment
2. Narcissistic injuries (i.e.: negative self-identity)
3. Escalatory events (i.e.: conversion experience)
4. Personal connections to terrorist groups (Olsson in Volkan, 1990, p. 188)

When applied to individuals this model is generic enough to explain the conversion of victim to terrorist in such diverse contexts as Belfast, Belgrade and Bethlehem. For example, many IRA operatives come from the Catholic ghettos of west Belfast, a notoriously violent environment. Because of such factors as poverty and the ethnic victimization of second-class citizenship, many children grow up with negative self and group identities. Personal experiences of physical abuse by police, army troops or loyalist terrorists, often result in converting the victim of such abuse into violent felons or terrorists. Finally, personal connections to terrorist groups through family, school or neighbourhood contacts often complete the conversion. The personal pathway model offers an explanation for why some members of groups who suffer from ethno-national or religious identity victimization become terrorists and others do not. This is one of the most salient questions in research on terrorism today.

The second aspect of motivation of terrorism comes from macro level phenomenon. This is a two-part answer that addresses the long-term underlying preconditions and short-term precipitant causes that relate to macro or societal level issues. As with the micro level issues regarding terrorist motivation there are no simple answers or silver bullets. The macro level phenomena that combine to create the conditions that give rise to terrorism are complex and difficult to reduce to simple models. Popular macro level explanations for the causes of terrorism are relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970)—as discussed in relation to cognitive dissonance and structural violence (Galtung, 1969). Although both theories hypothesize the presence of significant socio-economic indicators that can serve as breeding grounds for terrorists, they do not answer the question of why some people or groups in the same structurally disadvantaged situations choose terrorism and others do not. As structural variables are explored elsewhere in this book, we turn to a discussion of schools of thought over the contentious issue of root causes of terrorism.

In the West, there are two mainstream and one contending school of thought regarding the nature of terrorism. The mainstream schools are divided over the question
of whether there are root causes of terrorism. Those who believe that there are root causes of terrorism base their assumptions on the hypothesis that there are necessary conditions that give rise to terrorism. These conditions are experiences such as a history of colonialism, ethnic, minority, cultural or religious persecution, political repression and economic deprivation. This approach may be referred to as the liberal school.

The other mainstream school assumes that the search for root causes only acts to justify the terrorist’s unjustifiable acts. For them, terrorism is not rooted in conditions but caused by extremists and fanatics who choose to ignore conventional norms in order to influence the political environment. This school of thought is the conservative school. Those who support the liberal approach tend to be scholars and researchers. Many who agree with the conservative school tend to be security analysts, police and military officials and government representatives. Noted historian Walter Laqueur argues that terrorism is largely a matter of the perception of traditions and political calculations.

History shows it has little to do with the severity of the oppression measured by any acceptable standard; terrorism is largely a matter of perception, of historical, social and cultural traditions and of political calculus (Laqueur, 1999, p. 36).

This view cuts across both liberal and conservative schools of thought, but does not dislodge their claims to the presence or lack of sources.

The contending approach is the radical school. The radical school views the mainstream approaches as two sides of the same coin. Radicals critique the liberal and conservative pro-Western and anti-Eastern bias. This distinction between mainstream and radical views was heavily influenced by Cold War ideologies and the nature of the bi-polar world. The radicals critique the mainstream by arguing that they ignore the terrorism practiced by the U.S. and their allies. Further, as Halkides (1995, p. 254) observes, they criticize the mainstream view of terrorism ‘as an attempt by the enemies of the West to destabilize Western democracy and undermine Western interests.’ Consequently, the debate between the mainstream and radical approaches is largely over ideology and the classification of who practices terrorism. The key assumption challenged here is that our allies never practice terrorism, but our enemies often do.

A further consideration is that the solutions prescribed by the schools of thought to counter terrorism are defined by their stand on the issue of root causes. Consequently, the liberal approach seeks to eliminate the root causes of terror: political oppression and economic deprivation for a start. Once the causes of terrorism are eliminated, the liberal school assumes, there will be no reason for groups to engage in such types of violence. On the other hand, the conservative school suggests that the only solution is to crush the dissenters with force using the police and the military. They assume that those groups using terror will only respond to power and they are not really interested in political solutions. This is a realpolitik view of terrorism, based on assumptions of power politics and the rational actor model.

The radical school of thought would argue that the root causes of terrorism stem from Western colonialism, capitalism and imperialist hegemony and therefore the West
must change in order to eliminate the underlying causes of terrorism. With the end of the Cold War and the changing dynamics of the international system, we should add globalization to the list of causes and sources of radical discontentment. With this in mind we now turn to an analysis of definitions of terrorism and offer one of our own.

Defining Terrorism

The purpose of this section is to compare and contrast specific definitions of terrorism and to address the questions raised in the previous sections by developing a comprehensive definition. There are literally hundreds of definitions of terrorism from such diverse sources as academics, law enforcement agencies, legislatures, intelligence agencies, militaries and other governmental and international governmental organizations. This is reflective of the problem of perception and parochialism that was discussed at the beginning of this chapter. We begin our review with an academic perspective from Professor Martha Crenshaw who defines terrorism as:

The deliberate and systematic use or threat of violence to coerce changes in political behavior. It involves symbolic acts of violence, intended to communicate a political message to watching audiences (Crenshaw in Sick, 1990, p. 53).

While avoiding the pitfall of pejorative connotations, this conception gives us a useful working definition of terrorism. The important elements of this definition are:

- deliberate and systematic—not mindless and random or sociopathic
- symbolic use or threat of violence—sometimes a threat is all that is needed, but violence is implicit—however, the violence is symbolic and not instrumental;
- political behavior—a political act, not primarily economic as ordinary crime, it is also intended to alter behavior; and communication: the target audience usually lies beyond those victims who are directly affected by the act itself.

The problem with the definition of political behavior is that it is so broad that almost any act of political violence could be conceived to fall within the boundaries of this definition. However, it is still useful as a conceptual starting point. There are many researchers of terrorism who come to the conclusion that the reason for the definitional problems stems from confusion over what it is we are really talking about. Laqueur argues that one definition will not fit all forms of terrorism, as there are many divergent forms.

As we have seen, terrorism has been defined in many different ways and little can be said about it with certainty except that it is the use of violence by a group for political ends, usually directed against a government, but at times also against another ethnic group, class, race, religion or political movement. Any attempt to be more specific is bound to fail, for the simple
reason that there is not one but many different terrorisms (Laqueur, 1999, p.46).

Laqueur’s notions give us caution as we attempt to discover the characteristics of divergent forms of terrorism. We agree that there are many forms of terrorism but disagree that these diverse forms and actors cannot be systematically and scientifically defined and categorized. Part of the problem is that not only is the phenomenon itself difficult to explain, but there is a distinct variability among observers who seek to define it. As Brian Jenkins notes,

The term “terrorism” has no precise or widely accepted definition. If it were a mere matter of description, establishing a definition would be simple: Terrorism is violence or the threat of violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm—in a word, to terrorize—and thereby bring about some social or political change (Jenkins in Kegley, 1990, p. 28).

Jenkins argues, correctly, that the problem isn’t one of mere description; it is a problem of observer bias based on perception and political motivation. Jenkins identifies the core of this problem when he suggests, “Terrorism can be objectively defined by the quality of the act, but not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause” (Jenkins in Kegley, 1990; p. 29). Consequently, the problem is not what terrorism is, but who perpetrates it. Paul R. Pillar clarifies this problem and proposes a definitional solution:

Its [U.S. government] message should be that terrorist techniques, in any context, are unacceptable. Which gets to the most important point to remember about definitions: terrorism is a method—a particularly heinous and damaging one—rather than a set of adversaries or the causes they pursue (Pillar, 2001, p. 18).

Therefore, if one conceives of terrorism as a method, rather than a set of actors or their goals, one can remain more subjective and less subject to observer bias.

There are many leading theorists who offer definitions of terrorism but many are redundant and overlap and we do not have space here to address them all. By examining a few key definitions we hope to separate the definitional wheat from chaff. Richard Shultz offers a simple and concise definition: “In essence, political terrorism is goal directed, employed in pursuit of political objectives. It is calculated violence directed at affecting the views and behavior of specific groups” (Richard Shultz in Kegley, 1990, p. 45). The important elements here are goal directed—external purpose greater than the act; political objectives—not criminal; calculated violence—not sociopathic; affecting behavior—it is meant to communicate a message and affect the behavior of a wider audience than the immediate target. In many respects this is similar to Crenshaw’s conceptualization and it suffers from the same problem of being too broad. However, Shultz, like Crenshaw, captures the essence of terrorism well.
In order to counter the problem of too broad a definition we will examine more detailed and specific definitions below. Schultz offers more detail in the definition that follows.

Political terrorism may be defined as the threat and/or use of extra normal forms of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of achieving certain political objectives/goals. Such goals constitute the long range and short-term objectives that the group or movement seek to obtain. These will differ from group to group. Such action generally is intended to influence the behavior and attitudes of certain targeted groups much wider than its immediate victims. However, influencing behavior is not the only aim of terrorist acts. The ramifications of political terrorism may or may not extend beyond national boundaries (Shultz in Kegley, 1990, pp. 45-46).

Schultz highlights the issues of extra normal forms of political violence, goal directed, intended to influence behavior of target group beyond immediate victims and terrorism may have wider implications beyond national boundaries. He uses a number of qualifiers such as ‘in varying degrees’ and ‘differ from group to group’ to suggest that there is a range of behavior and objectives that can be incorporated here. This is to accommodate the wide range of behavior, motivators and context that relate to terrorist group activities. This range of behavior is taken for granted in other definitions. Hoffman also incorporates more specific elements into his definition below.

We may therefore now attempt to define terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within and thereby intimidate, a wider ‘target audience’ that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale (Hoffman, 1998, pp. 43-44).

Hoffman chooses to focus on the deliberate exploitation of fear through violence or threat, the pursuit of political change, the psychological affects beyond target groups, the fact that it is power based and that publicity is used to influence change. The issues of power and publicity (mass media and communication) should not be overlooked. Most of the power of terrorism is derived from the responses to the act and not the act of terrorism itself. This power is the power to terrorize and cause fear. This fear is spread by the media and by our individual and collective responses to the terrorist acts. How we respond to terrorism after an event or incident is as important as our attempts
at prevention. Ignoring or minimizing the psychological and communicative aspects of terrorism is to treat it as other, more legitimate forms of political violence. Finally, Alex Schmid offers his detailed conceptualization below.

Terrorism is an anxiety—inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population and serve as message generators. Threat-and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought (Schmid and Jongman, 1988, p. 28).

Schmid focuses on the anxiety inspiring (fear or terror) and repeated violent action of terrorism. He also acknowledges that the actors are individuals, groups or states and that they use terrorism for idiosyncratic, criminal or political purposes. This contends with those who believe in terrorism’s inherent political nature and with those who believe that states do not commit terrorism, but rather terror. He also highlights the distinction between direct targets and main targets and that the targets (random or symbolic) are message generators for communication process intended to change behavior of main audience—for intimidation, coercion or propaganda purposes. Schmid and Hoffman both address many of the qualities that define terrorism as a distinct form of political violence—indirect targeting and communication to a wider audience. Most instrumental acts of violence do not share these qualities.

Now that we have explored some important academic definitions of terrorism, it is necessary to contrast them with governmental definitions. In general, governmental definitions are more concise and focused than academic definitions. However, they are also too broad and miss important elements. Hoffman provides us with U.S. government definitions below (Hoffman, 1998, p. 38). Both the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency use Title 22 of the U.S. Code—Section 2656f (d) below:

Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

Federal Bureau of Investigation:

The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

Department of Defense:
The unlawful use of—or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.

While the State Department definition addresses premeditation and the noncombatant status of victims, it does not address state actors or the psychological affects of the acts. It also fails to mention the illegal or illegitimate nature of such acts. The FBI definition addresses the illegal nature of the acts, but it does not address the actors. It does suggest that there are political or social objectives that add a little depth to the definition. The Department of Defense definition adds religious and ideological objectives and eliminates general social ones. It mentions the unlawful nature but it also fails to address the issue of actors. By way of contrast to U.S. government definitions, Schmid and Jongman (1988, p. 34) provide us with one from the United Kingdom’s 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA):

For the purposes of the legislation, terrorism is “the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.

This simple and broad definition is similar in brevity and scope to the U.S. government definitions. Under this definition one could include interstate war, genocide and a variety of other types of political violence. While they are more succinct than the academic definitions they also suffer from their own deficiencies.

Paul R. Pillar (2001, pp. 13-14) summarizes four elements of terrorism that are common among governmental definitions:

1. Premeditation— must be intent and prior decision to commit an act that would qualify as terrorism—terrorism is not a matter of momentary rage or impulse.
2. Political motivation—excludes criminal violence motivated by monetary gain or personal vengeance.
3. Targets are noncombatants—terrorists attack people who cannot defend themselves with violence in return.
4. Perpetrators are either sub-national groups or clandestine agents.

While these four elements are essential for a comprehensive definition of terrorism, Pillar misses the psychological and communicative nature as well as the distinction of immediate victims and secondary (wider audience) targets. As is common with governmental definitions, Pillar excludes state actors. Jonathan White summarizes the criticism of legal definitions: “The problem with legal definitions of terrorism is that they account for neither the social or political nature of terrorism. Violence is the result of complex social factors that range beyond narrow legal limitations and foreign policy restrictions” (White, 1991, pp. 5). We suggest that this is fair criticism of U.S. governmental definitions of terrorism. While they are concise, they are also too broad.
They are simpler and easier to comprehend than the academic definitions, but they also lack the depth of understanding of the salient issues that make terrorism a distinct and illegitimate form of political violence. With this criticism in mind we offer the following definition of terrorism:

Terrorism is defined as the illegitimate use or threat of violence to further political objectives. It is illegitimate in that it targets civilians and/or non-combatants and it is perpetrated by clandestine agents of state and non-state actors in contravention of the laws of war and criminal statutes. It is symbolic and premeditated violence whose purpose is to communicate a message to a wider population than the immediate victims of violence. It is designed to affect this audience by creating psychological states of fear in order to influence decision-makers to change policies, practices or systems that are related to the perpetrators’ political objectives. These objectives can be either systemic or sub-systemic and may be motivated by complex social forces including, but not limited to, ideology, ethno-nationalism or religious extremism.

While this definition suffers from conceptual limitations as others do, it attempts to overcome the problems of being too broad or simple to be operational and too complex to be useful.

The literature on terrorism research points toward two conclusions: (1) terrorism is an illegitimate method of political violence that is perpetrated by both state and non-state actors and (2) our friends as well as enemies engage in terrorism in its different forms. Therefore, in order to counter terrorism effectively, all forms and practitioners of terrorism should be managed—either through conversion to peaceful political competition over the long term, imprisoned or, if all attempts at resolution fail, dealt with through the use of force.

**Typologies of Terrorism**

The second major problem in understanding the parameters of terrorism is that of developing a useful typology. Because our definition covers a wide range of behavior, a typology needs to be used in order to distinguish between divergent types of terrorism. This is a further definitional problem, as there are no universally accepted typologies for terrorism. For example, Jonathan R. White observes that Professor Paul Wilkinson distinguishes between criminal, political and state sponsored terrorism, while J. Bowyer Bell’s typology outlines six types of terrorism: psychotic, criminal, vigilante, endemic, authorized and revolutionary (White, 1991, pp. 10-11). Part of the problem is that the environments in which terrorists operate are dynamic and not static. Also, terrorism is a global phenomenon and what may be an accurate observation of terrorist groups in the Middle East may not be necessarily true in Latin America or Europe. This is due to the socio-economic, political and cultural contexts in which these groups operate. This led Wilkinson to conclude, “terrorism is dynamic and should be situationally defined” (White, 1991, pp. 10). Typologies are useful models to supplement our definition, but they do not solve all of the methodological problems. Models are reductionist and therefore they
loose a lot of detail. Further, the phenomena of terrorism changes over time while our theoretical models remain static. It is hoped that by understanding these limitations of definitions and typologies that we may use them to frame our analysis but not determine causality or outcomes. White suggests, “To be usable, typologies must account for a group’s political motivation origins, scope of actions and the focus of its attention” (White, 1991, p. 9). Most typologies do not incorporate all of these elements, indeed it would be difficult to do so, but it is a useful guideline. Several popular terrorism typologies are compared in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wilkinson</th>
<th>Bell</th>
<th>Crozier</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Schultz</th>
<th>Crenshaw *</th>
<th>Cunningham</th>
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<tr>
<td>Political</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Political</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Authorized</td>
<td>Neofascist</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Sponsored</td>
<td>Establishment</td>
<td>Nationalists</td>
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<td>Marxist</td>
<td>Guerilla</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
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<td>Minority</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Nationalistic</td>
<td>Sub-Revolutionary</td>
<td>Minority Separatists</td>
<td>Ethno-nationalism</td>
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<td>Pathological</td>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Anarchists, millenarians, reactionaries</td>
<td>Single Issue</td>
<td>Groups</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Crenshaw’s typology quoted from Stohl, 1988, p. 180

There are common themes that run through several of these typologies. First, five of them cover state sponsored, authorized or establishment types that reflect terrorism perpetrated by or for state governments. Second, criminal groups are covered in three and nationalism is mentioned in four. Ideology is covered in many forms from anarchism to Marxism and neo-fascism. The revolutionary aspect of terrorism is also mentioned in four. What this illustrates is that while there is little consensus on the details, there are themes that permeate the literature and models of terrorism.

Another popular typology splits terrorist groups into a dichotomy of domestic and international terrorism. The group’s targets as well as their areas of operation determine this categorization. The United States Department of State defines international terrorism as “terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country” (DOS, 1999, pp. viii). Such groups exemplify international terrorism as Al Qaeda who operate primarily in the Middle East but also in Afghanistan, North America, Western Europe, East Africa and in Asia-Pacific. An example of domestic terrorism would be the 1995 bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City in the United States. American citizens inside the United States perpetrated this act and it did not involve foreign elements. Areas of operation are important to discuss in terms of both capabilities, but more importantly for our analysis, in terms of what motivates these groups. Their targets will help to identify their objectives and the sources of their motivation. As the targets are usually of symbolic importance, understanding them will help to uncover hidden motivators and anticipate where subsequent attacks may be likely. Motivation is the key variable in understanding how to resolve the underlying issues that give rise to such groups. This is why our typology, which seeks to adopt a conflict resolution approach, focuses on motivation.
In Flemming, Stohl and Schmid’s chapter on typologies of terrorism (Stohl, 1988), they review the state of field and conclude that there are four broad categories of typologies. They are based on those who try to classify groups, modus operandi, motivations and origins. The problem with the group classification scheme is that they are idiosyncratic and not scientific. Focusing on modus operandi is dangerous because groups can change tactics, targets and operations at will; that is if they have the capabilities. Grouping by origins highlights the importance of context, but ignores the process of long-term change. Long-term strategic issues of counterterrorism need to be derived from such variables as motivation and sources of conflict. Short term tactical planning for counterterrorism focuses on tactics, targets, leadership and modus operandi. Those analysts who use such tactical data to construct their typologies are concerned with short-term control and management rather than longer-term policies and conflict resolution. Tactics, targeting policies and operational characteristics can and often do, change over time. However, deep motivational factors are much more stable indicators as to how and why terrorist groups operate. If you are concerned with short term counterterrorism then focus on tactics and leadership. If you are concerned about long-term strategy and conflict resolution then focus on longer-term indicators such as motivational factors.

In order to impose a sense of order on the chaos of the nature of terrorism, we developed the following typology. First, a distinction is made between state and non-state actors. This is a level of analysis issue as well as recognition of fundamental qualitative and quantitative differences between state and non-state terrorism. State and non-state actors engage in different forms of terrorism that are comprised of different types of acts and actions. This is the most salient variable in our typology. State actors are defined as nation-states and are not distinguished by their form of government. In any case, it is irrelevant whether the state is democratic or authoritarian, as both forms of government have sponsored and supported terrorism in its varying forms since the terrorist upsurge in the 1960s. Non-state actors are groups that are not governmental actors and they are defined by their affiliation as group members motivated by a variety of causes. These distinctions are made for non-state actors over the issue of primary motivators: political ideology, ethno-nationalism and religious extremism. Each of these will be explored in turn. Key comparative aspects are summarized in Table 4 (next page).

State actors engage in three forms of terrorism. First, there is state-sponsored terrorism. This can be defined as a government lending support to kindred external groups engaged in terrorism, whether that state defines that group’s behavior as terrorist or not. Governments never claim that they support terrorists, but they often claim to support ‘liberation struggles’, ‘independence movements’ or ‘anti-Communist insurgents’. What is relevant is whether that group is engaged in terrorism as previously defined. State sponsored terrorism is externally directed and its purpose is to influence the political behavior of target groups outside of the sponsoring state. This is often viewed as a form of proxy warfare or an element of foreign policy. An example of this would be Iran and Syria’s support for the Islamic fundamentalist organization Hizballah. Although based primarily in Lebanon, Hizballah carries out operations in support of Iranian and Syrian foreign policy objectives.
### Table 4: Terrorism Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Actors</th>
<th>Action Type</th>
<th>Operational Group</th>
<th>Target Victims</th>
<th>Target Audience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>Police, Military, Judicial, Vigilante</td>
<td>Internal Individuals and groups considered subversive</td>
<td>Entire or segment of domestic population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Sponsored</td>
<td>Foreign Affiliate</td>
<td>Symbolic targets based on shared enemy</td>
<td>Population of shared enemy and allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Performed</td>
<td>Intelligence Service, Commando Unit</td>
<td>Symbolic targets based on foreign enemy</td>
<td>Population of foreign enemy and allies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-state Actors</th>
<th>Primary Motivator (Identity)</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Target Victims</th>
<th>Target Audience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>Anarchist</td>
<td>Symbolic targets based on relationship to ‘system’</td>
<td>Population of System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxist</td>
<td>Symbolic targets based on relationship to capitalist-imperialist system</td>
<td>Population of capitalist-imperialist system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fascist</td>
<td>Symbolic targets based on opposition to Fascism (government, middle class, Marxists)</td>
<td>Population of Nation-State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single Issue</td>
<td>Symbolic targets based on issue</td>
<td>Population of issue region (Nation-State or region)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-nationalism</td>
<td>Pro-state</td>
<td>Symbolic targets based on relationship to anti-state revolutionaries</td>
<td>Population of Nation-State</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>Symbolic targets based on relationship to support of the state</td>
<td>Population of Nation-State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separatist</td>
<td>Symbolic targets based on relationship to state</td>
<td>Population of Nation-State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Symbolic targets based on relationship to state</td>
<td>Population of Nation-State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Vigilante</td>
<td>Symbolic targets based on relationship to ethnic group</td>
<td>Population of issue region (Nation-State or region)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Extremism</td>
<td>Fundamentalist</td>
<td>Symbolic targets based on relationship to fundamentalist religious worldview</td>
<td>Population of worldview and competing systems (internal cohesion) and those outside worldview (external)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cults and Sects</td>
<td>Symbolic targets based on relationship to cult or sect</td>
<td>Population of sect region (Nation-State or segment)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**State Terrorism**

The second form of state terrorism is *state performed terrorism*. This is defined as an act or acts of terrorism that are conducted by state governments directly and covertly. This type is similar to state sponsored terrorism except the state in this instance does not use an external group as a proxy. Such units as intelligence assets or specially trained military units carry out these acts. An example of this could be the Libyan agents who bombed Pan Am flight 103. Whether Al Qaeda can be defined as a
state organ of the Taliban remains contentious, as their relationship is complex. However, if not an actual act of state performed terrorism, September 11 was certainly a state sponsored event. An act of state performed terrorism can be viewed as an act of war. Hoffman explains why governments would choose terrorism as a viable foreign policy option: “Terrorism thus became associated with a type of covert or surrogate warfare whereby weaker states could confront larger, more powerful rivals without the risk of retribution” (Hoffman, 1998, p. 27). Indeed, terrorism, in its many forms, is an asymmetrical attack of the weak against the strong. However, since September 11th, Hoffman is no longer correct in his assumption that this type of terrorism is without risk of retribution.

The third form of state terrorism is internal repression. This form of terrorism is that which is practiced on one’s own population as exemplified by such state organs as Hitler’s Gestapo, Stalin’s NKVD and Afghanistan’s Taliban regime. This can take many forms such as extreme deprivation of civil liberties, violations of human rights, torture, imprisonment for political activities and murder. This form of state terrorism is internally directed and its purpose is to eliminate opposition to the regime. As White explains, “Governments use terrorism to maintain political power, not to obtain it: true state terrorism involves the political repression of governmental opponents” (White, 1991, p. 7). Internal state terrorism differs from the previous two forms in that it is directed specifically at internal rather than external enemies of the state. The other major attribute is that its objective is status quo maintaining rather than status quo changing, as is the primary objective of non-state terrorist groups.

Non-State Terrorism

There are a variety of non-state actors engaged in terrorism with many purposes and goals. They range the political spectrum from left wing Maoists like the Shinning Path in Peru, to right wing neo-Nazis in Europe. They include a multitude of ethnic and sub-national groups that seek autonomy and independence. There are groups that use violence against globalization, perceived threats to the environment and those who operate abortion clinics. There is a growing trend in religiously motivated groups across the spiritual continuum from Fundamentalist Christians and Muslims to Orthodox Jews and millenarian sects whose purpose is to attempt to initiate the apocalypse.

There are a number of ways analysts have sought to categorize these divergent groups, as mentioned previously. Some analysts categorize according to tactics, targets or characteristics. These are short term and highly variable elements. Our solution to this problem is to categorize non-state actors according to their primary motivation. Non-state terrorist groups are primarily motivated by political ideology, ethno-nationalism or religious extremism. There is also a smaller category of single-issue focused groups such as those who bomb abortion clinics. However, these groups usually show traces of ideological, racial (ethnic) or religious extremism. This is not to suggest that all groups are singular in focus. Some groups may have competing motivations, while individual members may have their own reasons for joining terrorist groups. What concerns us here is finding the primary reason for why a group as a whole chooses to conduct terrorist operations. Underlying the primary reasons are complex interactions of psychological, environmental, political, cultural and socio-economic variables.
The reason why motivation is a key variable in our model is because one must understand why behavior occurs (sources of motivation) before anything can be done about it. Consequently, understanding motivation will provide insight into how to develop appropriate counterterrorism and conflict management and resolution approaches. If groups are motivated to carry out violence in the name of an oppressed and victimized minority group with whom they have significant popular support, the approach will be very different than if facing religiously motivated fanatics who are isolated from the mainstream and are willing to kill and die for their cause. One can negotiate with ethno-national groups and attempt to eliminate the underlying structural causes that give rise to terrorism. One cannot negotiate with people who make no demands other than their enemies’ destruction. Because understanding motivation points towards solutions, it is the most important variable after actor status (nation-state or non-state actors).

Another key variable in this typology is the level of change or threat in which the terrorist group is engaged in. There are two levels of change associated with terrorists’ demands: systemic change and sub-systemic change. Systemic change demands are associated with revolutionary movements – those that wish to change an entire political system or socio-economic structure. These are the most threatening and often, particularly if motivated primarily by ideology, the least successful terrorist groups in terms of long-term strategy (e.g. Baader-Meinhoff – RAF). Sub-systemic change can be anything from a demand in a change of governmental leadership (but keeping the system in place), changing levels of autonomy for minority groups and finally single issue focused groups who want to change a single policy or process (such as abortion clinic bombers or animal rights extremists). Non-state actors motivated by any of the three primary motivators can engage in either systemic or sub-systemic levels of demands for change.

Here we build into our typology conceptions from Paul R. Pillar, who developed a typology of counterterrorism based on the dimensionality of terrorist groups (Pillar, 2001). Pillar suggests that one must ask two basic questions about terrorist groups: “what is the nature of the objective that it pursues through terrorism?” and “does the group represent something larger than itself?” (Pillar, 2001, pp. 130-132). Depending on the answers to these questions, he identifies the group as unidimensional or multidimensional. Unidimensional groups are those that are singular in their focus on violence as a means of promoting change and they are also isolated from wider social currents. They do not reflect the policies or aspirations of larger social groups. Their goals are unrealistic and often non-negotiable. The multidimensional groups represent larger social forces, such as ethno-national groups seeking a level of autonomy or independence. They engage in political and social activities other than violence and terrorism. They mobilize members for legitimate forms of political action such as elections (e.g. Sinn Fein – PIRA). Their goals are usually difficult but negotiable, especially if coupled with the reduction of underlying structural causes. Based on the group’s dimensionality and ability to negotiate a political solution Pillar chooses a counterterrorist policy that he outlines: “But eventually one has to decide whether the ultimate objective regarding a group is to engage it or exterminate it” (Pillar, 2001, pp. 142). Although oversimplified, this does get to the heart of basic options and decision-making on what to do about terrorist groups. Based on his model and our typology we can place terrorist groups in Table 5.
## Table 5: Terrorism Group Type and Counterterrorism Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Dimension Type</th>
<th>Primary Motivation (non-state)</th>
<th>Secondary Variable</th>
<th>Objective: Level of Change Sought</th>
<th>Threat Level</th>
<th>Counterterrorist Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multidimensional</td>
<td>Ethno-nationalism</td>
<td>Pro-State</td>
<td>None – maintain status quo</td>
<td>Moderate to Low</td>
<td>Engage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethno-nationalism</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>Systemic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Engage or Exterminate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethno-nationalism</td>
<td>Separatist</td>
<td>Systemic</td>
<td>Moderate to High</td>
<td>Engage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethno-nationalism</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Sub-systemic</td>
<td>Moderate to Low</td>
<td>Engage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethno-nationalism</td>
<td>Ethnic Vigilante</td>
<td>Sub-systemic</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Engage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Single Issue</td>
<td>Sub-systemic</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Engage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Extremist</td>
<td>Cults / Sects</td>
<td>Sub-systemic</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Engage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although not all groups fit easily into these boxes and many exceptions exist, it is a useful if reductionist approach for understanding how motivation and group type relates to how one approaches solutions to the problem of terrorism. Obviously much detailed analysis of each particular group would be conducted before one finalized policy options regarding how to approach each group, but it is hoped that this matrix serves as a useful guide. One must remember that context or the complex environment in which terrorist groups operate, is always important to consider.

As mentioned, there are primarily three things that motivate non-state actors to engage in terrorism: political ideology, ethno-nationalism and religious extremism. The one underlying factor to all of these is the perception that their ideology, identity or religion is under threat. Laqueur (1999, p. 99) notes other common elements.

Offensive and defensive fanatics, religious believers and political soldiers all have in common an absolute certainty as to the justness of their cause, the legitimacy of their leader, the inability to recognize other moral values and considerations and the abdication of critical judgment.

These elements feed into their perceived identity under threat and generate the notion to take action to defend the group as its very survival may be at stake.
Political Ideology

Terrorist groups that are driven by ideology are such as the disbanded Red Army Faction (RAF) group in Germany and the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru. The tactics, objectives organizational structure and logistical support systems for these organizations are very different. Each group develops within and adapts to the environment in which they operate. For example, the RAF espoused Marxist ideology to justify their tactics of bombings, kidnappings, assassinations and robberies. They had a hardcore cadre of 10-20 operatives with a support base of several hundred. They targeted the German government and private sector as well as American and NATO interests. On the other hand, the Sendero Luminoso is Peru’s largest subversive organization with strength of 4,000-5,000 members. They adhere to Maoist interpretations of Marxism. While the RAF carried out several operations per year, the Sendero Luminoso managed to kill thousands every year in their campaign to overthrow the Peruvian government. What these groups have in common is that they are both primarily motivated by political ideology.

However, true Marxists eschew terrorism, as they believe it takes energy away from the socialist revolutionary movement. Small-scale violence that does not incite the masses runs counter to Marxist theory. Terrorism is, by nature, not large scale or widespread violence. Once it crosses the line of support and becomes a mass movement the violence can move to revolutionary or guerilla warfare depending on tactics and targeting. These are not forms of terrorism but distinct forms of political violence. Rubenstein suggests that the level of popular political support is an important variable in understanding and characterizing political violence and distinguishing other forms from terrorism (Rubenstein, 1987).

Political ideology also motivates those extremists from ideologies other than Marxism. Terrorism is not a strategy normally adopted by moderates. It may be used in times of crisis, but that is not the norm. It is a strategy of extremes. Those on the far right who engage in terrorism do so to challenge the liberal state in an effort to bring it down in order to establish a neo-fascist, ultra nationalist or racially-ethnically homogenous state. These are obviously extreme and not mainstream political aspirations, at least not in Western Europe and North America. While some may view those motivated by Marxism as the ‘ideology of the working class’; the extreme views of the right can be viewed as ideologies of exclusion.

We turn now to those motivated by anarchism as a political ideology. There are two schools of anarchist thought, the individualistic and the religious. The individualistic school traces its ideological roots to the Marquis de Sade, who promoted self-pleasure and abhorred social structures that limited the exercise of individual freedoms. In this form of anarchism ‘anything goes’ including using violence to bring down ‘oppressive’ social structures. This form of anarchism became popular in Europe and North America at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries. The rise in assassinations and bombings during this period can be traced to the anarchist movements. Contemporary anarchist movements are often associated with anti-globalization proponents and as globalization progresses more anarchist terrorists may emerge to threaten this change. The alternative school of anarchism wishes to do away with political structures in place of moral beings that have no need to hurt or control one another. This is known as the religious school and it was popularized by Leo Tolstoy and is based on Christian
teachings in the Beatitudes and the Sermon on the Mount in the New Testament. This form of anarchism does not support or engage in violence or terrorism.

The common thread of ideologically motivated terrorist groups is that they all espouse extremist views that fail to motivate large audiences of followers. They remain isolated from the political mainstream. This may be one of the answers of why political extremists turn to violence rather than pursue their goals through non-violent political mechanisms such as mobilizing political parties and participation in elections. They understand that their views are not widely embraced and will therefore not succeed in elections or popular referendums. They become frustrated at the prospect of not having their vision of the future become reality and they turn to violence as a means to express their frustration and anger. Anger can be viewed as an emotional response to fear. Terrorists fear that the ideological dreams they have will fail to bear fruit and the utopia they envisage will never materialize. They are deluded into thinking that their violence will spark the revolution that will lead to their specific version of utopia. They suffer from cognitive dissonance in that their preferred and actual states are widely separated. It is difficult for governments to negotiate with ideological extremists unless they make the effort to give up their political violence in favor of non-violent political engagement. Ultimately it will depend on the specific details of the group’s interactions, motivations and context.

**Ethno-nationalism**

Ethno-national terrorist groups may espouse ideological concerns which may either be closely held beliefs or mere window dressing. However, the primary reason for their existence is their identity with an ethnic or national group. These groups are most often minorities and they usually perceive themselves as oppressed or threatened by dominant majority groups. Examples of such groups are the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA), the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka (LTTE) and Hamas of Israel/Palestine. One of the characteristics that distinguish ethno-national terrorist groups from ideological ones is that the nationalist groups usually have a higher degree of public support which is derived from a sympathetic national or ethnic group from which they emerge. The ideological groups are usually isolated from the masses by espousing non-popular or fringe political views—either from the far left or the far right. Ethno-nationalist terrorist groups, while usually representing a minority, nevertheless can have populist appeal within their ethnic populations. These groups may be either pro or anti-state, depending on their objectives. For example, the IRA comes from the minority community in Northern Ireland and they have been dedicated to overthrowing the British supported province, therefore they are an anti-state organization. The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) is comprised of members of the majority unionist community and they operate as a pro-state paramilitary (terrorist) organization.

Ethno-nationally inspired political violence has been a growth industry since the Second World War and there has been an upsurge since the end of the Cold War. Terrorism is only one manifestation of this violence. Others include wars of secession (Chechnya), civil wars (Bosnia-Herzegovina) and coup d’etats (the Rwandan genocide was sparked by an assassination and coup attempt). Part of this rise in ethnic hostility can be explained by structural variables such as the nature of the state system,
globalization and socio-economic inequalities between competing ethno-national groups.

The goals and objectives of ethnically motivated political violence are to secure some level of autonomy or independence for a minority group from the majority dominated state structure. They may engage in different levels of threat from revolutionary (high), separatist (high–moderate), to autonomous (moderate–low) and ethnic vigilante (low). It is important to determine their objectives and motivation, which will lead to an understanding of the nature of their threat. Also, some ethnic and tribal groups are spread over a number of states and these groups may harbor irredentist goals of reacquiring lost territories. For example, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has emerged to fight for Kurdish irredentism. As territory is intertwined with our sense of identity, it is difficult to untangle the drive for territorial control from ethno-national identities (Vasquez, 1993). Minority groups that are not strong enough to field a significant guerilla army or challenge the state in a civil war may resort to terrorism. Also, if the mainstream of the minority group is satisfied with the status quo, fringe elements of the minority group will often form terrorist groups as a means of expressing the frustration of their nationalist goals. Bruce Hoffman suggests this below.

Accordingly, like all ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorists, ETA uses demonstratively symbolic acts of violence to generate publicity and rally support by underscoring the powerlessness of the government to withstand the nationalist expression they champion and thereby embarrass and coerce it into acceding to the group’s irredentist demands (Hoffman, n.d., p. 3).

Consequently, the ethno-nationally motivated terrorist group’s objectives are to secure a measure of autonomy, independence or territory from the majority controlled state or states. At the revolutionary extreme they wish to take over the government from rival ethno-national groups and control the state for their own benefit. They usually have more support from the community from which they are derived than do terrorist groups motivated primarily by political ideology. This is due to the intense forms of identity under threat that they experience as victimized minority or sub-national groups. Another form of cultural identity is religious identity. A key difference between ethnic and religious identity is that our ethnic identity is ascriptive at birth, whereas religious identity may be changed through conversion. Also, the source of authority and legitimacy of an ethno-nationalist terrorist group comes from its members' identity as association with, a perceived victimized minority. For religious zealots, their legitimacy and authority comes from their relationship with their version of God. Many ethno-nationally motivated groups are capable of responding to engagement, particularly if they conclude that their use of violence is counterproductive to achieving their political goals. Negotiations will not be easy, as evidenced by the peace process in Northern Ireland and the Middle East. However, in protracted social conflicts engagement must be multifaceted and address the complex sources of political violence.

