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Operation Desert Storm:
Evaluation of the Air Campaign
(Letter Report, 06/12/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-134)


WEIGHT OF EFFORT AND TYPE OF EFFORT ANALYSIS

Appendix VIII


The weight of effort and type of effort indices permitted us to
examine the relative contributions of the air-to-ground platforms and
revealed the overall magnitude of the weight and type of effort that
was expended against the strategic target sets established pursuant
to the military objectives of the Persian Gulf War.  In this
appendix, we report results not included in appendix I. 


   WOE PLATFORM COMPARISONS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix VIII:1

Collectively, military industrial base, offensive counterair and kill
box target sets received most of the weight of effort from the
air-to-ground platforms reviewed here, and KBX targets received by
far the most strikes, the most bombs, and the most bomb tonnage. 
BE-numbered targets in the KBX target set received at least 9 times
more strikes, 5 times more bombs, and 5 times more bomb tonnage than
the next highest ranking strategic target set in this regard.  The
comparisons indicate that the F-111F and the F-117 accounted for the
majority of the guided bomb tonnage delivered against strategic
targets, while the B-52 and the F-16 accounted for the majority of
the unguided bomb tonnage delivered. 

The B-52 and the F-16 accounted for the majority of unguided ordnance
delivered against KBX targets.  Respectively, they delivered
approximately 32 million and 31 million pounds of bombs on KBX
targets.  The F-15Es participated most exclusively against Scud
targets.  Of the PGM tonnage delivered on C\3 , NBC, and MIB targets,
the F-117 accounted for most of it.  Weight of effort on NAV targets
was almost exclusively the domain of Navy platforms, where the A-6E
accounted for much of the weight of effort.  The Navy platforms did
contribute a considerable WOE against KBX targets.  The only non-U.S. 
coalition platform reviewed here--the British Tornado, GR-1--did not
contribute a majority of WOE on any of the strategic target sets. 

Figure VIII.1 shows the number of strikes by each platform against
all
12 target categories.  Relative to other platforms, the F-16 was a
predominant force against KBX targets, accounting for at least 51
percent of the total strikes.  The number of strikes conducted by the
F-16s, F/A-18s, F-111Fs, A-6Es, F-15Es, and the B-52s on KBX targets
was the largest number of strikes that each conducted compared to
other strategic target categories.  Figure VIII.1 also shows that the
majority of the Desert Storm platforms expended more of their strike
efforts on KBX targets than on any other strategic target category. 

   Figure VIII.1:  Target Category
   Strikes, by Platform

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Figure VIII.2 depicts strike data for the selected platforms against
the target categories, excluding KBX targets. 

   Figure VIII.2:  Target Category
   Strikes, by Platform, Excluding
   KBX Targets

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

When KBX strikes are removed, figure VIII.2 more clearly shows other
patterns, particularly that more strikes were expended on the MIB and
OCA target categories relative to other target categories.  In
addition to being one of the strategic target sets, MIB targets often
served as "dump" targets or secondary targets, while the OCA target
set was associated with the Desert Storm objective of achieving air
supremacy and would be expected to be given a considerable weight of
effort. 

Similar to F-16 strike data against KBX targets, the F-16 stands out
in terms of the number of strikes conducted against OCA, MIB, ELE,
and OIL target sets.  One factor that can account for this is that
more F-16s were deployed to the Persian Gulf theater than any other
aircraft. 

Compared to other target sets, the F-111F delivered more strikes on
the OCA target category.  This coincides both with the stated mission
capability of the F-111F, as well as the Desert Storm plans for the
F-111F, which focused predominantly on an air interdiction role. 

The F-15E conducted the largest number of strikes against Scud
targets.  In contrast to other platforms, the F-15E was not a
significant part of strike efforts on any other target category.  The
F-117 conducted the most strikes on the C\3 target category, the GVC
target category, and the NBC target category.  Figure VIII.3 shows
the number of bombs delivered by air-to-ground platforms against the
strategic target sets. 

   Figure VIII.3:  Bombs
   Delivered, by Platform

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Figure VIII.3 shows that the number of bombs delivered on KBX targets
was at least four times as great as the number of bombs delivered on
the MIB target set, the next highest. 

Figures VIII.3 and VIII.4 show that the B-52 delivered more bombs
against 7 of 12 target categories (ELE, KBX, LOC, MIB, NBC, OCA, and
OIL).  The F-16 was second only to the B-52 in bombs delivered
against MIB and OCA strategic targets.  Together with the data from
the KBX target category, the F-16 is second to the B-52 in number of
bombs delivered against the KBX, the MIB, and the OCA strategic
target sets.  The A-6E dominated strategic targets in the NAV target
set, and the F-15E delivered substantially more bombs on Scud targets
compared to the other platforms. 

