Return to Information Warfare Tutorial Intro/Contents
[1] Alberts, David S., and Richard E. Haynes. "Information Warfare Workshop: Decision Support Working Group Report." First International Symposium on Command and Control Research and Technology (June 1995): 569-76. Discusses information warfare decision support, and offensive and defensive information warfare issues. Highlights pervasive nature of information warfare. Recommends one consistent, widely disseminated policy on information warfare, full integration of information warfare into military operations, emphasis on defensive information warfare, and attention to psychological and coalition warfare issues. [2] Alberts, David S., and Richard E. Haynes. "The Realm of Information Dominance: Beyond Information War." First International Symposium on Command and Control Research and Technology (June 1995): 560-65. Examines the concept of information dominance. Suggests a data, information, understanding, knowledge, and wisdom typology of information. Defines information space across arenas, levels, and natures of interaction between entities. Highlights danger of focusing too narrowly on commonly discussed elements of information warfare. [3] Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt. "Cyberwar is Coming!" Comparative Strategy 12 (April-June 1993): 141-65. Classic paper introduces terms "cyberwar" and "netwar". Argues mass and mobility will no longer decide the outcome of conflict. Instead, decentralized, networked forces with superior command, control, and information systems will disperse the fog of war while enshrouding the enemy in it. Provides excellent example of twelfth and thirteenth century Mongol armies successfully employing such doctrine. [4] Arquilla, John. "The Strategic Implications of Information Dominance." Strategic Review (Summer 1994): 24-30. Focuses on the importance of information dominance over traditional attritional and maneuver techniques. Introduces control warfare and advocates a systems approach to identifying and attacking an adversary's "center of gravity". Identifies the links between systemic elements as key targets. [5] Campen, Alan D., ed. The First Information War: The Story of Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf War. (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1992.) Often cited reference on the role of information, communications, command, control, and electronic warfare in the Persian Gulf War. [6] Campen, Alan D. "Information Warfare is Rife with Promise, Peril." Signal 48 (November 1993): 19-20. Argues military leaders must understand the nature of change in warfare inherent in information based warfare. The right changes will act as effective force multipliers. The wrong changes, or failure to change, will leave the United States dangerously exposed. Discusses specific military issues. [7] Campen, Alan D. "Vulnerability of Info Systems Demands Immediate Action: Reliance by Military on Commercial Communications Infrastructure Poses Significant Peril to United States." National Defense (November 1995): 26-7. Focuses on military reliance on commercial communications and market driven security policy. Argues for stronger government role in assuring the security of the National Information Infrastructure. [8] Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. (New York: Viking Penguin, 1988.) Classic text on warfare that has dominated military thinking for over a century. Clausewitz regards information as generally unreliable in war. This can be explained by his focus on operational and tactical level issues, and his pre-Industrial Age frame of reference. Unfortunately, Clausewitz so dominates military thinking that his bias against information and intelligence has in some cases undermined acceptance of the precepts information warfare. [9] Dubik, James M., and Gordon R. Sullivan. "War in the Information Age." AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, Landpower Essay Series 94-4 (May 1994): 16 pages. Parallels the changes needed in today's Information Age military with the changes that were necessary in the Industrial Age military at the turn of the century. Specifically, the network as the model replaces the machine as the model; near-simultaneous, continuous, short-run production replaces paced, sequential, continuous, long run production; and, mass-customized products, precisely targeted, with near-instantaneous distribution replaces mass output. [10] Franks, Frederick M., Jr. "Winning the Information War" Vital Speeches of the Day 60 (May 15, 1994): 453-8. Discusses the shift from hierarchical organizations to networked organizations necessary in information based warfare. Traces the evolution of command, control, communications, and intelligence through major wars. Emphasizes the need for rapid, reliable sharing of information across units and at different levels instead of traditional stove-piped intelligence activities. [11] Grier, Peter. "Information Warfare." Air Force Magazine (March 1995): 34-7. Provides overview of information warfare from the U.S. military perspective. Pulls together information from many sources highlighting key topics. [12] Handel, Michael I. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared. (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1991.) Compares the two most highly regarded classic texts on warfare. Section on deception, surprise, intelligence, and command and control speaks to issues related to information warfare. [13] Jensen, Owen E. "Information Warfare: Principles of Third-Wave War." Airpower Journal (Winter 1994): 35-43. Summarizes War and Anti-War [31] and proposes eight principles of information warfare grouped into four categories summarized as: "(1) thicken the fog of war for our enemy, (2) lift the fog of war for ourselves to create a transparent battlefield, (3) ensure that our enemies can't turn these tables on us, and (4) always fight the information war with full intensity." [14] Johnson, Stuart E., and Martin C. Libicki, eds. Dominant Battlespace Knowledge: The Winning Edge. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995.) Introduces the concept of dominant battlespace knowledge which is the ability to collect real-time battlefield information, understand that information, and turn that knowledge into a decisive battlespace advantage. Discusses necessary doctrinal changes. [15] Lawrence, R. E., and A. J. Ross. "Equities: Dissemination vs. Protection: Information Warfare Workshop Results." First International Symposium on Command and Control Research and Technology (June 1995): 566-8. Recommends action to raise public awareness of the threat of information warfare. Recognizes vulnerabilities to national information infrastructure. Argues information needs to be shared instead of overprotected, on the premise that some adversaries, notably hackers, have achieved their relative effectiveness largely through the practice of information sharing. [16] Libicki, Martin C. What is Information Warfare? (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995.) Proposes seven distinct forms of information warfare: command and control warfare, intelligence based warfare, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, "hacker" warfare, economic information warfare, and cyberwarfare. Posits that the concept of information dominance is hollow. [17] Libicki, Martin C. The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995.) Analyzes the "revolution in information technology." Argues that technology begets doctrine and doctrine begets organization, implying a possible need for organizational changes in the military. Examines a proposed "Information Corps". [18] Libicki, Martin C., and James A. Hazlett. "Do We Need an Information Corps?" Joint Forces Quarterly 1 (Autumn 1993): 88-97. Examines the debate as to whether a separate Information Corps should be created. The benefits would be common doctrine, inherent standardization, and increased innovation. The downside would be a lack of integration with other forces. [19] Libicki, Martin C. "Dominant Battlefield Awareness and its Consequences." First International Symposium on Command and Control Research and Technology (June 1995): 550-9. Introduces the concept of dominant battlefield awareness. Predicts the ability to achieve perfect knowledge of a 200 mile square battlefield by the year 2008. Discusses the technological requirements for achieving dominant battlefield awareness. Examines the pros and cons of related issues. [20] Lucky, Robert W. Silicon Dreams: Information, Man, and Machine. (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1989.) Discusses in layman's terms the concept of information, information theory, and information processing. Provides even coverage of philosophical and technical issues. Touches on almost every important aspect of information. [21] Mann, Edward. "Desert Storm: The First Information War?" Airpower Journal (Winter 1994): 4-14. Takes the theory of information warfare and ties it together with specific examples from the Persian Gulf War. Discusses many key concepts in concise, readable terms. [22] Nielson, Robert E., and Charles B. Gaisson. "Information - The Ultimate Weapon." First International Symposium on Command and Control Research and Technology (June 1995): 545-549. Examines the differences between war in the Industrial Age and war in the Information Age. Focuses in on the decision environment and the old and new paradigms for decision making. Argues for greater technological support for decision making to reduce need for fallible intuition. [23] Peterson, A. Padgett. "Tactical Computers Vulnerable to Malicious Software Attacks." Signal 48 (November 1993): 74-5. Highlights the role of tactical computers in warfare, examining their vulnerability to viruses. Discusses the history of viruses, how they work, what they are capable of, and theoretical reasons why no perfect defense can be established. Examines practical measures that can be taken with tactical computers to reduce the threat. [24] Ryan, Donald E., Jr. "Implications of Information Based Warfare." Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn-Winter 1994-5): 114-6. Discusses the need to re-examine doctrine in light of advances in technology. Draws analogies between traditional Industrial Age warfare doctrinal elements and proposed future doctrine. [25] Schwartau, Winn. Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway. (New York, NY: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1994.) Popular text on information warfare in general. Full of anecdotes. Lacks grounding in the theoretical basis of warfare. Divides information warfare into personal, corporate, and global information warfare. [26] Science Application International Corporation (SAIC). Information Warfare: Legal, Regulatory, Policy, and Organizational Considerations for Assurance. (Prepared for the Joint Staff, 4 July, 1995.) Exhaustive legal reference on the legal, regulatory, policy, and organizational implications of information warfare. Cites specifics in public law, executive orders, court decisions, etc. [27] Starr, Stuart H., and Dale K. Pace. "Developing the Intellectual Tools Needed by the Information Warfare Community." First International Symposium on Command and Control Research and Technology (June 1995): 577-86. Outlines a detailed conceptual framework for understanding information from the military perspective. Leaves room for further definition of non-military elements of information warfare. Examines toolsets applicable to the support of the information warfare community. [28] Stein, George J. "Information Warfare." Airpower Journal (Spring 1995): 31-39. Discusses a definition of information warfare, development of a strategy for information warfare, the U.S. Air Force perspective, and the danger of failing to address information warfare. Sees the rise of information warfare as similar to the rise of Airpower. [29] Stoll, Clifford. The Cuckoo's Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of Computer Espionage. (New York: Doubleday, 1989.) Classic true story of international information warfare over the Internet. Often referenced. [30] Szafranski, Richard. "A Theory of Information Warfare: Preparing for 2020." Airpower Journal (Spring 1995): 56-65. Defines information and warfare. Focuses on psychological warfare aspects on information warfare. Sees the primary target of information warfare as the knowledge and belief systems of the adversary. [31] Toffler, Alvin, and Heidi Toffler. War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st century. (New York, NY: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993.) Traces the evolution of warfare through agrarian, industrial, and informational warfare "waves." Forecasts the future of human conflict. Constantly referenced and highly recommended by other authors on the subject of information warfare. [32] Tzu, Sun (Griffith, Samuel B., trans.) The Art of War. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.) Ancient text on warfare popularized due to Sun Tzu's holistic view of warfare and the increasing irrelevance of Clausewitz's classic On War in the Information Age. Unlike Clausewitz, Sun Tzu regards information as indispensable in reducing the uncertainty of war. Much of The Art of War is arguably applicable to information warfare. [33] Waller, Douglas. "Onward Cyber Soldiers." Time (August 24, 1995): 38-46. Focuses mostly on examples and speculation to describe information warfare. Provides a summary of some of the major papers on information warfare. Includes many salient points. [34] Wardynski, E. Casey. "The Labor Economics of Information Warfare." Military Review (May-June 1995): 56-61. Examines the economics of providing appropriate education in the nation's public schools to ensure the numbers of quality workers that will be required to support and defend the nation in the Information Age. Analyzes the wages these people can expect to make and discusses the tradeoff between developing technologies that require low skill, low wage workers, versus developing technologies that require high skill, high wage workers. [35] Cornerstones of Information Warfare. (Department of the Air Force, 1995.) States the Air Force's definition of information warfare. Outlines the traditional elements of warfare which comprise information warfare. Discusses how Air Force doctrine should change to accommodate information warfare. [36] Jumpstart Information Warfare Briefing. (Department of the Air Force, 1995.) Open source briefing ordered by the Air Force Chief of Staff to educate Major Command and Numbered Air Force commanders and staffs on the subject of information warfare. Contains numerous examples of information warfare activities. [37] National Defense University School of Information Warfare and Strategy Syllabus, Academic Year 1995-96. Details goals, objectives, lessons, and labs taught at the School of Information Warfare and Strategy. [38] U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information Operations, 8 July, 1995 Working Draft. States the Army's definition of information warfare. Discusses information environment, threats, information dominance, information operations, command and control warfare, intelligence, information systems, and information activities. [39] U.S. Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-9, Concept for Information Operations, 1 August, 1995. "This concept describes the importance of information and how to win the information war in military operations now and into the twenty-first century."