A Consequentialist Argument against Torture
Interrogation of Terrorists
Jean Maria Arrigo, Ph.D.
Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics
Abstract
Much support for torture interrogation of
terrorists has emerged in the public forum, largely based on the “ticking bomb”
scenario. I draw from the historical
record, criminology, organizational theory, social psychology, and interviews
with military professionals to envisage an official program of torture
interrogation. The quintessential
element of program design is a sound causal model relating input to
output. I explore three, increasingly
realistic models of how torture interrogation leads to truth: the animal
instinct model, the cognitive failure model, and the data processing
model. These models expose the rational,
mid-level social processes that lead from an official program of torture
interrogation to breakdowns in key institutions—health care, biomedical
research, police, judiciary, military, and government. Stated most starkly, the damaging social
consequences of a program of torture interrogation evolve from institutional
dynamics that are independent of the original moral rationale. Further, a legal, regulated program cannot
eliminate use of rogue torture interrogation services, because they still serve
to circumvent moral and procedural constraints on the official program.
In my view, it remains for
consequentialist advocates of a
Introduction
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks
on the
Ethicist John Rawls proposed that
consequentialist moral argument for a program of action should include assessment of the practices required
to implement that program. For with
careful attention to implementation, there is less danger of adopting means
that do not actually reach the desired ends.[5] As a social psychologist, this is the course
I pursue. I pass over foundational
issues, such as the definition of “torture” and the morality of torture per
se. I do not reach as far as state-level
issues, such as international covenants
banning torture. Rather, I draw from
criminology, organizational theory, the historical record, and my own
interviews to explore the design, implementation, and consequences of such a
program. This strategy makes visible the
mid-level social processes that lead from an official program of torture
interrogation to serious dysfunctions in major institutions—health care and
biomedical research, police and the judiciary, and the military and government.
Policy studies demonstrate that the
quintessential element of program design and implementation is a sound causal
model relating input to output.[6] Can we send only key terrorists into the
torture chamber and produce at the other end only knowledge of terrorist plans
and harmless prisoners? For orderliness
of exposition, I present three, increasingly realistic models of how torture
interrogation leads to truth: (I) the animal instinct model, (II) the cognitive
failure model, and (III) the data processing model. The inadequacies of each model lead on to the
next, with increasing involvement and compromise of key social
institutions—that is to say, with
unintended inputs and unintended outputs of great consequence. To these causal models, I append (IV) the
rogue models of outsourcing torture interrogation to foreign or illegal
information services, without regard for causal explanation.
In outline:
Practical
Mid-Level Considerations for
Programs
of Torture Interrogation of Terrorist Suspects
|
Causal Models of How Torture Leads to Truth 1. Animal
Instinct Model In order to escape
pain or death, the subject complies with the demands of the torturer. The model fails when (a) physiological
damage impairs ability to convey the truth and (b) torturers cannot control
subjects’ interpretation of pain. |
Prototypical Interrogation Scenarios 1. "Ticking bomb" Subjects
divulge their plans under sufficient torture. |
Special Institutional Requirements 1. Assistance
of medical practitioners, before, during, and after torture sessions. |
|
2. Cognitive Failure Model he
physiological and psycho-logical stress of torture renders the subject
mentally incompetent to muster deception or to maintain his own
interpretations of pain. The model
fails due to (a) time delays and (b) torturers’ inability to distin-guish
truth from deceit or delirium. |
2. Fanatics, Martyrs, and Heroes Subjects are
resistant to coercion by means of pain or threat. |
2A. Biomedical and psychological research
into methods, detection, and concealment of torture. 2B. Establishment of a torture interrogation
unit, with training of torturers in sophisticated methods. |
|
3. Data Processing Model Torture
provokes ordinary subjects to yield data (both true and false) on an opportunistic
basis, for comprehensive analysis across subjects. The model fails when (a) analysts are
overwhelmed by data and (b) torture motivates many new terrorists. |
3. Dragnet Interrogations Numerous
weaker or less committed terrorists, associates, and innocents are detained
and interrogated. |
3A.
Coordination of torture agencies with the police. 3B. Coordination of of torture agencies with
the judiciary. 3C. Accommodation of torture units within the
military and the government. |
|
Non-Causal Models of How Torture Leads to
Truth 4. Rogue
Models Torture is
emotionally, culturally, or historically inseparable from other methods, or
it is one tactic among many in a hit-or-miss approach. The model fails when
(a) biases and ulterior motives of torturers invalidate results or (b)
torture tactics empower competing political or criminal entities. |
Prototypical Interrogation Scenarios 4A. Indiscriminately
Brutal Foreign Intelligence Agencies 4B. Covert
4C. “Information Services” of Organized Crime. |
Special Institutional Requirements 4. Discreet government and military liaisons. |
I. The Animal Instinct Model of Truth Telling
The January 2001 cover of The Atlantic
Monthly asked in large print, "MUST WE TORTURE?" Terrorism analyst Bruce Hoffman from Rand
Corporation suggested we must. He
reported sympathetically on his meeting with a Sri Lankan intelligence officer—"Thomas"—
whose terrorist opposition “eclipse[d] even bin Laden’s al Qaeda in professionalism,
capability, and determination." In
one vignette,[7]
Thomas’s
unit had apprehended three terrorists who, it suspected, had recently planted
somewhere in the city a bomb that was then ticking away, the minutes counting
down to catastrophe.... He asked them
where the bomb was. The
terrorists—highly dedicated and steeled to resist interrogation—remained
silent....So Thomas took his pistol from his gun belt, pointed it at the
forehead of one of them, and shot him dead.
The other two, he said, talked immediately; the bomb, which had been
placed in a crowded railway station and set to explode during the evening rush
hour, was found and defused, and countless lives were saved.
In this compelling ticking-bomb scenario,
terrorists give up their secrets in a timely manner to escape immediate pain or
death, a causal pattern I label the animal instinct model. Ancient Greek courts placed great faith in
testimony obtained through torture of slaves.
