

Integrated Coercive and the Role of the



AV-8B launching from USS *Kearsarge* in the Persian Gulf

USS *Kearsarge* (Finley Williams)



F-15E banking after strafing target, Exercise *Excalibur*

48th Communications Squadron (Jessica Struble)

By MERRICK E. KRAUSE

In the late 19th century, Hans Delbrück described war in terms of annihilation and exhaustion.¹ A century later, after the advent of airplanes, access to space, computers, nuclear weapons, computers, and the information revolution, strategists introduced a new paradigm, *effects-based operations*. This concept suggests a new national objective: control of an enemy. *Control* is a contemporary, efficient, and humane goal. It stands in stark contrast to the traditional and perhaps dogmatic military objectives of annihilating an enemy's army or engaging in costly wars of attrition.²

Given the current constrained fiscal environment and limited goals as features of the most likely future conflict scenarios, this article provides a simple conceptual lens through which to plan or analyze coercive operations. Keeping the objective of control in mind, it asserts that the military instru-

ment, and particularly joint aerospace power, is a vital tool for coercing enemy decision-makers. Then it proposes a simple model that leaders and strategists might consider when planning coercive campaigns. This treatment is not a debate over decisiveness or Service roles and missions.

If one accepts Carl von Clausewitz's idea that war is politics, then political realities must bound the use of force. So, assuming that the United States will be forced into conflicts in coming years, the most likely disputes will be characterized by limited means and ends. Today, the air component—joint and coalition aerospace power—often provides lower-cost and lower-risk coercive action.

Difficult strategic situations require decisionmakers to use limited means to change an adversary's behavior. It is not hyperbole to state that the use of *limited*

military force is deep-seated in contemporary American culture. Embedded reporters in Iraq and the administration's measured response after the 9/11 terrorist attacks provide compelling evidence.

The United States did not rush headlong into battle. Military and civilian leaders alike attempted to limit direct and unintended negative impact on innocents while destroying regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. The targets were the enemy government's pillars of power, not the populace. Wholesale destruction of civil infrastructure and wanton killing of innocent civilians were avoided through careful planning, adaptive training, and precise execution. U.S.-led coalitions thus toppled two hostile rogue regimes in 2 years; then, in a uniquely American way of leading war, vast amounts of humanitarian support were provided to the people while military operations were engaged against terrorists, enemy combatants, and rogue regime leaders, often simultaneously.

Colonel Merrick E. Krause, USAF, is Editor of *Joint Force Quarterly* and Director of National Defense University Press.

Strategies Air Component



AH-64 providing close air support,
Operation Enduring Freedom

1st Combat Camera Squadron (Aaron Allmon)



FA-18s and F-14 in
combat mission over Iraq

125th Fighter Wing (Lee O. Tucker)

▲ Download all 4 photos as wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu.

This emphasis on exhaustive analysis, careful planning, and limited force is a result of tradition, American values, alliances, cooperative security responsibilities, globalization, politics, and the complexity of the current strategic environment. Fortunately, technology enables more discriminating combat power for those willing to invest in it. Regardless of technical marvels and super-power status, however, today's enemies seek nothing short of the destruction of the Western way of life—a critical planning factor when comparing will and popular support and considering useful potential strategies against enemies.

Although the stakes are high, Americans prefer limited means to achieve carefully selected objectives. However, a limited war for the United States may be a total war for an adversary. Since contemporary enemies, terrorists, and the states that support them are not constrained by concern for human life and civil rights, strikes against any American interest or ally are possible. Extremists and rogue state supporters encourage attacks

against innocents in an age of rapid communication, travel, and proliferation of advanced weapons technology. A fanatical disregard for the safety of their followers or compatriots and a desire to kill innocents make today's terrorists and rogue leaders dangerous and difficult to thwart.

