

Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication



US Joint Forces Command

Joint Warfighting Center

1 September 2008



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
MESSAGE TO THE JOINT WARFIGHTERS

As US Joint Forces Command continues to interact with the combatant commands and Services, we recognize that there is no universal agreement on the best way to plan and execute strategic communications related activities, and there is very little doctrinal guidance. Consequently, we have developed this pre-doctrinal handbook to help joint force commanders and their staffs understand alternative perspectives, techniques, procedures, “best practices,” and organizational options associated with strategic communications.

Strategic communication must be at the heart of US Government efforts to influence key audiences in support of broad US national interests, policies, and objectives. We seek to achieve this influence by understanding key audiences and engaging them with coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, images, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

The US military plays an instrumental supporting role in strategic communication, primarily through information operations, public affairs, and defense support to public diplomacy. Strategic communication considerations should be associated with every military operation across the entire range of military operations from routine, recurring military activities in peacetime through large-scale combat associated with major wartime operations. Effectively employed strategic communication has the potential to achieve national, theater-strategic and operational-level objectives in a manner that could lessen the requirement for combat in many operations. This is especially the case in circumstances where the focus of operations is on gaining and maintaining support of the relevant population, such as in counterinsurgency and operations associated with irregular warfare.

During the past four years, understanding of strategic communication and its impact on joint operations has continued to evolve across the joint community. Their experiences are in this handbook. I encourage you to use the information in this handbook and provide feedback to help us capture value-added ideas for incorporation in emerging joint doctrine.



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PREFACE

1. Scope

This handbook is a **pre-doctrinal document** on “Strategic Communication (SC).” It provides the fundamental principles, techniques, and procedures that are evolving in the joint community and moving toward incorporation into joint publications. This handbook serves as a bridge between the current practices in the field and their migration into doctrine. As such, the intent is to inform doctrine writers, educators, and trainers of SC for inclusion in joint doctrine, education, and training.

2. Content

This handbook outlines current doctrine, recognizes some best practices, and offers some techniques and procedures currently used in the field. It also addresses some techniques, procedures, and implications for further development of SC-related joint doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. A hypothetical vignette progresses through the document to assist in understanding the material.

3. Development

Development of this handbook was based on data obtained from applicable approved and emerging joint, multinational, multi-Service, and Service doctrine and procedures; training and education material from CAPSTONE, KEYSTONE, and PINNACLE senior executive education programs; joint exercise observations in facilitated after-action reviews and commander’s summary reports; related joint concepts; experimentation results; the draft DOD Directive on SC; other related Joint Staff (JS) directives; joint exercise and other trip reports; joint publication assessment reports; and Service and joint lessons learned databases. Additional research involved discussions with members of the Services, doctrine development organizations, combatant commands, JS, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); a review of the USJFCOM *Communication Strategy 2007*; the Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy (PD) Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) *US National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*; emerging USJFCOM *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept* (JIC); SC conferences and working groups; congressional testimony; and various related reports, articles, and publications.

4. Application

This handbook is not approved doctrine, but is a non-authoritative supplement to currently limited SC doctrine that can assist commanders and their staffs in planning and executing SC-related activities. The information herein also can help the joint community develop SC doctrine, mature emerging SC concepts for possible transition into joint doctrine, and further SC effectiveness in joint operations. **Commanders should consider the potential benefits and risks of using this information in actual operations.**

5. Contact Information

Comments and suggestions on this important topic are welcomed. USJFCOM JWFC points of contact are LtCol Robert Kurowski, 757-203-7966 (DSN 668), robert.kurowski@jfc.com.mil; and Mr. David Spangler, 757-203-6028 (DSN 668), david.spangler@jfc.com.mil.

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OTHER COMMANDER'S HANDBOOKS

Commander's Handbook for Joint Battle Damage Assessment

•

Commander's Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group

•

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting

•

Joint Fires and Targeting Handbook

•

Organizing for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (IEDD) at the Operational Level (SECRET)

These documents can be downloaded at:

www.dtic.mil/doctrine/

<https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/>

Click on the "JWFC Pamphlets" link in the "Global Resource" box.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Discusses the background, definition, and doctrinal underpinnings of strategic communication (SC)**
 - **Addresses synchronizing themes, messages, images and actions**
 - **Describes current SC practices at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels**
 - **Identifies some SC “best practices” from the field**
 - **Identifies unique skill sets needed to assist in understanding the operational environment**
 - **Provides planning tools to assist SC planning efforts**
 - **Provides sample SC planning and execution synchronization matrices**
 - **Discusses other SC initiatives**
 - **Identifies operational implications of SC implementation**
-

Communication Challenges

Strategic communication (SC) must be a responsive and agile whole-of-government effort with synchronization of crucial themes, messages, images, and actions.

The continuous, rapid communications flow in the information environment, facilitated by modern technological advances and media distribution methods, requires responsive, agile processes and capabilities to preserve and enhance the credibility and influence of the United States. To address these challenges through unified action, a whole-of-government approach known as strategic communication (SC) has emerged. SC generally is accepted as “Focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.” Further and more specifically, effective SC requires synchronization of crucial themes, messages, images, and activities with other nonlethal and lethal operations

The Department of Defense (DOD) needs to develop a common, clear SC baseline in the areas of doctrine, concept development, and training.

The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identified SC as one of five specific “areas of particular emphasis” critical to the Department of Defense (DOD) ability to address a strategic environment “characterized by uncertainty and surprise.” The QDR went on to state that DOD, “...must instill communication assessments and processes into its culture; developing programs, plans, policy, information and themes to support Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) that reflect the U.S. Government’s overall strategic objectives.” The primary military capabilities that contribute to SC include public affairs (PA), information operations (IO), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD).

Because SC involves activities outside joint force commander (JFC) control, coordination and synchronization of SC is more complex.

Synchronizing SC-related themes, messages, images and actions across the joint force is often critical to mission accomplishment. However, SC encompasses national-strategic level and non-DOD activities that are not under the direct control of the joint force commander (JFC). This adds to the complexity of the effort to adapt and apply themes, messages, images, and actions at each level within military operations to create desired and avoid undesired outcomes in selected audiences.

National Strategic Communication

The Department of State (DOS) leads the US Government (USG) SC effort and has created several organizations to facilitate SC activities.

Within the USG, the Department of State’s (DOS) Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has the lead for SC. The Secretary of State created the DOS Office of Strategic Communication and Planning that provides short- and long-term planning in support of SC issues. DOS also created several new organizations and structures such as the interagency Counterterrorism Communications Center – recently renamed the Global Strategic Engagement Center. Additionally, the DOS Rapid Response Unit (RRU) responds to urgent issues by providing approved strategic-level SC statements that military leaders can use to develop military-oriented SC-related products. DOS also established an Interagency Crisis Communication Team to initiate an interagency conference call immediately upon major breaking news that might have an impact on our efforts against violent extremism to coordinate message points. The DOS also uses their INFOCENTRAL website as a central repository for vetted senior leader statements, research, analysis, and other products for use by SC programs at all levels. This site is available to assist the joint force in SC planning. A close collaborative working relationship has developed between DOS and DOD on SC.

DOD Organization, Processes, and Guidance

DOD organizational changes and other SC efforts have demonstrated significant progress.

To support the USG effort led by DOS, DOD has established new staff organizations and processes to guide and provide support to the SC effort. In late 2005, SecDef appointed a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication ((DASD (JC)) charged with the responsibility "... to oversee Department of Defense activities directed at shaping department-wide communications doctrine, organization, and training for the joint force." These organizational changes and other efforts have produced significant results. Publication of the *QDR Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap (SC Roadmap)* was instrumental in initiating numerous SC-related activities within DOD; the SC Integration Group (SCIG) published the *DOD Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan*, and successfully moved combatant commander (CCDR) templates through the SCIG Executive Committee and to the DepSecDef for decision. OSD has released an SC concept of operations and a set of SC principles in Appendix A.

Joint Force Practices

The commander's communication strategy must be commander-driven, proactive, and synchronize themes, messages, images, and actions.

Observations of current joint force practices result primarily from JWFC's training and exercise support in numerous exercises and assistance visits to combatant commands and US joint and Service component HQ in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. Lessons learned recorded by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis also provided valuable insights. Some organizations find it useful to distinguish the SC-related planning and execution that occurs within the theater from SC-related activities at the national-strategic level. This approach uses the CCDR's communication strategy to support the broader interagency SC effort and closely coordinate support from other agencies and organizations. This strategy must be commander-driven, proactive, and synchronized with respect to all themes, messages, images, and actions. A synchronization matrix provides a graphical representation of the JFC's communication strategy and an effective tool in matching words and deeds directed toward the various audiences.

SC activities and organizations are at different levels of maturity and effectiveness.

Current SC staff organizations and processes used by JFCs are at different levels of maturity and effectiveness. Likewise, a number of JFC's have both increased senior leadership involvement in the SC effort and have integrated SC into planning and staffing processes. Five specific examples of these efforts are increased command emphasis, tasking an existing staff leader, direct planning team integration,

centralized control of all SC-related activities under a separate directorate, and a strategic communication director with small coordination staff and supporting SC working group.

Thirteen Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) SC “best practices” may be adaptable to other areas of responsibility.

In April 2008, USJFCOM sent a team to identify Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Communication Division “best practices” for possible inclusion in joint doctrine, curricula, and training events and consideration by other commands. The team observed MNF-I, Multinational Corps-Iraq, and US Embassy communication programs and identified 13 best practices. Some are unique to the operational environment in Iraq; however, many could be adapted to other operational areas. Their prioritized list follows:

- The commander is clearly involved and regularly provides SC intent at the daily battle update meetings and twice weekly at the communication division meetings. The MNF-I commander accepts risk in order to shorten the time it takes to release information.
- Two senior (O-6) liaison officers greatly improve efforts to integrate communication division activities with intelligence and special operations task force (SOTF) operations. This enables actionable SC planning, cueing to future operations, exploitation of adversary documents, dissemination of beneficial information, and anticipation of adversary reaction.
- The communication assessment team integrates operational research and systems analysis expertise into planning and execution. The assessment effort evaluates current and past communication efforts, informs leadership and planning, provides support to theater and major subordinate commands, helps anticipate public and adversary reaction, and integrates and shares knowledge.
- A media operations center (MOC) provides immediately actionable information through real time monitoring, translation, and connection to operating forces, including the SOTF. MOC actions ensure early release of operational information into the public domain, as well as providing aggressive correction/clarification as needed several times daily.
- Engagement of Government of Iraq (GOI) spokespersons at Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and Prime Minister Offices by contracted experienced Iraqi US citizens assigned as liaison officers (LNOs). These

contractors provide common language, culture, and experience that facilitate building relationships and enables building a shared understanding.

- Proactive full-time US media engagement closely coordinated with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD (PA)) and focused on US media needs and production schedules. This practice compliments MOC operations, supports daily OSD press briefs, and involves an expanded circle of military speakers.
- An expedited process for rapid release of military visual information products, to include attached detailed storyboards is established. The impact of visual images was recognized and integrated into planning considerations.
- The US Ambassador and MNF-I commander are closely connected. The MNF-I communications division assigned LNOs to the US Mission Iraq PA, and they share planning, execution, and assessment resources.
- A corps-level IO task force shares robust products and assessment with MNF-I and GOI. This unique effort resulted from expert and innovative application of marketing and communication principles, combined with major funding and insightful contracting actions. Highly effective focused products are pre-tested, carefully placed, and assessed. The communications environment is closely studied and results are shared with MNF-I and GOI.
- A combined press information center employs integrated media support. A media support facility enables integrated support to media and the MOC. Facility is well equipped and located for ease of media access.
- A proactive Iraqi media engagement team includes Iraqi employees, a protected facility, and focuses on building a free-press culture in support of democracy in Iraq. Coalition provision of training and access to information are key enablers.
- Current, comprehensive, and practical SC planning involves US Mission Iraq and major subordinate commands participation. Planners provided ample detail and synchronized the communication annex with the campaign plan, supporting all major elements.

- Commander driven emphasis on key leader engagement (KLE) events stimulates action at all levels. KLE planning includes US Mission Iraq efforts and use coalition military leaders at all levels to execute the plan. This effort focuses on building relationships with local leaders and enjoys decentralized execution.

Other Strategic Communication Initiatives

Although progress is being made, resourcing remains an ongoing challenge.

Much effort has gone into progress on *SC Roadmap* assigned tasks, such as developing DOD SC policy, expanding Joint Public Affairs Support Element SC support, incorporating SC planning considerations in curriculum at joint and Service mid- and senior-level colleges, and creating a senior SC training course in Monterey, CA. However, resourcing remains an ongoing challenge. The SC joint integrating concept (JIC), currently in development at USJFCOM, focuses eight to twenty years in the future and outlines the operational problem as one of “influence.” There is a growing desire for the creation of courses and programs focused on SC. The DASD (JC) conducted a review of military education programs to determine quantity and quality of SC education. This review has discovered that current SC-related instruction primarily consists of lessons/material within courses on IO and PA. The DASD (JC) has sponsored and scheduled a number of SC-related conferences designed to gather SC educators and key practitioners for thoughtful discussions on SC education and training issues.

Planning and Assessment

The field struggles with how to implement SC planning.

“Everyone is a planner” is a phrase underpinned by the proposition that the process of planning is about developing “ways” of utilizing “means” to achieve “ends” which solves a problem. In essence, planning is problem solving and in that respect the statement is correct. However, there are many specialty areas supporting the joint operational planning process that require specialists to plan effectively, such as intelligence, logistics, IO, PA, and others. The field is currently struggling with how to implement SC planning. Some feel that there needs to be a separate SC analysis and planning effort. Others feel that simply training planners to include SC considerations in the doctrinal process would be sufficient. Investigation of this issue will continue, but the requirements for synchronization of SC efforts across the force and integration into the final plan remain steadfast.

To properly support SC, understanding the operational environment must include the cognitive dimension.

Understanding the operational environment is fundamental to joint operation planning, and is particularly important for effective SC. In particular, the JFC and staff must attempt to understand what people think, how they perceive the operational environment, and why. It may require analysis of the informational and cognitive dimensions that permeate the local social, political, economic, and information networks. However, the JFC must understand that these are complex, adaptive systems that are more difficult to understand than closed systems, such as an air defense network. This is a complex undertaking, complicated by factors such as the audience pre-existing bias, cultural lens, stimulus-response patterns, motivation, expectations, and view of current situation.

Understanding and mapping the cognitive dimension may require leveraging unique skill sets not normally found in a military organization.

SC planners must understand that cognitive factors can vary significantly between locality, cultures, operational circumstances, and that SC ways and means that worked in one situation might not work in another. For SC purposes, the JFC, chief of staff, J-2, and others may also need to leverage outside experts to support joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, planning, and assessment, either by deploying them forward or through "reachback." Examples of such expertise include the following:

- Anthropology or Sociology (understanding the local culture)
- Local marketing expertise (understanding points of individual influence/interest in the local population and venues for communication)
- Linguistics expertise (understanding linguistics nuances of local communication processes and products)
- Local and regional communications expertise (understanding the means, methods, and relative impact of local and regional communications)
- Diplomacy expertise (understanding intricacies of diplomatic efforts)
- US Embassy/DOS/United States Agency for International Development (USAID) expertise (understanding coordination requirements and methods between DOD and DOS ongoing foreign diplomacy)

Because SC attempts to create outcomes primarily in the cognitive dimension, it is a challenge to create measures that are relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced.

Measuring progress toward mission accomplishment assists commanders in decision-making and adjusting operations to achieve military objectives and reach the end state. With local population perception playing a pivotal role—particularly in irregular warfare, such as in counterinsurgency operations—and the fact that “battles and campaigns can be lost in the cognitive dimension,” assessment has a key role in SC-related activities. Because SC attempts to create outcomes primarily in the cognitive dimension, it is a challenge to create measures that are relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced.

Planning Techniques

This handbook provides SC planning techniques and considerations.

This section focuses on creating a useful tool as a guide to assist SC planning efforts. The planning techniques are adapted from material taught in the SC planner’s course, with the emphasis on analysis and synchronization of key overarching issues to keep planners out of the weeds/details as long as possible. Appendix G provides a more detailed checklist of planning considerations to assist planners in considering important SC factors during preparatory information gathering, planning, Annex Y development, and execution.

Delivery vehicle, timing, and tempo are important planning considerations.

There are three fundamental considerations for planning SC-related activities: delivery vehicle, timing, and tempo.

- It is clear that construction of the message must include considerations for resonance with the intended audience, but the delivery vehicle can also significantly distort, impede, or facilitate reception by the audience. Selection of the appropriate vehicle can be quite complex and must consider message content, desired audience impact, resistance, vehicle advantage, and other factors.
- Timing of the message is important for myriad reasons, including synergy with other messages/events, receptivity of the audience, momentum, audience motivation/expectations, and stimulus response patterns. Factors that define the timing window often include audience social/cultural expectations, motivation, the perception of personal impact, and timing of other important messages.
- Tempo of message delivery can directly affect how the audience decides to take action. A continual drum beat of

a specific message or type of message can result in the receiving audience over time treating it as noise. However, a well-timed message at the optimum tempo can have significantly increased effect.

Operational Implications

The joint community needs to publish SC policy and expand joint doctrine.

In order to integrate and synchronize SC efforts and capabilities, as noted in the *SC Roadmap*, the joint community needs to publish SC policy and expand joint doctrine. This effort should include identification of value-added emerging structures and practices, the scope and limits of SC, subordinate elements, supporting capabilities, and relationships. Training and education may be the key enabler to rapidly increase effectiveness of SC operations and allow dissolution of some of the interim organizational methods. Training of commanders and staffs to synchronize words and actions can help the JFC close or avoid the “say-do gap” and influence audiences more efficiently and effectively.

An analysis of SC processes, organizational needs, and coordination means may be of value.

More work needs to be done to identify an SC end state for DOD, analyze existing doctrinal processes to determine needed modification, and provide organizational constructs to support the process changes. This work could produce some efficiencies for SC-related activities and organizations. Likewise, investigating ways to better reach out and coordinate SC with interagency, coalition, and other partners may provide significantly improved coherence in SC themes, messages, images, and actions for achieving long-term SC-related objectives

Commercial and nongovernmental expertise may be useful to SC.

A study of private enterprise or nongovernmental expertise in the areas of advertising, marketing, and progress measurement may be beneficial to help shift paradigms and develop new ways to conduct SC as well as new ways to use military resources in the execution and assessment of SC.

The field needs a process for rapid approval of SC products above the theater level.

A recent example of a well-established expedited crisis communication process is the ASD (PA) handling of the public affairs guidance package. A review of this process may provide some value for consideration in adopting a similar process for SC-related products.

Training planners to include SC considerations and providing authority to SC directors should help planning and synchronization of SC activities.

The detailed techniques and procedures for how the JFC should synchronize IO, PA, and DSPD in support of higher-level SC themes, messages, images, and actions have not been decided, so organizational changes – particularly those that require more resources – are premature. A more efficient approach may be to train planners to incorporate SC more completely into the existing doctrinal joint operation planning process and to slightly modify and expand the doctrinal baseline. Whether or not organizational changes are necessary, those leaders responsible for implementing, coordinating, or directing SC-related activities for their command must be given the requisite authority, tools, and other resources to accompany the responsibility.

Diminishing stovepipes could help unify SC efforts.

Diminishing stovepipes, review of authorities or bridging DOD organizations that overly segment missions or inappropriately restrain employment of capabilities may prove invaluable to producing a more unified SC effort. While this may require some revision of staff process and procedures within joint organizations, the results could be a single coherent effort that can more effectively meet the challenge of conducting successful operations at all levels.

Feedback from the field indicates a need for a machine translator and a center of excellence.

SC subject matter experts in the field have indicated that a “Center of Excellence” type organization for SC may be useful in developing SC doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, concepts, capturing lessons learned, and advocacy for warfighter SC issues. Likewise, feedback from the field indicates that development of a machine translator that is dialectically accurate, agile, and culturally validated should improve the JFC’s ability to communicate with indigenous personnel. It would facilitate dialogue, enable discussion, and improve understanding.

Personnel shortages affect SC efforts significantly.

Interviews with DOD SC experts have indicated that personnel shortages continue to affect SC efforts significantly. In order to alleviate some pressure on the personnel resource system, intensifying the incorporation of SC considerations into joint and Service planner development programs may be of value.

Developing regional and country experts may prove valuable.

A key enabler for many SC programs is an understanding of the local language, cultural and information environment. Development of regional and country experts to assist in intelligence preparation, planning, and executing SC-related tasks may prove valuable. Network analysts will need the unique skill set to support SC efforts.

CHAPTER I

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION CHALLENGES

“Victory in the long war ultimately depends on strategic communication by the United States and its international partners. Effective communication must build and maintain credibility and trust with friends and foes alike, through an emphasis on consistency, veracity and transparency both in words and deeds. Such credibility is essential to building trusted networks that counter ideological support for terrorism.”

Quadrennial Defense Review Report
February 6, 2006

1. Preserving Influence

The continuous, rapid communications flow in the information environment, facilitated by modern technological advances and media distribution methods, requires responsive, agile processes and capabilities to preserve and enhance the credibility and influence of the United States. The communication capabilities of today greatly amplify the impact and speed of change in foreign and domestic public opinion and the subsequent influence on activities of the US Government (USG). Adversaries are often unconstrained in this environment, unencumbered by traditional processes, and unconcerned about necessary ethical, moral, or legal constraints under which the US and its allies operate. They have successfully used the information environment to advance their objectives and undermine our ability to do the same.

“... I say to you: that we are in a battle and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.”

Ayman al-Zawahiri, Letter to
Al-Zarqawi, 9 July 2005

2. Providing Unified Action

a. **Unified action** is the synchronization, coordination and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Key activities, among others, that contribute to unified action are assignment of responsibilities, organizing, establishing relationships, and collaboration. Unified action is a comprehensive approach to achieve unity of effort.

b. **Strategic Communication.** To address the strategic communication (SC) challenges through unified action, a whole-of-government approach known as SC has emerged. SC is defined as:

Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.¹

Further and more specifically, effective SC requires synchronization of crucial themes, messages, images, and activities with other nonlethal and lethal operations to influence selected audiences in support of US national interests. However, a lack of sufficient guidance, resources, and capabilities government-wide hinders unified action.