Religious Extremism
For 21st century Westerners who are not familiar with the 17th century European wars over the split in the Christian churches, religion does not seem an appropriate motivator for violence. Indeed, one may remark that all of the planet’s mainstream religions do not preach hate and violence but rather love for our fellow humans as well as peace. Where then does religion come to motivate violence? Mark Juergensmayer offers one simple explanation: “A reason often given to explain why religious symbols are associated with acts of real violence is that religion is exploited by violent people” (Juergensmayer in Rapoport, 1988, p.181). This is a very simple yet satisfying answer. Terrorists hijack religion for their own purposes. This is, at times, no doubt true. However, it only scratches the surface of why people use religion as a source of violent conflict and a motivator of terrorism. Juergensmeyer penetrates much deeper when he notes that:

The fact is that the symbols and mythology of most religious traditions are filled with violent images and their histories leave trails of blood. ... The central symbol of Christianity is an execution device—a cross—from which, at least in the Roman tradition, the dying body still hangs (Ibid, p. 179).

So, it seems as if religious traditions, as reflective of other cultural traditions, are not immune from the violence that often plagues human existence. Juergensmeyer explains why religious traditions often reflect violence by suggesting “Since religious language is about the tension between order and disorder, it is frequently about violence” (p. 179). Here we can identify the link between the roles of religious dogma and political ideologies; they both offer forms of order to counteract the effects of chaos. Although both religion and political ideologies offer forms of order and legitimacy, there is a fundamental difference in operating levels between the two. One functions on a substantive (temporal) level while the other functions on a spiritual (cosmic) level. This difference is important to distinguish because it affects the presumed level of moral authority for engaging in violence. While the ideological or ethno-national terrorist knows he must answer to his fellow man for his actions, the religiously motivated believe that they receive their marching orders from God. This has profound affects on the constraints imposed on terrorists and their willingness to use weapons of mass destruction. Juergensmeyer discusses this point below.

Those who want moral sanction for their use of violence and who do not have the approval of an officially recognized government, find it helpful to have access to a higher source: the meta-morality that religion provides. By elevating temporal struggle to the level of the cosmic, they can bypass the usual moral restrictions on killing (Ibid., p. 182).

Having this higher source of moral authority emboldens the religiously motivated terrorist. For them the struggle is not one of political parties or systems or even of competing ethnic groups, but one of good versus evil. Juergensmeyer explores this theme below.
By identifying a temporal social struggle with the cosmic struggle of order and disorder, truth and evil, political actors are able to avail themselves of a way of thinking that justifies the use of violent means. Ordinarily only the state has the moral right to take life (Ibid., p. 182).

Not only do religiously motivated terrorists have the moral authority to take life, they have supreme authority from God, which trumps all other forms of authority. This has profound implications for the conduct of terrorist operations. The selection of appropriate or ‘legitimate’ targets widens to all of those who are not members of the faith. Further, as they are not members of the faith, they are not God’s chosen people and therefore considerations do not need to be made for their lives. As Hoffman explains below:

For the religious terrorist, violence is first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in response to some theological demand or imperative. Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental dimension and its perpetrators are consequently undeterred by political, moral or practical constraints (Hoffman, 2001).

The problems associated with religious extremist violence in particular are that they create non-negotiable demands that are based on deeply held cultural and worldview belief systems. These represent core values that are not easily changed, modified or negotiated away. This makes it very difficult to engage groups that are motivated by religious extremism. This lack of constraints and sense of transcendentalism are illustrated by the examples recounted in Laqueur (1999, pp. 136, 141).

As Abbas Mussawi, the former leader of Hizbullah, put it, “We are not fighting so that the enemy recognizes us and offers us something. We are fighting to wipe out the enemy.

Police sub-inspector Beant Singh, the bodyguard of Indira Gandhi who killed the Indian prime minister, thought of himself as a martyr and said that God would reward him for what he did.

These statements illustrate two issues that separate religiously motivated terrorism from the secular. First, the goal is not a negotiated settlement but the destruction of one’s (and God’s) perceived enemies. Second, not only is violence in the name of God permitted, it is required and also rewarded. These issues make for a more potent and dangerous form of terrorism than the average ideologically or ethno-nationally motivated violence produce. Although speaking only of one type of religion, Laqueur’s statement could sum up all religiously motivated terrorism: “In brief, the Islamic fundamentalist attitude toward violence is that the final aim justifies the means” (Laqueur, 1999, pp. 129). For those motivated by ideology the final ends are a new socio-economic-political structure. For those motivated by ethno-nationalism, the ends are some level of autonomy or independence. For the religious extremists it is the
destruction of their enemies. We argue here that the religiously motivated exhibit traits of both the ideological and the ethno-national. Extreme or fundamental religious dogma is the spiritual equivalent of extreme forms of political ideology. Further, one’s religion is most often a key part of their ethnic or cultural identity. Therefore, we make the case that what can be said of victimized ethno-national groups can also be valid for those perceiving similar threats to their religious identity. Also, as religious extremism plays a similar role to political ideology, combining both these factors together into a single terrorist organization makes for an extremely volatile mix.

Bruce Hoffman reflects the views of Juergensmeyer and Laqueur. He believes that the religiously motivated terrorist is operating on a different level and with much higher stakes.

The reasons why religious terrorism results in so many more deaths than secular terrorism may be found in the radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality and worldviews embraced by the religious terrorist (Hoffman, 2001).

The contemplation of such wholesale acts of violence is thus a direct reflection of the fact that religious terrorists, unlike their secular counterparts, do not seek to appeal to any constituency or authority other than their own god or religious figures and therefore feel little need to regulate or calibrate their violence (Hoffman, 1987).

The implications of the significant value differences and perceived legitimacy from God are that there is little room to negotiate or resolve underlying issues using collaborative or win-win approaches. Unfortunately there seems to be little policy space between engage and exterminate. Magnus Ranstorp (1996) returns us to why religiously motivated groups would pursue violence in the first place.

The identity of the enemy and the decision to use religious violence against them are dependent on and shaped by, the heightened degree of the sense of crisis threatening their faiths and communities.

In summary, religiously motivated terrorism has the potential to set new trends and records for violence and the scope of terrorism. There appear to be fewer constraints on violence than with other forms of terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors. Further, while ethnic and national groups are by definition limited to specific regions (i.e. homelands), there are no such borders for religious groups’ intent on perpetrating violence. Religious extremism can be viewed as having similar effects as both political ideology (dogma) and ethnicity (deep cultural elements). Therefore, it has the potential of being much more violent, complex and difficult to come to terms with. The rise of religiously motivated terrorism may signal a globalization of this phenomenon as never before seen. It will certainly be more violent and deadly. The solutions to such problems do not appear to offer a wide range of policy or negotiable options.
Conclusion

What makes terrorist attacks so dangerous is their unpredictability. At least this was the trend from the 1960s-1990s. Terrorist groups sought to get their message across, not kill a lot of people. There is a changing trend in contemporary terrorism that seems to be moving away from terrorism as symbolic violence, as a communicative act, to instrumental violence or a form closer to actual warfare. It is still used as a weapon of the weak against the strong, but it is being used more as an actual weapon than as a bargaining chip. This is indicative of the religiously motivated violence rather than that which is perpetrated by those motivated by ideology or ethno-nationalism. This is the most salient issue that makes the religiously motivated terrorist groups more dangerous than their nationalist counterparts. When one factors in the potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) such as chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons, the trend towards more destructive, violent and deadly forms of terrorism emerge. This is the nature of the current threat facing the United States.

Non-state actors comprise the bulk of active terrorist organizations. Their primary motivators distinguish these organizations. Although many of these groups have competing motivators, the primary reason for their existence is important to understand, especially if we are to resolve the underlying issues that give rise to them. Most non-state terrorist groups are primarily motivated by political ideology, by some form of ethnic or sectarian nationalism or by religious extremism. These non-state groups may be either pro or anti-state, depending on their motivation and objectives. A minority of groups are motivated by single issues that are usually associated with political ideology or religious dogma. The ideologically motivated tend to be disenfranchised elites and the ethno-nationally motivated are usually oppressed or victimized minority groups.

The threat of terrorism ebbs and flows with political movements and conflicts around the world. Some nations are exempt from its ravages while others are plagued by it. Some issues call more to arms than others and at different periods of time. For example, the early forms of terrorism, as exemplified by the zealots, assassins and thugs, were all motivated primarily by religious factors. By the nineteenth century and the rise of nationalism as a key political force, the religiously motivated groups declined while those motivated by nationalism increased. The post Second World War upsurge of terrorism in the 1960s saw the rise of ethno-national and ideological groups. This was largely due to the anti-colonial movements that swept Asia, Africa and the Middle East after the War. It wasn't until the 1980s, after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, that the resurgence of religiously motivated terrorism made a significant contribution to terrorist violence. As we shall see in the future issues such as globalization, the assimilation of various forms of identity under threat (particularly religious, cultural or ethnic-national identities) and the conflicts over water, oil and other precious resources, will trigger groups to form and perpetrate political violence in the name of their causes. It must be clearly understood that there is no one type of terrorism or terrorist. There is no single cause that unites them all. The only single variable that is common is their willingness to resort to violence. The sources and causes that motivate people to such acts vary and change over time. This is one of the problems that have prevented the development of explanatory theories of terrorism. What is a current threat now may not be for very long. Or, it may haunt us for decades and wither away. New forms of political violence will
rise and take the place of their predecessors. The understanding that the terrorist threat will not disappear and cannot be eliminated lead William B. Quandt to suggest:

Like crime in the United States, terrorism cannot be completely eliminated. Our goal in fighting it is to reduce the danger it poses and to insure that our society can continue to function even with the occasional threats from terrorists that will doubtless occur in the future (in Kegley, 1990, p. 75).

Perhaps our best efforts at dealing with the problems of terrorism will be limited to conflict management rather than resolution, at least for the foreseeable future.

The most enduring problem with regard to the literature on terrorism is its lack of consensus on definitions and typologies. It has not moved much beyond the descriptive and into the theoretical realm. Therefore, it is difficult for this literature to offer a comprehensive explanatory model. The typology used here distinguishes between state and non-state actors. State actors practice three kinds of terrorism: the externally directed state sponsored terrorism and state performed terrorism and the internally directed state repression. Non-state actors are distinguished by their primary motivation: political ideology, ethno-nationalism and religious extremism. These non-state groups may be either pro or anti-state, depending on their goals and objectives. Non-state actors can threaten change through violence at either the systemic or sub-systemic levels.

The two schools of mainstream thought, liberal and conservative offer divergent views as to the nature, causes and solutions of terrorism. While the liberal school believes that there are necessary conditions that give rise to terrorism, the conservative school believes this only justifies the terrorist’s reprehensible acts. The contending radical school argues that the liberals and conservatives are two sides of the same coin. They contend that the West fails to acknowledge its own acts of terrorism while they label their enemies’ behavior as terrorism.

Many observers distinguish between international and domestic sources of terrorism. This can be a useful tool when comparing groups around the world. It also helps to identify states that are engaged in state sponsored terrorism. In the past, most attention was focused on international terror. With such acts as the Oklahoma City bombing and the rise of militia groups in the United States, attention shifted to domestic sources of terrorism. However, after the unprecedented attack of September 11th, the focus has changed back to international sources of terrorism.

Most governments are conservative in their analyses of terrorism. Their counterterrorism policies reflect this bias. Rather than focusing on long-term solutions or eliminating the preconditions that may give rise to terrorism, they choose to use force to counter the threat. They use intelligence assets, law enforcement, judicial systems and specially trained assault units against terrorist groups. In many cases this is successful, at least in the short term. However effective these resources may be in dealing with the tactical and immediate responses to terrorism, they do little to resolve the underlying socio-economic, political and cultural conditions that give rise to terrorism. The long-term prognosis is that terrorism, as a form of political violence, will be with us well into the 21st Century.
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Characteristics of Terrorism

R. Scott Moore

Introduction

If formulating the definition and typology of terrorism remains problematic, the search for common terrorist traits, operational patterns, mindsets and motivations presents an equally difficult task. Unfortunately for the analyst, the primary and overriding characteristic of terrorism centers on its unpredictability. Terrorists defy being placed into precise paradigms; instead, they tend to mirror the unique conditions and causes of a particular time and place. Laqueur (2002), in his seminal work on the history of terrorism, disparages attempts to catalog terrorists, citing a turbulent past that has included right and left-wing dissidents, anarchists, national-separatists, fascists, communists, religious extremists and idealists, all representing wide ranges of economic and social well-being, all of whom mounted attacks with little correlation as to whether their targets were repressive or democratic institutions. Terrorists have come from almost all political persuasions and socio-economic classes, used means that ranged from silent assassinations to massive bombings and reflected the often idiosyncratic situations in which they fought. Today, despite claims of a global terrorist network with common goals, the only real common bond of the wide array of terrorist organizations may be their desire for violence. The incongruent nature of terrorism remains one of its most prominent features.

Yet, despite terrorism's diverse personality, certain general characteristics, operational principles and tactical patterns can be discerned, that, if not universally applicable, do offer a conceptual starting point for observation, analysis and prediction. Even Laqueur (2002) relents somewhat, admitting terrorism possesses certain broad traits that, if they do not allow for detailed prescription, at least provide a framework for inquiry. This chapter seeks to identify such a framework by stepping back from the particular threats of today and examining terrorism in a broader context, searching for a general whole rather than a collection of barely interchangeable parts. Before proceeding, however, the boundaries of this inquiry should be established so that the reader better understands why certain aspects of terrorism may or may not be included. First, the definition of terrorism and its legal and political parameters established in the previous chapter will continue to be used. To add clarity, the discussion focuses on terrorism aimed at destroying or radically reforming from within the existing political or
social order, be it within a state or society or in a wider regional or global context. So-called "state-terrorism", symbolized by such groups as Hitler's Nazi Brownshirts or today's government supported paramilitaries in Africa and Latin America, while brutally subjugating domestic populations, more accurately constitute political repression, not terrorism. Military special operations, to include those performed by proxies, directed by one state against another must be considered, in keeping with international law, acts of aggression and war, however vicious the tactics, are also dropped from consideration. This chapter thus deals with terrorists whose primary objectives lie in the realm of rebellion or revolution; those seeking, through violent means, to change or overthrow existing political and social institutions, policies or practices.

Before looking at common traits, one must first understand the lineage of terrorism. Contrary to the wisdom of many of today's pundits, terrorism represents neither a new phenomenon nor some radical departure from the past. Indeed, terrorism boasts a long history, with foundations in the Roman Empire, arguably much earlier. The acts of such infamous terrorist bands as the ancient Jewish Sicarii Zealots, medieval Persian Assassins, 19th Century Russian Narodovoltsy, anti-colonial Algerian urban terrorists in the 1950s, the continually reborn Irish Republican Army provide a legacy of violence that Al Qaeda both emulates and improves upon, but cannot claim to have invented. Causes, targets, weapons and technologies may change, but, conceptually, terrorism remains remarkably consistent. As a form of asymmetric violent conflict, it draws from a long heritage of murder, arson, destruction, assassination, theft and random attacks conducted for more than two millennia. Indeed, many of the pronouncements of ancient terrorists in Judea are chillingly familiar today and have been repeated by generations of terrorists. Likewise, the questions being asked by policy makers seeking to fight terrorism today echo those of the past. In assessing the current threat of terrorism, this feature must be remembered; terrorism, like its two relatives, crime and war, is not a departure from past experience. Given its long history, it should be little surprise that terrorism possesses certain essential characteristics transcending time and situation. While exceptions can always be found, these characteristics tend to be repetitive. If causes, strategies, targets and tactics of terrorists may differ, the essential traits of terrorism have remained remarkably consistent.

**Fundamental Traits of Terrorism**

At its most basic level and despite variances in social and political conditions and causes, terrorism almost invariably seeks radical change. The specific objectives of terrorists can and do, widely diverge, from the limited, albeit occasionally deadly, protests of American anti-abortionists to the reactionary extremism of Islamic fanatics. However, all share a collective intent to overturn the social structures in which they live. Revolution, whatever its roots, provides a common link for terrorists. This explains, at least in part, why such apparently unrelated groups as the Japanese Red Army and the Palestinians teamed to carry out a bloody attack on Lod Airport in Tel Aviv in the 1970s or, today, Irish Republican Army fighters have taken to training Colombian terrorists. Since the early 1970s, terrorist training camps have hosted individuals and groups representing a vast range of radical movements whose only bond consists of a fervent desire to overthrow the existing order. Al Qaeda, while often portrayed as a monolithic
threat, can be more accurately described as exploiting this bond by financing, training, equipping or supporting an eclectic variety of nationalistic, ethnic, religious and militant groups. Rage and thirst for radical change, not any hierarchical structure, unites these groups.

To achieve revolutionary change, terrorism resorts to violence; simply stated, terrorist acts inflict death and destruction or threaten to do so. This straightforward truth, as obvious as it may be, too often gets lost in debates over terrorist motivations, causes and personalities, as well as discussions of current and future terrorist threats. Whether the violence consists of a single assassination or hijacking, suicide bombings or even the intentional spreading of disease, it inflicts injury, damage and quite often death. And it does it in the open, for all to see. In that sense, terrorism shares a place with war and it is this tenuous similarity that causes many terrorists to proclaim themselves as soldiers fighting and killing in the name of a greater cause. One recent author has even proposed that terrorism constitutes a form of war waged against civilians and its very violence can only be understood in that light (Carr, 2002). If so, the violent persona of terrorism places it, to draw from Clausewitz (Paret, 1976), at the unbridled edge of warfare, where violence for its own sake tends to overcome social and political constraints. For terrorists, violence comprises both a means and an end in what they view as absolute war, especially in the current era where nationalist, ethnic and religious causes offer few compromises and even less tolerance of enemies. Civilians and non-combatants become targets every bit as legitimate as military and security forces (an attitude, it must be admitted, not far different from that which underpinned strategic air bombardment just a few decades ago), whatever the precepts of international law. Even those terrorist groups who show restraint in conducting attacks display little hesitation killing selected civilians or inflicting destruction on civil targets when deemed necessary. The nature of the violence and the choice of targets has far more to do with impact and image than with any squeamishness derived from established legal or moral standards. Terrorism, whatever the cause or whoever carries it out, is, first and foremost, violent, destructive and often bloody.

If terrorists seek change through brutal, often random violence conducted at the extreme outer reaches of warfare, they do so for a purpose. Rather than being a source of conflict, terrorism is, in fact, a symptom of a larger set of causes and must be seen as such. The reasons for terrorism can be complex and often deep-rooted; however, they all derive from political, social, cultural and economic conditions and grievances, perceived or real. And, while one may debate whether terrorist violence represents a popular uprising, turned to only after legitimate means have failed or it constitutes unbridled anger or even psychopathic behavior on the part of a radical group operating on the margins of a society, terrorists seek redress of their grievances, even if they may seem incomprehensible to observers. While many societies and groups suffer under harsh conditions, they do not turn to violence. Terrorists turn grievances to violence through ideological visionary lenses colored by narrow radical religious, ethnic, cultural, social or political hues. Hoffman (1998) asserts that terrorists live in the future, dedicated to a prophecy of an ideal world, however constructed, the achievement of which defines victory. Because of this basic trait and despite the brutal nature of their violence, terrorists should not be considered irrational; to portray them as evil criminals or madmen misses an essential point. Terrorist violence, as horrifying as it may be,
must be seen as stemming from a combination of current conditions and future worldviews, rather than an irrational thirst for violence.

Reinforcing the purposeful nature of the violence, terrorists tend to be explicit in proclaiming the causes of their struggle, as well as the means to be used to redress them. If the violence is to be meaningful, its purpose must be broadcast. 19th Century anarchists openly published their manifestos calling for resistance to the encroachments of industrial society; indeed, much of their notoriety stemmed from their writings rather than their usually amateurish acts (Laqueur, 2002). Today's threat from radical Islamic terrorism comes as a surprise to many in the West only because they did not hear or, if they did, discounted what has been openly stated for many years. Osama Bin Laden, in particular, exploits the media, using videotapes, radio recordings and published documents to explicitly announce his desire to destroy the West's influence on the Muslim world. If many of the messages and proclamations of terrorists come wrapped in passionate rhetoric, they should not be discounted as the mere ravings of madmen. Their words reflect a profound sense of purpose that cannot be ignored and must be deciphered, however incomprehensible to their enemies. If the visions may seem irrational to many, it is real to the terrorists.

In the end, however valid may be its roots, the darker side of terrorism cannot be justified. Terrorism as previously defined and discussed and as practiced lacks legitimacy; the ends do not justify the means. Political rhetoric and valid causes aside, terrorism fundamentally diverges from the norms associated with warfare or insurgency, based largely on just war traditions of proportionality, even if often bearing the outward appearance and precision of military operations. Despite claiming to be soldiers, terrorists, by their acts, reject the recognition accorded belligerents in an armed conflict. Instead, terrorist attacks dwell almost entirely in the realm of criminal acts and include murder, assault, arson and kidnapping. The very nature and characteristics of terrorism thus place it in a conundrum. If, as some would argue, terrorist groups constitute legitimate insurgents, often described as freedom fighters that should be considered as recognized belligerents, then their indiscriminate and deliberate killing of noncombatants and destruction of civil targets constitute war crimes. Yet such crimes may be essential to effectively realizing the psychological intent of terrorism. Unlike conventional or even insurrectionary military operations, terrorism must ignore constraints imposed by both political and legal convention. To do otherwise would be to severely reduce their effectiveness. Military forces, for the most part, are organized and dispatched to fight other military or paramilitary forces that operate, at least in principle, within the customary and legally binding laws of armed conflict. Armies failing to follow these norms face legal sanction, as Serbia's former president Milosevic discovered. Even guerrilla movements attempting to become legitimate belligerents turn to recognized standards for the conduct of war (which, notably, prohibit targeting and attacking civilians) to gain international recognition. Conduct, rather than the visible trappings of military or political movements determine their legitimacy. Terrorists, despite military-style training, titles and garb, have no intention of confronting military or police forces; to do so invites failure or even destruction. Terrorist targets often possess little intrinsic military value, the destruction of which rarely more than inconveniences, however tragic, their enemies. The nature of terrorism demands striking the very targets it does, at the same time places it in the realm of criminality. The difference between
terrorist and military operations resides in the purpose, the effects and most importantly, the nature of the results. Those who define terrorists in military terms or tout the justness of the cause miss this essential point. If terrorism, as some argue, constitutes another form of war, then its basic traits relegate it to being a war crime. Whatever the political or social goals, terrorism possesses its own unique character largely incompatible with recognized norms associated with military operations. This dichotomy may be the most distinguishing and consistent characteristic of terrorism.

To achieve political or social change, terrorist violence strives primarily for psychological impact rather than physical effect. For terrorists to be successful, they must both terrorize their enemies and gain the attention of a larger constituency from whom they hope to garner sympathy if not open support. To do so, terrorists create uncertainly and fear. Unlike military operations, in which success usually requires the physical defeat of an opposing force, terrorism uses killing and destruction to strike at the mind of the enemy population rather than the body. As horrifyingly catastrophic as were the attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001, they actually inflicted limited physical damage to the United States as a whole, could not hope for victory in a classical military sense. But the shock produced by the television images of two aircraft crashing into the New York skyline created near panic on the government and public, not just in the United States, but worldwide. The real impact lay not in the destruction or death wrought by the attacks, but in the psychological impact. A year later, fear still grips much of America. Terrorist violence need not be catastrophic, however, to achieve that effect. Political assassination, such as that conducted by the Viet Cong in the 1960s against local government leaders and supporters kept much of the Vietnamese countryside under psychological if not always physical control. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) often retained their ascendancy over many Catholics in Northern Ireland using selective maiming and murder ("kneecapping", in which a victim was crippled by a bullet fired through the back of the knee joint, being the most infamous). Nor need the violence be actually inflicted; often the very threat of an attack causes the sought after fear, as Americans trying to make sense of large numbers of vague warnings issued since the attacks on the World Trade Center have come to understand.

In addition to inducing fear in its targets, terrorism also seeks to influence a second audience, one normally untouched by and often geographically distant from the acts of violence. But for a few isolated, apocalyptic groups, whose audience tends to be themselves, terrorists strive to gain the acceptance and support of a much wider constituency, be it local, regional or international. A cursory reading of terrorist goals and pronouncements almost invariably reveals that the terrorists view themselves as a sort of vanguard for a much broader political, ethnic, cultural or religious movement. Their ability to strike freely and randomly at their enemies demonstrates the power, efficacy, dedication and righteousness of their cause both to immediate supporters and, more importantly, to a greater, sometimes global, audience without whose empathy the cause dies. For that reason, many terrorist groups openly claim credit for their or someone else's attacks; even those groups remaining silent send a silent message not lost to those they seek to impress. That the terrorists sometimes have little chance of favorably swaying onlookers, their attacks often achieve the opposite effect, does not seem to deter them from seeking to impress. In many cases, the purported constituency remains ill defined or incomprehensible to those outside the terrorist group. Yet,
whomever the perceived audience may be, the critical goal of terrorism centers on gaining its attention; a goal largely to be achieved only through violence. The violence thus combines shock with self-defined legitimacy—the extreme cause and the need to gain support for it justifies the death and destruction inflicted. To that end, terrorists encourage the widely held rationalization expressed in liberal societies and media that only a just cause could foment such carnage. Suicide bombers, for all the gruesome images they paint, succeeded in turning an incredulous, yet previously apathetic, international public to reconsider their view of the Palestinian cause; much of the horrified world reasoning that such desperate attacks must reflect deep-seated issues demanding redress.

To enhance their status and gain support for their cause, terrorists may intentionally incur the wrath of security forces, fully realizing the resulting momentary tactical defeat. Overreaction by the police and military, especially when it fails to distinguish between terrorists and the populace in which they hide, only serves to reinforce the terrorist cause. Algerian urban terrorists (the National Liberation Front-FLN) in the 1950s, by indiscriminately targeting civilians in the capital city of Algiers, deliberately provoked retribution by the French Army, whose brutal, yet highly effective (at least militarily), counteractions rallied apathetic Algerians to the terrorist cause and forced an internal political crisis in France. The ensuing bloody tactical defeat of the FLN doomed colonial rule in Algeria still reverberates in Paris nearly four decades later. Israeli Defense Force incursion into the West Bank, especially Jenin, in early 2002 in response to Palestinian suicide attacks brought widespread international condemnation and charges of war crimes. That the charges often ignored the realities on the ground and made the largely ineffectual Yasser Arafat a hero in the eyes of most Palestinians represented more than a coincidence. In a similar vein, perceived American heavy-handedness in conducting the most recent war on terrorism, symbolized to many in the world by Afghani civilian deaths from bombing U.S. aircraft attacking Al Qaeda and Taliban forces, raised the ire of many previously neutral Muslims in the region while weakening support from America's allies. Each case provides a clear lesson that the real theater of war for terrorists resides largely in the minds of both their enemies and, equally important, a much wider, potentially supportive audience. In the end, terrorists, whatever the level of violence they inflict, keep a close watch on the perceptions they create.

The psychological consequences of terrorism necessitate sudden, unexpected, spectacular (at least in the mass media sense) and, for those at the receiving end, apparently random attacks. Successful terrorist confound and create uncertainty among both victims and security forces; the terrorist seems to be everywhere yet nowhere, the attack horrifying in its effect yet defying prediction. When terrorists strike, they do so in such a manner that the victims have little doubt as to the source, at least generically if not specifically. Jewish Zealots killed unsuspecting Roman soldiers by slitting their throats in open markets then quickly disappearing; the shock to the onlookers, not to mention the rage and fear felt by the Roman legion, quickly spread throughout Judea. Russian revolutionaries a century ago published their objectives and identified their intended victims in openly distributed pamphlets, eventually succeeding in assassinating the Russian czar. In recent decades, modern telecommunications and mass media have turned terrorism into a spectator sport, to be viewed instantaneously
Palestinian terrorists discovered and became masters of exploiting the media as early as the late 1960s when instantly transmitted images of hijacked aircraft exploding on Jordanian runways competed for attention with those of pistol wielding captors peering out cockpit windows. Media frenzy reached a gruesome climax in front-page newspaper photos of masked gunmen at the 1972 Summer Olympics. A sort of 'ratings war' between terrorist groups emerged and persists today as they vie to outdo each other to grab headlines and television coverage. The September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center had as much to do with outshining previous terrorist attacks, which in the past decade have become increasingly deadly, as it did with inflicting specific damage to the United States. Still part of the daily news broadcasts months later, the event continued to evoke fear in America as well as admiration among many Muslims. The Palestinians, in an innovative and horrifying example of one-upmanship, turned to suicidal teenagers, instantly displacing Osama Bin Laden on the front page of the world's newspapers. The dilemma for future terrorists may not be when or where to strike next, but how to outdo previous attacks to gain the attention of a world increasingly desensitized to bloody violence.

Possessing a long historical record, terrorists combine bloody violence and psychological shock to achieve social and political change. Its indiscriminate nature and targeting of civilians and non-combatants makes it both a method of warfare and a war crime. Terrorists succeed by actual or threatened killing and destruction not because of the physical damage that may be inflicted, but as a result of the responses of both the victims and the onlookers. While every terrorist campaign carries its own unique conditions and each terrorist group seeks results peculiar to the social, cultural and political situations in which they operate, which they seek to alter, conceptually, terrorism possesses certain common traits that provide an analytical framework with which it may be examined. Sharing an historical lineage, terrorists seek violent change to perceived or real conditions stemming from deep-rooted and often complex causes. In doing so, they create fear and uncertainty in their victims while attempting to sway larger regional or even global audiences. Yet, if the cause may be just, the necessary methods lack both legal and moral legitimacy; it is this dichotomy, perhaps more than any other, which makes terrorism so hotly debated and often misunderstood.

**Principles of Terrorist Operations**

The traits shared by most terrorists translate into principles, which, like the more well known and practiced Principles of War guiding conventional military operations, define how terrorism is conducted, largely determine the extent of its success. Perhaps surprisingly for those who assume terrorism lacks the necessary doctrinal foundations intrinsic in military operations, its general operational principles tend to be clearly delineated in written manuals and correspondence and systematically passed to individual terrorists and groups through training and indoctrination. Indeed, terrorist groups have historically exhibited a fervent desire to put their methods in print in order to ensure conformity of both thought and action and continue to do so today. Writings and texts can be found dating back to the mid-19th Century, the most famous being Russian terrorist Sergei Nechaev's *Revolutionary Catechism*, which was both a
philosophical statement of the nature of terrorism as well as an operational guide on how to carry it out (Laqueur 2002). More recently Carlos Marighella (1969) promulgated his *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, a primer on urban terrorism that became the core text for many Latin American terrorist groups. The Irish Republican Army published its infamous *Green Book* in the 1970s to train its fighters (Harmon 2000). British police recently seized an Al Qaeda operations manual during a raid on a safehouse in Manchester, England. The manual can be considered typical of many others in that it provides political and spiritual guidance as well as detailed information on tradecraft ranging from intelligence collection to operational procedures to methods of resistance if captured. In addition to writing their own doctrine, terrorist organizations often share information, thus forming a more general body of operational knowledge. Periodic gatherings and collective training, during which revolutionary tactics are compared, have been a regular feature of terrorism since the late 19th Century. During and after the Cold War, state sponsors such as the Soviet Union, Libya, Syria and Iraq operated and some continue to operate, training facilities. Common training reached its height in efficiency and outreach in the last decades of the 20th Century with the multitude of linked terrorist training camps operated by and for the Palestinians and perfected by Al Qaeda, all of which became international centers for terrorist instruction. Today exchanges between terrorist groups as diverse as the Irish Republican Army and the Colombian FARC indicate a growing universalism of terrorist operational doctrine. It can be seen in the patterns of terrorist attacks and operations, which clearly reflect the theories, standards, training and experiences shared by terrorist organizations, whatever their particular situation or cause.

In order to achieve maximum psychological impact terrorist operations rely, first and foremost, on surprise. Attacks must both catch the enemy unaware and, at the same time, ensure the terrorists can act with relative impunity or at least appear to do so. While the principle of surprise has long been a recognized aim of military operations, for terrorists it constitutes an absolute imperative; success depends on the ability to strike where least expected while avoiding detection and compromise. Surprise drives the tactics to be employed, the particular weapons used and quite often the selection of targets. It also requires terrorists to constantly be aware of and adapt to changing conditions, especially countermeasures employed by security forces. Some analysts might argue this statement contradicts the historical reputation of terrorists as poor innovators; such an argument ignores the record. If some terrorist groups seem wedded to certain types of attacks or weapons, their proclivities should not be taken to indicate operational stagnation. Terrorists tend to be highly pragmatic about innovation—if a tactic, method or weapon works, they see little reason to change. But they repeat themselves only so long as they attain surprise and, failing that, will readily adapt their tactics when shock no longer seems attainable. Yet, shock rarely becomes open-ended. Even in the face of such atrocities as the attacks on the World Trade Center, terrorists have in the past and continue to exhibit certain circumspection in the level of violence they inflict. Shock appears to be governed by, on one hand, a need to attract widespread attention and inflict fear in the target, which requires a minimum level of bloodshed and destruction in order to gain media attention. On the other hand, the violence cannot assault the cultural sensitivities of the constituent audience, an effect that could marginalize the terrorist cause. So the terrorists must maintain a careful
equilibrium, one defined by their cause, their enemies and their potential supporters and one that tends to be unique to the particular terrorist group conducting the attack. Surprise can be a complicated balancing act.

In addition, surprise demands that the terrorist avoid detection. Security is an imperative; compromise means failure. The reasons are simple and straightforward. First, terrorists almost always operate from a position of relative weakness, outnumbered and usually outgunned by their enemies. Second, terrorist attacks usually occur in locations controlled by the intended victims. Thus, terrorists must operate in the shadows, dependent on their ability to remain clandestine until they choose to violently reveal themselves, then fade into the darkness once they have done so. One of the noteworthy characteristics of terrorism and most frustrating for counterterrorism forces, centers on stringent security measures. Terrorist groups, historically, have tended to be small, close-knit and nearly impossible to infiltrate; the penalty for betrayal is normally swift and deadly. Individuals within groups rarely know more than what is necessary to carry out their specific tasks in the event one or more should be captured by security forces—individuals cannot reveal what they do not know. One of the weaknesses of Al Qaeda, deriving to its sometimes centrally planned operations and its global reach and accompanying bureaucracy, has been security lapses resulting from captured fighters and materials. Discoveries of documents and computer files in Afghanistan and other locations, as well as interrogations of suspected terrorists, revealed planned operations in the Balkans, Singapore and probably in several other locations, to include the United States. However, most groups, especially at the local and regional levels, remain highly suspicious and tightly circumspect. Many also ensure their inaccessibility through intimidation, both of their own members and of the local populace who may know of their activities, meting out swift and usually deadly justice for perceived or real betrayals. Terrorist training emphasizes security both overtly through constant instruction and deliberate psychological indoctrination, at times bordering on brain washing, emphasizing dedication and loyalty to fellow fighters and the cause; many small units train together for months, isolated and ignorant of other teams who may be training nearby. The distance might as well be miles. This combination of closed organizations, severe psychological indoctrination, the promise of swift retribution for those who may betray the cause translates into a security system ensuring terrorists plan and execute their operations in near impenetrable secrecy.

To effectively conduct an attack at the time and place of their choosing and to ensure that attack causes fear and uncertainty, terrorists rely on detailed, meticulously gathered and analyzed intelligence. Terrorist often expend vast time and resources collecting information and conducting surveillance of potential targets. Training emphasizes both covert and overt collection of information. For sheer audacity and thoroughness, terrorists often exhibit a mastery of the art of intelligence equal to the world's intelligence gathering organizations. The sheer sophistication of many of the attacks and the efforts expended to avoid detection and attribution, attest to terrorist knowledge of their intended victims. Intelligence may be collected innocuously through immigrant communities, open sources or the internet, so as to avoid the potential of arrest or compromise. Special cells, either specially dispatched or, more often, integrated into the societies well in advance, gather information and conduct surveillance prior to attacks. The presence of terrorist cells throughout Europe and in
the United States testifies to the extensive intelligence collection efforts of Al Qaeda. Prior to 9/11, Al Qaeda operatives collected intelligence for months, probably years, before determining the best way to carry out the attack. The hijackers themselves infiltrated into the United States months in advance and are known to have tested airport security; but their final preparations and intelligence gathering probably only confirmed intelligence collected by others who may never have known the precise purpose of their efforts.

The driving force behind terrorist intelligence collection centers on target selection and attack. As with any intelligence process, it must identify an enemy's capabilities and vulnerabilities, as well as provide detailed understanding of how best to avoid the first and exploit the latter. Nonetheless, terrorist targeting is fundamentally very different from that of military forces, both in concept and in conduct. Military targeting, especially with today's emphasis on air strikes and precision munitions, first identifies a target, usually predefined and prioritized in terms of its threat to friendly forces or its value to the enemy, then employs a wide array of often sophisticated intelligence collection assets to develop a detailed picture and determine the best weapons with which to attack. Much of the intelligence supports weaponeering. If the target is located in a populated or politically sensitive area, additional consideration may be given to minimizing collateral damage. Driven by the need to strike at specific targets, the process is flexible only in its selection of weapons, not the targets themselves. Terrorists approach targeting from the opposite direction. Rather than selecting a specific target and then determining how best to attack it, the terrorist cycle begins with several targets, all of which may provide similar shock value, even if widely diverse in nature, then seeks to find vulnerabilities that can be exploited. In essence, terrorism reverses the targeting process, using intelligence to cull one or more preferred targets from a larger list. The process may last months or even years, requiring patience and a sophisticated collection network. It begins with simple gathering of information, sometimes provided by individuals whose ties to terrorism may be no more than ethnic or religious sympathy and who often may not even know they are collecting intelligence. Open sources, travel and innocent sounding queries will, eventually, be supplemented by active collection conducted by agents specifically dispatched or tasked (if they are already living in the society being targeted). The terrorist group, having a fairly detailed description of the potential targets, seeks to find those with the combination of vulnerability to attack, psychological and political significance and which, if attacked, poses the least risk to the terrorists. Indeed, terrorists usually focus least on the physical or operational significance of the target; any damage done to enemy strategic military capabilities is an added luxury that normally is of secondary importance. Thus, targeting drives the selection of the target, rather than the opposite. While this process may be conducted differently by different groups and, especially in the case of small terrorist organizations, may involve the same people throughout, conceptually, the approach of progressively concentrating to find the most vulnerable and psychologically spectacular remains much the same.