For American leaders and commanders, balancing risk with national interests, international political concerns, media, and

leaders attempted to limit direct and unintended negative impact on innocents while destroying regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq

other factors is ultimately trumped by the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and the real potential for rapid escalation of a regional conflict. Depending on the situation and specific national interests threatened, a tailored application of limited force can contribute to efforts to coerce an adversary while actually reducing the potential for escalation.³ In sum, a limited conflict can be a high-stakes contest because of the realities of modern global politics, economics, and

power—hence the need to orchestrate the instruments of national power.

Instruments of Power Bound

Many senior U.S. Government and military leaders recognize that coercion will be achieved more effectively by coordinating a variety of instruments of national power. Each case is different, but contemporary international confrontations, at least on the

Western side, are unfailingly bounded by political restraints, both domestic and coalition. Military strategies must therefore consider a variety of political factors

to avoid international condemnation or long-term diplomatic and economic repercussions while recognizing the necessity to protect U.S. vital interests. The bounds of current political acceptability and American ethics are necessary elements of any responsible discussion of the limited employment of U.S. power.

Political boundaries limiting military options are not new. Hans Delbrück, a student of Clausewitz, noted this idea a



U.S. Air Force (Gregg L. Davis)

century ago: “After a careful consideration of all circumstances—the aim of the war, the combat forces, the political repercussions, the individuality of the enemy commander, and of the government and people of the enemy, as well as his own—the general must decide whether a battle is advisable or not.”⁴

Thus, when a U.S. leader elects to employ military force to support national interests, in concert with other instruments of power, wide-ranging approaches exist to change an adversary’s behavior.⁵ Among them are many combinations of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic responses. The coercive methodology depends on the desired endstate and, more immediately, near-term objectives. Furthermore, the international environment shapes American responses and the weight of the emphasis of each instrument of power.

American leaders prefer to operate under the auspices of the United Nations or a coalition to effect changes in the behavior of adversaries. Operating within the bounds of coalition and international politics provides legitimacy for decisions and increases domestic and international support. This inoculation may inhibit some short-term objectives, but coalition-building generally favors a sustainable long-term strategy by garnering popular support and educating the public to the risks of inaction.

Working in a coalition environment, when moving from the political, diplomatic, economic, and informational realms to the military instrument, low-risk and low-cost options are particularly important to maintain cohesion and avoid rapid, divisive escalation to large-scale war. This is why aerospace power force projection options, such as precision strike and bombardment (but not

the key to an effective operational strategy is understanding the mechanisms that effect desired behavior

excluding supply and humanitarian assistance), are so attractive to leaders as relatively low-risk, low-cost military actions—they are akin to dipping a toe into a shark tank. The key to an effective operational strategy, then, is understanding the mechanisms that effect desired behavior, tempered with the knowledge that war is not surgery and 500-pound bombs are not scalpels.

Two Mechanisms

Reducing coercion through force to its essence, the military instrument brings about change in an adversary or its leaders’ behavior—*control* in the new parlance—through two fundamental mechanisms: *fear* and *loss*. Since the first acknowledged offensive force arrives by air (even if that airpower is transported by sea), and airpower itself is particu-

larly useful for destroying objects to produce desired effects, it is likely that use of joint or coalition aerospace power would produce a materiel loss for an enemy. This loss could include eliminating individuals in leadership command positions, as well as destroying fielded or garrisoned military forces and, in some cases, civil or military infrastructure.

Aerospace power is emphasized in this treatment because the range, speed, surprise, and power of weapons used in that medium enable them to attack directly and affect an adversary’s pillars of power with incredible accuracy and at relatively low military and political risk. For example, what is commonly considered the opening shot of Operation *Iraqi Freedom* was an airstrike in Baghdad against a leadership target. It was at least partly successful even though the battle damage estimate was inconclusive. This same airstrike, however, also served to cause confusion and fear in the minds of the leaders, reducing their grip on power—a difficult effect to measure but one that was nevertheless observable. The reduction in Iraqi command, control, and communications capabilities certainly contributed to the rapid dissolution of the military.