3. Guidance and Capability Shortfalls

a. Policy and Resources

(1) The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identified SC as one of five specific “areas of particular emphasis” critical to the DOD ability to address a strategic environment “characterized by uncertainty and surprise.”² The QDR went on to state that DOD, “...must instill communication assessments and processes into its culture; developing programs, plans, policy, information and themes to support Combatant Commanders that reflect the U.S. Government’s overall strategic objectives.”³

“We recognize that our current governmental structure was not meant to resolve the problems of the global Information Age – the mismatch between authorities for public diplomacy in State and the resources in DOD – being one obvious proof of this.”

Dr. Michael Doran
DASD for Support to Public Diplomacy
House Armed Services Committee testimony,
8 Nov 07, 8-9

(2) The 2008 a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Strategic Communication report acknowledges improvement at the operational level since the 2003 report, but states “...despite progress, much work remains to be done.”

Specifically, the latest DSB report expresses concern for the permanence of this progress:

Positive changes within organizations are real, but they depend to a considerable extent on the skills and imagination of current leaders. These changes must be evaluated, and those that work should be institutionalized. Resistance from traditional organizational cultures continues. Resources for strategic communication have increased, but they fall substantially short of national needs.⁴

Expansion of current limited SC doctrine and training can help institutionalize these positive changes.

(3) DOD subsequently released the September 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication* (referred to in this handbook as the *SC Roadmap*) that assigned fifteen tasks to USJFCOM, including SC joint integrating concept development, force generation analysis, collaboration tools development, and various training and education initiatives. Likewise, many other SC activities are underway within the combatant commands, Services, Joint Staff, and other US government agencies to improve SC within their respective areas of responsibility. These activities have resulted in different views from the joint community about how to implement SC.

b. Military Capabilities and Limitations

(1) **Joint Doctrine.** The primary military capabilities that contribute to SC include public affairs (PA), information operations (IO), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD). PA, IO, and DSPD have established doctrine and terms of reference, but little joint doctrine exists to integrate them for SC purposes. SC is relatively new and other operational implications could emerge. Discussions across DOD, including those with flag officers at CAPSTONE and PINNACLE⁵ seminars, underscore the need to develop a common, clear SC baseline across DOD in the areas of doctrine, concept development, experimentation, and training.

“The panoply of U.S. force actions must be synchronized across the operational battlespace to the extent possible so as not to conflict with statements made in communications at every level from President to the soldier, sailor, marine, or airman on the street.”

Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation, RAND Corporation, Feb 07

(2) The *SC Roadmap* clearly outlined current military limitations:

*The U.S. military is not sufficiently organized, trained, or equipped to analyze, plan, coordinate, and integrate the full spectrum of capabilities available to promote America's interests. Changes in the global information environment require the Department of Defense (DOD), in conjunction with other U.S. Government (USG) agencies, to implement more deliberate and well-developed Strategic Communication processes.*⁶

(3) Synchronizing SC-related themes, messages, images and actions across the joint force can be critical to mission accomplishment. However, SC encompasses national-strategic level and non-DOD activities that are not under the direct control of the joint force commander (JFC). This adds to the complexity of the effort to adapt and apply themes, messages, images, and actions at each level within military operations to create desired and avoid undesired outcomes in intended audiences.

c. **Understanding the operational environment** is fundamental to joint operation planning, and is particularly important for effective SC. In particular, the joint force commander (JFC) and staff must attempt to understand what people think, how they perceive the operational environment, and why. It may require analysis of the informational and cognitive dimensions that permeate the local social, political, economic, and information networks.⁷ However, the JFC must understand that these are complex, adaptive systems that are more difficult to understand than closed systems, such as an air defense network. Such analysis could assess the audience pre-existing bias, cultural lens,⁸ stimulus-response patterns,⁹ motivation, expectations, and view of current situation. An additional challenge is that the information environment is typically complex, has many competing signals, and is globally interconnected. Understanding and mapping the cognitive dimension may require unique skill sets not normally found in a military organization.

d. **Assessment.** Measuring progress toward mission accomplishment assists commanders in decision-making and adjusting operations to achieve military objectives and reach the end state. With local population perception playing a pivotal role—particularly in irregular warfare, such as COIN operations—and the fact that “battles and campaigns can be lost in the cognitive dimension,”¹⁰ assessment has a key role in SC-related activities. Because SC attempts to affect the cognitive dimension, creating measures that are relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced is a challenge.

4. Addressing Shortfalls

To assist joint force planners, this handbook provides definitions of SC-related capabilities, discusses their relationships, provides a brief discussion of USG and DOD strategic-level SC implementation, and offers more in-depth information on current

practices at the operational level. This handbook provides principles (Appendix A), selected best practices from the field, a planning techniques, and planning considerations to assist in planning and executing SC-related activities. Finally, this handbook discusses ongoing developmental activities, such as USJFCOM SC Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) development and SC education initiatives.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION VIGNETTE

This hypothetical vignette illustrates key points and provides examples of SC-related processes and products. The vignette begins here and extends through other relevant parts of the document. It is not specific enough to cover every potential process step and product, but it should provide the reader with a clear idea of typical SC interactions and activities.

The situation in this vignette requires crisis-action planning in anticipation of very near-term commitment of forces in a combatant command's area of responsibility (AOR). All activities in the vignette occur prior to deployment.

BACKGROUND

In a fictional combatant command's (USXCOM) AOR, tensions over a border dispute between Country Red (Red) and Country Gray (Gray) have recently escalated. Although not an ally, Gray maintains a favorable US relationship, including economic trade and military-to-military contacts. Gray is a primary supplier of certain minerals important to the production of US military satellite systems. Gray is also strategically located adjacent to Country Green (Green), a US ally that controls a key seaport important both for military purposes and as a significant hub on ocean trade routes. Gray and Green have limited military capability.

Historically, Red has been less than friendly toward the US, although Red and the US maintain embassies and economic trade. The US is the primary supplier of essential machinery components used by Red's manufacturing industry. However, a recent coup by Red's military leader deposed the former Red President, who fled the country with his key advisors. US-Red relations have deteriorated during the past six months. During the last three months in particular, Red has sponsored anti-US demonstrations and has possibly supported terrorist acts against US and pro-Western facilities in the AOR. Intelligence sources indicate that the Red junta is seeking an alliance with certain countries in an attempt to degrade US influence and freedom of action in the AOR. Intelligence analysts believe that Red's unstated strategic objective is control of Green and its seaport and that a Red attack is likely. The combatant commander (CCDR) of USXCOM (CDRUSXCOM) has advised the SecDef that indicators suggest Red can position sufficient capability in three weeks to attack successfully into Gray.

The President of Green has expressed concern over the deteriorating situation to the US President through diplomatic channels, and the Prime Minister of Gray has requested US military assistance. The US President has decided to assist, and tentatively agrees to deploy military capability to the region.

(Events described later in this scenario occur during a 30-day period prior to deployment of US forces to the region.)

"Face the fact that communication superiority is a prerequisite for success in irregular warfare, just as air superiority is a prerequisite for victory in conventional war. To date we have been ineffective in the strategic communication campaign to strengthen the will of our own people, to weaken the will of our enemies, and gain the support of people around the world. In the current battle of wills, strategic communication is the center of gravity. This conflict is not to be won through economic, diplomatic, and military means."

Cross and Crescent
Sam Holliday

CHAPTER II

ESTABLISHED POLICY AND GUIDANCE

“In the past when soldiers were trained to adjust artillery fire, they were instructed to make bold corrections because the eye often underestimates the distance to the right or left, up or down, that the gun’s aim must be adjusted to hit the target. So it is with strategic communication. To date, the American effort to get into the game has been half-hearted and limited to bureaucratic fixes.”

Richard Halloran, “Strategic Communication,” 2007

1. National Strategic Communication

a. The 2008 *National Defense Strategy* acknowledges, “Our efforts require a unified approach to both planning and implementing policy . . . one that seamlessly combines civil and military capabilities and options.”

*Strategic communications will play an increasingly important role in a unified approach to national security. DoD, in partnership with the Department of State, has begun to make strides in this area, and will continue to do so. However, we should recognize that this is a weakness across the U.S. Government, and that a coordinated effort must be made to improve the joint planning and implementation of strategic communications.*¹¹

b. Within the USG, the Department of State’s Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has the lead for SC. DOS established an interagency (IA) coordination body with primary responsibility for SC oversight:

*The Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is the overall mechanism by which we coordinate our public diplomacy across the interagency community.*¹²

The primary product of this committee is the *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*. This document provides USG-level guidance, intent, strategic imperatives, and core messages under which DOD can nest its themes, messages, images, and activities.

c. A significant national SC resource is the Central Intelligence Agency’s Open Source Center (OSC), formerly FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Intercept Service), which focuses on media reports and broadcasts from specific countries and regions.

30 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-30)

The US President convenes the National Security Council (NSC) to discuss options for responding to Red's anticipated attack against Gray. CDRUSXCOM monitors by secure video teleconferencing. After lengthy discussion, the President provides guidance, including the following US strategic objectives:

1. Maintain the sovereignty of countries Gray and Green and reestablish conditions for a secure and stable region.
2. Defend Gray and Green from Red attack and defeat or eject Red forces from Gray.
3. Degrade Red's offensive military capabilities and minimize the Red threat to other countries in the region.
4. Identify and degrade terrorist capabilities in Red and elsewhere in the region.
5. Seek opportunities to strengthen regional nations' ability to defend themselves from future aggression by Red.

Shortly after the NSC meeting, the President issues an official statement that outlines the national strategic objectives for the current crisis. Concurrently, CDRUSXCOM consults with the SecDef, the Secretary of State (SECSTATE), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They discuss the President's objectives and guidance within the context of the AOR, global US objectives, and strategic communication themes. This discussion will help CDRUSXCOM focus the command's planning effort to achieve a desired military end state consistent with the President's strategic objectives for the impending crisis. SECSTATE verifies that the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization will be the DOS lead for post-conflict planning and operations.

CDRXCOM notifies the XCOM J-5 and J-3 to begin modifying applicable portions of XCOM OPLAN 6153, which describes options for responding to three potential contingencies in the Red-Gray-Green region of XCOM's AOR. The option that most closely matches the current circumstances requires responding with a JTF, formed around the headquarters of XCOM's Army component. CDRXCOM notifies the Army component commander to begin planning accordingly and to have the JTF headquarters operational within 5 days of the "Prepare to Deploy" order. The XCOM J-3 issues a commander-authorized planning order to OPLAN 6153 affected supporting and subordinate commands.

2. Department of State Organization and Processes

a. The Secretary of State created the DOS Office of Strategic Communication and Planning that provides short- and long-term planning in support of SC issues.¹³ DOS also created several new organizations and structures such as the interagency Counterterrorism Communications Center (CTCC) – recently renamed the Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC) – headquartered at DOS, with the core mission of developing messages and strategies to discredit terrorists and their ideology.¹⁴ The GSEC's responsibilities are expected to include:

(1) Serving as a subject-matter advisory group and sub-PCC body to assist the Under Secretary of State and the members of the PCC on topics and issues related to the “War of Ideas”.

(2) Coordinating counterterrorism messages for the PCC (including developing and distributing products and alerts).

(3) Coordinating four sub-PCCs (Harnessing and Connecting Expertise, Research and Intelligence, Metrics and Polling, and Countering Violent Extremism at the Grassroots).

b. Additionally, the DOS Rapid Response Unit (RRU) responds to urgent issues by providing approved strategic-level SC statements that military leaders can use to develop military-oriented SC-related products.¹⁵

c. DOS also established an Interagency Crisis Communication Team (ICCT), consisting of representatives from the offices of White House Communications, National Security Council Senior Communications Director/Spokesman, White House Press Secretary, DOS Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and DOD Public Affairs. This team will “... initiate an interagency conference call immediately upon major breaking news that might have an impact on our efforts against violent extremism to coordinate message points.”¹⁶ The CTCC captures the resulting coordination points, develops a response message, and relays appropriate official statements to cabinet secretaries, ambassadors and the military chain of command through the RRU at DOS.¹⁷

29 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-29)

Red and transnational terrorist organizations understand and use strategic communication to influence both US and international opinions. “Las Jihadistas,” an anti-US terrorist organization, issues a statement that calls for all regional terrorist organizations to unite against the impending American aggression against Red and occupation of Gray. To gain advantage in the war of ideas, the statement cites anticipated US

strategic and operational objectives as evidence of continuing US “imperialistic” intentions.

In separate events, an Islamic Extremist gunman killed eight students, most aged 15 and 16, and wounded ten others at a theological school in Green. Local police shot and killed the gunman, identified as Ala Abu Dhaim, a 25 year-old from Gray. These activities reinforce the terrorist organizations' position through escalated violence against innocent students and represent continuing resistance against US “imperialistic” intentions.

In response to the terrorist events in the USXCOM AOR, the ICCT initiates an interagency conference call and recommends the following SC-related actions to the SECSTATE:

1. The President and SECSTATE should issue official statements within 24 hours that outline US strategic objectives.

2. State Department and White House should raise the subject at their regular briefings.

3. The President should approve the following SC themes for the current crisis:

a. As requested by the Government of Gray, the United States is ready to assist Gray in preserving the peace and is prepared to move forces to the region.

b. Gray continues to be a leader for stability in the region, and its record of helping its neighbors is unmatched.

c. Red's recent actions benefit no one in the region; we call on its leaders to restore a democratically elected government, cease provoking tensions in the region, and end their support of terrorist factions.

d. We encourage all nations to support efforts to preserve security and stability in the region.

The DOS ICCT continues to consider and recommend appropriate counters to the Las Jihadistas statement and related future events. In coordination with the State Department, the USXCOM staff will analyze anti-US statements, US responses, and regional events with respect to adjusting combatant command SC-related activities during planning for the impending operation.

d. The DOS also uses their INFOCENTRAL website as a central repository for vetted senior leader statements, research, analysis, and other products for use by SC programs at all levels.¹⁸ This site is available to assist the joint force

in SC planning. To engage Internet audiences, DOS established the america.gov website and the Digital Outreach Team that interacts on key local and regional blog sites in indigenous dialects including Arabic, Persian, and Urdu.

e. The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs provides leadership through PCC meetings and decisions that guide and enable the activities of all USG departments and agencies. A close collaborative working relationship has developed between DOS and DOD on SC. For example, DOS sent participants to the DOD SC education conferences and they are actively participating in the DOD SC Education Consortium. Other examples are DOS participation in DOD biweekly SC Directors secure video teleconferences, attendance at the quarterly DOD SC Directors Group meetings, and co-sponsoring of this year's Worldwide SC Seminar. Likewise, multiple DOD organizations participate in the weekly SC Fusion Cell video teleconference.

28 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-28)

After assessing the terrorist statement and Red-sponsored events from the previous day, the US Ambassador to Red contributes to the US strategic communication effort by sending a diplomatic cable to SECSTATE (with a copy to CDRUSXCOM). The cable states that Red's leader apparently believes the US will not intervene militarily due to the deployment challenge and other US commitments around the world. The cable also includes the Ambassador's view of the current situation, Red's primary contributors to the crisis, Red's key media messages and their potential regional impact, and uncertainties among Red decision-makers.

27 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-27)

Intelligence sources continue to provide information on Red leadership's SC-related activities. Red disinformation products attempt to establish a number of themes to convince audiences that the Gray military will refuse to fight, Gray's economy is collapsing, and the US lacks commitment to support Gray militarily.

The DOS RRU issues daily summaries of senior leader statements and coverage of the situation. These statements are a good source of approved SC material that USXCOM planners can use to develop SC-related products and courses of action.

DOS CTCC issues themes that provide a communication framework for highlighting the threat posed by religious extremists. These themes DO NOT substitute for official press talking points or PA guidance. SC professionals use these themes to develop op-ed pieces and speeches, talk with the public, and frame discussions on religious extremism with media professionals, politicians, and opinion-makers. An example of a CTCC product is below.

OIC Condemns Seminary Attack

The Islamic world's largest political bloc, the 57-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), condemned the killing of eight teenagers in a seminary, saying it was "against any act of violence and terror anywhere in the world," according to a statement released on its website on January 12.

OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu urged all parties "to act with calm and restraint in the face of this tragic event," saying that "this vicious cycle of killing must be stopped."

Ihsanoglu expressed his hope that the OIC condemnation would "open up the eyes of those who remained silent during the violence directed against innocent civilians, including children."

The USXCOM J-3/5 staffs begin consultation with the US Embassy Defense Attaché (DATT) and country team.

3. Department of Defense Organization, Processes, and Guidance

a. To support the USG effort led by DOS, DOD has established new staff organizations and processes to guide and provide support to the SC effort. In late 2005, SecDef appointed a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication ((DASD (JC)) charged with the responsibility "... to oversee Department of Defense activities directed at shaping department-wide communications doctrine, organization, and training for the joint force."¹⁹ On 31 Jan 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef) stood up the SC Integration Group (SCIG) to "... recommend, coordinate, and oversee DOD strategic communication initiatives and plans for the DOD."²⁰ These organizational changes and other efforts have produced significant results. Publication of the *SC Roadmap* was instrumental in initiating numerous SC-related activities within DOD; the SCIG published the *DOD Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan*,²¹ and successfully moved CCDR templates through the SCIG Executive Committee and to the DepSecDef for decision.²² Appendix C, Figure C-1, provides an example of an SC guidance template format. OSD dissolved the SCIG in March 08 and began migration of responsibilities to a new communication integration and strategy planning section with DASD (JC) and the ASD (PA) plans and policy division.

b. The DASD (JC) synchronizes broader DOD SC efforts, such as the Wounded Warrior²³ communications plan. This effort now involves 38 stakeholders, including interagency partners such as the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Health & Human Services. Likewise, current DASD (JC) efforts include developing SC policy, advocating for SC doctrine and increased SC fidelity in exercises, and combining DOS and DOD SC plans for Afghanistan into a

single document that provides useful strategic-level guidance.²⁴ DASD (JC) has also established a strategic-level SC working group of all key stakeholders that conducts SC assessment, analysis, coordination, and cross-agency information sharing. Finally, DASD (JC) oversees SC portfolio interests within joint capability areas for better alignment with the budget. Due to the myriad SC-related capabilities, organizations, missions, and audiences, some have likened SC to an orchestra (Figure II-1). In order to create the desired effect (outcome), different sections of the orchestra play at different times, tempos, and volumes.

c. OSD has released an SC concept of operations and a set of SC principles that were used to develop the SC fundamentals in Appendix A. In addition, the QDR SC Execution Roadmap augments the discussion of SC within the QDR Report and assigns execution tasks. No DOD policy directive or instruction currently exists for SC; however, DOD has developed a draft DOD directive²⁵ on SC. Once approved, this document should provide additional guidance and clarify roles, responsibilities, and interactions of various organizations within DOD. This important policy should accomplish the following:

(1) Require close alignment of DOD SC efforts with USG SC efforts led by DOS.

(2) Direct that SC be institutionalized as an integrating process across DOD, included in concept and doctrine development, strategy and plan design,




Figure II-1. Strategic Communication is Like an Orchestra Producing Harmony

execution, and assessment, and incorporated into Service and joint education and training programs. This includes the establishment of senior leader positions and necessary organizational structures at the Service Secretary and combatant command level to integrate communication efforts across each organization's span of influence.

(3) Direct that coordination and synchronization of DOD actions, images, and words occur throughout strategy development, planning, execution, and assessment in order to achieve desired impact at all levels.

(4) Direct that military plans address SC objectives throughout all phases of an operation and direct integration and synchronization of SC dimensions of military plans with US national policy, plans, and objectives.

(5) Confirm that DOD SC-related activities do not replace traditional IO, PA, and DSPD roles, functions, and missions.

(6) Clarify and assign SC-related responsibilities to the Joint Staff and relevant DOD agencies.

4. Joint Doctrine

"We must emphasize doctrine as the driver for change. You can't cement change in the organization until you adapt the institutions. That change begins with doctrine."

GEN George W. Casey
Chief of Staff of the Army

a. **Overview.** Joint publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, contains the established doctrinal definition that is virtually identical in meaning to the *SC Roadmap's* definition. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, states the USG uses SC to provide top-down guidance relative to using the informational instrument of national power in specific situations. The military instrument of national power plays an important supporting role. Coupling primary SC capabilities with DSPD and military diplomacy²⁶ activities allows the JFC to implement a holistic SC effort. In addition, two keystone joint doctrine publications briefly discuss SCs:

(1) JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, contains a description similar to the *SC Roadmap* definition, and mentions that SC planning will, among other things, determine objectives, themes, messages, and actions; identify audiences; emphasize success; and reinforce the legitimacy of national strategic objectives. It continues by stating that SC-related activities are particularly essential to shaping,

security cooperation activities, stability operations, humanitarian assistance operations, and combating terrorism.²⁷

(2) JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, slightly expands the SC discussion by stating that SC is a “natural extension of strategic direction.” JP 5-0 requires SC to be included in all joint operation planning and to be coordinated with the Department of State (DOS) diplomatic missions. CCDRs consider SC during peacetime theater security cooperation planning, and incorporate themes, messages, and other relevant factors in their resulting plans. CCDRs review SC guidance during mission analysis, and their staffs address SC issues, as appropriate, in their staff estimates. CCDRs will brief the SecDef on their SC planning during contingency planning and crisis action planning in-progress reviews. As described in JP 5-0, synchronized planning of PA, IO, and DSPD is essential for effective SC. JP 5-0 also establishes a specific requirement for concept plans and operation plans (OPLANs) to include an ANNEX Y²⁸ (Strategic Communication) that proposes a synchronized SC effort for “interagency coordination and implementation.”²⁹

“IO’s importance grows daily, and our enemy, who recognizes that victory can be secured in this domain alone, has seized the opportunity to be the best at operating in the information domain.”

