WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

DOD’s Actions to Combat Weapons Use Should Be More Integrated and Focused
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Letter

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Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
May 26, 2000

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

In December 1993, the Secretary of Defense announced the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative in response to the growing threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, often referred to as weapons of mass destruction. The Initiative calls for the development of offensive and defensive capabilities—to include equipping, training, and preparing U.S. forces, in coalition with the forces of friends and allies—to prevail over an adversary that threatens or uses such weapons in peacetime and during all phases of conflicts. The Secretary of Defense has described the threat and the potential use of these weapons against U.S. and allied forces as the greatest and most complex challenge facing the Department of Defense (DOD). The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in testimony to the Congress in February 2000, underscored the presence and seriousness of the threat.

Since the Initiative was announced, the Congress has increased funding for counterproliferation while there have been congressional committee concerns expressed about the direction and DOD’s management of the counterproliferation program. At your request, we reviewed DOD’s implementation of the Initiative. This report describes DOD actions to

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1Counterproliferation is the activities of DOD to combat the spread of NBC capabilities and the means to deliver them. The offensive component of counterproliferation (referred to as “counterforce”) includes actions taken to defeat NBC targets, such as mobile missile launchers, and NBC weapons production and storage facilities. The defensive component includes “active defense,” which are actions taken to destroy enemy NBC weapons and delivery vehicles while en route to their targets; “passive defense,” which are measures taken to help U.S. forces survive and operate in an NBC environment, such as biological and chemical agent detectors and protective clothing and masks; and “consequence management,” which refers to efforts to mitigate the consequences resulting from the use of an NBC weapon, such as the decontamination of weapon systems and equipment and casualty evacuation. Consequence management measures are often included in passive defense.
make the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat a matter of routine consideration within its organization, activities, and functions and identifies other actions the Department can take to improve implementation of the Initiative. It also examines the actions of the interagency Counterproliferation Program Review Committee to coordinate the research and development programs of DOD, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. intelligence community\(^2\) to identify and eliminate unnecessary duplication.

**Background**

The U.S. National Military Strategy states that the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and biological weapons, has made their use by an adversary increasingly likely in both a major theater war and smaller scale contingencies. These weapons are capable of causing mass casualties, and their threat or use can disrupt the planning and conduct of military operations. DOD believes effective deterrence against the use of these weapons depends on a range of nuclear and conventional response capabilities, as well as active and passive defenses and supporting command, control, communications, and intelligence. DOD estimates that for fiscal year 2001 it will invest over $7.3 billion on the research, development, and acquisition of such conventional response capabilities, with about $5.3 billion of that investment on missile defense. Although an unclassified estimate is unavailable, additional funding is spent to provide intelligence support for counterproliferation.

To help ensure that DOD’s counterproliferation policy objectives are met and that implementation of the Counterproliferation Initiative is integrated and focused, the Secretary of Defense, in 1996, established the Counterproliferation Council composed of senior DOD civilian and military

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\(^2\)The U.S. intelligence community is a group of 13 government agencies and organizations that carry out the intelligence activities of the U.S. government. Members include the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the intelligence organizations of the military services.
officials. The Council is to monitor departmental progress on developing the strategy, doctrine, and force planning necessary to effectively execute its counterproliferation objectives. In 1997, DOD’s Quadrennial Defense Review report stated that a key challenge the Department must meet to ensure it is prepared for the NBC threat is to institutionalize—integrate or make permanent—counterproliferation as an organizing principle in every facet of military activity. A chronology of major events surrounding DOD’s Counterproliferation Initiative is included in appendix I.

To review activities and programs related to countering proliferation threats within the Departments of Defense and Energy and the U.S. intelligence community, in 1993 the Congress established the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee. The Committee’s charter includes addressing shortfalls in existing and programmed capabilities to counter the proliferation of NBC weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems; identifying and eliminating undesirable redundancies or uncoordinated efforts; and establishing priorities for programs and funding. Since 1995, the Committee has submitted an annual report to the Congress detailing its findings and recommendations.

We have extensively reviewed U.S. government efforts to both prevent and combat the proliferation of NBC weapons. A summary of our recent unclassified reports on combating the use of such weapons is provided in appendix II.

The Council, which is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, is to continue until the end of fiscal year 2001, by which time counterproliferation is expected to be established as a mainstream DOD mission area. Its tenure can be extended by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Department of Defense, May 1997. The congressionally mandated review was designed to be a fundamental and comprehensive examination of U.S. defense needs from 1997 to 2015: potential threats, strategy, force structure, readiness posture, military modernization programs, defense infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program. (Sections 921-926 of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1997, Public Law 104-201.) Another review is to be conducted in 2001 to revisit defense needs and make recommendations to the new President, as mandated by section 901 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65).

Results in Brief

DOD is taking steps to make the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat a matter of routine consideration within its activities and functions, such as training and field exercises and the acquisition of weapon systems and equipment. Since the 1993 Defense Counterproliferation Initiative was announced, DOD has given greater emphasis to this threat in policy and planning documents, and the Joint Staff\(^6\) has made considerable effort to determine and prioritize the counterproliferation requirements of the unified commands.\(^7\) The services, particularly the Air Force, have increased the importance placed on counterproliferation requirements in their acquisition programs, training, and doctrine. Regional unified commands have incorporated counterproliferation concepts, equipment, and tasks into their planning and military exercises.

While DOD has taken positive steps, it can do more to integrate and focus its response to the growing threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. DOD does not have an overarching joint counterproliferation doctrine document to provide a centralized picture of how DOD should respond in a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment across the spectrum of military operations. Such a document, which was recently approved for development, will help ensure that counterproliferation is being satisfactorily integrated in the entire body of joint doctrine. DOD also has not taken sufficient action to provide reasonable assurance that its weapon systems and equipment can survive and operate in a biological and chemical environment. Additionally, studies by DOD and a congressionally mandated commission indicate that DOD’s organization structure may be too diffused to effectively manage and integrate the Department’s counterproliferation mission.

DOD has not developed key strategy documents and management plans to aid in directing and managing its counterproliferation initiatives. Internal DOD reviews have identified the need for a comprehensive strategy for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and a military

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\(^6\)The staff that assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in executing the Chairman's responsibilities.

\(^7\)Regional unified commands are composed of components of two or more military departments and have a broad continuing mission under a single commander that has geographic responsibilities. The regional commands are the Joint Forces, Central, European, Pacific, and Southern Commands. Four other unified commands—the Space, Special Operations, Strategic, and Transportation Commands—have functional responsibilities.
strategy for integrating offensive and defensive capabilities. There is also no management plan to guide, oversee, and integrate departmentwide initiatives, which would include a reporting and evaluation process with performance measures to allow for a continual assessment of the Department’s progress in achieving goals and objectives.

DOD primarily coordinates its counterproliferation activities with the Department of Energy and the intelligence community through the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee. DOD, Energy, and intelligence agency officials generally expressed satisfaction with the exchange of information that the Committee had provided about ongoing programs among the agencies. However, the Committee has taken little action to identify and eliminate undesirable redundancies among research and development programs, one of the primary reasons the Congress established it. The Committee does not have a process to facilitate such determinations and provide a basis to make decisions on eliminating undesired redundancies.

This report includes recommendations that the Secretary of Defense (1) develop strategies, a management plan, and performance measures to help guide and manage the implementation of DOD’s counterproliferation actions; (2) include in the next Quadrennial Defense Review an examination of the Department’s organization for counterproliferation; (3) take steps to help ensure that the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat is being given sufficient attention in military doctrine and in the design and development of weapon systems and equipment; and (4) devise and implement a mechanism to help identify and eliminate undesirable redundancies among counterproliferation programs. DOD generally agreed with our recommendations and indicated that many corrective actions that are responsive to them have already been started. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The Department of Energy and the Central Intelligence Agency reviewed a draft of the report but did not comment on our findings and recommendations.

DOD has taken actions to integrate the threat of NBC weapons into its organization, activities, and functions. Actions include incorporating counterproliferation guidance into major department planning and policy documents; establishing offices and other organizational elements that focus on counterproliferation issues; increasing NBC warfare emphasis in training, exercises, and education; and improving intelligence support of counterproliferation initiatives. DOD officials believe these actions have
improved the Department's ability to develop and field the capabilities required by U.S. forces to respond to an enemy's use or threatened use of NBC weapons.

Since 1993 DOD has been giving greater emphasis to the NBC threat in its planning and policy documents. For instance, the defense planning guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense to DOD components has placed increased emphasis on the NBC threat, particularly the biological and chemical threat, and the importance of preparing for it. The 1998 and 1999 planning guidance state that countering the NBC threat will be given a high priority in defense planning. These documents discuss factors, such as intelligence and logistics support and the active and passive defense and counterforce capabilities, that are required to fight and win in an NBC environment in greater detail than the 1996 guidance. The documents require that major joint exercises routinely include activities to assess and enhance preparations for sustained operations in chemical and biological warfare environments. The military services and the unified commands are to ensure that routine individual, unit, joint, and combined training exercises incorporate realistic chemical and biological threats.

To better manage its counterproliferation efforts, DOD has taken steps to improve its organizational structure. For example, the Air Force has established a central headquarters office for counterproliferation, which is the focal point for all Air Force counterproliferation activities, including doctrine, strategy, policy, and requirements. This office has developed a master plan to provide the overarching guidance to enable the Air Force to meet its counterproliferation goals and a long-term plan to guide the development and acquisition of improved counterproliferation capabilities. The office has also initiated studies of subjects such as the implications of the NBC threat for strategic airlift operations and the metrics used to assess the readiness of Air Force units to respond to the threat. These two studies are to be used to identify solutions to current airlift problems and to develop meaningful criteria for measuring and reporting force readiness.

In training and exercises, the unified commands and the military services have incorporated counterproliferation tasks into service training, large-

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8“Joint” refers to two or more of the military services operating in coordinated action, such as a joint exercise involving units from the Army and the Navy.

9“Combined” is used when two or more of two or more allies operate with U.S. forces.
scale exercises, computer-assisted exercises, seminars, and operations. In intelligence support, the Defense Intelligence Agency—DOD’s focal point for integrating intelligence information on foreign NBC warfare programs in support of counterproliferation—has established a counterproliferation support office and is increasing the size of the office’s staff. It has created a center to provide improved intelligence analysis on underground facilities. Potential adversaries may use such facilities to protect and conceal their NBC weapons programs. The Agency has also developed a computerized system to provide current, substantive intelligence information and support to policy makers, force planners, and unified combatant commanders. Appendix III discusses other institutionalization actions.

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<th>Limitations Remain in DOD’s Integration of Counterproliferation</th>
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<td>Integration shortcomings require DOD’s attention to better ensure that its counterproliferation efforts are integrated and focused. We identified the following four:</td>
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<td>• An overarching joint doctrine document has not been developed to provide a comprehensive, integrated picture of how DOD should respond and operate in an NBC environment across the spectrum of military operations.</td>
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<td>• A systematic approach does not exist to provide reasonable assurance that NBC survivability features are incorporated in weapon system designs.</td>
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<td>• DOD’s organizational structure may be too diffused to facilitate efficient and effective management and integration of the Department’s counterproliferation efforts.</td>
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<td>• Key strategy documents and management plans have not been developed to help guide, oversee, and integrate the multiple departmentwide counterproliferation initiatives.</td>
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<th>Lack of a Comprehensive, Integrated Joint Doctrine</th>
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<td>Adapting military doctrine to deal with operations in an NBC environment is critical because doctrine provides the fundamental principles that guide the employment of military forces. Unified commands build plans and conduct exercises on established doctrine. Because the offensive, defensive, and intelligence elements of counterproliferation cover so many aspects of military operations, those elements can be found in numerous joint and service doctrine publications. There is no one overarching joint counterproliferation doctrine document to provide a centralized picture of how DOD should respond in an NBC environment across the spectrum of</td>
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military operations and help ensure that counterproliferation is being satisfactorily integrated in the entire body of joint doctrine.

Several publications are either under revision to correct deficiencies or are being developed to fill voids in the body of joint doctrine. For example, the principal joint doctrine for NBC defense (Joint Publication 3-11),\textsuperscript{10} which deals particularly with the passive defense area of counterproliferation, has been extensively revised. DOD officials expect the new version to be published in spring 2000. Among the deficiencies being addressed in the new version is the lack of a thorough discussion of biological warfare and service responsibilities for chemical and biological defense and decontamination in joint operating areas, such as ports and airfields.\textsuperscript{11} Joint doctrine for active defense against the NBC threat is contained in air and missile defense doctrine publications that provide the fundamental principles for responding to all air and missile threats.\textsuperscript{12} This doctrine, which was completed in 1999, also contains some discussion of the offensive, or counterforce, elements of counterproliferation. Two new joint doctrine publications in development—one on attack operations against an adversary's high value targets and one on joint targeting of an adversary's forces and related capabilities—are expected to provide additional principles for counterforce operations. The targeting doctrine, for example, will provide guidance for the targeting of critical mobile targets, such as missile launchers. Joint assessments identified the need for such doctrine. With regard to conventional responses to NBC weapons and their associated infrastructure, counterforce operations are not discussed exclusively in any joint or service doctrine publication. However, the joint doctrine publications for nuclear operations include counterforce issues for the employment of U.S. nuclear weapons.