Military force, aerospace power in particular, is well suited to cause the adversary to react with fear. Initially, it is fear of an attack, whether a preemptive strike or a response to provocation. Then the fear changes to a dread of further actions. Both mechanisms are inexorably linked. As Clausewitz said, “The effects of physical and psychological factors form an organic whole . . . in formulating any rule concerning physical factors, the theorist must bear in mind the part that moral [morale] factors may play in it.”⁶

The modern U.S. interpretation of the fear mechanism does not imply terrorizing the populace or collapsing a country’s civil infrastructure. Fear in this context functions in the minds of the enemy leadership, and it influences their decisionmaking process and behavior. Those who resist using the fear mechanism fail to understand modern American employment. They rely on the tired canard, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” a vacuous retort arguing for moral relativism. Terrorizing civilians is unacceptable in the contemporary American psyche and in the coalition against terror, while creating fear and uncertainty in



Marine during battle damage assessment mission in Fallujah

3rd Marine Air Wing (Richard A. Hilaro)

the minds of enemy leaders is acceptable. The fear mechanism, then, necessarily focuses on influencing adversary leaders, not crushing or exploiting an already oppressed and presumably powerless civilian populace.

The enabler of this stratagem is technology, a distinct asymmetric American advantage. Technology permits joint and coalition aerospace power to provide pinpoint accuracy only dreamed of in the 1930s, when the Army Air Corps hotly debated strategic bombardment and industrial web theory. America and its allies have since modernized their practices to exploit new capabilities and, as a result, saturation bombing and fire bombing of cities are not required or desired to achieve necessary effects. As a result, U.S. policy can emphasize avoiding civilian and unnecessary military casualties on both sides. This desire to minimize death and widespread destruction may result in increased risk to American military personnel and limit the ability to achieve desired objectives. Thus, the mechanism of fear is not terrorism; there is no intent to attack innocents (unlike the aims of such groups as al Qaeda) but instead a deliberate attempt to reduce national disruption through influencing adversary leaders.

The Mechanism of Loss. The most basic and obvious coercive mechanism, *loss* is

the attrition or depletion of a commodity or item that is valuable to the enemy. This deprivation is typically quantifiable, and measures of merit or effectiveness are often straightforward. Some call a strategy emphasizing this mechanism *denial*.⁷ Others speak in terms of counterforce or countervalue targeting, depending on the goal.⁸ Simple attrition may also be part of a strategy emphasizing punishment, or military destruction intended to send a message of resolve, or even actions to encourage civilian disaffection, revolution, or a coup. Loss is not viable as a stand-alone strategy under the modern U.S. construct that promotes life and liberty; it simply describes a mechanism that creates desired effects and changes in adversary behavior that lead to achieving specific objectives under a more comprehensive national strategy.⁹

Regardless of the moniker and the specific targets chosen, the desired effect of a strategy emphasizing loss is reducing, depleting, or wearing down something the enemy leadership values.¹⁰ Furthermore, adversaries' susceptibility to coercion through attrition using aerospace power depends on their desire to retain their troops, materiel, wealth,

or defensive position. In a democracy, it also depends on the will of the people and civilian leaders.

For example, since Operation *Deliberate Force* in Bosnia in 1995, some state and nonstate adversaries have used human shields (innocents or prisoners held as hostages to deter U.S. military action). This strategy specifically targets a perceived American weakness: valuing human life. In these cases, aerial bombardment may be physically possible but not politically or ethically viable, so another instrument may be more useful. Also, nonlethal or indirect options may be available to cause politically acceptable attrition, though international law prohibits some modern nonlethal technologies.

Loss may also directly affect an adversary's military or economic capability, removing an enemy leader's options by reducing his military power, wealth, or influence. However, it is critical to determine if the enemy is vulnerable to the politically acceptable and legally supported use of aerospace power. Therefore, intelligence and diplomatic efforts are essential to make an ultimatum or conditions clear to the adversary while permitting a response tailored to compel the outcome with minimal cost, effort, and loss of life.


The need to minimize civilian casualties, collateral damage, and negative political consequences may inhibit the ability to coerce or use airborne weapons.¹¹ Bombing is of limited use if civilians are at risk or the targets are located where unacceptable collateral damage would be unavoidable.