**LTG Thomas Metz, USA,
Military Review, May-June 2006**

b. **Doctrinal SC Enablers.** The predominant military activities that support SC themes, messages, images, and actions are IO, PA, and DSPD.³⁰

(1) **IO** are the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own.³¹ IO is comprised of core, supporting, and related capabilities. It is important to understand their relationships in order to determine how the military will integrate these capabilities to support SC themes, messages, images, and actions during planning and execution and how joint doctrine will clearly describe this integration. The effective integration of IO core capabilities of EW, PSYOP, OPSEC, MILDEC, and CNO in support of the JFC’s objectives can be a challenge for the staff. “Supporting” capabilities for IO include physical attack, information assurance, physical security, counterintelligence, and combat camera. Civil-military operations (CMO), PA, and DSPD are “related” capabilities, further complicating planning and execution. Figure II-2 uses a Venn diagram as one way to depict these doctrinal IO relationships. The sets of supporting and related capabilities partially intersect

the IO core set, because the JFC also employs them in other ways not connected with IO. The core capabilities have their own internal Venn relationships within the IO core set, but they are omitted from Figure II-2 for simplicity.

(2) **PA's** three basic functions (public information, command information, and community relations activities) are directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the DOD. As the primary coordinator of public information within the military, PA plays a key role in SC efforts. Because accurate and timely information is essential to the public's understanding, morale, and resolve in times of crisis, planners must include this consideration in planning. The PA mission is to support the JFC by communicating truthful and factual unclassified information about DOD activities to various audiences. Public affairs officers at all levels provide counsel to leaders on the possible outcomes of military activities, and identify the potential impact on the public information realm. They also participate in the development and dissemination of the command information message.³² Appendix B, Figure B-1, summarizes the support relationships between some of the primary SC-related capabilities.

(3) **DSPD** includes those activities and measures taken by DOD components to support and facilitate USG public diplomacy efforts.




Figure II-2. Military Communication Capabilities

c. **Application.** SC (i.e., IO, PA, DSPD) planning must be integrated into military planning and operations, documented in OPLANs, and coordinated and synchronized with other government agencies and multinational partners.³³

(1) **Integration.** The point in understanding the relationships in Figure II-2 is that military support of specific SC themes, messages, images, and actions typically will require the integration and synchronization of two or more IO core and supporting capabilities as well as PA, DSPD, and CMO activities. Moreover, the type and balance of actions between these capabilities can be different at the CCDR's level than at a subordinate JFC's headquarters (HQ), and will vary from operation to operation. For example, the focus of a CCDR's activities for a specific SC theme or message could be on PA and DSPD, while the subordinate JFC might accomplish supporting tasks primarily with CMO and PSYOP. Based on their purpose, certain IO capabilities (such as CMO, PSYOP, and MILDEC) typically will have greater potential to support SC than will information assurance, and OPSEC. Appendix B, Figure B-2, shows some of the potential conflicts within the capabilities of IO.

(2) **Consistency.** As a coordinated effort integrated into the joint operation planning process, synchronized planning of PA, IO, and DSPD is essential for effective SC. Additionally, interagency efforts can help promote international support from nations in the CCDR's area of responsibility (AOR) and help advance our regional and global partnerships. CCDRs should ensure that their PA, IO, and DSPD planning is consistent with overall USG SC objectives. Because PA and IO both disseminate information, themes, messages, and images adapted to their audiences, their activities must be closely coordinated and synchronized to ensure consistency and establish/maintain credibility.³⁴

(3) **Balance.** The balance between PA, IO, and DSPD efforts in support of SC depends upon multiple factors such as the theme, message, information environment, and intended audience. For example, the CCDR may engage key host nation (HN) and regional leaders in the AOR in support of DSPD, with little IO or PA participation. Conversely, PA would be prominently involved in broad engagement of domestic, international, and HN audiences. More focused influence efforts may require more IO involvement than PA or DSPD.

d. **Organization and Process.** Joint doctrine does have significant material on the SC-related capabilities of IO and PA. However, JP 5-0, JP 3-0 and JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, currently do not discuss organizational structures or processes specifically for planning, and executing SC-related activities. For detailed discussion of doctrinal implications, see Chapter V, "Operational Implications."

e. **Definitions.** Webster's definitions of "theme" and "message," and the JP 1-02 definition of the term "message" are too broad and insufficient for the

KEY TERMS

theme – an overarching concept or intention, designed for broad application.

message – a narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience.

need to differentiate between overarching themes and the supporting messages. Likewise, field observations noted that the definitions are insufficient for clarifying the differences in military use and application. Therefore, the definitions in the following text box are applied throughout this handbook.

CHAPTER III

CURRENT PRACTICES AND INITIATIVES

“At Southern Command, Strategic Communication is our main battery.” We’re in the business of launching ideas, not Tomahawk missiles.”

ADM James Stavridis
Commander US Southern Command

SECTION A. JOINT FORCE PRACTICES

1. General

a. Observations of current joint force practices result primarily from JWFC’s training and exercise support in numerous exercises and assistance visits to combatant commands and US joint and Service component HQ in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. Lessons learned recorded by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis also provided valuable insights.

b. Some organizations find it useful to distinguish the SC-related planning and execution that occurs within the theater from SC-related activities at the national-strategic level. For example, a USCENTCOM Service component uses the term “operational communication” for this purpose. USJFCOM JWFC observer-trainers discuss with training audiences the value of a JFC’s “communication strategy” as an integral part the JFC’s overall military strategy (Figure III-1). This approach uses the CDR’s communication strategy to support



Figure III-1. Establishing the Commander's Message

the broader interagency SC effort and closely coordinate support from other agencies and organizations. This strategy must be commander-driven, proactive, and synchronized with respect to all themes, messages, images, and actions. A synchronization matrix provides a graphical representation of the JFC's communication strategy and an effective tool in matching words and deeds directed toward the various audiences. Appendix D, Figures D-1 and D-2, provide examples. This tool works well for synchronizing SC activities in the context of a specific operation. However, Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) found that such a matrix became too large and unwieldy to be useful for large steady-state operations, focused at the national level.

26 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-26)

The SC Director reviews the theater security cooperation plan to ensure military engagement has been focused on strengthening relations with various military and political leaders in the region. He recommends that USXCOM participate in numerous regional security conferences, some of which also include Red and Gray.

CDRUSXCOM provides additional SC-related planning guidance to the staff, such as “ensure we are not solely focused on getting our message out, we have to listen as well. Analyze what they are saying, why, what is the intended message, and find common areas of understanding.”

The USXCOM SCWG convenes, consolidates and disseminates information, determines SC-related tasks, and coordinates activities. Working group members include the following representatives: J-55, J-35, PA, IO, Service/functional components, CMO, political advisor (POLAD), IA, and J-2. Other representatives are brought in as needed, such as the J-33, PSYOP, combat camera, staff judge advocate, chaplain, lethal fires (joint fires element), and others. The SCWG discusses the following Information:

1. Vetted senior leader statements, research, analysis, and other products from DOS INFOCENTRAL web site
2. Briefing on draft White House document sent from the NSC to OSD on the following USG desired strategic results:
 - a. Regional audiences support US intervention
 - b. Cessation of Red hostilities
 - c. Red stops support for terrorism
 - d. Gray sovereign territorial integrity maintained/restored
 - e. Red responsible international partner by:
 - (1) Increased transparency
 - (2) Improved human rights
 - (3) Reduced belligerence to neighbors
3. The approved SC themes for the current crisis:

a. As requested by the Government of Gray, the U.S. is ready to assist Gray in preserving the peace and is prepared to move forces to the region.

b. Gray continues to be a leader for stability in the region, and its record of helping its neighbors is unmatched.

c. Red's recent actions benefit no one in the region; we call on its leaders to restore a democratically elected government, cease provoking tensions in the region, and end their support of terrorist factions.

d. We encourage all nations to support efforts to preserve security and stability in the region.

4. Review of pre-existing SC country plan in support of ongoing theater security cooperation activities with Green and Gray.

5. Review of the end state contained in the CCDR's guidance.

6. Review of draft theater-strategic objectives from the CCDR's guidance.

7. Review of draft desired effects (outcomes) from the CCDR's guidance.

8. Review of key coordination points from the DATT and country teams.

9. Tasks to SCWG members:

a. USXCOM SCWG request direct liaison authority (DIRLAUTH) to coordinate with IA and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

b. POLAD determines USAID position on situation via the country team.

c. Staff WGs and functional components (IOWG, CMOWG, PA, IO, PSYOP, etc) develop proposed messages, intended audiences, and actions for submission to SCWG.

d. J2 and assessment cell representatives determine:

(1) Key issues the JTF needs to understand.

(2) What are the leading indicators of those issues?

(3) How will the J2/assessment cell collect on those issues?

Staff working groups then convene to complete SC-related tasks assigned from the SCWG.

“Good commanders know how to lead in combat. Great commanders possess the unique intuitive sense of how to transition very quickly from active, kinetic warfare distinguished by fire and maneuver to a more subtle kind of cultural warfare distinguished by the ability to win the war of will and perception. Rare are the leaders who can make the transition between these two disparate universes and lead and fight competently in both.”

MG Scales, USA (Ret)
House Armed Services Committee testimony, 15 July 04

c. Current SC staff organizations and processes used by JFCs are at different levels of maturity and effectiveness. Likewise, a number of JFC's have both increased senior leadership involvement in the SC effort and have integrated SC into planning and staffing processes.³⁶ The following five numbered paragraphs discuss specific options, observed in the field, for organizing and directing SC efforts.

2. Option 1: Increased Command Emphasis

In this construct, leaders maintain traditional HQ staff structures and processes, and increase command emphasis on SC through promulgation of commanders' SC-specific intent, guidance, and increased oversight. Examples include designation of the Chief of Staff (COS) or deputy commander as the overall SC director (as an additional duty). The principal advantages of this model are that it places emphasis on unity of command, requires the least additional manpower, and the COS or deputy commander have direct access to the JFC.

3. Option 2: Tasking an Existing Staff Leader

a. In some cases, the JFC or COS tasks the leader of one of the SC-related capability sets (normally IO or PA) or a director (J-5, J-3) with SC planning and execution. This responsibility typically includes supervising the SC staff coordination mechanism (such as the SC working group (SCWG)) if one exists. Historically, most SC organizations begin with this model by simply expanding the focus and/or membership of an already existing working group or planning entity (such as an IO working group, the PA staff, or an operational planning team).

b. This model also employs no additional manpower, but there are several *observed* disadvantages to this approach:

(1) The direction, focus, and output of the SC efforts tend to be more heavily weighted toward the expertise of the appointed lead (such as the PA Officer (PAO), IO staff leader, etc.).

(2) In a crisis, the requirement to coordinate the planning and execution of the broader SC-related activities detracts from the SC lead's ability to perform principal duties (such as IO cell chief or PAO).

(3) Typically, the command does not provide additional staff to assist with the new SC coordination requirements. Therefore, these tasks devolve to the lead's previously established staff section. This exacerbates the problems mentioned above by proliferating them to the lead's staff officers as well.

(4) Most importantly, coordination, participation, and command emphasis on SC has been historically weak in cases where the SC lead lacks adequate seniority and a direct reporting relationship to the commander.

c. Most observed instances of this model occurred early in planning and execution. As the staff evolved, this model typically transitioned to more permanent and mature structures and processes. No observed JTF HQ has chosen to implement this approach as a permanent solution.

4. Option 3: Direct Planning Team Integration

a. In this alternative, IO and PA experts are typically assigned to operational planning teams and provide their inputs directly to planning team chiefs. This eliminates the requirement for a separate SCWG or SC director to integrate SC activities. The planning team chief, J-5, and J-3 are responsible for including relevant SC considerations into the planning process and products.

b. The principal advantages of this approach are the direct inclusion of functional experts into existing processes and integration of SC-related activities in the planning effort from conception. However, several issues have hampered the use of this approach in the field:

(1) Staffs at all levels have struggled to provide adequate functional representation from all SC-related capabilities to the multiple operational planning teams that typically exist. Even in the largest HQ, the supply of IO and PA functional experts is limited. Thus the pace and scope of operations can quickly overwhelm the SC-related staff's ability to support multiple teams.

(2) With increased manpower requirements, the caliber of the IO and PA functional experts assigned to each team may degrade and directly affect the quality of the plan. Likewise, operational planners are typically less familiar with the employment of the nonlethal SC-related capabilities, and tend to revert to traditional lethal solutions.

(3) Having no designated lead for championing SC issues or communication integration can result in less than optimum SC level of effort and synchronization.

(4) This approach provides no direct SC connection to the commander or command group, observed to be a fundamental element of successful SC efforts.

c. These problems often result in a general lack of SC emphasis that causes SC-related shortfalls in joint operation planning and execution. No observed JTF or combatant command HQ has had the resources available or staff maturity to execute this approach successfully.

5. Option 4: Centralized Control of All Strategic Communication-Related Activities Under a Separate Directorate

a. In this option, a newly created staff entity or directorate controls the IO, PA, and other SC-related functional capabilities directly. The director typically outranks other staff counterparts (J-3, J-5, etc.) and is a de facto “super-director.” Observed variations on this model have been as far-reaching as placing the entire PA, IO (including PYSOP), CMO, engineers, and lethal fires elements of the HQ under a single director. The associated cross-functional staff organizations (i.e. working groups and boards) tend to include multiple working groups and approval boards, with the final board chaired by the “super-director,” COS, or deputy commander. Some HQs have titled these directorates differently, but the basic premise is the same: they attempt to integrate staff activities through consolidation of staff structure and power versus using coordination processes that cross normal functional staff sections. Observations of this model have only been at the JTF level. Current and historical examples of this model include the Strategic Communication Directorate circa 2006 (currently called Strategic Effects) at Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I); the Strategic Communication Directorate at Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa; the Effects Coordination Cell at MNC-I; and the Effects Directorate at Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan circa 2003. Only MNF-I still employs a form of this model. There is one example in the field where a command has consolidated all communications capabilities under a separate directorate, including those PA and IO activities outside SC. In this construct, the directorate head created functional communications branches with each reporting to the deputy directorate head. The SC branch, however, reports directly to the head of the directorate. Some of the successes achieved under this organizational construct are discussed in detail later in the “Other Implementation Observations” section.

“We can’t win this thing with a bullet. We can’t win it by killing everybody. We have got to attack the insurgency from what source it comes from.”

MG Benjamin Mixon
US Army Commander of
Multi-National Division-North and the 25th ID

b. While the centralization of authority under a single staff entity has the potential of providing focus, clarity, and emphasis on SC capabilities, HQs have had varying degrees of success employing this model. Several difficulties *observed* with this model include:

(1) Managing a capability set normally led by several directorates is a challenge.

(2) The scope of responsibilities tends to overlap with the traditional responsibilities of the J-5 for future planning and the J-3 for current planning/operations.

(3) The successful employment of this model requires special relationships and understanding between the heads of other directorates within the HQ.

(4) A direct-support PA element is still required to provide direct PA support to the commander.

(5) The associated cross-functional staff organizations can become so prolific that they represent, in essence, planning teams and decision venues separate from doctrinal planning processes.

(6) The placement of PA and IO capabilities directly under the same staff structure has tended to draw ongoing criticism and unwanted attention from entities external to the military HQ.

6. Option 5: Strategic Communication Director With Small Coordination Staff and Supporting Strategic Communication Working Group

a. This last construct combines some of the advantages of the previous models. **Eight combatant commands are either currently employing or transitioning to this model.** Observations have shown this configuration to produce the most consistent progress. Details vary among HQs, but the primary components of organization, process, and output include the following:

(1) A separate SC director (O-6/7 or GS-15/SES) who has immediate access and reports to the COS and/or JFC. This facilitates JFC involvement in the SC process and ensures the ability to synchronize the wide variety of capabilities from across the command on behalf of the COS/JFC.

(2) A small SC staff (2-5 personnel at the combatant command level) to assist the director in monitoring and assessing SC-related activities and managing the SCWG. While this staff manages the SCWG process, it does not supplant the functional expertise of IO (including PSYOP), PA, and other SC contributors or their direct support to operational planning teams. Staff responsibilities typically include:

(a) Organize and lead SCWG meetings, including communication planning, integration and products.

(b) Present SCWG recommendations to the operational planning teams for incorporation into planning and execution.

(c) Manage the assessment of SC-related activities for presentation to the JFC.

(3) Some HQs have also chosen to provide PA and IO LNOs to J-3/5 operational planning teams and across traditional communications stovepipes. For example, in USEUCOM PA LNOs reside within the IO staff and visa versa to foster cross-communication and coordinate product development.

(4) Staff integration mechanisms typically include an action officer-level working group, a directorate-level steering group, or an approval board. The board allows senior decision makers to provide SC guidance on themes, establish planning priorities, assign resources, and approve inputs to planning.

(a) Some current examples of these groups include:

1. USEUCOM – Senior Executive Council and SCWG
2. USSOUTHCOM – Office of Strategic Communication (OSC) Strategic Communication Board (SCB) and SCWG
3. USNORTHCOM – Communication Strategy Working Group and Blue Team Meetings
4. USJFCOM – Enabling Strategic Communication Cell and Communication Synchronization Cell
5. USCENTCOM – Effects Synchronization Committee
6. USPACOM – PACOM Communication Integration Working Group

(5) SCWG outputs have typically included SC country plans in support of TSC activities, Annex Y (Strategic Communication) to OPLANs and concept plans, and planning and execution synchronization matrices for inclusion in operations orders and fragmentary orders. Appendix E provides the format for Annex Y. Appendix D provides some example SC synchronization and execution matrices.

(6) The SCWG serves as the multifunctional conduit to coordinate support from departmental/USG-level resources and those of other agencies through the process discussed earlier, now migrating from the SCIG to the ASD (PA).

b. This model typically has a central repository (linked to the HQ main website/portal) for SC-relevant guidance and products. This facilitates collaborative

planning and information sharing for all SC supporting activities. One example is the USEUCOM Senior Leader Engagement Portal. This site provides SC-specific information for current events and detailed country plans for 89 of 92 countries in their AOR. The site displays engagement activities in a current operational picture linked to their TSC information management database. Any portal user (including US Embassy country teams) can instantly view the full set of SC-related activities in the AOR by type of activity or by country. This has proven extremely useful as both a resource for functional planners and a preparation tool for senior leaders, the broader staff, and subordinates.

25 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-25)

The SCWG reconvenes to consolidate and coordinate themes, messages, identify intended audiences, examine SC lines of operations (LOOs), and outline the way ahead. Theater-strategic SCWG products will identify the following:

1. Obstacles:

- a. Understanding Red's view of end state.
- b. Red internal politics/challenges.
- c. International support of Red.
- d. Red pursuit of competing international strategy.

2. Primary audiences to engage:

- a. Red government and military.
- b. US and international media.
- c. Partner nations.
- d. Audiences in the AOR.
- e. Green government, military, and public.
- f. Gray government, military, and public.
- g. US military.

3. SC lines of operation:

- a. Key leader engagement.
- b. Military support to public diplomacy.
- c. Information operations.
- d. Messages sent by maneuver and fires.
- e. Public Affairs.

4. Key Themes:

- a. As requested by the Government of Gray, the United States is ready to assist Gray in preserving the peace and is prepared to move forces to the region.

b. Gray continues to be a leader for stability in the region, and its record of helping its neighbors is unmatched.

c. Red's recent actions benefit no one in the region; we call on its leaders to restore a democratically elected government, cease provoking tensions in the region, and end their support of terrorist factions.

d. We encourage all nations to support efforts to preserve security and stability in the region.

5. Messages:

a. US forces are moving into the theater to help preserve regional security and stability.

b. Red stop aggression; coalition military forces will commit and win.

c. Gray and the international community welcome peaceful relations with Red.

d. Preserving regional stability benefits everyone.

e. Red can be responsible partner in international system and family of nations.

f. Lack of Red transparency contributes to uncertainty.

g. International relations with Red can improve through a peaceful resolution.

The SCWG designates Assessment Cell as lead for assessing regional/international perceptions of US activities for the following focus areas:

1. Coalition, Red, Gray, Regional (non-aligned), neutral

2. Political positions of key stakeholders

3. US perception of Red/Gray activity

(a) US press reporting

(b) US reactions

4. Red perception of military activity (coalition and Red)

(a) Red press reporting

(b) Red reactions

5. Gray perception of military activity (coalition and Red)

(a) Gray press reporting

(b) Gray reactions

6. Regional perception of military activity (coalition and Red)

(a) Regional press reporting

(b) Regional reactions

7. Other Implementation Observations

a. **Key Leader Engagement.** Peace enforcement, counterinsurgency (COIN), and many other joint operations require coalition forces to engage and influence the attitudes of key leaders and influencers in the local society. Developing messages and finding an effective means of delivery are challenges, especially in societies where interpersonal relationships are paramount. Understanding cultural context, cognitive orientation patterns, and communication methods is essential to any SC approach. USCENTCOM approaches the local society's leaders directly using face-to-face engagement and tailors the messages to local conditions. The key leader engagement (KLE) cell oversees this engagement process and includes representatives from PAO, J-5, IO, and civil affairs. This cell develops a detailed background briefing on each key leader, and then suggests specific approaches to convey the command's overall theme for encouraging support for stability and reconstruction activities. As a tool for implementing a strategic communication program, the employment of key leader engagement cells has ensured that whenever commanders act in a public forum, they are delivering an effective, consistent message that supports the command's goals.

b. **KLE Plan.** An April 2008 lessons learned report³⁷ states that a detailed KLE plan for engagement of local leaders is essential. Too often, different units engage local leadership on identical issues, but with different desired end states and little or no coordination. This afforded the local leadership the opportunity to exploit gaps between these units. For example,³⁸ one coalition unit incentivized the local police to do criminal investigations faster by offering to provide more facilities if investigation speed increased. A different coalition unit later undermined this effort by simply offering the facilities without any stipulations. In another example, a civil affairs team told the Mayor they would build a clinic if the local leader increased police recruitment. Then a battalion representative told the same leader that they would provide the clinic if he would promise to be their friend. Without a detailed engagement plan, units met with and engaged local leadership with different desired end-states, thereby undermining the ability of any or all units to build capacity and work towards transition. To assist in KLE plan development, the J-2 can develop a map focused on municipal and neighborhood leaders. The lessons learned report cites an example³⁹ in a large city, where the J-2 developed an extensive database of all tribal leaders and their respective affiliations. The report claimed that the synergy developed by the human terrain mapping led to breakthroughs in Tribal support for the coalition force that continued to build and eventually turned local sheiks against Al-Qaida.