While there are over 100 joint doctrine publications, no single joint publication synthesizes counterproliferation doctrine. The Air Force, recognizing the value of such a document, is preparing a doctrine publication that will discuss all areas of counterproliferation in Air Force


\textsuperscript{11}We are currently reviewing the readiness of U.S. forces to conduct NBC defense operations. This review includes an examination of the important policy issues for successful implementation of Joint Publication 3-11. A report on the results of this work will be issued later this year.

\textsuperscript{12}Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats, Joint Publication 3-01, Oct. 19, 1999.
B-284722

operations. Air Force officials believe this “capping” publication will provide a clearer centralized picture of how the Air Force is to respond in an NBC environment across the spectrum of military operations. The other services do not have a similar publication, though the Navy is considering one. In April 2000, while our report was at DOD for review, a joint doctrine committee approved a Joint Staff proposal for an overarching counterproliferation doctrine publication for joint operations. The document will be developed, with final publication expected in winter 2001. Such a capping document would complement, not replace, existing doctrine publications in providing a centralized picture of counterproliferation doctrine.

The Joint Staff has taken steps to examine counterproliferation guidance and correct deficiencies in several joint doctrine areas, but it has not systematically reviewed all joint doctrine to help ensure that counterproliferation is satisfactorily integrated. Additionally, Joint Staff officials told us that a number of supporting publications that would provide further practical guidance for implementing doctrine on NBC issues, such as for consequence management, had not been developed. Counterproliferation-related tasks span many missions, functions, and types of military operations, including intelligence support to operations, rear area operations, joint special operations, space operations, base defense, airlift support, nuclear operations, amphibious operations, operations other than war, and antiterrorism. While deficiencies in doctrine can be identified and changes made to improve doctrine through lessons learned from joint training and exercises, a review has not been made to assist in ensuring that the entire body of doctrine satisfactorily addresses the NBC threat. Development and maintenance of an overarching joint counterproliferation doctrine publication should help satisfy this need.

Absence of Systematic Approach to Ensure NBC Survivability

DOD major acquisition program regulations require that systems essential to the accomplishment of missions be able to survive at the NBC contamination levels anticipated in their operating environment. However, DOD does not have a systematic approach that identifies weapon systems that should be capable of operating in a biological and chemical contaminated environment and that provides sufficient management

13Section 4.4.1 of DOD Regulation 5000.2R, setting forth the mandatory procedures for major defense acquisition programs.
controls to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate survivability features are incorporated in the design of these systems.

DOD has stated that the ability of U.S. systems and equipment to survive and operate in an NBC environment is a major concern. However, DOD’s regulations for acquiring major weapon systems only state that survivability needs to be addressed during the acquisition process—key provisions that would promote the consideration of survivability are lacking. For example, survivability is not a condition of the process’ milestone exit criteria. A January 1999 report, a DOD team reviewing the status of the Department’s chemical and biological defense program found that weapons survivability in a chemical and biological environment was a concern across the Department. The team’s findings corroborated and updated a 1995 DOD Inspector General report. The team noted a lack of uniform standards among the services to ensure survivability in systems and equipment they are acquiring. In their acquisition processes, the services treat survivability differently. For example, the Army uses criteria for evaluating survivability, but if the criterion is not met, the program manager can waive it. The other services do not use specific criteria and, therefore, have no waiver process. In the acquisition of chemical and biological defense systems and equipment, the team found that design and test measures to ensure that survivability requirements are sufficiently considered in weapon system acquisitions are largely absent from the process.

Recognizing the potential seriousness of the survivability problem, the DOD study team developed a plan for immediate application to all DOD acquisition programs. The plan included implementing interim measures to immediately strengthen the survivability provisions in DOD’s major acquisition program regulations and studying how NBC contamination survivability criteria developed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and adopted by the Army could be cost-effectively utilized for all DOD acquisition programs. It has been over a year since the report was issued.

14Exit criteria serve as gates that, when successfully passed, demonstrate that a program is on track to achieve its goals and should be allowed to continue.


and no action has been taken on the plan nor has an implementation timetable been established. According to the DOD official responsible for implementing the proposed measures, action has not been taken because of the investment required and the issue is not considered a top priority.

While several DOD officials concurred with the study team's report, they noted that survivability is only one of several criteria to be considered in the design and development of weapons and equipment. Others, such as cost and combat effectiveness, could take priority. Survivability design features could include filtered overpressurized ventilation systems to minimize the effects of chemical and biological weapons on combat vehicles, ships, and aircraft or hardening against electromagnetic radiation for command, control, communications, and intelligence systems.

Other factors may further reduce the likelihood that acquisition programs will incorporate survivability features in system design. For example, DOD is required to purchase commercial items to the maximum extent practicable. According to one DOD official, this can reduce the likelihood that systems and equipment being acquired will be designed to operate in an NBC contaminated environment. Also, DOD program and acquisition decision-making bodies generally do not include representatives with responsibilities for NBC survivability requirements. The study team's January 1999 report recommended that such a representative be appointed to attend reviews for acquisitions that involve compliance with NBC contamination survivability requirements. At completion of our review, action had not been taken on this recommendation.

Questions Raised About DOD's Organization Structure for Managing Counterproliferation

While DOD has taken steps to improve its organizational structure to better manage its counterproliferation efforts, its counterproliferation organization for establishing policy and guidance and developing offensive and defense capabilities, including intelligence support, still consists of diverse constituencies and involves numerous organizations and committees that are loosely connected. Questions have been raised by the Congress, a key congressionally mandated commission, recent DOD studies, and officials we interviewed about DOD's organizational changes.

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and the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD’s organization structure for managing counterproliferation.

As shown in figure 1, the counterproliferation mission involves many diverse DOD organizational elements and numerous functions and activities that present management challenges for DOD in integrating its counterproliferation initiatives. Each of the organizations, such as the Joint Staff, must ensure that issues related to the four areas of counterproliferation—counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management—are fully considered in its planning, policies, doctrine, acquisition, and other functions. In turn, the actions of each organization must be coordinated to ensure consistency in application and direction throughout DOD. As noted in a comprehensive congressional staff report on DOD’s organization and decision-making procedures, inefficient mission integration can lead to gaps in capabilities, wasted resources through undesirable duplication, interoperability problems, unrealistic plans, inconsistent doctrine, inadequate joint training, and ineffective fighting forces.18

To promulgate policy and provide oversight, DOD established an office for counterproliferation policy and a senior-level counterproliferation council. The Office of Counterproliferation Policy reports to an Assistant Secretary who also oversees nearly a dozen other offices that are involved in various policy and strategy issues, three of which concentrate on preventing the proliferation of NBC weapons. The Counterproliferation Council is responsible for ensuring that the implementation of DOD’s counterproliferation efforts is integrated and focused. While it provides a venue for the Deputy Secretary of Defense to discuss DOD’s counterproliferation efforts, the Council has largely functioned as an information gathering body.

DOD’s efforts to develop and acquire active and passive defense and counterforce capabilities for counter-NBC operations involve many DOD
organizations. The Ballistic Missile Defense and Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organizations work with the unified commands, services, and other DOD agencies to develop active defense systems to counter an adversary's use of ballistic and cruise missiles. Passive defense capabilities are being developed by the services with oversight responsibility assigned to an office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Two joint service groups are responsible for joint NBC defense requirements, priorities, training, and doctrine and for coordinating and integrating NBC defense research, development, and acquisition efforts. Counterforce capabilities are being developed by each of the military services and the Special Operations Forces, but there is no central organization or management structure similar to those for active and passive defense. Appendix IV provides additional information on DOD's counterproliferation organization.

Several organization changes were included in the Secretary of Defense's 1997 Defense Reform Initiative19 that were intended to raise the priority of DOD proliferation-related activities and improve the Department's overall performance. The Initiative was the impetus for creating the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which brings under one director the mission-oriented capabilities of DOD to reduce the threats from weapons of mass destruction. It also assigned responsibility for all proliferation policy under a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction. DOD proposed to abolish the position of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Affairs, which was created by the Congress (10 U.S.C. 142). This proposal was unsuccessful because of strong congressional opposition.20 In opposing this change, the Senate Committee on Armed Services believed the position was necessary for fulfilling specific congressionally mandated responsibilities and for ensuring appropriate senior-level oversight and implementation of DOD guidance.

19Defense Reform Initiative, Secretary of Defense, Nov. 1997. The initiative is designed to streamline DOD's organizational structure and business practices.

In July 1999, a congressionally mandated commission reported on the results of its assessment of the federal government's organization for combating weapons of mass destruction proliferation. The Commission noted the diffusion of counterproliferation responsibilities throughout DOD's organization and the lack of a focal point responsible for integrating the organization and its efforts. It recommended establishing (1) a senior position for all proliferation-related issues in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and (2) an Assistant Secretary of Defense position for technology acquisition programs bearing on combating proliferation. These recommendations were never adopted by DOD. Some officials we interviewed agreed with the Commission's conclusions and recommendations, believing the suggested organizational changes would increase the Department's focus on counterproliferation issues and improve DOD's ability to make difficult decisions on the best allocation of limited resources across the counterproliferation areas and agencies. Others disagreed, believing that the current organization provides the necessary attention and management tools for managing the counterproliferation mission. Although DOD prepared comments to the Commission's report and recommendations, we were unable to review or be briefed on them because a governmentwide response to the report had not been released.

The results of two recent DOD studies tend to support the need for some reexamination of the DOD organization structure to determine if adjustments can be made to realize greater efficiency and effectiveness in the management and integration of the Department's initiatives. A major conclusion of a November 1999 Joint Staff study was that the 1999 Commission was right—the integration function required for DOD's NBC defense program is too diffused. The study found that the integration that needs to take place is not always occurring. An October 1999 DOD report on the defense intelligence community support of joint


22 Chemical and Biological Warfare Study of Studies, Deterrence and Counterproliferation Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Team, Joint Staff, Nov. 1999.

counterproliferation operations cited the need for improvements in policies, processes, and mechanisms to manage and oversee intelligence support of the counterproliferation mission. Similar problems were identified 3 years earlier by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

DOD Counterproliferation Initiatives Lack Overarching Strategies and a Management Plan

Important management tools, including (1) a comprehensive Department strategy for countering the NBC threat; (2) an integrated military strategy that describes how the offensive and defense capabilities of U.S. forces will function together to achieve maximum capability against the threat; (3) a management plan that can be used to guide, oversee, and integrate DOD's multiple departmentwide counterproliferation initiatives; and (4) a reporting and evaluation process with qualitative and quantitative performance measures for assessing departmentwide progress toward achieving counterproliferation strategic goals and objectives, have not been developed. The absence of such tools makes it very difficult to ascertain the strategic direction and status of DOD's Counterproliferation Initiative, particularly how the Department plans to effectively integrate the organizations, plans, policies, requirements, and programs of the diverse, but complementary, counterproliferation areas.

In 1996, the Joint Staff, the military services, and the unified commands conducted a 6-month review of the strategic environment expected for the year 2010. An important element of that review was the NBC threat. The resulting report\textsuperscript{24} cited the need for a comprehensive Department strategy for countering this threat because of the threat's gravity for deployed U.S. forces and for the U.S. homeland. This strategy was never developed.

The Secretary of Defense's May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review report stated that to advance the institutionalization of counterproliferation concepts, the Joint Staff and the unified commands would develop an operational strategy for integrating the offensive and defensive elements of U.S. counterproliferation capabilities. Because the capabilities necessary to deal with NBC weapons and conditions cover such a broad range of joint and service operations, there is a tendency to assume that the sum of the deterrence, active, passive, counterforce, and consequence management capabilities will be sufficient to meet the requirement to fight and win in an NBC environment. The kind of operational strategy discussed above would

\textsuperscript{24}Joint Strategy Review, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Jan. 1997.
more effectively integrate the broad range of existing and developing U.S. capabilities into a mode of operations and indicate areas where further progress is needed. It would also describe the means by which a broader DOD-level counterproliferation strategy would be executed. The Joint Staff is preparing a strategy document, but its development has languished because of staff shortages and higher priorities. As described to us by the Joint Staff, the document might not provide the integrated strategy sought. It would be more of a collection of current guidance contained in numerous publications, rather than a strategy for bringing together the offensive and defensive capabilities for countering NBC weapons. The Joint Staff plans to issue this document in June 2000.