Without some sort of hierarchical organization that enables them to effectively plan, command and coordinate operations, gather intelligence, maintain security, train and ensure logistics and financial support, terrorists would be unable to effectively carry out their attacks. Every terrorist organization, whatever its size, must be structured to
provide these functions. Traditionally, terrorist groups preferred a cellular structure, in which specific responsibilities, such as intelligence, operations, command and logistics, have remained distinctly compartmented, largely for security reasons. Each cell independently carried out a particular function, usually without other cells being aware of their actions, even if directed towards the same operations. Control and coordination of the disparate actions occurred at a higher level, usually through a command cell where only a very few fully understood the full extent of the operation being conducted. Thus, cell members, if captured or defecting, divulge only a small piece of the operation, even then their actions may have been so obscure, even to them, that little would be revealed. Thus, intelligence collection might be carried out by one cell while another smuggles weapons and a third prepares and trains for a mission without knowing the specifics of the target, a secret retained by senior leaders until shortly before the attack order is given. None of the cells will be aware of the others, their only common link being directives issued from an often unseen commander. These types of compartmented organizations characterize many of the Palestinian groups, as well as the IRA, the Spanish Basques and a host of smaller, independent movements that plagued Europe in the 1970s and 1980s.

Much has been made of the organizational structure of Al Qaeda, seen by some to be a tightly knit global monolith, perhaps akin to a multinational terrorist corporation, that has given up the traditional cellular structure of past groups. That perception may only be partly true, while the structure may differ somewhat from the past, it retains many of the well-established characteristics. In fact, Al Qaeda demonstrates how truly sophisticated and complex terrorist organization has become. It maintains varying degrees of control and influence on at least three organizational planes, each related but seldom operating together, except in the broadest sense. At the top sits Bin Laden and his key lieutenants, closely directing a group of select and specially trained terrorists who plan and carry only the most important and complex attacks. This level provides the funding, training, strategic planning and spiritual guidance behind the current global war declared in Bin Laden’s fatwa. Highly sophisticated attacks, such as those on the U.S. embassies in Africa and the World Trade Center probably originated and were controlled from the highest level. These form the heart of the terrorist onslaught, but not its entirety. In addition, Al Qaeda offers an umbrella of logistics, training and funding support to a myriad of regional, nationalistic, ethnic and radical Islamic terrorist groups, to include some Palestinian groups, but leaves the details of their operations alone. These operations may be coordinated within a strategic framework crafted by Bin Laden, but to directly attribute them to a monolithic structure seems to exaggerate his reach. He seems more content to help them create chaos in the name of Islam. Abu Sayef in the Philippines, a nationalistic radical Islamic movement often resorting to banditry, dwells at this level. Finally, at the bottom rung, resides a host of factions and individuals whose only linkage seems to be a common faith that includes hatred for the United States and the West. They receive moral support, as well occasional funding and training, but their actions tend to be independent of any command influence. Their ability to increase mayhem accomplishes the Al Qaeda goal of keeping the United States off balance and sending an image of global turmoil. Individuals such as the infamous shoe bomber, Robert Reid, perhaps somewhat mentally imbalanced but willing and able to add to the fear of terrorism, offer
an example of this third level of Al Qaeda. Combined, the three add up to a highly flexible, global terrorist threat that is at once both centralized and decentralized, connected and disconnected. Nonetheless, rather than being a revolutionary new structure, Al Qaeda takes advantage of the traditional cellular units characterizing most local and regional groups and places a larger umbrella, itself compartmented, over the top to provide coordination and support.

The principles of terrorist operations translate into a relatively straightforward and identifiable, process for tactical planning and execution of attacks. It begins with a general determination of the type of target to be attacked. As previously described, the ensuing strategic guidance tends to be broad in nature and often includes a wide list of potential targets, although it can also include one or a few targets with several attack options for each. Most importantly, it sets in motion a series of independent, yet connected, actions ranging from training to weapons acquisition, with the most important being intelligence collection, looking for those targets that combine symbolic importance, vulnerability and minimal risk of both either compromise or failure. Much of the information provided by Al Qaeda detainees and used by the United States to determine threat levels and predict potential concerning future attacks probably reflects this stage of the process. Similarly, the so-called “sleeper cells” in the United States and Europe seem to be dedicated to initial intelligence collection and support, rather than active operations. Once sufficient intelligence has been collected to determine specific targets and develop an operational plan, the next phase entails deployment of the actual team or cell intended to conduct the attack. The cell will finalize plans, conduct detailed reconnaissance of the target and perhaps conduct rehearsals or additional training. Safe houses, necessary documentation, finances and logistics will already be in place, arranged by other cells who may not ever know the reasons for their efforts. With the preparations complete, the attack occurs. This cycle of initial target guidance, intelligence collection, preparation, deployment of the attack team, final preparations, intelligence and attack characterizes most terrorist operations, whether each phase is conducted by a single, small cell, as was the case with the Baader-Meinhoff group in Germany in the 1970s or by a complex organization wielding multiple, functional cells, as is the case with Al Qaeda. The process may last months or even years or can be as short as a few days, with phases compressed or overlapping. The popular image of the Palestinian suicide bombers as fanatical individuals who impulsively throw themselves at buses or cafes belies the truth. Such operations are carefully planned by radical Palestinian groups, intelligence of targets meticulously gathered, the actual attackers, in the form of young bombers, only entering the cycle towards the end, receiving minimal training (essentially, how to detonate the bomb and remain undetected until the final moment) and then being directed or perhaps even taken, to the site. The sudden shock of the attack, however, should not hide its careful preparation nor the complex network that made it successful.
Current and Future Trends of Terrorism*

Perhaps the most commonly heard sentiment since 9/11 centers on the supposedly revolutionary nature of the attacks and the fundamental changes in terrorism they reflect. Analysts in the United States and elsewhere find themselves scrambling to predict where terrorism may be headed and what types of threats it may pose, especially in the face of potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Given the enormity of the attacks on 9/11 and the possible mix of radical religious and ethnic doctrines with new, potentially catastrophic technologies of killing, terrorism seems to have broken any restraints it may ever have exhibited. Daily, the media bombards readers and listeners with dire predictions of mass casualties at the hands of biological or chemical weapons. Debate in recent months focused on the fundamental shifts in both motivations and tactics apparently inaugurated by the attacks on the World Trade Center. For the United States, accustomed to the predictability (at least in the strategic sense) of conventional warfare and the Cold War, terrorism strikes fearful uncertainty. Given the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and apparent globalization of terror, predicting the future remains a tricky business. Indeed, forecasting the probable path of terrorism may reside in the realm of sorcery.

Nevertheless, the future never strays completely from its past and if the history of terrorism offers any guidance, then broad trends, if not detailed specifics, may be discerned. The preceding discussion provided insight into the common characteristics and operational traits exhibited by terrorists. Those traits evolved over decades, perhaps even centuries and remain valid today. Indeed, little evidence, beyond the single events of 9/11, indicates any revolutionary change in the nature of terrorism. Terrorism expert Steven Sloan recently asserted that, while current and future situational specifics may alter the tactics or weapons of terrorists, their basic strategies and goals remain constant (Sloan, 2002), a viewpoint increasingly shared by others. However incomprehensible the causes may be to their victims, terrorists will continue to fight for revolutionary social, economic, political, nationalistic or religious change, seeking, through their violence, to overthrow the existing order. In that sense, Al Qaeda and its successors present no revolutionary new form of warfare or behavior—they merely continue in the footsteps of their mentors. And like the ancient Zealots, the medieval assassins and the modern era Palestinian extremists, future terrorists will remain committed to violent protest. As long as a society's basic needs are not met, even if for only a small fraction of its population, then terrorists will continue to spring up. Terrorism of the future, like that of the past, will continue to inflict violence, shock and fear to achieve its goals. Frightening victims while courting a constituency through the use of highly visible attacks will, for the foreseeable future, remains the primary strategy of terrorists.

For that reason, there seems little incentive for terrorists to conduct operations aimed at disabling or disrupting infrastructure, agriculture or economies, at least not as a primary objective. Many of the recent scenarios depicting attacks on key dams, power grids or computer networks, for example, while potentially crippling and clearly representative of most state warfighting strategies, make little sense to terrorists. Such operations, if damaging in the long run, tend to lack the immediate media and symbolic

* Research assistance for this section provided by Sascha Sheehan.
impact necessary. In addition, the effects of such attacks depend on many variables outside the control of the terrorist group while often being very difficult to carry out. Cyberattacks suffer under the same constraints; their very nature tends to conceal rather than publicly proclaim the attacker. Additionally, for cultural and societal reasons, such attacks often mean little to the constituents terrorists seek to influence. The brutal truth being that bloody scenes of carnage remain far more spectacular, therefore psychologically effective, than quiet disruptions of internet systems. The combination of unpredictability, difficulty and relative absence of psychological impact, at least in the short term, probably explains why terrorists, even those with apocalyptic visions, rarely have targeted infrastructure.

For the foreseeable future, terrorist attacks will mix the old and the new. Local and territorial terrorism likely will not be consumed by a greater, global version. Linkage between failed, lawless or corrupt states and terrorist violence will persist. The inability of many states to meet the basic needs of their citizenry means that many will suffer from local terrorism; despite dire prediction of a worldwide, monolithic threat, most terrorists will thus remain committed to the local cause for which they fight. They may seek political or social redress of grievances, ethnic or religious separation or the total overthrow of the existing structure, but the geography of their struggle likely will stay relatively well defined. Groups resembling the Tamil Tigers, Hamas, Abu Sayef, the Colombian FARC and the IRA will continue to create local or regional chaos, staying dedicated to the specific causes for which they fight. Perfectly willing to accept assistance from other groups and even to coordinate their actions, they probably will remain, fundamentally, local. As long as political and social unrest remains, it will bread violence. In future years, local terrorism will continue to sprout in such areas as South Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Causes will vary, as will the structure of the terrorist groups, but they will share a common bond that sees violence as a way of changing the structure in which they find themselves.

Yet, even while internal terrorism persists, terrorists continue to develop an international persona. Starting in the 1960s, terrorist groups met and sometimes coordinated operations, shared resources and trained together. Nevertheless, such cooperation lacked any truly cohesive purpose or direction beyond a general desire to strike out at the existing order and to spread fear. If a common thread existed, it was growing hatred of the West and capitalism. Bin Laden tapped into that hatred, inaugurating a much wider, universalistic cause based on religion and ethno-nationalism. Terrorist groups, even those tied to specific locations, increasingly draw on non-territorial bonds; religious or ethno-nationalistic identity, in particular, forms a backdrop to local and regional causes. Whether this stems from the break-up of the Soviet Union or is an inevitable and final shockwave of post-colonialism may be debated. While political, social, economic or cultural causes continue to ferment unrest, the catalyst for resorting to terrorist violence more and more centers on non-territorial religious and ethnic issues. Identity issues are turning terrorism into a global phenomenon. Today, radical Islam, ignoring borders and offering spiritual justification as well as integration, unites once independent terrorist groups. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, begun largely as a secular movement demanding a territorial homeland, more and more espouses and supports radical religious ideology.
Such ties are exploited and exacerbated by globalization, both for good and evil. Modern communications, in particular, bring terrorist opportunities previously unknown. While linking once remote parts of the world, they allow terrorist groups to coordinate operations, issue orders, receive intelligence and gain access to support and funding once unavailable. In addition, more potentially dangerous, these communications also ensure that even the most remote acts of violence can gain worldwide attention. The potential danger centers on the growing need for once widely disparate groups to compete for global attention, attempting to outdo each other for headlines and television coverage, encouraging ever more deadly attacks. Bin Laden's network makes use of these capabilities, ensuring that even localized terrorist groups can draw on his support, both material and ideological. Because of the growing reach of terrorism in the West, the United States in particular, is likely to remain a primary terrorist target, even for local groups whose causes may only marginally include the United States. The United States offers a very convenient scapegoat given the perceived cultural and social onslaughts associated with globalization, as well as the United States' ability and apparent willingness to project its military might wherever and whenever it chooses. These trends threaten to both expand terrorism and increase its violence.

The real wildcard in both localized and internationalized terror rests with religious extremism. Drawing strength from political, economic and societal ills, religion serves as a catalyst. Causes become linked to spiritual identities, transforming unrest into violent rage. The destruction wrought on 9/11 demonstrated the heights to which that rage could reach. Change, at least in the sense of adjustments to existing orders, no longer frames such terrorism. With the very identities of themselves and by their definition entire religious populations at stake, compromise becomes impossible. Worse, their opponents become dehumanized, reduced to a level at which their deaths not only become inconsequential, but actually preferred. Additionally, religions know no artificial political boundaries; terrorism once confined to particular states can and will become regional or global when linked to religious causes. Unfortunately, the future paints a grim picture. The post-Cold War Era spawned a new dawning of religious extremism showing few signs of abating. Years of repression, either by Communist dictators or totalitarian regimes propped by the United States gave way in the 1990s to ethnic, cultural and especially religious awareness. In many newly created or rapidly failing states, religion has become a means of answering endemic societal problems. If radical Islam continues to dominate headlines, it is not alone in its absolutist visions. In the western world, religious consciousness may be undergoing a renaissance, bringing with it religious intolerance. One need only look at the American Christian militia groups, whose doctrines are every bit as narrow as those of Islamic extremists. Territorial and secular terrorism remains the most dominant form and is expected to remain so well into the future, terrorism motivated by religious radicalism threatens to be its most dangerous.

An apocalyptic vision of the struggle raises the specter of terrorists turning to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For Americans, nightmare scenarios swirl around the possibility and probability of their use by terrorists. Unfortunately, possible and probable have become almost synonymous when discussing these weapons. Given their potentially catastrophic effects, perhaps that should be so. WMD, by which, for this
Debates over that threat divide along two general lines—that terrorist use is a matter of "not if, but when" and the view of WMD terrorism as a "low-probability, high consequence" threat (CCR, 2002). The first bases its assumption on the premise that proliferation of the technology and scientific knowledge has become so widespread as to make the attainment of WMD by terrorists a relatively easy proposition. Aum Shinrikyo sent a shockwave through defense analysts; with money and the ability to recruit scientists, the Japanese terror group managed to manufacture nerve agent and was seriously working on weaponizing anthrax, having tested it unsuccessfully. The anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001 created near panic, despite the relatively few—albeit tragic—number of casualties. Recent intelligence reports seem to confirm rumors that Al Qaeda actively pursues a WMD capability. In addition, the extensive use and movement of toxic industrial chemicals means that terrorist may not even need to obtain their own weapons; they may be better served by causing the release of toxic gases already in rail cars or manufacturing plants. One need only look at the disaster at Bhopal, India to see the potential. The other side of the debate, while acknowledging the catastrophic nature of WMD, sees their use as unlikely, citing difficulty in obtaining and welding such weapons as well as the apparent continued unwillingness of most terrorist groups to use them—either through ignorance of the consequences or the realization that using WMD could result in a public backlash, as well as invoking a deadly counterterrorist campaign. The use of WMD crosses a line of violence never before attempted, one well beyond the use of car bombs, suicide bombers or aircraft to destroy buildings. With a few exceptions however, there has been an absence of WMD use, both by terrorist and most states (at least since World War I), despite ample opportunity and leaders who would seem to have the will.

Terrorist use of WMD certainly is possible and to some extent, may even be inevitable. However, public debate has reached near hysterical frenzy and needs a brief shot of reality. The two most catastrophic scenarios, attacks with smallpox or nuclear weapons, remain highly unlikely. International counterproliferation agreements and efforts since the end of the Cold War, the difficulty in obtaining and using such weapons and the clear and unequivocal statements from the United States and its allies of the consequences to any state providing such weapons to terrorists have combined to reduce the availability of such weapons. While advances in scientific knowledge, especially in the areas of genome research, may result in the resurgence of smallpox or a similarly dangerous pathogen, its use today remains unlikely. Other biological agents, most notoriously anthrax, can, if a terrorist group succeeds in obtaining the necessary cultures and can develop or buy expertise, offer more viable threats, as Americans recently experienced. However, the use of biological agents is as much a health care and response problem as it is a terrorism problem. Potentially devastating, it begins locally as a symptomatic outbreak; unless contagious, the disease remains confined to those exposed at the time of attack. In short, with proper additions to health care,

*Although large-scale explosive devices are often included in the definition of WMD, for this discussion, the term WMD will be used to mean chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons. The fundamental difference in psychological impact of these weapons from more "conventional" explosive weapons, regardless of killing or destructive power, places them in a separate category.*
treatment, diagnosis and, especially, immunization and prophylaxis, the threat posed by biological agents can be contained and need not be the source of panic. In the case of nuclear weapons, for which weapons-grade materials are becoming more and more difficult to obtain, the danger from terrorists also divides into the categories of either potentially catastrophic but low probability or more likely but manageable. Despite media rumors of missing nuclear warheads, there seems little likelihood that lost nuclear bombs have or will get into the hands of terrorists. More likely would be the provision of either a weapon or weapons-grade material by a rogue state, although the list of possible donors is small and very aware of the consequences. Most experts agree that the threat of terrorist use of a nuclear warhead or bomb remains unlikely. The other element of the “nuclear” threat, the radiological or so-called ‘dirty bomb’, which can be made with relative ease using spent fuels or commonly available materials, may be more hype than reality. A chunk of radioactive material wrapped around and explosive would, in fact, create few casualties beyond those affected by the blast. Perhaps the greatest threat of such an attack and one that cannot be discounted given the goals of terrorism is that an attack with a radiological bomb might create panic out of proportion to its actual damage. To many, the mere mention of exposure to radioactivity, however slight, instills panic. Even with the misperceptions and potential for panicked response by the victims, the threat of biological or nuclear attack by terrorists will, barring any revolutionary technological advances or the intervention of a state supplier, remain low probability.

The most likely future threat of WMD terrorism derives from chemical agents, either produced by terrorists or, equally likely and perhaps more deadly, toxic chemicals already manufactured and moved in the target country. They are readily available or easily produced, can often be disguised and transported legitimately and once released, can be deadly. That said, a terrorist attack with chemical weapons, while highly dangerous, likely would be local in nature. Quantities and delivery systems necessary for wide area attack, especially if lethality is a goal, present difficulties probably beyond the capabilities of a small terrorist team or individual. However, use of relatively small quantities in confined spaces, such as subways or building, presents a much more dangerous, if confined option. Such attacks can be conducted using easily produced agents from commercially available compounds, but their impact will be limited, albeit capable of inducing ample fear in the victims. A potentially more serious threat, one that requires little or no prior weapons development by terrorists, involves attacks on toxic chemical manufacturing or transportation. Terrorist use of chemical weapons poses the most likely, if not catastrophic, future option for those groups seeking to use WMD.

Conclusion

Ending terrorism may be as unreachable a goal as ending warfare; human conflict, in terrorism’s case bloody and indiscriminate, shows little sign of resolution. Even should Al Qaeda be destroyed, terrorism will continue, displaying the common characteristics bequeathed by its predecessors. Poverty, social injustice, ethnic and cultural conflict and political inequality, exploited by religious and ethnic intolerance and radicalism, egged on by maniacal leaders show no signs of abating in the future. Similarly, the fundamental characteristics and principles of terrorism will not change
either. This should not be taken to imply terrorism is a static phenomenon, subject to predictable routine or slavish adherence to past doctrines. Rather, terrorists adapt to the changing conditions it confronts and molds itself to the unique cultural, political and social situation in which they find themselves. The very operational principles they practice—surprise, security, intelligence and organization—ensure that they remain unpredictable to their enemies. But to conclude from their apparently random and ruthless tactics that terrorist groups carry out their attacks with no cognizance of the past or with no underlying conceptual basis for planning and execution, would grossly underestimate their capabilities and betray a lack of understanding of the nature of terrorism. Where terrorists tread in the future remains an open question, but in trying to determine their path, analysts would do well to dispassionately seek to understand the past and present.
Sources


Introduction

Terrorism is a socio-political phenomenon that has existed in various forms throughout much of known history. In order to combat terrorism effectively by reducing and containing - if not totally eliminating - the phenomenon, it must first be thoroughly understood. Any given terrorist act or campaign should be examined, and can be understood, only within the broader contexts in which it exists.

Being that terrorism is largely a symbolic act, which emerges as an outcome of various historical forces, both the forces and the interrelations between them must be carefully looked at. This chapter examines terrorism in the context of the political, cultural, social, religious and economic realities within which it emerges and persists. Its presentation and analysis will attempt to be not only contextual, but to the extent possible holistic as well.

Examples of terrorism abound across time, space and contexts. However, rather than surveying numerous examples, I have chosen the Middle East, and more specifically the Arab-Israeli conflict, as a case study. My choice of this particular case, or rather conflict region, is based not only on the availability of pertinent historical and contemporary examples, but more on the fact that it enables us to examine a number of specific terrorism campaigns, the context in which they evolved, the interrelations between them, their evolution over time, and the reciprocal relationships between different terrorist organizations, and between these organizations and their various audiences.

A plethora of materials on terrorism and the various terrorist organizations exists in the literature, and will not be fully exhausted in this chapter. Rather, the campaigns and organizations chosen as the case study will be presented in relation to one another, to the political struggles they claim to spearhead, and to the larger reality of which they are a part.

Historical Overview

Terrorism, more than anything, is a tactic - a course of action - chosen by individuals or groups to pursue specific political goals. It is perceived by its perpetrators - usually disempowered groups or individuals– as the best, if not only, way to achieve these goals. While the exact formula for the emergence of terrorism is short of being
fully understood, it is clearly a product of the combustible combination of various factors - historical, political, social/cultural, ideological, religious, economic, and psychological.

Combining micro and macro levels of analysis may help reveal the “ingredients” necessary, sufficient, or conducive to the emergence and employment of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1995). The causes, enabling factors, and consequences of terrorism are intrinsically related to the interactions and dynamics between political actors (Crenshaw, 1995), be they governments and oppositions, various groups and splinter groups, or terrorist organizations and their “audiences”.

The modern term “terrorism” dates back to the French Revolution. Though the term is relatively new, acts that may, in retrospect, be defined as terrorism in fact date back even further. Terrorism emerged and manifested itself through time, in various geographical locations, and within the contexts of different cultures, religions, or ideological frameworks.

Acts performed by the Sicarii Zealots in Palestine (AD 66-73) might have qualified as an early form of terrorism. Persia and Syria were the cradle of the Assassins, a sub-sect of the Isma’ili Muslim sect, which emerged and acted between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries (Wardlaw, 1982; Lewis, 1997, Sprinzak 2000; Sela, 1999). The Assassins were the first to plan and implement the systematic use of murder as a political weapon (Sela, 1999). They developed a religious doctrine justifying the murder of their political and religious opponents (the Seljuqs), and attempted to replace the dominating Sunni order with their own (Sela, 1999; Wardlaw, 1982).

In spite of its early historic roots, the systematic manifestation of terrorism emerged only in and following the French Revolution (Wardlaw, 1982). In order to decide whether we consider terrorism as a unique, contemporary threat, we must assess to what degree the phenomenon of terrorism is novel and to what degree it is in fact contiguous with historical events that might have constituted political terrorism (Wardlaw, 1982). In any event, some clear differences exist between terrorism today and that which was employed in the distant past. For one thing, while in the past terrorist groups and campaigns were more localized and self-contained, today there exist complex interrelations between various groups and campaigns. Terrorist groups inspire and are inspired by one another, and are linked to each other in terms of training, logistics, personnel and operations. Terrorism is often seen as a form of surrogate warfare between nation-states rather than merely separate political struggles (Wardlaw, 1982).

People in the United States often associate terrorism with the Middle East. However the use of terror to influence policy is undoubtedly as old as civilization itself. Jewish Zealots that publicly slit the throats of captured Romans and their collaborators during the first century of the Common Era. The Thuggee cult would ritually strangle passersby as sacrifices to the Hindu deity Kali, perhaps as late as the eighteenth century in India. However, terrorism is not a tactic utilized merely by the peoples of the Levant and Southern Asia. There are numerous examples of terror being employed by governments through the ages, but the easily recognizable form of modern political terrorism can be found first within Europe itself.
In the late 19th century, the Narodnaya Volya ("People’s Will") formed in Imperialist Russia to oppose the rule of the Tsar. Composed primarily of young students and intellectuals, the Narodnaya Volya purported to represent the peasantry and pronounced a death sentence the Tsar in August 1879. They sought the enfranchisement of the working classes and actually succeeded in assassinating Tsar Alexander II on 1 March 1881. Their hopes of a revolution by the peasantry, ignited by their actions, were dashed.

One of the more influential acts of modern terrorism was perhaps the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand in 1914 by the Black Hand organization. Gavrilo Princip, a Serb nationalist who deeply resented the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina directly into the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1908, was one of three men trained by the Black Hand and sent to intercept Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the throne, during a June 1914 visit to Sarajevo. Princip shot the Archduke and his wife at close range with a pistol. The ensuing friction between Serbia and Austria over the affair caused many European nations to choose sides and, by summer’s end, the assassination came to embroil Europe in the First World War (Shackelford, 1999).

Twentieth-century Europe has been host to many terrorist organizations, some seeking advancement for the communist movement, others seeking the liberation of their homeland. The British have long been engaged with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The IRA is opposed to continued British rule in Ireland and has had many successes in political assassination and bombings. After years of trying to physically destroy the IRA, the British and the IRA are now dealing with each other through political venues.

While many terrorist organizations attempt to engage a government in order to further some goal, the reality is that terrorism is generally too weak an instrument to overcome a powerful modern state/regime. The terrorists of Italy’s Red Brigades naively believed that the state had a heart that could be attacked. The Red Brigades emerged after the worldwide student protests of 1968. European secret services infiltrated and crushed the Red Brigades and many other similar groups that arose in Europe after 1968 such as the Red Army Faction in Germany and Action Directe in France.

Italy’s Red Brigades [Brigate Rosse – BR] formed Europe’s biggest, best organized and most powerful armed terrorist organization. It was an elitist organization spawned by the 1968 student protest movement. The ultimate goal of the Red Brigades was to seize power in Italy. Its members were drawn from universities and factories. It comprised the most idealistic part of the nation’s youth and at various times could claim the admiration and moral support of millions of Italians. People admired the Red Brigades as “one of the few things in Italy that really worked” (Stewart, 2002).

The late twentieth century witnessed numerous terrorist acts committed by factions somehow connected to the Middle East or Muslim groups. The increasing international scope of these activities has eclipsed to some extent the terrorist actions going on in other parts of the world but remain primarily within national borders. A brief list of examples would include Chechens fighting Russians, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and the Shining Path in Peru. Such a list would also include the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building on April 19, 1995 by Timothy McVeigh. Intra-national terror
seems to garner far less attention despite its being the logical starting point for later more International actions in order to garner more attention.

Terrorism has been extensively used by various factions all over the world and throughout history. It has been performed in the name of religious doctrines, including Catholicism, Sikhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Islam and others, and under the banner of political ideologies ranging from left to right, national movements, or other ideological struggles.

**Cultural, Structural and Direct Violence**

While terrorism perhaps epitomizes direct violence, it is often produced by or in reaction to structural violence and is commended by some as a consequence of cultural violence. Cultural, structural, and direct violence are thus closely interrelated. Culture, the normative beliefs and practices of a society, can be a source of violence by allowing a dehumanization of certain persons or groups. Cultural violence leads to structural violence when it is incorporated into formal legal and economic exchanges. While individual acts of direct violence have many causes, their occurrence is frequently predicated upon a larger and often hidden structure that induces violence (Galtung, 1990). The process can in fact be reciprocal, whereby the existence of structural violence breeds even further cultural violence.

Cultural violence, more specifically, refers to those aspects of culture that can be used to justify or legitimate direct or structural violence. Such aspects of culture include religious symbols, flags, anthems, speeches, etc. Cultures themselves cannot usually be defined as being violent or not, but most cultures do possess certain violent aspects. Cultural violence may manifest itself in religion, ideology, language, art, science, and cosmology (Galtung, 1990).

The three types of violence differ temporally. Direct violence is an event; structural violence is a dynamic process, and cultural violence remains more invariant, given the slow transformation of basic culture. In most cases, there is a flow from cultural violence to institutionalized structural violence, and finally to eruptions of direct violent acts. Direct violence is used by both “underdogs” and “top dogs,” but serves quite different purposes for the two groups. Underdogs use violence as a way to get out of a "structural iron cage" of powerlessness or to get back at the group that put them there. Top dogs, on the other hand, use violence as a way to keep or gain power (Galtung, 1990).

Structural violence, as opposed to direct violence, is covert and thus harder to identify. While it is easy to recognize acts of killing, shooting or bombing as violent, structural violence often goes unrecognized, as it appears “normal” (or is invisible) on the surface. Examples of structural violence include unequal access for different people or groups to goods - jobs, funding, etc. A situation of military occupation, such as the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, is an especially relevant example of structural violence. More often than not, structural violence is left unchanged and the cycle of violence continues. Nevertheless, structural violence is often the cause of direct violence – either by the victims of the structural violence (against its “perpetrators”), or by its “perpetrators” against the victims. Often, however, boundaries between perpetrators and victims are blurred, as both (or all) sides most likely perceive
themselves as victims. Terrorism is but one example of direct, overt violence, which is embedded in cultural violence and which is influenced by and in turn influences (or attempts to influence) structural violence.

Structural violence is being laid bare and increasingly those who have benefited from it are being challenged and forced to cede or to defend their privileges by overt violence. Role differentiation has nothing inherently unstable about it. It only gives rise to relative deprivation, status disequilibrium, multiple dysfunction and perhaps terrorism when it is based on criteria which are not acceptable to all the relevant actors and when the role is not being fulfilled to the general satisfaction in the circumstances of the day. Authority without coercion can only be sustained on the basis of a continuously renewed consensus. In short, the exercise of authority requires the participation of all: not the active participation of everyone, but sufficient to satisfy those who are interested” (Groom in Wardlaw, 1982).

Cultural violence is what makes direct and structural violence look and feel right - or at least not wrong (Galtung, 1990). It is what makes acts of terror and “reprisals” to it – no matter what the “collateral damage” might be – acceptable and justifiable.

**Violence as Symbolic Action**

Terrorism, like violence in general, should not be dismissed as senseless or irrational. On the contrary, it should be understood primarily as a symbolic act which carries, and intends to convey, meaning.

Terrorism, being primarily an act of meaning, needs an audience – whether from among its “own” group or its opponents’. Understanding the relationship between terrorism and its audiences and the cultural and social forces that enable or encourage the performance of acts of terrorism is of crucial importance. While Osama Bin-Laden and Al-Qa’eda may pose problems in and of themselves, the fact that their acts appeal to, or are legitimized by, millions of Arabs and Muslims (and others perhaps) worldwide should be no less alarming.

Collective identity is the medium through which the individual is related to collective violence, whether it is carried out by the military, the state or some other collective, or on behalf of those struggling for statehood. National discourse always represents wars as being fought on behalf of the “nation” and therefore for a just cause. Likewise, terror campaigns are often seen as a necessary, even taken-for-granted, part of a collective (national, religious, sectoral) struggle.

Discourse (a “body of knowledge” which depicts a group of statements that share a common system of formation) is the way something is talked about. Discourse in fact constitutes a boundary between acceptable and unacceptable interests and acts (Jabri, 1996). It represents a translation of violent events into a larger social text, and enables one to deal with the complex connections between violence and ethical beliefs, and between boundary and boundary violation (Apter, 1997). It is when events are incorporated into interpretive discourses embodied in discourse communities, that political violence becomes self-validating and self-sustaining. Activities are redefined in terms of the needs and obligations of the social movement/entity (Apter, 1997).
The legitimization of one’s own violence is a result of a discourse about violence and the conflict, as well as of societal beliefs about one’s own group or society, and the belief in a “just world” (Staub, 1989; Jabri, 1996). In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, each side clearly views itself as the victim and thus believes it is right in using violence against the other.

Terrorism, like other acts of violence, is also meant to convey a message. Often the perpetrators of terrorist acts feel they have no other way to be heard, and they are determined to get their message across (although the message that comes across is not necessarily the intended one). To understand the use of violence, as well as its legitimization by both its employers and its recipients, we must look at the meaning it carries for both. Violence should be looked at as a historically developed cultural construction whereby the way people conceive of violence and the meaning it has for them depend on time, place, historical context, and vantage-point (offenders, victims, bystanders, etc) (Aijmer and Abbink, 2000).

**Terrorism: Legality and Legitimization**

Terrorism is socially produced, out of a specific cultural context, and its cultural meaning and culturally inscribed motives are relatively autonomous of legal codes (Toloyan, 1988). Making the perpetrators the subject of law does not address their sense of impotence within the law. Thus, while acts of terrorism may have specific legal status in the courts of (mainly) Western governments, referring to terrorism in legal terms - themselves a product of hegemonic, dominant discourse, in whose construction “marginalized” groups rarely take part anyway - is rather useless in mitigating further acts of terrorism.

Terrorism is but one type of violence. Violence is by its very nature ambiguous, and no well-demarcated, widely accepted concept of it exists. The process of defining and classifying acts as violent or non-violent is itself value-laden. Hence, definitions of violence are usually closely linked with issues of legitimization and delegitimization (Schlesinger, 1991), and any classification of violence is thus not universally accepted. “Like power, violence is essentially contested: everyone knows it exists, but no one agrees on what actually constitutes the phenomenon” (Nordstrom, 1997, p.6).

Though the term “Terrorism,” narrower than “Violence,” may be somewhat easier to define, it, too, is both ambiguous and often value-laden. Attempts to delineate clear boundaries between terrorism and other forms of political violence are difficult and invariably provoke dispute (Crenshaw, 1995). Moreover, discussion of terrorism as a separate phenomenon singles it out from within a larger context of violence, other forms of which - while perhaps termed differently - may be no less abhorrent or problematic than terrorism per se.

While both “legality” and “legitimacy” are relative, value-laden, terms, they are not necessarily synonymous. Both are socially constructed and thus dynamic and context specific, yet “legality” is more “institutionalized,” and hence perhaps more subject to hegemonic dominant discourse. While terrorist activities may be deemed illegal by most governments, their legitimacy in the eyes of various groups (mainly those in whose name terrorism is performed, or who are sympathetic towards it) is completely
independent of its “illegality”. In a sense, this legitimacy constitutes a “counter narrative,” or “counter paradigm,” to a given prevalent dominant discourse.

Case Study: The Arab-Israeli Conflict

An Overview

From the late 1960s the Middle East has become known as a center of regional and international terrorism, initially related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and later, from the 1980s, to the resurgence of Islamic radicalism as well (Sela, 1999).

Violence and terrorism, whether in the name of religion (as with the Crusaders, or Muslim and Jewish religious radicals), nationalism (such as Zionism, Palestinian nationalism, Ba’athism) or other ideologies, has been an integral part of Middle East history for centuries. Terrorism in the contemporary Middle East is best understood as a result of several specific events in the region’s modern political and social history, including Western colonialism (Sela, 1999). In the more recent past, mainly since the 1920s, terrorism has also been intrinsically linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the context of the struggle against Western domination (in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict), terrorism was employed by Jewish dissident underground groups (the Irgun/IZL and Lehi/Stern Gang), against both the British and the Arabs in Palestine (Sela, 1999), as well as by Arabs/Muslims against the Jews, Zionists, and later Israelis whom many Arabs viewed as an extension, or manifestation, of Western dominance.

The relationship between Palestinians and Jews in Palestine was violent practically from the onset, preceding the establishment of the state of Israel. It intensified with the 1948 war, launched on the nascent state of Israel by the neighboring Arab states, and has persisted until today. During the 1948 war many acts of direct violence – massacres, bombings and killings – were committed by each of the sides against the other (Morris, 1987), leaving scars in the minds and hearts of both peoples. The 1948 war ultimately resulted in the establishment of the state of Israel, on the one hand, and in the Palestinian Nakba, or Catastrophe, on the other, whereby half of Palestine’s Arab population (approximately 700,000-900,000 people) were either expelled or fled the country, becoming refugees. The Palestinian refugee camps are, still today, a poignant manifestation of structural violence and a source of both direct and cultural violence.

Terrorism surrounding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has taken on many forms and been perpetuated by both Jews and Arabs. There have also been, over time, “spillover” effects whereby the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has affected other campaigns of violence and terror (such as in Southern Lebanon). Similarly, events in other Muslim countries, such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran, have directly and indirectly affected the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Terrorism employed by both Jews and Palestinians has, at different points in history, been both “other-directed” and “solipsistic”. The former refers to violence directed towards the adversaries’ targets for the purpose of manipulating their behavior. The latter, on the other hand, refers to violence whose purpose is to affect, or manipulate, the behavior of those groups with which the perpetrators identify (Lustick, 1995). In the early to mid 40s, for instance, much of the Zionist violence had as its
psychological target the Jews themselves. Jewish violence against Arabs often served to inspire and motivate other Jews, both in Palestine and in the Diaspora (Lustick, 1995; Shafir, 1989). Over time Zionist/Jewish other-directed terrorism became more dominant, though solipsistic terrorism continued to be influential even after the establishment of the State of Israel (Lustick, 1995).

Since the early 1900s, humiliating self-depictions of Palestinians, similar to the depiction of Diaspora Jews by Zionists, became increasingly present, and linked to Arab violence against Jews. Motifs of heroism, self-sacrifice and martyrdom became more and more prevalent (Lustick, 1995). According to Lustick (1995), it is clear that the main audience for Palestinian violence up until the 1970s was in fact Arabs, and Palestinians in particular.

As one pertinent example, Lustick mentions Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam - a prominent figure in both Zionist and Palestinian historiography of the 1930s. According to Zionists, he was a Muslim fundamentalist and terrorist, who played a role in inciting and carrying out the 1936 Arab Riots – as termed by Zionists (Lustick, 1995). According to Palestinian historiography of what they term the Great Arab Revolt, he was among the first *fidaiyun*, self-sacrificers, “those whose willingness to lay down their lives for Palestine enabled Palestinians to escape the humiliation of Zionist success and kindle a healthy national consciousness”. (Lustick, 1995, p. 535). Indeed, Izz-al-Din al-Qassam’s image has, to this day, been exemplary and inspiring for generations of Palestinian fighters.

**Terrorism and Mutual Violence in Palestine Preceding the 1948 War**

Mutual hostilities and tensions between Jews and Arabs in Palestine began in the 1880s, with the arrival of the first *Aliyot* – waves of Jewish immigrants from Europe – and their settlement in Palestine (Morris, 1987; Morris, 1990; Shafir, 1989). During this time, mutual violence was mostly of low-intensity, and was solipsistic (Lustick, 1995) as well as directed towards the “other’s” community.