As Aristotle explained, free men can reason about the personal
consequences of truth and false testimony, and they will testify, even under
torture, to their long-term advantage; but slaves, deprived of reason, are
compelled by their feelings to meet the torturer’s demands so as to terminate
the pain.[8] Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz adds a
moral element: “...you want to cause the
most excruciating, intense, immediate pain” but “with minimum lethality.”[9]
The animal instinct model requires medical
assistance at the torture site. As
explained by neurologist Lawrence Hinkle, who examined Korean War veterans
after communist "brain-washing":[10]
The human brain, the repository of the
information that the interrogator seeks, functions optimally within the same
narrow range of physical and chemical conditions that limit the functions of
human organs in general.... Any
circumstance that impairs the function of the brain potentially affects the
ability to give information as well as the ability to withhold it.
In
particular, the interrogation fails if the terrorist loses consciousness before
revealing his plans.
Assistance
of Health Professionals in Torture Interrogation
Routine participation of medical personnel
in state-sponsored torture interrogation has been documented worldwide. Medical professionals determine the types of
torture a person can endure, monitor the person for endurance under torture,
resuscitate the person, treat the person to prepare for further torture, and
administer non-therapeutic drugs. To
cover up torture, physicians falsify health certificates, autopsy reports, and
death certificates.[11] Studies of survivors show medical
participation in the range of 20% to 40% of cases, or even "the
majority".[12] Coercive interrogation manuals, such as the
1983 edition of the
To obtain the physicians’ perspective, the
Indian Medical Association surveyed a random sample of 4,000 members.[14] Of the fifth who responded, 58% believed torture
interrogation permissible; 71% had come across a case of probable torture;
18% knew of health professionals who had
participated in torture;16% had witnessed torture themselves; and 10% agreed
that false medical and autopsy reports were sometimes justified.
Government-sponsored torture generates
deep conflicts within medical communities and between governments and their
medical communities. In
Proponents of a
The larger lesson here is that a national
security rationale for torture does not suspend, without tumult and schisms,
the ethics codes of professions whose participation is required. Judging from the experience of other
countries, similar turmoil might be anticipated in clinical psychology, law,
and journalism.[21]
II. The Cognitive Failure Model of Truth Telling
A greater obstacle to torture
interrogation than bodily frailty of the subject is the mental resistance of
fanatics, martyrs, and heroes to coercion.
A former
In 1979 the [TNP] team captured Nalan
Gurtas. She had personally killed 32
Turkish National Police officers.... Trying to obtain intelligence out of one
of the most violent people on earth is a bit of trouble.... She screamed, spat,
kicked, ripped up her holding facility, refused to talk....She tried to cut her
wrists with a plastic knife; she ran full force with her head onto the wall. She threw feces at all of us. Then the word
came down to go to Level 1 [i.e.,
potentially fatal torture]. .... She
stayed silent.... [During transport] she tried to jump from the speeding
vehicle...after laughing she loved shooting police and Americans. She was between the car and the ground when
they fired 32 rounds into her, which was one hell of a hard shot to make.....
Modern psychology maps the intractability
of the psyche. In general, people tend to
react against those who constrain their freedom of action (reactance theory,[23]
for instance, by substituting untraceable acts of sabotage. People tend to become more dogmatic and
tenacious in their belief systems when reminded of their mortality (terror
management theory).[24] And under extreme stress, as during a car
crash, rape, or battlefield injury, people may dissociate, that is, experience
the episode as if from a distance, temporarily protected from pain and
awareness of consequences (traumatic stress theory).[25] For
such reasons, Copher said he tried to interview terrorist suspects
“before any heavy handed ex-Turkish farmer slapped them around.”[26]
Even under the Nazis, torture
interrogation failed to break dozens of high state officials and military
commanders involved in late-war plots to assassinate Hitler. According to Peter Hoffman’s History of the
German Resistance: 1933-1945:[27]
Six
months from the start of their investigations the Gestapo still had nothing
like precise knowledge of the resistance movement.......This lack of
information and knowledge is all the more astounding in that Himmler's men
employed every means to extract confessions....
Moreover all forms of torture were used without hesitation....
Hoffman
attributes the failure of the Gestapo to the “fortitude of their victims.”
Closer to home for Americans, during the
months and years of North Vietnamese torture of American POWs, Commander James
Stockdale estimated that under 5% of his 400 fellow American airmen succumbed
to North Vietnamese demands for anti-American propaganda statements.[28] These
examples expose the bigotry in the expectation that key enemy terrorists will
readily give up their plans and associates under torture.
The animal instinct model ultimately fails
because the physiological experience of pain is mediated by individual and
cultural interpretation. Anthropologists
identify the “punitive pain” envisioned by the torturer as only one of several
competing interpretations. In addition
to the valor of “military pain;” exemplified by Nalan Gurtas, German resistors,
and Stockdale, we recognize the “medical pain” of surgery, the “athletic pain”
of the marathon; and the “sacrificial pain” of martyrs.[29] A psychological study of 79 Palestinians
detained by the Israelis identified seven meanings of their prison abuse, such
as “struggle between strength and weakness” of character; “heroic fulfillment”
of their role as liberators of their people; a “developmental task;” and
“return to religion.” [30]
In the cognitive failure model of truth
telling, torture renders the subject cognitively incapable of maintaining his
or her own interpretation of pain. As
understood by contemporary criminal psychology, overwhelming physical and mental
stress create a state of disorientation in which the subject is unable to
maintain a position of self-interest and becomes suggestible or compliant under
interrogation.[31]
Similarly, in the 15th to 18th Centuries, European courts employed juridical
torture in the belief that bodily suffering eliminates self-will, which
accorded with Catholic asceticism.
Absent self-will, the accused was presumed to expose the truth in
involuntary testimony or nonverbal signs.[32]
In contrast to the resistance of
Stockwell’s airmen to North Vietnamese tortures, only 5% of the repatriated
American POWs held by the Chinese in the
Korean War decisively resisted the cognitive disorientation—and reorientation—
tactics of the Chinese; 15% “participated” to the extent they were court-martialed
or dishonorably discharged. The
“brain-washing” regimen of the chinese included solitary confinement, lack of
stimulus, unremitting observation by guards, sleep deprivation, ridicule,
pressure to confess to unstated crimes, and interminable instruction in Marxism
and Maoism, as well as deprivations and threats. “Physical abuse and mistreatment were
frequently the results of resistance, but seldom the prelude to participation,”
“with only 3% of the “Participators” severely mistreated.[33] Here I pass over a considerable literature
pointing to the greater efficacy of noncoercive interrogation based on social
skills: subtlety and finesse of interrogation,[34]
sympathy with the subject,[35]
appeal to the subject’s self interest,[36]
and outright deceit and trickery.[37]
The cognitive failure model demands
cutting edge biomedical research into techniques of torture, to stay ahead of
savvy terrorist organizations, and research into concealment and detection of
torture, to stay ahead of human rights monitors. Further, it demands a corps of trained torturers
to apply the precision torture technology.