In addition to the absence of documented counterproliferation strategies, DOD has not created a single, integrated master, or management, plan to guide, oversee, and integrate its departmentwide counterproliferation efforts. Such a plan would establish specific responsibilities, goals, objectives, timetables, and a process for reporting and evaluating the progress toward achieving goals and objectives. It would also serve as a tool to guide execution of counterproliferation strategy.

Some organizations involved in counterproliferation have created or are considering developing master plans. For example, the Air Force published a comprehensive master plan for counterproliferation in 1997 that detailed its approach for developing and providing capabilities, requirements to support the unified commands, and shortfalls and deficiencies and measures to correct them. An Air Force official told us the plan helps the Air Force to integrate all the various counterproliferation efforts that were once separate functions and encourages working relationships among the efforts. Counterproliferation officials in Navy and Marine Corps headquarters stated that their services saw value in having such plans and are considering creating similar master plans. These officials also saw a benefit in having a DOD-wide counterproliferation master plan to provide a better focus for executing their individual service efforts.

A senior policy official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense told us that his office considered developing a comprehensive departmentwide master plan but decided against it. The official said ensuring that counterproliferation is addressed in major department policy and planning documents, such as the Defense Planning Guidance, is a better approach than a master plan. He also added that creating such a plan would take quite a bit of resources and time.
DOD also has not established a reporting and evaluation process for assessing departmentwide progress toward achieving counterproliferation strategic goals and objectives. Such a process is important to implement the strategy, to assess its effectiveness, provide information on what needs to be done to refine policy and program directions, and assist with program budget management. The qualitative and quantitative performance measures developed under this process could allow for a constant assessment of progress toward a strategy’s goals and objectives in order to gauge success or failure and to adjust the strategy accordingly. Such goals and performance measures would be consistent with the principles of the Government Performance and Results Act, which the Congress anticipated would be institutionalized and practiced at all organizational levels of the federal government.25

DOD coordinates its programs that are strongly related to counterproliferation with the Department of Energy and key intelligence agencies primarily through the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (see app. IV). The Committee’s coordination of ongoing research and development programs is necessary to ensure that funding is optimally used and that undesirable redundancies or uncoordinated efforts are eliminated. While the Committee has enhanced the exchange of information among these agencies, it has not taken determined steps to identify and eliminate undesirable redundancies or uncoordinated efforts throughout counterproliferation programs.

DOD, Department of Energy, and intelligence agency officials generally expressed satisfaction with the exchange of information that the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee provides. They believe the Committee has led to good interaction at the working level as a result of representatives from the agencies preparing the Committee’s annual report. The officials also cited instances where coordination had enabled the agencies to leverage work being done by each other. A typical example is where the agencies participate in each other’s tests to develop needed test data. Senior-level meetings, while less frequent than working group meetings, also have reportedly improved communication among the

Committee Has Not Established a System to Identify and Eliminate Undesirable Redundancies and Uncoordinated Efforts

The Committee has not taken concerted actions to identify and eliminate undesirable redundancies, one of the primary reasons the Congress established it. While several Committee participants believe duplication had been reduced, they were able to provide few examples. Central Intelligence Agency officials cited, for example, an instance where two similar projects being conducted by two Department of Energy laboratories were merged. This duplication was identified when a review was made of a list of research and development projects with potential intelligence implications. While duplication can be identified through normal coordination actions, a process has not been established to focus on identifying and eliminating duplication. As far back as 1994, the Committee itself recognized the need for a system to identify overlaps.

Overlap and duplication within and among the agencies could be widespread, as evidenced by a 1999 U.S. Joint Forces Command assessment of organizations and projects developing capabilities to attack critical mobile targets, particularly ballistic and cruise missiles with NBC warheads. The Command initially identified and obtained information on 525 projects related to joint experiments it was planning. These projects included experiments, demonstrations, studies, simulations, exercises, and war games. In its assessment, the Command used an integration database tool to assess each project for relevance to the mobile target experiment and identified 113 associated projects that it deemed applicable. Representatives from each of these projects met to share information and identify opportunities to pool their efforts. While some of the project teams had established strong relationships, many had not. The Command also found some duplication among the projects, but it believes the type of cooperation demonstrated by their efforts will reduce that redundancy. The Command has continued to expand its database and identify additional

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26Section 1605 (b) (2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (P.L. 103-160), as amended.

27A war game is a simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation.
projects, beyond the initial 113, associated with attacking mobile targets. Although these projects have counterproliferation implications, we found no evidence that the Committee had reviewed these projects to determine whether they overlapped or were redundant.

In its 1996 report, the Committee recommended development of an integrated chemical and biological defense research and development plan for DOD, Energy, and the intelligence community. In May 1999, the Senate Committee on Armed Services, seeing no action on this recommendation, directed the Committee to submit the integrated plan to congressional defense committees by March 1, 2000. In July 1999, the Committee tasked development of the integrated plan to a newly established joint chemical and biological defense research and development focus group. DOD officials believe the coordination and collaboration involved in developing such a plan could result in identifying and eliminating duplicative programs and uncoordinated efforts in passive defense. DOD said that similar plans may be developed to optimize integration of joint research and development activities in the other areas of counterproliferation. The Central Intelligence Agency, recognizing the difficulties faced in eliminating unnecessary duplication among programs, sees the focus group as a limited but positive step. Difficulties have been encountered in developing the plan and the March 1, 2000, deadline was not met. In explaining the delay, DOD officials cited difficulties in merging the research and development programs of two independent agencies.

Conclusions

While DOD has taken actions to integrate considerations of the NBC threat into its organization, activities, and functions, it is very difficult to gauge the progress or context of the Department’s counterproliferation actions relative to stated goals and objectives. Development of mechanisms such as a comprehensive strategy, a military strategy, and a management plan complemented by a reporting and evaluation process would provide an integrated long-range vision and comprehensive guidance to better focus and direct DOD’s counterproliferation efforts and tools to guide and oversee progress toward achievement of goals and objectives. Without such mechanisms, it is difficult for senior leaders, the Congress, and others to determine the progress and success of DOD’s efforts and make optimal

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decisions on the effective use of resources to develop the capabilities required for the counterproliferation mission.

While DOD has taken steps to strengthen its counterproliferation organization, studies indicate that the links between policy and programs, as well as among the major counterproliferation areas—counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management—could be strengthened. A strong organizational focus is necessary to ensure efficient integration and management of the wide range of counterproliferation initiatives being carried out by many diverse and loosely connected DOD organizational elements. Inefficient integration of these initiatives can lead to gaps in capabilities, wasted resources through undesirable duplication, interoperability problems, unrealistic plans, inconsistent doctrine, inadequate joint training, and ineffective fighting forces.

DOD has not developed an overarching joint counterproliferation doctrine document to provide a centralized picture of how DOD should respond in an NBC environment across the spectrum of military operations. Developing and maintaining a comprehensive overarching doctrine for counterproliferation could identify and eliminate gaps in addressing counterproliferation-related tasks in the body of doctrine. Gaps in doctrine can result in weaknesses in the ability of joint forces to effectively train, respond, and operate in an NBC environment. Joint training policy, for example, requires that the joint tasks, such as the decontamination of NBC contaminated equipment, used in joint training be supported by doctrine.

DOD’s acquisition processes, including those of the military services, are not providing effective oversight to guard against developing and deploying systems and equipment that cannot perform effectively in an NBC contaminated environment. Failure to field NBC survivable systems and equipment would significantly affect the ability of U.S. forces to sustain operations in such an environment.

Although interagency coordination among DOD, Department of Energy, and the intelligence community is reported as good, the full potential benefit of the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee is not being realized. While tasked by the Congress to identify and eliminate unnecessarily redundant programs or uncoordinated efforts, the Committee does not have a procedural mechanism to facilitate such determinations and decisions within and across the counterproliferation areas. The results of the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s assessment of organizations and projects developing capabilities to attack critical mobile
targets suggest that there are opportunities to improve coordination and identify potential undesirable redundancies and uncoordinated efforts in counterproliferation. Identifying and eliminating unneeded redundancies and uncoordinated efforts is necessary to ensure that the resources available for counterproliferation efforts are optimized.

**Recommendations**

To more clearly determine DOD’s progress in implementing its Counterproliferation Initiative, provide additional tools to guide and oversee its efforts, and ensure greater accountability to the Congress, we recommend the Secretary of Defense take actions to develop (1) a departmentwide strategy that takes a long-term, comprehensive view of the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat and links ends, ways, and means to better integrate DOD’s policies and programs for counterproliferation and (2) a military strategy for integrating U.S. offensive and defensive capabilities. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop (1) a management plan that clearly delineates responsibilities, explicit and outcome-oriented goals, a process for reporting, evaluating, and validating its progress, and a resource strategy for ensuring funding of its efforts and (2) quantitative or qualitative performance measures that can be used to assess progress toward goal achievement.

Additionally, the Secretary of Defense should include in the next Quadrennial Defense Review an examination of the Department’s organization for counterproliferation to determine if adjustments can be made to realize greater efficiency and effectiveness in the management and integration of the Department’s initiatives.

To provide assurance that the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat is being given sufficient attention in the body of military doctrine, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense have the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a comprehensive overarching joint doctrine publication that encompasses all elements of counterproliferation.

To improve the attention given to nuclear, biological, and chemical survivability in DOD and service acquisition processes, we recommend that the Secretary devise and implement a systematic approach that identifies the systems and equipment that need to be capable of operating in a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment and provides reasonable assurance that appropriate features are incorporated into the designs of these systems.
To strengthen the effectiveness of the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee in identifying and eliminating any unnecessary redundant programs, the Secretary of Defense, as Committee Chairman, should direct the Committee to devise and implement a procedural mechanism that establishes clear criteria, procedures, and a process for making such decisions.

**Agency Comments and Our Evaluation**

We received written comments from the Departments of Defense and Energy on a draft of this report, which are included in their entirety as appendixes VI and VII, respectively. DOD generally agreed with our recommendations and indicated that many corrective actions that are responsive to them have already been started as a part of the continuing implementation of the Counterproliferation Initiative. DOD also provided technical comments to the draft that were incorporated in the report where appropriate. The Department of Energy did not have any comments on our findings or recommendations. We obtained oral comments from the Central Intelligence Agency on specific sections of the report and have made changes in the report where appropriate.

While DOD acknowledges that there is merit to our recommendations, it is noncommittal on most of them. We examined many of the initiatives DOD cites in its comments and have discussed them in this report. We believe the Department's corrective actions are limited, and that the long-term challenge posed by the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons requires a more concerted, focused, and integrated effort by DOD. Therefore, we continue to believe that the Department should implement our recommendations. DOD's comments and a more detailed discussion of them are included in appendix VI.

**Scope and Methodology**

To identify actions DOD has taken and opportunities for further action to institutionalize counterproliferation throughout DOD's organization, activities, and functions, we obtained information, documents, and perspectives from officials at all levels of the Department, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, relevant defense agencies, the four military services, and the four unified commands that we visited, including their service component commands. We also obtained perspectives from former defense officials, military experts, and academicians, and defense support contractor staff. Appendix V lists the principal organizations where we performed work.
We reviewed an extensive array of policy, planning, and guidance documents, joint and service doctrine, acquisition program documents, military plans, intelligence documents, posture statements and speeches, congressional hearings and testimonies, relevant legislation, statutory reports, open literature, and studies and assessments. In particular, we examined several Defense Planning Guidance documents to understand how counterproliferation guidance has evolved. We examined the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff’s counterproliferation concept plan and corresponding plans prepared by the regional unified commands. We also reviewed the extent that counterproliferation tasks had been incorporated into the theater operation and concepts military plans of the regional unified commands. To ascertain the extent that counterproliferation tasks have been incorporated into joint and service field exercises, we asked the Joint Staff to prepare a summary of the relevant exercises and to include tasks, conducted by the unified commands and the services over the past 3 years. We surveyed and obtained documents from the service and joint intermediate and senior-level professional military education schools to determine how counterproliferation concepts had been incorporated into their curricula. To determine the rationale for recommendations made in the 1999 Report of the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, we reviewed the report and discussed the findings and observations with Commission staff.