24 TO 22 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-24) TO (C-22)

After the USXCOM SCWG develops and consolidates critical SC-related products, they coordinate draft themes, messages, and products with various interagency representatives in the region and OSD. The SCWG and other organizations accomplish a variety of actions during the following three days, to include the following:

1. The SCWG consolidates inputs and provides its input to the strategic communication board for approval and integration into the planning process.

2. The SCWG develops the SC guidance template and execution matrix, then forwards (with an OPLAN Annex Y if time permits) to ASD (PA) Plans & Policy division for DOD coordination and approval at the Cabinet level. (Appendices C-E provide examples of SC guidance template format, synchronization and execution matrices, and Annex Y format, respectively) *[NOTE: This is a spiral development process. USXCOM SC planners will conduct informal exchanges of themes, messages and products with the DASD (JC)/ASD (PA) staff during development and the ASD (PA) staff will conduct similar informal exchanges at their level. Other inputs (senior leader statements, etc.) will drive refinements during further product refinement.]*

3. ASD (PA) Plans & Policy staffs the template and execution matrix with DOD stakeholders, such as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P)) to include its respective desk officers and USD (P) Support for Public Diplomacy, DOD Office of the General Counsel, JS J3/5, and other DOD staffs as needed.

4. The ASD (PA) pursues interagency coordination through the Deputies Committee. *[NOTE: Time demands may preclude formal staffing of the SC template and matrix through the IA; they may go directly to the ICCT for review and approval. The spiral development process supports this approach—staffs see draft products and provide input during product development, thereby reducing the staffing process and shaping products earlier in development.]*

5. USXCOM SCWG continues development of Annex Y (as needed), refinement of products, and development of new products until approval received.

6. KLE Engagement Plan is developed to include leader background, tailored messages, items of interest, and desired outcomes.

7. Themes and messages cards are developed for distribution to individuals throughout the force, to facilitate individual understanding and assist in closing the "say-do gap."

c. **Themes and Messages Cards.** Failing to synchronize SC-related activities with actions at all levels sends conflicting messages and significantly inhibits the creation of desired outcomes. Many refer to this as not closing the "say-do gap." To solve this problem in the CENTCOM AOR, units issued each

soldier a card with key themes and messages to carry with them at all times. This approach was designed to synchronize words and activities all the way down to the individual level. This card helped soldiers consistently communicate the desired message and guided their actions during unanticipated circumstances. Arming each soldier with key information helped close the "say-do gap," which enhanced SC and overall operational efforts.⁴⁰

d. **MNF-I Best Practices.** In April 2008, USJFCOM sent a team to identify MNF-I Communication Division "best practices" for possible inclusion in joint doctrine, curricula, and training events; and consideration by other commands.⁴¹ The team observed MNF-I, MNC-I, and US Embassy communication programs and identified 13 best practices. Each of these in itself would be a significant accomplishment for a major military HQ, so it is remarkable that they were all found at MNF-I. Some are unique to the operational environment in Iraq; however, many could be adapted to other operational areas. The observation team attempted to prioritize MNF-I's practices to identify those with the greatest positive impact. This prioritized list follows:

(1) The commander is clearly involved and regularly provides SC intent at the daily battle update assessment meetings and twice weekly at the communication division meetings. The division meetings focus on measures of performance and future activities. During these meetings, he provides feedback, direction, decisions explained with depth, and personal insights. The MNF-I commander accepts risk in order to shorten the time it takes to release information. For example, MNF-I and MNC-I require public information release within ninety minutes of a significant operational event or incident.

(2) Two senior (O-6) LNOs greatly improve efforts to integrate communication division activities with intelligence and special operations task force (SOTF) operations. For example, PA personnel assigned within SOTF provide draft materials explaining selected operations that require time-sensitive public disclosure. The LNO's efforts speed the review and provide possible public release of information resulting from operational actions, results, and incidents to inform SC activity. This enables actionable SC planning, cueing to future operations, exploitation of adversary documents, dissemination of beneficial information, and anticipation of adversary reaction.

(3) The communication assessment team integrates operational research and systems analysis expertise into planning and execution. The assessment effort evaluates current and past communication efforts, informs leadership and planning, provides support to theater and major subordinate commands (MSCs), helps anticipate public and adversary reaction, and integrates and shares knowledge. This communication assessment capability is without peer in DOD.

(4) A media operations center (MOC) provides immediately actionable information through real time monitoring, translation, and connection to operating forces, including the SOTF. The MOC has 24/7 capability including communication event planning, visual information management, managing public information distribution, and rapid media response. The MOC supports MNF-I, its components, US Mission Iraq, and aggressively pursues media outlet correction of misinformation and disinformation. MOC actions ensure early release of operational information into the public domain, as well as providing aggressive correction/clarification as needed several times daily.

(5) Engagement of Government of Iraq (GOI) spokespersons is accomplished at the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and Prime Minister Offices by contracted experienced Iraqi US citizens assigned as LNOs. These contractors provide common language, culture, and experience that facilitate building relationships and enables building a shared understanding. The LNOs assist in coaching, mentoring, building ministry capacity, coordinating and reinforcing Iraqi/coalition actions, and supporting a free press with diverse opinions.

“Local groups from Iraq to the Philippines have rejected al-Qaida’s stagnant ideology. And the timing of these events contradicts claims that US policy in Iraq has radicalized Muslims worldwide. Currents of opinion in Muslim regions are more complex than polling data can ever show. Even where polls suggest growing anti-Americanism, the link between attitudes and behavior is a complicated one. Muslims may not like US policy, but it does not follow that they will turn to al-Qaida.”

Dr. Michael Doran
DASD for Support to Public Diplomacy
House Armed Services Committee testimony, 8 Nov 07

(6) Proactive full-time US media engagement is closely coordinated with ASD (PA) and focused on US media needs and production schedules. This practice compliments MOC operations, supports daily OSD press briefs, and involves an expanded circle of military speakers.

(7) An expedited process for rapid release of military visual information products is utilized, to include attached detailed storyboards. The impact of visual images has been recognized and integrated into planning considerations. Assignment of two dedicated, experienced visual information professionals to create, implement, and manage the process significantly streamlined procedures for planning, executing, transmitting, editing, and clearing visual information for public release. Public release is authorized from the division level, with visual information from airborne platforms being scrubbed at the air operations center and released from MNF-I.

(8) The US Ambassador and MNF-I commander are closely connected. The MNF-I communications division assigned LNOs to the US Mission Iraq PA, and they share planning, execution, and assessment resources. Combined media engagements and congressional testimony are good examples of this close coordination of SC efforts. Collocation within the same building spaces also facilitates coordination and sharing.

(9) MNF-I creation a corps-level IO task force with robust products and assessment shared with MNF-I and GOI. This unique effort resulted from expert and innovative application of marketing and communication principles, combined with major funding and insightful contracting actions. These efforts are informed by and deconflicted with PA and MNF-I communications division actions and responsibilities. Highly effective focused products are pre-tested, carefully placed, and assessed. The communications environment is closely studied and results are shared with MNF-I and GOI.

(10) A combined press information center with integrated media support was established. A media support facility enables integrated support to media and the MOC. Facility is well equipped and located for ease of media access. Personnel resources include US Army Reserve PA operations center staff, Armed Forces Network staff to support the studio, and employees from the host nation to interact with Iraqi media.

(11) The proactive Iraqi media engagement team includes Iraqi employees, a protected facility, and focus on building a free-press culture in support of democracy in Iraq. Coalition provision of training and access to information are key enablers.

(12) Current, comprehensive, and practical SC planning involved US Mission Iraq and MSC participation. Planners provided ample detail and synchronized the communication annex with the campaign plan, supporting all major elements.

(13) A commander-driven emphasis on KLE events stimulates action at all levels. MNF-I Commander's intent directs the focus of KLE efforts and component commander's guidance further shapes planning at each level. KLE planning includes US Mission Iraq efforts and employs coalition military leaders at all levels to execute the plan. This effort focuses on building relationships with local leaders and enjoys decentralized execution.

e. **Operational-level Challenges.** Some of the challenges that affected SC efforts may be unique to the Iraq operational environment, but many occur in other theaters as well. These challenges are as follows:

(1) Individual augmentee rotation cycles caused a continual turnover and drain on experienced personnel.

(2) PA personnel did not have adequate local language skills and cultural awareness/understanding varied.

(3) Local media was still immature and blog engagement under-resourced.

(4) Some regional media outside Iraq and their impact within the AOR were challenging.

f. **Enablers.** Several enablers, listed below, applied to many or all of MNF-I's best practices.

(1) Commander-driven communication effort

(2) Assignment of seasoned public affairs officers

(3) Adequate resources and facilities

(4) Robust assessment

(5) Responsive processes

(6) Linkage to joint campaign plan and lines of operations

(7) Blended workforce that includes active duty, reserve, contractor personnel, operators, intelligence, PA, and operational research and systems analysis specialties.

(8) Risk acceptance enabling a learning environment

(9) Communication division portal

19 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-19)

USXCOM assessment results and recommended actions briefed to the USXCOM SCWG include the following:

1. Increased military activity will compel nations to re-assess their allegiances and national interests formally. This will generate coalition RFIs to determine stakeholder revised intent, posture, and shifts toward third-party nations or organizations (such as Russia, China, European Union, Organization of American States, etc.) for security.

2. Assessment: Red does not believe US will engage in fight. Action: US must engage all elements of DIME to reverse this belief. Possible additional actions include:

- a. Commerce Department support restrictions on the machinery Red wants
- b. World Bank limitations on financing
- c. Direct diplomatic contact at the Ambassador/SECSTATE level
- d. SecDef contact with the Red Minister of Defense
- e. Execution of flexible deterrent options

3. **Assessment:** Gray wants US commitment. **Action:** US can demonstrate commitment by USXCOM commander moving theater assets to more visible posture in support of Gray.

4. **Assessment:** Regional nations are wary of conflict. **Action:** US must express to regional countries our commitment to alliances, quick resolution, and return to regional stability.

5. **Assessment:** US public support is below desired levels. **Action:** Increase media engagement and public information efforts.

The SCWG develops the following additional messages in support of themes and messages developed on C-25:

1. Red is aggressor and responsible for escalation of tensions.
2. Gray and coalition want regional stability and peace.
3. US committed to allies, friends, and ready to uphold agreements.

g. **Strategic Communication — USSOUTHCOM’s Main Effort.** Another example of significant progress toward implementation of an SC organizational construct is in USSOUTHCOM, which has elevated SC to the “main effort.” For high priority efforts, the USSOUTHCOM Office of Strategic Communication uses the SC Director and small staff model described earlier. This office determines key objectives and themes, gains the SCB’s approval, and then passes them to the planners to develop tasks and activities in support of the “messaging.” Therefore, in this sense, the message drives the operation in this HQ.

(1) In recent years, USSOUTHCOM’s AOR has experienced increased anti-American sentiment. Accordingly, one theater-strategic objective for USSOUTHCOM is to improve the public image of the US among regional populations. Because SC is Southern Command’s “main battery,” planners incorporate actions to improve regional perceptions into all planning efforts. One example follows below.

(2) The following highlights important parts of USSOUTHCOM’s SC:

(a) Upon receipt of a CJCS directive to conduct a humanitarian assistance mission involving the hospital ship USNS COMFORT, the USSOUTHCOM OSC took the directive to the SCWG, which includes

representatives from all staff sections. The SCWG began a review of national and command guidance, including the USSOUTHCOM Strategic Communication Framework, and crafted nested SC objectives and themes. All of the themes for this mission supported USSOUTHCOM strategic themes, such as “*The United States, Latin America and the Caribbean share common interests*” and “*Regional challenges require cooperative solutions.*” The OSC passed the nested objectives and themes to the J-3 planners that shaped planning and execution of the mission.

(b) A Strategic Communication Base Plan facilitated consistency in planning and execution at all levels by providing SC planning guidance, objectives, and tasks to subordinates. The headquarters provided this plan to components and security cooperation offices, who work directly with embassy country teams.

(c) These SC-focused planning and staff actions resulted in numerous cross-functional and IA value-added activities, such as a USNS COMFORT planning seminar of all DOS embassy public affairs officers at USSOUTHCOM HQ. The seminar increased coordination throughout the AOR and enhanced efficiency and effectiveness during the operation.

(d) These cross-functional and interagency relationships also proved critical in constructing a robust "Initial Impact Assessment" immediately following the deployment. USSOUTHCOM is using this data in developing ongoing SC themes and messages to inform a variety of audiences on multiple aspects of the highly successful mission.

SECTION B. OTHER STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION INITIATIVES

8. Strategic Communication Roadmap Progress

a. Much effort has gone into progress on *SC Roadmap* assigned tasks, such as developing DOD SC policy, expanding JPASE SC support, incorporating SC planning considerations in curriculum at joint and Service mid- and senior-level colleges, and creating a senior SC training course in Monterey, CA. However, resourcing remains an ongoing challenge. Policy documents have emerged in the recent past to help clarify and guide SC-related activities. Examples include the draft DODD on SC, the *SC Roadmap* itself, the *SC Concept of Operations*, and the policy change that enables IO staffs to be active in the internet blogging environment. This policy change enabled USEUCOM to hosting two internet information websites and blogging sites that act to counter disinformation on the Internet. Research is still required at multiple levels, however, to address issues such as the following:

(1) What are the best and acceptable methods for countering enemy disinformation? The adversary will often view our domestic public opinion as a friendly center of gravity and attempt to influence it. Therefore, the joint force may need to improve its methods for informing the international audience and American people of its mission and actions. The joint force also could participate more fully in the public dialogue concerning the operation.

(2) How does SC relate to the *Military Contribution to Cooperative Security* joint operating concept (draft), as well as the ongoing approach to irregular warfare?

(3) What is the best staff configuration to effectively and efficiently conduct SC and leverage existing staff processes?

(4) What ways and means are best to assess the results of SC-related actions during execution?

9. *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept Development*

a. The **SC JIC**, currently in development at USJFCOM, focuses eight to twenty years in the future and outlines the operational problem as one of “influence.”

“The concept deals with the challenge of influence—convincing others to think and act in ways compatible with our objectives, whether this means causing others to adopt a specific course of action or simply understand us better and accept us more. The joint force commander must be able to affect the actions or behaviors of selected populations, governments or other decision-making groups to accomplish the mission and promote broader national interests in a socially complex and globally interconnected information environment. A key dimension of this challenge is integrating all the various influencing actions of the joint force to maximize their combined effect and likewise to coordinate these actions with those of any partners.”⁴²

b. **SC Goals.** The draft JIC proposes that the spectrum of influence extends from “inform” and “educate” to “persuade” and “coerce,” and should involve all SC-related capabilities. Engagement in full-spectrum influence and use of all SC-related capabilities should facilitate accomplishment of four specific SC goals outlined in the JIC⁴³ and stated as follows:

“What you do speaks so loud that I cannot hear what you say.”

Ralph Waldo Emerson

- (1) Improve US credibility and legitimacy
- (2) Weaken an adversary’s credibility and legitimacy
- (3) Convince selected audiences to take specific actions that support US or international objectives
- (4) Cause a competitor or adversary to take (or refrain from taking) specific actions

c. In viewing SC holistically, the JIC states that commanders must understand and apply the old adage “actions speak louder than words.” When promulgating their intent or guidance, commanders must include overarching themes and guidance on how actions will support them. Sometimes these actions speak volumes when compared to the various communication activities and can amplify or degrade their impact. In this context, commanders must view SC results within the context of actions taken across the full range of military operations. This also means that SC is a continuous activity and that even inaction can convey a message, whether intentional or not. Planning and execution must include these considerations.

d. **Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop Model.** The ultimate objective of most DOD SC-related activities is not only to influence perspectives or attitudes, but also to produce actions by the intended audience. SC should include efforts to understand and motivate individuals and groups to act in ways that help accomplish JFC objectives. In order to accomplish this, we must consider the full spectrum of cognition from audience observation of the information or event all the way through to audience action. One approach to this is to use the Boyd OODA loop model as the basis for moving SC themes, messages, images, and actions from providing information toward producing action (Figure III-2).⁴⁴ This model is often used to discuss the commander’s decision cycle, but it also applies to how the audience observes, perceives, and acts. In basic terms, the “observe” step is simply “what does the audience see?” The “orient” step is “what does the audience think about what it saw?” The “decide” step is “what does the audience believe it should do about what it saw?” The final “act” step is how the audience reacts (or does not react).

- (1) When studying this model, it appears that the *orient* step may be the most critical step in influencing an individual in a specific audience to act in a desired way. To facilitate or accelerate the orient step, the SC effort should

either leverage orientation patterns that already exist or instill new ones.⁴⁵ Sending messages that fit neatly into pre-conceived orientation patterns should shorten the time from observation to action. Creating new orientation patterns is much more difficult, but sending messages that leverage other high-credibility orientation patterns can help. For example, a new orientation pattern message may include known local influencers modeling orientation patterns that we desire, such as local religious leaders speaking on Qur'an passages that condemn attacks on innocent women and children.




Figure III-2. The OODA Loop—The Strategic Communication Process

(2) To implement a re-orientation approach fully, all SC-related activities must be coordinated. The problem with uncoordinated SC-related activities, happening simultaneously and at multiple levels, is that conflicting messages can very quickly undermine long-term efforts to establish new orientation patterns that facilitate desired action. Trying to establish new patterns of orientation and decision requires coordinated messages at all levels over time.

10. Strategic Communication Education

a. There is a growing desire for the creation of courses and programs focused on SC. The DASD (JC) conducted a review of military education programs to determine quantity and quality of SC education. This review has discovered that current SC-related instruction primarily consists of lessons/material within courses on IO and PA. For example, the Joint Forces Staff College incorporates SC discussion in its multiple IO-related courses, as well as in its Joint Advanced Warfighting School program. The DASD (JC) also reports that the Army War College addresses the topic in a similar fashion. The Defense Information School incorporates an SC block of instruction into its new Joint Senior PA Course for

O-6 level participants. In addition, USJFCOM JWFC, working with the National Defense University on the PINNACLE and CAPSTONE senior leader development programs, has incorporated discussion of SC, bolstered by segments specific to public communication, IO, and IA relationships. The creation of dedicated SC educational curriculum is progressing. A pilot course, conducted four times in 2008, had the DASD (JC) as the primary contributor. This course, called the DOD Senior Executive Strategic Communication Workshop, is a three-day course offered through the Naval Postgraduate School (Executive Education Center) and the University of Southern California Annenberg School for Communication.

b. The DASD (JC) has sponsored and scheduled a number of SC-related conferences designed to gather SC educators and key practitioners for thoughtful discussions on SC education and training issues. DASD (JC) held the SC Education Summit in March 08 with the following goals and objectives:

- (1) Create draft “principles of SC” from a JFC’s context (Appendix A).
- (2) Align draft SC learning objectives.
- (3) Align SC in all senior service school/intermediate level education core curricula.
- (4) Form an SC education consortium.
- (5) Explore additional SC education initiatives.⁴⁶

c. The goal of this effort to begin to standardize the teaching of SC processes, horizontal integration, and synchronization of actions, words, and images is to start to align current SC practices until clear policy and doctrine is established.

CHAPTER IV PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT

“Information is a powerful tool in the operational environment. In modern conflict, information has become as important as lethal action in determining the outcome of operations. ... Since information shapes the perceptions of the civilian population, it also shapes much of the operational environment.”

FM 3-0, Operations, Feb 08, 4-3

1. General

“Everyone is a planner”⁴⁷ is a phrase underpinned by the proposition that planning is a problem-solving process that determines and describes how to employ “means” in specific “ways” to achieve “ends” (the problem’s solution). Strategic communication can present the JFC with a unique problem set depending on strategic objectives, the operational environment, and many other factors. Among other challenges, planning for certain SC-related results may require topical specialists not normally available to the joint force. Even when initial operations focus on large-scale combat, the CCDR and subordinate JFCs must nonetheless plan both current and future activities that support national and combatant command SC themes and messages, while avoiding actions that are counterproductive to the SC effort if possible. The joint force’s SC actions are important and challenging throughout the operation, but SC success can be especially problematic during types of irregular warfare in which there typically is competition for long-term influence over the local population. In operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, multinational and Service headquarters continue to seek the most efficient and effective ways to plan and manage solutions for the SC problem set. Chapter III described potential organization options. The following paragraphs discuss various factors that affect SC-related planning.

28-18 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-28 to C-18)

The USARXCOM staff conducted planning activities during the past ten days, concurrently and in collaboration with USXCOM, per USXCOM planning order to OPLAN 6153. CDR USXCOM receives a "Prepare to Deploy" order and tasks his Army Component Commander (USARXCOM) to stand-up the XJTF. USARXCOM requests augmentation of XJTF staff to support XJTF stand-up, to include capability from the Joint PA Support Element (JPASE), Joint Military Information Support Team, combat camera, Joint IO Warfare Center, and others.

During the previous ten days, the XJTF COS adjusted the battle rhythm to sequence staff processes and ensure integration of products from the entire staff into planning, execution and assessment. These battle rhythm events included IOWG, SCWG, and SCB (COS, J-5, PA, IO, DSPD). [*Note:*

Small staffs often consolidate such coordination decisions at a Joint Coordination Board.] The XJTF SCWG convened and took the following actions:

1. Designated the PA as lead for media briefs and correcting misperceptions.

2. Determined:

- a. Key issues the JTF needs to understand.
- b. What are the leading indicators of those issues?
- c. How will the J2 or assessment cell collect on those issues or requests for information (RFIs)?

3. Designated Assessment Cell as lead for coordinating with USXCOM assessment cell and assessing local and regional perceptions of US activities.