I explore these two institutional requirements next.
Biomedical
Research for Torture Interrogation
Twentieth Century researchers developed
numerous techniques to induce disorientation:
psychiatric-pharmacological substances, electroshock, electromagnetic
resonance, and others.[38] But
how could torture-interrogation research proceed in the
Consider a Cold War strategy for a program
of similarly stigmatized research, the CIA's mind control Project MKULTRA. A 1977 Senate investigation into CIA research
on human subjects disclosed that the CIA had simply contracted with researchers at over 80 universities,
hospitals, chemical and pharmaceutical companies, and research institutes
through a front funding agency. The
Human Ecology Society, as it was called, was co-founded by the neurologist
Hinkle who had examined the POWs “brainwashed” in Korea.[39] One MKULTRA subproject sought
"[s]ubstances which will enhance the ability of individuals to withstand
privation, torture and coercion during interrogation...." Another called for three research teams to
compare various combinations of "straight interrogation, hypnosis, and
drugs on subjects who had denied allegations known to be true." Admiral Stansfield Turner, then Director of
Central Intelligence, stated: “I believe we all owe a moral obligation to these
researchers and institutions to protect them from any unjustified embarrassment
or damage to their reputations which revelations of their identities might
bring.[40] The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
identities should not be revealed for security reasons.[41] The CIA research strategy therefore remained
viable.
The "war on terrorism" has
produced a related research strategy.
The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) hosted an
invitation-only conference on March 11-13, 2002, called "Scientists
Helping America." his According to a widely broadcast DARPA call for
submissions, "The primary focus of the conference is to tap into new ideas
of scientists and inventors...."
"Luminaries" from
industry and academia are invited to "come and interact with real special
operation forces including US Navy SEALS and US Army Green Berets." [42]
In a 1995 interview, I remarked to (now
deceased) biological psychologist John Liebeskind on the potential
contributions of his pain management research to torture interrogation. In most fields of animal experimentation,
anesthetics and analgesics are administered to mask the experience of injury;
however, pain management researchers intentionally induce pain in laboratory
animals to study the mechanisms of pain.
Liebeskind, a Fellow of the National Academy of Sciences and a great
humanist, replied with candor and insight:[43]
I
don’t think I am or would be in a good or well informed position to assess the
ethical consequences of any military project I might be asked to help
with. They wouldn’t tell me the truth
(and I certainly wouldn’t know if they had or not), and I wouldn’t really
understand all the ramifications even if they did or thought they did. So if we are developing something military
and are in competition with other countries, I would feel an "us versus
them" dilemma, and there surely aren’t very many "thems" I would
trust more than us.
Biomedical applications to torture
interrogation may have a humanitarian theme.
A neuroscientist recently developed a “brain fingerprinting”
technique. Words or pictures relevant to
an event are flashed onto a computer screen.
Measurement of the subject’s brain-wave responses to words or pictures
flashed onto a computer screen determine whether the subject has knowledge of
corresponding events.[44] Copher
suggested that we “use the brain fingerprint to find out who the terrorists are, then we torture them...,” thus
avoiding torture of innocents—but, warned that, “like the polygraph, the
machine would have a wide range of [desirable and undesirable] effects.”[45]
Israel exhibits the motive for torture
research to stay ahead of savvy enemies.
A former Palestinian prisoner proudly explained: “We learned about all the types of
ill-treatment and the techniques that the secret police use, and we learned to
observe the behavior of enemy officers during our interrogation.”[46] Turkey exhibits the motive for research into
concealment and detection of torture to stay ahead of human rights
monitors. The European Union Commission
postponed Turkey’s admission into the European Union because of the flow of
torture victims from Turkey. To gain the
political and economic advantages of membership, Turkey attempted to develop
torture techniques that leave no medical trace.
European forensic experts, meanwhile, employed successively more refined
methods of detection, such as bone scintigraphy, ultrasonography, CAT scans,
and MRI’s.[47] Thus develops the race between techniques of
torture and techniques of resistance and detection.
Torture spreads to foreign governments
through exchange of torture technology. Argentina gave classes in torture to
Latin American military officers, and Brazilian torturers trained Chileans.[48] The School of the Americas, with its coercive
interrogation manuals, was widely known as a training school for Latin American
dictators during the Cold War. Amnesty International cites the United
States as the largest international supplier of electroshock weapons—stun guns,
electro-shock batons, and the like—to governments that practice electro-shock
torture (for instance, $3 million worth to Saudi Arabia in 1990).[49]
Another
unintended consequence of biomedical research on torture is the opportunity for
secret, illegal research on human subjects for other purposes. Administrators of torture interrogation
programs cannot prevent alternative uses
by their own biomedical scientists, who have negotiating power over valuable
resources.[50] Historically, government-sponsored ethics
investigations of the CIA’s mind control Project MKULTRA and the Department of
Energy’s radiation studies exposed extraneous, excessive, and criminal human
subjects research.[51]
Similarly, as will be seen later, torture
interrogation is a resource that could not be denied to certain military,
police, and government agencies for their own applications.
Establishment
of a Torture Interrogation Unit
Political scientist Harold William Rood,
who for ten years taught field interrogation of prisoners of war in military
intelligence schools, explained the institutionalization challenge as
follows. Many agencies must coordinate
in a counterterrorist operation.
Reliability and accountability are therefore essential. Outlaws and madmen cannot be hired as
torturers by an otherwise orderly agency.