To provide a context within which to review DOD’s actions and determine the pervasiveness and extent of institutionalization within the Department, we used criteria DOD had established for implementing its institutionalization efforts. DOD plans to institutionalize counterproliferation by (1) embedding counterproliferation in all aspects of its planning and programming process, (2) adapting military doctrine and operational plans to deal with NBC weapons in regional contingencies, (3) maturing acquisition programs to ensure that U.S. forces will be adequately trained and equipped to operate effectively in contingencies involving NBC threats, and (4) reallocating intelligence resources to provide better information about adversary NBC capabilities and how they are likely to be used. We also used these criteria to examine actions aimed at institutionalization at all levels of DOD’s organization, in the functional areas of planning, programming, and budgeting, and across the four areas of counterproliferation capability efforts (counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management). We did not evaluate the
impact or effectiveness of the actions because it was beyond the scope of our work.

To evaluate the effectiveness of the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, we discussed the level of interagency coordination and collaboration with DOD, Department of Energy, and Central Intelligence Agency officials and staff. We also discussed with these officials and obtained information on the development of the Committee's annual report to the Congress, the structure of the Committee and its network of supporting committees, and the implementation of key Committee recommendations. We reviewed the legislative history and legislation establishing and defining the Committee's authority and responsibilities and compared each of the Committee's annual reports from 1994 to 1999. To determine the Committee's actions to identify and eliminate unnecessary redundancy or uncoordinated efforts among agency programs, we asked senior officials and action officers to cite specific examples and provide documentation.

Our review was conducted from April 1999 through February 2000 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We will send copies of this report to interested congressional committees; the Honorable William S. Cohen, the Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Bill Richardson, the Secretary of Energy; the Honorable Louis Caldera, the Secretary of the Army; the Honorable Richard Danzig, the Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, the Secretary of the Air Force; General Henry H. Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Honorable George J. Tenet, the Director, Central Intelligence Agency; Dr. Jay Davis, the Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and the Honorable Jacob J. Lew, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3610 or Marvin Casterline at (202) 512-9076.
Key contributors to this assignment were Mark Wielgoszynski, Joseph Kirschbaum, and Sally Newman.

Norman J. Rabkin  
Director, National Security  
Preparedness Issues
### Chronology of Major Counterproliferation Milestones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Department of Defense (DOD) annual report issued.</td>
<td>Stated that countering weapons of mass destruction is a high priority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>The Central Intelligence Agency established the Nonproliferation Center.</td>
<td>Established as the focal point for all Intelligence Community activities related to proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (P.L. 103-160) enacted.</td>
<td>Established the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. Funding for the program was centralized and overall management responsibility placed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense announced the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative.</td>
<td>Identified need to recognize new mission of protection in addition to proliferation prevention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense issued memorandum, &quot;DOD Role in Counterproliferation.&quot;</td>
<td>Assigned responsibility within DOD for developing policies, acquisition strategy, a statement of military roles and missions, and intelligence support for Counterproliferation Initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Interagency group issued <em>Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs</em>.</td>
<td>First of annual Counterproliferation Program Review Committee report series. (“Nonproliferation” was dropped from title the following year).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense issued memorandum, “DOD Counterproliferation Policy” is issued.</td>
<td>Memorandum’s purpose was to focus DOD expertise to enhance effectiveness of nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities. Emphasized development of plans to conduct counterproliferation operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Counterproliferation Support Program established by Deputy Secretary of Defense.</td>
<td>Program’s goal is to “address key shortfalls in counterproliferation capabilities.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Executive Order 12938, “Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” is issued.</td>
<td>Order declared a national emergency to deal with “proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the means of delivering such weapons.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>White House issued <em>A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.</em></td>
<td>This version of the National Security Strategy stated “…a key part of our strategy is to seek to stem the proliferation of [weapons of mass destruction and missiles] and to develop an effective capability to deal with these threats.” The 1996 update repeated this phrase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff issued revised National Military Strategy.</td>
<td>Emphasized deterrence and improved capability to operate in contaminated environments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense approved Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterproliferation Missions and Functions Study Report.</td>
<td>Report concluded that improvements were needed in regional unified command planning processes and that the unified commands should be responsible for implementing counterproliferation policy in their geographic areas of responsibility.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I  
Chronology of Major Counterproliferation Milestones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President signed revised Unified Command Plan.</td>
<td>The regional unified commands were assigned counterproliferation responsibilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1996 April</strong></td>
<td>DOD issued first version of <em>Proliferation: Threat and Response.</em></td>
<td>Document provided information on the nature of global proliferation and DOD policies and programs for countering the threat. It was updated in November 1997.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved “Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” concept plan (CONPLAN 0400-96).</td>
<td>Plan directed the five regional unified commands to develop regionally specific counterproliferation plans. (All of the plans were approved by August 1999.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Instruction 5113.02, “Counterproliferation Charter,” issued.</td>
<td>Instruction provided policy and guidance for the employment of U.S. forces for counterproliferation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1997 May</strong></td>
<td>White House issued <em>A National Security Strategy for a New Century.</em></td>
<td>The new National Security Strategy states that the United States must plan and prepare to fight major theater wars “under conditions where an adversary may use asymmetric means,” including weapons of mass destruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>DOD issued <em>Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review.</em></td>
<td>Assessment viewed chemical and/or biological attack as a “likely condition of future warfare” and directed a $1-billion counterproliferation funding increase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff issued new <em>National Military Strategy.</em></td>
<td>The strategy stated that employment of weapons of mass destruction in both major theater war and smaller-scale contingencies is increasingly likely and U.S. forces must have a balanced counterproliferation capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Defense Reform Initiative Report issued.</td>
<td>DOD panel report called for creation of Defense Threat Reduction Agency to consolidate nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force issued counterproliferation master plan.</td>
<td>Described the Air Force's strategy and objectives for confronting weapons of mass destruction capable adversaries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1998 April</strong></td>
<td>Defense Planning Guidance 2000-2005 issued.</td>
<td>Called the threat or use of chemical and biological weapons a likely condition of future warfare and provided increased guidance to DOD's components for responding to the threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1999 April</strong></td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative announced.</td>
<td>Committed NATO members to share weapons of mass destruction information, broaden planning, coordinate on nonproliferation measures and on civilian protection, and establish a NATO weapons of mass destruction center.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Counterproliferation Mission Support Senior Oversight Council established.</td>
<td>Group created to enhance cooperation on counterproliferation among regional unified and functional unified commands.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Continued from Previous Page
# Appendix II

## Our Recent Unclassified Reports on Counterproliferation and Related Subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medical Readiness: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Its Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program (GAO/NSIAD-00-36, Oct. 22, 1999)</td>
<td>Testing problems have slowed release of the anthrax vaccine. The manufacturer has yet to get Food and Drug Administration permission to release lots produced after restarting operations following renovation shutdown. DOD’s plans for maintaining an adequate supply assume approval of tested lots in less time than in past. It has no contingency plan and is not meeting its requirement to consistently record vaccination data. It has not informed personnel how to provide necessary data for its monitoring system. Thus, it may not be able to monitor vaccine safety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on Actions Taken to Protect Military Forces (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49, Oct. 20, 1999)</td>
<td>Testimony summarizing the message in our previous reports and testimonies on DOD’s efforts to resolve problems identified in the Gulf War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of Non-Medical Chemical and Biological R&amp;D Program (GAO/NSIAD-99-160, Aug. 16, 1999)</td>
<td>Four federal programs fund research and development of nonmedical chemical and biological defense technologies (two of them for warfighting applications). The framework to coordinate these programs has limited information on user needs and on how programs relate research and development projects to needs. More information about user needs and how user needs relate to projects would allow coordination mechanisms to better identify overlaps, gaps, and collaboration opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should Follow Results Act Framework (GAO/NSIAD-99-159, Aug. 16, 1999)</td>
<td>DOD’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program, in general, and its research, development, test, and evaluation activities in particular, have not satisfactorily incorporated key Results Act principles. Program goals are vague and unmeasurable, inconsistently applied, and do not articulate specific desired impacts. Performance measures emphasize activities rather than impacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Readiness: Issues Concerning the Anthrax Vaccine (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-226, July 21, 1999)</td>
<td>Studies have not been done to determine optimum number of doses of anthrax vaccine. The DOD system to collect data on adverse events relies on vaccine recipients or their health care providers to report adverse events. Studies show that adverse events are reported significantly less then they would be under an active surveillance system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Defense: THAAD Restructure Addresses Problems but Limits Early Capability (GAO/NSIAD-99-142, June 30, 1999)</td>
<td>The Theater High Altitude Area Defense system's flight-test schedule did not allow for adequate ground testing. Interceptors for tests were not equipped with sufficient instruments to provide optimum test data. Flight-test failures have been caused primarily by manufacturing defects rather than problems with advanced technology. These failures have prevented the Army from demonstrating that it can reliably employ the “hit-to-kill” technology critical to the system’s success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense: More Common Systems and Components Could Result in Cost Savings (GAO/NSIAD-99-101, May 21, 1999)</td>
<td>The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has achieved commonality primarily at lower levels of assembly, such as components. Officials report limited success in designing common systems or major subsystems mostly because of differences in system requirements and operating environments and difficulties in incorporating new technologies into mature systems. DOD needs to establish a structured effort with appropriate funding to identify and evaluate common systems and components.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruise Missile Defense: Progress Made but Significant Challenges Remain (GAO/NSIAD-99-68, Mar. 31, 1999)</td>
<td>The organization for coordinating cruise missile defense across the services consists of the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization for operational requirements and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization for acquisition. They are to work closely together to develop and refine a theater air and missile defense master plan. The military services are primarily responsible for funding and developing cruise missile defense capabilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Defense Acquisitions: DOD Efforts to Develop Laser Weapons for Theater Defense

**Message:** DOD is developing two laser weapons—the Airborne Laser and the Space-based Laser—to destroy enemy ballistic missiles. Additionally, in a joint effort with Israel, DOD is developing a ground-based laser weapon, the Tactical High Energy Laser, which Israel will use to defend against short-range rockets. They are in various stages of development. The airborne laser is scheduled for full operational capability in 2009. Laser experts agree all three systems face significant technical challenges.

### Force Structure: Opportunities for the Army to Reduce Risk in Executing the Military Strategy

**Message:** The Army's risk in implementing the National Security Strategy increased since its 1996 review. The Army's risk may be even higher. The 1998 force structure review was based on several "best case" assumptions, including limited enemy use of chemical weapons and immediate access to ports/airfields. The Army's overall chemical support requirement is significantly under resourced, with only about 12,300 of 23,600 required positions allocated end strength during Total Army Analysis 2005.

### Chemical Weapons: DOD Does Not Have a Strategy to Address Low-Level Exposures

**Message:** DOD does not have a strategy to address low-level chemical weapons exposures. It has not stated a policy or developed a doctrine on protection of troops from low-level battlefield chemical exposures. Research indicates low-level exposures to some chemical agents may result in adverse short-term performance and long-term health effects.

### Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD's Evaluation of Improved Garment Materials

**Message:** Because the Marine Corps Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology Program and the Army's exploratory development efforts were research and development activities, they were not subject to the same procedures as acquisition programs. DOD provided industry adequate opportunity to participate. The basic requirement for a lightweight, launderable, chemical protective garment did not change, but certain mission-specific requirements were added.

### Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DOD's Plans to Protect U.S. Forces

**Message:** While many Gulf War deficiencies remain, DOD has increasingly accepted the urgency of developing a capability to deal with the chemical and biological threat. Its actions have resulted in increased funding and fielding of more and better defense equipment. DOD, however, still needs to decide major policy and doctrine issues, improve agent detection capabilities, provide forces with better and sufficient numbers of individual protective equipment, and deal with collective protection and decontamination problems. Doctrine and policy are inadequate regarding responsibility for defense of overseas airfields and ports against chemical or biological attacks. Questions remain regarding the force structure and equipment needed to protect these facilities. Unresolved doctrinal, policy, and equipment questions persist regarding return of chemical or biological contaminated aircraft and ships and protection of essential and nonessential civilians in high-threat areas. Servicemembers in high-threat areas normally lack biological agent detection capability. Collective protection facilities and equipment and agent detection systems are generally insufficient to protect the force.