Up until 1948, Jewish and Palestinian groups geared their terrorist efforts against each other’s communities, as well as towards the British - with the purpose either of expelling them or at least influencing British policies (Mattar, 2000). Initially, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was termed an “inter-communal” conflict (Kimmerling, 1999).

While mutual violence had begun earlier, the campaigns we more generally refer to as terrorism began later, mainly in the 1930s. Some of the violence was in the form of “sporadic” riots and massacres (Morris, 1987; Morris, 1990; Nasr, 1997), while other manifestations of violence were well organized. The 1936-1939 Arab Revolt was seen by many Zionists as merely riots and terrorism. It did produce some of the mythical characters (such as Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam) who later set the example for future terrorist campaigns.

The Jewish Undergrounds (as termed by Jews/Israelis) conducted most of the organized Jewish/Zionist violence in the pre-state years. The *Irgun Zvai Leum* (National Military Organization), IZL, was founded in 1937 by Ze’ev Jabotinsky. Its first appointed leader was David Razi’el, later to be replaced by Menachem Begin – who four decades later became the Prime Minister of the state of Israel. The Irgun’s first action, in November 1937, was a raid against an Arab village (Nasr, 1997).
In 1939 Lohamei Herut Yisrael, LEHI (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) was formed as a splinter group from the Irgun. It was led by Avraham Stern and often referred to as the Stern Gang. In 1942 the British found and killed Stern, and in 1945 LEHI was taken over by Yizhaq Shamir (Nasr, 1997), also to later become the Prime Minister of Israel.

The Irgun and the Stern Gang committed numerous acts of terrorism against Arabs and the British in Palestine and abroad. In 1944 Lord Moyne, influential in Middle East policies and suspected by the Jews of being pro-Arab, was assassinated in Egypt by LEHI members. In 1946-1947 over seventy mail bombs were sent to British government employees. In 1946 the King David Hotel in Jerusalem was bombed by Irgun forces, killing almost 100 British, Palestinians and Jews and injuring close to one hundred others (Nasr, 1997).

Though the Irgun and LEHI were the main perpetrators of terrorism, the Haganah and later the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) played their parts as well. Moreover, intra-Zionist violence and terrorism was also employed on a number of occasions. One pertinent example of such violence is the Altalena episode, which was the culmination of already existing intra-Zionist rivalries and violence. In the midst of Israel's War of Independence, and shortly after the establishment of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and the Irgun (then lead by Menachem Begin) were engaged in a struggle. In mid-June 1948, the Altalena, a ship bound from France and purchased by Irgun members abroad, arrived at Kfar Vitkin. The ship carried arms and ammunition, a portion of which had been allocated for Begin's Irgun forces. On June 1st (after the ship's intended arrival date but before its actual arrival, which had been delayed), an agreement had been signed for the absorption of the Irgun into the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). One of the clauses in the agreement stated that the Irgun had to cease all independent arms acquisition activities. The insistence of the Irgun, nevertheless, on specific allocations of the ship's cargo was interpreted by Israeli government representatives as a challenge to their authority and as an attempt to create an “army within an army.” A governmental debate ended in a resolution to empower the army to use force if necessary to overcome the Irgun and to confiscate the ship and its cargo. An ultimatum was given to Begin. When he would not comply Ben-Gurion ordered the vessel shelled, and nineteen Jews were consequently killed (Sprinzak, 1999). Of the nineteen, sixteen were Irgun fighters and three were IDF soldiers. After the shelling of the Altalena, more than 200 Irgun fighters were arrested on Ben-Gurion's orders. Most of them were released several weeks later.

Zionist terrorism was directed against Palestinians as well as the British, both before and after 1948. One of the most infamous of these was the killing by Irgun and Stern Gang members of a few hundred Palestinians in Deir Yassin (Nasr, 1997). The Dier Yassin Massacre had profound psychological effects on other Palestinians at the time “encouraging” them to flee out of fear, and became a central theme in Palestinian national consciousness and a symbol of Zionist terror against Palestinians. In Zionist/Israeli collective memory it is also considered by most as a “stain” – not something of which to be proud.
Overall, the Jewish/Zionist campaign of terrorism helped convince the British to leave the country in May 1948, rather than in August of that year, as had been their original intention.

The 1948 War and Its Aftermath

The 1948 war was perhaps the most important watershed in the Palestinian-Israeli (until then Jewish/Zionist) conflict. It resulted on the one hand in the establishment of the state of Israel. On the other, it had detrimental consequences for the Palestinians. For Palestinians, 1948 – the Nakba, or the Catastrophe, as they refer to it – is perhaps the most significant formative event, from which all else flows. Palestinian identity has, ever since 1948, been in many ways constructed of the experience of dispossession, homelessness, insecurity and uprootedness.

Memories of destroyed villages and towns play a central role in Palestinian consciousness. The Deir Yassin massacre, committed by Irgun forces in 1948, was crucial in heightening Palestinian fears at the time, and consequently in heightening the flow of refugees. It has been, ever since, a central theme in the narration of Palestinian history, and has had a great impact on how Palestinians saw (and still see) their enemies.

Since 1948 there has been an ongoing struggle over the preservation and recreation of the Palestinian identity, which has taken place in a few loci: the refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the population in the major Palestinian cities, such as Nablus; and the “satellite” Palestinian communities in the Diaspora, which eventually served as a hotbed for national and rebellious activities (Kimmerling, 1999).

No one exemplifies these feelings more than the refugees themselves. Indeed, the concept of “Ghurba”, or exile, is a major component of Palestinian identity. In addition, a distinct identity and character developed in the camps themselves, and in those camps outside the mandatory borders of Palestine the situation was different from that in the West Bank and Gaza Strip camps. A major agent in instilling Palestinian consciousness among the camp refugees was the educational system established by the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA). For many Palestinians, the core of the conflict, from which all else flows, is the refugee issue. They see their dispossession by Israel in 1948 as the defining element in the modern history of their people, as well as in the entire Arab-Israeli conflict.

Following the new reality created in 1967, after Israel took control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and in the context of their nation-building process, Palestinians developed three main, heroic, “prototypes” which became central elements of their collective identity: the Fida'i (“he who sacrifices himself”), the Saamed (“steadfast”), and the Shahid (“martyr”) (Kimmerling, 1999).

The image of a Fida'i has its roots in the Palestinian (mostly peasant) collective memory of the 1936-39 Arab Revolt, and is a sort of modern secular version of the Muslim fighter of Jihad (the “Holy War” waged by Muslims against non-believers). The popularity of this mythical image rose in the context of the PLO’s guerrilla warfare waged against Israel (Kimmerling, 1999).
The concept of *Sumud* (steadfastness) and its bearer -the *Saamed* - imply a continued connection to the land and refusal to leave it. This concept is more passive than *Fida'ī*. It also legitimized partial cooperation with the Israeli authorities, based on the claim that this is acceptable so long as the higher objective - that of clinging tenaciously to the land and not "giving in" to the "Israeli conquerors" - is achieved (Kimmerling, 1999).

With the outbreak of the first *Intifada* (Palestinian Uprising) in late 1987, a third heroic figure - the *Shahid* - emerged, who, according to Kimmerling (1999), is a merge of both the *Fida'ī* and the *Saamed*. The image of the *Shahid*, as emerges from the first *Intifada*, is that of a young teenager, who fights against all odds and sacrifices his life for the national cause. Borrowing from the world of Islamic imagery, the *Shahid* is promised upon his death a life of eternity in heaven.

The 1987 *Intifada* came to symbolize *resistance*, and its heroes and martyrs were put on a national pedestal. In fact, the *Intifada* has come to mean the epitome of the ultimate struggle, which is part of the essence of Palestinianism. The September 2000 *Intifada* again symbolizes resistance, though the levels of violence employed by both Israelis and Palestinians have dramatically risen.

Terrorism has often been a strategic choice employed by Arab and Palestinian groups (as well as some Jewish/Zionist groups, as previously mentioned). Between 1948 and the mid 1950s, many Palestinians (refugees from the 1948 war) infiltrated Israel mostly for "thefts" – often "stealing" from their own property which they had lost (Morris, Sela, 1999) - but also for the purpose of harming and taking revenge upon Israelis (Sela, 1999). From 1955 Egypt sponsored the first groups of fida'īyyun (self-sacrificers) squads which infiltrated Israel and committed acts of terrorism against Israeli civilians (Sela, 1999).

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed in 1963, and soon after officially adopted the principle of "armed struggle" for the liberation of Palestine. While this was seen as no more than classical terrorism by many, Palestinians usually differentiated between terrorism and armed struggle – the latter of which they viewed as a legitimate means through which to liberate their homeland (Bechor, 1991).

Articles 9 and 10 of the PLO National Charter state:

Article 9: "Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. This is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it. They also assert their right to normal life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-determination and sovereignty over it."

Article 10: "Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This requires its escalation, comprehensiveness, and the mobilization of all the Palestinian popular and educational efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution. It also requires the achieving of unity for the national (watani) struggle among the different groupings of the Palestinian people, and between the Palestinian people and the Arab masses, so as to secure the continuation of the revolution, its escalation, and victory."

Since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, various Palestinian groups opted for an armed struggle, often constituting terrorism, as a means by which to fight
Israel, exert pressure on Israel or internationally, and, if nothing else, at least express their grievances to the world (Mattar, 2000).

The idea of armed struggle actually began to take root more seriously among Palestinian (Fatah) ideologues in the very early 1960s, but gained more momentum following the 1967 war (Bechor, 1991). Its main objective was to demoralize Israelis and possibly instigate problems between Israel and its neighbors. Another important objective, as stated by Fatah ideologue Khaled al-Hassan (Bechor, 1991), was to create a mood of struggle within the Arab nation itself, and encourage Arabs to go out and fight (here again – another example of solipsistic terrorism). The concept of armed struggle quickly caught on and henceforth became the motto of many other Palestinian organizations.

After the Jordanian crackdown on Palestinian guerilla fighters in September 1970 (known as “Black September”), the expulsion of these fighters from Jordan and their subsequent fleeing to South Lebanon, a special revenge team – named, coincidentally, “Black September” - was created in 1971 under the leadership of Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) and with at least tacit Fatah support (Mattar, 2000).

By the early 1970s there already existed a number of different Palestinian guerilla groups and splinter groups, such as George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Ahmad Jibril’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command, and Nayif Hawatima’s Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). These groups differed on various ideological points, including the tactics which were to be employed in the Palestinian struggle (Mattar, 2000).

Sabri al-Banna, formerly a member of Fatah, had long been critical of Fatah’s activities. In 1974 he created his own group – known as the Abu Nidal (Sabri al-Banna’s name) Group. For years the Abu Nidal Group carried out many acts of terrorism internationally, against Israelis and Jews and against Palestinian rivals (Nassr, 1997).

In general, the most active Palestinian groups in international terrorism during the 1970s and 1980s were the PFLP, Fatah, and the Abu Nidal group. In fact, due to the many acts of terrorism carried out by Palestinian groups, the term “Palestinian” during the 1970s was practically synonymous with “terrorist” (Mattar, 2000).

During the early seventies, a great deal of operational collaboration existed between Palestinian organizations (mainly the PFLP), and other terrorist groups such as the Baader Meinhof gang and the Red Army in Germany, the Japanese Red Army, the Red Brigades in Italy, and others (Sela, 1999).

The seeds of subsequent violence and destruction in Lebanon were sown mostly during the early seventies (although to begin with Lebanon’s demographic make-up was potentially volatile). In 1975, with the eruption of the Civil War in Lebanon, it became a virtual free zone for terrorist groups (Sela, 1999). The Israeli air force bombarded Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon in retaliation for the use of the camps as launching pads for guerilla warfare. These Israeli raids contributed to the polarization of Lebanese into factions which either supported or opposed Palestinian presence in, and operations from, Lebanon (Mattar, 2000).

After November 1974, when Arafat spoke at the UN, implicitly accepting territorial compromise and negotiations, the face of covert violence in the Middle East changed
From the late 1970s Fatah attempted to gain international recognition as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and committed significantly fewer acts of terrorism. Palestinian guerilla groups were also preoccupied with the Civil War that had been raging in Lebanon since 1975 (Mattar, 2000). However, terrorism did not completely cease and in fact the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador to Britain by the Abu Nidal group served as a trigger for Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (Mattar, 2000).

On a number of occasions over the years members of the Israeli Mossad (Secret Service) assassinated leading Palestinians in various parts of the world. The war between Israelis (the Israeli authorities) and Palestinians (the PLO) often took place in arenas like Jordan and Lebanon.

The 1980s & 1990s: Israel's Invasion of Lebanon, the First Palestinian Intifada

The 1980s and 1990s were eventful years, marked with religious and Messianic motivated violence. New forms of Jewish terrorism, sponsored by Gush Emunim and known as the Jewish Underground, surfaced in the early 1980s. The emergence of the Hizballah in the early 1980s, and the Islamic Jihad and Hamas in the mid and late 80s brought with them more lethal forms of terrorism, such as suicide bombings and attacks from ambush (Sela, 1999). All of these were examples of Jewish Messianism, Islamic resurgence (spearheaded also by the Islamic Revolution in Iran), and the merger of religious and nationalist goals and fervor.

Hizballah

Hizballah – the Party of God – was formed in Lebanon in 1982, though it became official only in 1983. It emerged in the midst of Israel's invasion of Lebanon which commenced on 6 June 1982 and which closely followed the 1979 Iranian Revolution (Jaber, 1997; Hezi-Ashkenazi, 2002; Norton, 2000).

Prior to the emergence of Hizballah, the most prominent Shi'i organization in Lebanon was Amal, a reformist movement founded in the early 1970s by an Iranian-born cleric (Norton, 2000).

Iran and Syria, each for their own reasons, were deeply involved in the creation and later activities of Hizballah. For Iran, Hizballah constituted part of the campaign to spread the Islamic Revolution. For Syria, it served as an instrument for preserving its interests and stronghold in Lebanon (Norton, 2000).

Hizballah, a Shi'i organization, has its ideological roots in the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and its founders were clerics inspired by the revolution (Norton, 2000; Jaber, 1997). It also has roots in Hizb-Al-Da'wa – a Shi'i group known for its opposition to the Ba'ath regime in Iraq and its links to Arab Shi'i jurists of the 1970s (Norton, 2000).

Soon after its creation, and with Israel's persistent presence in Southern Lebanon, Hizballah attracted growing numbers of followers. While Lebanese resistance to Israeli occupation of South Lebanon had initially been spearheaded by secularists, by 1984 Hizballah, as part of the "Islamic resistance," clearly led and dominated the campaign (Norton, 2000).
One of Hizballah’s main mobilizing forces was the concept of martyrdom in the name of Jihad which, especially in Shi'i Islam, resonates in a particular way (Norton, 2000). The use of suicide bombers, especially in the 1980s, unnerved the IDF and provoked reactions that further inflamed resistance and perpetuated the cycle of violence (Norton, 2000).

By mid-1986, however, Hizballah began suffering a number of setbacks. First, they suffered great casualties from the Israelis. Secondly, they were somewhat alienated from the populace since the southern Lebanese were tired of bearing the brunt of Israeli reprisals (Jaber, 1997). By the late 80s Hizballah was facing opposition from Amal, as well from Amal’s main sponsor – Syria. The ideological differences between Amal and Hizballah had become apparent as early as in 1985, when Israel withdrew from most of the South and retreated to what it termed as its “security zone”. While Hizballah was determined to fight until all of Lebanese soil was “liberated,” Amal’s position was slightly more moderate. Another major point of contention between the two organizations was their relationship to the Palestinian guerilla fighters. Here, Amal, backed by Syria, held the harsher position and was more strongly opposed to letting the guerilla fighters regain power in the refugee camps in Southern Lebanon than was Hizballah, which was more supportive of the Palestinian guerillas (Jaber, 1997).

A landmark event in the relationship between the two organizations was the kidnapping by Hizballah of American Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins in February 1988. Following this, Amal forces rounded up Hizballah followers and raided some houses. In May 1988, war finally erupted between Hizballah and Amal, basically over control of Southern Lebanon. Eventually, Hizballah was expelled from the Southern Lebanon and banned from carrying out attacks against Israel or the South Lebanon Army (Jaber, 1997). Hostilities between the two organizations eventually spread to parts of Beirut. Amal was principally backed by Syria, and Hizballah by Iran. The relationship between Syria and Iran thus had much to do with what was going on between these two organizations (both the violence and its curtailment) in Southern Lebanon. In early 1989, an understanding was reached between Hizballah, Amal and Syria. New ground rules were established, and Hizballah was ultimately allowed to continue its war against Israel (Jaber, 1997).

Towards the early nineties Hizballah was gaining strength, becoming more efficient in its strategies and tactics, and adopting bolder measures in its operations (Jaber, 1997). Increasingly, Hizballah fighters were launching assaults against Israeli strongholds in Lebanon and threatening Israel’s northern border. Much of their improved success is attributed to a change in their structure of command. They were also making increased use of the media (Jaber, 1997).

The weakness and incompetence of the Lebanese state in answering its people’s needs left a vacuum for Hizballah to fill, especially among Lebanese Shi’i. In fulfilling this role Hizballah was forced to deal with issues central to Lebanon’s social and economic life, especially in the more neglected areas of the country (Hezi-Ashkenazi, 2001). Dealing with daily socio-economic problems forced Hizballah to emphasize social rather than strictly religious interests (Ibid, 2001).

Internal Lebanese political processes, such as the Ta’if Agreement which called for the dismantling of the militias in Lebanon, forced Hizballah to become actively engaged in the Lebanese political process in order to survive (Hezi-Ashkenazi, 2001;
In 1992, and later again in 1996, Hizballah ran for elections to the Lebanese parliament. In 1992 the party won eight seats, a fact which points to its significance in the Lebanese political arena (Hezi-Ashkenazi, 2001).

Islam sees as one of its main goals the achievement and upholding of social justice. In that sense, there are similarities between Hizballah’s platform and Leninism – both of which have as their declared goal to protect the underdogs in society from those who take advantage of them, and to do so, if necessary, by means of revolution (Ashkenazi, 2001). Alongside the battle against the “enemies of Islam” Hizballah struggled to change the face of Lebanese society, known for its schisms and inequalities.

Hizballah began its use of suicide bombings in 1983. Initially, several Hizballah leaders, including Sheikh Fadlallah, opposed this practice, but eventually its effectiveness convinced them to change their mind (Sprinzak, 2002). Ultimately, Hizballah’s suicide attacks, and more so its guerilla war of attrition against Israel, were major factors in hastening Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in May 2000. At least in the short run, the Israeli withdrawal can be considered a remarkable achievement for Hizballah. On the other hand, no longer having the Zionist enemy to fight against, might have forced the party to “normalize,” and as a result affect its internal cohesion (Zisser, 2000).

Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad, although a Sunni Muslim organization, was largely inspired by the (Shi’ite) Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. It is believed to have been founded in the early 1980s (Taraki, 1989). Together with Hamas, it, too, has been the perpetrator of numerous suicide bombings against settlers and other military and civilian Israeli targets.

Hamas (the acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya - The Islamic Resistance Movement), was formed by Muslim Brethren activists during the early stages of the 1987 Intifada – first in Gaza and later in the West Bank. Its ideological roots go back to those of the Muslim Brethren of the 1930s, and the Hamas charter in fact calls itself a “wing” of the Muslim Brethren in Palestine (Nusse, 1998; Taraki, 1989). Its ideological and revolutionary roots go back to Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam in the 1930s, and its military wing is named after him (Taraki, 1989). Its ultimate goal is the establishment of a Muslim state by means of Jihad – striving in God’s cause (Nusse, 1998).

In the early months of the first Intifada, Hamas surfaced as a contender for authority among Palestinians, challenging that of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Since Israel had its own interest in challenging the PLO’s power and thus cracking Palestinian unity, ultimately to subdue the Intifada, it in fact encouraged Hamas in its early years. It even gave stage to Hamas leaders on Israeli TV in Arabic (Taraki, 1989) – an “honor” not bestowed on PLO leaders at the time. It is widely accepted that the Israeli Intelligence Services, at least in the early years of the first Intifada, encouraged Hamas to sow discord and disunity among Palestinians (Taraki, 1989).
Hamas, like many other organizations, surfaced as a result of the merger of different historical factors, among them the harsh economic and social conditions in Gaza and the West Bank. Initially it was rather marginalized, yet over the years it has gained substantial power and legitimacy, mainly in the Gaza Strip but increasingly (during the recent Intifada) in the West Bank as well. As Taraki (1989) claims, “The success of any social movement depends to a large degree on its ability to put forth a political and social agenda responsive to the real needs of its constituency” (Taraki, 1989, p.319). Indeed, Hamas’s widening appeal is a result of among other things its address of Palestinian socio-economic concerns. It is a religious movement, though societal order, politics and religion are one in Islam. More recently Hamas’s appeal has risen due to the Palestinian public’s disillusionment with the Oslo Process and the PLO leadership.

According to Hamas’s ideology, the entire land of Palestine is part of Muslim Waqf (Islamic trust), and is thus non-negotiable. Furthermore, by negotiating with the enemy over land, one is committing an act of treason (Taraki, 1989; Kimmerling, 1999). This is remarkably similar to the belief some religious Jews hold with regard to the Holy Land (or the Land of Israel). It was Israeli Prime Minister Rabin’s “act of treason” (signing the Oslo accords, by which he agreed to secede parts of Israel), which caused him to be declared by some (albeit limited) Jewish religious circles a “traitor,” a title which ultimately served as the justification for his assassination by a follower of that school of belief.

The Hamas charter claims that there are three circles – the Palestinian, the Arab and the Muslim. Each has its role in the struggle against Zionism. Islamic consciousness must be disseminated among the masses at all levels, the spirit of Jihad must be spread among the Umma (the Islamic polity), the enemy must be engaged and the ranks of the Mujahidin must be joined (Taraki, 1989).

While Hamas talked of Jihad mostly when addressing Arab and Muslim audiences, it was aware of the word’s negative resonance among Western audiences. Thus, when addressing “the West” it usually talked instead about a “justified liberation struggle” (Nusse, 1998).

In its early years, Hamas upheld Islamic laws of sparing women, children and the elderly in their attacks against the enemy. However, this changed over time. The massacre in February 1994 of Muslim worshipers by a Jewish settler (Barouch Goldstein) served as a significant turning point for Hamas, which viewed this act not as a private one by Goldstein, but as a part of the overall “Jewish conspiracy” against Palestinians and Muslims (Nusse, 1998).

**Jewish and Israeli Terrorism**

Acts of violence and terrorism have been committed by vigilante Jews/Israelis, as well as by the state of Israel. An example of a Jewish ideological group that turned into an organized terrorist group is the Jewish Underground – part of Gush Emunim (The Block of the Faithful).

Gush Emunim sprang up following the 1967 war, in which Israel gained control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and was for the first time in possession of most of the historical/Biblical Land of Israel. Gush Emunim thus emerged as a Messianic ideological group, which saw Israel’s great conquests as a “sign” (Avruch, 1979, 1988;
Gradually, however, their idealistic dreams turned into idealistic, and later professional, terrorism. In the late 1970s a group named “The Temple Mount Faithful” meticulously planned to blow up the Muslim Dome of the Rock, which stands on what Jews consider their holiest spot, the Temple Mount (where the First and Second Temples once stood). In spite of years of preparation, the plan was never implemented (Sprinzak, 1988). However, the Jewish Underground officially became a terrorist organization when on 2 June 1980 it blew up the cars of two Palestinian mayors (Sprinzak, 1988). David Weisburd, who studied the Settler Movement, wrote the following in 1984:

The vigilantism of Gush Emunim settlers is part of an organized strategy of social control calculated to maintain order in the West Bank. Though a minority of settlers actually participates in vigilante acts, they are not isolated deviant figures in the settlement movement. Rather, those vigilantes are agents of Gush Emunim community as a whole. They carry out a strategy of control that is broadly discussed and supported (in Sprinzak, 1988).

Sprinzak (2000) claims that “the combination of messianic belief in national redemption,” such as that held by Gush Emunim, “coupled with a situation of an endemic national conflict has...a..propensity for incremental violence – extra-legalism, vigilantism, selective terrorism and finally...indiscriminate terrorism”.

Had the Gush Emunim Underground activities not been stopped by Israel’s Intelligent Services in 1994, it would likely have become a professional group of killers, claims Sprinzak (2000). However, in some ways it has perhaps become, or remained, something not too far from that. It was the Gush Emunim constituency from which emerged Barouch Goldstein, the settler who murdered 29 Muslim worshipers in a mosque in Hebron. It was this same constituency which produced and largely legitimized Yigal Amir, the assassin of Prime Minister Yizhaq Rabin. And it is this same constituency which, still today, commits, on a regular basis, vigilante acts of violence and harassment of Palestinians – with hardly any real sanctions imposed on them.

Since both settlers and citizens of Israel-proper have been targeted more frequently during the September 2000 Intifada, the boundaries have become more and more blurred, and settlers have perhaps won more Israeli sympathy. At the same time, many Israelis feel the urgency and necessity of evacuating and dismantling some or most of the settlements, since the “cost” for keeping them, usually paid in human lives, is too high. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that Gush Emunim has clearly and openly been practicing violence for over two decades, neither it nor its acts have been unequivocally denounced by any of Israel’s governments or by the majority of the Israeli population. If anything, the contrary is often true, and Gush Emunim is “rewarded” for its acts by receiving light, if any, punishment for its crimes, and having the IDF protect them even when they are clearly the perpetrators of violence. Gush Emunim and the settlements have clearly played a major role in recent years in exacerbating the conflict.
May of 2000 and Beyond

In May 2000 Israel withdrew from Southern Lebanon. Shortly afterwards, peace talks between Palestinians and Israelis came to a deadlock, and, following a series of events, provocations, and unfortunate occurrences, the September 2000 Intifada erupted. Ever since September 2000, violence has been mounting, with the combined toll of dead and injured numbering in the thousands.

The September 11 attacks on the US World Trade Center and Pentagon were yet another significant watershed. Aside from their horrifying consequences in terms of lives lost, they brought about American reprisals termed “the War on Terrorism.” As such, US discourse about terrorism and security is now even more closely aligned than before with Israeli discourse. This has in fact caused the US to turn a blind eye even more than before on much of what Israel is doing “to combat terrorism”. The fact that what Israel is doing constitutes severe violence and violation of human rights and international law – themselves acts termed terrorism by many worldwide – seems irrelevant. The events of September 11 have helped neither the Palestinian cause nor the Palestinian-Israeli situation at large. If anything, the situation has worsened.

Arafat knew that identifying Palestinians with terrorism would harm his relations with the US. At the same time, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the Palestinian press denounce Israel’s attempt to associate Palestinian violence with terrorism. Rather, they insist on it being a legitimate means by which to resist Israeli occupation (Litvak, 2001). So as not to alienate himself from the US even further, Arafat has not openly denounced the US’s war against Afghanistan. Hamas, however, has blatantly done so (Litvak, 2001). Arafat is in a tough spot. On the one hand he cannot crackdown on Hamas and Jihad completely because that would alienate him both from their supporters and from much of the Palestinian population. However, he is being pressured by the US and Israel to do so. At the same time, he himself and the PNA are being accused of the outright perpetuation and support of terrorism (Litvak, 2002). While in some ways it may be hard to argue against these accusations, Arafat, or the Palestinians at large for that matter, hardly stand a chance. Israel and the US have already constructed the dominant discourse on terrorism, for the most part, and all the Palestinians can do is act or react in relation to these already existing frames of reference.

In a recent interview, Hizbollah leader Sheikh Fadlallah was interviewed regarding his views on September 11, Islam, terrorism and the Intifada. Fadlallah claims that the US enjoys hegemonic power in all domains: politics, economics and security, and that Osama Bin Laden and al-Qa’eda are actually scapegoats whose guilt has not yet been legally proven. He also claims, however, that the Shari’a and Islamic values reject such acts as Bin Laden is accused of and consider them acts of terrorism, not martyrdom. This, Fadlallah claims, is not the Jihad that Islam preaches.

In Palestine, however, suicide killing is justified, he claims. Israel enjoys US support and employs US made weapons, and that does not help the US stance in relation to the Arab and Muslim world. The Palestinians, who are much weaker and more poorly armed than the Israelis, have no choice but to resort to suicide tactics. Their war is not necessarily to kill Israeli civilians, but rather to “kill the project called Israeli security.”
September 11, claims Fadlallah, has had a negative effect on the Palestinian cause. It has marginalized their issues, especially since American media is biased in favor of Israel. Muslim states have raised the issue of Israeli state terrorism, but to no avail. In any case, he claims, Muslim leaders are employed by, or are puppets of, the US, and fail to pursue the issue with any real conviction.

Fadlallah emphasizes that Islam is not the problem. Rather, it is the Western media’s arrogance in relation to Islam which is the real problem. There is no such thing as an Islamic terrorist spirit. When you corner people and leave them no alternative, claims Fadlallah, they chose desperate ways in which to react.

Increasingly, Palestinians are coming to see suicide bombings as a strategic weapon. Palestinians, emulating the Lebanese experience, have adopted a mix of guerilla tactics to fight a war of attrition against Israel and basically “Lebanonize” the West Bank and Gaza (Luft, 2002). The results during the first year of the Intifada were not satisfactory, and thus they opted for something else. The PNA was playing a dual role, on the one hand playing the role of a political authority, but at the same time allowing a campaign lead by paramilitary units (the Tanzim, for instance) and PNA officials, in which guerilla tactics are used against Israeli targets.

Simultaneously, Hamas and Islamic Jihad have been carrying out a campaign of suicide killings, which has proven far more effective. They have carried out over 40 suicide attacks, which have killed more than 80 Israelis and wounded more than 1000. In other words, there have been many more Israeli casualties as a result of Hamas and Islamic Jihad operations than there have been as a result of operations by mainstream Palestinian organizations (Luft, 2002).

Recently a communiqué was published by a group of leading Palestinian intellectuals and decision-makers, calling for the end of suicide killings, and stating that, in fact, it is harmful to the Palestinian cause, mainly because it gives Israel more reason to launch reprisals and to exert more violence against the Palestinians. The debate in Palestinian political circles with regard to suicide attacks is, at this point, more about politics and strategic choices than about morality. And the decision by some to call for an end to such attacks is based on, or at least justified by, the assumption that it is counterproductive (El-Sarraj, 2002).

While in the past most Palestinians differentiated between settlers, Israeli military targets, and Israeli civilians, those boundaries are now blurred. In spite of the harsh violence Israel exerts on the Palestinians in reaction to every suicide killing, growing numbers of Palestinian support the campaign and, if nothing else, are glad to see Israelis suffer as well (Luft, 2002). Israelis, likewise, seem to be supporting harsher and harsher acts towards Palestinians. While people on both sides tend to justify their support in “logical” or “utilitarian” ways, knowingly or unknowingly they are often lead by feelings of revenge and dehumanization. And thus, the cycle of violence continues - with no end in sight.

Objectives and Achievements of Middle East Terrorism

Terrorism in the Middle East has clearly had profound impacts on political, social and psychological realms of life (El-Sarraj, 2002), all of which are by definition
interrelated. These effects can be assessed in more than one way. Some have been directly related to the terrorists' defined objectives and thus may be defined as "successes" or "failures" in relation to those objectives, while other consequences may have been indirect or perhaps unforeseen.

Looking back at Zionist terrorism in Palestine, and at both its other-directed and solipsistic objectives, it could possibly be termed a "success". Though the violence committed by the Irgun helped encourage the British departure from Palestine, the British had in fact already been intent on leaving (Nasr, 1997). Likewise, the "success" of terrorism by the Irgun may not have been as great had it not been for the subsequent sweeping victory of the Haganah and Israeli Army (Nasr, 1997) in the 1948 War. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that Zionist and Palestinian terrorism and violence (against each other and against the British) did contribute, at some level, to the British decision to leave Palestine (in general, and earlier than planned in particular), since the "cost" of staying was becoming heavier than the British were prepared to endure. The escalation of violence, including the terrorism committed by the Irgun and Stern Gang likely helped hasten the British departure. Zionist terrorism before and during the 1948 War was instrumental in both expelling (and killing) some Palestinians directly, while "encouraging" others to flee in fear. In that sense, Zionist, and later Israeli, violence overall (part of which we would define as terrorism) is what resulted in the fact that after the war 50% of Palestine’s Arab population had become refugees outside of Palestine.

As for the solipsistic aspect of Zionist terrorism, it indeed did help rally Jewish/Zionist support, already by the early 1900s, and create a new image - later an integral part of the Israeli/Jewish national ethos - of a fighting and triumphant, rather than a passive and defeated, Jew. While the definition of "success" is highly arguable, it can be said that at least in the short term some of the objectives of Zionist terrorism were met – in that the British left, many of the Palestinians fled or were expelled, and the state of Israel was established.

Palestinian terrorism, too, has had a strong impact on the course of events in the Middle East and elsewhere. Early on, Palestinian terrorism, or violence, like Zionist violence, helped perpetuate and intensify the cycle of violence that began so early on. Palestinian terrorism served then, as it does now, as an excuse for Jewish/Zionist or Israeli "reprisals". And of course the reverse is equally true: Jewish/Zionist/Israeli violence has served as a reason for Palestinian "reprisals".

Inasmuch as the main objective of the Palestinian armed struggle was to "liberate Palestine from the Jews," this objective has not yet been crowned with success. Nevertheless, more "modest" objectives have been achieved. Since 1948, but mainly since the late 1960s, Palestinian groups have carried out numerous terrorist attacks against Israelis and Jews, inside Israel and worldwide (Mattar, 2000; Bechor, 1991; Sela, 1999). Aside from the loss of innocent lives, these attacks for years have managed to terrorize Israelis and Jews, and to deeply affect both the individual psychological state of mind, and the Israeli national psyche. Violence in the first Intifada (some though not all of which may be defined as terrorism) was one of the main contributors or incentives for the Madrid and later the Oslo peace talks. Though Israeli officials may not like to admit that violence "paid off," there is little doubt that this violence, and the fact that it was brought into the living rooms of Israelis every evening (via television) for years, was a major catalyst for initiating the subsequent peace talks.
Groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as extremist right-wing elements in Israeli society, attempted to derail the process of which they disapproved, by committing acts of terrorism and violence. Unfortunately, they, too, were rather successful in doing so. The massacre of Palestinians in Hebron by Barouch Goldstein, the assassination by Yigal Amir of Israeli Prime Minister Yizhaq Rabin, and the numerous suicide bombings and other acts of terrorism by Hamas and Islamic Jihad committed against Israeli civilians and military personnel were extremely influential in derailing the peace process, and have no doubt contributed to the state of affairs in which Israelis and Palestinians currently find themselves.

It is true that a great deal of social and political pressure to withdraw from Lebanon had existed for years within Israeli society, but Israel’s withdrawal in 2000 from South Lebanon can be and is seen as a success of Hizballah tactics. The eventual withdrawal was a culmination of a number of different factors, including simultaneous pressure from “without” and from “within”. However, Hizballah violence, which in fact raised the cost of Israel’s presence in Lebanon, was definitely one of those “external” factors which ultimately influenced public opinion within Israel to withdraw. While most Israelis were wholeheartedly celebrating the withdrawal (some disagreed on its unilateral nature, but most supported it in principle), the Arab world and particularly Hizballah, the Lebanese and the Palestinians saw it as nothing but their own success.

The escalation in the use of violence during the current (September 2000) Intifada, is clearly related, among other factors (including the experience of the previous Intifada), to the Lebanon experience, in that some Palestinians have attempted to “Lebanonize” the West Bank and Gaza. Following Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon after a long “war of attrition” against Palestinian and other militia organizations (mainly Hizballah), many Palestinians have concluded that the only way to get Israel out of the West Bank and Gaza is by carrying out a similar war of attrition, using violence as much and as often as possible, until Israel eventually subsides and retreats. This idea has indeed been expressed by many since (and before) Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon.

Never Say Never

While governments always make a point of refusing to “give in” to terrorism, this is more often than not a symbolic and at the same time hollow assertion (Luft, 2002). To begin with, it has more than once been the case that governments initially support groups which are later defined by them as terrorist (such as in the case of the Israeli government and Hamas). Or, on the other hand, that the “terrorist enemy” of yesterday is newly defined as a result of shift in the political arena as “non-terrorist” and as a “partner for peace” (such as with the Israeli government and the PLO). Or, furthermore, that “partner for peace,” if he does not fulfill all expectations, can once again be reverted back to the status of “terrorist” - not worthy of reckoning with (such as in the case of the PNA and Yasser Arafat, both being seen these days by Israel as well as the US as terrorists and thus unworthy peace partners). And, of course, those defined by their opponents as terrorists at one point often later become leaders and “legitimate” heads of states. Begin and Shamir, two previously defined “terrorists” by British and Arabs,
later became Prime Ministers. Other Israeli Prime Ministers, even if not defined as terrorists in the same manner, had previously been military personnel in charge of committing mass violence against their opponents (including, as in the case of Altalena, violence against rival groups from amongst “their own” people). This is true even of Yizhaq Rabin, who was assassinated as a result of his concessions for the sake of peace with the Palestinians. Yasser Arafat, who for years was regarded a terrorist by both the international and Israeli communities, has become a legitimate head of the PNA (though his future status at present is unclear).

Thus, the labeling a person or organization as terrorist is hardly ever carved in stone. Not only is the definition “in the eyes of the beholder” (or those who have hegemonic power to construct definitions), but it is fluid over time, circumstances, and political calculations. Excellent examples, from other contexts, would be the support rendered by the US to both the Taliban in fighting the USSR and the Iraqis in countering the Iranians. Both of these governments were subsequently deemed outcasts and became subject to military actions.

The Meaning of Success

As we have seen, some of the specific objectives of terrorist organizations have indeed been met, and thus the use of terrorist tactics can be termed “successful.” In other words, “success” refers to the obtaining of specific (usually narrow) objectives. Nevertheless, this narrow definition of success is rather problematic with regard to terrorist as well as counter-terrorist efforts.

Governments have also routinely exploited the same terrorist organizations that they pursue. By keeping the name of the organization alive they are able to blame it for the limitations placed on personal liberties in the name of security, or to distract citizens from domestic frictions. Oppressors often wait for opportunities to arise that will stimulate or allow them to perpetrate terrorist acts in order to crush all opposition to the regime. In the Russian example, the Narodnaya Volya failed to incite a revolution, but the harsh reaction of the Tsarist is certainly likely to have contributed to the success of the Communist revolution a generation later.