The torturers have to be well trained and professional: "To deliberately torture a person over a
period of six weeks is asking a lot of human beings. And therefore you have to
recruit them very carefully." This
is the work of a highly trained team of interrogators.[52]
The
Los Angeles Times recently reported a
former counter-terrorism official as saying that one of bin Laden’s top
deputies, captured in March 2002, "will be put through the ringer for days
and weeks....It will take at least 96 hours to get him to spill
everything....If not, they will keep going...."[53]
Training programs have been studied
through interviews with former torturers in Greece,[54]
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay,[55]
Nicaragua,[56]
and Israel,[57]
to name a few. As a composite picture,
trainees are typically selected on the basis of their ability to endure hardship
and pain, for correct political beliefs, trustworthiness, and obedience. Often the young, the lower class, or the
poorly educated are recruited, or even kidnapped. Brutal training at the outset desensitizes
trainees to their own pain, suffering, and humiliation. Confinement and initiation rites isolate them
from prior relationships. Constant
physical and psychological intimidation instill obedience. Trainees first learn torture through social
modeling in witness and guard roles.
They usually experience tension between their new roles and their
previous values, and they variously resort to denial, psychological
dissociation, alcohol, or drugs. The
efficacy of shame tactics tends to lead, as with the Israeli General Security
Services treatment of Palestinians, to sexual tortures, which in turn
contribute to stigmatization and corruption of torturers. Training programs use dehumanization and
scapegoating of victims to relieve the bad self-image experienced by many
torturers.
Criminologist Ronald Crelinsten, who
studies the career paths of torturers, writes movingly of their travails in the
closed world of the torture unit.
"The world of conventional morality and human decency....has been
largely replaced by a new morality where disobedience"— including refusal
to torture friends—"means punishment, disgrace, humiliation,...or even
death."[58] Alistair Horne, historian of the Battle of
Algiers, concluded that torture "tends to demoralise the inflictor even
more than his victim, and he gave harrowing examples of psychological
impairment from the psychiatric record.
The French negotiator for the final peace settlement with Algeria, Louis
Joxe, grieved: "I shall never
forget the young officers and soldiers whom I met who were absolutely appalled
by what they had to do...."[59] After the fall of the Pinochet regime in
Chile, the navy and air force did not take back officers who had worked in the
secret service but considered them to be “defiled.”[60]
The utiliarian argument for torture
interrogation, therefore, must justify the additional sacrifice of the
torturers—made vulnerable to "perpetration-induced traumatic stress,"[61]
severe social stigma, and possibly spiritual turmoil—or develop some
hitherto-unknown transcendent regimen for training and after-care of torturers. This sacrifice should be expanded to include
also families, where secrecy, stress, and stigmatization take their toll over
decades, and support staff—secretarial, custodial, and maintenance. As Copher commented: “Although our team [of
liaison officers] could become accustomed to the [Middle Eastern
counterterrorist] interrogation process, the secretaries that received our
hand-written analysis and interrogation observations were badly shocked.”[62]
Rood further cautioned that it would be
difficult to set up a program for torture interrogation without unintentionally
incorporating an inside agent of the terrorists.[63] Counterterrorist agencies depend on
informants. As in police detective units
with official informant programs, there is the perennial risk that the
informant will corrupt the agent and reverse roles, so that the informant
becomes the handler and the agent becomes the paid informer.[64] Recently, mafioso James "Whitey"
Bulger, unprosecuted murderer of 11 FBI
informants, was found to have been running his own agents inside the
FBI—including FBI Special Agent John Connolly, whose opposition to organized
crime had raised him to eminence.[65]
Considerations of futility are thus added to the sacrifice of personnel in a
cost-benefits analysis.
III. The Data Processing Model for Knowledge
Acquisition
The cognitive failure model for fanatics,
heroes, and martyrs alerts us to the fact that torture interrogation provides
only data, not actionable knowledge.
Commander James Stockdale ordered his fellow American POWs in Vietnam
to “resist to the point of permanent
injury or loss of mental faculty, and then fall back on deceit and
distortion.” The standard of truth for
intelligence agencies is not the one-shot revelation, which is always suspect,
but convergent analyses of far-ranging data.
The French General Paul Aussaresses, chief
intelligence officer in the Battle for Algiers from 1955 to 1957, credits his
large-scale, merciless, torture interrogation campaign with crushing the
Algerian insurgency and stopping terrorist bombings. Aussaresses’ name is often brought in to
support the ticking bomb argument, but his memoir records cases of terrorists
dying under torture with their secrets or exasperating him to the point of
murdering them himself.[66] He did not run a small-scale, precision,
torture-interrogation program, as envisioned by advocates in the U.S. He had an informant for each city block in
the native section of Algiers.
Altogether, thirty to forty percent of the men were arrested and interrogated
during the war, frequently under electrical shock to the sexual organs.[67] Aussaresses ran a dragnet interrogation
program, which swept up the peripherally involved and the uninvolved along with
terrorist leaders.
Dragnet torture interrogation is the
norm. Soviet historians estimate that
between 1936 and 1939 the Soviet government arrested 5% to 10% of the
population, so as to suppress political opposition. Under severe interrogations, with beatings,
sleep deprivation, and isolation, almost everyone confessed, thereby providing
public justification for the arrests.[68] The widespread torture interrogation programs
of Latin American dictatorships during the “dirty wars” against communism are
well known. Between 1987 and 1994, the
Israeli General Security Service officially interrogated 23,000 Palestinians,
of whom 94% were tortured or severely abused, according to a large interview
study.[69]
Copher gave a feeling for this style of
diffuse data collection on terrorists in Turkey a couple of decades ago.[70]
...We
[American liaisons] were called when major terrorist arrests were made and we
sat in.... We did not need to be present in the room but we were in the
facility and monitored all of it. Often
we suggested that the person be pulled out of the session and brought to
us. We then started when it became clear
the individual was a terrorist....
. ..If [the locals told us] the subject went
to “donkey heaven” [i.e., died under their interrogation], I would say, “It was
already written by Allah,” and get on with the next truck load of
subjects. When a nation declares martial
law, all the interrogators go into high gear and work until exhausted and then
some....[Y]ou can conduct five or six normal-level interviews and suddenly you
have a “holding pen” of several thousand people....
As
a prototype to guide a torture interrogation program, the time scale of the
ticking bomb scenario is extremely misleading.