### Ballistic Missile Defense: Improvements Needed in Navy Area Acquisition Planning

**Message:** The area air defense system is a sea-based weapon system being developed by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the Navy to defeat theater ballistic missiles. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the Congress consider it a high-priority theater missile defense program to protect deployed forces, population centers, and industrial facilities from theater missile attacks. The system has experienced schedule delays; additional slips are possible. The Navy plans to begin production before conducting operational tests.
Additional Information on DOD’s Actions to Institutionalize Counterproliferation

The underlying objective of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative is to make counterproliferation one of the matters routinely given consideration within DOD activities. DOD has taken actions since 1993, some of which are identified in table 1, to integrate the threat of NBC weapons and their means of delivery into its organization, activities, and functions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy and planning</td>
<td>• DOD incorporated counterproliferation guidance into major department planning and policy documents.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Joint Staff and the regional commands developed an overarching concept plan for counterproliferation operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regional unified commands incorporated counterproliferation tasks and guidance into military plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Army developed a planning/strategy document for NBC defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Navy is developing a counterproliferation master plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirements determination</td>
<td>• The Joint Staff established a warfighting assessment team to assess joint counterproliferation requirements and capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>• DOD created the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program to manage joint research, development, and acquisition programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Air Force and the U.S. Special Operations Command created long-range acquisition plans (road maps).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and exercises</td>
<td>• DOD components increased NBC emphasis in service-level training and major joint exercises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Air Force reviewed chemical and biological weapons defense training and readiness deficiencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional military education</td>
<td>• Joint and service colleges have incorporated coverage of the counterproliferation areas into their curricula.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence support</td>
<td>• Defense Intelligence Agency set up a counterproliferation office and continues to increase the size of its staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Defense Intelligence Agency created an NBC threat intelligence database that is widely accessed to support operations and planning.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

While DOD continues to institutionalize counterproliferation, it recognizes that there are areas where further efforts are clearly warranted. For example, DOD has agreed to take action in response to DOD Inspector General reports that have identified deficiencies in service training and intelligence support. Much also remains to be done to understand the biological threat and to develop the doctrine, training, and equipment to counter it. This appendix provides additional discussion of DOD’s actions to institutionalize counterproliferation in its functional areas.
One of the objectives of the DOD Counterproliferation Initiative is to integrate proliferation concerns into the existing planning process. Major policy and planning guidance and the strategy for military actions to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery systems are contained in numerous key documents such as the National Security Strategy, the Defense Planning Guidance, a June 1994 DOD counterproliferation policy memorandum, DOD's counterproliferation directive, and the National Military Strategy. However, while presidential decision directives have been issued on preventing proliferation and counterterrorism, none have been issued specifically to address the military measures to combat the threat of NBC weapon use.¹

Two DOD planning documents that provide detailed guidance—the Defense Planning Guidance and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan²—have significantly increased emphasis on the NBC threat. A comparison of the Defense Planning Guidance of 1996 and 1999 shows a marked increase in emphasis on the NBC threat. Table 2 provides examples of the differences between the 1996 and 1999 documents.

¹A presidential decision directive is used to promulgate presidential decisions on national security matters.

²The Defense Planning Guidance provides Secretary of Defense guidance to the military departments for development of their budgets. It includes major planning issues and decisions, strategy, and policy. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides guidance to the commanders in chief of the unified commands and chiefs of the military services for accomplishing tasks and missions based on current capabilities. It also assigns tasks and resources to the unified commands for preparing their theater plans.
Appendix III
Additional Information on DOD's Actions to Institutionalize Counterproliferation

Table 2: Comparison of Counterproliferation-Related Areas of the 1996 and 1999 Defense Planning Guidance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hostile states may be capable of using weapons of mass destruction in a major theater war.</td>
<td>Threat or use of chemical and biological weapons is a likely condition in a future major theater war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC warfare is not mentioned in discussing the phases of a major theater war.</td>
<td>Need for active and passive defenses during three phases of major theater war is discussed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC weapons or warfare is not mentioned in discussing contingency operations.</td>
<td>Counterforce operations against NBC facilities are cited as a potential contingency operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning section discusses NBC weapons. Most of the discussion is on proliferation prevention with a limited discussion of capabilities to counter the use of NBC weapons.</td>
<td>Planning section contains a detailed discussion of defensive measures; intelligence requirements; logistics; counterforce and active and passive defense capabilities; and doctrine, exercises, and training. Nuclear survivability is briefly discussed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programming guidance briefly discusses development of capabilities to defeat buried and hardened targets and active and passive defenses against the NBC threat.</td>
<td>Modernization guidance includes more specifics on intelligence support, counterforce, and active and passive defense capabilities against the NBC threat.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the recommendation of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1995 study, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan was revised to explain counterproliferation policy objectives and identify the missions and assign counterproliferation tasks to the unified combatant commanders. We reviewed portions of the 1996 and 1998 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans that included regional taskings for the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the U.S. Southern Command, as well as the general guidance on counterproliferation and NBC-related issues. Generic planning guidance regarding defense against weapons of mass destruction when confronted by such a threat is provided to all unified commands. This guidance was essentially identical in the 1996 and 1998 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans with the 1998 version providing more specific weapons of mass destruction taskings for two of the unified commands.

Requirements Determination

There are several means for identifying the counterproliferation requirements and capabilities of the unified commands. Formally, each command annually submits a list of integrated priorities to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, that identifies its highest requirements across all mission areas. Some commands have included counterproliferation-related

3Counterproliferation Missions and Functions Study Report, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 18, 1995.
elements among their highest priorities. Additionally, each regional command and Special Operations Command have prepared a counterproliferation concept plan for its region that identifies capabilities to carry out missions. Also, as part of its Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment process, the Joint Staff established an assessment team for deterrence and counterproliferation when the process was established in 1994. This team annually assesses the requirements of the regional unified commands to accomplish their counterproliferation mission as assigned by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The final assessments of the team are used to influence programming and budget guidance and to develop recommendations on allocating resources for joint requirements. The Chairman uses the information to develop two key documents—the Chairman's Program Recommendations, which contain his recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for consideration in developing the Defense Planning Guidance, and the Chairman's Program Assessment, which contains alternative program recommendations and budget proposals for the Secretary's consideration in refining DOD's programs and budget. The team has made several important contributions to these documents, such as helping secure funds for an increase in biological agent detection units.

Since 1995, the deterrence and counterproliferation assessment team has conducted an annual assessment of requirements and capabilities through a series of workshops at the unified commands. The 1998 assessment identified and prioritized 19 requirements and 72 capabilities to meet those requirements. For example, a high priority identified by the commands was to provide individual protection to forces and assist allies and coalition partners with relief from the effect of NBC use. Capabilities necessary to meet that requirement included individual protective equipment, medical treatments, specified training, movable NBC detection and characterization devices, and immediate decontamination. The assessment team determined the sufficiency of then current capabilities.

Officials at the unified commands we visited were satisfied with the team's review of the issues and determination of requirements and capabilities. A
U.S. Central Command official noted that the assessment was a useful process to raise concerns of the regional commands to the Joint Staff. Joint Staff officials who support the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which oversees the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment process, said the team has done a good job of balancing risk, fiscal constraints, and requirements and effectively communicating the results of its work.

The regional unified commands have responsibility for implementing DOD counterproliferation policy within their respective geographic areas of responsibility. Each of the commands has approved concept plans, based on the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Concept Plan 0400, to meet its counterproliferation mission based upon theater-unique situations and circumstances. They have incorporated elements of their counterproliferation concept plans into other theater plans, particularly their plans for major theater wars.

Acquisition

The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative identified "changing what we buy" as a key step in acquiring the right capabilities necessary to respond to NBC threats. DOD has taken several steps to respond to the Initiative's direction and to institutionalize counterproliferation into defense acquisition processes. *The Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs*, issued in 1994 by an interagency group in accordance with provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, discussed key shortfalls in counterproliferation capabilities. The report also prompted the establishment of the Counterproliferation Support Program, whose goals are to leverage ongoing research and development and acquisition programs to meet the counterproliferation priorities of the unified commands and to accelerate the deployment of enhanced capabilities to the field. It provides partial start-up funding for efforts that the services might not otherwise undertake. Projects that received such funds included the Tactical Unattended Ground Sensor and Joint Biological Remote Early Warning System.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 also established the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program.\(^5\) The program's mandate is to coordinate and integrate all DOD chemical and

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biological defense research and development and acquisition efforts. 
Oversight comes from the NBC Defense Steering Committee, which is 
composed of the Director for Defense Research and Engineering, the 
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary for Chemical and Biological Defense, the 
Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Director of the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Chemical and Biological Defense 
directorate. The military services provide day-to-day management of the 
program.

Chemical and biological defense has figured prominently in recent research 
and development planning documents. Since 1996, chapters on chemical 
and biological defense and countering weapons of mass destruction have 
appeared in the annual DOD-wide Joint Warfighting Science and 
Technology Plan. This document identifies joint objectives critical to future 
forces and is designed to ensure that DOD's Science and Technology 
Program supports warfighting requirements. Each chapter defines needed 
and available capabilities and lays out a road map for redressing 
technological deficiencies. A chapter on hard and deeply buried target 
defeat was added in the February 2000 plan. In addition, the Joint Service 
Materiel Group, which is responsible for research, development, 
acquisition, planning, and technical oversight for the DOD Chemical and 
Biological Defense Program, issued a comprehensive plan of action in April 
1998 to guide research and development and acquisition funding.

To expedite the deployment of needed counterproliferation capabilities, 
DOD uses its Advanced Capability Technology Demonstration Program. 
While the normal acquisition process can take many years for a new system 
to begin production and be deployed, the advanced capability technology 
demonstration process focuses on deploying prototypes of promising 
technologies to determine their operational feasibility and application. One 
example is Portal Shield, a biological agent detection system that provides 
a capability to detect, warn, and identify a biological weapons attack on a 
fixed location, such as an air base or seaport. DOD considers the Portal 
Shield project a success. The number of Portal Shield systems to be 
acquired was increased in 1999 in response to the large demand by several 
regional unified commands for additional systems. Counterforce weapon 
capabilities developed under another counterproliferation demonstration 
project were used against hardened targets in Kosovo during Operation 
Allied Force in 1999.

The technology demonstration program is not designed for full-scale 
procurement. To procure larger quantities and provide the operations and
maintenance support for a demonstration item, a military service must agree to sponsor and provide the necessary funding. These demonstration items must compete for resources with other major systems being acquired through the normal acquisition process.

Training and Exercises

Numerous military tasks and operations support counterproliferation. The military operations conducted by the unified commands are based on joint doctrine, trained to unified command and service standards, described in detail within military theater plans, and exercised and trained to the standards during unified command, service, and joint training events. While the unified commands and the services are not required to develop specific exercises to train associated forces on counterproliferation tasks, they have incorporated coverage of these tasks into various training events, such as service training, large-scale exercises, computer-assisted exercises, seminars, and operations.

Counterproliferation-related elements are found in the joint task lists, which are the basis for joint training. The requirements for the joint tasks derive from the Defense Planning Guidance, the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the military theater plans of the regional unified commands. Each of the services also has a list of essential tasks, including NBC and counterproliferation issues, that must be performed to accomplish that service's mission. For example, one Navy task is to “defend against, detect, monitor, and reduce NBC threats.” This task includes warning and reporting of NBC threats and involves both threat reduction and implementation of readiness measures. Such essential tasks are the basis for subsequent training to support readiness.

Each of the services has taken steps to increase the NBC training it provides as well as enhance its NBC readiness. For example, the Marine Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force provides NBC training to deploying Marine Expeditionary Units. In addition, the Marine Corps has added an organic NBC capability, smaller but similar to the Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force, to each deploying unit. Similarly, the Army has developed a series of NBC-related training packages for various command levels and a plan to further incorporate NBC issues into such areas as training simulations, models, and the curricula of intermediate and senior Army service schools. The Army also includes the NBC-related items in its regular tests of Army Common Tasks for individual soldiers and for units.
A July 1998 report by the DOD Inspector General described numerous shortfalls in the execution of chemical and biological defense training among the services.\textsuperscript{6} The report concluded that except for Navy surface ships, unit commanders generally were not fully integrating chemical and biological defense into unit training. The Inspector General found that such training was not adequately incorporated into traditional readiness reporting mechanisms and recommended that the services revise their training plans and readiness reporting to better reflect the importance of this training. The services generally agreed with this recommendation. For example, as a result of a recently completed counterproliferation-readiness review, the Air Force plans to increase not only unit and individual NBC training but also the importance of NBC issues in measures of readiness. The Inspector General also noted the disparity between the relatively good Navy training of shipboard personnel and the more limited training of Navy air squadron personnel. The Navy is addressing the issue, especially in the context of joint operations. A number of major Navy exercises have included NBC elements for Navy and multiservice NBC-related training. However, the training and readiness shortfalls identified in the report have led the Counterproliferation Council to meet with the DOD Senior Requirements Council to discuss means of further integrating NBC issues into its measures of readiness. As the DOD Inspector General report suggests, this would provide further impetus for the services to more thoroughly conduct a broader range of NBC training.

In addition to the routine service and joint training and scheduled exercises conducted at the unified and component command levels, counterproliferation training can be achieved in incidental ways during events such as humanitarian relief operations, contingency deployments, and military operations other than war. For example, Pacific Command officials told us that U.S. forces received valuable practical training during the summer 1999 evacuation and re-occupation of Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. An approaching hurricane prompted a major consequence management operation on the island, which has a facility for destroying chemical weapons and agents. Pacific Command officials considered the operation a good test of the Command's NBC-related capabilities.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues guidance that directs joint commanders to concentrate training on specific areas the Chairman finds

deficient. For example, weapons of mass destruction and NBC defense are among the list of issues recommended by the Chairman for immediate action. Included in the list of items for ongoing training concentration are theater missile defense, which has a direct counterproliferation role, and areas such as information superiority, interagency operations, and interface between commands, which have only a relation to counterproliferation operations.