4. Disseminated USXCOM-directed SC themes.

5. Assigned OPRs for major messages, such as:

a. US forces are moving into the theater to help preserve regional security and stability. [PA OPR]

b. Red stop aggression; coalition military forces will commit and win. [IO OPR]

c. Gray and the international community welcome peaceful relations with Red. [DSPD OPR]

d. Preserving regional stability benefits everyone. [PA OPR]

e. Red can be responsible partner in international system and family of nations. [PA OPR]

f. Lack of Red transparency contributes to uncertainty. [IO OPR]

g. International relations with Red can improve through a peaceful resolution. [PA OPR]

6. Established SC lines of operation:

- a. Key leader engagement
- b. Military support to public diplomacy
- c. Information operations
- d. Messages sent by maneuver and fires
- e. Public Affairs

7. Requested DIRLAUTH to coordinate with IA and NGOs. SC-related cells/WGs met to coordinate their activities and consolidated planned activities into a capability-specific synchronization matrix, such as the IO,

CMO, or PA engagement synchronization matrices. For example, The IOWG (IO core, supporting, related capabilities, and components) coordinated products and developed the IO synchronization matrix. Appendix F provides an example of a PA engagement matrix. The working groups used audio and video teleconference capabilities to coordinate their efforts with non-resident SC representatives from staff, components, and other key players.

JTF SCWG consolidated SC-related cell/WG inputs for JTF SCB (or JCB) approval and drafted a JTF SC synchronization matrix for coordination.

Individual JTF SC-related capability areas (PA, IO, CMO, PSYOP, KLE, Medical, Chaplain) then developed specific messages, proposed products, and drafted planned actions, such as PA media events, EW targets, CNO targets, PSYOP leaflets, CMO projects, DSPD events, and key leader engagement.

“Virtually every action, message, and decision by a force shapes the opinions of an indigenous population, to include how coalition personnel treat civilians during cordon and search operations, the accuracy or inaccuracy of aerial bombardment, and the treatment of detainees. Unity of message is key in this regard.”

Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation,
RAND Corporation, Feb 07

2. Understanding the Operational Environment

a. **Network Perspective.** Understanding the operational environment is fundamental to joint operation planning, and is particularly important for effective SC. This includes viewing the operational environment from a network perspective and understanding the interaction of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and other systems relevant to the specific operation.⁴⁸ To support joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE), network analysis identifies links, nodes, and relationships within each network and across networks. This helps planners understand how a network behaves and how best to create desired results. In particular, the JFC and staff must attempt to understand what people think, how they perceive the operational environment, and why. It may require analysis of the informational and cognitive dimensions that permeate the local social, political, economic, and information networks.⁴⁹ However, the JFC must understand that these are complex, adaptive systems that are more difficult to understand than closed systems, such as an air defense network. This is a complex undertaking, complicated by factors such as the audiences pre-existing bias, cultural lens,⁵⁰ stimulus-response patterns,⁵¹ motivation, expectations and view of the current situation.

See JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, for more information on understanding the operational environment.

b. **The Cognitive Dimension.** The cognitive dimension of the information environment encompasses the mind of the decision maker and the target audience.⁵² It is the dimension in which commanders, staff, and the audience think, perceive, visualize, and decide. Public opinion, perceptions, media, public information, and rumors influence the cognitive dimension, and SC “engagements” are won or lost here. To effectively communicate with the intended audience, it is necessary to understand this dimension and how it pervades the operational environment’s social, political, informational, and other systems.

(1) SC planners must understand that cognitive factors can vary significantly between locality, cultures, operational circumstances, and that the SC ways and means that worked in one situation might not work in another. The J-2 must consider these variances during JIPOE.

(2) In order to assist SC planners in understanding the operational environment, presenting SC-significant information on a terrain map can be helpful. This information can be distilled from the SC-relevant JIPOE analysis, such as communications, political, or social networks. Additional information could include individual perceptions of the situation, motivations, expectations, and attitudes derived from polling data, focused groups, or interviews/discussions with key leaders. This information could identify perceptions or attitudes that the commander desires to change and help planners to tailor messages more affectively. Finally, results of SC-related activities can be added to the map to begin to determine what messages resonated with which audiences in specific locations.

“CAIRO: A young Bedouin in the Sinai peninsula has been sentenced to have his tongue cut out or hand over more camels after he made ‘naughty’ remarks to a shepherdess.”

**International Herald Tribune
Cairo, Egypt
Wed, 7 Nov 07, Front Page**

c. **Staff Expertise.** Although the J-2 manages the analysis and development of JIPOE products that provide an understanding of the operational environment, this is a cross-functional process in which the entire staff participates. For SC purposes, the JFC, chief of staff, J-2, and others may also need to leverage outside experts to support JIPOE, planning, and assessment, by deploying them forward or through “reachback.” Examples of such expertise include the following:

(1) Anthropology or Sociology (understanding the local culture)⁵³

(2) Local marketing expertise (understanding points of individual influence/interest in the local population and venues for communication)

(3) Linguistics expertise (understanding linguistics nuances of local communication processes and products)

(4) Local and regional communications expertise (understanding the means, methods, and relative impact of local and regional communications)

(5) Diplomacy expertise (understanding intricacies of diplomatic efforts)

(6) US Embassy/DOS/United States Agency for International Development (USAID) expertise (understanding coordination requirements and methods between DOD and DOS ongoing foreign diplomacy)

d. **Opportunities.** The Defense Science Board identified existing “critical science and technology opportunities” that can benefit these efforts to support SC and recommended that DOD:

(1) Identify nodes of influence through network analysis

(2) Support communication and media analysis with machine translation

(3) Understand viral information flows and influences

(4) Utilize innovative evaluation and measurement methodologies (e.g., sentiment detection/analysis)⁵⁴

“Strategic empathy often is lacking in those who need it most. Asymmetric warfare or, more exactly, warfare between different kinds of belligerents, all but mandates careful study of the enemy’s strategy.”

Colin S. Gray
Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy

e. **Result.** Informed by a detailed understanding of the operational environment, the JFC and staff can improve their plan objectives, themes, messages, images, and tasks to support national and theater-strategic objectives, themes, and messages.

f. **Information Requirements.** The commander’s critical information requirements, priority information requirements, and other information requirements drive collection management. SC planners must submit their information requirements and work to have them placed high enough in the priority list to have collection assets assigned. JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*,

and JP 2-01.3, *JTTP for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace* (in revision), discuss process details and outline how to properly submit information requirements. Feedback from the field indicates that SC experts must clearly identify desired information, including specific indicators for success or failure, and may need to assist in interpreting the information once collected. The previous section on understanding the operational environment lists some of the unique skills required for SC information collection and interpretation. This effort could result in a better understanding of how the adversary conducts SC, key adversary themes, messages, images, and actions that are resonating with the local population, adversary SC capabilities and infrastructure that may be vulnerable to interdiction or exploitation, ideological and physical strengths, and weaknesses. Key findings from a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty report⁵⁵ on Iraqi insurgent use of the media are good examples of this type of beneficial information and insight:

(1) Sunni insurgents in Iraq and their supporters worldwide are exploiting the Internet to pursue a massive and far-reaching media campaign. Insurgent media are forming perceptions of the war in Iraq among the best-educated and most influential segment of the Arab population.

(2) The Iraqi insurgent media network is a boon to global jihadist media, which can use materials produced by the insurgency to reinforce their message.

(3) Mainstream Arab media amplify the insurgents' efforts, transmitting their message to an audience of millions.

(4) The insurgent propaganda network does not have a headquarters, bureaucracy, or brick-and-mortar infrastructure. It is decentralized, fast-moving, and technologically adaptive.

(5) The rising tide of Sunni-Shi'ite hate speech in Iraqi insurgent media points to the danger of even greater sectarian bloodshed. A wealth of evidence shows that hate speech paved the way for genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

(6) The popularity of online Iraqi Sunni insurgent media reflects a genuine demand for their message in the Arab world. An alternative, no matter how lavishly funded and cleverly produced, will not eliminate this demand.

(7) There is little to counter this torrent of daily press releases, weekly and monthly magazines, books, video clips, full-length films, and even television channels.

(8) We should not concede the battle without a fight. The insurgent media network has key vulnerabilities that can be targeted. These include:

- (a) A lack of central coordination and a resulting lack of message control.
- (b) A widening rift between homegrown nationalist groups and Al-Qaeda affiliated global jihadists.

17 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-17)

The XJTF SCWG requests considerable network analysis of both Gray and Red to identify key hubs or influencers in selected audience segments. The J-2 works with IO, PA, and Assessment Cell representatives to outline a collection plan. XCOM also receives assistance in development of a better SC-related understanding of the operational environment by bringing in an anthropologist from Green University, Gray and Red marketing experts, linguistics experts, DOS regional representative, USAID representative, and Red, Gray, and Green defense attachés.

g. **Adversary Transmission Techniques.** Our adversary, though very limited in resources, can leverage existing media infrastructure to transmit their message. Likewise, because they are operating within their own language, culture, and society, they are more easily able to transmit themes, messages, images, and actions that resonate with the intended audience. In fact, the 2008 National Defense Strategy states that:

Although the United States invented modern public relations, we are unable to communicate to the world effectively who we are and what we stand for as a society and culture, about freedom and democracy, and about our goals and aspirations. This capability is and will be crucial not only for the Long War, but also for the consistency of our message on crucial security issues to our allies, adversaries, and the world.⁵⁶

Better understanding of the operational environment, integrated SC planning, synchronization of SC-related activities at all levels, and closing the “say-do gap” could help change this dynamic.

3. Planning Sequence and Key Considerations

a. **General.** This section focuses on describing a useful tool as a guide to assist SC planning efforts. The planning techniques are adapted from material taught in the SC planner’s course,⁵⁷ with the emphasis on analysis and synchronization of key overarching issues to keep planners out of the weeds/details as long as possible. Appendix G provides a more detailed checklist of planning considerations to assist planners in considering important SC factors

during preparatory information gathering, planning, Annex Y development, and execution.

b. SC Planning Sequence

- (1) Review the strategic end state and identify SC high impact areas
- (2) Determine SC-relevant objectives and supporting conditions
- (3) Analyze audience/stakeholder

- (a) Who
- (b) Stake
- (c) Relationship to coalition
- (d) History with the organization
- (e) Perspective of the situation

(f) View of truth [*Note: Others may not see truth the same way you do. What is obvious to you is probably not obvious to others, for example “Dog” is open to wide interpretation, and “Democracy” may mean “No Restraint” to others.*]

- (4) Understand communication philosophy from commander’s intent:

(a) Restrictive and risk averse: nobody communicates unless authorized and reviewed, vetted, validated, and absolutely correct

(b) Agile, responsive, but higher risk: everyone informed and authorized to communicate because speed and broad continuous engagement are very important

- (c) Something in-between

- (5) Identify key communications:

- (a) Themes
- (b) Messages
- (c) Categorize the level of intended effect:

KEY TERMS

theme – an overarching concept or intention, designed for broad application.

message – a narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience.

1. Knowledge

2. Understanding

3. Beliefs

4. Actions

(d) Categorize the content format:

1. Words

2. Images

3. Actions [*Note: The commander's decision to send forces ashore UNARMED in support of Southeast Asia Tsunami relief efforts sent a strong signal to the local population that we are here to help. Likewise, inaction sends a very strong signal as well.*]

(6) Develop or update SC Annex

(a) Operational level

1. Nine months

2. Six months

3. Ninety days out

4. Thirty days out

(b) Tactical level

(c) Stay away from detailed product development as long as possible.

The secret for success is to stay at the analytical level and not allow the team to "get into the weeds" of product development. This is because planners often fall into the temptation of reverting to their Service or specialty (IO or PA) comfort zone of product development too soon.

(d) Look for possible “landmines” as a means of risk mitigation. For example:

1. USCG wanted to establish live-fire ranges permanently, and entered the coordinates into the federal register, in accordance with the law, without telling anyone. The coordinate list was quite lengthy, but only enclosed small areas. Multiple special interest groups, normally at odds with one another, all united to form a powerful force against the USCG. Highlighting list length, appearance of taking vast areas, and public safety concerns, the special interest groups were able to overwhelm the USCG. A SC plan to facilitate the establishment of these ranges, executed in advance of entering the information in the federal register may have eliminated significant resistance.

2. Some corporate entities have found it beneficial to identify the five most potentially damaging issues and create communications contingency plans to address them. One hypothetical application of this method (for recent DOD incidents) would have been the creation of a communications contingency plan for the aftermath of the death of any high-profile individual. Identifying the most damaging issues could include “What if this individual is killed,” “What if this individual is killed in a horrible way,” “What if this individual is killed by our own troops by accident,” or “What if this individual is captured and abused by the enemy.” The idea is to have these create communications contingency plans on the shelf and update them quarterly to assist with rapid SC execution in a crisis.

3. A common mistake is to think that we can control information, that it can be contained, and that it will not leak out. If we try to control information, it may appear that we are trying to cover it up. The best way to deal with damaging information is to get in front of it and address the issues positively and quickly.

“The solution is not to be found in some slick PR campaign or by trying to out-propagandize Al Qaeda, but through the steady accumulation of actions and results that build trust and credibility over time.”

**SecDef Gates
14 August 08**

c. **Key SC Planning Considerations.** While Appendix G includes many detailed planning considerations, there are three fundamental considerations for planning SC-related activities: delivery vehicle, timing, and tempo.

(1) **Delivery Vehicle.** It is clear that construction of the message must include considerations for resonance with the intended audience, but the delivery vehicle can also significantly distort, impede, or facilitate reception by the audience. Selection of the appropriate vehicle can be quite complex (Figure IV-1) and must consider message content, desired audience impact, resistance, vehicle advantage, and other factors. For example, use of key leaders for message delivery can speed reception to audiences with limited access. However, audience perceptions of the key leader will color the message and may bring unintended consequences. Clearly understanding a key leaders' previous stance on issues, audience perception of the leader, potential baggage, and perspective may be crucial in creating the desired effect. Some of the considerations for selection of the appropriate delivery vehicle can include formats (visual, written, or word-of-mouth) and available activities, such as KLE, soldier-populace interaction, civil-military operations, and many activities of subordinate commands that interact with selected audiences. Having a superb message delivered by the wrong vehicle can be disastrous. Risk mitigated measures can include utilizing multiple vehicles and reinforcing messages.

(2) **Timing** of the message is important for myriad reasons, including synergy with other messages/events, receptivity of the audience, momentum, audience motivation/expectations, and stimulus response patterns. Sending some




Figure IV-1. Matching Capability and Vehicle to Intended Audience

messages immediately following an event is optimum, such as following an attack by the enemy. Delay of other messages is preferable, such as showing how the legitimate government is improving quality of life in a recently secured area. This would allow time for repairing initial combat damage and improvements to become more visible. Likewise, launching a significant military operation often draws significant media attention and can obscure other more important messages. For example, on 16 March 2006, the launch of Operation SWARMER (large air assault operation in Iraq) immediately grabbed media attention and virtually silenced two important strategic messages including the US National Security Strategy release and implementation of significant Iraqi constitutional reforms. The commander later commented that had they known that the two strategically important events were happening on that day, they would have delayed the operation. A message sent too early will lose its potency and one sent too late results in a lost opportunity. Factors that define the timing window often include audience social/cultural expectations, motivation, the perception of personal impact, and timing of other important messages.

(3) **Tempo** of message delivery can directly affect how the audience decides to take action. A continual drum beat of a specific message or type of message can result in the receiving audience over time treating it as noise. However, a well-timed message at the optimum tempo can have significantly increased effect. For example, providing a rapid tempo of messages is beneficial in circumstances where we desire a relatively quick response, such as messages attempting to motivate occupants of a city to give up their arms during the week leading up to an operation to clear terrorists. However, a slow tempo of messages is more appropriate when the audience must decide/respond over a longer period, such as the message to embrace democracy. In the latter case, it is important to vary the message content, style, and delivery method to keep it fresh. Other factors may include the need to show progress, such as in the 2003 period in Iraq where the MNF-I issued a daily “drum beat” to the Iraqi population that showed the good things that the Iraqi government was doing each day.

d. The following FM 3-0, *Operations*, excerpt, based on operations in Afghanistan, provides a good example of incorporating SC into planning and synchronizing SC with counterinsurgency operations.

In January of 2007, a large Taliban force attempted to destroy a US combat outpost near Margah in the Afghan Province of Paktika. Seasoned by months of experience, the US brigade combat team in that area had organized their entire counterinsurgency operation around influencing specific audiences with carefully combined information and action. The brigade identified, engaged, and destroyed the enemy force as it moved into the area from Pakistan. In the ensuing week, with joint support, the brigade implemented a comprehensive information engagement plan to:

- Persuade the Afghan elders around Margah to deny support to the Taliban.
- Erode the cohesion, morale, and support base of the Taliban.
- Reassure the local population in Paktika Province.
- Persuade the Pakistani Army to increase active measures inside Pakistan to disrupt the Taliban.

Additionally, the joint commander wanted to use this battle and other events to inform regional and global audiences about progress in this part of Afghanistan.

Soldiers gathered evidence and met with the local populace to ensure they understood the situation. The provincial reconstruction team helped the Afghan governor to organize a meeting with the Margah elders to pressure them into cutting ties with the Taliban. The attached psychological operations detachment developed and disseminated sophisticated products, targeting Taliban survivors of the battle. The public affairs officer then organized a press conference on-site in Margah to allow the Afghan governor to tell the story of the security success to local and regional audiences. The joint public affairs team organized a similar event for the international media. The joint commander met with senior commanders of the Pakistani and Afghan military.

The operation proved successful. The Pakistani Army improved security cooperation along the border. The Margah elders began to sever ties with the Taliban. Perhaps most importantly, the tribes in Pakistan began to resist Taliban recruiting efforts. Closely integrated information and action on the ground allowed joint and multinational forces to exploit tactical success.

FM 3-0, *Operations*

16 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-16)

The CDR XJTF approves planning guidance, including incorporated SC guidance and themes, messages, images, and actions. He further directs subordinate components to begin planning. SC LNOs on J-35 planning teams ensure inclusion of SC considerations and activities in the planning process. Products include themes, messages, and images, coordinating requirements by phase, Annex Y, press releases, key leader engagement plan, SC synchronization matrix, update brief, senior leader engagement portal, and country plans.

4. Assessment

a. **Measuring progress** toward mission accomplishment assists commanders in decision making and adjusting operations to achieve military objectives and reach the end state. With local population perception playing a pivotal role—particularly in irregular warfare, such as in COIN operations—and

the fact that “battles and campaigns can be lost in the cognitive dimension,”⁵⁸ assessment has a key role in SC-related activities. Because SC attempts to create outcomes primarily in the cognitive dimension, it is a challenge to create measures (Figure IV-2) that are relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced.

b. **Pattern Determination.** In an assessment, commanders are most interested in patterns: the changes to attributes of a system, node, link, task or action. Other factors can include rate of change, periodicity, historic comparison, and statistical analysis. Metrics show change over time and indicators give commanders a sense of whether they are making progress. However, determining relevant thresholds is often not knowable until sufficient measurement has taken place to show a pattern or trend, especially when assessing human behavior.

c. **Measurement Types.** Both MOEs and MOPs can be qualitative or quantitative measurements. Whenever possible, quantitative measurements are preferred, because they are less susceptible to staff interpretation—subjective judgment. They demand more rigor (or proof) and are enduring even when the analysts and the users – the commanders – change. For these quantitative measures to have maximum utility, however, they should have three common characteristics: each indicator must consist of at least one measure, metric, and a standard (or threshold).




Figure IV-2. Quantitative Measurement

KEY TERMS

measure – the extent, dimensions, quantity, etc., of something. (Webster’s)

measure of effectiveness – A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 3-0)

measure of performance – A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0)

metric – the distance between two points being independent of the order of the points. (Webster’s)

threshold – the point at which a stimulus is of sufficient intensity to begin to produce an effect. (Webster’s)

d. **Measuring performance** is the most straight-forward measurement endeavor and helps track what is being transmitting into the information environment. For example, tracking completion of key media engagement activities (picture below of a USCENTCOM briefing slide), press releases, and other SC-related activities helps to determine if the force is “doing things right.”

e. **Measuring Effectiveness.** Finding substantive and reliable measures of effectiveness in the cognitive dimension of the information environment is


UNCLASSIFIED


Media Engagements

LAST 24 HOURS

Mon, 18 Aug 08

- *Brig Karim, NP; Brig Fadil, IP; COL Martin, Associated Press*
- *Brig Karim, NP; COL Martin, MND-B; al-Iraqiya, al-Safir, al-Jeel Magazine, Iraq News Agency, Journalist Associated Bar*
- *Amb. Ford, AMEMB, McClatchy*
- *Mr. Specht, AMEMB, WHTM (ABC, Harrisburg, PA), Cumberland Sentinel*
- *Mr. Matel, AMEMB, WDJT (CBS, Milwaukee, WI), Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*
- *Mr. Smith, AMEMB, KSDK (NBC, St. Louis, MO), The Free Lance-Star, WFVA (Fredericksburg, VA), KMOX (St. Louis, MO)*
- *Mr. Laskaris, AMEMB, KNRY (Monterey, CA), Monterey Herald, KION (CBS, Monterey, CA)*
- *Mr. Hillas, AMEMB, WVII (ABC, Bangor, ME), Bangor Daily News*
- *Mr. Foote, AMEMB, WLVL (Lockport, NY), WECK (Buffalo, NY)*
- *Mr. Tribble, AMEMB, KTTV (FOX, Los Angeles, CA)*
- *Mr. Lynch, AMEMB, DVM News Magazine, Veterinary Practice News Magazine, San Fernando Valley News*
- *GEN Petraeus, MNF-I, WTOP, NY Times*
- *LTG Austin, MNC-I, Pentagon Press Conference*

Gol

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more difficult than measuring those resulting from traditional lethal means. A 2007 OSD research project entitled “Measuring Progress in a Conflict Environment (MPICE)” involved interagency and academia participation in determining substantive and reliable goals, indicators, and outcome measures for stability operations. This project resulted in a widely accepted set of historically

15 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-15)

XJTF SC planners determined that in this environment, metrics involve not only opinion tracking, but increasingly actions as well, including numbers of calls to telephone tip lines, numbers of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) reported, numbers of children in schools, numbers of businesses open, levels of street trade and internet patterns such as numbers of hits on various pro-government and pro-insurgent web sites.

validated outcome measures for both the drivers of conflict, and institutional performance of the host nation government to deal with instability. The project identified four data methodologies: content analysis, survey/polling data, expert knowledge, and quantitative data. Content analysis involved searching media reporting on specific topics, and expert knowledge involved interviewing subject matter experts. Current operations in the field have incorporated some of these same methodologies for measuring progress associated with SC-related activities. In Iraq, for example,⁵⁹ SC practitioners review content from Western and Pan-Arab media, aggregate the information, and brief the current media situation daily to decision makers (picture below of a USCENTCOM slide).