In FBI experience, deterrence of
terrorist acts is a long-term affair, with informants, electronic
surveillance networks, and undercover agents.
Operations must be tracked and allowed to play out almost to the last
stage to comprehend their scope.[71] The fanatics, martyrs, and heroes scenario
errs, like the ticking bomb scenario, in its focus on key terrorists. They are difficult to apprehend and likely to
require great exertions from torturers.
Their numerous peripheral associates are much easier to apprehend and
more susceptible to interrogation—whence the inevitable trend towards the
dragnet interrogation model of knowledge acquisition. Among the detainees will be many innocent or
ignorant persons but these, too, are critical for comparison of nonterrorist
with terrorist data. The difficulty
“from a purely intelligence point of view,” as noted by Horne, is that “more
often than not the collating services are overwhelmed by a mountain of false
information extorted from victims desperate to save themselves further agony.”[72]
This is all to say that while torture of
terrorist suspects indeed provides more data, it does not discriminate between
truth and lies. Turning to the related
criminological studies, truth and lie detection falls into a conflicted
area. Contemporary police interrogation
manuals provide time-tested schemas for truth and lie detection by eminent
practitioners in the criminal justice system.
Manuals discriminate truth tellers from liars through numerous verbal
and nonverbal behaviors, often linked to involuntary physiological responses.[73] Partly contradicting this literature of interrogation
expertise, experimental studies find that the short-term success rate of
professional lie catchers—police officers, detectives, prison guards, customs
officers, and the like—falls mostly in the 45% to 60% range, where 50% is the
chance rate. In these experiments,
professional lie catchers only differ from nonprofessionals in their high level
of confidence! The professionals’
unwarranted confidence has been traced to lack of feedback in the workplace
regarding the accuracy of their judgments and to their false reliance on
behavioral signs of deceit, such as gaze aversion. In fact, behavioral signs of deceit differ
across liars and constitute only a small effect. Accuracy of lie detection has been raised to
the 70% to 85% level through arduous technical methods, such as film analysis
of micro-facial expressions, content analysis of testimony, polygraphy by
independent examiners, etc. Yet even
these methods can be counteracted by trained subjects[74]
or may fail due to individual differences.Ï[75] Torture, which exaggerates physiological
variability in subjects, may complicate objective lie detection.
Because
of the large number of detainees and the weak discrimination between the guilty
and the innocent, dragnet interrogation requires much coordination between
torture interrogation units and (a) the police, (b) the judiciary, and (c) the
larger military institution and government.
I examine in turn these facets of an official torture interrogation
program.
Coordination
of a Torture Interrogation Program with the Police
The U.S. "war on terrorism" has
driven into close cooperation previously separated, or even estranged, police,
FBI, CIA, and military intelligence agencies.
As of October 2002, the 18,000 police agencies, with 800,000 officers, vastly
outnumbered the other agencies, for example, the 27,000 FBI agents, 58% of whom
work abroad.[76] Because of their numbers, networks,
jurisdictions, and the urgency of action, in any torture interrogation program
the police will be at the forefront of detention and interrogation of terrorist
suspects. Indeed, cross-national studies
have found that expertise in torture typically passes from the police to
military intelligence services.[77]
What proportion of ignorant or innocent
suspects are likely to be interrogated under torture? Modern crime statistics indicate that among
suspects arrested and charged with serious crimes, one-half to three-quarters
are not convicted, depending on the state of jurisdiction.[78] Under the proposed torture interrogation program,
a detainee firmly believed to be involved in serious acts of terrorism will
likely be tortured. The secrecy and
urgency of terrorist cases certainly cannot improve the rate of accuracy over
serious criminal convictions, for the counterterrorist program rejects normal
judicial safeguards—the right not to testify against oneself, the right to
legal counsel, habeas corpus, bail setting, public hearings, and so on. Moreover, in tracking terrorist operations it
is customary to interrogate individuals just because they are acquainted with a
person who has been detained, not because they are suspected of crimes.[79] So an error rate of one-half to
three-quarters of torture interrogees would be a low estimate. For a long historical comparison, examination
of court records for 625 cases of torture interrogation in France, from the
1500s through the mid-1700s, showed approximate rates of error—that is, no
confession on the rack, under repeated drowning, crushing of joints, and the
like—in 67% to 95% of cases, depending on the province.[80]
One source of error is the nondescriptness
of most terrorists. In search of
terrorist profiles, a 1999 government report on The Sociology and Psychology of
Terrorism synthesized dozens of cross-cultural empirical studies. Contrary to stereotypes, the report concluded
that terrorists are “practically indistinguishable from normal people” in terms
of outward appearance, they do not have “visibly detectable personality traits
that would allow authorities to identify a terrorist,” they are not
“diagnosably mentally disturbed”—except for an occasional psychopathic or
sociopathic top leader. Terrorist
organizations weed out the conspicuous
and the mentally ill as liabilities.[81]
How will the counterterrorist program
uphold a monopoly on the use of torture?
Investigators of many other crimes—narcotics trafficking, serial murder,
sabotage of information systems, espionage, financial scams....— will consider
their own pursuits compelling, some at the level of national security.[82] Both U.S. and British judiciaries have
struggled for decades with the overwhelming ill consequences of coercive
interrogation of suspects, which include false confessions and false testimony;
police deception and manipulation of courts; failure of systems of oversight;
and involvement of organized crime.[83] The 1956 Miranda rights for suspects in the
U.S. and the 1986 Police and Criminal Evidence Act in Britain[84]
stipulate conditions of fair interrogation and (in principle) require judges to
reject all but demonstrably voluntary confessions.[85] On the whole, analyses of subsequent police
interrogations have found negligible change in percentage of valid confessions.[86] For reliability, professional police practice
leans toward “extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful
investigation”[87]
and away from confession evidence with its epistemic, ethical, and practical
problems.[88]
A U.S. program of torture interrogation
engenders the monumental task of discriminating between terrorist and
nonterrorist criminal suspects, in spite of many overlapping criminal
activities, and restricting torture interrogation to key terrorists. Yet police departments are still struggling
to transform a history of counterproductive coercive interrogation into a
modern professional practice of efficient and accountable interrogation.