In cases where the loss of life would be minimal, or the interest is particularly vital, air attacks can prove effective.

In scenarios short of an unlimited war for national survival, the mechanism of loss has a practical need to focus primarily on destroying enemy forces and military targets. Infrastructure and leadership targets may be acceptable to attack if the political climate allows. Yet enemies who possess fanatical ideologies or who, in their calculus, have no acceptable options may not be susceptible to coercion by loss. They may fight to the death. To avoid this endgame, Sun Tzu recommended leaving a bridge behind an enemy. Ultimately, however, attrition produces strategic effects by force and results in

aerial bombardment may be physically possible but not politically or ethically viable

Spectrum of Choices for Aerospace Power Application



and psychological, a strategist might exploit the enemy leaders' fears to coerce them. Furthermore, if what they value is vulnerable to a politically acceptable attack by air forces, then relatively low-risk coercion by aerospace power may be possible.

Strategy and Targets

The loss and fear mechanisms are not discrete; they overlap and synergistically contribute to a coercive strategy. A commander manipulates these mechanisms, under the auspices of a strategy designed to achieve specific effects, by targeting enemy (and *axis*—entities supporting the enemy) assets and capabilities intended to create an environment favorable for coercion. Informed and careful selection of targets for kinetic and nonkinetic attack will be more likely to lead to the achievement of desired effects at acceptable costs than wanton destruction or annihilation of convenient, or all, enemy forces.

When considering how to achieve desired effects, it is important to recognize that attacking/influencing certain targets can produce unintended consequences, and some targets or methods of attack are physically possible but fall beyond the realm of current political mores. Indeed, the essence of effects-based operations is to determine desired effects and select the best ways to produce them under the given national

Delbrück's exhaustion of an enemy's ability to fight effectively. The cost, however, may be too high for modern Western sensibilities in most likely conflicts.

The Mechanism of Fear (Morale or Will). Realists anticipate that enemies use a cost-benefit analysis. Adversaries believe they can benefit from war or they would not fight. A calculus may appear obscure to a Western observer but seem perfectly logical to a fanatical adversary, based on culture, extremist values, brainwashing, indoctrination, or a unique situation. Intelligence tempered with sensitivity to cultural differences is imperative during an analysis of intentions and motivations. Though fear is difficult to quantify, a qualitative analysis (incorporating bounded rationality, game theory, or prospect theory) can produce insights into the decisionmaking process. The mechanism that deters aggression is *fear*—of material loss, death, or loss of power. This mechanism can also help restrain escalation if deterrence proves ineffective.

Destruction of different or fewer targets may be required to affect the fear mechanism rather than to affect the loss mechanism through direct attrition. Moreover, it is more economical than exhausting an enemy's military before one's own forces or political will are spent. For example, destroying a country's principal port and all the ships in it

is attrition. But if that country values the port greatly, attacking selected port targets while threatening its long-term viability through diplomacy, psychological operations, and demonstrated military capability could be more efficient in the long term than destroying the entire facility and then rebuilding it.¹²

unlike assassination, a politically acceptable option may be attacking enemy command and control nodes

For the adversary, this decision leverages the fear of future loss.

Conversely, attacking fielded forces might be simple attrition. But destroying a leader's elite personal guard is a selective, deliberate elimination of a valued military unit that reduces the adversary's power beyond a statistical casualty count. Psychological and information operations can build a synergy in these situations. This targeting strategy may effectively leverage the mechanism of fear in regard to the leaders' or the remaining fielded forces. It is therefore a more indirect coercive mechanism than loss.

To use the mechanism of fear, the strategist must understand what adversary leaders value *and* fear. Strategists gain this information through intelligence, analysis, and non-ethnocentric role-playing (wargaming or red-teaming). By deducing an adversary's vulnerabilities, both physical


policy and strategy. Considering where the planned conflict sits in relation to other actions is a useful exercise for leaders, planners, and strategists to bound the possible with the approvable or likely.