Most of the perpetuators of terrorism most likely do not make detailed plans for the far future, nor do they necessarily analyze (or even care about) the wider social and psychological results of their acts either on their “own” society or on their “enemy’s.” The real effects of terrorism are much broader than the mere success or failure of a given act or campaign and are very difficult to assess. They include the loss of innocent lives, first and foremost, but also the long-term psychological effects that living in a state of constant war and terror produces.

The more violence is employed, and the longer it persists the more each side becomes entrenched and dehumanizes the other. And the more it dehumanizes the other, the more it supports and justifies the use of extreme violence against the other. This is precisely cultural violence at work. The way people perceive themselves, the other, and the conflict, makes it permissible and even justifiable for them to do things they never would have considered doing under “normal” circumstances (Jabri, 1996; Galtung 1990). And the more violent people perceive the “other” to be, the harsher the retaliatory measure they justify, and the more their leaders can get away with doing.
The effects of decades of violence and terror, and of its unprecedented escalation, will no doubt have long-lasting effects (El-Sarraj, 2002). There will come a day when each people, or faction, will have to deal not only with the effects of the “enemy’s” terror on it, but also with the effects - moral, social and psychological - that the legitimizing of terrorism will have had on its own society. Meanwhile, however, terrorism accomplishes little more than contributing to the ever-spiraling cycle of violence. Unfortunately, the same can usually be said for the accomplishments of counter-terrorism endeavors. Perhaps, then, the time has come to redefine what we view as “success” – both of terrorists and of those claiming to be working to mitigate it.

Conclusion

Direct violence, as structural violence, takes on many forms. It includes, among other things, shooting, stone-throwing, mortar shelling, house demolitions, execution of “collaborators,” suicide bombings of buses, land confiscation, uprooting of trees, digging trenches to prevent freedom of movement, abductions, torture, military force, lynching - and the list goes on. Terrorism is but one form of violence in any given context.

Terrorism in the Middle East, as elsewhere, must be examined in relation to the military actions of the enemy (Nasr, 1997) which too can often be termed at worst as terrorism, or at best as another form of political violence. The “exchanges” taking place between the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, as well as between the Israelis and Hizballah or for that matter - between any other parties in this regional conflict, and between each leadership and the other people - can be interpreted as a discourse of violence. Every act by either side carries a message to the other, spoken in the language of violence.

More often than not, terrorism is motivated by revenge rather than by a sincere desire to end the conflict (Nasr, 1997). Thus, while terrorism may achieve specific short-term goals, it merely contributes to the perpetual and spiraling cycle of violence, which so far seems to have no end in sight. Reprisals and counter-terrorism measures taken thus far have apparently not been effective in stopping terrorism operations. If anything, they have often raised the level of the conflict by antagonizing and radicalizing the opposition (Nasr, 1997).

Zionist and Palestinian terrorism was and still is seen by its respective peoples as part of a legitimate national struggle. While each people clearly defines the acts of its adversaries as nothing less than terrorism, they view their own actions as a legitimate means, in their given contexts, to fight for liberation against the “enemy.”

Hizballah emerged following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, with the declared purpose of ending Israeli occupation there. It also had as part of its platform the improvement of conditions for Shi’i Muslims in Lebanon, as well as the spreading of the Islamic revolution from Iran elsewhere. Hamas, like Hizballah, promoted an Islamic platform, albeit mixed with the Palestinian national struggle. Both these and other Islamic movements pursued (or claimed to pursue) social justice for their respective constituencies. Their emergence and subsequent prevalence (and “success”) are directly related to the vital niches they filled in their given contexts to specific
constituencies. These niches are defined by social and economic needs, as well as by internal and external political factors.

Terrorism does not occur in a vacuum, nor does it occur in isolation from other terrorist campaigns or other political events. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was initially related to Great Britain, and later had spillover effects in Lebanon and other neighboring countries. Palestinian terrorism over the years was linked, in various forms, to other terrorist campaigns worldwide. Internal Lebanese power struggles, related to the social, religious and political make-up of Lebanon (and also related historically to French colonial power) and to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, together with Israeli actions (also related to the Palestinians) and the Islamic Revolution in Iran all contributed to the rise and popularity of Hizballah. Other regional power relations, such as those between Syria, Iran, the Palestinians, etc – all played an important role in the various terrorist campaigns.

Thus, no single source of terrorism can be pointed to, since its emergence is a culmination of many different factors, and is part of an intricate web of relationships and circumstances. Concentrating on the violence of terrorism is often a way of avoiding larger issues (Nasr, 1997), the underlying causes that motivate terrorists in the first place and that stand at the heart of the conflict. “However, terrorism is in fact such a complex conjunction of socio-cultural, psychological and political factors” (Toloyan, 1988; p.217), that in order to be understood and dealt with must each be addressed. While terrorists represent nothing but violence to some, in the eyes of others they fulfill other roles and occupy other niches. As Toloyan (1988) claims, “terrorism with an authentically popular base is never a purely political phenomenon”.

Israel has long been regarded as “the expert” on terrorism, especially in the United States, since it has had to deal with it for decades. Yet, clearly, something may be wrong with this classification. While the Israelis have accumulated some tactical expertise in dealing with terrorism's military aspects, to claim Israel as an “expert” perhaps exaggerates the point. In truth, Israel remains far from having won its war on terrorism, and its experiences demonstrate a mixed set of results that have neither eliminated nor ameliorated Palestinian terror. The problem, perhaps, is that there are too many “blind spots”. While certain kinds of tactical expertise in combating terror may be momentarily effective, they do little to address the other side of the equation – those factors which in fact exacerbate and produce terrorism. Thus, the same processes which combat terror with one hand may be producing and sustaining it with the other. While the United States may gain valuable tactical insight, it gains little strategic advantage. Like Israel, it could seemingly win all or most battles, yet still lose the war. So long as the entire equation, and in it the sources of terrorism, is not addressed, at least at some reasonable level, there is little hope of ever “winning” the war on terrorism.
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The Causes of Terrorism

Dennis J.D. Sandole

Introduction

In the film, "Seven," with Morgan Freeman, Brad Pitt, Kevin Spacey and Gwyneth Paltrow, Kevin Spacey plays a serial murderer who, when asked by detective Brad Pitt why he has committed a series of ghastly murders, replies, "Sometimes you have to hit people on the side of the head with a sledge hammer to get their attention!"

Clearly, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 constitute such a hit on the head for Americans. For a country that contributed significantly to ending the Holocaust, launched the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after World War II, prides itself on occupying the "moral high ground" in international affairs and which Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992) proclaimed the victor in the ideological clash between democracy and communism, it was a double shock, on top of the traumatizing collapse of the World Trade Center, that the 19 men who overtook the four airlines with box cutters to turn them into cruise missiles, could have hated the U.S. that much.

How could that be? What could the U.S. have possibly done to incur such wrath, leading to the deaths of thousands and a pervasive sense of insecurity among Americans the likes of which have not been seen since the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963?

Asking the questions is easy. The hard part is in recognizing that, in our outrage and anger, grieving and mourning and in general, shock, the last thing that many of us want to hear is "analysis." However, if we want to win the "War on Terrorism," then I am afraid that analysis is where we must begin.

A Comprehensive Response to Terrorism: The Use of Force as Part of a "Big Picture" Strategic Framework

As a former U.S. Marine and police officer, I still find it a compelling proposition that whenever we face a threat to our security, we respond accordingly. For instance, in retrospect, had I been an armed air marshall on board any of the four hijacked airliners on 11 September 2001, I would like to believe that I would have taken appropriate action to stop the hijacking in progress.
As a social scientist and conflict resolution professional, however, I also believe that, to the extent possible, the use of force must take place in the context of a comprehensive framework and strategy, where force is used to achieve and maintain negative peace—the absence and/or cessation of hostilities—as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the achievement and maintenance of positive peace: a significant reduction in, if not (ideally) total elimination of the underlying deep-rooted causes and conditions of a violent conflict (Galtung, 1969).

To put this all into the stark reality of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, if I were armed and sitting with my son and wife in a cafe in Jerusalem and knew that someone in our proximity was about to blow herself and us up, I would like to think, again, that I would be able to take the appropriate preventive action. But equally, if I were at home with my family in the besieged Jenin refugee camp under attack by soldiers of one of the world's best-equipped armies, I would like to think that I would act appropriately in that setting as well.

Conflict-as-Startup Conditions vs. Conflict-as-Process

Here we have the gist of a problem created often by the sole use of force: what conflict resolution pioneer Anatol Rapoport (1960) referred to years ago as "bite and counter-bite," or what I call conflict-as-process. Responding to conflict-as-process is what the military and police do and indeed, in the appropriate circumstances, need to do. We need them when the situation calls for it (e.g., in Rwanda in mid-April 1994). However, as even law enforcement hostage negotiators have acknowledged, "We are not problemsolvers" (de Filippo, 2002); i.e., dealing only with conflict-as-process or its symptoms, does not do anything for the underlying conflict-as-startup conditions, except, possibly through the escalating use of force, exacerbate those underlying factors.

According to the logic (or "psycho-logic") of escalation, the progressive use of force by Palestinian suicide bombers in cafes, discotheques, restaurants, supermarkets, hotel dining rooms, snooker halls, bus stations and busses in Israel and by Israeli defence forces in Palestinian refugee camps and townships is part of the problem and not of the solution. Moreover, for the international community to characterize one party to this conflict as "terrorist" while the other party, as a State—which the other party is not—is "merely" exercising its right to self-defense, also is part of the problem and not of the solution. All this does is privilege one side at the frustrating expense of the other, which is not an effective role for the international community to play.

In other words, returning to my earlier scenarios, if I were to "shoot dead" the teenager who is about to blow my family up or the soldier who is attacking my home, none of these acts, by themselves, would change the "objective" strategic relationship between Israelis and Palestinians: that one side is creating, maintaining and expanding a State at the expense of the indigenous population which is surrounded, held captive, isolated, militarily occupied and humiliated, even during periods of normal, "negative peace."
Again, not only does violence not address the underlying causes and conditions, but often exacerbates them, throwing the conflict into the hands of extremists on both sides ("peace spoilers") who, should they prevail, especially among members of the stronger party, can move the conflict toward a genocidal "final solution."

Not only is it unethical for the international community to stand by, as it did in Rwanda in April 1994 and let such action take place (Power, 2001, 2002; Dallaire, 2002), but it is also impractical. Given the compelling attraction and incidence of the use of force and violence, especially among males (van Creveld, 1991; Gilligan, 1996; Wrangham and Peterson, 1996; Garbarino, 2000; Kaplan, 2001; Barash, 2002), plus the "mimicking" nature of Homo sapiens, the use of force and violence in one part of the world is likely to encourage its use elsewhere through what I call multiplier-effect systemic contagion.

For instance, it seems fairly clear that Serbian genocidal assaults on Croats and Bosniaks without too much effective international resistance probably encouraged then Russian President Boris Yeltsin to launch his war on Chechnya in December 1994, a mere week or so after the conclusion of the Budapest Summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): if the West did not respond effectively to genocidal violence 45 minutes flying time from Vienna, then why would it do so in response to the Russian total destruction of the Chechen capital Grozny and countless human rights violations, hundreds of miles further from the Balkans?

So, yes, by all means, in the tactical short term, we should reactively defend ourselves against terrorism, through forceful means if necessary, but in the strategic long term, we must proactively deal effectively with the underlying, deep-rooted causes and conditions of the problems that result in terrorism. Otherwise we will have a never-ending supply of recruits for martyrdom or "national defense," until either one side or the other capitulates or is genocidally removed from the planet, as the Nazi Third Reich nearly did to European Jewry during World War 2. Neither option is a "solution" that deals effectively with the conflict-as-startup-conditions—a lesson apparently well understood by the new Prime Minister of Sri Lanka (WP, 2002c):

For years Sri Lanka's government tried and failed to stamp out the terrorism of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam with brute military force. Sixty thousand people died in the fighting and a host of senior politicians, including a prime minister of India, were killed by some 200 suicide attacks. Now Ranil Wickremasinghe, who won election as prime minister last December on a pro-peace platform, is getting some results by addressing the root causes of the violence—deprivation in Sri Lanka's northern and eastern regions and the aspiration of the ethnic Tamil minority there to rule itself. There is no evidence that Al Qaeda or other international terrorist groups have links to Sri Lanka; nevertheless, Mr. Wickremasinghe, who visited Washington [in late July 2002], has a chance to achieve a major success in the global struggle against terrorism (emphasis added).
Accordingly, terrorism clearly needs to be stopped and prevented in the long-as well as short run. While there seems to be a plethora of short-term military and law enforcement responses to terrorism, there does not seem to be much in the way of long-term "conflict transformation" or "peacebuilding" (Cohen, 2002; Wright, 2002; Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Lederach, 1997). Quite simply, this means that the "War on Terror" as presently waged is not only not likely to succeed, but is likely to "self-fulfillingly" exacerbate the problems it is meant to address. Hence, the comments by Udo Steinbach (2002, p. 48), director of the German Orient Institute in Hamburg, that:

The fight against terrorism, especially as it is currently being waged by the U.S. administration, will in all likelihood radicalize increasing numbers of people in the Muslim world and heighten their approval of the use of violence in fighting the West and all those associated with it in Islamic societies. In the arc from North Africa to Indonesia the resort to terrorism is rooted in a series of complex, decades-old crises over regional conflicts, internal ethnic problems or, more broadly, democratic deficits. It is therefore impossible to solve the problem of terrorism without simultaneously addressing the underlying political problems.

This is especially true for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Equating Al Qaeda terrorism with Palestinian terrorism as Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon does is fatal; the Israeli army's fight against this terrorism by exclusively military means has led to further radicalization of Palestinians and to an escalation of violence. Washington's inability to counter this strategy with prospects for political solutions has further exacerbated the hatred of the U.S. far beyond the Palestinian territories; it has increased bin Laden's popularity and called into question the U.S. fight against terrorism in much of the Islamic world. This pours oil on the fire of Islamic fundamentalists (emphasis added).

Implicit here is a growing sense of the complex nature of the task facing those of us involved in this book: In addition to the research problem of exploring the underlying causes and conditions of terrorism, there is the practical problem of how to get policymakers to think outside the Realpolitik-only box to deal more effectively with them. In this regard, T. Irene Sanders (2002) tells us that:

The war on terrorism has heightened the need for a new way of thinking about defense. ... In general terms, the challenge before us is to move from an emphasis on simple [linear] cause-and-effect relationships to a focus on more intuitive, [nonlinear] associative forms of pattern recognition.

Again, this does not mean that we forget Realpolitik in the short run because in mid-April 1994 in Rwanda or July 1995 in Srebrenica (Bosnia), we could have used a rapid deployment of international forces to prevent genocidal actions. What it does mean, however, is that, in the first instance, we locate Realpolitik perspectives and
corresponding behaviors in a larger, more comprehensive framework that includes other options as well; e.g., *Idealpolitik* and what I call "non-Marxist radical thought". Then we can deal with the question of how to communicate more effectively with policymakers.

But first, we have to deal with the *research problem* and explore the underlying causes and conditions of terrorism. Where to begin?

**Investigating the Etiology of Terrorism: Analytical Frameworks**

As a visual person and former artist of sorts, I like to make use of "pictures" to get my ideas across. One diagram that I use when discussing underlying causes and conditions of deep-rooted conflicts—including those that are expressed through acts of terrorism—is the following "3 levels of conflict reality":

**Figure 1: 3 levels of Conflict Reality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[1] <strong>Conflict-as-Symptoms:</strong></th>
<th>Discrete acts of violence, investments in defense and/or deaths (&quot;body count&quot;) <em>within</em> an existing <em>conflict-as-process</em>. In general, any observable indicator of underlying conflict processes.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[2] <strong>Conflict-as-Process:</strong></td>
<td>Fights, arms buildups/races, wars, arguments, divorce litigations and/or mediated negotiations characterized by a &quot;bite and counter-bite&quot; (action-reaction) exchange over time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[3] <strong>Conflict-as-Startup Conditions:</strong></td>
<td>Initial and/or successive acts of violence, trauma, brutality, victimization which seem to demand a response from the targeted person, group organization, state. When &quot;mythologized&quot; as part of the history, traditions and <em>identity</em> of the targeted actor and passed from person to person, generation to generation, such &quot;<em>chosen trauma</em>&quot; (Volkan, 1997) can generate and help to sustain conflict-as-process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Among these levels, the international community seems to be paying attention primarily to symptoms. This is where the media are (the "CNN factor") as well as the motion picture industry ("Black Hawk Down," "Hart's War," "We Were Soldiers," "Behind Enemy Lines," "Windtalkers"), popular and academic literatures (e.g., spy novels, works on terrorism), with policymakers responding to the symptoms or the processes giving rise to them, only or primarily through Realpolitik—based interventions to prevent, manage or stop them. Hence, T. Irene Sanders' (2002) concern that:

The question that lingers in my mind is whether the attacks [of 11 September 2001] provided enough of a wake-up call to revolutionize our approach to our own security.

Why there is not too much attention paid to conflict-as-startup conditions—underlying causes and conditions—may require another book to answer (Warfield, 1993; Sandole, 1999, pp. 189-192). One possibility, however, is that, over time, in complex conflict systems, conflict-as-startup conditions may be overwhelmed and overtaken by conflict-as-processes, such that conflict becomes self-stimulating and self-perpetuating (Sandole, 1999). In other words, beyond a certain critical threshold, a dynamic conflict may become self-driven so that the process is the most palpable thing that intervener feel compelled to deal with. Hence, our initial response to a fire is not to try to figure it out, but to stop it! The problem is, however, once the fire is put out, the original combustible materials may still be present, which means that, under certain conditions, there could be another fire.

Accordingly, my purpose in this chapter is to identify some of those underlying "combustibles"—the causes and conditions of terrorism—as something that policymakers will have to address and deal with if they really want to win the "War on Terror." As I think about that goal, another "picture" comes to mind: my "3 pillar" comprehensive mapping of conflict and conflict resolution.

Figure 2: 3 Pillar Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar 2</th>
<th>Pillar 1</th>
<th>Pillar 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict Causes and Conditions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conflict (Latent [Pre-MCP] MCP/AMCP)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conflict Intervention</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>3rd Party Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>Issues</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>[=Preventive Diplomacy]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global/Ecological</td>
<td>Means</td>
<td>Conflict Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict-handling Orientations</td>
<td>[=Peacekeeping]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict Environments</td>
<td>Conflict Settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[=Peacemaking (coercive)]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[=Peacemaking (noncoercive)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[=Peacebuilding]</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Using the three-pillar framework to explore the etiology of terrorism, we might find that, initially, under pillar 1, we would be observing violent symptoms of perhaps a manifest conflict process (MCP) that has escalated to an aggressive manifest conflict process (AMCP) (Sandole, 1998, pp. 1; 1999, pp. 16-17). We could then attempt to identify the parties involved in the conflict process; the issues about which they are in conflict; the long-term objectives they hope to achieve by waging conflict over those issues; the means they are using to achieve those objectives; their "normal" conflict-handling orientations (despite the means they are actually using at any point in time); and the nature of the environments—cultural, historical, political, economic, social—within which their conflict is occurring.

Then, under pillar 2—with which this chapter is primarily concerned—we could explore the underlying causes and conditions of the conflict that has escalated to an AMCP, with acts of terrorism as symptoms.

Finally, under pillar 3—the primary focus of chapters 6-7 and major concern of policymakers—we could explore what could be done in the long term (e.g., implement policies undergirded by Idealpolitik and/or non-Marxist radical perspectives) as well as short term (implement policies based on Realpolitik) (Sandole, 1993; 1999, Ch. 6).

The major assumption underlying use of the 3 pillar framework is that potential third parties at any level—interpersonal, intergroup, interorganizational, interstate—must first identify all the distinguishing characteristics of a particular conflict (pillar 1) and understand what drives the conflict (pillar 2) before, given their objectives and available means for achieving them, they can design and implement an effective response to the conflict (pillar 3).

What is useful about the 3 pillar framework is that it can be employed as a basis for "mapping" the (1) elements, (2) causes and conditions and (3) potential 3rd party responses to conflict or terrorism in general or to any particular conflict or act of terrorism.

Accordingly, what can pillars 1 and 2 of the framework tell us about terrorism in general as well as the particular terrorist acts of 11 September 2001 (9/11) that might be useful to policymakers at pillar 3?

A Pillar 1 Analysis

First of all, under pillar 1, we would examine the parties to a conflict, for which terrorism has become a symptom. In general, terrorism is the choice of minority, often nonstate actors (e.g., racial, ethnic, religious, national, class groups) lacking the resources of majority groups or those who, through ethnic, political, religious or other identification, assume the role of spokespersons for those groups. In either case,
generally "outrageous" acts are committed in order to get the minority voices heard, which is usually guaranteed and amplified by media coverage (the "CNN effect").

With particular regard to 9/11, the majority, "target" actor appears to be the U.S. or "Western Civilization" with the U.S. as primary "mediagenic" representative, as defined by some Muslims (e.g., Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda) who have elected to represent the interests of other Muslims (e.g., Bosniaks, Chechens, Kosovar Albanians, Palestinians, Saudis, Iraqis) whose identities, cultures, religions, traditions and lands are perceived to have been or are under assault by the West.

The next item under pillar 1, issues, could be concerned with, in general, a perceived negative impact of the majority on a minority (e.g., the nature of the governance by the majority of a minority) residing in a given territory. For Osama Bin Laden, the apparent architect of or inspiration for the 9/11 attacks, the issues are, among others, the continued presence, since the Gulf War, of some 5000 U.S. troops in his native Saudi Arabia, site of two of the holiest shrines in Islam (Mecca, where The Prophet was born and Medina, where The Prophet established the first Islamic state); the one-sided U.S. response to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and the fact that the West allowed Serbs to slaughter Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) for three years before intervening to stop the carnage.

Apropos this latter issue, not only did the West prevent the lifting of the UN arms embargo on the Bosniaks to "at least ... allow them to defend themselves, even if no international military force [came] to their aid" (Fuller, 1994), but it even accepted Bosnian Serb rejection of the offer by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) "to send more than 17,000 soldiers [under the UN flag] to help defend security zones for civilians in Bosnia" (IHT, 1993), at precisely the same time that the UN was having difficulty recruiting more peacekeepers to defend the newly created "safe havens" (Preston, 1993), including Srebrenica.

Given that the "The Serbs have frequently raised the specter of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Bosnia as justification for their war [and indeed the] Bosnian head of state, Alija Izetbegovic, is a Muslim" (IHT, 1993), it seems clear that, as former senior CIA forecaster Graham Fuller (1994) put it:

... many statesmen in Europe and the United States [apparently accepted the Serb argument as they] had private doubts about the wisdom of creating a Bosnian Muslim state in the Balkans, precisely because that state could be seen as a foot in the door for Muslim power in Europe or even, as some might allege, a potential base for radical Islam to play a destabilizing role in Europe. Better to choke off the prospect for such a state now, the rationale goes.

Fuller then goes on to say, with profound implications for the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Ibid. 2001):

Yet, the very one-sided and disproportionate suffering of the Bosnian Muslims—in what is not a simple, black-and-white situation—may be the issue that will in fact guarantee the existence of rich soil for Muslim radicalism in the Balkans in the future (emphasis added).
Under these circumstances, it is easy to imagine bin Laden assuming that a "Clash of Civilizations" (Huntington, 1993, 1996) was certainly underway in the Balkans, ending only with the genocide perpetrated by Serb forces at the UN "safe area," Srebrenica, in July 1995, when 8,000-10,000 Muslim males were massacred. It is also not difficult to imagine how such a perception on the part of radicalized Muslims could draw sustenance from the original Western-Islamic civilizational conflict of a thousand years ago, the Crusades and later when Serbs in the Krajina defended Western/Christian civilization against the Ottoman Empire. And at least up until Srebrenica, the West could be viewed as having repaid the Serbs for their steadfast loyalty by ensuring that the Serb definition of the conflict in former Yugoslavia was the "politically correct" one.

Indeed, when, in summer 1993, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) offered troops from Muslim countries to join the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia at exactly the same time that the UN needed more troops to guarantee security of the "safe areas" (again, including Srebrenica), not only was the offer rejected by the West—allegedly because the Muslim troops would have needed "additional training for the mission, as well as transportation equipment and other supplies that the [UN would] have to get from the stocks of other countries"—but UNPROFOR was kept so small that then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said that a force of such limited size could operate effectively only with "the consent and cooperation of the parties" in Bosnia" (Preston, 1993). This had the effect, intentional or otherwise, of ensuring the dominance not only of the Serb definition of the conflict, but also its veto over the OIC proposal.

The third item under pillar 1, objectives, can be subdivided into majority actors who want to maintain a certain status quo and minorities (or their spokespersons) who want to change it. Clearly, for 9/11, the U.S. wants to maintain its presence and policies in the world, including its military forces in the Arab/Muslim world; to continue sanctions against Iraq and supporting Israel and "Western Civilization" in general, including globalization. By contrast, Osama Bin Laden and others wish to change all that and, lacking the traditional resources associated with the superpower, have elected to use terrorism to undo the U.S. and its influence throughout the world, especially in the Arab/Muslim world.

The means one elects to employ in a conflict are generally confrontational or collaborative, lethal or nonlethal (or a combination thereof). Clearly, terrorism involves the use of extremely confrontational, lethal, "outrageous" means; e.g., with regard to 9/11, hijacking commercial airliners packed with passengers and transforming them into cruise missiles to destroy the World Trade Center and sections of the Pentagon.

Although an actor may employ confrontational, lethal means, he or she may feel that the "Other" drove them to that point of desperation. Hence, by including in one's pillar 1 analysis, actors' preferred conflict-handling orientations—i.e., whether for cultural, religious or other reasons, actors would prefer to be doing something else (e.g., conflict avoiding, accommodating, compromising or collaborating)—the analyst can explore how much "distance" there is between the preferred and the actual; in effect, how much ground has to be negotiated to move the actors from confrontation to dialogue.
Ultimately, once the "fire" has been suppressed, the parties have to somehow find a way to live with each other—in close territorial proximity or just in terms of inhabiting the same planet—and the means for achieving that must be explored through dialogue (Steinbach, 2002). With regard to 9/11, in order to avoid what some observers have termed the "ultimate trap"—the development of an actual "Clash of Civilizations"—the U.S.-led "War on Terror" must include more than bombing and special forces' forays into Afghanistan and other countries (e.g., Philippines and Georgia). The U.S. must also consider removing its forces from Saudi Arabia, developing a more even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, easing (if not ceasing) sanctions against Iraq and in general, making its presence and policies in the world, including globalization, at least appear to be less destructive of traditional cultures.

Finally under pillar 1, the analyst would pay attention to the conflict environments or "spaces", within which the conflict is occurring: the milieu into which a third party under pillar 3 may ultimately intervene. Environments, like structures, are generally invisible to the eye, save for their symptoms, but they exist nevertheless, exerting an impact on all of us. For example, when NATO-led peacekeepers entered Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999, what they could clearly see were destroyed villages, dead bodies, hungry, wounded, sick and angry survivors: the physical environment. What they may not have been able to see clearly were the cultural, religious, historical, economic and/or political environments.

Accordingly, to not be sensitive and not pay attention to these less obvious manifestations of "environment" is probably to doom one's intervention to frustrating failure. In the context of 9/11, it is interesting to observe the rapid rise in the U.S. and West in general of an interest in Islam, the Arab world, studying Arabic and the like (Cooperman, 2002), in addition to the more palpable "War on Terror" which is intimately linked primarily to the physical environment. As the U.S. learned so painfully in its war in Vietnam 30 years ago, we, the majority, do not "win hearts and minds" of minorities by destroying them and their physical resources and environment only, but also by paying attention to their needs: their identities, their participation in decisions that affect their welfare and their security. In order to do that, we must know something about who "these people" are: culturally, religiously, politically, economically and the like, especially who they are in a way that may not be compatible with U.S. interests and/or the forces of globalization.

It would be useful, for example, for Americans to know something about the religious beliefs associated with Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the 19 young men who conducted the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001: Wahabism is a Saudi-based approach to Islam "whose most famous adherent is Osama Bin Laden [and which] should be taken seriously. While the West has little reason to feel threatened by traditional Islam, the events of Sept. 11 demonstrate that we have much to fear from Wahabism" (emphasis added) (O'Leary, 2002).

Wahabism is associated with "the religious leader Mohammad Ibn Abdul Wahab," who in 1745 "forged an alliance with Mohammad Ibn Saud, the principal tribal leader of a large portion of the Arabian peninsula" (Ibrahim, 2002):
Ibn Abdul Wahab wanted to propagate his brand of Islamic orthodoxy. Ibn Saud wanted to unite tribes and secure political command, becoming the founder of the Al Saud dynasty that still rules what is now known as Saudi Arabia. ... (p. B1)

... the links between Saudi rulers and Wahabi followers have been real and durable. The pact of mutual convenience made more than 250 years ago continues. The Saudi minister of religion is always a member of the Al Sheikh family, descendants of Ibn Abdul Wahab. Moreover links between Ibn Abdul Wahab and the house of Saud have been sealed with multiple marriages. The Wahabis' sway over mosques has ebbed and flowed, but they possess their own notorious religious police and have extended their reach via networks or schools throughout the Muslim world (p. B5). ...

[Wahabism is] extremely austere and rigid. It tolerates little dialogue and less interpretation. It frowns on idolatry, tombstones or the veneration of statues and artworks. Wahabis forbid smoking, shaving of beards, abusive language, rosaries and many rights for women. They expect their followers to pray five times a day and they regard all those who don't practice their form of Islam, including other Muslims, as heathens and enemies (Ibid, 2002).

It is well known that the U.S. had a hand in creating and arming the Wahabi influenced Mujahideen who fought the Soviets in the 1980s when the latter invaded and occupied Afghanistan, thereby inadvertently helping to create and arm the Taliban against whom the U.S. later went to war. What may be less well known, however—as another example of the long-term self-defeating nature of U.S. policies, which seem to make sense in the short term—is the more direct role of the U.S. in spreading Wahabism (O'Leary, 2002):

Wahabism gained a foothold in the Muslim world in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, as the Saudis, tacitly encouraged by the United States and its allies, used their enormous financial resources to ensure that [the] radical Shia Islam [of revolutionary Iran] did not spread to the Sunni Muslim world [of, among others, Saudi Arabia]. In order to check Iranian influence in Pakistan [through which Western aid for the Mujahideen passed into Afghanistan], for example, the Saudis financed the establishment of Wahabi madrassas or Islamic schools. As many Americans learned in the aftermath of 9/11, it was in those Pakistani madrassas that the Taliban movement was born.
A Pillar 2 Analysis

Under pillar 2, I find it compelling to start by reflecting on a potent comment attributed to Frantz Fanon by Morton Deutsch (2002), "Violence is the expression of impotence grown unbearable." This suggests to me that something "in" us (endosomatic) can be violated by something "outside" us (extrasomatic). In other words, it is highly likely that there is an "interaction-effect" between "nature" and "nurture" that sets us off (see Sandole, 1984, p. 40). How does pillar 2 help us to understand this?

In earlier efforts to spell out pillar 2 (Sandole, 1993; 1999, Ch. 6), I grouped together a number of interrelated concepts under the individual level, each of which involves a breakdown between a preferred and an actual state of affairs or dissonance, as articulated by Leon Festinger (1962) in his classic work on "cognitive dissonance" theory. These concepts are:

- structural violence (Galtung, 1969, 1996);
- relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970);
- rank disequilibrium (Galtung, 1964);
- frustration-aggression (Dollard, et al., 1939); and
- basic human needs [BHNs] (Burton, 1979, 1990, 1997).

Structural violence, the brainchild of peace research pioneer Johan Galtung (1969, 1996), is the pivotal, umbrella term here, under which all the other "dissonance" items are subsumed. Structural violence refers to the distance between actors' actual and potential (preferred) bodily and psychological need fulfillment. Generally, minorities, with respect to majorities, are recipients of structural violence, whether perceived or not by either group. In such cases, members of various ethnic, religious, racial, class and other groups tend to be denied access to political, economic, social and other resources typically enjoyed and presided over by majorities, not because of what the minorities have done, but because of who they are, because of their "involuntary" membership in those groups. The greater the distance between the actual and potential (preferred) need fulfillment, the greater the structural violence.

When structural (as well as physical) violence is legitimated in religion, language, ideology, literature, music, civil ceremonies, motion pictures, the media and the like, then we also have cultural violence (Galtung, 1996, pp. 196-210). Whether culturally celebrated or not, however, the perception of structural violence by minorities can be characterized as either:

(a) Relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970), which refers to a perceived breakdown between "value expectations" (resources to which one feels entitled: "wants") and "value capabilities" (resources one thinks one is likely to obtain and hold on to: "gots"). The greater the distance between the preferred (value expectations) and the actual (value capabilities), the greater the perceived structural violence and the greater the likelihood that the deprived actor will respond aggressively to the perceived source of the relative deprivation. And/or
(b) Rank disequilibrium (Galtung, 1964), which refers to a lack of consistency between an actor’s rankings on various barometers of socio-economic measurement: a breakdown between a preferred state of affairs (e.g., high rankings on educational, employment, income, job and security status) and an actual state of affairs (e.g., high on educational status, but low on employment, job, income and security status). The greater the status inconsistency, the greater the perceived structural violence and the greater the likelihood that the "consistency-deprived" actor will respond aggressively to the perceived source of the inconsistency, especially if other, less lethal means have been tried to alleviate the inconsistency, but without success and if there is a "culture of violence" in the actor’s "conflict environment."

When structural violence has been experienced as either relative deprivation or rank disequilibrium (or both!), the actor feels the breakdown between the preferred and actual states of affairs. Feeling implies emotion, which is energy mobilized to do something; e.g., to flee the "field" or to attack the Self or Others.

Where does this emotional energy come from? According to the classical studies of the link between frustration and aggression conducted some 60 years ago by John Dollard and his colleagues at Yale University (Dollard, et al., 1939), frustration generates the emotion that makes an attack likely against the perceived source of the frustration. Frustration is an interruption in the processes initiated by an actor to get what she or he wants at a particular point in time. It mobilizes energy to attack the perceived source of the frustration (which may be either the Self or Others) depending upon the following factors:

(a) The importance of the blocked (frustrated) goal;
(b) The intensity of the blocking (frustration); and
(c) The frequency of the blocking.

So, conceivably, the more important the frustrated goal that the actor wants to achieve (e.g., freedom for his or her people), the more intense the blocking of that goal (e.g., a majority group’s use of military force to prevent minority-group goal achievement) and the greater the frequency of the blocking (frequent attacks by the majority on the minority), the more likely an attack by the frustrated minority against the frustrating majority. But Dollard and his colleagues entered one additional, complicating factor into their frustration-aggression calculus:

(d) The frustrated actor’s anticipation of punishment for attacking the perceived source[s] of frustration.

Here is where we get into the societal and international levels of influence under pillar 2, into national and international regimes of governance: Do an actor’s domestic and international, political, economic and/or social environments alleviate factors [a]-[c] above (as would be expected by regimes associated with Idealpolitik or non-Marxist radical paradigms) or exacerbate them by enhancing factor [d] (as might be expected by a Realpolitik-based regime)? Just imagine the Israeli-Palestinian or Indo-Pakistani conflicts against the background of these factors and it becomes clear that in many
conflicts throughout the world, frustration builds upon frustration to continue escalating
conflicts into confrontational, lethal, self-defeating AMCPs that appear impervious to
conflict resolution and transformation.

The final component in the dissonance subcategory of individual—level factors
that may make violent conflict more rather than less likely is basic human needs
(BHNs): the phenomena that seem to be what ultimately get frustrated. BHNs,
according to conflict resolution pioneer John Burton (1979, 1990, 1997), are
endosomatic imperatives that all humans have. Hence, they are part and parcel of the
"nature" component in the "nature-nurture" debate. However, while all humans may
have needs for, say, identity, recognition and security (Burton, 1997), their experience
of fulfillment or violation of these needs may be different from one person to the next,
depending on the cultural, religious, political, social, economic and other "identity
groups" to which they belong—all examples of the "nurture" component in the debate.

Burton tells us that actors will endeavor to fulfill their needs for identity,
recognition and security, no matter what, even at the expense of their own lives. If they
cannot fulfill their needs within status quo settings, they will endeavor to do so within
parallel structures that they create for that purpose and in the process, may attempt to
damage, destroy or otherwise undermine the status quo.

Applying the "dissonance set" of interrelated factors to terrorism, it seems fairly
clear that minorities in general—the dispossessed, desperate, "wretched of the earth"
(Fanon, 1968) who have been colonized, exploited and marginalized—are recipients of
felt structural violence: a great sense of distance between where they want to be and
where they actually are, in terms of access to resources (relative deprivation) and status
(rank disequilibrium). The greater this distance, the greater the frustration, with the
minority targets of structural violence and their spokespersons perceiving their national
or international environments to be enhancing rather than alleviating the factors making
for frustration of certain BHNs (e.g., identity). What may then follow is a mobilization of
emotional energy for attacks—terrorist attacks—against the perceived sources of the
frustration: the U.S., the West in General, Israel, authoritarian regimes in the Arab
world (e.g., Egypt, Saudi Arabia) (Hudson, et al., 1999, pp. 27, 29, 32, 52, 53, 65-66).

Accordingly, to summarize our pillar 2 discussion, we can say that in the eyes of
some of the educated, but unemployed males of the developing world, Islam is under
assault by "Western Civilization," especially by the leader of the West, the U.S (Hudson,
et al., 1999, pp. 62-66). Not only are Israelis using U.S. supplied F-16 fighter jets and
Apache helicopter gunships and tanks to destroy Palestinian infrastructure (and
arguably, culture) as part of the "War on Terror," but Russians are killing Chechens and
Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic's defense at his trial for war crimes at The Hague rests
in part on his claim that he was "merely" doing in Kosovo what everyone else is now
doing: combating terrorists. In addition, the U.S. and its European allies permitted Serb
genocidal attacks on Bosniaks to occur for three years before the massacres at
Srebrenica in July 1995 undermined UN and NATO (and arguably U.S.) credibility. In all
these cases, Muslims were and continue to be the victims.

Add to this that the superpower supporter of Israel and architect of globalization
has military forces in oil-rich Saudi Arabia, site of two of the holiest shrines in Islam
(Mecca and Medina), while the U.S. backed Israelis control the third holiest site, the al-
Aqsa Mosque and we have casus belli for war—for terrorism—perpetrated by some
(especially Wahabi) representatives of the Islamic World against the persons, symbols and structures of the Judaic-Christian World.