Coordination
of a Torture Interrogation Program with the Judiciary
Intelligence agencies around the world
strongly resist interference from the judiciary and attorneys, who are often
perceived as politically liberal, uninformed, infiltrated by the opposition,
or, in any case, security risks for sensitive operations. The Argentine General Acdel Vilas, who was
active in counterinsurgency operations in the early 1970s, afterwards described
how he circumvented judicial procedures.
He sent out plainclothesmen instead of uniformed officers to pick up
suspects and passed only the insignificant suspects into the justice
system. The plainclothes approach,
however, jeopardized his officers, and he had to cover for their deaths in
irregular circumstances.[89] Similarly,
General Aussaresses wrote of an important terrorist who refused to
confess: “...I’m convinced he won’t say
a word [under torture]. If there were to
be a trial and he hasn’t confessed, he could actually walk away free, along
with the entire FLN cadre. So let me
take care of him before he becomes a fugitive...” Aussaresses himself hung the terrorist, as a
weakly staged suicide.[90] The Israeli Supreme Court found that
interrogators from the General Security Service (GSS) routinely gave false
testimony about coerced confessions to conceal its methods from terrorists, to
secure convictions where evidence was lacking, and simply because false
testimony succeeded. GSS interrogators
insisted that they only lied in cases of actual guilt, and, “[o]ne cannot clean
sewers without dirtying oneself.”[91] In the British criminological literature,
this is called “noble cause corruption”:
self-sacrificing agents falsify cases and perjure themselves in court to
convict people they believe to be criminals.[92] Nevertheless, both British and Israeli
security services have been shamed by notorious cases of the conviction of
innocents after coerced confessions, false testimony by interrogators, and
contrived evidence. [93]
What about judicial monitoring of a
torture interrogation program? The U.S.
judiciary, with its publicly elected and politically appointed judges, is not
designed to hold its own against intelligence agencies, especially in matters
of national security. Dershowitz has
proposed legalization of torture in ticking-bomb cases by requiring
"torture warrants" judges, by analogy with search warrants.[94] But the ticking bomb scenario itself does not
afford judicial consideration of torture warrants for specific individuals on
specific occasions. A former Brazilian
police officer explained: “It is necessary to get the information now because
from now on to the future it might be too late.
And to save time, everything is valid.”[95]
Within
intelligence agencies, concealment of security operations is a professional
virtue, not a moral flaw.[96] A
colleague’s obituary for Richard Helms, former Director of Central
Intelligence, praised him “for standing up to the pressures” of a 1977 Senate
investigation “to betray secrets that could be damaging to the country.”[97] Intelligence professionals in the field are
usually more skillful in methods of concealment than those dispatched to
monitor them. Copher provided an example:[98]
[E]very
other year an inspector would stop by and ask what we all would do if ordered
to eliminate a foreign national. We
would all say, “report them as per regulations.” Then the inspector would leave. Then what we were told to do was often in
conflict with this idea. In Lebanon we
put our pro-U.S. warlord in charge and with the help of Shiites in Iran, [the
foreign national] was assassinated.
The consequentialist moral rationale for
torture interrogation of terrorists provides no plausible mechanism for
coordinating interrogators with the judiciary but would seem to support
interrogators’ idealistic motivations to present false testimony in court and
to thwart oversight. A legal analysis of
Israeli torture in the Occupied Territories concluded that in a liberal
democracy torture subverts the rule of law and erodes other democratic ideals
supported by the rule of law.[99]
Accommodation
of a Torture Interrogation Program within the Military and the Government
Rood reasoned from historical examples
that, like the Nazi Deaths Head SS, an elite torture interrogation corps would
be isolated from the regular military and intelligence. Its commander would inevitably gain special
powers, and his elite corps would have a destabilizing effect on the military
and government.[100]
Illustrative of destabilization of the
military, under the leadership of several generals the Brazilian military
gradually eliminated torture between 1975 and 1986 to save itself as an
institution. With counterterrorist agencies working outside the law,
torturers graded into “smugglers, blackmailers, and extortionists, and no one
dare[d] to stop them.” Torturers scorned and controverted the chain of
command, creating two factions and destabilizing the army.[101] Illustrative
of the destabilization of government, near the end of his life President
Franklin Roosevelt commissioned a study that advised disbanding the Office of
Strategic Services—the World WarII covert operations agency whose only rule
was to win[102]—so
as to preclude a “‘post-war Gestapo.’”[103] Illustrative of the risk of excessive of
powers, in 1962 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff considered framing Cuba for a
terrorist campaign on America, as a pretext for invading Cuba.[104]
Military wisdom cautions that the
long-term potential of a weapon or tactic is more important than its initial
purpose.[105] Regardless of the initial purpose, resources
invite new uses and are adopted by new users, as demonstrated by the spread of
atomic weapons. To this point, a recent
issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin expressed concern that
"The Patriot Act" approved by Congress on October 26, 2001, would
"expand the definition of ‘terrorist’ to include non-violent protesters at
an anti-war rally."[106] Indeed, such a strategic expansion of the
target group occurred under the Alien Enemy Act in World War II. The incarceration of 7,000 German Americans
partly resulted from a policy of arbitrary arrest to intimidate the German
American community as a whole. The deportation
of 4,000 Latin Americans of German ancestry to U.S. internment camps partly
resulted from their utility for prisoner exchange with the Germans and from
local greed for their properties.[107] The FBI and Bureau of Justice labeled people
of German ancestry “potentially dangerous” on the basis of unverified
accusations by neighbors, friends, business competitors, disgruntled employees, and the like.[108] Under the currently proposed torture
interrogation program, such detainees would be in line for torture as well as
incarceration.
The larger institutional theme here is the
difficulty of embedding a specially empowered domestic program of torture
interrogation, with high secrecy, into a political system equilibrated by
competing institutions. In a national
security framework, police, judicial, military, and government authorities are
unprepared to check the excesses toward which the mandate and tools of a
torture interrogation unit easily lead, according to both historical record and
rational institutional processes.