Relationship of Fear and Loss Mechanisms

Threatening or attempting to kill an enemy leader affects the fear mechanism directly (figure, point A).¹³ It is not the killing itself but the fear of death that may produce a coercive effect. If an enemy leader is killed, the replacement knows his potential fate if he remains recalcitrant. If the leader is not killed, fear still increases the security demands of the adversary leaders and complicates or disrupts their decisionmaking process.

Such a direct approach, however, typically is not politically possible under the current policy and U.S. force employment

B-2 operating in the USPACOM area of responsibility



36th Communications Squadron (Cecilio Ricardo)

▲ [Download as wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu.](http://ndupress.ndu.edu)

paradigm. Attacking a militarily significant target that threatens a leader's life directly carries an implied message. Yet it might also eliminate the leader himself and hasten a new strategic situation. For example, unlike assassination, a politically acceptable option may be attacking enemy command and control nodes, such as command bunkers in presidential palaces or a terrorist camp headquarters (figure, point B). The effect of disruption is manifest, and a lucky strike may end the conflict. But a systemic collapse requires early consideration and preparation, as do branches caused by unintended consequences, such as reported or actual civilian collateral damage.

A nuclear strike against fielded forces intended to destroy an adversary's military capability and resistance is an extreme example of exploiting the loss mechanism (figure, point C). A brute force strategy this drastic is currently not a politically feasible or desirable use of American power in any but the most profound circumstances.

Conventional weapons, delivered in large quantities with tremendous accuracy,

can cause significant material attrition as well as psychological effects against the adversary leadership and fielded forces alike. Extensive battlefield preparation with heavy bombers is politically acceptable and can be devastating physically and against enemy morale, as evidenced by Operations *Desert Storm* in 1991 and *Enduring Freedom* in 2001 and 2002 (figure, point D).

If planned well, a strategy balancing the two mechanisms can generate the commander's desired effects. Both the fear and loss mechanisms are affected when a strategy calls for attacks against targets in this overlapping region, though the strategy remains bounded by shifting political restraints (figure, point E). Retaliatory aerial attacks during the 1996 *Desert Strike* operation against Iraq serve as an example where loss through bombing was intended, as was the fear of future loss of a valuable resource. In this case, surface-to-air missiles were the valued commodity. Moreover, a fear of further strikes (and the resultant potential for future attrition) was intended to inhibit aggression. The 1998

Desert Fox operation degraded Iraq's capability to threaten its neighbors while simultaneously sending a message of resolve. Neither of these actions was a stunning success, but the extended air campaign over Serbia in 1999, Operation *Allied Force*, ended more conclusively. In this operation, coalition aerospace power reduced enemy military capability through attrition, forced dispersion, and eroded the will of adversary leaders enough to force capitulation before invasion became necessary.

In late 2001, Operation *Enduring Freedom* demonstrated the employment possibilities of a new variety of aerospace and special operations forces (SOF) partnering. This included heavy payload B-1 and B-52 bombers delivering huge amounts of ordnance against Taliban fielded forces. Smaller payload joint surface attack and fighter aircraft, often with the assistance of SOF ground troops, selectively reduced capabilities, particularly in populated or urban areas (figure, point F).¹⁴ This was attrition through ground-assisted aerial bombard-

ment, and here the fear component was used both to influence the enemy directly and to deter other governments from harboring and supporting terrorists through the psychological impact of near-real-time television and graphic images of coalition successes.

However, concomitantly with the application of destructive force, the coalition used nonkinetic aerospace power effectively. This included psychological operations, continual surveillance, communications, and

aerospace power, other escalating military options, and other instruments of national power must be coordinated to remain digestible to domestic and international audiences

navigation, and distribution of humanitarian aid. These noncombat functions demonstrated that bombardment was coordinated to an unprecedented extent not only with SOF but also with other instruments of national power.

