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Our experience in Desert Storm was a watershed for space power . . . space is now so integral to joint and combined military operations that were we to remove space assets from our military arsenal, . . . we would be relegated to employing warfighting tactics much like those of World War II.—Gen Horner, CINC US Space Command [1]
The Gulf War was the first space war. . .it was the first war of the space age—Gen Merrill McPeak [6]
Space has improved the way the US military fights its wars, without their space eyes and ears they could be fighting in the blind once again. The tough question is how to achieve and maintain the control of space while denying an enemy the same. [2] To understand the impact of Gray Space assets a warfighter must work with US Space Command to provide a list of all satellites, military and civilian, within his or her theater of operations.
With this list the warfighter must then do an assessment of what satellite services are available to both friend or enemy. At that point a risk assessment must be done to help decision makers decide which instruments of power must be used to counter the space threat. In addition, they must identify Gray Space assets they want to augment their force structure—such as the leasing of INTELSAT satellite bandwidth to increase communication capacity.
To receive an appreciation of how easy it is to access satellite information, the following section shows a sample of what satellites are currently being used by selected nations. Additionally, if a satellite’s footprint transits over a particular nation it was included. The countries selected represent nations where the United States has intervened militarily in the past or where a future conflict could take place.
Click on this image for an example of Satellite Order of Battle planning.
In times of peace the general staff should plan for all contingencies of war. Its archives should contain the historical details of the past and all statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and papers for the present and future."—Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini [3]
Phase II of the Deliberate Planning Process is the Concept Development Phase. This phase is comprised of six steps:
As a joint planner this is where the warfighter must ensure senior leadership is aware of the impact of Gray Space assets to the theater of operations. The warfighter must look at Gray Space assets as both a benefit and a potential threat to his or her efforts to ensure space superiority. Those commercially owned communication satellites can provide valuable transponder space to augment DOD military communication birds. [5]
Gray Space satellites are predominately commercial systems owned and operated exclusively for profit. As with most corporations their allegiance is to their stockholders, and those countries with whom they do business. Unlike the United States Commercial Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), whose member airlines are majority US owned, the space industry has no such legal restrictions. Satellite service providers are being dominated by the global market and it is not uncommon to have one satellite network service over a hundred nations. With this being the case, what instruments of power can be used to achieve the objective of space superiority? [7]
The biggest challenge in achieving and maintaining space superiority is on the horizon; Motorola is leading the pack with the launching of its "Big LEO" constellation of 66 satellites to form a complete worldwide cellular telephone system. This constellation is Iridium and its communication services are for sale to the highest bidder. [8]
The distinction between the realms of civil and military space is rapidly blurring.—Lieutenant Commander Nosenzo [9]
Commercial space access is swiftly becoming a free-for-all, lacking international cooperation, regulation, and enforcement.—Mr. John L. Petersen [10]
It is imperative military planners understand the challenges of Space Control and incorporate realistic options to the Theater CINC. In the area of Gray Space the United States’ best options lie in their political, economic and information instruments of power. The difficulty in distinguishing between civil and military space is increasing, especially with the rapid commercialization of space assets to include former military systems. The Russian Space Agency, unable to financially support many space research and development efforts, are now selling the data from military space systems over the Internet. [11] Gray Space assets reflect the ever-changing environment military planners must deal with on a day to day basis when engaged in deliberate or crisis action planning. The United States can count on the fact their adversaries will use commercial satellite platforms, to support their military forces during a conflict.
The United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) exercises operational command over all forces assigned. USSPACECOM plans, coordinates, and employs forces to conduct those activities in space which support US national objectives. It prepares operational plans for the conduct of military space operations. USSPACECOM assigns tasks to, and directs coordination among the subordinate component commands (Air Force Space Command, Naval Space Command, U.S. Army Space Command) to ensure unity of effort in accomplishment of Command assigned missions.—USSPACECOM Mission Statement [12]
Space is the newest frontier and the challenges of achieving space superiority will be the responsibility of USSPACECOM. The National Command Authorities require a theater CINC to counter, if necessary, space systems used by an enemy for military purposes. Theater commanders need to work closely with USSPACECOM, as a supporting command, to execute this mission.