Restated by a U.S. Army chaplain,
“We just cannot go there. It would
change our national identity.”[109]
IV. Rogue Models of Truth Telling under Torture
The grave, unintended consequences of
overt state-sponsored programs of torture interrogation have made covert
programs attractive. In the rogue
models, torture is not necessarily the causal factor in extracting the truth
from captives but may be emotionally, culturally, or historically inseparable
from customary tactics. Or torture may
be one tactic among many in a hit-or-miss approach permitted by lack of
accountability for errors.
One much discussed rogue option is
outsourcing to foreign intelligence services.
In the Korean War, for instance, U.S. troops commonly turned over North
Korean spies to South Korean intelligence for torture interrogation.[110] The Association of Former [U.S.] Intelligence
Officers acknowledged outsourcing in its October 21, 2001, newsletter:[111]
[S]ince
Sept. 11, the CIA has arranged for 230 suspects in 40 countries around the
globe to be jailed and questioned. One notable
aspect of putting possible terrorists in the hands of foreign security services
is that [those] states ... use interrogation methods that include torture and
threats to family members.
The
loss of control over information and the creation of political debts
discourages this option though.
A second rogue option is the discreet use
of illegal, government-sponsored torture.
Secrecy can be maintained through plausible deniability; isolation of
torture sites; expendability of torturers; and initial recruitment of torturers
trained elsewhere—abroad, in prisons, by abusive families. A combat veteran, Kenneth Kendall, combining
his “guinea pig” experience at the Nevada Test Site with his witness of torture
interrogations by South Koreans,
conjectured the means of concealment of torture:[112]
Once
you’ve got what information you need, then—it’s hard to do—but go ahead and
finish killing them and erase them from existence, and then that would cover
you from the dilemma of having to admit that you did something like this. If there’s only a small number of people
involved that could ever get out and say anything, then you can insist that
they didn’t know what they were talking about.—“This guy sung his head off. We didn’t have to do nothing with his wife
and child. We don’t know where they’re
at.” This is probably what I would
advise, how this went and all. Primarily
based on my past experience.
Numerous self-identified survivors of
alleged government-sponsored torture—in such self-help organizations as the
Advocacy Committee for Human Experiment Survivors-Mind Control (ACHES-MC), Stop
Mind Control and Ritual Abuse Today (SMART), SurvivorShip, and Citizens against
Human Rights Abuses(Cahra)—would agree with Kendall’s explanation.[113]
The “information services” of domestic
criminal enterprises offer a third rogue option. It is a truism of criminology that organized
crime supplies the goods and services for which there is strong demand but no
legal avenue for supply. Narcotics,
“snuff” films, child pornography, transplant organs, artifacts from
archeological sites, and illegal weapons are familiar examples. In World WarII, the U.S. Navy turned to the
Sicilian-American mafia for information about German U-boats off the Atlantic
seaboard and the invasion of Sicily.[114] Organized crime also runs “information
services,” which include torture interrogation.[115]
From an organizational perspective, these
three rogue options are attractive because the services can be utilized
according to need, with an elasticity difficult for state bureaucracies. Moreover, training, monitoring, silencing,
and disposal of participants can be managed with relatively little involvement
or corruption of U.S. government institutions because few official liaisons
need be involved. The practical
liability is the difficulty in breaking off or limiting relationships with
rogue collaborators, on account of sensitive information held in “dirty hands.”
In effect, terrorist information is bought through long-term tolerance of
political and criminal wrongdoing, under the euphemism, “protection of sources
and methods.”
Consequentialists may argue that society
is better off legalizing and regulating torture because it is impossible to
prevent it.[116] But an official U.S. program of torture
interrogation could not eradicate rogue services. They would still serve to circumvent ethical
and procedural constraints on the official program. And they are independently maintained by other
political and criminal interests.
Summary
and Assessment of the Torture Interrogation Program
Returning now to the proposed official
program of torture interrogation, here is a rough schema of notable inputs and
outputs, according to causal model.
Notable Inputs and Outputs of
Programs of Torture Interrogation of Terrorists
According to Causal Model
I. The animal instinct model of truth telling,
for the ticking bomb scenario
|
Intended
inputs • Terrorists
with plans of mass destruction • Basic
torture techniques • Ordinary
police and military interrogators Unintended inputs • Medical
personnel at interrogation sites |
Intended
outputs •
Fore-knowledge of plans of mass destruction • Harmless
terrorist prisoners • Unharmed
interrogators Unintended
outputs • Schisms and
resistance in the medical community • Disabled and
dead interrogees. |
II. The cognitive failure model of truth telling,
for fanatics, martyrs, and heroes
|
Additional
intended inputs • Terrorists
resistant to coercion •
State-of-the-art torture interrogation techniques • Teams of highly
trained torturers Additional
unintended inputs • Biomedical
research on torture techniques •
Establishment of torture interrogation unit(s) |
Additional
intended outputs • General
knowledge of terrorist operations and terrorist psychology Additional
unintended outputs • Inseparable
mixtures of truth and lies regarding terrorist plans • Spread of
technologies of torture to other nations and terrorist organizations •
Opportunistic illegal, bio-medical research on human subjects. • Spread of technologies
of torture, resistance, and detection to foreign governments • Ruination
of torture personnel • Terrorist
infiltration of program |
III. The data processing model of knowledge
acquisition, for dragnet interrogations
|
Additional intended
inputs • Terrorist
suspects and possible associates •
Bureaucratic apparatus for comprehensive data management and analysis. • Police
assistance • Judicial
oversight. Additional
unintended inputs • Falsely detained
persons with no terrorist involvement or knowledge |
Additional
intended outputs •
Understanding of social process of terrorist organizations, with actionable
knowledge. Additional
unintended outputs • Tortured non-terrorist
prisoners and corpses. •
Opportunistic torture interrogation of other classes of prisoners and
political dissidents. •
Institutional degradation of the police. •
Institutional degradation of the judiciary. •
Institutional degradation of the military and government. |
Policy studies demonstrate that program
success in balancing intended outputs against unintended outputs depends on
formal access by outsiders and on provisions for independent evaluation
studies.[117] A criminological
study of police interrogation methods over a 50-year period concluded that “all
police interrogations should be witnessed by observers who are both independent
of police and empowered to act on behalf of suspects by preventing escalation of
inherently coercive pressures.”[118] In the case of a torture interrogation
program, such a safeguard is impossible
for security reasons.