Here, we have another complication: the difference between those directly affected by perceived structural violence, its primary victims (e.g., Palestinians) and those who are disturbed by the existence of oppression suffered by others (e.g., the 19 hijackers of 11 September 2001). Apropos the latter, the following comments, offered by an "American terrorist" of the 1960s (Lerner, 2002), provide some generic insight:

I didn't grow up hungry, seething with inherited hurt in some refugee camp or ghetto--but well-fed in Chevy Chase [Maryland], in a big loving family in a house full of books. My grandparents were struggling immigrants, but my parents were solidly middle-class and when I approached adulthood in the mid-'60s, all the richness of this country was there for me. I could have been anything.

Like many children of affluence, I was horrified by racism and poverty and filled with idealism. The impulse was simple and honorable: Everybody should have opportunities like mine. I became an activist in the civil rights movement and renewed my desire to perfect the world in response to Vietnam. Yet by the end of that decade I had become warped enough to help found the Weathermen, a cult of leftist cynicism and violence. We were contemptuous of others, convinced we had the answers and willing to impose them by violence. In other words, we were political terrorists (Lerner, 2002, p. 24).

... I felt the politics and didn't disagree. Still, I joined SDS [Students for a Democratic Society] then and the Weathermen later, mostly for psychological, not ideological, reasons.

This is how it is in organizations that have the characteristics of cults and maybe in any group of activists. You get a role that fills some hole in you. The hijacker Mohammed Atta, like me, came from a middle-class family and received a good education. He also happened to have ... an overbearing father who derided him for being timid and girlish and challenged him to be as successful as his older sisters, a professor and a physician. I don't doubt the fierceness of Atta's Islamic passion. But perhaps he also had something to say to his dad.

In my experience, the glue that bound groups together was not so much ideology as a collective identity based on feeling different--superior, that is--continually reinforced by our state of escalating battle (emphasis added) (Lerner, 2002, p. 28. Also see Hudson, et al., 1999, pp. 19, 36, 48-49, 56-57, 63).
Add to this Mohammed Atta's sense of Arab and Muslim identity with Palestinians who are downtrodden, militarily occupied and attacked by U.S.—supported Israel—an example of the "civilizational rallying" that plays a role in the "Clash of Civilizations" thesis (Huntington, 1993, 1996)—and we may have a combustible recipe for "elite terrorism."

Apropos the "civilizational rallying" potential for elites regarding their less well-off, oppressed brethren, no less a figure than the Saudi Ambassador to Britain, Ghazi Algosaibi, has written poetry commemorating and applauding Palestinian suicide bombers:

"The Martyrs"

God is witness that you are martyrs
The prophets are witness ... and the Holy men
You died to honor my God’s word
In lands where the dearest are prisoners ...
You committed suicide?
We are the ones who committed suicide by living like the dead (Reid, 2002).

Revealing the Etiology of Violent Conflict Through Other Means: An Experiment in "Triangulation"

The above findings are insightful, but it is always worthwhile to attempt to generate findings on the same phenomenon through the use of other research methodologies and data (triangulation) to explore the possibility of overlap and enhanced validity of findings (Brewer and Hunter, 1989; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2000, pp. 189-190).

Such an opportunity came my way when, in March 2002, I attended a conference of conflict resolution professionals at John Jay College in New York City. All participants, recipients of Hewlett Foundation funding, were invited to submit papers stimulated by the conference, which have been collected and published online (<http://johnjay.jjay.cuny.edu/dispute> and <http://www.gmu.edu/departments/icar>).

I have attempted to distill from all the presentations—given by law enforcement hostage negotiators, people of faith (Jews, Christians, African, European-Americans, women and men), diplomats, academic and NGO researchers, theorists and practitioners—a sense of "generic theory" both with regard to third party intervention (pillar 3) as well as the etiology of violent conflict (pillar 2).

On the etiology of violent conflict, I discerned in the various presentations and discussions certain common themes shown in Figure (3).
### Figure 3: Common Themes on the Etiology of Violent Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Theme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>An absence of proactive problem-solving mechanisms (e.g., effective training in communication skills, monitoring and early warning processes).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dominance of male gender (and patriarchy).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dominance of <em>Realpolitik</em> thinking and behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Negative perceptions (stereotypes).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fractured relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Class and other <em>identity</em> group-based economic and other disparities (absence of justice).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Absence of conflict empowerment options (perceived or actual) for those experiencing disparities and injustice; and consequently Felt structural violence (relative deprivation and/or rank disequilibrium) and frustration-based anger.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A cursory examination of the relationship between "Western Civilization" (the North) and the Islamic world (the South) in terms of these eight common themes, against the background of the events and aftermath of 11 September 2001, reveals the following:

[1] There is an absence of effective problem-solving mechanisms to deal with North-South issues, although some might feel that the UN, World Bank and IMF already fulfill this need. Given the massive protests that confront meetings of these international organizations, however, it is clear that improvements can be made in this area. For example, there are no positive relationship-building (*peacebuilding*) mechanisms to deal with Islamic-Western "civilizational" or Israeli-Palestinian concerns. Perhaps as a consequence, hijacked airliners have careened into skyscrapers and Palestinian teenagers have blown themselves up in order to get their voices heard.

[2] The dominance of male gender and patriarchy is significant as, more and more, it is clear that, worldwide, most acts of violence are committed by males 15-29 years of age: a demographic group that is increasing in the South (Gilligan, 1996; Wrangham and Peterson, 1996; Hudson, et al., 1999, pp. 81; Garbarino, 2000; Kaplan, 2001; Barash, 2002). All 19 of the hijackers who took over the four aircraft on 11 September 2001 were male, as are most (but not all) Palestinian suicide bombers. As indicated by Lerner’s (2002) article, cited above, one of the hijackers, Mohammed Atta, apparently was not "male enough" in the eyes of his father (Kimmel, 2002), which may have contributed to his participation in what for him and others was undoubtedly an act of great sacrifice and heroism.
[3] The dominance of Realpolitik thinking and behavior is as clear in the actions of the 19 hijackers of 11 September 2001 as it is in the post-9/11 actions of the Bush administration. It is also as clear in the actions of Palestinian suicide bombers as it is in Israeli responses. In other words, at various levels, we are witnessing an escalation in confrontational, lethal, "bite-and-counterbite" behaviors where, at the end of the day, everyone is worse off than they were at the beginning: conflict-as-process has come to overwhelm and overtake conflict-as-startup conditions, so that, at any point in time, it does not matter "who threw the first punch," because the process itself, more than the deep-rooted causes and conditions, drives the conflict. The conflict has become self-stimulating and self-perpetuating (Sandole, 1999). Hence, the conclusion that John Vasquez (1993) has drawn from his comprehensive assessment of scientific studies of war, that Realpolitik makes war (and by implication, terrorism) more, rather than less, likely!

[4] There are clearly negative stereotypes at work in the relationships between North and South, "Western Civilization" and Islamic Civilization, Israelis and Palestinians. "Racial profiling" has taken on new meaning in post-9/11 America, where hate-crimes and detentions without trial have been recorded or are feared, at new levels (Pierre, 2002). Profiling has also been occurring in normally liberal, humanistic Western European countries, where far-right, anti-immigrant politicians have recently been scoring impressive electoral gains (Applebaum, 2002). In the Russian Federation, in addition to the war in Chechnya, white supremacist groups are attacking anyone of "dark" complexion: among others, Chechen, Azerbaijani and Tajik Muslims; but also Jews, Indians, Africans and even fellow Christian Armenians (Baker, 2002).

Not only has the global "War on Terror" succeeded in replacing the post-Cold War development of a multipolar system with a new bipolar system- terrorists vs. the rest of us- but it has also created a new bipolar ethnic/religious/racial system- Arabs vs. non-Arabs, Muslims vs. non-Muslims- which enhances the more traditional bipolar economic divide between "have-nots" and "haves," and indeed, the ultimate trap: the development of a "Clash of Civilizations"!

[5] Given the above, fractured relationships clearly exist between the North and the South, Muslims and non-Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians. Indeed, in one variant of the Muslim/non-Muslim relationship, Pakistan and India have been threatening to go to war over Kashmir in a way that includes use of nuclear weapons:

Although the current South Asian crisis seems to have ebbed, the underlying dynamic remains. The next flare-up will be even more dangerous if the region's nuclear confrontation develops in the same direction as the U.S.-Russian standoff— with nuclear missiles on alert, aimed at each other and ready to launch on warning (Mian, Rajaraman and von Hipel, 2002).
As is commonly heard in the popular culture use of American English, one does not have to be a "rocket scientist" to realize that there are profound, identity group-based economic and other disparities and an overall lack of justice, in the fractured relationships between North and South, non-Muslims and Muslims, non-Arabs and Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians. Indeed, as was reported over 20 years ago by the first Brandt Commission Report (1980), "one fourth of the world's population (the North) has four-fifths of the world's income, while three-fourths of the world's population (the South) has one fifth of the world's income" (Sandole, 1999, p. 126):

In the North, the average person can expect to live for more than seventy years; he or she will rarely be hungry and will be educated at least up to secondary level. In the countries of the South the great majority of people have a life expectancy of closer to fifty years; in the poorest countries one out of every four children dies before the age of five; one fifth or more of all the people in the South suffer from hunger and malnutrition; fifty percent have no chance to become literate (Brand Commission Report, 1980, p. 32).

Willy Brandt (1980, pp. 7) basically concluded that these objective conditions of structural violence on a grand scale constitute the "great social challenge of our time. [Hence,] the two decades ahead of us may be fateful for mankind" (in Sandole, 1999, p. 127). It seems that, with 9/11, we have clearly arrived at that fateful point for Humankind!

Most importantly, there is an absence of constructive empowerment mechanisms for minorities worldwide, for the South, for Palestinians and others. And here, we may have the single most powerful explanation for and predictor of terrorism: The absence of viable, "peaceful" alternatives to having to continue contending with humiliation, degradation and structural, cultural and physical violence. Indeed, who ensures that the "occupied" Palestinian voice gets heard? Yasser Arafat or the suicide bomber? As Mao tse-Tung said years ago, "Power flows from the barrel of a gun." Sad, but true, especially within the setting of the dominant political paradigm, Realpolitik.

Finally, against the background and interactive accumulation of the above factors:

Perceived structural violence (relative deprivation, rank disequilibrium), felt frustration and anger (rage), contribute further to the tendency for "Violence [to be] the expression of impotence grown unbearable":

Using Erikson's theory of identity formation, particularly his concept of negative identity, the late political scientist Jeanne N. Knutson (1981) suggests that the political terrorist consciously assumes a negative identity. ... In Knutson's view, terrorists engage in terrorism as a result of feelings of rage and helplessness over the lack of alternatives. Her
political science-oriented viewpoint seems to coincide with the \textit{frustration-aggression} hypothesis.

Knutson (1984) ... carried out an extensive international research project on the psychology of political terrorism. The basic premise of terrorists whom she evaluated in depth was "that their violent acts stem from feelings of \textit{rage} and hopelessness engendered by the belief that society permits no other access to information-dissemination and policy-formation processes" (emphasis added) (Hudson, et al., pp. 30, 34-35).

Quite simply, \textit{triangulated} factors 1-8—which overlap significantly with, but also add to the results of the 3 pillar-based analysis—make terrorism more rather than less likely.

\textbf{Applying the Overall Findings to the Middle East Conflict: A Major Source of Terrorism}

There is a photograph of Yasser Arafat on the front page of the \textit{Washington Post} (2002a) after the Israelis lifted their one-month siege of his headquarters in Ramallah in spring 2002, which is revealing of intense \textit{rage}. Held captive and hostage, isolated and occupied militarily—in effect, marginalized not just by Israel but by the international community for half a century—plus Ariel Sharon's assaults on refugee camps and townships: these and other aspects of Palestinian life experiences might make Arafat or any Palestinian feel that "Death is a way of life" (Leiby, 2002).

What else might this rage lead to? For expressing one's frustration, suicide bombings might be considered an option, albeit a grim, indiscriminate one, especially for Palestinians who lack the trappings of state power possessed by Israel and used against them: F-16 fighter jets, Apache helicopter gunships and tanks, not to mention the ever-present, home-destroying bulldozers. So, dispossessed, disempowered, desperate Palestinians could likely blow themselves up, killing Israelis (including children) in the process, as they have been doing, as their way to communicate their rage, to be "heard" by their occupiers and the international community at large.

In other settings, frustration-based rage has been a factor in explaining violent behaviors. And then, as expressed, for example, in the \textit{Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders} —the Kerner Commission Report (1968) on urban riots in the U.S.—long-term structural (\textit{Idealpolitik/non-Marxist radical}) as well as short-term security (\textit{Realpolitik}) measures are advanced to deal with that rage, so that the horribly violent behaviors do not have to repeat themselves.

But what do we see in the Middle East? Under the cover of the U.S. led "War on Terror," Israeli Prime Minister Sharon has been reducing to rubble Palestinian residential areas already under Israeli siege or domination, preventing a UN mission from investigating possible war crimes in the Jenin refugee camp and in the process, probably creating legions of future suicide bombers among the youth televised and photographed by the international media for all to see, digging through the rubble of their homes looking for loved ones and personal possessions. And yet both the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives endorsed, overwhelmingly, Israel's military
campaign to "dismantle the terrorist infrastructure" (Washington Post, 2002b) despite evidence of probable violations of human rights in Jenin.

As long as the deep-rooted causes of Palestinian rage are not addressed, Israel, with one of the world's most powerful armed forces, will continue to pulverize the already vanquished who have nothing to lose—why else would a young Palestinian girl blow herself to bits? —enhancing rather than decimating the "terrorist infrastructure" among the Palestinians.

In the meantime, Ariel Sharon and Hamas, among others, will continue to provide the world with a negative conflict model, showing the absurd levels to which violent conflict can descend, where each day that the conflict lingers, the conflicting parties are worse off than they were the day before.

For the foreseeable future, therefore, the Middle East will continue to resemble the Balkans, with Israelis in the role of Serbs and Palestinians in the role of Bosniaks. Although each side will continue to slaughter the other, according to any "objective" standard, the dominant victims will continue to be Muslims—not a very useful image to go forward in the post-9/11 world!

Conclusion

As Elie Wiesel (2002), the Nobel Peace Prize laureate (and concentration camp survivor), noted about the perpetrators of 9/11, "To Defeat Them, First We Must Understand Them." In this chapter, we have taken some steps in that direction by focusing primarily on the research problem: exploring causes and conditions of terrorism relevant to better understanding and dealing with the events and aftermath of 11 September 2001. Clearly, however, much more needs to be done, especially with regard to pillar 3 and—reflective of our practical problem—finding ways to get policymakers to think outside the simplistic Realpolitik—only box to capture the complexity of contemporary global issues affecting our security.

In the short to middle term, we must endeavor to prevent acts of terrorism, in part, by preventing violent conflicts that give rise to terrorism. Failing that, we must "manage" the conflicts that do give rise to terrorism, if not actually stop them altogether. In addition to enhancing airport and aircraft security and making appropriate use of military and law enforcement resources, actions in the short to middle term should include improved coordination between security and intelligence gathering organizations within as well as between states and international organizations, plus increased numbers and competencies of conflict/terrorist analysts, including those who can discern the similarities as well as differences among various conflicts as continuations or shifts in global conflict trends, plus linguists for dealing with foreign language information and potential early warnings (Bamford, 2002; Hiro, 2002).

Bridging the operational divide between short/middle-term conflict prevention, management and settlement mechanisms and long-term conflict resolution and transformation measures, former Undersecretary of the U.S. Air Force Antonia Chayes (2002) has put forward some interesting ideas for achieving peace in the Middle East, including: "An international peacekeeping force—made up of NATO troops with U.S. participation," which would provide security plus the necessary separation of the parties to allow for a cooling-off period to encourage dialogue between the parties.
Given the thrust of this chapter, such a dialogue should deal with the underlying causes and conditions and not just the symptoms of conflict—suicide bombings, destruction of refugee camps, targeted assassinations—because dealing only with symptoms in the absence of dealing with the deep-rooted causes helps keep the conflict alive. That was what the Kerner Commission Report (1968) suggested some 30 years ago, with implications for rage-based conflicts elsewhere. Why reinvent the wheel? Why wait any longer for further suicide bombings and Jenins to exacerbate what is already, according to Antonia Chayes, "a threat to international peace"?

Accordingly, we must build upon the short-to middle-term measures, striving to help the parties resolve the conflicts that give rise to terrorism, working with them over time to deal with their long-term relationships in less confrontational, less lethal ways, so that next time they have a problem, they do not have to "burn down the house." Otherwise, according to former French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine (2002):

... the Middle East problem will never be settled, Israel will never be secure, no Palestinian leader will be able to contain the fury of his despairing people, the region will remain a powderkeg and no anti-terrorist coalition will last. All the people who want the clash of civilizations—who are counting on it—will have the future they want.

A clear, simple message, but will it take hold with policymakers who are accustomed to seeing and responding to the world, including threats to security, in terms of linear, *Realpolitik*—*only* lenses, fighting fire *only* with fire?

T. Irene Sanders (2002), who advocates "a new way of thinking about defense," based on *complexity science* (Sanders, 1998; Waldrop, 1992), has some doubts in this regard:

Complexity science may be able to help those of us in the Western world understand a perspective that has been part of Eastern and Middle Eastern cultures for centuries. I recently reviewed a dissertation proposal on organizational management by an employee of the Islamic Development Bank in Saudi Arabia, in which he described the Islamic worldview as "fundamentally holistic and systemic—one that integrates rather than divides; one that concerns itself with complex patterns rather than simple single events."

Our inability to see and understand the interconnected nonlinear nature of the world made us vulnerable to the malevolent intentions of those who could. The enemy we face is a loose coalition of semi-independent terrorist cells, each with a well-defined mission and a high degree of adaptability and flexibility in carrying out that mission. Al Qaeda does not rely on immediate direction from a central authority yet still maintains effective coordination—a model similar to the one used by organized crime syndicates—and hence has been far less susceptible to intrusion or destruction. It adapts its methods to accomplish its goals. This
is in direct contrast to the defense and intelligence gathering organizations in the United States, which are still large and centralized bureaucratic operations, characterized by hierarchical command-and-control structures.

[U.S. Secretary of Defense] Rumsfeld has recognized and is already acting upon this challenge. As he writes in the May/June [2002] issue of *Foreign Affairs* magazine, "Preparing for the future will require new ways of thinking and the development of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstances. The ability to adapt will be critical in a world defined by surprise and uncertainty." But just how receptive are other people in positions of leadership to such a radical change of emphasis? People I have spoken with on Capitol Hill seemed resistant to the idea. "I'd hate to admit that there's anything we can learn from the Al Qaeda network," one senator said to me when I suggested that there was a lot to be understood from the thinking and organizational structure of the terrorists.

The price tag for this type of arrogance is high. Despite our overwhelming trillion dollar military and economic superiority, we were caught off guard by a terrorist network that put out an expenditure of about $400,000. What's to stop that from happening again? Very little, it seems.

At present, the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill "finds itself besieged in federal court and across the airwaves by Christian evangelists and other conservatives" for asking its "3500 incoming freshmen to read a book about Islam": Michael A. Sells *Approaching the Qur'an: The Early Revelations* (1999) (Cooperman, 2002, pp. A1). Hence, despite the fact that the "demand for lectures and courses on Islam [since 11 September 2002] is higher than ever," resistance to "thinking outside the box" may be more pervasive than just within leadership circles in Washington, D.C.

Shifting people from one belief-value system to another is not easy, but it can be done (Sandole, 2002b). The authors of this book have endeavored to contribute to that process. And it would seem clear from the discussion thus far, that the security of all of us depends upon it—a view further encouraged by the author of "Approaching the Qur'an," (Sells, 2002):

The Koran has been extremely difficult for most Americans to approach; the written "translations" in the bookstore are not what most Muslims consider to be the word of God or what they experience in their worship. "Approaching the Qur'an" explains why that is the case and offers an entry into the religion's core literary features and ideas. Reading it can only strengthen any subsequent discussion of Islam and terrorism.

In the meantime, the "Clash of Civilizations" that Hubert Vedrine warns of may already be upon us, as suggested by Clyde Prestowitz (2002, p. B1), former U.S. trade negotiator during the Reagan administration:
"The way things are going, it will soon be the United States against the world."

That comment, by a top political leader in Kuala Lumpur [Malaysia], was just one of hundreds of expressions of a new and disturbing alienation from America that I heard during a recent swing through 14 Asian, European and Latin American capitals.

What a contrast to the supportive attitudes abroad immediately after Sept. 11. Then, the sometimes anti-American French journal Le Monde captured the world's sentiment with a headline proclaiming: "We are all Americans." Ten months later, sympathy for the victims of the terror attacks remains. But the American image is increasingly perceived as ugly and support abroad for U.S. policies is plummeting—in response to such U.S. actions as the threat ... to withdraw its peacekeepers from Bosnia unless Americans are exempted from jurisdiction of the new International Criminal Court.

Of course, anti-Americanism is not new, but what I found disturbing after 35 years of visiting these cities was that the foreign leaders who have been longtime friends of the United States are the ones voicing dismay (emphasis added).

The German Orient Institute's Udo Steinbach (2002, p. 49) provides further insight in this regard:

The fear that further military steps in the fight against terror could lead to the West's being viewed as neo-crusaders is not entirely unfounded. From Rabat to Jakarta there is agreement that in order to achieve the common goal of rooting out terror, it is far more important finally to foster a just agreement between Israelis and Palestinians than to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Hatred of the U.S. has grown greatly since President Bush left unchallenged the statement by Israeli Prime Minister Sharon that Arafat is to Israel what bin Laden is to the United States. The suspicion is widespread that Bush supports Sharon's politics of delegitimizing the Palestinian right to an independent Palestinian state with the same status as Israel. When a higher priority in the fight against terrorism is accorded to toppling Saddam Hussein than to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this appears to many Muslims to be another example of the kind of Western arbitrariness and arrogance that stoked the fires of hatred in the past and the atrocities of September 11.

There can be agreement on terrorism between Islam and the West only if the fight against it is understood to be a collective task based on principles that all agree on, with account taken of the sensibilities of all
those involved. Only then will it be possible to enlist the Islamic world in the fight against terrorism (emphasis added).

Implicit in these comments is a sense of an unacceptably high price that we Americans and others are paying for policymakers continuing to force a complex, "messy" world into narrow, simplistic boxes, a practice which often results in counter-productive, self-defeating policies. On top of the events and aftermath of 11 September 2001, what will it take for them and the public at large to move with the times, shift paradigms and capture the complexity of contemporary and future events? Hopefully, not a "cultural world war," with weapons of mass destruction and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still at the core.
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The Need for Multi-Paradigmatic Analysis and A Multi-Dimensional Strategy

Sascha Sheehan

Introduction

Important questions since the harrowing events of September 11th are what triggered the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and what path should the U.S. take to defend itself, to counter global terrorism and, as the lone superpower, to protect other nations against similar such attacks. Since September 11th, the Bush administration has adopted what most would describe as a strategy of realpolitik (political realism). Indeed, in the wake of September 11th, President Bush branded terrorist mastermind Osama Bin Laden and his network of associates (Al Qaeda) the “prime suspect” in the attack, declared a global war on terrorism and warned that any nation that “harbors or supports terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime” (Address to Joint Session of Congress, 9/20/01). However, there are some who believe that due to the “rise of ethnic and other large group conflicts based on issues of identity” (Volkan, 1997) political realism is no longer a useful framework within which to interpret international conflict. In Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism, Volkan writes “Diplomats have started to see that complex new conflicts in the world cannot be measured by methods of realpolitik, nor can they easily be negotiated by traditional diplomacy” (ibid. 18). Those who adopt this latter line of reasoning suggest that the U.S. would be wise to adopt a strategy of idealpolitik based on human needs theory and the emerging field of conflict analysis and resolution. This paper seeks to examine the basis for and benefits of each conceptual framework. A central thesis of this paper is that political realism and basic human needs theory are not as incompatible or mutually exclusive as they might appear if, as Professor Dennis Sandole suggests, we “think outside of the box.” I contend that each theoretical framework is necessary if we are to create a strategic framework to effectively counter global terrorism in the years ahead.
Basic Human Needs & September 11th

One of the basic tenets of conflict analysis and resolution theory is that conflicts inevitably arise and escalate in situations where universal basic human needs for security, identity and recognition go unmet. Moreover, social stability can be restored when such needs are addressed. John Burton (1979) writes,

We believe that the human participants in conflict situations are compulsively struggling in their respective institutional environments at all social levels to satisfy primordial and universal needs-needs such as security, identity, recognition and development. They strive increasingly to gain control of their environment that is necessary to ensure the satisfaction of these needs.

Burton further states:

Unless identity needs are met in multi-ethnic societies, unless in every social system there is distributive justice, a sense of control and prospects for the pursuit of all other human societal development needs, instability and conflict are inevitable.

There can be little doubt that the deprivation of basic human needs, as defined by Burton, is a key cause of protracted and ongoing conflicts around the world. The denial of access needs (participation in the structural institutions of society), of acceptance needs (recognition of identity defined as shared cultural values and heritage) and of security needs (physical welfare), opens up fault lines and over time leads to greater levels of hostility and distrust. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999, p.73) assert:

Grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively. Failure to redress these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for conflict.

Basic human needs theory suggests that violence may become an instrument of retaliation if people perceive that their identity or another universal need such as recognition is threatened. In this light, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon could be viewed as a form of retaliation against the U.S. for what is perceived by some as the use of economic leverage by the U.S. against less developed, less powerful “third world” nations. Indeed, basic human needs theorists contend that the attacks on New York and Washington were the culmination of accumulated hatred toward the U.S. for years of deprivation. Proponents of basic human needs theory suggest that the U.S. has targeted the Palestinian people by siding with Israel in the ongoing struggle in the Middle East, inflicted massive human casualties in the form of “collateral damage” through numerous foreign military interventions, imposed sanctions on countries like Iraq and North Korea that have resulted in significant deaths and even
stationed U.S. servicemen on land held to be sacred within the Islamic faith. As such, basic human needs theorists contend that it should not be surprising that the U.S. is the focus of myriad resentment around the world. This resentment takes the form of what Volkan (1997) terms “Chosen Trauma” which ultimately culminates in feelings of greater resentment and a persistent escalation of violence.

With this in mind, Dennis Sandole penned a letter to the editor of the Washington Post shortly after September 11th, where he asserted that “In addition to identifying and going after the culprits...we have to ‘declare war’ on the economic and environmental and humanitarian and human rights problems for which we are, rightly or wrongly, held responsible.”

On October 15th in a subsequent unpublished letter to the editor of the Washington Post, Professor Sandole (2001b) agreed that the U.S. must “think outside the box” in the war against terrorism. Exemplifying classic idealpolitik and human needs theory, Sandole wrote:

One possibility here, imminently doable and pregnant with positive PR and other multiplier effect implications, would be for President Bush’s national security advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice and U.S. Secretary of State General Colin Powell to launch working groups on global problem-solving across multiple interlocking fronts—economic and environmental, humanitarian and human rights, plus diplomatic and military—together with the Nobel Prize winning United Nations and its Secretary General Koffi Anan as a profound way to demonstrate to peoples in the developing world in general, that “Western” Civilization includes them as well.

Arguing for the need to expand our conceptions of global security to include human needs theory and establish cooperative international relationships (a la political idealism), he further asserted:

If the events of and since 11 September 2001 have any meaning it is that we are all interconnected: there is no longer any meaningful distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. On a global scale, we are all us!

At the same time, International Alert, the non-governmental organization dear to so may conflict resolution theorists released a statement that also-called for greater emphasis on universal basic human needs:

International Alert is committed to analysis which examines the root causes of conflicts and to structural changes which addresses both the symptoms and origins of violence. This approach is fundamental to understanding and addressing the manifestations of the current global crisis. In this vein, issues of identity, security, recognition, religion and socio-economic, psych-social and historical frameworks all need to be examined, analyzed and employed.
Given this line of reasoning it should be of little surprise that basic human needs theorists believe that the events of September 11th lend credence to the notion that the U.S. must do more to cooperate with the nations of the world and seek mutual understanding. Peace and security, these theorists argue, are not just the absence of violence, but the recognition of basic human needs. As such, if the U.S. is to combat global terrorism effectively, then we must first address issues of international human rights, poverty and deprivation, health concerns and other concerns that plague underprivileged members of the global community. These theorists assert that the “root cause” of global terrorism it is the fact that basic human needs, global development and global economic concerns are not addressed. Then argue billions the U.S. spends on modern security measures should instead be invested in promoting peace agreements and meeting basic human needs in the world's poorest societies.

Rather than make the world safer, human needs theorists contend that the current campaign on global terrorism will serve only to increase further dislocation, deaths, disease and the physical destruction of infrastructure. They make the case that this will only heighten the need for security and increase the prospect of conflict as extremists are “radicalized” by the continued denial of universal needs.

**Political Realism & September 11th**

In contrast, the politics of realism (realpolitik), dating back at least to Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes and including in the 20th century, such proponents as Hans Morgenthau, President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, takes a somewhat different approach. A basic tenet of political realism is that conflict is inevitable and deeply rooted in man’s intrinsically “flawed” human nature. Unlike human need theorists, political realists believe that no amount of need fulfillment will result in the end of conflict. Indeed, it is in the nature of man to struggle and fight. As Hobbes put it, as far back as 1651, “All men in the state of nature have a desire and will to hurt, but not proceeding from the same cause...” Applied to September 11th, we might conclude by using political realism that the men who mounted the devastating attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon the did so not because of need deprivation (indeed most were middle class) but out of instinctual unrestrained aggression. Political realists adopt the stance that the purpose of government (whether national or international) is generally to restrain, to protect the group against the baser forces of individual members. In Hobbes view, as described by Kaplan, man “fears more than anything else violent death at the hands of other men in close quarters and because that’s such an overriding, deep-seated profound fear, men will willingly give up part of their freedom to come into concord with other men to form an authority that can protect them from each other so that they can go about their daily lives.” Therefore government is formed as a form of protection and a means of survival. Expressing support for the notion that men should be held directly responsible for their actions Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote “If what we do now is to make no difference in the end then all the seriousness of life is done away with.”

In modern times, political realism has been associated with the policies of nation-states that “think and act in terms of interest defined as power” (Morgenthau, 1967, p. 94). It was assumed that nations had to act against other states to ensure their own
survival when threatened. The role of political realism in the current post 9/11 world is therefore problematic. It would appear that political realism, on the grounds of national security, would demand the exercise of force by one government to curtail the liberty of another government if it was attacked. But the 9/11 attacks were not (as far as we know) mounted by a legitimate recognized government. It could be argued that the use of force against a group of actors (terrorists) that does not constitute a “state” or “nation” has the problematic effect of legitimizing a non-legitimate group of actors on the international scene. It can also be argued that political realism promotes the opposite of cooperation on the international arena. In the eyes of realists, politics is a zero sum game. Whoever develops the most resources and whoever has the most power ultimately wins. Political realism is also attacked because it justifies violence on the part of states in the interests of order and because it justifies shifting alliances in the pursuit of stability. Thus, there are those who criticize the dropping of bombs in Afghanistan since it results in civilian casualties and there are those who criticize our recent shift towards an alliance with Pakistan, a state we recently shunned because of its development of nuclear weapons. For idealists, ends can never justify means. For realists, morality is more complicated. Political realists seem to believe their responsibility is to their constituents (national security is the protection of vital national interests not universal basic human needs). They also believe that sacrifices may need to be made among the few (civilian casualties) for the benefit of the many (all who are potential victims of terrorism). Shifting alliances even in the direction of states that are less than perfect models may be necessary for the greater good.

While philosophical arguments about whether ends justify means (most notably stated by Machiavelli) rage on, it seems to me that realpolitik does have a benefit in its appreciation of the “reality” that different moralities may coexist and one may have to be prioritized over another (Kaplan). Political realism also makes an important contribution in maintaining that human nature is not infinitely malleable and that man has the capability of being murderous, violent and aggressive in instances in which his needs are not under siege.

So, Which Paradigm is Right? Perhaps Both…

Realists, like political idealists and basic human need theorists, agree that creating a peaceful secure world is desirable but see no easy way of escaping “the harsh world of security competition and war” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 16). Thus, although creating a peaceful world is an attractive idea, it is not realistic or practical in the eyes of political realists.

Political realism correctly asserts that calculations about relative power dominate states’ thinking and that states compete for power among themselves. Like many realists, I believe that international politics is a struggle among groups for security, power, influence, prestige and the distribution of scarce resources. As such, the world consists of groups of individuals who are in constant, intense competition under conditions of relative scarcity. Morgenthau is well known for asserting that states have a “limitless lust for power” and, it is this insatiable appetite that leads nations to dominate other states. Since states compete for relative power in a zero sum world, conflicts among states are intense and unforgiving.
In contrast, political idealism asserts that conflict and war can be the result of many contributory factors. Conflict resolution makes an important contribution to the analysis of international conflict by asserting that “power”, while a major motivator in many conflict situations, is not the primary motivator in every conflict situation. Whereas political realism is largely concerned with the acquisition and application of power in conflict situations, conflict resolution theorists are concerned with cooperative relations and to a large extent with the satisfaction of basic human needs of identity, security, recognition and belonging. The emphasis on cooperative relations stems from a rejection of threat and coercion as the primary means of generating order and stability.

Perhaps the most significant contribution of conflict resolution and basic human needs theory is the critique of the state as the primary actor in international conflicts. The emphasis on the effect of non-state actors in international conflicts is an important one. Indeed, unlike political realism, basic human needs theory takes into account the fact that citizenship becomes an artificial boundary when identity (e.g. religion) is under siege.

Ultimately, the dramatic attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon demonstrated that the origins of global terrorism must be studied at multiple levels and understood as the result of multiple contributing factors. It appears to me that realists and idealists both make valuable contributions. Indeed, although I do not believe that human evil and human aggression can be understood fully in terms of causes such as poverty, maladjustment, lack of education or socioeconomic conditions, the realist assertion that “lust for power” is the only motive is not in itself sufficient as an explanation for the violence that occurred on September 11th.

Final Thoughts: The Need for a Multi-Dimensional Strategy to Combat Terrorism

“The original sin of any writer,” Robert D. Kaplan (1998) writes in Warrior Politics, “is to see the world only from his point of view” (ix). He goes on to quote Edmund Burke wrote, “Man’s nature is intricate, society is wondrously complex…” (51). An effective foreign policy must be multi-dimensional and multi-paradigmatic and conflicts be viewed as complex entities that occur for a variety of reasons under different circumstances. Unless policymakers internalize this lesson, the U.S. and the international community will be less than effective in waging its war on global terrorism. Indeed, no conflict, no serious dispute can be viewed solely through the lens of any one paradigm. The devastating events of September 11th are no exception. Sandole (1999) asserts that “different paradigms, different mappings of the ‘same thing’, mean different realities” (Sandole, 1999, pp. 111). These multiple, competing conceptions of reality, when taken in their entirety, surely lead to a more comprehensive analysis of violent international conflict.

The great Prussian general and military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz held that war “is the province of uncertainty...hidden in the fog of greater or lesser uncertainty” (Kaplan, 1998, pp. 38). A wide-ranging intellect is “called for to feel out the truth with instinctive judgment” (ibid. 38). I believe Clausewitz is correct. War is remarkably complex and can only be understood with a “wide ranging” intellect that takes into account multiple causal factors—the desire for power and the quest for human needs such as identity and recognition.
Although many in the post 9/11 world echo the words of poet W.B. Yeats, “All is changed, changed utterly,” it would be wise to ask whether it is more likely that only our perception of the world has changed. Indeed, the logic of waging war-as articulated by Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Hobbes and Machiavelli-is as universal and timeless as human nature itself (Handel, 1997). What has clearly changed is our recognition of a point first made by Reinhold Niebuhr in the Irony of American History. Niebuhr concludes that our “supra-continental power, purchased in part because of the strength of our military has interwoven our destiny with the destiny of many peoples and brought us into a vast web of history” (in Kaplan, 1999, p. 352). As such, we would be wise to recognize that our fate, our security and our future lies largely in the hands of others. It is here that a combination of political idealism based on needs theory and yet rooted in the realist belief that man is sufficiently wicked to require restraint, will play its most significant role. Ultimately, this hybrid approach must, in the words of political scientist James Q. Wilson (2000, p. 211), induce man “to respond to the better side of their natures so that affluence, decency and freedom can prosper”. While author Michael Novak observes that ultimately “Human beings, unlike animals, have the choice whether or not to obey the higher laws of their own nature, whether to follow the better angels of their being” (Kirk, 1953, p. 965). How to achieve this task will continue to be one of significant debate in the years ahead. It is my strong conviction that we will only achieve this noble aspiration through an approach that emphasizes the best elements of political realism and political idealism as expressed through conflict resolution and human needs theory.
Sources


Terrorism and Conflict Resolution
Matthew Hersey and Charles Hauss

Introduction

Six months after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Time magazine's front cover raised a concern shared by just about every American. “Can we stop the next 9/11? The FBI and CIA have been in a desperate struggle to fix a broken system before the next attack comes (Time, 2002).”

There is no denying the importance of “fixing the broken system”, a reference to the exposed gaps in intelligence and preparedness. However, we want to go farther than the editors of Time and much of the mainstream media to offer two points.

First, we join our colleagues in the conflict resolution field in arguing that the response to September 11th and terrorism in general must go much farther and address the root causes of terrorism, thereby significantly reducing the growth and spread of terrorism over the long-term. Relying primarily on military and other traditional approaches to national security may reduce the threat of terrorist attacks in the short or medium term, but will do little to reduce the likelihood that new and perhaps more lethal forms of terrorism will emerge in the future.

Second, we think events since September 11th offer an unprecedented opportunity for the conflict resolution community and national security policy makers to work together. As we will argue in this chapter, neither approach, alone, provides all the answers for ending terrorism. In fact, the demands for answers placed by terrorism on both national security and conflict resolution decision-makers should not be considered mutually exclusive. They seek the same objective, i.e. and a peaceful end to violent conflict while maintaining global cultural, social, political and economic security. Thus, in examining solutions to the war on terrorism, two fundamental prerequisites must be understood. First, the use of force and the need for conflict resolution are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the avenues we propose should be viewed as complementary. Second, no single or group of solutions offer a panacea instantly ridding the world of terrorism. Whatever strategies one proposes with whatever political or intellectual inspiration, there is no quick fix for terrorism.
September 11th and everything that eddied around it were jarring events for us all. They proved particularly shocking for the conflict resolution community whose raison d’être revolved around the peaceful and cooperative settling of disputes. It found itself suddenly confronted with the need to reconcile its essentially pacifistic ideals with the specter that force might become a necessary tool for conflict resolution.