All elements of counterproliferation are included in major joint and combined exercises. Table 3 provides examples of joint and combined exercises that have had counterproliferation elements over the last 4 years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise name</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Counterproliferation element</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO Crises Management Exercise 2000</td>
<td>NATO forces</td>
<td>Scenario used in exercise included dealing with an adversary armed with chemical/biological weapons and medium-range ballistic missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligible Receiver</td>
<td>DOD and interagency staff</td>
<td>Scenarios used in exercises have included disaster relief and weapons of mass destruction terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater Missile Defense Exercise</td>
<td>United States and Russia</td>
<td>Conducted with Russian officers to exercise coordinated theater ballistic missile defense of a fictional third world country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brave Knight</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
<td>Focused on consequence management operations and included NBC defense emphasis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempest Express</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
<td>Trained joint task force and joint task force augmentation cell staff on crisis action procedures for consequence management operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coral Breeze</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
<td>NBC war game, analyses, and seminars to examine the effects of chemical and biological agent employment on U.S. operations on the Korean peninsula.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matador</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
<td>Includes planning, intelligence, and operational tasks that are not counterproliferation-specific but relate to NBC defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellipse Series</td>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
<td>Exercises include counterforce and support to consequence management operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turbo Challenge 2000</td>
<td>U.S. Transportation Command</td>
<td>Passive defense training incorporated into the tasks for the exercise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle Resolve</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
<td>Focuses on theater ballistic missiles and other NBC threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Endeavor 98-1</td>
<td>U.S. Joint Forces Command</td>
<td>Exercise provided training for joint task force staff on NBC protection in theater.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Professional Military Education

DOD officials consider professional military education to be vital to increasing awareness in officers and leaders of the seriousness of the NBC threat in military operations. DOD intermediate- and senior-level military schools have incorporated counterproliferation-related topics into their curricula, though the extent and emphasis of coverage vary among the schools.

The war colleges provide general coverage of counterproliferation-related topics in their core programs related to national security decision-making and operations. For example, 1 of the 14 instructional periods for the Air War College’s Department of Future Conflict is dedicated solely to weapons of mass destruction. Counterproliferation and NBC issues are also offered as additional courses at each of the war colleges. For example, a weapons of mass destruction elective course at the Army War College uses experts in the NBC field for lectures and provides an opportunity for a detailed study of NBC weapons and their means of delivery. Such courses generally include aspects of nonproliferation and counterproliferation. The colleges also regularly conduct conferences, war games, and exercises that address counterproliferation issues. For instance, counterproliferation issues are included in an annual war game attended by all of the war colleges at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

The National Defense University and the Air Force have established academic centers to improve counterproliferation education and research at their respective schools and to support other DOD components. These centers provide instructional support to the professional military education schools and participate in seminars and war games.

In 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that weapons of mass destruction be considered by the military schools as one of several special areas of emphasis to incorporate into their curricula. The 1998 list included the areas of consequence management support to foreign governments and force protection for U.S. forces operating overseas. Based on input from throughout DOD, this annual list highlights areas that are considered important for keeping professional military education on the leading edge of joint warfighting. However, such guidance contains no specific direction on the degree to which these topics should be emphasized or where in the overall curricula they belong. The schools have discretion on how these areas are incorporated into their curricula. The Air Command and Staff College noted that some guidance is also provided indirectly through DOD and joint agencies. They cited an example where
Intelligence Support

Effective intelligence support is critical to all aspects of DOD's counterproliferation mission. The Defense Intelligence Agency, which is the DOD focal point for integrating intelligence information in support of counterproliferation, established a counterproliferation support office in 1995 to provide focus for its efforts. This office had an authorized personnel level of about 135 in fiscal year 1999. Approval has been given for the addition of 35 analysts between fiscal year 2000 and 2004. Ten of those were on board as of January 2000. Expenditures by the support office increased from about $6 million in fiscal year 1995 to about $20 million in fiscal year 1999.

Initiatives have been undertaken to enhance intelligence support of counterproliferation initiatives and further integrate intelligence into DOD's counterproliferation efforts. The Defense Intelligence Agency's counterproliferation office is now producing a worldwide and four regional threat assessments every 2 years in support of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's weapons of mass destruction counterproliferation concept plan. An intelligence requirements office was established at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to facilitate the flow of intelligence requirements and products between the operational and intelligence communities. In 1998 the Defense Intelligence Agency established a computerized system to provide current substantive intelligence information and related support to policymakers, force planners, and combatant commanders. By December 1999, this classified system had 21 U.S. government agencies and organizations posting data to it. The Agency's data indicate wide use of the system. Another key initiative was the 1997 establishment of a center to provide improved intelligence support on underground facilities. Adversaries can use such facilities to protect and conceal their weapons of mass destruction programs. Additional initiatives are outlined in the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee's annual report to the Congress.

Two recent DOD assessments of counterproliferation intelligence support—one by the DOD Inspector General and the other by the Joint Staff—identified weaknesses in the level of support. Problems cited by the
Inspector General in a classified October 1999 report\(^7\) were similar to deficiencies cited in a 1996 study of biological and chemical weapons intelligence by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The Inspector General made numerous recommendations, concurred by DOD officials, that included establishment of policies, processes, and mechanisms to manage and oversee intelligence support to the counterproliferation mission. The December 1999 Joint Staff report\(^8\) concluded that there are inadequate resources to support intelligence collection and analysis of the NBC threat. The report, signed by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended more flexible allocation of resources to support counterproliferation missions and improvements in DOD’s intelligence production program to facilitate analyst collaboration to support counterproliferation missions.


Various organizations, offices, and coordinating bodies throughout DOD are assigned responsibilities for executing the 1993 Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. A 1996 DOD directive\(^1\) establishes the policy, assigns responsibilities, and formalizes relationships among DOD organizations for implementing counterproliferation activities and programs. This appendix (1) describes the organizational structures and major missions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military services, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency for counterproliferation; (2) presents information on current personnel levels and funding for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and (3) provides information on key DOD and interagency coordinating bodies.

### Office of the Secretary of Defense

Several organizations under the Office of the Secretary of Defense have counterproliferation-related responsibilities. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,\(^2\) is assigned general responsibilities for, among other things, (1) coordinating DOD research, development, and acquisition programs to ensure that they adequately support counterproliferation efforts and U.S. forces’ ability to conduct operations successfully in an NBC environment and (2) providing management oversight to the advanced concept technology demonstration program and to the directors of the defense agencies who report to the Under Secretary.\(^3\) The Assistant to the Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense provides oversight of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program.\(^4\) The Under Secretary for Policy is to “develop,\(^5\) ...
coordinate, and oversee” policy implementation throughout DOD and coordinate efforts with other U.S. government agencies and foreign allies and to oversee the Defense Technology Security Administration. Although not specifically assigned responsibilities for counterproliferation, the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, also plays a key role in the process of planning, programming, and budgeting. The Defense Intelligence Agency is a combat support agency. As such, it operates under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, but submits intelligence estimates and other substantive products directly to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and, as appropriate, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director, Defense Research and Engineering, is charged with assisting the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) in the day-to-day oversight of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The major counterproliferation-related organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense are shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Organizations and Functions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

- Secretary of Defense
  - Deputy Secretary
  - Assistant Secretary
    - Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence
  - Assistant Secretary
    - Strategy and Threat Reduction
  - Deputy Assistant Secretary
    - Requirements, Plans, and Counterproliferation Policy
  - Under Secretary
    - Acquisition Technology and Logistics
    - USD (AT&L)
    - Comptroller
    - Policy
  - Under Secretary
    - Acquisition Technology and Logistics
    - USD (AT&L)
    - Comptroller
    - Policy
  - Under Secretary
    - Policy
  - Under Secretary
    - Acquisiton Technology and Logistics
    - USD (AT&L)
    - Comptroller
    - Strategy and Threat Reduction
  - Under Secretary
    - Policy
  - Under Secretary
    - Acquisiton Technology and Logistics
    - USD (AT&L)
    - Comptroller
    - Strategy and Threat Reduction
  - Under Secretary
    - Policy
  - Under Secretary
    - Acquisiton Technology and Logistics
    - USD (AT&L)
    - Comptroller
    - Strategy and Threat Reduction
  - Under Secretary
    - Policy
  - Under Secretary
    - Acquisiton Technology and Logistics
    - USD (AT&L)
    - Comptroller
    - Strategy and Threat Reduction
  - Under Secretary
    - Policy

- Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
  - Director, Defense Research and Engineering
    - Defense Threat Reduction Agency
      - Manage programs to reduce the threat of NBC, conventional and special weapons
    - Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
      - Manage, direct, and execute the Ballistic Missile Defense Program
    - Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
    - Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Counterproliferation and Chemical/Biological Defense
      - Provide oversight of the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program
    - Director Counterproliferation Policy
      - Develop, coordinate, and oversee implementation of counterproliferation policy throughout DOD
  - Assistant Secretary
    - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
      - Conduct biological weapons defense research
  - Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
    - Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
  - Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
    - Counterproliferation and Chemical/Biological Defense

Source: DOD.
The Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff’s overall responsibilities for counterproliferation include (1) preparing guidance for the commanders of the regional unified commands and integrating the capabilities of the functional unified commands, such as the U.S. Special Operations Command; (2) preparing and reviewing plans; (3) making recommendations to the National Command Authorities\(^5\) for operational employment of U.S. forces in counterproliferation operations; and (4) developing joint counterproliferation doctrine. Figure 3 shows the Joint Staff organization and functions for counterproliferation activities.

Figure 3: Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff

Note:
TAMD—Theater Air and Missile Defense
WMD—weapons of mass destruction
Source: DOD data.

\(^5\)National Command Authorities are the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.
The military services’ counterproliferation responsibilities include developing doctrine; conducting research, development, and acquisition efforts; and organizing, training, and equipping their respective forces to address NBC threats. The Air Force has established a single headquarters staff office to serve as a focal point for overseeing all aspects of Air Force counterproliferation policy to a greater degree than the staff organizations of the other services. The office’s responsibilities include doctrine, strategy, policy, and requirements, such as developing and coordinating implementation of the Air Force’s counterproliferation master plan and capabilities roadmap. Like the other services, the Air Force staff has organizations that perform specific counterproliferation-related tasks. For example, Air Force civil engineers are responsible for coordinating and conducting NBC defense at Air Force installations. The other military services have established different staff offices within their headquarters to address counterproliferation issues (see fig. 4).

Figure 4: Organization of the Military Services

Note: CNO—Chief of Naval Operations.
Source: DOD.
The planning and execution of the individual elements of Army counterproliferation-related activities are performed in a number of separate offices throughout its headquarters. The National Security Policy Division, which is part of the Army’s Strategy, Plans and Policy Directorate, coordinates arms control and proliferation-related policy issues and is the point of entry for most Army counterproliferation matters. A separate Army NBC Defense Division oversees all aspects of Army NBC defense and serves as the Army focal point for the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program. The Army also serves as DOD’s executive agent for several counterproliferation-related functions such as DOD support to civil authorities for consequence management and for developing medical, biological, and chemical weapons countermeasures. The Army is currently conducting an internal assessment to determine how it should be organized to better address counterproliferation issues.

The Navy also has a number of staff offices that deal with counterproliferation issues. The Surface Warfare Division is responsible for coordinating the Navy’s NBC Defense issues as well as serving as the Navy’s focal point for the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program. An office under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations deals with arms control and counterproliferation policy issues.

An officer in the Marine Corps headquarters staff addresses counterproliferation policy and other issues, such as arms control agreements and the anthrax vaccine. Personnel at the Marine Corps Systems Command are responsible for many of the programs and equipment-related issues of counterproliferation. The Marine Corps and the Navy have proposed forming a council for the two services, composed of senior officers, to address specific counterproliferation issues, such as amphibious operations in an NBC environment.

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency was established on October 1, 1998, to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction and to support operational forces and develop and field systems for counterproliferation. The Agency comprises six functional directorates, support elements such as general counsel and business management, senior advisers representing the Departments of State and Energy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and an advisory panel called the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee.

Three of the Agency’s six directorates focus on nonproliferation issues. The Technology Security directorate is responsible for monitoring export
license applications and U.S. satellite launches to minimize the transfer of weapons of mass destruction-related technology. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Directorate is to assist former Soviet Union countries in reducing their weapons of mass destruction infrastructure and provide verifiable safeguards against further proliferation. The On-Site Inspection directorate supports on-site control inspection, escort and monitoring activities, and arms control confidence building activities and develops treaty verification monitoring technologies.