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Pan-Arab & Western Media

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Iraq wants to improve relations with Arab states

Ammar al-Hakim, deputy leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, says Iraq can be a bridge between the Arab world and Iran. He is working to improve relations with majority Sunni countries suspicious of Iraq's ties to mostly Shi'a Iran. *(al-Khaleej)*



Basrah politicians tell Iran to stop interfering in Iraq

Political leaders in Basrah have warned Iran to stop interfering with the city's security, politics, and business. City leaders previously asked Iraq's Foreign Ministry to close the local Iranian consulate. Now they say if Iranian interference does not cease by September, they will seek legal action. *(al-Arabiya)*



Iraqi delegation to meet with Olympic committee

Dr. al-Dabbagh is leading an Iraqi delegation to meet with the International Olympic Committee in Switzerland. They hope to persuade the Committee to reverse a ban on Iraqi participation in the Beijing Olympics enacted earlier this year. *(al-Jazeera)*

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(1) **Polling** is an excellent opportunity to gauge local perceptions. Although attempting to determine causality by linking increase or decrease in perception to any specific event is difficult, polling is an important tool for assessing progress on achieving desired effects (outcomes). Public opinion research provides the best means to gauge local public perceptions on numerous and various topics in order to develop the capability to perform trend analysis. If the polling sampling is sufficiently large and representative of the national population, results can be projected to the larger population.

14 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-14)

Collection focuses on attitudes toward the United States, although Red attitudes toward Gray are still tracked. Unsurprisingly, the surveys show a dramatic improvement in the Gray opinion of America, but they also provide valuable information for making improvements. The surveys are cross-referenced to the existing JIPOE and other information mapping efforts. Survey questions are tied directly to the established themes and messages to learn which resonate with different audience segments and which do not.

(2) A **focus group** is a qualitative research method that uses open-ended questions to explore attitudes, beliefs, and opinions of 8 - 12 individuals in a small group setting. Focus groups explore new ideas to gain an in-depth understanding of the participants' opinions on a particular topic. However, the results from Focus groups, due to the typically low sample size not representative of the larger group, usually are not projected to the larger population.

13 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-13)

XJTF does considerable pretesting with ethnic-Red focus groups in other countries. The digital outreach team steps up its activities in the Red chat rooms and blogosphere, concentrating on moderate sites—the so-called “swing voters”—as opposed to the hard-line sites. One tack is to provide irrefutable factual evidence of long-standing Red efforts to undermine Gray sovereignty. This theme tests well with focus groups comprising Red overseas residents.

(3) **Weekly assessment briefings** can offer actionable recommendations to achieve desired effects (outcomes). Consideration of topics for the briefings can include customer requests, needs of senior leadership, and current events that SC practitioners deem to be of value to those involved in SC-related activities.

(4) **Commercial Methods.** Review of other methods for measuring outcomes utilized by commercial entities may provide some additional useful methodologies. With the level of effort expended daily by industry in advertising

and assessing outcomes with respect to consumer attitudes and desires, it would appear that a wide variety of validated and value-added assessment techniques might be available. This review may produce a good set of regionally effective methodologies.

12 DAYS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (C-12)

This collection and assessment effort involves extensive opinion polling using a variety of methods such as telephone, internet, and personal interviews, as available. XJTF and other agencies have the capability to perform some polling themselves, but often hire independent polling organizations because these enjoy greater access and credibility. This effort makes extensive use of the Red Diaspora.

Assessment results in a dramatically deeper understanding of Red and Gray perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and interests. Although XJTF planners begin to understand intuitively what signals they need to send, frequent pretest of specific messages with Gray and Red focus groups (in other countries) ensures messages are on target.

The SCWG has established what it calls the “Red 70” and “Gray 50.” These are lists of the top 70 and 50 selected opinion leaders in Red and Gray respectively who are continuously monitored for indications of their attitudes. The Red 70 are composed of leaders resident in both Red and overseas locations. The lists include political, religious and social leaders who have been identified as representative of national attitudes. Their activities and statements in response to US actions are monitored in an attempt to correlate action and outcome.

f. Complexity.

(1) The JFC must understand that assessing complex adaptive systems, such as insurgent recruiting, is much more difficult than assessing closed systems, such as communications infrastructure. The decision to assess complex adaptive systems must include considerations for significantly increased resource requirements (due to the number of variable involved) and difficulty in keeping the assessment current (due to the speed of change in the system).

(2) In order to predict future outcomes (what will happen), based on assessment results (what happened), the analyst must determine causality (what caused it to happen). Determining causality is often possible for a closed system, but requires significantly more effort. However, attempting to accurately establish causality or predict outcomes in complex adaptive systems may not be scientifically possible, due to the infinite number of variables involved.

CHAPTER V

OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

“The first duty of a wise advocate is to convince his opponents that he understands their arguments, and sympathizes with their feelings.”

Samuel Taylor Coleridge

1. General

a. In order to integrate and synchronize SC efforts and capabilities, as noted in the QDR *SC Roadmap*, the joint community needs to publish SC policy and expand joint doctrine. This effort should include identification of value-added emerging structures and practices, the scope and limits of SC, subordinate elements, supporting capabilities, and relationships. Training and education may be the key enabler to rapidly increase effectiveness of SC operations and allow dissolution of some of the interim organizational methods. Training of commanders and staffs to synchronize words and actions can help the JFC close or avoid the “say-do gap” and influence audiences more efficiently and effectively.

b. More work needs to be done to identify an SC end state for DOD, analyze existing doctrinal processes to determine needed modification, and provide organizational constructs to support the process changes. This work could produce some efficiency for SC-related activities and organizations. Likewise, investigating ways to better reach out and coordinate SC with interagency, coalition, and other partners may provide significantly improved coherence in SC themes, messages, images, and actions for achieving long-term SC-related objectives. A study of private enterprise or nongovernmental expertise in the areas of advertising, marketing, and progress measurement may be beneficial to help shift paradigms and to think of new ways to conduct SC as well as new ways to use military resources in the execution and assessment of SC.

c. Current interim SC-related solutions observed in the field range from creating new boards, cells, and working groups to sharing LNOs across traditional lines. Increasing command emphasis on SC has produced some degree of success; however, results vary widely and are somewhat hampered by resourcing issues, community stovepipes, immature policy, insufficient doctrine, and inadequate training. Full and effective implementation of SC in joint operations depends not only on sound policy, but also on integrating solutions across the areas of joint doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Continuing implementation and evaluation of SC should consider the consequences across DOTMLPF functional processes.

2. Policy

a. The draft DODD 3050.00, *Strategic Communication*, is a foundational SC policy document, but it will not have its intended effect until signed. Likewise, some *SC Roadmap* tasks are progressing, including JIC development and continuing improvement in JPASE capabilities. However, insufficient resources hamper progress and timely completion of other *SC Roadmap* tasks.

b. Although SC guidance templates are being submitted and processed above the combatant command level (through JS J-5, DASD (JC), USD (P), and ASD (PA)), Annex Y (Strategic Communication) processing is taking weeks in some cases. Some combatant commands have stopped using Annex Y in favor of placing two or three paragraphs in the commander's intent section and referring to the IO and PA annexes. A good example of a well-established expedited crisis communication process is the ASD (PA) handling of the public affairs guidance package. A review of this process may provide some value for consideration in adopting a similar process for SC-related products.

3. Doctrine

a. Concurrently with approval of the *SC Roadmap*, joint doctrine was quick to address strategic communication in JPs 3-0 and 5-0, and later in JP 1. Since SC was a new construct at the time, these keystone and capstone publications did not discuss SC in depth, nor include detailed relationships between SC and PA, DSPD, IO core, supporting, or related capabilities that other relevant publications should address. Considerations for further development or revision of doctrine should include:

(1) A more thorough discussion of SC integration into all operations including integration into the joint operation planning process may be beneficial in JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, and JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*. This discussion could include an SC vignette and considerations for making SC the main effort during certain phases of an operation. These keystone publications should address the growing importance of SC and its prevalent role in irregular warfare and stability operations.

(2) Clarification of the relationships between all SC-related capabilities, such as those for IO found in Appendix B, would help planners and operators in the field. JP 3-13, *Information Operations*, series and JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*, may benefit from incorporation of this material.

(3) Combatant commands have tailored organizational constructs that facilitate SC for specific mission sets. A discussion of validated, value-added SC

organizational constructs (such as the SCWG or the USSOUTHCOM Office of Strategic Communication) may be of value in JP 3-33 and other JPs listed below.

(4) To better support SC, joint doctrine must expand the understanding of the operational environment, largely through the JIPOE process, to provide more depth in SC-related areas. This expansion should consider cultural, cognitive, and communications network mapping. Revision of JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment* that is currently in the early stages of the revision process, should address these issues.

(5) Identification and incorporation of value-added, compatible civilian communication assessment techniques and procedures may benefit SC assessment planning. The JP 3-13 series and JP 3-61 may benefit from this effort. Army and Air Force ORSA communities may be uniquely qualified to help advance this area.

(6) An outline of interagency, intergovernmental organization (IGO) and NGO coordination requirements, with recommended processes, may speed and focus coordination efforts in crises.

(7) Identification of SC challenges that are unique to each level of war or type of operation may help planners to adapt to emerging circumstances more quickly.

(8) Validation of a process that focuses and synchronizes planning and execution of all communication activities within the staff, and provides a mechanism to coordinate with the broader USG effort, could enhance SC execution.

(9) The importance, complexity, and breadth of SC-related capabilities and activities may validate the need for a new joint publication on SC.

(10) Joint doctrine should consider a separate naming construct that recognizes the difference between USG-level activity and military implementation at theater-strategic and operational levels. Potential examples include the “communication strategy” construct taught by the JWFC and “operational communications” being used by USCENTCOM’s Army component. One argument for this construct:

“While military commanders directly control PA and IO assets and direct the “M” in DIME, they do not direct the PD actors. Because of this, we draw a distinction between a military commander’s communication strategy and the interagency nature of strategic communication.”⁶⁰

(11) Doctrine must define relationships between SC; PA; DSPD; and IO core, supporting, and related capabilities. For example, doctrine states that relationships do exist, but does not discuss the direction of flow for support of those efforts. For example, *combat camera* appears to support IO, PA, DSPD, and CMO; however, clarification of the two-way relationship between combat camera and others may add value. Likewise, *counterintelligence* should have a more clearly defined role in support of PA and DSPD. In the same vein, determining the relative importance of SC supporting capabilities in specific types of military operations could alter the relationships. For example, military support to stability operations appears to need PA, DSPD, CMO, and PSYOP in a primary role in SC. However, major operations appear to have physical attack, PSYOP, MILDEC, and PA in the primary SC roles.

(12) Assessment processes are currently insufficient to provide timely measures of SC effectiveness. Typical arguments against developing these processes include the difficulty of correlating the informational activities of the command with the cognitive and behavioral changes of the intended audiences, the length of time and patience required to observe the change of opinions and attitudes, or the complex and difficult nature of collection requirements. Commercial research and marketing practices include processes to overcome these same difficulties because they cannot afford to wait for extended periods to determine communications effectiveness in selling a product. One can argue that industry does not communicate under combat situations, but commercial processes and techniques may provide value to our efforts, especially those that are successful in the local operating environment. It may be prudent, during this effort, to keep in mind that marketing focuses on the transaction, whereas SC focuses on the relationship/message.

b. The primary joint publications that likely need to add a more robust discussion of SC include the following:

- (1) JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*
- (2) JP 1-04, *Legal Support to Military Operations*
- (3) JP 1-05, *Religious Support in Joint Operations*
- (4) JP 2-01.3, *JTTP for Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*
- (5) JP 3-0 Ch1, *Joint Operations*
- (6) JP 3-13, *Information Operations*

- (7) JP 3-13.1, *Electronic Warfare*
- (8) JP 3-13.3, *Operations Security*
- (9) JP 3-13.4, *Military Deception*
- (10) JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*
- (11) JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*
- (12) JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*
- (13) JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*
- (14) JP 3-63, *Detainee Operations*
- (15) JP 3-24, *Joint Counterinsurgency Operations* (in development)
- (16) JP 3-26, *Counterterrorism* (in development)
- (17) JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*
- (18) JP 6-0, *Joint Communication System*

4. Organization

a. When faced with a new requirement like SC, there is a natural tendency to jump to an organizational solution before fully understanding if process adjustments are necessary. Organizational changes might be necessary for some new requirements, but not for others. The detailed techniques and procedures for how the JFC should synchronize IO, PA, and DSPD in support of higher-level SC themes, messages, images, and actions have not been decided, so organizational changes – particularly those that require more resources – are premature. Some have argued that if new organizational constructs are necessary, then we must “be sure to bring everyone over to the new way, and get rid of the old.” Otherwise, “The end result is that we now have about twice the [SC] force structure oriented around doing generally the same thing, without broad understanding of who does what, or more importantly, who has what authorities.”⁶¹

b. Whether or not organizational changes are necessary, those leaders responsible for implementing, coordinating, or directing SC-related activities for their command must be given the requisite authority, tools, and other resources to accompany the responsibility.

c. Diminishing stovepipes, review of authorities, or bridging DOD organizations that overly segment missions or inappropriately restrain employment of capabilities may prove invaluable. While this may require some revision of staff process and procedures within joint organizations, the results could be a single coherent effort that can more effectively meet the challenge of conducting successful operations at all levels.

d. SC subject matter experts in the field have indicated that a “Center of Excellence” type organization for SC may be useful in developing SC doctrine, TTP, concepts, capturing lessons learned, and advocacy for warfighter SC issues.

5. Training

a. The JWFC is providing more robust SC training and improving the fidelity of external SC entities during joint exercises. However, role-playing at the DOD/USG level has been limited. OSD, JS, and interagency participation in SC training activities, to include planning and communication integration interaction, would provide a significant benefit. This participation could be facilitated using reachback capability.

b. A more efficient approach (than the current organizational fixes) may be to train planners to incorporate SC more completely into the existing doctrinal joint operation planning process and to slightly modify and expand the doctrinal baseline.

6. Materiel

Feedback from the field indicates that development of a machine translator that is dialectically accurate, agile, and culturally validated should improve the JFC’s ability to communicate with indigenous personnel. It would facilitate dialogue, enabling discussion, and improving understanding.

7. Leadership and Education

a. Feedback from ongoing DOD SC education conferences indicates that there is value in bringing together SC educators and key practitioners for thoughtful, productive discussions on SC education and training issues. Value-added products of these venues could affect leadership and education in various ways to include those addressed below.

b. The application of SC-related capability, planning, and coordination may need to be strengthened in joint professional military education and Service education programs, including PINNACLE and CAPSTONE courses. This education could include planning considerations for early SC efforts. In the current

global war of ideas, our military leaders may significantly benefit from training and education to inculcate SC and SC-related implications in their deliberate, analytic, and intuitive decision-making processes.

c. The Services' disparate education programs may need to incorporate a broad knowledge of SC processes, including Service and JFC responsibilities.

d. The creation of dedicated SC educational curriculum is in the infancy stage. The DOD Senior Executive Strategic Communication Workshop was a three-day pilot course offered through the Naval Postgraduate School (Executive Education Center) and the University of Southern California Annenberg School for Communication and could be considered as a prototype for similar future course.

8. Personnel

a. The *SC Roadmap* assigns several tasks to determine resource requirements needed in the SC-related capability areas. Interviews with DOD SC experts have indicated that personnel shortages continue to affect SC efforts significantly. In order to alleviate some pressure on the personnel resource system, intensifying the incorporation of SC considerations into joint and Service planner development programs may be of value. Some factors for incorporation may include:

(1) Consideration of SC implications in all planning efforts, to include IO, PA, and DSPD capabilities

(2) Synchronization of lethal and nonlethal operations for maximum impact

(3) Coordination with interagency, IGO, NGO, multinational, and other organizations in the operational environment

(4) Coordinating concepts with JS and OGAs during the early stages of planning and execution

b. A key enabler for many SC programs is an understanding of the local language, cultural and information environment. Development of regional and country experts to assist in intelligence preparation, planning, and executing SC-related tasks may prove valuable.

c. Network analysts may need the following unique skill sets to best support SC efforts:

(1) Anthropology (understanding the local culture)⁶²

- (2) Local marketing expertise (understanding points of individual influence/ interest in the local population)
- (3) Linguistics expertise (understanding linguistics nuances of local communications processes and products)
- (4) Local and regional communications expertise (understanding the means, methods, and relative impact of local and regional communications)
- (5) Diplomacy expertise (understanding intricacies of diplomatic efforts)
- (6) US Embassy/DOS/USAID expertise (understanding coordination requirements and methods between DOD and DOS ongoing foreign diplomacy)

9. Facilities

The US Navy recommends an expansion of the DOD Information School.

10. Conclusion

“The longer it takes to put a Strategic Communication framework into place, the more we can be certain that the vacuum will be filled by the enemy and by news informers that most assuredly will not paint an accurate picture of what is actually taking place.”

**Former Secretary of Defense
Donald H. Rumsfeld**

Strategic communication is a critical capability for waging the War of Ideas in support of counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East and the broader War on Terrorism. Strategic communication is at the heart of USG efforts to influence key audiences to support US national interests, but is not a stand-alone process. SC integrated into all operations processes at the outset and synchronization throughout planning, preparation, execution, and assessment ensures the greatest effect in the information environment. Synchronizing words and actions can help the JFC close the “say-do gap” and significantly increase the potential to influence intended audiences. Effectively employed SC ways and means can potentially achieve national, theater-strategic, and operational-level objectives in a manner that lessens the requirement for combat in many operations. Past operations have not demonstrated the best integration of IO, PA, and other SC-related capabilities in support of SC themes, messages, images and actions. Recent experience proves that a more integrated, synchronized, holistic effort is both beneficial and required. To date, solutions have focused on planning adjustments and organizational alternatives. While improvements have

been significant, they do not approach the anticipated effectiveness of truly integrated and synchronized SC planning and execution. A review of all related processes and capabilities, with a clearly articulated SC end state in mind, should guide future DOTMLPF changes that produce a holistic SC solution set.

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APPENDIX A

PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Definition of a principle: A fundamental tenet; a determining characteristic; an essential quality; an enduring attribute.

**DOD Memorandum *Principles of Strategic Communication Guide*
15 August 2008**

1. Caveat

a. The nine “Principles of Strategic Communication” listed in Figure A-1 are included in the *Principles of Strategic Communication Guide*, signed by the Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs 15 August 2008, Figure A-2.

b. These principles are provided in this handbook to assist dialogue and instruction, promoting understanding of Strategic Communication. They are not listed in order of precedence.



Figure A-1. Principles of Strategic Communication

2. Discussion

a. **Leadership-Driven—Leaders must decisively engage and drive the strategic communication process.** To ensure integration of communication efforts, leaders should place communication at the core of everything they do. Successful Strategic Communication – integrating actions, words, and images – begins with clear leadership intent and guidance. Desired objectives and outcomes are then closely tied to major lines of operation outlined in the organization, command or joint campaign plan. The results are actions and words linked to the plan. Leaders also need to properly resource strategic communication at a priority comparable to other important areas such as logistics and intelligence.

b. **Credible—Perception of truthfulness and respect between all parties.** Credibility and consistency are the foundation of effective communication; they build and rely on perceptions of accuracy, truthfulness, and respect. Actions, images, and words must be integrated and coordinated internally and externally with no perceived inconsistencies between words and deeds or between policy and deeds. Strategic Communication also requires a professional force of properly trained, educated, and attentive communicators. Credibility also often entails communicating through others who may be viewed as more credible.

c. **Understanding—Deep comprehension of attitudes, cultures, identities, behavior, history, perspectives and social systems.** What we say, do, or show, may not be what others hear or see. An individual's experience, culture, and knowledge provide the context shaping their perceptions and therefore their judgment of actions. We must understand that concepts of moral values are not absolute, but are relative to the individual's societal and cultural narrative. Audiences determine meaning by interpretation of our communication with them; thus what we say, do, or show, may not be what they hear or see. Acting without understanding our audiences can lead to critical misunderstandings with serious consequences.

d. **Dialogue—Multi-faceted exchange of ideas to promote understanding and build relationships.** Effective communication requires a multi-faceted dialogue among parties. It involves active listening, engagement, and the pursuit of mutual understanding, which leads to trust. Success depends upon building and leveraging relationships. Leaders should take advantage of these relationships to place U.S. policies and actions in context prior to operations or events. Successful development and implementation of communication strategy will seldom happen overnight; relationships take time to develop and require listening, respect for culture, and trust-building.

e. **Pervasive—Every action, image, and word sends a message.** Communication no longer has boundaries, in time or space. All players are communicators, wittingly or not. Everything the Joint Force says, does, or fails to do and say, has intended and unintended consequences. Every action, word, and image sends a message, and every team member is a messenger, from the 18-year-old rifleman to the commander. All communication can have strategic impact, and unintended audiences are unavoidable in the global information environment; therefore, leaders must think about possible "Nth" order communication results of their actions.

f. **Unity of Effort—Integrated and coordinated, vertically and horizontally.** Strategic Communication is a consistent, collaborative process that must be integrated vertically from strategic through tactical levels, and horizontally across stakeholders. Leaders coordinate and synchronize capabilities and instruments of power within their area of responsibility, areas of influence, and areas of interest to achieve desired outcomes. Recognizing that your agency/organization will not act alone, ideally, all those who may have an impact should be part of communication integration.

g. **Results-Based—Actions to achieve specific outcomes in pursuit of a well-articulated endstate.** Strategic communication should be focused on achieving specific desired results in pursuit of a clearly defined endstate. Communication processes, themes,

targets and engagement modes are derived from policy, strategic vision, campaign planning and operational design. Strategic communication is not simply “another tool in the leader’s toolbox,” but must guide all an organization does and says; encompassing and harmonized with other functions for desired results.

h. Responsive—Right audience, right message, right time, and right place. Strategic Communication should focus on long-term end states or desired outcomes. Rapid and timely response to evolving conditions and crises is important as these may have strategic effects. Communication strategy must reach intended audiences through a customized message that is relevant to those audiences. Strategic Communication involves the broader discussion of aligning actions, images, and words to support policy, overarching strategic objectives and the longer term big picture. Acting within adversaries’ decision cycles is also key because tempo and adaptability count. Frequently there will be a limited window of opportunity for specific messages to achieve a desired result.

i. Continuous—Diligent ongoing research, analysis, planning, execution, and assessment that feeds planning and action. Strategic Communication is a continuous process of research and analysis, planning, execution, and assessment. Success in this process requires diligent and continual analysis and assessment feeding back into planning and action. Strategic Communication supports the organization’s objectives by adapting as needed and as plans change. The SC process should ideally operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries.