The mission of Air Force Space Command, as component of USSPACECOM, is to provide the warfighter satellite products and services during all levels of conflict. In addition, they must establish an environment where they are free to operate without interference from enemy forces. However, unlike other Air Force missions, space operations has no current joint or service doctrine. The newest draft Joint Publication 3-14 and Air Force Doctrine Document 4 have yet to be published; space planners have been operating without approved space doctrine for over a decade. Therefore, space planners have been forced to rely on space policy developed internally or work off drafts like AFDD 4. [13]
This lack of approved doctrine has spun space planners in many directions which is one of the reasons USSPACECOM has yet to address the issue of Gray Space. Theater warfighters, who must develop plans to employ the military instrument of power, must focus on space control and force enhancement roles and missions of its space forces. The space forces must deny an enemy the use of their space resources but also, deny them the use of commercial satellite services. The force enhancement mission ensures all United States forces have the reconnaissance, communication, meteorological, and navigation support they need. Space assets provide exceptional capabilities to commanders "who need more than experience and a strong will" to guide them through the "friction in war." [14]
Space superiority is a main tenet of spacepower and Gray Space makes it even harder to achieve superiority in the "highest ground." This new battlefield, as "high tech" as it is, is like guerrilla warfare in space because of the difficulty in isolating and identifying the enemy. The US Air Force demonstrated its ability to destroy a low-earth orbiting satellite with the now canceled F-15 air - space launched cruise missile. However, the problem with this approach is the significant collateral damage caused to all users of the satellite which, in some cases, include US corporations. The military must be able to design operational systems to deny the use of space systems to US adversaries. Alvin and Heidi Toffler discuss the advantages of "Soft-Killing the Satellites" to achieve a much cheaper, temporary method of denying satellite services to an enemy. [15]
The most recent Air Force Executive Guidance from Secretary of the Air Force Widnall and CSAF General Fogleman states the importance of counter space, offensive counter space, and defensive counter space. They make the assumption that "the number of national and non-national entities utilizing space-based assets to gain strategic advantage" is increasing. [16] The Airborne Laser, designed to destroy satellite launch vehicles in the boost phase thereby keeping an adversary’s space assets from orbit, is one answer when fighting an enemy with space launch capabilities. [17] However, it is not an answer to the Gray Space threat; if corporations or other nations refuse to deny services to an enemy then the military may have no choice but to attack their critical space nodes to deny their enemy the advantages of space based assets.
At the tactical level, the Air Tasking Order (ATO) must consider targeting space system elements to "deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy adversary space assets or capabilities." [18] When targeting an enemy’s use of Gray Space assets the military must destroy their satellite uplink and downlink communication facilities. With the proliferation of Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs) and global cellular phone access the warfighter must go beyond targeting large hardened targets, and interdict an enemy’s information network, preventing space data from reaching enemy forces. [19]
Therefore, it is important for the theater warfighter to consider combining forces in a parallel attack against a country’s space and information system infrastructure. They must employ strategic attack missions using air strikes or information warfare technology to deny an enemy the use of space. The theater warfighter must also pressure USSPACECOM to develop and field counter space systems that can truly ensure space superiority. [20]
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[1] Charles A. Horner, General, CINC USSPACECOM, NORAD, and AFSPC, ACSC Operational Structures Instructor Presentation, (Maxwell AFB, AL, December 1997). [Return]
[2] Owen "Juice" Jensen, Colonel, 14th Air Force, Vice Commander, Speech to Space Tactics Center Leadership Conference, (April 1993). [Return]
[3] Antoine-Henri Jomini, Baron, (Precis de l’ Art de la Guerre, 1838), As quoted in Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 April 1995), III-3. [Return]
[4] Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, III-3. [Return]
[5] Rocky Simpson, Lt Colonel, J-6, Doctrine and Policy Division, "C4I for the Warrior Speech," ACSC Operational Structures Lecture, (Maxwell AFB, AL 3 December 1996). [Return]
[6] Merril A. McPeak, General, Air Force Chief of Staff,Aviation Week & Space Technology (8 April 1991). [Return]
[7] Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1996: Instruments of U.S. Power, (National Defense University: National Defense University Press, 1996). [Return]
[8] "Iridium System Overview," Nippon Iridium Corporation, (Nippon, 3 March 1997), http://www.ddi.co.jp/e/I_buckup.html. [Return]
[9] Thomas E. Nosenzo, Lt Cmdr, You Can’t Spell Space Control "ASAT" Any More, (Naval War College Research Paper, 6 March 1996). [Return]
[10] John L. Petersen, The Road to 2015, (Waite Group Press, 1994), 204. [Return]
[11] "Introduction to Glonass," Deutsche Forschungsanstalt fur Luftund Raumfahrt, (Glonass Updated Information Service, 12 December 1996), http://www.nz.dlr.de/gps/glonass.html and "Liftoff," Russian Space Agency, (Russian Space Agency, 28 February 1997), http://liftoff.msfc.nasa.gov/rsa/rsa.html. [Return]
[12] 1013th Combat Crew Training Squadron, Space Operations Orientation Course Handbook, Second Edition, (United States Space Command, 1 January 1991). [Return]
[13] Department of the Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 4, Space Operations Doctrine (Draft), (Department of the Air Force, 10 July 1996), 6. [Return]
[14] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret), (Princeton University Press, First Princeton Paperback printing, 1989), 121. [Return]
[15] Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, (Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 104. [Return]
[16] Sheila E. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force, and Ronald R. Fogelman, Gen, CSAF, Air Force Executive Guidance, (Air Force Strategy Division HQ USAF/XOXS, October 1996) 12. [Return]
[17] Phillips Laboratory, The Airborne Laser Program
Home Page, (Phillips Laboratory, 5 February 1997),
[18] Air Force Executive Guidance, 12. [Return]
[19] The Road to 2015, 192-193. [Return]
[20] Air Force Executive Guidance, 12. [Return]
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