The Agency's other three directorates support various areas of the counterproliferation mission. The Chemical and Biological Defense Directorate implements the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program. The Counterproliferation Support and Operations Directorate conducts technology development and provides support to the unified commands in the areas of counterforce, weapons effects, and force protection. This directorate also runs the Knowledge Preservation program, which is to protect the U.S. capability to sustain the U.S. nuclear deterrent in the absence of underground testing. The Nuclear Support and Operations Directorate works on technical aspects of maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

Although the Agency does not directly support DOD’s active defense efforts, its staff participates in DOD-wide working groups on related issues, such as weapon effects modeling. Figure 5 shows the organization and functions of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
The Agency had a staff of 1,872, or approximately 93 percent of the fiscal year 2000 authorized personnel total of 2,002, as of February 2000. Slightly more than 500 of the staff were assigned to the Counterproliferation Support and Operations, Chemical and Biological Defense, and Nuclear Support and Operations Directorates—the directorates largely involved in the Agency’s support of counterproliferation programs and activities. (See fig. 6.)
The Agency's fiscal year 2000 budget was $1.93 billion. The portion for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, $791 million, is, by law, protected from use for other purposes and controlled directly by the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program, which is managed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program portion, $458 million, is also protected in the Agency's budget. Figure 7 shows the allocation of fiscal year 2000 funding for the six directorates and support functions.
DOD and Interagency Coordinating Bodies

DOD has established two major coordinating bodies for counterproliferation—the Counterproliferation Council and the NBC Defense Steering Committee—and leads the interagency Counterproliferation Program Review Committee. The Counterproliferation Council is designed to bring all major components together on a regular basis, while the NBC Defense Steering Committee comprises senior officials with responsibility for the research, development, and acquisition activities of the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program. The Counterproliferation Program Review Committee is to coordinate research, development, and acquisition across DOD, the Department of Energy, and the intelligence community. Table 4 describes the purposes, composition, and authorities of these bodies.

Figure 7: Fiscal Year 2000 Funding Profile for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Source: Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
### Table 4: DOD and Interagency Coordinating Bodies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counterproliferation Council</th>
<th>NBC Defense Steering Committee</th>
<th>Counterproliferation Program Review Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose</strong></td>
<td>To strengthen the linkage between the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, the Deputy Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs [DATSD/CBD], and DTRA.</td>
<td>• Optimize funding for, and ensure development and deployment of (1) highly effective technologies and capabilities for detection, monitoring, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information in support of U.S. counterproliferation policy and (2) disabling technologies in support of such policy. • Identify and eliminate undesirable redundancies or uncoordinated efforts in development and deployment of such technologies and capabilities. • Establish priorities for programs and funding; facilitate interagency and interdepartmental funding of programs to ensure necessary levels of funding to develop, operate, and field highly capable systems. • Ensure that Energy programs are integrated with the operational needs of other government departments and agencies of government. • Ensure that DOD national security programs include technology demonstrations and prototype development of equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>DOD Directive 2060.2</td>
<td>Public Law 103-160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When formed</td>
<td>July 1996</td>
<td>November 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>Reports to Under Secretary of Defense (AT&amp;L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense (AT&amp;L); Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; under secretaries of military departments; vice chiefs of the military services; ASD(ISP) (who serves as Executive Secretary); ATSD(NCB); Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence; Director, Joint Staff, Strategic Plans, and Policy (J-5)</td>
<td>DDR&amp;E; Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs; DTRA director; and the head of DTRA's Chemical and Biological Defense Directorate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued
Appendix IV  
DOD Counterproliferation Organization and Coordinating Bodies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counterproliferation Council</th>
<th>NBC Defense Steering Committee</th>
<th>Counterproliferation Program Review Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frequency of meetings</strong></td>
<td>“Upon call of Deputy Secretary of Defense or designee”; in practice, approximately quarterly.</td>
<td>Meets twice each year and upon call of the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&amp;L).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Products and reporting</strong></td>
<td>Briefings by DOD organizations are presented to the Council.</td>
<td>DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program Management Plan (which specifies relationships and responsibilities among coordinating agencies and provides fiscal and programming guidance to the Joint NBC Defense Board to develop the Program Objective Memorandum).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy was eliminated as a result of the Defense Reform Initiative of November 1997. The functions of the position were merged with those of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Resources to create the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction.*

**Note:**

- AT&L--Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
- ATSD/NCB--Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
- DDR&E--Director, Defense Research and Engineering
- DOE--Department of Energy
- DTRA--Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

**Sources:** DOD Directive 2060.2; annual reports of the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Defense Annual Report to Congress, 1999; published overviews of the Joint Service Chemical and Biological Defense Program; GAO interviews.
Appendix V
Organizations and Offices Contacted

Washington, D.C., Area

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Finance Officer), Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation

The Joint Staff

Headquarters, Department of the Army

• National Security Policy Division
• Chemical and NBC Defense Division

Headquarters, Department of the Navy

• Strategy and Policy Division
• Surface Warfare Division

Headquarters, Department of the Air Force

• Counterproliferation and Nuclear Policy Office

Headquarters, Marine Corps

• Office for Plans, Policies and Operations

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

• Chemical and Biological Defense Directorate
• Counterproliferation Support and Operations Directorate
• Nuclear Support Directorate

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Army Soldier, Biological and Chemical Command, Aberdeen, Maryland
Defense Intelligence Agency

National Defense University, Counterproliferation Center

Department of Energy, Office of Nonproliferation and National Security

Central Intelligence Agency, Nonproliferation Center

Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Institute for Defense Analysis

Science Applications International Corporation

Battelle Memorial Institute

Norfolk, Virginia, Area

U.S. Joint Forces Command

- Air Force Air Combat Command
- Headquarters, Marine Forces, Atlantic
- Headquarters, Atlantic Fleet

Tampa, Florida, Area

U.S. Central Command

- U.S. Special Operations Command

Honolulu, Hawaii, Area

U.S. Pacific Command

- Headquarters, Army Pacific
- Headquarters, Pacific Fleet
- Headquarters, Pacific Air Force
- Headquarters, Marine Forces, Pacific
- Special Operations Command, Pacific
### Appendix V
Organizations and Offices Contacted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ramstein, Germany, Area</td>
<td>Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery, Alabama, Area</td>
<td>Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Air Force Counterproliferation Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles, California, Area</td>
<td>RAND Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albuquerque, New Mexico, Area</td>
<td>Defense Nuclear Weapons School</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3050 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3050

April 20, 2000

Mr. Norman J. Rabkin, Director
National Security Preparedness Issues
National Security and International Affairs Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington DC 20548

Dear Mr. Rabkin:

Thank you for the opportunity to review the GAO draft Report "WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: DoD Actions to Combat Weapons Use Can Be More Integrated and Focused," dated March 8, 2000 (GAO Code 701160/OSD Case 1962). This constitutes the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft report.

The DoD comments on each of the GAO recommendations are provided in the enclosure. In general, the DoD concurs with the recommendations contained in the GAO draft report. Many of the recommendations contained in the draft report had been identified by various DoD elements and agencies, and they had initiated actions on them as a part of the continuing implementation of DoD's Counterproliferation Initiative.

Technical comments for accuracy and clarification of the report have been provided separately. The Department appreciates the opportunity you provided to comment on the draft report.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Anna Johnson-Winegar, Ph.D.
Deputy for Counterproliferation and Chemical/Biological Defense Programs

Enclosure:
As stated
ENCLOSURE

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE DRAFT REPORT DATED MARCH 8, 2000
(GAO CODE 701160) OSD CASE 1962

"WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: DOD'S ACTIONS TO COMBAT WEAPONS
USE CAN BE MORE INTEGRATED AND FOCUSED"

DOD COMMENTS ON THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 1: To more clearly determine DoD's progress in implementing its
Counterproliferation Initiative, provide additional tools to guide and oversee its efforts, and
ensure greater accountability to the Congress, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of
Defense take actions to develop:

(1) a Department-wide strategy that takes a long-term, comprehensive view of the nuclear,
biological, and chemical threat and links ends, ways, and means to better integrate
DoD's policies and programs for CP;

(2) military strategy for integrating U.S. offensive and defensive capabilities;

(3) a management plan that clearly delineates responsibilities, explicit and outcome-
oriented goals, a process for reporting, evaluating, and validating its progress, and a
resource strategy for ensuring funding of its efforts; and

(4) quantitative or qualitative performance measures that can be used to assess progress
toward goal achievement. (p. 17/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE: Partially Concur.

(1) The DoD Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI) and progress implementing it continue to
mature, even as the threat from weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery
(WMD/M) continues to evolve. DoD's implementation of the Counterproliferation (CP)
objectives of the National Security Strategy in the Department's CP strategy has now been
incorporated in such key planning documents as the Defense Planning Guidance, the
Contingency Planning Guidance, Quadrennial Defense Review, the CICS CP charter, CICS
CONPLAN 0400, and various DoD Directives and Instructions. With these measures now in
place, DoD can take further steps to integrate CP policies and programs.

(2) The Joint Staff is in the process of coordinating an integrated counter-NBC weapons strategy,
expected to be completed in June 2000, that will better integrate DoD's policies and programs
for countering proliferation. This integrated strategy will link ends, ways, and means, and
incorporate both offensive and defensive capabilities. As noted in the GAO report, the CICS
published the first CONPLAN 0400, "Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" in
April 1996. The five regional unified commands were required to develop a regional
CONPLAN 0400. The last of these was completed in August 1999. CICS will begin staffing an
updated CONPLAN 0400 in the spring of 2000. This will incorporate lessons learned over the past four years as DoD’s expertise in the CP arena has grown. CONPLAN 0400 also included an annex ‘T’ on planning for weapons of mass destruction consequence management (CM) operations.

DoD has gained considerable experience in planning for the conduct of CM operations over the past few years. This has led to the designation of a Joint Task Force for Civil Support within US Joint Forces Command for response to domestic WMD CM incidents. DoD support for domestic preparedness against WMD threats also includes the new WMD Civil Support Teams able to deploy rapidly, assist local first responders in determining the nature of an attack, provide medical and technical advice, and pave the way for the identification and arrival of follow-on state and federal military response assets. The first ten Civil Support Teams currently are undergoing external evaluations prior to being certified as mission capable by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). All ten teams are expected to be certified by the third quarter of FY 2000. An additional 17 teams should be operationally capable in early 2001. These teams will be a part of the DoD’s overall efforts to support local, state, and federal civil authorities in the event of a domestic WMD incident. The Joint Staff is currently developing a Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) that identifies DoD and other government agency (OGA) units capable of responding to a WMD CM incident and is also developing a CM Planning Guide for use by DoD units deployed to an incident site. The Joint Staff is now considering developing a new CONPLAN 0500 specifically for Consequence Management Operations to address the complexities of these operations.

(3) For DoD NBC Defense, the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program Annual Report to Congress clearly delineates the management and oversight process for non-medical and medical CB defense research and development, logistics status, and doctrine and training initiatives. This report evaluates and validates the annual progress accomplished by the DoD CB defense program. The biannual DoD CB Defense POM Strategy outlines the resources required to fund these efforts. Each Service develops appropriate doctrine and strategies for integrating U.S. offensive and defensive capabilities. Equipment designed to support this doctrine is developed under a joint service approach. The Joint Service NBC Defense Board oversees these joint service efforts to ensure CINC requirements are met. The OSD CB Defense Steering Committee is developing a Performance Plan that will track progress toward an increased DoD CB defense capability.

For the other CP pillars of C4ISR, counterforce and active defense (as well as passive defense and CM), DoD is undertaking a number of initiatives to improve our understanding of how the requirements of the CP mission can be better satisfied. The Deterrence/Counterproliferation Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (D/CJP JWCA) team is in the process of assessing the feasibility of conducting a “Joint Force Organization for Defense Against WMD,” study that will determine tasks to be performed; determine resources available; and provide recommendations to improve support and eliminate unnecessary duplication. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has tasked the D/CJP JWCA with conducting an assessment of CINC CP requirements to identify tasks required by the CINC/Services to complete their CP mission. Within the CPRC, Areas for Capability Enhancement (ACEs), first established in 1995, delineate those areas where progress is needed to enhance both the warfighting capabilities of the CINC's
and the overall ability to satisfy the demands of U.S. nonproliferation and CP policy and define those priority areas where additional capabilities are required to meet the challenges posed by WMD/M proliferation threats. They prioritize the CP-related responses to interdepartmental policy needs and reflect the operational requirements of the Unified Commands for countering proliferation. The ACEs guide the CPRC’s program review process; provide a unified basis for reviewing and assessing future progress in meeting CP and related nonproliferation mission needs of CPRC-represented organizations; provide broad guidelines for R&D and acquisition program investments; and help to define programs that are strongly related to countering proliferation. The ACEs are reviewed and reprioritized on an annual basis to ensure they continue to reflect the integration of CINC required capabilities and the overarching national security objectives they support. Each CPRC-represented organization prioritizes the ACEs in accordance with its own departmental missions to more accurately reflect each organization’s response to countering proliferation and NBC terrorism.