15 August 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Principles of Strategic Communication Guide


Strategic Communication has been viewed as an emerging and extremely pertinent joint concept in recent years. Several important review panels have addressed Strategic Communication (SC) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has designated Strategic Communication as one of the CJCS Special Areas of Emphasis for joint education in 2007 and 2008.

Despite the interest and attention, Strategic Communication is still a developing concept. Contributing to the challenge is the lack of approved policy and doctrine.

As part of a larger DoD Strategic Communication education initiative, the Department held the first Strategic Communication Education Summit in March 2008, at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Va. One of the most significant outcomes was the development of "Principles of Strategic Communication" to help standardize Strategic Communication education until policy and doctrine are published.

Through the collaborative efforts of DoD, State Department, and civilian educators and practitioners, the Principles initially developed in the Strategic Communication Education Summit have been refined into this guide. The purpose of this publication is to provide a tool to assist dialogue and instruction promoting understanding Strategic Communication.

As the Strategic Communication concept continues to mature, these Principles will be reviewed every two years until they are incorporated into formal doctrine. Comments are welcome and should be addressed to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication.



Robert Hastings
Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense of Public Affairs

Figure A-2. *Principles of Strategic Communication Guide* Cover Letter

SUPPORT ROLES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS, CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEFENSE SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND COMBAT CAMERA					
	INFORMATION OPERATIONS	CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS	PUBLIC AFFAIRS	DEFENSE SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY	COMBAT CAMERA
INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) SUPPORTED BY		Influencing/informing populace of CMO activities and support. Neutralizing misinformation and hostile propaganda directed against civil authorities. Controlling electromagnetic spectrum for legitimate purposes.	Conducting counter-propaganda and protection from misinformation/rumor. Developing essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) to preclude inadvertent public disclosure. Synchronizing psychological operations (PSYOP) and operations security (OPSEC) with PA strategy.	Ensuring accuracy of information. Maintaining relevance of information. Timeliness of information. Usability of information. Completeness of information. Security of information.	Coordinating guidance to COMCAM teams with commander's information/objectives. Assisting in expeditious transmission of critical COMCAM images.
CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS (CMO) SUPPORTS BY	Providing information to support friendly knowledge of information environment. Synchronizing communications media and assets and message with other IO capabilities. Coordinating command and control target sets with targeting cell. Establishing and maintaining liaison or dialogue with indigenous personnel and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Supporting PSYOP with feedback on PSYOP themes. Providing news and information to the local people.		Providing information on civil-military operations center activities to support public affairs (PA) strategy. Synchronizing information communications media and message. Identifying, coordinating, and integrating media, public information, and host-nation support.	Providing information to inform interagency elements on local information environment. Synchronizing communications media and messages with other IO capabilities. Establishing and maintaining liaison or dialogue with indigenous personnel and NGOs. Supporting DPSD with feedback on strategic communications themes.	Using COMCAM capabilities to record priority civic action projects. Synchronizing imagery assignments with COMCAM team leader.

Figure B-1. Support Roles of Information Operations, Civil-Military Operations, Public Affairs, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and Combat Camera

SUPPORT ROLES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS, CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEFENSE SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND COMBAT CAMERA (cont'd)					
	INFORMATION OPERATIONS	CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS	PUBLIC AFFAIRS	DEFENSE SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY	COMBAT CAMERA
PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA) SUPPORTED BY	Developing information products to protect soldiers against the effects of misinformation or disinformation. Coordinating with IO planners to ensure a consistent message and maintain OPSEC. Supporting counterpropaganda by countering misinformation. Providing assessment of effects of media coverage to OPSEC planners. Providing assessment of essential nonmedia coverage of deception story.	Producing accurate, timely, and balanced information for the public. Coordinating with civil affairs specialists to verify facts and validity of information.		Developing information products to protect US actions consistent with strategic communications themes and objectives. Coordinating with interagency planners to ensure a consistent message. Providing assessment of media coverage.	Managing release of key images through PA channels. Coordinating for COMCAM coverage and access to key events and operations.
DEFENSE SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (DSPD) SUPPORTS BY	Providing a link to interagency for coordination and guidance on strategic communications themes and activities.	Providing a link to interagency for coordination and guidance on strategic communications themes and activities.	Providing a link to interagency for coordination and guidance on strategic communications themes and activities.		Providing a link to interagency for coordination and guidance on strategic communications themes and activities.
COMBAT CAMERA (COMCAM) SUPPORTS BY	Providing responsive imagery coverage of events in the operational area.	Providing responsive imagery coverage of events in the operational area.	Providing responsive imagery coverage of events in the operational area.	Providing responsive imagery coverage of events in the operational area.	

Figure B-1. Support Roles of Information Operations, Civil-Military Operations, Public Affairs, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and Combat Camera (Cont,d)

POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

	OPSEC	MILDEC	PSYOP	PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION	EW	PHYSICAL SECURITY
OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) CAN CONFLICT BY		Limiting information that can be revealed to enhance deception story credibility.	Limiting information that can be revealed to develop PSYOP themes.	Limiting information that can be revealed to enemy to develop targets.	Electronic protection (EP) and OPSEC may have different goals.	Should be no conflict.
MILITARY DECEPTION (MILDEC) CAN CONFLICT BY	Revealing information OPSEC normally seeks to conceal.		Limiting PSYOP theme selection. Limiting information that can be revealed to develop PSYOP themes.	Limiting targeting to allow survival and conduct of critical adversary command and control (C2) functions.	Limiting electronic attack (EA) targeting of adversary information systems (INFOSYS) to allow survival and conduct of critical adversary C2 functions.	Negating the deception story by physical security preventing our transmitting a realistic deception story.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP) CAN CONFLICT BY	Revealing information OPSEC normally seeks to conceal.	Limiting deception story selection if deception story contains untruths.		Limiting targeting of adversary C2 infrastructure to allow conveying of PSYOP themes.	Limiting EA against adversary communications frequencies to allow PSYOP themes to be conveyed.	Should be no conflict.
PHYSICAL ATTACK CAN CONFLICT BY	Causing firing systems to reveal their locations.	Limiting selection of deception means by denying or degrading elements of adversary C2 infrastructure necessary to process deception story.	Limiting means available to convey PSYOP themes by denying or degrading adversary C2 systems.		Limiting opportunities for communications intrusion by denying or degrading elements of adversary INFOSYS.	If need-to-know considerations limit access to targeting data.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) CAN CONFLICT BY	Revealing EW assets prematurely.	Limiting selection of deception measures by denying or degrading use of adversary C2 systems.	Reducing frequencies available to convey PSYOP themes.	Limiting targeting of adversary C2 systems.		Revealing what physical security is trying to protect (EA). EP should not conflict.

Figure B-2. Potential Conflicts within the Capabilities of Information Operations

POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS (cont'd)							
	OPSEC	MILDEC	PSYOP	PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION	EW	PHYSICAL SECURITY	
INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) CAN CONFLICT BY	Should be no conflict.	Reinforcing the deception story	Should be no conflict.	Should be no conflict.	EP and IA must be deconflicted.	Should be no conflict.	
COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK (CNA) CAN CONFLICT BY	Attack selected on enemy targets may provide information on friendly activities.	May result in attacking wrong target if coordination not made with MILDEC	Preventing the enemy from receiving the PSYOP message.	Attacking same target with nonlethal and lethal weapons wastes both time and ammunition.	Need to deconflict which systems attack which targets.	Revealing CNA source that should be protected.	
COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENSE (CND) CAN CONFLICT BY	Should be no conflict.	Reinforcing the deception story	Should be no conflict.	Should be no conflict.	Should be no conflict.	Should be no conflict.	
COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (CI) CAN CONFLICT BY	Should be no conflict.	Should be no conflict	Should be no conflict.	Killing sources.	Electronic warfare support may be needed for other activities.	Should be no conflict.	
	IA		CI		CNA		CND
OPSEC CAN CONFLICT BY	Should be no conflict.		Should be no conflict.		Should be no conflict.		Should be no conflict.
MILDEC CAN CONFLICT BY	Presenting data the enemy will believe versus assuring data is not revealing to enemy.		Giving the adversary a cover story that inadvertently supports his collection plan.		Should be no conflict.		Should be no conflict.
PSYOP CAN CONFLICT BY	Should be no conflict.		Should be no conflict.		Should be no conflict.		Should be no conflict.

Figure B-2. Potential Conflicts within the Capabilities of Information Operations (Cont'd)

POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS (cont'd)

	IA	CI	CNA	CND
PHYSICAL ATTACK CAN CONFLICT BY	Attacking incorrect adversary systems capable of influencing friendly INFOSYS availability and integrity.	Destroying insufficient number of adversary collection assets.	Should be no conflict.	Should be no conflict.
EW CAN CONFLICT BY	Should be no conflict.	Should be no conflict.	Should be no conflict.	Should be no conflict.
IA CAN CONFLICT BY		Having insufficient INFOSYS available to conduct CI.	Not having available links with higher headquarters to pass CNA requests.	Should be no conflict.
CNA CAN CONFLICT BY	Should be no conflict.	Attacking enemy computers before exploiting hostile intelligence collection efforts.		Should be no conflict.
CND CAN CONFLICT BY	Should be no conflict.	Should be no conflict.	Should be no conflict.	
PHYSICAL SECURITY CAN CONFLICT BY	Should be no conflict.	Should be no conflict.	Should be no conflict.	Should be no conflict.
CI CAN CONFLICT BY	Ineffective CI can negate information integrity.		Should be no conflict.	CI revealing how networks are protected.

Figure B-2. Potential Conflicts within the Capabilities of Information Operations (Cont'd)

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STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION GUIDANCE TEMPLATE FORMAT EXAMPLE	
<u>Desired Strategic Endstate</u>	
<p><u>Narrative Description/Strategic Context</u></p> <p>Frames the issue in the broadest terms by describing the background and situation applicable to the issue and desired goal(s).</p>	
<p><u>Goal(s)</u></p> <p>What the strategic plan is attempting to achieve</p>	<p><u>Themes</u></p> <p>Key focus areas as a guide for more specific messaging</p>
<p><u>Obstacles and Constraints</u></p> <p>Obstacle – Something you can improve on Constraint – Something you cannot change</p>	<p><u>Key Assumptions</u></p> <p>Factors that are thought to be true and form the basis for the plan</p>
<p><u>Primary Audiences</u></p> <p>Target groups/organizations that are the focus of actions and words designed to achieve the goal</p>	<p><u>Assessment Methodology</u></p> <p>Key measures of progress toward identified goal</p>
<p><u>Way Ahead</u></p> <p>Specific steps to be taken to complete and implement SC plan</p>	
<p> <input type="checkbox"/> Proceed as written <input type="checkbox"/> Proceed IAW guidance <input type="checkbox"/> Adjust </p>	

Figure C-1. Strategic Communication Guidance Template Format Example

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STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX EXAMPLE

Air Tasking Order Cycle or Date		AA or Day 1	AB or Day 2	AC or Day 3			
Information Operations	Psychological Operations						
	Commando						
	Electronic Warfare	SEAD South		SEAD West			
Public Affairs	Combat Camera	US Congressional Delegation		Terrorist Clearance Operation			
	Conference	Deputy Commander Public Speaking		Local Media Engagement			
	Release	Weapon Training with CIVPOL Killed in Action Incident	Fishing Nets to Fisherman	Distributing School Supplies			
	Interview		Host Nation President	Host Nation Military Leader			
Civil-Military Affairs	Humanitarian Assistance	Internally Displaced Persons Camp		Medical Clinics			
	Assess	Internally Displaced Persons Camp	Power Plant				
Engagement	CJTF KLE	Maritime Component with Host Nation Navy Chief					
	Task Force KLE	Commander with Government Leader	Commander with Military Leader				
	Training	Maintenance Training/Deployable Terminal Medical Health	Training	Dental Hygiene Training			
	Outreach	Standing Water Treatment	Local Medical Treatment	Computer Training for Teachers			
Lethal/Physical Destruction/Maneuver		Security Operations	Blockade				
CIVPOL	Civilian Police	CJTF	Commander Joint Task Force	KLE	Key Leader Engagement	SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defense

Figure D-1. Strategic Communication Synchronization Matrix Example

Air Tasking Order Cycle or Date		AD or Day 4	AE or Day 5
Information Operations	Psychological Operations		
	Commando		
	Electronic Warfare	Jamming Terrorist Communication Networks	
Public Affairs	Combat Camera		Distributing School Supplies
	Conference		Maritime Component Press Day Police Integration Training
	Release		
	Interview		Host Nation Police Chief
Civil-Military Affairs	Humanitarian Assistance	Internally Displaced Persons Camp Internally Displaced Persons Camp	
	Assess		Coordination for Vaccines
Engagement	CJTF KLE		
	Task Force KLE	Commander with Police Leader	Commander with Economic Leader
	Training		
	Outreach		
Lethal/Physical Destruction/Maneuvre		Local Medical Treatment	
		Security Operations	
		Blockade	
CIVPOL	Civilian Police	CJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
		KLE	Key Leader Engagement

Figure D-1. Strategic Communication Synchronization Matrix Example (CONT)

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PLAN EXECUTION MATRIX

Desired Effects	Constraints	Methods	Tasks	Lead	Partners	Measures of Effectiveness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accurate understanding of international community's efforts in host nation (HN) • Comprehensive Understanding of progress country-wide • Comprehensive understanding of long-term challenges • Recognition of the strategic importance of HN to international security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiple actors means multiple voices • Coalition is a consensus-driven body made up of sovereign governments • Media attention tends to be drawn to kinetic operations • Difficult to develop a consensus strategic response to crisis events in such a fast-paced media environment • Extremely complex modern media environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Message coordination within USG, with coalition, main HQ, HN Government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create and update quarterly a Master Narrative, synchronized with coalition's Master narrative and HN Government messages to provide high-level messaging to all levels of command 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • USD(P) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM • EUCOM • JS • State • Coalition MOC • HN Government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Greater Clarity on Missions • Greater understanding of progress and increased appreciation of HN's strategic importance to international security
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop, coordinate, disseminate, and regularly update talking points and supporting materials/fact sheets on key issues related to HN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) • State • CENTCOM • SOCOM • JS • Coalition MOC • HN Government 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quarterly update of Audience Analyses to reflect current attitudes, prioritized list of methods by which audiences receive messaging (e.g., TV, traditional communications, etc.) and assessment of shifts in attitudes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JIOWC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • USD(P) • USD(I) • JS • State • Intell Community 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regular operational coordination to deconflict and synchronize messages and activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SOCOM • State • USD(P) • PA 	

Figure D-2. Strategic Communication Plan Execution Matrix

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APPENDIX E

FORMAT AND GUIDANCE FOR ANNEX Y TO AN OPERATION PLAN

ANNEX Y⁶³

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

References: List additional documents essential to this annex

1. Situation

a. General

(1) USG guidance. Provide summary of USG objectives and guidance relevant to the area of operations that effect the communication environment.

(2) Strategic Communication Overview. Provide the strategic communication overview of the environment, outlining the overall objective of executing the strategic communication process through coordinating, synchronizing, and integrating the supporting communication capabilities.

(3) Country/Regional Perspective. Provide an overview to the country or region's perspective to the operation outlined in the Base Plan and as described through the strategic communication overview. Address primary strategic communication assets within the country or region that have the ability to execute strategic communication initiatives or strategies.

b. Enemy. Adversary or Competitor Perspective. Identify primary opposing perspectives in the area of responsibility that will compete against US strategic communication efforts. Categorize the perspectives in descriptive subparagraphs as either an "obstacle" or a "constraint" to implementation of the strategic communication objective. Perspectives listed should not normally repeat supporting communication capabilities but the significant obstacle or constraint requiring coordination, synchronization, or integration through the strategic communication process.

(1) Opposing Audiences. IO audiences/key decision makers and support activities who contribute to the establishment of obstacles and constraints through their influence of planning guidance, key policy decisions, and operational execution of their strategy. These key decision makers direct the development or allocation of resources to execute course of action that may be contrary to US and command strategic communication objectives. Identify groups that can influence plans, decisions, and operational effectiveness in task accomplishment; identify their susceptibility to strategic communication messages and actions.

(2) Information Systems. Identify primary information and collection systems that support opposing decision makers and their staffs. Summarize intelligence capabilities pertinent to the situation. Cite references for detail.

c. Friendly

d. Assumptions. Address the overall assumptions necessary to execute the strategic communication process and list specific assumptions necessary for particular supporting communication capabilities in the respective annexes.

e. Lines of Operation. Identify the significant expectations to be coordinated, synchronized, and/or integrated to identify primary responsibilities and mission expectations of the various supporting communication capabilities.

(1) Friendly

(2) Neutral

(3) Adversary

2. Mission. Refer to the Base Plan.

3. Execution

a. **Concept of Operations**

(1) Overview. State the Base Plan commander's intent for strategic communication. Discuss the goal(s) of the strategic communication process and provide emphasis on how it contributes to the end-state of the Base Plan. Conceptually explain how combatant commands produce effects that contribute to the accomplishment of national objectives for the area of operations (AOR).

(2) Specific Guidance. Provide guidance for the various supporting communication capabilities, through subordinate command elements, to ensure coordinated execution of strategic communication objectives. (See Strategic Communication Planning Matrix at Tab A).

(a) Identify the strategic communication goal(s) to achieve the commander's intent.

(b) Discuss the strategic communication themes, subsequent messages, and desired end state to achieve the strategic communication objective(s) throughout the AOR (Annex Y Appendix 1).

(c) Provide guidance on target audiences who are instrumental in achieving the strategic communication objective(s). Associate themes and subsequent messages to each identified audience. Generally associate performance expectations to provide guidance to the various communication capabilities in developing associated action (Annex Y Appendix 1).

(d) Address themes, subsequent messages, and actions to be avoided because of their potential to produce unintended consequences or harmful attitudes and behavior (Annex Y Appendix 2).

(e) Describe primary adversarial themes and messages directed at friendly audiences in the operational area that oppose US and combatant command strategic communication objectives. Strategic communication objectives should provide guidance for countering or minimizing affect of adversary operations (Annex Y Appendix 1 and Annex Y Appendix 2).

(3) Relationship to Information Operations (IO) and Public Affairs (PA). Cross-reference and demonstrate relationships between the effects, audiences, messages, and activities in various enclosures to the Basic Plan. This will include Annex C (Operations), Appendix 3 to Annex (IO), Annex F (PA) and Annex V (Interagency Coordination). Discuss the sequencing of messages and activities and refer to Tab A.

(4) Measures of Performance (MOP). Provide expectation as to methods expected for measuring performance, such as intelligence, multidiscipline counterintelligence, security monitoring, and operational feedback; how will strategic communication requirements be assessed. Include measurement expectations to ensure the implementation of a selected MOP, by the supporting communication capability, confirms the delivery of the message, to the targeted audience, with the desired end state.

(5) Measures of Effectiveness (MOE). The primary measure of effectiveness in the communication environment is a change in behavior of the identified target audience that supports an objective. Measure of effectiveness, the result of an implemented “measure of performance,” may be a less stringent opposition to a democratic initiatives and/or an increased willingness to adapt improved humanitarian proposals. Such MOE must have established MOP and may require specialized reporting.

b. Tasks. Outline the tasks to be completed and divided into separate subparagraphs by supported and supporting commands and agencies. Each task should be a concise statement encompassing all key actions that subordinate and supporting elements must perform. Assign responsibilities based on capabilities to reach the intended audience(s). Ensure that tasks clearly assign responsibilities, consider Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD) and visual information, address interagency coordination, and provide for guidance on MOE and MOP.

- (1) Public Affairs
- (2) Information Operations
- (3) Civil Affairs
- (4) Military Diplomacy
- (5) Defense Support to Public Diplomacy
- (6) Visual Information (Combat Camera)
- (7) Subordinate Commands
- (8) Supporting Combatant Commands

(9) Specified Coordination with Higher Headquarters

(a) Non-DOD agencies

(b) OSD/Joint Staff and defense support agencies

(10) Other — Senior Leader Engagements

c. Coordinating Instructions. List the instructions applicable to the entire command or two or more elements of the command that are necessary for proper coordination of the operation but are not appropriate for inclusion in a particular annex. Explain terms pertaining to the timing of strategic communication execution and deployments. Also explain other operational terms required to lend clarity to the implementation of strategic communication throughout the AOR but are not defined in Joint Staff publications.

4. Administrative and Logistics. Provide a statement of the administrative and logistic arrangements applicable to strategic communication not covered in the Base Plan or another annex thereof.

5. Command and Control. Refer to appropriate sections of Annex K and provide pertinent extracts of information included in the Base Plan or Annex K.

[Note: Discuss the role of the command’s strategic communication “governing body” by explaining the chain of responsibility through each higher command, and the processes and procedures regulating its interaction with the DOD Strategic Communication Integration Group.]