Operation *Iraqi Freedom* blurred the traditional phasing of a conventional, limited war: an extended air campaign, offers for diplomatic recourse, refusal, a land campaign, then a period of stability under arms. Mere hours before the ground assault from the south, a precision weapon airstrike attacked a command and control target in Baghdad. Whether intended as a decapitation or attrition strike against principal enemy decisionmakers by the coalition, it sent a message exercising their fear component. Although aerial bombardment did not kill the Iraqi dictator—the central command and control hub—he was rapidly rendered ineffective. That disruption was apparent days later when Baghdad fell. Striking fleeting targets with precision weapons was a demonstrated capability. Once the *Iraqi Freedom* ground thrust began from the south, commanders were largely successful in integrating land, sea, and air components on an unprecedented scale (figure, point H). Other simultaneous countrywide operations were synchronized with the southern push, including joint air attacks supported by joint special forces in western Iraq and an extraordinary airdrop of infantry forces in northern Iraq.

Strategists may choose to attack certain targets primarily to create fear and others to destroy materiel, devices, or troops to reduce an adversary's military capability. Targets produce loss and fear in different propor-

tions, depending on the circumstance and the adversary's value system. The selection of any strategic target, however, remains bounded by political constraints and the desired endstate. Moreover, some adversaries will be more susceptible to one coercive mechanism than another. The specific targets identified to affect that mechanism depend on the adversary's governing system, leadership, and other contextual factors. The strategic art resides in determining how to effect change

through manipulating all the instruments of national power and the enemy's vulnerabilities to them.

Tailored Strategy Basics

When planning or evaluating a coercive strategy as a whole, it is important to remember the enemy's perspective, avoid mirror-imaging, and wargame the plan, considering moves from friendly, enemy, and interested third-party perspectives. Fundamentally, a successful coercive strategy must follow a careful analysis to determine if what the adversary possesses is vulnerable to attack before deciding the means or medium. Identified effects, and then targets (or target sets), must be established that would exploit the coercive effects in the given situation.

Once the adversary's values become evident, strategists should target or threaten selected, politically permissible items to maximize the effects of limited allied resources. However, for the best long-term solution, military force must be part of a coherent strategy, usually in concert with diplomatic actions, a strong economy, and a well-coordinated information campaign. The threat of friendly casualties and international law may limit the strategy and reduce acceptable target sets. In cases where threats or threatening attacks will not work, where "sending a message" is judged to be ineffective, attacks emphasizing attrition may produce coercive effects, but at more cost in political capital and national fortune.


The willingness of the United States to accept casualties varies with the interests and principles involved.¹⁵ Targeting thus varies with the situation, acceptable risk, and sus-

tainable expense. For example, some believed that the Kosovo air campaign, *Allied Force*, would last just 3 days—though airpower planners were dubious. As days turned into weeks, reality forced reassessment, and the strategy necessarily shifted. The use of regular North Atlantic Treaty Organization ground forces, previously taken off the table, had to be reconsidered, though it was ultimately not necessary. *Iraqi Freedom*, on the other hand, shows that the United States can still accept casualties for an extended period when the populace deems the objective valuable.

Pervasive media and an around-the-clock news cycle, international law, and the values of American citizens—casualty-sensitive if not casualty-adverse—influence both the desired outcome and the mechanism decisionmakers choose to exploit. Therefore, the outcome and intermediate objectives must all be obtainable and legitimate. The mechanisms must be tailored to affect the adversary in ways that are least costly and most beneficial to the coalition. The effects must directly relate to the targets chosen and should always relate to the strategy employed and the desired endstate. The synergistic effects of aerospace power, other escalating military options, and integration with other instruments of national power must be skillfully coordinated to remain palatable to domestic and international audiences.

When contemplating force in a coercive strategy and considering options led by the air component, leaders and commanders must ask if aerospace power is the right tool. Analysis may indicate that the application of a tailored aerospace power strategy, when coordinated with other instruments, can result in the change of the adversary's behavior. However, an analysis may also conclude that aerospace power, particularly aerial bombardment, is the wrong tool to effect a change; therefore, alternative strategies are needed. The endstate, mechanisms, and both domestic and international political considerations are important topics to evaluate in order to avoid using the wrong means to achieve coercive ends. Even if aerospace power is not the most effective tool for a given situation, its limited footprint and risk make it tempting. And as technology improves, and when America's joint air component has a large uninhabited aerial vehicle element, leaders will be even more attracted to the perceived lower risk and cost option.