(4) The DoD has made, and will continue to make progress, towards implementing the Counterproliferation Initiative. To delineate those areas where progress is needed to enhance both the warfighting capabilities of the CINCs and the overall ability to satisfy the demands of U.S. nonproliferation and CP policy, the CPRC established the ACEs to define those priority areas where additional capabilities are required. These ACEs prioritize the CP-related responses to interdepartmental policy needs and guide the CPRC’s program review process by providing a unified basis for reviewing and assessing future progress in meeting CP and related nonproliferation mission needs of the CPRC-represented organizations; and providing broad guidelines for R&D and acquisition program investments. In addition, the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program Annual Report to Congress clearly delineates the management and oversight process for non medical and medical CB defense research and development, logistics status, and doctrine and training initiatives. This report evaluates and validates the annual progress accomplished by the DoD CB defense program. The annual DoD CB Defense POM Strategy outlines the resources required to fund these efforts. Each Service develops appropriate doctrine and strategies for integrating U.S. offensive and defensive capabilities. Equipment designed to support this doctrine is developed under a joint service approach. The Joint Service NBC Defense Board oversees these joint service efforts to ensure CINC requirements are met. The OSD CB Defense Steering Committee is in the process of developing a Performance Plan that will track progress toward an increased DoD CB defense capability. In recognition of the necessity for DoD to integrate its extensive CM capabilities, the SECDEF appointed the ATSD-CS, in October 1999, to serve as the department’s single focal point for all matters related to DoD’s role in CM. The ATSD-CS chairs the DoD WMD Preparedness Group (WMDP), a coordinating body comprised of numerous agency, Joint Staff and service components, and divided into eight subgroups that range from R&D to exercises to agricultural issues. The DoD WMDP ensures that emerging DoD policy in the CM area considers the many organizations involved. The ATSD-CS ensures that DoD CM efforts are coordinated with the interagency through representation on the CM policymaking body led by the President’s National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism.

To assist in integrating the Chemical/Biological Defense (CBD) Research Development and Acquisition (RDA) activities of DoD and DOE, the CPRC created a joint CBD R&D Focus Group in July 1999. The Focus Group addresses R&D needs for CBD technology programs and
initiatives. The CPRC tasked the Focus Group to develop a joint DoD-DOE-Intelligence Community (DoD-DOE-IC) plan to integrate separate CBD initiatives. This DoD-DOE-IC coordination will further help produce a common set of Chemical-Biological Technology Objectives (CBTOs) with emphasis on objectives that are important to multiple applications. These CBTOs will help further coordinate the CBD technology development efforts currently underway. The Focus Group will provide the mechanism for integrating DoD-DOE-IC responses to resolve capability shortfalls in CBD and identify common user requirements, appropriate technology development areas to address those requirements, and prioritize Chemical-Biological Technology Objectives (CBTO) initiatives. The Focus Group will also coordinate the R&D roadmapping process between DoD and DOE to meet these objectives. The CBD subgroup has identified vulnerabilities and shortfalls in the U.S. ability to respond to domestic WMD incidents; it has specified R&D objectives that would address those shortfalls; and it has identified ongoing and proposed federal agency R&D programs that work to meet these R&D objectives. The CBD R&D subgroup provides the CPRC agencies an additional mechanism for surveying user requirements and coordinating their R&D programs with related ones conducted by other U.S. government agencies. Building on the experience gained through this CBD RDA effort, the CPRC will explore further efforts to delineate goals and develop quantitative or qualitative performance measures that can be used to assess progress toward goal achievement.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO also recommended that the Secretary of Defense include in the next Quadrennial Defense Review an examination of the DoD's Organization for CP to determine if adjustments can be made to realize greater efficiency and effectiveness in the management and integration of the Department's initiatives. (p. 17/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE: Partially Concur.

It will be the next administration's decision whether such an examination occurs as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Given the centrality of CP to future DoD success, we agree that periodic reviews of DoD's organization for CP are appropriate. In the interim, the DoD is proceeding to work on a number of initiatives that will improve our understanding of how the requirements of the CP mission can be better satisfied by making organizational changes that achieve greater efficiency and integration. The Deterrence/Counterproliferation Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (DCPJWCA) team is in the process of assessing the feasibility of conducting an Army-submitted issue that will address CP organization in the proposed study named "Joint Force Organization for Defense Against WMD." The proposed study will include the following tasks:

- Determine tasks to be performed by Combatant commands, Joint Force Commands, and Joint Task Forces in Major Theaters of War (MTW), Small Scale Contingencies (SSC), and Homeland Defense (HLD) Scenarios.
- Determine resources available, internal and external to the organization, to accomplish the tasks.
- Provide recommendations, consistent with manpower limitations and resource constraints, to improve support and eliminate unnecessary duplication. If approved, this study would begin in May / June 2000 and be completed May / June 2001.
In addition, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has tasked the D/CP JWCA with conducting an assessment of CINC CP requirements. The assessment will employ a strategy-to-task methodology to identify C4ISR, counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and CM tasks that are required by the CINCs / Services to complete their CP mission.

The D/CP JWCA is also in the process of submitting an additional issue to the JROC that will aid DoD in addressing its long-range CP requirements. Using the results of the previous CINC CP requirements assessment, the new assessment would first develop an overarching CP Mission Needs Statement (MNS) and Capstone Requirements Document (CRD). Following development of the CP MNS and CRD, the assessment would develop MNSs and CRDs for each pillar of CP (C4ISR, counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and CM).

**RECOMMENDATION 3:** To provide assurance that the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat is being given sufficient attention in the body of military doctrine, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense have the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a comprehensive overarching joint doctrine publication. That encompasses all elements of CP. (p. 17 / GAO Draft Report)

**DOD RESPONSE:** Concur.

As illustrated in the response to recommendation #2, DoD continues to evolve and keep pace with the threat of WMD. As the new and expanded mission requirements have become better understood, the department has developed the modern combat concepts and defined the equipment requirements to fashion effective fighting capabilities that are now being fielded.

The Joint Staff has begun to develop the innovative doctrinal concepts needed to employ effectively those new, mission-specific capabilities. A proposal for a Joint Counterproliferation Doctrine initiative was submitted and recently briefed to the Joint Doctrine Working Group at the Joint Warfighting Center. OSD will work closely with the Joint Staff on this initiative.

**RECOMMENDATION 4:** To improve the attention given to nuclear, biological, and chemical survivability in DoD and Service acquisition processes, the GAO recommended that the Secretary devise and implement a systematic approach that identifies the systems and equipment that need to be capable of operating in a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment and provides reasonable assurance that appropriate features are incorporated into the designs of these systems. (p. 17/GAO Draft Report)

**DOD RESPONSE:** Concur.

The objective of the CPI is to ensure that our forces have the training, equipment and doctrine necessary to sustain operations in the current and future WMD threat environments. DoD and Army acquisition regulations identify the need to integrate NBC contamination survivability measures into all military equipment. To successfully implement NBC contamination survivability measures, DoD requires, and continues to invest in basic science and technology to
identify alternative materials and engineering processes that resist degradation caused by nuclear, biological and chemical agents and military decontaminants.

RECOMMENDATION 5: To strengthen the effectiveness of the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee in identifying and eliminating any unnecessary redundant programs, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense, as Committee Chairman, direct the Committee to devise and implement a procedural mechanism that establishes clear criteria, procedures, and a process for making such decisions. (p. 17/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE: Partially Concur.

Within the DoD, and between the DoD and DOE, mechanisms are currently in place to conduct program assessments and to provide recommendations to eliminate unnecessary redundancies. These mechanisms include the Joint NBC Defense Board, Technology Area Review and Assessments (TARAs), and the Defense Technology Area Plans (TAPs). Program Managers from both the DoD and DOE participate in POM and budget preparations and in technical program reviews. These efforts facilitate the integration of technology development and the elimination of redundancies. Moreover, CPRC Action Officers from OSD, the Joint Staff, DOE, the Intelligence Community, the Services, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and other organizations conduct – over a 12-week timeframe – annual reviews of CP programs in order to identify opportunities for synergy and to improve interagency coordination. To delineate those areas where progress is needed to enhance both the warfighting capabilities of the CINCs and the overall ability to satisfy the demands of U.S. nonproliferation and CP policy, the CPRC established the ACEs to define those priority areas where additional capabilities are required. These ACEs prioritize the CP-related responses to interdepartmental policy needs and guide the CPRC’s program review process by providing a unified basis for reviewing and assessing future progress in meeting CP and related nonproliferation mission needs of the CPRC-represented organizations; and providing broad guidelines for R&D and acquisition program investments. Further efforts to develop quantitative or qualitative performance measures that can be used to assess progress toward goal achievement can be pursued.
The following are GAO's comments on DOD's letter, dated April 20, 2000.

GAO Comments

1. While DOD has taken actions that benefit the Department's integration efforts, these actions, even taken collectively, do not provide the integrated long-range vision and comprehensive guidance needed to focus and direct its overall counterproliferation efforts, nor do they provide the tools to help guide and oversee progress. The breadth and complexity of counterproliferation permeate through DOD organizations, functions, and activities. The potential use of NBC weapons against U.S. and allied forces requires a more comprehensive integrated approach by DOD. Such an approach would encompass the entire spectrum of counterproliferation programs and activities and provide greater assurance that all commands, military services, and department level structures are working together in the most effective manner. A DOD-wide management plan would establish performance measures that could be used to clearly measure the effectiveness of integration efforts while indicating where further progress is needed.

In regard to an integrated military strategy, if the one being coordinated by the Joint Staff embodies the elements and scope envisioned by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, rather than be a collection of current guidance, it would satisfy the intent of our recommendation.

2. We believe that a recommendation by the Secretary of Defense to include DOD's organization for counterproliferation in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review would be of significant value to the next administration and to those currently preparing to undertake the Review. Including such an examination in the Review would provide an early opportunity for the next administration to consider organizational alternatives for the efficient and effective departmentwide management of future counterproliferation efforts in light of its assessment of overall defense needs. The planned initiatives noted by DOD to improve its understanding of how the counterproliferation mission can be better satisfied by organizational changes should complement an examination by the Quadrennial Defense Review.

3. Subsequent to receiving DOD's comments, a proposal by the Joint Staff to develop a comprehensive overarching joint doctrine publication was approved. We reviewed the proposal and found it to be consistent with our recommendation. The new doctrine is planned for publication in winter 2001.
4. DOD agrees that NBC survivability measures must be incorporated into all military equipment, but indicates that it believes current acquisition regulations and investments in basic science and technology sufficiently address NBC survivability. We disagree. As discussed in our report, a DOD study team concluded in January 1999 that current survivability provisions in acquisition regulations need to be strengthened and that there is a lack of uniform standards among the services to ensure survivability in systems and equipment being acquired. It developed a plan to address these weaknesses, which after a year, has not been implemented. The thrust of our recommendation is to take actions consistent with the study team’s recommendations that provide reasonable assurance that appropriate survivability features are incorporated into systems and equipment being acquired by the Department.

5. In discussing its response with us, DOD agreed that there may be opportunities for the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee to do more to identify and eliminate any unnecessary redundant programs. However, DOD indicated that the Committee has not decided whether the mechanism we recommend is necessary at this time. We recognize that existing mechanisms can help eliminate redundancies and uncoordinated efforts, but we were provided few examples of that occurring. Given the scope of counterproliferation, including the number of organizational elements involved, we believe the establishment of a more structured, comprehensive approach within and across the counterproliferation areas would provide greater assurance and consistency in evaluating and strengthening the decision process for eliminating programs that may unnecessarily overlap or be redundant.
Appendix VII

Comments From the Department of Energy

Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

April 21, 2000

Mr. Raymond J. Decker
 Acting Associate Director, National Security
 Preparedness Issues
 U.S. General Accounting Office
 Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Decker:

The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation appreciates the opportunity to have reviewed
General Accounting Office draft report, NSIAD-00-97, “WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION: DOD’s Actions to Combat Weapons Use Can Be More Integrated and
Focused.” This draft report was reviewed by both the Office of Security and Emergency
Management and the Office of Research and Development of the Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation. Based on our review, the Department of Energy has no comments to make
regarding this draft report.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

cc: Audit Liaison Team, CR-2
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