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ENGAGEMENT MATRIX EXAMPLE

UNCLASSIFIED

A	B	C	D	E	F	
7 MAY C+82 UPDATE (sorted by timing)		Austere Challenge PAO Engagement Matrix				
1						
2	Primary Message	Messenger (w/command & time)	Medium (Delivery Vehicle)	Key Audiences	Objective	Specific Task
3	Continual					
4	All CJTF Messages	All	Media Corps	All	All	Media Embeds
5	Coalition responding to direct req for assistance from Blue and working with Blue forces/govt	CJTF, Embassy Blue PAO	Blue state run radio, TV	Blue	(3) Preserve stability in Blue	Get info to local Blue populace
6	Last 24 Hours					
7	Coalition in Ally with approval of Allyn government	C+81 06 MAY08, CFLCC, LTG Lee and MG Sputnik	Press Conference at Joint Info Bureau (JIB)	International Community, GGE, Blue	(5) Gain & Maintain coalition cohesion & support of audiences	Show we are invited guests of the Republic of Ally.
8	Combat ops began to liberate Blue	C+81 06 MAY08, EUCOM, MG Keel J3	IV USA Today	International Community	(2) Defeat Red aggression	Deliver CJTF themes
9	Coalition nations responding to Blue request for assistance and will work alongside Blue forces	C+81 06 MAY08, CFACC, PAO	Capital Today	Blue	(3) Preserve stability in Blue	Show we are answering Blue call for help
10	Coalition respects religious tolerance	C+81 06 MAY08, CJTF, Chaplain Adams	Embed Media (WNN, UPI) Interview aboard USS Mount Whitney	International Community	(2) Defeat Red aggression	Counter Red "anti Religion" Propaganda
11	Ongoing					
12	Civilian mariners play important role aboard Coalition Commander's Flagship	C+82 07 MAY08, CJTF, Capt Washington, CO MTW	Embed Media (WNN, UPI) Interview aboard USS Mount Whitney	International Community	(5) Gain & Maintain coalition cohesion & support of audiences	Highlight different elements of the Coalition
13	Coalition overwhelming combat power and are taking decisive action to stop Red aggression	C+82 07 MAY08, CFACC, MG Jones	Press Conference	Red	(2) Defeat Red aggression	Discussion of Air Campaign
14	Coalition forces take great care to minimize collateral damage	C+82 07 MAY08, CFACC, PAO	Capital Today	Blue	(5) Gain & Maintain coalition cohesion & support of audiences	Counter Red claims of indiscriminate bombing
15	Next 24 Hours					
16	Overwhelming combat power and are taking decisive action to stop Red aggression	C+83 08 TBDL MAY08, CFLCC, BG Pluto	Press Conference at Joint Info Bureau (JIB)	International Community, Blue, Red	(2) Defeat Red aggression	Announcement of Commencement Ground Combat Ops
17	Overwhelming combat power and are taking decisive action to stop Red aggression	C+83 08 TBDL MAY08, CJTF, VADM Smith	Embed Media (WNN, UPI) Interview aboard USS Mount Whitney	International Community, Blue, Red	(2) Defeat Red aggression	Announcement of Commencement Ground Combat Ops
PAO / IO / PSYOP / Interagency / < 						

UNCLASSIFIED

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ENGAGEMENT MATRIX EXAMPLE

APPENDIX F

Figure F-1. Public Affairs Engagement Matrix Example

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APPENDIX G

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Development of this appendix focused on creating a useful tool as a guide to assist SC planning efforts. The planning considerations⁶⁴ assist planners in considering important SC factors during preparatory information gathering, planning, plan review, and execution.

1. Information Gathering

a. General

- (1) Who are the stakeholders other than partners?
- (2) How does the joint force model, simulate, and anticipate human behavior (individual and group) and response?
- (3) How does the joint force detect, analyze, and respond to incoming messages?
- (4) How do the joint force and partners make sure that information is flowing freely?
- (5) How does the joint force build an integrated and synchronized SC approach?
- (6) How does the JFC decentralize SC at each level within parameters established by higher authority?
- (7) How does the joint force anticipate direct and indirect effects (outcomes) of messages on intended audiences?
- (8) How does the joint force evaluate products from processes and technologies (polling, focus groups, modeling and simulation)?

b. Means

- (1) How does the joint force selectively access, override, or exploit communications channels?
- (2) What SC-related capabilities are available for this operation or operate in the AO?
 - (a) Joint force
 - (b) Interagency
 - (c) Coalition

(d) Other partners

(e) Adversary

(f) Others

(3) How does the joint force communicate into denied areas?

(4) How does the joint force identify the right SC conduits and then access those conduits?

(5) How will the joint force embed and provide support to media representatives?

(6) How does the joint force identify, gain, and maintain contact/access to key audiences?

(7) How does the joint force use alternative ways to communicate in addition to language, such as visual images?

(8) How are the joint force and partners connected to the external environment?

(9) How are the joint force and partners influencing the environment, the larger external systems?

(10) What SC-related capabilities are the joint force and partners creating for the near future?

c. Relationships

(1) Which interagency, foreign partner or stakeholders have long-standing and favorable relationships with the joint force and joint force commander?

(2) Who may become stakeholders and partners later on, how, and why?

(3) How does the JFC nurture relationships with potential stakeholders and partners in a deliberate manner and in a pending/actual crisis?

(4) How does the joint force seek/choose partners for the SC-related effort?

(5) How does the joint force assist each partner?

(6) How do the joint force and partners learn to trust each other more?

(7) How does the joint force build partnership capacity and relationships in the long term (build a reservoir of goodwill)?

(8) What is the appropriate joint force relationship with competitors, potential adversaries, or adversaries?

(9) What are the appropriate command, control, coordination, consultation, and support relationships within/beyond the coalition in order to achieve effective SC results?

(10) How does the joint force connect with those who are critical to the success of the SC-related work (e.g., states, non-state entities, populations, private industry, and academia)?

d. Audience

(1) Who are the principle SC audiences affecting mission success?

(2) What is the audience(s) status?

(a) Ally

(b) Coalition member

(c) Friend

(d) Competitor

(e) Neutral

(f) Adversary

(g) State

(h) Non-state entity

(3) What are the partners', stakeholders' and selected audiences' interests, motivations, fears, and attitudes?

(4) How does the selected audience process information and make decisions?

(5) How does the joint force segment key audiences (e.g., opinion makers, shadow audiences, those most vulnerable, and adversaries)?

(6) How does the joint force determine which audience segments affect the desired end state most?

e. Networks

(1) What are the audiences' critical networks (formal and informal)?

(2) How does the joint force identify and analyze potential communication media and channels?

(3) How does the joint force identify physical and social communication networks?

(4) Does the joint force and partners understand the competitors, adversary, and their operating environment?

(5) Whom else does the competitor or adversary have in its support network?

f. Language/Culture

(1) How does the joint force identify and gain access to qualified personnel who can provide cultural awareness, language, and alternative skills not existing in the joint force?

(2) What languages do the joint force and partners need for effective communication?

(3) How does the joint force acquire local and regional cultural / language expertise to join the team?

(4) How does the joint force form analytical communities of interest (cultural anthropologists, linguists, local academics, sociologists, economists, religious experts, etc) to assist in SC-related activities via reach-back?

g. Collection

(1) How does the joint force persistently collect, analyze, disseminate, and access all-source external information, adversary SC efforts, and capabilities?

(2) How does the joint force gain and exploit SC-related intelligence derived from the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions?

(3) How does the joint force incorporate information that supports SC into the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment?

(4) How does the joint force collect in-depth information on the perceptions, attitudes, motivations, etc. of a variety of audiences with different linguistic and cultural backgrounds?

(5) How does the joint force determine and understand adversarial SC interests, objectives, capabilities, methods, etc?

(6) How does the joint force identify and analyze who else (other than the adversary) is communicating with designated audiences – what they are communicating, why, intent, methods, capabilities, etc?

(7) How does the joint force reorient intelligence capability to collect, analyze, and disseminate human terrain information (attitudes, perceptions, culture, etc)?

(8) What are the needs of the joint force and partners for additional intelligence and information?

(9) What security classification issues affect the sharing as well as protection of intelligence and information?

(10) Do all partners know how to use and act on the intelligence and information once collected and shared?

(11) Can all partners actually read the intelligence and information?

(12) Are the intelligence and information available in a timely way?

(13) How does the joint force identify other entities that have interests in the AOR, their goals, objectives, level of influence with key audiences, capabilities, and current activities?

(14) Whose SC-related work does the joint force know about that can be exploited?

(15) Who are the key leaders, subject matter experts, most credible sources and why?

h. Development

(1) How does the joint force conceive and coordinate physical actions to influence selected audiences?

(2) How does the joint force design, produce, and disseminate effective content for each distinct audience in a timely manner?

(3) How do joint force and partners conceive, produce, coordinate, and synchronize messages (physical and informational) across the various SC-related capabilities?

i. Assessment

(1) How does the joint force estimate the direct and indirect effects (outcomes) of potential signals on the perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and actions of selected audiences?

(2) Is there sufficient feedback among the partners in the system?

(3) How does the joint force and partners know that the selected audience is listening and attentive?

(4) How does the joint force identify and analyze potential unintended effects (outcomes) on primary, secondary, and tertiary audiences?

(5) How does the joint force develop SC-related measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of progress (MOP) to ensure they are relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced?

j. Restraints

- (1) What are the constraints, restraints, and barriers that affect SC?
- (2) What are the SC-related issues affecting the joint force from outside the system (e.g., historical ties, religious underpinnings, US domestic opinion, Congressional oversight, US election cycle, media attention, international attitudes, etc)?
- (3) What is the joint force SC-related rules of engagement and interaction?
- (4) How much will SC-related activities cost?
- (5) What are the US Government SC-related statutes, policies, regulations relating to the joint force and partners?
- (6) What legal restrictions affect the SC effort?
- (7) What are the joint force internal barriers to SC efforts?
- (8) How does the joint force reduce or eliminate internal barriers?

k. Risk

- (1) What are the relevant risks and mitigations means associated with the SC-related activities?
- (2) How can the joint force and partners become deliberate targets of either competitor or adversary SC activity?

l. Information

- (1) How will the joint force document joint force actions and disseminate this information in real or near-real time as required?
- (2) Who needs to know about the joint force SC-related work?

2. Planning

a. General

- (1) What is the end state?
- (2) What are the facts and assumptions that affect joint force SC-related activities?
- (3) What are the SC-related operational limitations?
- (4) What is the commander's guidance and intent concerning SC?

- (5) What is the JFC's vision and SC philosophy?
- (6) What are primary objectives that SC can affect for the USG, joint force, and partners?
- (7) What are the short, medium, and long-term objectives that SC must address?
- (8) What are the identifiable centers of gravity (partners, neutrals, competitors, adversaries, others, and ours), that SC can affect?
- (9) How does the joint force determine SC implications of CCIRs?
- (10) What measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) will the joint force and partners use, are they responsive and sufficiently resourced?
- (11) How does the JFC maintain the perception of keeping his word in this dynamic, complex, chaotic environment?
- (12) How does the joint force integrate all actions to maximize desired effects (outcomes) on selected audiences?
- (13) How does the JFC coordinate with USG Agencies and other organizations?
- (14) What joint force abilities/values need to be emphasized or de-emphasized?
- (15) What joint force behavior needs to change?
- (16) What audience(s) behavior(s) needs to change?
- (17) How do key partners organize for SC-related work?
- (18) How does the joint force develop and sustain a proactive and responsive multi-media SC capability?
- (19) How does the joint force perform and integrate SC in a comprehensive process in order to seize and maintain the initiative?
- (20) How does the joint force predict, anticipate, or realize strategic implications of tactical and individual actions?
- (21) How does the joint force plan and execute SC with various USG Agencies, organizations, and partners?
- (22) How does the joint force create, modify, and coordinate command, control, supported/supporting relationships, and SC actions across various USG Agencies, partners, and other organizations?

(23) How does the joint force manage a highly decentralized communication effort?

(24) How does the process verify the right message content, audience, timing, tempo, and delivery vehicle?

(25) How does the joint force rapidly exploit SC opportunities at each level of command?

(26) What is the joint force's desired reputation as observed by selected audiences?

(27) How does the joint force synchronize actions with messages?

(28) How does the joint force coordinate to preclude miscues and misunderstandings?

(29) How does SC assist the joint force recover from mistakes?

(30) How is the joint force going to deal with deliberate deviations from established principles and standards?

(31) How does the joint force synchronize lethal and nonlethal targeting efforts?

b. Relationships

(1) How can we leverage joint force history, partners, and stakeholder past relationships / histories?

(2) Do the joint force and key partners agree on the Strategic Communication problems/challenges that exist at the theater-strategic and operational levels?

(3) What are the current roles and responsibilities of partners and stakeholders?

(4) How does the joint force assimilate new partners in its SC-related activities?

c. Restraints

(1) What are the USG and other partners' policies that affect the SC problems / challenges and solution?

(2) How does the joint force anticipate and preempt competitor or adversarial SC actions?

d. Means

(1) How does the joint force identify and engage evolving New Media?

(2) How does the joint force reach back or consult across various USG Agencies, organizations, and partners?

e. Assessment

(1) How will the joint force and partners get feedback and adapt to the changing environment and nature of the SC-related work?

(2) How does the joint force conduct assessment of SC-related activities?

(3) Are the MOEs and MOPs relevant, measurable, responsive, and adequately resourced?

(4) Are progress measurement resources synchronized and processes in place to utilize and share the information?

(5) How does the joint force establish causality?

f. Risk

(1) How is the joint force going to deal with bad news?

(2) How does the joint force pre-test signals to evaluate effectiveness prior to sending?

g. Themes, Messages, Images, and Actions

(1) What are the key strategic and operational themes?

(2) What are the main messages to support each theme?

(3) What are the primary images to support each message?

(4) What issues are at risk of opening the “say-do” gap for internal stakeholders?

(5) What issues are at risk of widening the “say-do” gap for external stakeholders?

(6) What mitigation measures are appropriate?

(7) Which media choices and sources are best suited as vehicles for each message?

3. Plan Review

a. Are SC MOPs and MOEs relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced?

b. How will the JFC conduct a continuous engagement program with selected key audiences?

- c. How will the joint force conduct culturally reliable translation? Will this be sufficient to meet demand?
- d. How will the joint force train personnel to a working proficiency in important languages?
- e. How will the joint force exploit unplanned physical and virtual SC engagement opportunities?
- f. What audience behaviors are the joint force and partners planning to reinforce?
- g. What audience behaviors are the joint force and partners planning to change or eliminate?
- h. How will the joint force and partners create necessary feedback loops?
- i. How will the joint force and partners ensure all parties are listening to each other?
- j. What delivery vehicles does the plan use to access desired media for reaching the selected audience?

4. Execution

- a. What must the joint force do more, less, stop, or start doing in its SC work?
- b. What are the joint force and partners learning from SC-related activities?
- c. Do the joint force and partners really understand what is happening?
- d. How does the joint force monitor, measure, and assess the effects (outcomes) of friendly messages on intended and unintended audiences in relation to desired outcomes?
- e. What unanticipated SC-related questions and challenges are now surfacing?
- f. Are the joint force and partners continuing the same planned SC cycle or performing a completely new assessment and planning effort based on new realities on the ground?
- g. Does the joint force and partners need to narrow or broaden the scope of SC work?
- h. Is there a particular issue that needs more SC attention or focus of effort?
- i. What new information has surfaced that should cause a re-evaluation of the plan?
- j. Who else needs to be involved now in the SC effort?
- k. What new opportunities are developing for the joint force and partners?

- l. What joint force or partner organizational changes could improve conduct of SC-related activities?
- m. What is the truth on key issues from the primary audience perspective?
- n. What is the truth on key issues from the adversary perspective?

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APPENDIX H

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- ⁴ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, Washington, DC: January 2008, xi.
- ⁵ These senior level OPMEP education programs are for perspective joint/combined force commanders, selected flag officers and senior enlisted to understand: the fundamentals of joint doctrine and the Joint Operational Art; how to integrate the elements of national power in order to accomplish national security and national military strategies; and how joint, interagency, and multinational operations support national strategic goals and objectives.
- ⁶ *QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication*, US DOD, 25 Sept 06, Para 1.2.1.
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¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ DOS Ambassador comments during presentation at PINNACLE Senior Executive Education Course, Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, 2007.

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²⁰ DOD SC Integration Group (SCIG) memorandum from the DepSecDef, Washington DC, 31 Jan 07.

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²³ The US Army Wounded Warrior Program provides severely wounded Soldiers and their families with a system of advocacy and follow-up with personal support to assist them as they return to duty, or to civilian life.

²⁴ Interview with Director DASD (JC), Col Julian, 9 May 08.

²⁵ DODD 3050.00, draft dated 27 Nov 07. Highlights listed in the bullets that follow are from this document. This document is again on hold pending the sorting out of the transference of SCIG responsibilities, standing up of the DASD (JC) planning team, issues mentioned above, and others.

²⁶ CJCSM 3122.01A, *Joint Operation Planning & Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policy and Procedures*, 29 Sep 06, page GL-29, defines the term military diplomacy as: The ability to support those activities and measures US military leaders take to engage military, defense and government officials of another country to communicate USG policies and messages and build defense and coalition relationships.

²⁷ JP 3-0 Ch1, I-2.

²⁸ Note: CJCSM 3122.03C, *Joint Operation Planning & Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning Formats*, 17 Aug 07, provides a 24 page guide to writing Annex Y, enclosure E appendix Y.

²⁹ JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 26 December 2006, p. II-2. JP 5-0 designates Annex Y as the SC annex of an operation plan.

³⁰ Ibid, page B-18, para 'a'.

³¹ JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/i/02664.html> (accessed 12 June 08).

³² JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*, 9 May 2005, III-10.

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⁴⁸ JP 3-0 Ch1, pages II-22 through II-25. The JFC’s operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment. Included within these are the adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation.

⁴⁹ The description of the operational environment in JP 3-0 encompasses a discussion of the information environment, including its physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions.

⁵⁰ Klein, Helen Altman. 2004. Chapter 9: Cognition in Natural Settings: The Cultural Lens Model. In Michael Kaplan’s (Editor) *Cultural Ergonomics: Advances in Human Performance and Cognitive Engineering Research*, Volume 4, 249-280. Elsevier Press Ltd.

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GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AOR	area of responsibility
ASD (PA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
CCDR	combatant commander
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOWG	civil-military operations working group
CNO	computer network operations
COS	chief of staff
CTCC	Counterterrorism Communication Center
DASD(JC)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication
DepSecDef	Deputy Secretary of Defense
DIME	diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authority
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DOS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
DSB	Defense Science Board
DSPD	defense support to public diplomacy
EW	electronic warfare
GEN	General
GOI	Government of Iraq
GS	general service
HN	host nation
HQ	headquarters
ICCT	Interagency Crisis Communication Team
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IO	information operations
IOWG	information operations working group
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
J-33	current operations cell in the J-3
J-35	current plans cell in the J-3
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
J-55	future plans cell in the J-5
J-7	operational plans and interoperability directorate of a joint staff
JFC	joint force commander

JIC	joint integrating concept
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JP	joint publication
JPASE	Joint Public Affairs Support Element
JS	Joint Staff
JTF	joint task force
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
JWFC	Joint Warfighting Center (USJFCOM)
LTG	Lieutenant General
LOO	line of operations
MG	Major General
MILDEC	military deception
MNC-I	Multinational Corps - Iraq
MNF-I	Multinational Force - Iraq
MOC	media operations center
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NSC	National Security Council
OODA	observe, orient, decide, act
OPLAN	operation plan
OPR	office of primary responsibility
OPSEC	operations security
ORSA	operational research and systems analysis
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PCC	policy coordination committee
PD	public diplomacy
PMESII	political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information
POLAD	political advisor
PSYOP	psychological operations
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RFC	revision final coordination
RRU	Rapid Response Unit
SC	strategic communication
SCB	strategic communication board
SCIG	Strategic Communication Integration Group
SCWG	strategic communication working group
SecDef	Secretary of Defense

SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SES	senior executive service
SOTF	special operations task force
TSC	theater security cooperation
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USG	United States Government
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
WG	working group

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

area of responsibility. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called **AOR**. (JP 3-0)

center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called **COG**. (JP 3-0)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called **CA**. (JP 3-57)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 5-0)

computer network operations. Comprised of computer network attack, computer network defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling operations. Also called **CNO**. (JP 3-13)

defense support to public diplomacy. Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the United States Government. Also called **DSPD**. (JP 3-13)

electronic warfare. Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic warfare consists of three divisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. Also called **EW**. (JP 3-13.1)

end state. The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (JP 3-0)

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called **IO**. (JP 3-13)

instruments of national power. All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military. (JP 1)

intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional,

or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called **IGO**. (JP 3-08)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 3-0)

joint planning group. A planning organization consisting of designated representatives of the joint force HQ principal and special staff sections, joint force components (Service and/or functional), and other supporting organizations or agencies as deemed necessary by the joint force commander. Also called **JPG**. (JP 5-0)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called **JTF**. (JP 1)

major operation. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation. (JP 3-0)

measure of effectiveness. A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called **MOE**. (JP 3-0)

measure of performance. A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called **MOP**. (JP 3-0)

military deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Also called **MILDEC**. (JP 3-13.4)

military diplomacy. The ability to support those activities and measures US military leaders take to engage military, defense and government officials of another country to communicate USG policies and messages and build defense and coalition relationships. (CJCSM 3122.03C, *Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning Formats*, 17 August 2007)

nongovernmental organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called **NGO**. (JP 3-08)

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called **OPSEC**. (JP 3-13.3)

other government agency. Within the context of interagency coordination, a non Department of Defense agency of the United States Government. Also called **OGA**. (JP 1)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **PSYOP**. (JP 3-53)

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called **PA**. (JP 3-61)

rules for the use of force. Directives issued to guide United States forces on the use of force during various operations. These directives may take the form of execute orders, deployment orders, memoranda of agreement, or plans. Also called **RUF**. (JP 3-28)

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called **ROE**. (JP 1-02)

strategic communication. Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 5-0)

“Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks-political, economic, social, and military-to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power, 4GW makes use of society’s networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of the enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy’s political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy-measured in decades rather than months or years.”

*Col Thomas X. Hammes,
“The Sling and the Stone”*



Developed by the Doctrine and Education Group
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United States Joint Forces Command
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