This was not the first time those in the conflict resolution field were forced to consider the possibility of using military force to build peace. Many had already begun posing the question in the 1990s with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the tragedies following the collapse of Yugoslavia and the dozens of bloody wars fought in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East.

But, September 11th proved fundamentally different. The audacity, shock and magnitude of the attack forced many to rethink core questions left unanswered, especially the relationship of peaceful conflict resolution and more traditional and often coercive, national security policies. When we help people settle disputes, we help them “reframe” their differences in new ways, which make cooperation more likely. What we are suggesting here is that the conflict resolution and national security policymaking communities need to reframe the way they each conceive of their role.

Our thinking along these lines has been shaped by articles written shortly after September 11th by John Paul Lederach (2001a, 2001b) and Miroslaw Volf (2001). Both are acknowledged experts on reconciliation; perhaps the most difficult to achieve goal in conflict resolution and something that was not in many people’s minds in the last weeks of September 2001. Lederach is a Mennonite with years of experience helping disputants in some of the most troubled parts of the world find common ground. Volf was born and raised in Croatia and is professor of theology at the Yale Divinity School.

Lederach wrote of two “voices” he felt were speaking inside of most of our heads. Both involved calls for justice, but for two markedly different types of justice.

The first voice grew out of the shock, fear and anger most of us felt after the attacks. It included a call for traditional justice in which the perpetrators would be held accountable for their actions. For some people, this first voice included a desire—even a demand—for revenge. Most importantly for our purposes, if Lederach is right, we in the conflict resolution community were as likely to feel that way as anyone else.

The second voice calls on us to address the root cause of terrorism, to figure out “why they hate us so much.” It calls for the increasingly popular concept of restorative justice, “a systematic response to crime that emphasizes healing the wounds of victims, offenders and communities caused or revealed by the criminal behavior [and includes] practices and programs reflecting restorative purposes will: (a) identify and take steps to repair harm done, (b) involve all stakeholders and (c) transform the traditional relationship between communities and their governments.” Or, as Lederach and Volf stress in their theoretical writing, true conflict resolution requires reconciliation, which in turns requires justice, mercy and equality.

Like Lederach, Volf was away from home when the attacks occurred. In his case, he was addressing the Annual International Prayer Breakfast at the United Nations when the planes hit. Later that week he gave an interview to Christianity Today in which he eloquently spoke to the same two voices as Lederach.
I felt very strange. I had been inside talking about reconciliation with our enemies at the same time that a terrorist attack was taking place and the World Trade Center Towers were collapsing.

Felt we needed to go after them that they needed to pay. The naming of the deeds as evil and the protection of those who are innocent is extraordinarily important.

But none of these things means we should not also seek to forgive the offender and reconcile with the offender. One of the points in my talk at the U.N. was that we, as Christians, must develop a will to embrace and be reconciled with our enemy. This will to embrace is absolutely unconditional. There is no imaginable deed that should take a person outside our will to embrace him, because there is no imaginable deed that can take a person out of God’s will to embrace humanity (Volf, 2001).

Reverend Ken Sande—whose ministry is conflict resolution—summed up this point of view more succinctly:

So, is this a time for peacemaking or a time for war? The answer may be both.

But how can both paths be right, especially when they seem to go in opposite directions? Both can be right, because God himself has assigned different paths to different people.

We draw on these Christian thinkers and practitioners here in part because they are rarely included in the work of those of us in the secular conflict resolution community. Even more importantly, we drew on them because they pose the challenge we face more squarely and more bluntly than our secular colleagues. Somehow, we have to devise policies that speak to both of Ledearch’s conflicting, if not incompatible, voices.

The conflict resolution community does not have much to offer in addressing his first voice. That is the national security policy makers’ area of expertise. We do, however, have a lot to say about the second voice, something with which national security policy makers have little experience (Ignatieff, 2002). In short, if we are going to truly do something that makes major steps toward ending terrorism, we need each other.

What We Can’t Do

Prior to September 11th, the conflict resolution community had precious little to say about terrorism (though, for an exception, see Marks and Beliaev, 1991). Few of the major books in the field even mentioned it. None of the major conflict resolution NGOs (non-governmental organizations) had ongoing projects that even indirectly addressed issues growing out of terrorism.
And, more importantly, the aftermath of September 11th showed just how empty the conflict resolution “tool kit” is for addressing terrorism, at least for now. Of the hundreds of articles on the CRInfo web site on terrorism, only about ten percent even have proposals about what to do in response.

Moreover, much of what our colleagues proposed doing in immediate response to the attacks proved to have little popular appeal or intellectual merit. Indeed, the impetus to write this chapter came after a meeting of conflict resolution scholars at the United States Institute of Peace in October 2001 at which the participants took positions, which were all over the political map. Many complained that national security policy makers did not pay attention to them when they called for a stop to the fighting that had begun a few weeks earlier. One of us made the counterclaim that they might listen, but only if we had something to offer that would effectively counter terrorism at a time of global shock and national crisis.

It was not just that small group of Washington-area academics. The weekend the airwar began, we held a small workshop for a group of academic-practitioners like ourselves, which was pretty much split down the middle, half opposing the bombing, half reluctantly supporting it. When the Association for Conflict Resolution held its first annual conference the following week, it found it had no mechanisms for responding to a crisis of this sort. And, many of the leading conflict resolution and peace oriented web sites went weeks before they even added messages of sympathy to the victims.

That conflict resolution practitioners and scholars had little to offer after September 11th should not come as a surprise. No one was able to come up with viable, nonviolent responses to the attacks. The list of suggestions put forth after September 11th reads like an exercise in futility even a few short months afterward—treat it as a police action rather than a war, impose sanctions, negotiate with moderates and so on.

That is the case, in part, because many of us come from a background in the peace movement and have never easily been able to support the use of force—if we could at all. What’s more, most of our practical experience has been in other settings when it was at least possible to bring the various parties to a conflict to the table, which was not even a remote possibility with Al Qaeda or the Taliban.

The conflict resolution community also failed to take one of two “voices” Lederach writes about which was the more important one in the minds of most political leaders and average citizens alike in the immediate aftermath of September 11th and other terrorist attacks. Terrorism is seen as a dangerous threat to the security of the countries and citizenry attacked. The perpetrators of such acts must be captured and held accountable for what they did even if that requires the forceful intervention by the aggrieved party and/or its allies. Although many people fell far short of demanding outright revenge after September 11th, there were few who felt the actions of Al Qaeda could go unpunished or that it would be possible to hold the responsible individuals accountable without some use of force.

Conflict resolution practitioners will probably never have a role to play in the kinds of actions the United States and its allies took starting on October 6th. We can see no circumstances under which defense planners would even consider using us to forge a military strategy. Nor should they seek our advice on how to drop bombs or launch an invasion (though see some qualifying remarks on this in the next section).
However, if we are to be taken seriously in the areas where we do have resources to bring to bear on terrorism, we need to be far more aware of the nature of national security policy making and the demands placed on the people who make it. Put bluntly, far too many people in the conflict resolution community (and even more in the peace studies world) rejected the use of force out of hand and engaged in the kind of “image of the enemy” stereotyping of Bush administration officials, the negative consequences of which we so deplore in our writing and teaching. We do not have to agree with the policies of this or any other administration. But, if we want its officials to take us seriously, we have to treat them with the same kind of dignity and respect we expect others to use in dealing with us. We also need to be able to speak their language so that they can actually “hear” what we can offer. Finally, those of us who are primarily academics, in particular, have to understand that the uncertainties and complexities of policy making are such that national political leaders can never pay as much attention to following first principles as we (and they) would like in dealing with crisis situations.

What We Can Do

Although conflict resolution is a relatively new field, it does have a proven track record of ideas and projects that could be used in other aspects of our attempts to reduce support for terrorism. These involve Lederach’s second voice in which the threat to security lies as much in the unmet human needs that give rise to terrorism and other forms of violence in the first place. Dealing with them requires the kind of engagement, capacity building and cooperative problem solving that conflict resolution practitioners and theorists have been working on for more than a generation. There are three main areas where we in the conflict resolution community have a contribution to make, the first of which should have an impact on the short-term decisions national security policy makers reach.

What follows may seem overly optimistic given the state of the world since September 11th. However, as we suggest by referring to the progress in Northern Ireland, it is possible to sharply reduce terrorist violence through long-term peace building and conflict resolution.

Looking to the Long Term

When faced with a terrorist attack, national security policy makers invariably have to think about how they should respond in the days, weeks and months that follow. Given the pressing decisions they have to make, their time frames have to be short.

What conflict resolution practitioners understand is that any process that reduces future support for terrorism will, by contrast, take a long time. That is the case, as we will see below, because there is so much anger at so many targets and over so many overlapping issues that it is impossible to imagine any kind of quick fix.

Therefore, we tend to focus on the longer-term impact of our actions, including envisioning a different, less conflictual future. That perspective often leaves policy makers convinced we are little more than dreamers. However, the focus on the long term is important for policy makers to take into account for three main reasons.
First, doing so should lead them to rethink the ramifications of their actions. Because conflict analysis draws one’s attention to the “feedback” and the ways the components of an interdependent system interact over time, it leads to more pessimistic conclusions about the effectiveness of force than one commonly sees from policy makers. Whatever the short term reasons or even need for the kind of intervention we saw after September 11th, conflict resolution theory suggests that it will, among other things, sew the seeds for more anger and more potential support for terrorism in the years to come.

That does lead to one short-term conclusion policy makers probably should heed more than they currently do. In her groundbreaking work on NGOs in development and conflict resolution, Mary Anderson (1999) insists that they should “do no harm.” Military forces, which intervene in a forceful way, by definition, do inflict harm on their foes and, alas, often to citizens who are not parties to the dispute. But, given the main point of this paragraph Anderson’s invocation could be rephrased as “do as little harm as possible.”

Second, the development of alternative, less violent, widely accepted visions over time is important for the resolution of any conflict. Intractable conflicts are not likely to end if politicians approach them with “business as usual.” Like the rest of us, they have to think “outside the box” to find solutions that might work. And that, too, takes time. As Lederach put it, “Where we are going and how we get there depends a great deal on how we define the nature of our journey, its challenges and ultimately its proposed destination (2001b, p. 1).

Finally, true conflict resolution involves far more than just putting an end to the fighting—though that itself is no mean feat. In its most basic form, conflict resolution means putting the dispute to an end once and for all and that requires the time consuming effort of addressing the underlying social issues to be overcome through a process of reconciliation, which typically occurs one person at a time.

**Conflict Resolution as a Process**

As is the case with any academic field, there is plenty of controversy over what conflict resolution is, let alone how to accomplish it. Everyone, however, acknowledges that, in one form or another, it is achieved through a process that encourages parties to talk (and listen) to each other and develop the common interests and trust that making lasting win/win agreements possible over time.

One of the approaches used to structure conflict resolution processes which we particularly like is known as ARIA and has been presented most recently by Jay Rothman (1997, Ch. 1). ARIA is an acronym that evokes the flow of an operatic work as well as the life cycle of conflict resolution.

We raise the ARIA process not because it is the best such approach, but because it is typical of many of them and because any plan to undermine the support for terrorism in the future will have to go through something like it. And, for that to happen, policy makers and others will have to commit themselves and the necessary resources to working this way for a period which, we assume, could well last for a generation or more.

**Adversarial Framing.** First, parties to the conflict deal with each other in a confrontational manner. More often than not, they do so without even meeting each
other, as was the case between the United States and Al Qaeda in the aftermath of September 11. While this is an extreme case, it should be noted that leaders of Sinn Fein (the political wing of the IRA) and the main unionist parties had never been in the same room with each other before the negotiations which culminated in the Good Friday Agreement began. Similarly, Israel had a law that prohibited all contact between its citizens and PLO members until late 1992.

Reflective Reframing. Through track two or other diplomatic processes, the parties of the dispute are brought to the negotiating table for talks normally led by a team of neutral facilitators, such as George Mitchell and his colleagues in Northern Ireland. Clearly, we are nowhere near being able to convene such a body that would include even distant supporters of those responsible for September 11th. However, as the example of Northern Ireland suggests, a time can come—and a time can be prepared—when former terrorists can sit down with their foes.

At this stage, the facilitator’s task is to get the members of the group to brainstorm. This is a procedure in which the participants present their ideas but do not criticize those put forth by their counterparts on either side. When brainstorming works, the group gets creative and comes up with ideas that had never been on the agenda before.

After brainstorming, the facilitators try to reframe the debate between the two sides. In so doing, they try to help participants see the matters under dispute from a new perspective that allows them to begin finding areas where they could agree and others where they still are far apart.

Invention. This third stage can be the most difficult, because it is at this point that the participants “invent” an agreement. The facilitators may engage in more brainstorming and more reframing in an attempt to find common ground among the participants that could be the basis for a win-win outcome. In fact, the reframing to invention process usually occurs several times during negotiations to end an intractable conflict. And, it must be stressed that these discussions do not always lead to an agreement as was the case at Camp David and Taba during the last days of the Clinton administration.

Action. The successful negotiation of an agreement by no means ends the process. The situation in Cyprus is illustrative. A cease fire was arranged in 1964 and a peace keeping force was sent in. It is still there.

In the absence of a full agreement that lays out a strategy for moving toward reconciliation and concrete steps to implement it, agreements that come out of the invention stage tend to be “orphaned” as Fen Osler Hampson (1996) puts it. As in Cyprus, they can leave the disputants in political limbo with little or no progress being made above and beyond the initial agreement. Even more worrisome is the deterioration in the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians which we have seen since the start of the second intifada in the Fall 2001.

Political Strategy

A long-term commitment to a process akin to ARIA is not enough. Any attempt by conflict resolution professionals to thwart terrorism will also require a multi-dimensional political strategy, at least the broad contours of which can be laid out here.
**Unmet Human Needs.** Since its creation in 1980, much of the work of the Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution has revolved around the human needs theories of John Burton. Burton expands on the oft used political and economic assumption that humans need only food and shelter (Burton, 1996, pp. 30). Rubin, Pruitt and Kim expand on Burton’s work preferring to use the term ‘interests’ rather than human needs:

Some interests are virtually universal (such as the needs for security, identity, social approval, happiness, clarity about the nature of one’s world and some level of physical well being). Other interests are specific to certain actors (such as the Palestinian’s desire for a homeland or [a teenager’s] wish to have access to the family car). Some interests are more important (higher in priority) than others and such priorities differ from person to person. (Burton 1994, p. 12).

While an exact list of these needs is highly dependant on the culture of the individual, we generally recognize the needs of personal and group identity, security and distributive justice to be non-negotiable by nature. (Fisher, 1997, p. 256).

It is appropriate to question the motivations of individuals who will fly airplanes into buildings or who will engage in suicide bombings. That does not mean that we can ignore the huge social, political and economic chasms that give rise to terrorism and to sympathizers who allow them to operate.

We are talking about more than just objective inequalities here as Ted Robert Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation. According to Gurr, violence is a variable of perceived expectations and actual capabilities (Gurr, 1974). When an individual or group “gets” far less of some scarce resource than it “wants”, frustration follows that could lead them to lash out as terrorists or in other violent ways.

Even the gradual and incremental meeting of such needs has been shown to make a significant difference in reducing grass roots support for terrorism. Thus, as economic conditions improved and inside-the-system political opportunities opened up for Catholics in Northern Ireland, support for the IRA plummeted during the late 1980s and 1990s.

**Change the coalition dynamics.** Many western viewers were shocked to see how much support Al Qaeda and the Taliban had, say, among students at the madrassas or religious schools in Pakistan. Such individuals, who today support terrorists groups but do not become terrorists themselves and who, later, could form the next generation of terrorists, are critical to any long-term strategy.

Can these people be convinced not to make the leap from being frustrated to violence? In a curious way, the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Influence was created to organize a perfectly legitimate public relations campaign that would use the media to help shift public opinion in these communities. For good or ill, the fact that its plans to also carry out disinformation campaigns doomed these efforts and the office itself shortly after it was created in late 2001. It remains to be seen if the new White House Office of Global Communication, created the week we finished this chapter, will enjoy any more success.
It is also critical that the allies work ever more diligently to promote the interests of moderate leaders who will enact domestic policies that would make it clear that their governments will not tolerate terrorism. Doing that will require making progress on some of the festering issues in the Middle East (e.g. Israel and Palestine, the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia) and beyond. So far, unfortunately, the United States and its allies have done precious little on this score.

In short, the goal here is to isolate terrorists and their closest supporters in the societies in which they are based. It is probably going to be impossible to negotiate with Al Qaeda and other terrorist leaders for the foreseeable future. The next best alternative is to create environments in which it becomes increasingly difficult for them to operate or recruit.

Again, the situation in Northern Ireland is instructive. The combination of Britain’s commitment to a strong security presence and its offering political “carrots” for good behavior by extremists on both sides went a long way toward changing the climate in the province enough to get the talks started in 1994.

As Paul Arthur (1988) of the University of Ulster put it, the Major and, especially, the Blair government (which took office 1997) went beyond what he calls a “security response” to a political one—“the willingness to engage in political dialogue, to examine the roots of the problem and to search for political solutions.” Make no mistake here. Arthur and the like do not support negotiations with terrorists who are routinely carrying out attacks. Rather, they endorse the stand taken by George Mitchell (1999) that organizations like Sinn Fein would only be allowed into the talks if they made a commitment to nonviolence and democracy. In fact, following the 1996 bombings at Canary Wharf and on The Strand, Sinn Fein participation in the talks was suspended until another unconditional cease-fire was declared.

Inclusiveness of peoples and issues. Intractable conflicts such as the one of which September 11th is at the heart cannot easily be resolved because so many societies and overlapping issues are involved. The roots of Al Qaeda, for instance, in the opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, the Arab-Israeli conflict and more. There is no way of getting at the underlying and potential support for movements like that unless dramatic steps are taken to address all those issues.

And that can only be done if the conflict resolution process is as open to as many participants as possible. In the case of nation states, that means as many governments that are stakeholders to the dispute should be involved. So, too, should the relevant international organizations and NGOs, including those who have at least some ties or provide some intellectual support to the terrorists.

Taken together, the proposals in this section envisage creating what Jayne Docherty and Lisa Schirch (2001) call a global environment that does not support terrorism. Completely eliminating terrorism and the milieus from which it springs is not a viable possibility for the foreseeable future. However, a combination of multilateral negotiations, improved education and social services, economic development, public relations, political engagement and a spirit of openness can reduce the number of people who feel so frustrated and alienated that they might turn to terrorism and, at the same time, make it clear that the costs of turning to it will rise to an unacceptable level. These kinds of activities are in our toolbox. As Derek Sweetman (2001) put it:
By not using the tools and techniques we have, we instead play the game by the rules of those we are opposing. If we truly believe in the power of dialog, stepping into the other’s shoes, seeking integrative outcomes and listening, why do we refuse to these when trying to influence society?

The Time is Ripe

In the current war on terrorism, the time is nowhere near ripe for the start of a full-fledged conflict resolution process. To cite but the most obvious example, there is nothing approaching a hurting stalemate between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the various terrorist networks on the other.

However, the time is ripe for the conflict resolution and national security policy-making communities to work together on these issues. One of the conclusions we reached in writing this chapter is that neither the conflict resolution community nor the national security policy makers have a chance of dealing a major blow to terrorism on its own. Military options may be necessary, but it cannot do much to undercut the anger and frustration that give rise to terrorism, at least in the medium to long term. Conflict resolution professionals may not have the tools to address how to react in the immediate aftermath of an attack like those of September 11th, but we do have tools that have already been used to defuse intractable conflicts.

September 11th served as a wake-up call for many in the conflict resolution field. Along with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, many of the bloody conflicts in the third world and the wars in Yugoslavia, it has led many of us to both the potential that force can play in conflict settings and the importance of our learning to work constructively with national security policy makers. There is evidence, too, that at least some national security policy makers understand that they can’t go it alone. For instance, in the days after September 11th, the left-wing journalist, David Corn (2001), was struck by how open many traditionally conservative policy makers were to considering new, non-military supplements to the use of force. Jerrold Post, who pioneered the CIA’s program of psychological profiling, claimed that the overarching problem we face is the “rolling hatred within the Arab world directed at the United States. America doesn’t have the vaguest idea how much hatred. H. Allen Holmes who served at both the Pentagon and State Department claimed that “we must provide assistance and listen to other states, including states hitherto regarded as rogue states. In a war on terrorism, there will be no victory. We can contain it, slow it down and diminish it. But only if we put together a grand coalition for the long haul to do something about the sources of terrorism.”

Another indirect indicator that it is possible and necessary for the two groups to work together is the State Department’s web site on conflict resolution and the current crisis. As far as we know, this is the first time a United States government agency has had a site of this sort. That’s the good news. The bad news is that it only lists about a third of the major NGOs in the field, among those missing are Search for Common Ground and the Foundation for Global Community.

The notion that conflict resolution practitioners and national security policy makers can work together is not a pipe dream. Recent initiatives have proven otherwise; in a just completed three day workshop organized by the United States
Institute of Peace, senior conflict resolution professionals and policy makers considered how they could work together or at least complement each other’s work in a wide variety of foreign policy issues. That workshop was designed to be the first step toward creating an ongoing dialogue between the two communities and maximize the synergies that might flow from it.

In conclusion, we reach the same conclusion about terrorism that Thomas Homer-Dixon (2000) about a range of social, economic and environmental issues. He spoke of an “ingenuity gap” in which there is no shortage of information available to scholars or policy makers. If we have a shortage of anything, it is new and creative ideas. From what we have seen in writing this chapter and this book as a whole, we are in desperate need of new ideas for dealing with terrorism. And, if we are right, that “gap” can only be closed by people with very different perspectives coming together and generating new strategies and approaches to what could well prove to be the most dangerous form of conflict during the first years of the twenty first century.
Sources


A Broad Strategy for Defusing the War on Terrorism

R. Scott Moore

Introduction

Since the terrorist attacks in September 2001, the United States has waged an intense military campaign in Afghanistan, sent troops to combat Islamic guerrillas in the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere, stepped up its political and economic pressure on Saddam Hussein, and sought to enlist worldwide support for its ongoing military, diplomatic and economic offensive against the Al Qaeda network in particular and global terrorism in general. Yet, although these actions apparently succeeded in suppressing the operations of Osama Bin Laden and his followers, the global threat of terrorism appears undiminished. Billions of dollars flow into new security measures to protect American citizens, while continuous warnings of potential attacks numb our reflexes. Political debate swirls around new plans for homeland security and calls for preemptive military strikes against state sponsors of terrorism, most notably Iraq. Policy makers continue to warn of the dangers posed by terrorists, calling for open-ended warfare. In recent testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz underscored the threat and the drastic means needed to combat terrorism when he flatly stated, "it has spread throughout the world and it needs to be eliminated, root and branch" (Kilian, 2002). Worldwide terrorist violence threatens to escalate into a full-scale war in regions ranging from the Middle East to South Asia to the Southwest Pacific. The turmoil associated with terrorism paints a frightening picture of the foreseeable future.

Despite global military operations, security enhancements and law enforcement, the United States and its allies may be no closer to eradicating terrorism than they were on September 11, 2001. This is not to infer that the actions taken to date have not seriously degraded the ability of Al Qaeda to operate freely. Quite the contrary, the terrorist network is on the run, only capable of disjointed and largely ineffective responses. Recent videotapes and radio pronouncements raise questions about the durability of Bin Laden and his command structure. Notwithstanding his apparent defeat, however, Bin Laden’s message of defiance remains a powerful force, especially in the Islamic world. Cells and individuals purported to be aligned with Al Qaeda continue to operate in as many as 60 countries worldwide, including the United States, as the most recent arrest of suspected terrorist Jose Padilla indicates. Intelligence sources report a growing association between Al Qaeda and Palestinian terrorist groups, particularly Hamas and Hizballah. Islamic terrorist attacks have occurred in
Tunisia and the Gulf. Noted Muslim author Salman Rushdie (2002) points to recent polls in the Muslim world in which a majority denied any Islamic responsibility for the terrorist attacks on the United States, a disturbing result indicative of a wider distrust, sometimes bordering on hatred, of the United States. In Israel, Palestinian suicide bombing has become almost commonplace. Together, these indicators paint a picture of global Islamic terrorism that, while perhaps momentarily suppressed, lurks in the shadows ready to strike again.

While the United States has committed itself to ending the threat of terrorism, its strategy relies almost exclusively on the application of force, largely ignoring deeper causal issues. Unfortunately, even if power succeeds in suppressing terrorism, it probably cannot eradicate it nor prevent its recurrence in the future. Despite the destruction of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the apparent disorder engulfing Al Qaeda, the efforts of the United States and its allies address the symptoms rather than the causes of terrorism. As one recent report succinctly puts it, "U.S. 'drive-by' attacks using cruise missiles or bombing raids have demonstrated the long reach of U.S. military might, but not a U.S. willingness to truly engage over the long haul with the causes of conflicts" (Smith, 2001, p. 71). American policies continue to avoid the roots of terrorism, fearing that to deal with them implies legitimization. Official statements from the U.S. State Department (2001) proclaiming that "we must cripple the ability of terrorists to operate, but not make false causal relationships" and those of senior officials ringing with such terms as "axis of evil" betray this narrow focus. The United States, mesmerized by the violent horrors of terrorism, hopes that sheer force might crush the current and future threat it poses.

Yet, terrorism, by its very nature, involves a complex interaction of psychological, social, systemic and global factors demanding a much more far-reaching, multi-disciplinary strategy if it is to be overcome. Islamic extremism seeks to overturn a world viewed, justifiably or not, as threatening to its very existence. At its most basic level, terrorism rebels against prevailing conditions; as such it more closely resembles an insurgency or guerrilla movement than its more common characterization as criminal behavior. As with counterinsurgency, any plan for its elimination and prevention can not just strike at the physical structure of terrorist organizations. A coherent strategy that seeks to neutralize the driving forces behind current and future terrorism must also address the cultural, religious, ethnic and historical sources fueling the violent rage of Bin Laden and his followers. Such a strategy does not lend legitimacy to terrorism, nor does it somehow smack of appeasement to terrorist demands. Rather, it separates the terrorists from their raison d'être by addressing not only the symptoms of the conflict, but also the conditions and causes that perpetuate its violence. Such an approach is not an idealistic or a misguided attempt to justify terrorism. To the contrary, a strategy based on understanding the factors that feed terrorist rage offers a pragmatic approach to developing long-term solutions to the violence facing the world today and in the future.

A broad strategy for resolving the war on terrorism must first identify the factors motivating Al Qaeda and its followers, determine the necessary actions to defuse them and then develop a plan for ending the current violence and ensuring it will not create again the kind of catastrophes seen on September 11, 2001. The strategy must also admit to some sobering realities. Terrorism may never be completely eliminated,
however thoroughly its root causes are addressed or its perpetrators neutralized. By its very nature, terrorism constitutes an intractable conflict, one that eschews either simple solutions or wholly satisfactory resolution. Indeed, terrorism, especially that practiced by Al Qaeda, is both multi-faceted and multi-level, with causes and solutions being at once distinctly local and global in nature, intertwined and often of such complexity as to defy resolution. Any strategy dealing with terrorism, therefore, must be equally complex and even then, may only reach portions of the problem. Perhaps the best outcome to be expected of any such strategy, to borrow from noted strategist Harlan Ullman (2002), may be one of defusing terrorism, which means that not only must the strategy defeat today's terrorists, but also marginalize their successors. This essay seeks to find ways to achieve that by examining the war and finding alternatives to manage and perhaps resolve it while offering a broader framework for preventing terrorism from regaining a dominant role in conflicts of the future. Additionally, it hopes to get at the complexity of terrorism, unravel its violent core and develop approaches for addressing the critical components. Yet, it carries no illusions, fully realizing that any strategy, however comprehensive, may never wholly succeed in ever completely ending the violence. A conflict as complex as terrorism precludes such simplistic results.

**Conceptual Framework**

Determining the causes and solutions to the current war on terrorism requires an approach blending both the theory and practice of conflict analysis and resolution. The basic conceptual framework for this essay draws from Sandole's discussion of a previous chapter, whose three-pillar model of conflict analysis and resolution offers a structured way of examining conflicts and finding solutions to them. Each pillar represents a set of interrelated factors that define the characteristics of the conflict, the underlying causes that incite it and, finally, those actions essential to resolving it (see Figure 1 below). Pillar 1 defines the symptoms and manifestations of the conflict, describing the conflict, the actors and the actions. Pillar 2 focuses on the underlying causes of terrorism, combining theories of political realism, utopianism, conflict resolution, sociology and psychology to understand the conditions and causes fueling terrorism. Finally, Pillar 3 provides an approach to building a strategy based on the explanation and understanding offered by the first two pillars. In doing so, it uses an

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Figure (1)
integrated multi-tiered approach to find ways to stop the violence (conflict management and settlement) and then turn to resolving and preventing its recurrence in the future. Modifying Sandole’s model to better envisage the war on terrorism, Pillar, 3 has been renamed *Response Strategy*. This term is felt to reflect more accurately the intent of this paper, which centers on developing a comprehensive response strategy for the United States, a belligerent rather than an intervening third party in the conflict. In applying this framework, attention will be placed on the central aspects of the conflict—those deemed critical to its causes and its resolution. For that reason, not all will be considered. Rather, this chapter attempts to find paths through the complexity of the conflict to get at the essentials.

A word about the phrase ‘war on terrorism’ may be required, for it is rife with misinterpretations. Although a rallying cry for the American public and, to a lesser degree, allies of the United States, to think of the current conflict as a war, with all the attendant reliance on power and victory, especially military, restricts options to those that coerce, defeat or otherwise neutralize terrorists. For Americans, the term also comes laced with vengeance, which, although perhaps emotionally satisfying, hardly provides a useful foundation for strategic analysis. On a more pragmatic level, the concept of war also focuses resources on offensive and defensive means rather than the long-term outcomes (other than destruction of the enemy). One needs only look at billions of dollars already spent, as well as the treasure yet to be committed, to military operations overseas and security within the borders of the United States. While these measures may well increase the short-term security of Americans, little evidence indicates they may substantially reduce the latent threat of terrorism. Nonetheless, the term ‘war’, if applied in a Clausewitzian sense, also provides a useful way of looking at any strategy. For war demands an integrated political, economic and social policy and strategy to defeat an enemy and create a more lasting, peaceful settlement at its conclusion, one that rectifies the causes and conditions of the conflict. For this chapter, therefore, the ‘war on terrorism’ assumes a much more broadly defined, eclectic mantle, not so much to be fought with military, economic and political power, but to be resolved so that it may never have to be faced again. To think of the war on terrorism in lesser terms merely perpetuates violence.

**Pillar 1- Characteristics of the War on Terrorism**

The characteristics of the current war on terrorism are multi-dimensional and complex. To discuss them all would be a study unto itself and thus beyond the scope of this essay. However, as with all violent conflicts, certain constants frame how a conflict evolves and how it may be understood. Drawing from and somewhat modifying Sandole (1999) and Wehr (1979), this section maps the context of both the actions of Al Qaeda and the responses by the United States and its allies through the lenses of six characteristics: geography, parties, objectives and means, issues and temperament. The geography of the current conflict encompasses the geographical and political boundaries within which the war is waged. The parties comprise those key individuals, groups, states and organizations involved in the conflict. Interrelated, objectives and means comprise the goals and the tools, violent or otherwise, used to accomplish them. Finally the temperament of the parties defines their psychological and social
predisposition to the conflict and its solutions, if any. These characteristics explain the where, who, what and how of the conflict; to use military parlance, they provide the situational awareness so necessary to analyze the war on terrorism and find a strategy to defuse it.

If global in scale, the war on terrorism's primary theater of operations encompasses what Ullman (2002, p. 175) calls "the crescent of crisis." Circumscribed by a region rising in the eastern Mediterranean, beginning with Egypt, Israel and Palestine, arching through Syria and Iraq to encompass the Arabian Peninsula, of which Saudi Arabia forms the powerful core of the Gulf States, moving east to Iran and culminating on the India-Pakistan border, the crescent takes in most of the violence of the war. Inside the crescent bubble the bloody Palestinian-Israeli conflict, past and maybe future wars in Iraq and Iran, instability in the Gulf States, potential nuclear disaster over Kashmir and religious intolerance personified, but not exclusive to, Islamic extremism. Inserted into this cauldron, American and allied military forces chase an elusive Al Qaeda prey.

Within the region, several parts stand out as particularly important. Most obvious, Israel and its surroundings, especially the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza, foment daily violence as well as a seemingly never-ending cycle of hatred exploited by Islamic terrorists ranging from Hamas and Hizballah to the still dangerous worldwide Al Qaeda network. To the east, Iraq continues to draw American ire while posing—if allegations of possession of weapons of mass destruction prove valid—a significant regional and perhaps international threat. Oil-rich Saudi Arabia forms the bulwark of American security hopes in the Persian Gulf, as well as being the keeper of the Islamic Holy Places and, as a result, the home to Islamic spiritual, political and economic aspirations. Iran, still hoping to lead the Islamic world, remains a potential source of conflict, either overtly as a regional power or covertly as a haven for terrorism. Its continuing support for Hizballah as well as the powerful influence of fundamentalist clerics raises serious questions concerning its current role as a state-sponsor of terrorism. At the far end of the crescent, Pakistan remains a wildcard. Convenient ally of the United States, it also harbors militant Islamic extremists, occasionally loosing them on India from the rugged mountains that hide remnants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Each and all of these areas serve as breeding grounds for terrorist rage and violence. Together they present an almost overwhelming challenge to the United States.

The central importance of the region to the current war means any terrorist violence elsewhere on the globe, even if aimed at the United States, must be considered peripheral spillover. So, too, are American attempts to get at terrorism outside the perimeter of the crescent. Deployment of troops to assist Philippine military units chasing the so-called violent bandits, amounts to little more than a sideshow,
perhaps important as a political demonstration of global solidarity but of little real value in addressing the nature and causes of terrorism. The same can be said of security measures taken by NATO, increased alertness on the part of security forces inside the United States and freezes on international financial institutions suspected of bankrolling terrorists. While these measures are part of a warfighting strategy aimed at managing the conflict, their location outside the primary zone of conflict makes them secondary efforts. The geography of the war on terrorism remains firmly rooted in the 'crescent of crisis', a region where any lasting solutions must be sought.

The parties to the conflict pit a coalition of states against a nebulous but deadly transnational terrorist organization. On one side stand the United States and its global allies, including moderate Arab regimes led by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, a newly installed Afghan government, as well as such far-flung associates as NATO, Indonesia, Singapore, Tajikistan and a host of other international partners. Indeed, it would seem that the United States has fashioned a powerful global coalition. But to picture this coalition as anything but a tentatively connected, sometimes squabbling collection of self-interested states would be to overstate its significance. Within the crescent, fears of instability coupled with anger over perceived American blindness to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to create an environment in which cooperation depends on temporary convenience and momentary demands. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Egypt confronted with internal turmoil, much of it exploited by Al Qaeda, choose to keep the war in someone else's territory, notably Afghanistan and Palestine. The Saudis, in particular, walk a potentially deadly tightrope between religious moderation and the kingdom's tense friendship with the United States and an ever present Islamic fundamentalism originating in the Holy Places. A misstep could result in internal chaos. The festering Palestinian question all but eliminates close cooperation between the Arab countries and the United States. America's most public success, the creation of a friendly Afghan government, could rapidly crumble in the internal chaos of tribal politics. The crescent forms, at best, a factional group of competing and potentially tottering states. In other parts of the world, anger over perceived American unilateral policy-making and military posturing makes President Bush's coalition more form than substance. From United Nations displeasure with American attitudes towards peacekeeping and the newly created International Criminal Court, to European displeasure with being left out of decision-making and concern over the United States aggressive stance against Iraq, to a general unease at the idea of preemptive strikes by American air and naval forces, the coalition gets by with a precarious pasted together united front, behind which are barely hidden cracks.

Facing this intimidating, if disjointed, international posse lurks Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda terrorist network, more a loose, violent corporate venture than a cohesive organization. Despite portrayals of Al Qaeda placing it on a par with states in the international system, the structure and operations of the network tend to be highly decentralized, exploiting regional conflicts in the greater cause of a violent, extremist Islamic ideal. Al Qaeda actually consists of three interwoven but separate tiers. At the top sits Osama Bin Laden and his key deputies as well as a cadre of well-trained, dedicated fighters who carefully plan and carry out attacks on a global scale (the nineteen terrorists who attacked the United States on September 11th fall in the latter group). The second tier consists of thousands of trained fighters, most of whom passed
through the camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s, tutored by the legendary heroes of the anti-Soviet war of the previous decade (Elliott, 2001). Many of these terrorists and guerrilla fighters returned to their homelands, ranging from Indonesia to Bosnia and including the United States and Western Europe, to conduct opportunistic attacks or engage in ongoing civil wars or resistance movements. Chechnya and Algeria provide graphic examples of their efficacy. While money and support from Al Qaeda may flow to these fighters, they only indirectly respond to Bin Laden's orders, usually in the form of a religious *fatwa* exhorting them to violence. While certainly terrorist groups in the Al Qaeda network, they resemble loosely affiliated independent branch offices, receiving periodic help but fashioning their operations to local conditions and requirements. Finally, Al Qaeda motivates and occasionally supports a host of third-tier freelancers, local revolutionaries and restless, socially displaced young men, who, collectively, create a good deal of chaos and unrest. Many operate with little or no guidance from Bin Laden, beyond a vague nod or some indirect financing. However, their sometimes amateurish acts (such as that of the airline shoe bomber), enhance the sense of global confrontation (Bodansky, 2001).

Although directly engaged in the struggle with Al Qaeda, the Israelis and the Palestinians continue to crucially influence its course and outcome. Palestinian suicide bombers and Israeli tanks create a bloody backdrop to turmoil in the crescent, providing daily reminders of the complexity of conflict. The violence quickly assumes central importance to the United States as it tries to rally Arab support for operations in Afghanistan or Iraq. Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands also sits at the hub of Bin Laden's anti-Western, Islamic extremist rhetoric, attracting and retaining a large corps of dedicated terrorists and fighters. Bloodshed in the West Bank resonates throughout the crescent, both in the American led coalition and Al Qaeda terrorist network. The most recent attack on the El Al airlines counter in Los Angeles offers a stark example of its impact.