Combat air controller calling in airstrike in Fallujah, Operation Iraqi Freedom



982 Signal Company (Charles B. Johnson)

Value of the Fear-and-Loss Model

The value of considering fear and loss is that the model gives strategists and decisionmakers an uncomplicated lens through which to evaluate a variety of stratagems. A strategy leveraging the mechanisms of loss and fear promotes selectively targeting what an adversary values to achieve limited political ends. Loss and fear do not replace effects-based operations. Rather, the simple mechanisms of this model help frame what effects are likely and useful in the given strategic environment.

Integrating aerospace power in a comprehensive and synergistic coercion strategy involving other nations and instruments of national power is tempting, which is why leaders have relied on the air component to lead most post-Cold War conflicts. A final caution, however, is that predictability is a real risk. Until the ground assault in Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, conventional wisdom—including international conventional wisdom, to the degree that such a thing exists—assumed aerial bombardment was the most likely first U.S. reaction to provocation. Therefore, responding with joint aerospace power must involve close integration of other instruments of national power to increase useful synergy and reduce predictability.

Indeed, the art (the “genius” in Clausewitzian terms) required to succeed with a coercive strategy lies in the leaders’ ability to assess how, when, and where to exert pressure to achieve desired ends. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ Gordon A. Craig, “Delbrück: The Military Historian,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 341–342. Delbrück used the terms *Niederwerfungsstrategie* (the strategy of annihilation) and *Ermattungsstrategie* (the strategy of exhaustion), which he also called the two-pole strategy.

² David A. Deptula, *Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare* (Arlington, VA: Aerospace Education Foundation), 11–18.

³ Author interview with Elaine Bunn, distinguished research fellow, Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, October 19, 2001.

⁴ Craig, 342.

⁵ Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, *From Lexington to Desert Storm* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 13–14. Drew and Snow note that the United States needs objectives that are simple, morally or politically lofty, and vital to national interests.

⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 184.

⁷ Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 316. See Charles L. Glaser, “Why Do Strategists Disagree about the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence?” in *Nuclear Arguments*, ed. Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 109–171, for more on counterforce and countervalue terminology, and the effects of targeting what an enemy values.

⁸ Jesse James and Matt Martin, “Chapter 5: Recommendations on Specific Nuclear Policy Issues,” in *Beyond Deterrence: A Global Approach to Reducing Nuclear Dangers* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, July 2001), available at <<http://www.stimson.org/n2d2/?sn=n22001110726>>. This report presents a concise summary of the presented terms:

U.S. targeting strategy is based on counterforce and countervalue. Under a counterforce strategy military assets of a hostile state, both conventional and nuclear, are held at risk. A key component in the way we practiced nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, this strategy requires many weapons. A countervalue strategy holds populations, major industry, and leadership of a hostile state at risk. It requires fewer weapons than counterforce.

⁹ Rick Rowlett, “An Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations—Where Are We Now?” *A Common Perspective* 13, no. 2 (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, October 2005), 9.

¹⁰ See Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 70–71, for more on brute force, coercion, and compellence.

¹¹ Stephen T. Hosmer, *Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars 1941–1991* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), xix–xx.

¹² Schelling, 3, calls this process “latent violence.” Not simply the brute force destruction of a country, but the “threat of damage, or of more damage to come.”

¹³ I am not advocating assassination. Attacking command and control targets, including leadership targets, may be permissible depending upon the circumstances in a conflict.

¹⁴ Heavy bomber, B-1, B-2, or B-52, bombing attacks used dozens of 500- or 2,000-pound bombs dropped in a line over several hundred yards. This example is in contrast to the many precision bomb attacks made by smaller fighter-bombers, which typically carry a load of 2 to 12 bombs.

¹⁵ Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 50.