   Figure VIII.4:  Bombs
   Delivered, by Platform,
   Excluding KBX Targets

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Similar to the number of bombs delivered against target categories,
figure VIII.5 shows that the most bomb tonnage was delivered on the
KBX, MIB, and OCA target sets. 

   Figure VIII.5:  Bomb Tonnage
   Delivered, by Platform

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

B-52s delivered more bomb tonnage, relative to the other platforms
against strategic targets in the ELE, KBX, MIB, OCA, and OIL target
categories.  The F-16 delivered in excess of 31 million pounds of
bombs on KBX targets.  This is second only to the B-52, which
delivered approximately 32 million pounds of bombs.  (See fig. 
VIII.6.)

   Figure VIII.6:  Bomb Tonnage
   Delivered, by Platform,
   Excluding KBX Targets

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Figure VIII.6 shows that the F-16 delivered more bomb tonnage on C\3
and NBC targets than on the other platforms.  The F-15E delivered
more bomb tonnage on Scud targets than on any other strategic target
set.  With regard to F-15E efforts against Scud targets, all of the
WOE indices (number of BEs, number of strikes, number of bombs, bomb
tonnage) converge to indicate that the F-15E was the predominant
force on Scud targets and was not a principal part of the weight of
effort on other strategic target categories. 

Figure VIII.6 does not indicate that among the various platforms
tasked to C\3 , LOC, NAV, NBC, OCA, and SAM targets, a single
platform is distinctive in terms of the bomb tonnage delivered.  The
data show distinctive variability in sources of bomb tonnage
delivered against ELE, MIB, OIL, and to some degree, SCU targets. 
B-52 bomb tonnage accounts for this distinction against all these
target sets except for Scud targets, which were accounted for by the
efforts of the F-15E. 


   TOE PLATFORM COMPARISONS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix VIII:2

The type of effort measures indicate the quantity of guided and
unguided bomb tonnage delivered by the selected air-to-ground
platforms. 
Figure VIII.7 shows PGM tonnage delivered by platforms. 

The most PGM tonnage was delivered against OCA targets.  A factor
that can account for this is that many OCA targets were hardened
aircraft shelters and were attacked with LGBs.  F-111Fs delivered in
excess of 1.7 million pounds of bombs on OCA targets.  F-111Fs also
delivered the most PGM tonnage on KBX targets, which largely reflects
F-111F tank-plinking efforts using LGBs.  Compared to the other
platforms, the F-117 accounted for the bulk of the PGM tonnage
delivered on C\3 , NBC, and MIB targets. 

Figure VIII.7 shows that the F-15E delivered a majority of guided
bomb tonnage on Scud targets and that this was the only strategic
target category in which the F-15E contributed the majority of the
PGM tonnage.  This pattern is expected because the F-15E received
most of its tasking to Scud targets and because the wing had limited
PGM capability. 

   Figure VIII.7:  PGM Tonnage
   Delivered, by Platform

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Figure VIII.8 shows that not only were very sizable amounts of
unguided bomb tonnage delivered against BE-numbered KBX targets, but
the unguided bomb tonnage delivered against KBX targets, relative to
the other strategic target categories, was immense. 

   Figure VIII.8:  Unguided
   Tonnage Delivered, by Platform

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Approximately 78 million pounds of unguided bombs were delivered
against ground targets located in kill boxes.  Comparatively, F-16
and B-52 are the two platforms that accounted for the preponderance
of unguided bomb tonnage delivered here.  B-52s accounted for
approximately 32 million pounds; F-16s approximately 31 million
pounds, at least two-thirds of the total unguided bomb tonnage
delivered on BE-numbered KBX targets.  Figure VIII.8 also shows that
the B-52 accounted for the majority of unguided bomb tonnage
delivered against MIB targets. 

Figure VIII.9 indicates that more unguided bomb tonnage was delivered
against targets in the MIB and OCA strategic target categories than
in the other strategic target categories. 

The F-16 delivered more of the unguided bomb tonnage against
strategic targets in the C\3 , GVC, NBC, and OCA categories, and it
was second to the F-15E in unguided bomb tonnage delivered against
targets in the SCU category.  Summing across all target categories
and comparing to other platforms, B-52s and F-16s accounted for the
preponderance of bombs delivered against strategic targets. 

   Figure VIII.9:  Unguided
   Tonnage Delivered, by Platform,
   Excluding KBX Targets

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)