Aside from the primary belligerents, two other parties to the war on terrorism require consideration. Iraq looms as a key player, as much because American diplomacy vehemently singles out Saddam Hussein as for his past or potential transgressions. Although suspected of encouraging and actively supporting global terrorism, as well as being a potential source of weapons of mass destruction, Iraq, nonetheless, has yet to be a major party in the conflict. American attempts to enlist support from the Middle East states and much of Europe for a military campaign to oust the Iraqi dictator, have been largely unsuccessful to date, mainly because proof of Saddam's complicity seems lacking and the potential for regional instability in the event of such a campaign overshadows the perceived benefits. Pakistan, billed as a staunch American ally and a new bulwark against terrorism, ranks only slightly behind the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan for its support of Islamic extremism. Despite highly publicized crackdowns on Islamic fundamentalists and terrorist groups, especially following the murder of American reporter Daniel Pearl, the presence of radical extremists, even in the mountain regions, remains strong. Once and perhaps covertly still, supported by Pakistani intelligence agents, these extremists nearly brought the world to its first nuclear exchange. They remain dangerous and unknown quantities in the war against Al Qaeda.
The objectives of the many actors tend to be as complicated and competing as the line-up of belligerents. Repeated by President Bush and his key advisors, American objectives focus on preventing further attacks against the United States and its allies while destroying global terrorism – which means either killing or capturing Osama Bin Laden and his followers. These primarily warfighting objectives rely on the physical eradication of the terrorists as well as the elimination of the widespread financial and political infrastructure created by Bin Laden. Military strikes in Afghanistan and the pressure on Al Qaeda operatives worldwide, coupled with extensive security measure to protect the homeland, offer the most visible means. The no-compromise strategy relies on application of power by the United States or any other state willing to declare war on terrorism. The open support for Israeli counter-terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza reflects this single-minded approach. Indeed, condemnation of Israeli actions might equally discredit similar American responses and attacks in other parts of the world, including the recently stated possibility of preemptive strikes. Internal repression by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan adds to the pressure on Al Qaeda. Inside the United States, debates over homeland security and rapid expansion of law enforcement powers mirror the reliance on force to deter and defeat terrorists. Victory, not resolution or reconciliation drives America's strategy, whose objectives seek a negative peace in which terrorism is destroyed.

For the Muslim states in the crescent, the objectives prove far more complicated and difficult to achieve. Faced with growing challenges to internal stability, greatly exacerbated by Bin Laden's appeal as an Islamic revolutionary, many of the states find themselves torn between modernization and cultural tradition. Unlike the United States and much of Europe, these states must tread carefully, because aggressive actions against Islamic terrorist organizations could easily escalate to civil strife. Saudi Arabia, the keeper of the Muslim holy places as well as home to numerous budding Islamic fundamentalists, also serves as a base for thousands of American troops. Trying to balance a volatile mix of religious extremism and ethnic diversity and confront a Hindu neighbor with whom it periodically faces potentially catastrophic war, Pakistan may be the most unstable of the coalition states fighting Al Qaeda. At the same time, Pakistan is critical to current American strategy. If these states' goals seem more inward and their means proscribed to carefully balance competing influences, their actions are dictated by these unique conditions and, although frustrating to many Americans, must remain tentative.

Al Qaeda's loose confederation seeks, like the United States, to defeat its enemy, defined as the secular West and its influences. However, that aim contains a somewhat hazy connotation often lost in Bin Laden's grandiose pronouncements. One doubts that Al Qaeda, based on its operations, sees the total destruction of the United States as a viable goal. Rather, the more plausible objective seems to be weakening America to the point that it no longer encroaches on the Muslim world. Within the crescent, however, Al Qaeda demands radical change. But unlike political revolutionaries who look to the future, Islamic extremism looks for a return to a bygone era of religious purity in which corruption and secularism, symbolized by the West and the Arabic regimes it supports, are eradicated (Hoffman, 1993). Such change necessarily includes the destruction of Israel, which is a symbol of Western political and religious imperialism and an affront to Islam. Al Qaeda thus calls for a revolution of
absolutism demanding bloody violence in the name of religion. This imperative commands elimination of American presence in the crescent, as well as strikes at the American heartland to hasten the process, leaving Israel and the corrupt Muslim regimes of the region to their violent fate. A concerted terrorist campaign of bloody attacks and uncertain threats aims to stagger Americans, weaken their resolve, force them to overreact and thus reinforce Islamic extremism and, in the end, unite Islam in a common struggle. It is a revolutionary strategy borrowed from the history of anti-colonial movements of the past century rather than any radical new approaches to warfare (see, for example, Fanon 1963).

Given these stark and apparently intractable objectives, the current war tends to incite highly emotional language invoking categorizations of "good" and "evil" (terms used by all sides). As subjective as these terms may be, the vocabulary of the conflict reflects deep-seated structural and ideological issues. While the United States, Israel, Europe and many of the crescent states profess a concern for territorial integrity, control of vital resources, political stability and power relationships- all precepts of political realism and certainly vital elements of the conflict- the struggle goes much deeper. At its heart glares contending worldviews of the very nature of the global structure in its ethical, moral, social and cultural dimensions symbolized by the concept of globalization. A secular, democratically and commercially interwoven vision of international relations confronts head-on spiritual and insular prophecy of global social morality. For those believing in the inclusive benefits of the post-industrial era, modernization and globalization provide an economic and socially integrating solution to many of the chronic ills of lesser developed areas, including poverty, human rights abuses, disease and corruption. The United States, the theory's leading proponent, espouses globalization and modernization with missionary-like zeal, sometimes bordering on condescending intolerance of those who fail to recognize the inherent values of its democratic ideals and capitalistic advances. If American enthusiasm sometimes tramples local and regional cultures, the damage is viewed as an unfortunate but necessary by-product of progress. The vision is one of unlimited capitalist potential (Barber, 1995).

For Al Qaeda and Islamic extremism, a world vision of moral righteousness promises to restore the cultural and social values of a past era torn asunder by the corruption of the West. This is the overriding message of Bin Laden. It looks at the moral corruption of the West and its insidious impact on the Arab world, especially its imperialistic encroachments, best symbolized by Israel and sees in modernization a loss of traditional Islamic culture. Only through violent struggle can Islam return to its so-called 'golden era' of the 7th Century C.E, in which Muslim culture prospered. Salman Rushdie (2002) argues that the conflict, despite protestations by Americans to the contrary, strikes at the very core of Muslim identity. It is all about Islam. The fundamental issue has become, at least in Bin Laden and his follower's eyes, one of religious and cultural identity. A vision not subject to interpretation and diametrically opposed to modernization. Bin Laden's diatribes against infidels in the Muslim Holy Lands, his repeated proclamations for Jihad (including attacks on American mothers and children) and efforts to destabilize many of the current Arab regimes can thus be seen as logical outgrowths of Al Qaeda's vision of the world. As Juergensmeyer (2000, p. 228) powerfully puts it, Islamic terrorism attempts to establish the "legitimacy of
religious worldviews with the currency of violence." The clash is not one of civilizations; rather, it is one of existential worldviews.

With such strongly divergent issues as globalization and religious extremism, little wonder the combatants display an unwillingness to resort to anything but force and violence. Islamic terrorists exhibit a sense of rage at both the conditions they wish to change and the nature of their enemy. Beyond the bombnings, killings and random attacks on civilian targets historically associated with terrorism, they have transformed their rage into an apocalyptic urge for larger and more shocking catastrophes (such as September 11th or the use of suicide bombers) which could turn to the use of weapons of mass destruction. Recordings by Bin Laden and his lieutenants leave little doubt of his temperament. Much the same can be said for the United States. Filled with grief over the casualties of September 11th, Americans look for retribution, offering few apologies or explanations for their bellicosity, even when it results in innocent casualties. For them, the war on terrorism has also assumed absolute proportions pursued with high technology weapons and wholesale deployment of military forces. The escalatory cycle of bloody violence allows for little conciliation; brute force seems the only bargaining tool. For these protagonists, violence has become as much an end as a means.

Despite the global scale of violence, those who find themselves in the middle of the fight exhibit a less belligerent outlook. Within the crescent, as much to preserve internal stability and to allow the Americans to vent their anger as for any altruistic motives, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, as well as Pakistan, show mixed emotions. They seem willing to crack down on terrorism only to the extent that such measures do not threaten the precarious social truce inside their own borders. In addition, their long-standing anger over the American support for Israel not unexpectedly draws anger and limits full cooperation. Elsewhere in the world, American propensity for unilateral action creates schisms and frustration. While NATO and many others publicly declare solidarity and decry terrorist violence, their eagerness for military solutions remains, at best, lukewarm. If the United States and Al Qaeda are locked in what they each perceive to be a death struggle, global responses vary with the directness of the threat and specific moods.

The characteristics of the war on terrorism can best be summed up as global in impact, but regional in scope, with the broad area from Israel to Pakistan being the primary scene of combat. Within that swath, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the internal stability of the Islamic states greatly affect the paths taken by both Bin Laden and President Bush. Nevertheless, the United States and Al Qaeda dominate the war; their actions and reactions largely determining its course and intensity. To date, the conflict has proven to be intractable, the two existential global visions brokering little compromise. Bloody violence in the form of suicidal terrorism followed by retaliatory applications of military force characterizes it. This cycle of violence shows little sign of abating until one side or the other is destroyed or becomes exhausted. To many belligerents, the conflict process has become self-perpetuating, assuming a life of its own and overwhelming the original objectives and issues, which often seem to be lost in the emotional violence.
Identifying the underlying causes of terrorism can be both frustrating and academically contentious. Arguments abound as to which combination of factors leads to terrorism, yet none adequately offers full understanding of the roots of brutal violence. Noted terrorism expert Walter Laqueur (2001) argues that most theories of causation lack empirical foundations. The best that can be claimed may be that under particular situations and given specific conditions, some variables may lead to terrorist behavior. In truth, no general set of factors consistently correlates with the occurrence of terrorism. If some terrorists come from downtrodden segments of societies, others, including Bin Laden, grow up in highly educated and privileged socio-economic classes. If some oppressed societies or groups fail to respond to their circumstances, others, with little provocation, turn to terrorism. Yet, terrorism does not just happen. As previously discussed, terrorism represents a violent demand for revolutionary social change. It thus originates and grows, like most violent conflicts, in the minds of the belligerents. Debates over the level of violence or the validity of claims ignore this fundamental point, for terrorism depends for its sustenance as much on perception as reality. Failure to understand the perceived causes, whatever their factual merits, dooms any strategy for defusing terrorism to one of reaction and escalating violence.

Perhaps the greatest single explanation and, paradoxically, fallacy associated with Islamic extremist terrorism revolves around the precept that, by nature, terrorists are predisposed to violence. American leaders assume terrorist actions mark symptoms of inherent instability, perhaps even mental illness (else, goes the reasoning, why would anyone commit suicide to kill innocent people?). In an essay on Arab terrorism, anthropologist Lionel Tiger (2001) attributes much of the motivation behind terrorism to the inherent aggressiveness and restlessness of the predominantly young men who conduct such attacks. Psychologist Jerrold Post, whose analysis of terrorism led him to coin the term ‘terrorist psycho-logic’, identified sociopathic and narcissistic personality disorders as keys to terrorist acts, with violence being the inevitable response (Hudson 1999). In addition, frustration over inability to meet basic human needs, especially security and identity, aggravates these violent predilections. Indeed, if one looks beneath the rhetoric of Islamic extremism, clear reflections of Burton (1990) can be found. These missing human needs get translated into violence by terrorists who find themselves unable to fulfill them within existing social and political structures. For Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda fighters, frustration finds solace in religious extremism, especially the radical interpretations of Islam contained in Wahhabism. Religious beliefs assume a psychological imperative exacerbated by inherent predilections for violence and triggered by the specific conditions confronting the crescent.

Extremism adds a fatalistic and apocalyptic dimension transforming terrorist acts into cataclysmic violence. Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian cleric whose teachings shape much of Islamic extremism, preached a form of Islam that demands its internalization. Islam cannot be practiced, it must be lived; its virtue stems from its totality, both in spirit and in action (D’Souza, 2002). The nineteen hijackers cannot simply be dismissed as evil or psychologically unbalanced. To them, death while striking at their enemies...
constituted a sacred honor and thus a highly rational act. Americans who see suicide bombings as irrational fanaticism miss this essential point. The Arabic term *istishad* denotes giving one's life for Allah; a far cry from both irrationality and suicide (Hudson, 1999). Such sacrifice stems from choice, but choice stemming from such fundamental beliefs as to be part of the psychological framework of individuals and, to a large extent, the society in which they live. While the nature of Islamic terrorism may be incomprehensible to Western analysts, in no way can it be considered irrational. Indeed, it reflects what may be considered a pragmatic and practical response to perceived onslaughts on the very identities of the terrorists; it is political realism taken to bloody finality. One Islamic terrorist chillingly proclaimed, "*Jihad* is not about fighting against oppression and occupation. *Jihad* is about the way you think and say prayers, the way you eat and sleep. It’s about the struggle of life" (Wright, 2000).

Yet, terrorism does not derive solely or even primarily, from psychological predisposition. It draws equal sustenance and motivation from environmental conditions and external triggers. Decades of internal and external oppression, social and economic disappointment, neo-colonial exploitation of their lands and political corruption have left deep wounds. In final instructions to his September 11th fellow hijackers, Muhammad Atta underscored the external grievances, real and perceived, that motivate the Islamic radicals. References to global persecution, religious righteousness (including analogies to fighting alongside the Prophet in the 7th Century) and appeals to military ardor fill the text. The letter is also noteworthy for its anger at the external forces motivating the actions of the terrorists. The combination of deep-rooted rage and emotional exhortation is frighteningly clear (Paz, 2001). A few months after the attack, a Palestinian psychiatrist, reinforcing the critical importance of external conditions and the psychological imperatives they create, wrote:

> What propels people into such action is a long history of humiliation and a desire for revenge that every Arab harbors. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the resultant uprooting of Palestinians, a deep-seated feeling of shame has taken root in the Arab psyche. Shame is the most painful emotion in the Arab culture, producing the feeling that one is unworthy to live. The honorable Arab is the one who refuses to suffer shame and dies in dignity. (Sarraj, 2002)

If the surroundings provide the fuel, the Israelis and their perceived masters, the United States, often ignite the fire. The fifty-year conflict, however much we might seek to decouple it from the current war, always looms in the background, perception and reality disfigured into tragic myth by both sides. In fact, it matters little, in practical terms, whether or not the Palestinians or Jews arrived in the area first, nor do equally valid claims to sovereignty and freedom. For, in the context of the other conditions, perception, laced with rage and reaction, becomes reality. Palestinians live in squalor in occupied lands, confronting American built Israeli armored vehicles and aircraft and are incited by perceived and real injustices at the hands of their enemies. Suicide bombers offer an heroic outlet. Israelis, the Holocaust always a recent memory, refuse to grant any quarter in response. Attempts by the United States to isolate the conflict from the
wider war on terrorism are fruitless; for Islamic extremists, decades of deprivation, anger and hopelessness preclude such niceties.

Although endemic conditions and American and Israeli transgressions greatly contribute to the causes of terrorism, the internal political leadership of the Muslim states also adds to the violence. Corruption, neglect, repression and human rights violations committed by Islamic regimes on their own people, as well as their failure to turn potential wealth into real progress, multiplies feelings of hopelessness and, correspondingly, the pool of potential terrorist recruits. A recent study by the United Nations paints a picture of social and economic despondency in the crescent. With nearly 38% under the age of fourteen, nearly one in five of the populations earn less than $2 a day. Economic growth has stagnated, while unemployment threatens to exceed 15%, despite the obvious vast wealth of the ruling families in the Gulf States. Political systems based on centralization, paternalistic leaders unwilling to give up any powers, corruption and repression all contribute to the inability of much of the crescent to keep pace with the rest of the world (Economist, 2002). With few outlets for reform, little chance for progress and offered spiritual, if not worldly, emancipation, little wonder many of the disenchanted turn to terrorism. For many, the Islamic extremist groups seem to be the only avenue for challenging the status quo.

Into this cauldron of extreme Islamic beliefs, loss of identity and security, the Palestinian struggle, political ineptitude and social stagnation unwittingly struts the United States, callously producing the final outrage. Its faith in secularism, modernization and liberalism strikes at the very heart of the social fabric of the crescent, for all the reasons previously discussed. Rather than offering an alternative to the social and political conditions of the region, American ideals, to use Gurr’s (1970) theory of relative deprivation, merely highlight the huge social and economic disparity afflicting the region. But the solution of religious fundamentalists is to turn inward. Rejecting what they perceive to be the decadence of the West, Islamic extremists long for a return to the past, when the Muslim world exceeded all other civilizations in commercial, scientific and social development. Globalization, as practiced by the United States and the West, rather than offering an alternative path, merely succeeds in demonstrating its wickedness and confirming the extremists in their chosen course.

Unfortunately, by relying on its overwhelming power to coerce international stability, the United States, with a surety bordering on arrogance, too often appears oblivious to the effects of its actions. Since the end of the Cold War, American military interventions have trampled local and regional sensitivities, however altruistic the motives. The relationship between an increasingly activist foreign policy and anti-American terrorism cannot be denied (Eland, 1998). For radical Muslims, military operations in the Persian Gulf beginning in 1988 and continuing today, Somalia in 1993, Iraq since the Gulf War and the Balkans only after Muslims were massacred by Christian Serbs point to a concerted war against Islam. In the holy lands of the Arabian Peninsula, thousands of American troops occupy bases. The American led assault in Afghanistan after September 11th, followed by months of low-level combat operations that seem to kill Afghani civilians as often as fleeing Al Qaeda fighters, confirmed for many Muslims the dire threat posed by the United States.

None of the preceding discussion implies that the United States somehow should be blamed for the brutal events of September 11th or for Islamic extremist terrorism as a
whole. The causes and conditions are far too complex for such simplistic reasoning. Indeed, in terms of both internationally recognized and accepted legal and human rights standards, terrorism has no excuses. Many moderate Muslim clerics denounce Bin Laden's campaign of terrorism; shortly after the attacks on the World Trade Center, several issued religious decrees condemning the violence. Amnesty International recently condemned Palestinian suicide attacks as crimes against humanity. If not always agreeing with American policies or methods, few nations think the United States somehow deserved to be attacked. But a disturbing fact remains; a significant and some might argue growing, segment of the Muslim world empathizes with the rage underpinning Al Qaeda. To label its perceptions as unfounded or, worse, to ignore them as the products of religious illogic, misses the essential causes and context of the current war on terrorism. Like most conflicts, this one finds its basis as much in perceptions and interpretations of reality as on the events themselves. If thousands of terrorists, not to mention millions of potential sympathizers, believe religious extremism might solve the social, political and economic problems that afflict their lives, if they attribute, rightly or not, their inability to meet basic needs of security and identity to the United States and the regimes it supports and if they act on the premise that death and violence are preferable to the current conditions they face, the causes of that ideology must be understood to adequately address terrorism, for this becomes far more than a military campaign to eradicate a few isolated gunmen.

Pillar 3- A Strategy for the War on Terrorism

Based on the foregoing analysis, any proposed strategy for defusing terrorism must begin with the following precepts. First, no strategy will fully resolve the current conflict or prevent a future one. Terrorism is simply too complex and, in many cases, too intractable for wholly satisfactory solutions. This does not imply that an integrated strategy should not be attempted. Quite the contrary, as the next few pages will attempt to show, defusing the war demands more than the application of force. Second, while Islamic terrorism may be global in nature, its foundation and thus any strategy to address it, remains anchored in the crescent. Any strategy must focus there. Third, the conflict remains essentially a religious one, despite protestations to the contrary. Islam cannot be ignored or wished away. An approach must be found to integrate Western secularism with Muslim theology. Fourth, the strategy must discard the notion that addressing the underlying causes equates to legitimizing terrorism. Terrorism can remain unacceptable without marginalizing the reasons for its bloody excesses. Finally, strategy remains the art of the possible, not the idealistic. Thus, any solutions must be feasible and practical. Neither idealistic notion of global harmony nor realist models of total victory meet these two criteria, for neither will ever be fully achieved. However, both the effects of terrorist acts and their underlying causes can be reduced to a point where terrorism no longer poses a threat. The goal of a successful strategy for the war on terrorism thus becomes one of defusing the volatile mix of violence and perceptions currently making any type of solution, short of defeat of one side or the other, difficult if not impossible.

The first step in building a strategy to defuse terrorism must be to re-shape the objectives of the war. Rather than solely seeking to destroy or defeat Al Qaeda, three
interrelated, sequential aims offer a more practical and potentially successful approach. The first centers on continuing to suppress and neutralize terrorism itself. If any lasting results are to be achieved, the violence must be significantly reduced, primarily through the execution of the tools of political realism—diplomatic, economic, political and military power. Once violence has been reduced and concurrent with the efforts to do so, the next objective revolves around isolating Al Qaeda, both physically and, more important, morally. Like all revolutionary movements, terrorists depend on popular support for their physical and moral survival. Without the backing of those they seek to liberate, not only does logistical and political support dry up, but their very purpose becomes a moot point. Terrorist attacks may continue and some may be catastrophic attempts to regain notoriety, but if the terrorist group has been isolated, those acts will be counterproductive. Abu Sayef in the Philippines faces this fate; over the years, popular support for their Islamic cause has all but disappeared, relegating them to little more than well-armed banditry. Al Qaeda, if isolated from its Islamic constituency, becomes a nuisance rather than a real threat to either the United States or the crescent. Finally, to ensure Bin Laden remains isolated and to set the stage for more lasting resolution efforts, the gap between worldviews must be reduced. Globalization and Islam need not, nor should they be, diametrically opposed. This last goal seeks to find their commonalities and exploit them so as to limit the bipolarity of the conflict. Together, these three objectives can transform the conflict from one of bloody confrontation with little hope of compromise to one in which violence ceases to be a primary means and, while area of contention will always remain, the war on terrorism can be defused.

The first objective, suppressing and neutralizing the violence of terrorism, has been the predominant goal of the United States since September 11th. Its achievement largely falls within the general processes associated with Track I Diplomacy, those official actions taken within the international state system using military, political and economic means. Military operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, political pressure on state sponsors of terrorism, including threats against Iraq, worldwide law enforcement operations and increased security measures, are parts of a relatively effective plan for suppressing and containing terrorism. In the initial months of the American incursion into Afghanistan, military forces proved very effective at both eliminating the political and military infrastructure supporting Al Qaeda and scattering its fighters. Intensive security and law enforcement efforts by the coalition cracked down on Al Qaeda operatives throughout the world, robbing the organization of potential counterattacks. Within the crescent, Muslim leaders proved quite willing to suppress potential terrorists, although perhaps a little too enthusiastically and at the expense of human rights. Even traditional state-sponsors of terrorism, cowed by the vehemence of these responses, remain largely mute; Syria and Iran being notable for their silence. While Bin Laden and his fighters continue to spew propaganda and occasional low-level attacks, they appear unable to mount a concerted response. On the run, Al Qaeda seems to be temporarily contained. Overall, the American led campaign looks to be achieving its goal of managing the conflict by keeping terrorism at bay. Realism and the application of power have proven effective in managing the current conflict.

Unfortunately, the vehement applications of military force as well as United States proclivity for unilateral action may be undoing some of the positive effects of the initial campaign. Rather than managing the conflict so that Al Qaeda might be isolated,
the over-reliance on force seeks victory in the traditional war fighting sense. The dogged hunt for Bin Laden threatens to become increasingly counterproductive, with the United States squandering some of the advantages gained by military and security operations. As evidenced by the assassination of an Afghani vice president, violence in the country increasingly jeopardizes stability. Yet, the refusal by the Americans to participate in a general peacekeeping effort in Afghanistan allows warlords to prevail and the remnants of Al Qaeda to reestablish their presence. Worse, American aircraft and Special Forces, trolling for the remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, show a penchant for indiscriminate attacks, too often in the vicinity of innocent civilians. Enraged at becoming targets, some Afghani locals now shoot at American forces in retaliation; one even equated the U.S. troops to the Soviet occupiers of the 1980s, an ominous sign. The desire to root out Al Qaeda stragglers must be balanced with the potential risks of overturning gains already won, especially as the war moves to other regions of the world. Patrolling bombers cued by unmanned aerial vehicles and controlled by remote operators having little association with conditions on the ground fuel hatred and confirms Islamic extremist rhetoric. Perhaps tactically justified, military strikes must be carefully weighed for their long-term strategic impacts, not just the body counts they may produce a lesson that should have been learned in Somalia nearly a decade ago.

While terrorists should be attacked whenever located, military efficiency cannot be confused with efficacy. Suppression of Al Qaeda requires a velvet fist selectively wielded, not indiscriminate bludgeoning. The complexity of the war on terrorism makes any action telescopic in nature; an apparently justifiable policy may spiral and play into the hands of the terrorists. Increasingly effective as the war drags on without decisive results, Al Qaeda propaganda paints a picture of American imperialism engaged in a war against Islam. The picture is highlighted by errant air attacks in Afghanistan, threats against Saddam Hussein, calls for worldwide preemptive strikes, rejection of the International Criminal Court and an insular focus on American security. Perhaps most damaging, unwavering support for Israel, exploited by Islamic extremists as an abject example of American duplicity, provides an obstinate example of the escalatory effects of short-term emphasis on force and military victory. Attempts to physically destroy the terrorists, if left as the primary means of dealing with Islamic terrorism, may well be counterproductive in the end.

These measures, if applied with circumspection, place the initial objective into a wider strategy. If containing the violence may be the essential prerequisite, it does not isolate Al Qaeda from its support; indeed, as has been shown, wrongly applied force can add to its attractiveness, despite even crippling physical losses. Separating the terrorists from the populace they purport to represent necessitates resolving many of the political, economic and social roots of the conflict feeding Al Qaeda rage. This objective, however, postulates no forlorn hopes of changing the perceptions of Bin Laden and his hard-core followers, rather it seeks to isolate Al Qaeda from much of the rest of the Islamic world by removing its rationale for violent change. Rather, it seeks to resolve the overt conditions of the conflict as well as building institutional means for redressing ills. This demands a multi-dimensional approach for resolving these elements of the conflict. Drawing from John Paul Lederach (1997), the goal must be addressed simultaneously at three levels. The top-level looks to international and state institutions to establish the overarching necessary conditions and institutions. The mid-
range looks to both official and non-governmental organizations within states to establish political, economic and social programs directly addressing the causes. Finally, at the grassroots, local levels, participatory programs resolve the more critical issues and perceptions affecting daily lives. When combined into an integrated strategy, efforts at all three levels can go far in resolving many of the overt causes of the war, thereby separating the terrorists from the Islamic societies who, at least tacitly, support them.

The United States, for reasons discussed in the previous section, provides the most visible historical, political, economic and social rationalizations for Al Qaeda's bloody violence. Thus, de facto, it becomes the primary actor in any top-level attempt to isolate the terrorists. The essential first step must be minimizing the open sources of open friction between the United States and the Islamic world. Already touched upon, but worth repeating, misapplied military actions, intentional or not, add to the conflict. In their zealous pursuit of Bin Laden, military forces cannot be indiscriminate. That means proscribing rules of engagement that err on caution's side, however tactically distasteful. Clausewitz places combat operations subservient to greater political aims; it is no less applicable today than when written nearly two hundred years ago. Indeed, it should be expanded. Understanding the vital nature of the Gulf to American economic interests and the threats to those interests, American forces based in Saudi Arabia form a central theme of Bin Laden's rhetoric, as well as a font of anger in the Muslim world. Reducing the presence could go far in lessening tensions without seriously degrading American ability to defend its interests. The point of minimizing the negative impact of military operations is not to retreat or give in to terrorist demands, but to defuse one of the causes of the current war.

Successful isolation of terrorism also depends on the international rule of law, which offers a widely accepted framework with which to both attack and, more important, discredit Bin Laden's terrorist methods. The importance of international law derives from two fundamental precepts. First, however currently defined, terrorism must be seen for what it is—a form of warfare. While objections to declaring terrorism in such a manner centers on fears that to do so also accords political and legal legitimacy, the opposite actually may be true. Terrorism must be seen as a form of armed conflict aimed at revolutionary change. That reality cannot be denied, but is not a justification, merely a statement of fact. As such, the bloody, indiscriminate tactics of terrorism violate most international agreements on the conduct of armed conflict, especially indiscriminate targeting of civilians, but also requirements to achieve and maintain combatant status, use of certain types of weapons, prescriptions against kidnapping, murder and hostage-taking and treatment of any prisoners that may be taken. Under the laws of armed conflict, Bin Laden and most other terrorists would be considered war criminals, not just outlaws, a legal ruling largely ending any debates as to whether or not Al Qaeda constitutes a legitimate resistance movement. That leads to the second precept—the need to invoke international law to punish the terrorists. The United States must face the prospect that to isolate Al Qaeda, the International Criminal Court (ICC) or a similar ad hoc legal body offers a way out of the legalistic and political morass into which its detention center in Cuba has taken it. By relying on accepted laws of armed conflict rather than continuing its unilateral and secretive handling of captured terrorist suspects, a major factor framing the war on terrorism as a bipolar struggle between
Islam and the West gives way international consensus. Terrorists must be internationally condemned for their crimes against humanity by an international tribunal, if Islamic terrorism is to be transformed from a predominantly American enemy to a global menace. Reliance on international law raises questions of politicization of the process, as well as definitions of terrorism itself (the old question of "terrorist or freedom fighter?" remains controversial, even in the United Nations). Yet, the international law exists, prescribes a global standard of conduct and its processes can be adapted. The alternative, unilateral American action and criminal incarceration in Cuba has met widespread disapproval and succeeded in uniting many moderate Muslims against the United States.

Perhaps the most significant and festering issue preventing Al Qaeda from being isolated resides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As long as it continues, so too will many of the motives for Islamic extremism, for it serves as a symbolic rallying cry for the perceived colonialism and religious onslaughts inflicted by the West on Muslims. Indeed, the conflict glares as one of the major themes in Bin Laden’s fatwa declaring war on the United States (WIF, 1998). While the scope of this paper limits detailed analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a few broad points as they relate to defusing terrorism must be made. As long as it remains an uncritical sponsor of Israel, the United States will continue to be the target of Islamic terrorist rage. American policies towards Israel, to include massive arms sales, continue to be perceived as encouraging Israeli incursions into the West Bank and Gaza. In the highly charged atmosphere of religious extremism, perceptions become everything; American attempts at mediation in the region appear to be little more than attempts to prop up the hated Jews. If American policies are to cease being a source of rage, they must be toned down both in words and, more important, in deed. Instead, as the only state able to influence both belligerents, the United States must reposition itself to become a neutral, but essential, intervening third party. While other states may be important to the peace process, the United States remains the hinge. Only the United States can engineer an end to the killing and violence. Without a component that includes attempts to resolve or at least manage, the conflict in Palestine in an impartial manner, the objective of isolating the terrorist threat may never be achieved, for it will continue to draw sustenance from this intractable conflict within a conflict.

If the United States provides vital leverage, one top-level approach to isolating terrorism, nonetheless, only peripherally involves the United States. Within the Muslim states of the crescent, a pervading atmosphere of political and economic corruption, social degradation and hopelessness prevails. Although deflected outward at external symptoms, the internal malaise of such states as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Palestinian authority perpetuates unrest and provides a constant source of terrorist recruits. Failure to address these ills dooms the war on terrorism to a slow, grinding and perpetual existence. Within the regions, perhaps encouraged but certainly not directed by the United States, the aspirations of the thousands of Muslims must be addressed. At the state and regional level, this demands a concerted institutional effort, perhaps on the model of the Europe’s willingness to resolve similar ethnic, social, economic and political ills endemic to Eastern Europe. The highly effective OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities, a watchdog intended to ensure internal stability in eastern Europe while preventing legal and human rights
abuses in the name of maintaining order offers an example of an effective regional body quietly addressing the causes of conflict. The High Commissioner is strictly enjoined not to address terrorism as an activity, thus alleviating any fear it might be legitimized, but does look closely at the conditions that precede or succeed its appearance (OSCE, 2002), in essence, managing the status quo and preventing the emergence of violence. A similar regional or international body, non-intrusive, yet authoritative, adapted to the Arab League or the Gulf Cooperation Council, in which Muslim states take an active part, could go far in monitoring the economic, political and social causes feeding Islamic terrorism.

Poverty, lack of education, poor or non-existent medical care, lingering psychological scars from past violence (especially in Palestine and Afghanistan) and political powerlessness must all be addressed at the mid-range and grassroots levels. While certainly not all terrorism derives from the underdeveloped conditions prevalent in the crescent, they do provide an important source of anger and hopelessness exploited by religious extremists. Indeed, it comes as little surprise that some terrorist organizations, notably Hamas, include local social programs in their efforts to gain and retain popular support. Resolving social, political and economic issues requires carefully coordinated ‘multi-track diplomacy’ (Diamond and MacDonald, 1996), beginning with official programs but devolving through a series of unofficial, but equally vital projects that include professional conflict resolution and reconciliation, business investment, education, public opinion and communications, activist programs and religion. At the mid-range level, problem-solving workshops, training in peaceful conflict resolution skills and non-governmental programs intended to establish informal and formal means of redressing grievances without resort to violence. In areas in which violence has been widespread, such as in Palestine and Afghanistan, reconciliation becomes a critical issue. At the grassroots level, non-governmental programs addressing humanitarian needs, human rights, political empowerment at the local level, education and dispute resolution can go far in defusing frustration and empowering people whose sense of hopelessness sometimes leads to violence.

Mid-range and grassroots programs cannot just react to conditions, they must seek to identify and preclude those inciting terrorist violence. This requires adequate warning and prevention of the presence and growth of underlying causes. Cueing from a regional organization such as the earlier discussed OSCE model offers a start, but equally essential is an awareness of the local conditions that may fuel terrorist inroads. Fortunately, an early warning structure already exists. A wide variety of non-governmental organizations dealing with the causes of terrorist violence already operate in the crescent, they only need to be integrated into a cohesive whole. Indeed, with a stake in the outcomes, networks of mid-range and local authorities and, perhaps most important, a keen awareness of local conditions, these organizations offer a critical inroad to addressing the causes of terrorism. They comprise a potentially powerful and effective means for the United States, as well as the states in the region to both understand those causes and ensure that the methods being used to manage the conflict do not clash with resolution and prevention efforts. A new paradigm may be necessary in which the war on terrorism becomes an integrated strategy in which the use of military, economic and political power at the states and international levels dovetails with more informal, yet equally vital efforts by non-governmental organizations
reconciling the underlying causes that fueled terrorism. Closer coordination between these unofficial "field diplomats", to draw from Reychler's (2001) description of those working at the local levels and the more formal governmental and international efforts to change conditions in the region could yield significant long-term results.

This leads to the final objective of the strategic triad, closing the gap between religious and secular worldviews. However well terrorists may be contained and the underlying overt causes addressed, the clash of visions between Islam and globalization holds the key to any effort to defuse Islamic terrorism. In the crescent, Islam serves as the vehicle through which political, economic and social reform flows. The links between Islamic beliefs and more secular needs cannot be separated; to do so is to both ignore the very nature of Islam and to play into the hands of Al Qaeda. Any of a wide range of options that may be implemented in the wake of military and security operations—be they problem solving or reconciliation workshops, social welfare programs, peace commissions or any others—must be carefully tied to the religious structures and mores of the crescent. Channeled through Islamic leaders, programs may gain legitimacy and strengthen the social and moral resources necessary to reconciliation. Such organizations as the World Conference on Religion and Peace, as international and regional sources of theological legitimacy, offer paths to bridging the secular-religious divides of any potential solutions (Sampson, 1997).

The precept that the war on terrorism is not a war on Islam must be reframed to declare the war on terrorism is a war for Islam. That distinction sits at the heart any attempt to resolve and prevent Islamic extremist terrorism. At the most fundamental level, the currently narrow view, held both by Islamic extremists and many Western modernists, that Islam and globalization are mutually exclusive or that Islam represents a unique and insular culture destined to clash with the West (see, for example Huntington 1996) must be dispelled. Islamic leaders can play a key role and have begun to do so. Shortly after the September 11th attacks, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia declared his disgust with the bloody catastrophe and called on all Muslims to condemn it (Shaik abdul-Azeez, 2001). Easing its restrictions on free speech, the Saudi government allowed questioning of some insular religious assumptions; the ensuing debate has begun to question the extremist views of Wahhabism. A growing feeling among fundamentalist Muslims that modernization can and should, coexist with Islam reflects both historical longing for an earlier 'Golden Age' and appreciation for the positive aspects of globalization. These very tentative steps must be nurtured, not trampled. American arrogance and near evangelical belief in democracy and progress too often threatens the identity of more traditional societies, leading to violent backlash. Thus the rhetoric of the war on terrorism, laced with references to evil extremists and extolling the virtues of democratic ideals and freedom, do little to encourage the internal debates and reforms perhaps percolating in the crescent. Rather, they merely highlight the divide between world visions. In fact, the war on terrorism is as much a war for the soul of Islam as for the body of secularism. Friedman (2000), in his widely read treatise on globalization points out the competing nature of insular religious beliefs and unreserved capitalism, concluding the two can only harmonized when they combine material well-being with preservation of cultural and religious identities. Until that is understood and becomes an integral component of the policies of both the United
States and the states of the crescent, the underlying rage of terrorist violence will remain unresolved.

The preceding essay, admittedly, only provides an outline strategy for defusing the war on terrorism. It offers suggestions for managing the conflict (neutralizing the violence), resolving it (addressing the underlying causes) and preventing terrorism in the future (transforming perceptions and beliefs), realizing that specific details depend on the situation and conditions. Unfortunately, the war on terrorism remains too complex for simple answers or generally applicable solutions. Its whirlpool of local, regional, international and global causes and symptoms defy formation of neat or even complete strategies. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for is that it may chip away at the three objectives. In addressing each, Americans must discard the notion that recognizing the underlying causes of the conflict equates to legitimizing terrorism. That realization, alone, will go far in making the strategy work. At its core, however, the conflict remains essentially a religious one; any solution must reconcile Western secularism with Muslim spirituality. Until the two worldviews accept each other, no permanent solution can be achieved.
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Recommended Reading


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