In my view, it remains for
consequentialist advocates of a practical U.S. interrogation program to plan
for social repair after the inevitable breakdowns of institutions and
community. In country after country
where national security threats drove torture of domestic enemies —South
Africa, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, El Salvador, Guatemala, Ireland ...—human rights researchers have shown the
inadequacies of various attempts at social repair—the criminal trials, truth
commissions, reparations to victims, community mourning rituals, .... The great majority of bystanders constitute an
intractable element. Their passivity facilitated
the social breakdown but they cannot be held accountable for the repair.[119] Another intractable element is the disparity
between repair policies effective at the state level and policies effective at
the individual level. A victim group
accused the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission of
“‘reconciliation showbiz’,” for substituting disclosure of wrongdoing for
prosecution of wrongdoers.[120] The National Association of Radiation
Survivors accused the 1993 U.S. President’s Advisory Committee on Human
Radiation Experiments of “giving the
government what the government paid them for”—a cover-up job.[121] When grievances, such as torture of
nonterrorists, cannot be remedied by the state, scapegoating, cover-up,
discrediting of victims, and token reparations easily emerge as fraudulent
social repair tactics.
The counterargument, of course, is that in
a society destroyed by terrorism there will be nothing to repair. That is why the actual causal mechanism of
torture interrogation in curtailing terrorists must be elucidated rather than
presumed. A criminological analysis of
500 British court cases found that police interrogation of defendants
contributed little to discovery and conviction.
Rather, the study concluded that interrogation fulfilled certain
psychological and administrative needs and that “police perceptions of reality
dominate the criminal process.”[122] Unless the question of efficacy of torture
interrogation of terrorists is settled, advocates are liable to the charges of
making excuses for inflicting suffering on others[123]
and imposing torture for social control.[124]
The historical record is not entirely
clear but suggests that initial gains from torture interrogation are later lost
through mobilization of moral opposition, both domestically and
internationally, and through demoralization or corruption of the torturers and
their constituencies. In a final
assessment of the efficacy of the French torture campaign in Algiers, Horne
wrote: "the stunning, cumulative
impact it had was materially to help persuade public opinion years later that
France had to wash her hands of the sale guerre." Winning the Battle of Algiers meant losing
the war.[125]
Conclusion
Alan Dershowitz closes his essay on
“Torture of Terrorists” with this challenge:[126]
Had
law enforcement officials arrested terrorists boarding one of the airplanes [of
the September 11 disaster] and learned that other planes, then airborne, were
headed toward unknown occupied buildings, there would have been an
understandable incentive to torture those terrorists to learn the identity of
the buildings and evacuate them.
I
would like to close my essay with a reply.
The
individual law enforcement officials, of course, can make their own moral
choices and take their own risks. But if
it is state policy to torture the terrorist, then the policy should be rational
and the torture interrogation proceed with a reasonable chance of success.
Terrorists selected for such a role—like
most American POWs in North Vietnam—can probably stand up to commonplace
tortures from untrained staff for a long time.
The use of sophisticated techniques by a trained staff entails the
problematic institutional arrangements I have laid out: physician assistance; cutting edge, secret
biomedical research for torture techniques unknown to the terrorist
organization and tailored to the individual captive for swift effect; well
trained torturers, quickly accessible at major locations; pre-arranged
permission from the courts because of the urgency; rejection of independent
monitoring due to security issues; and so on.
These institutional arrangements will have to be in place, with all
their unintended and accumulating consequences.
Then the terrorists themselves must be detected while letting pass
without torture a thousand other criminal suspects or dissidents, that is,
avoiding a dragnet interrogation policy.
The moral error in reasoning from in the
ticking bomb scenario arises from weighing the harm to the guilty terrorist
against the harm to the prospective innocent victims. Instead, the harm to innocent terrorist
victims should be weighed against the breakdown of key social institutions and
the state-sponsored torture of many innocents.
Stated most starkly, the damaging social consequences of a program of torture
interrogation evolve from institutional dynamics that are independent of the
original moral rationale.
Acknowledgments
For conversations, correspondence, and
interviews with former and active military professionals, I thank: William Casebeer, Barak Cohen, Paul Copher,
Ernest Garcia, Kenneth Kendall, Tony Pfaff, and Harold William Rood.
For responses to my query on the
intelligence list-serves of Cass Publishers’ Intelforum
(http://www.intelforum.org/) and the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (http://www.afio.com), I thank: Robin Bhatty, Drake Currie, Mike Dravis
(moderator), Harlan Girard, Stephen Godjas,
Brendan Howley, Howell McConnell, Bill Oliver, Pauletta Otis, Lewis
Regenstein, Richard Thieme, Allen Thomson, Douglas Vaughn, Nigel West, and Mike
Yared.
For responses to my query on the
list-serve Ask-a-Philosopher, sponsored by Sheffield University for the
International Society of Philosophers (http://go.to.ask-a-philosopher‚ I
thank: Sean Allen-Hermanson, Steven Bullock,
Anthony Flood, Hubertus Fremery, Geoffrey Klempner (moderator), Derel Dov
Lerner, Harry Lesser, Gerald Marsh, Matthew del Nevo, Michael Neumann, and
Duncan Richter.
For
review of the manuscript, I thank John Crigler.
NOTES
[1]. Solomon, Alisa. (2001, December 4). The case against torture [Electronic
version.]. The Village Voice.
[2]. McLaughlin, Abraham. (2001, November 14). How far Americans would go to fight terror.
The Christian Science Monitor, pp.
1 & 4.
[3]. Based on 1560 votes.—Crimeweek Daily
[On-line:
http://crime.miningco.com/gi/pages/poll.htm?poll_id=2149603124&linkback=http://crime.miningco.com/library/blfiles/blpoll-torturingterrorists.htm]. Retrieved February 10, 2003.
[4]. Dershowitz, Alan M. (2002, January 22). Want to torture? Get a warrant [Electronic version]. San Francisco Chronicle, p. A-19.
[5]. Rawls, John.
(1955). Two concepts of
rules. The Philosophical Review, 44 (1),
3-32.— No one is proposing torture of all terrorist suspects in urgent
situations, so act utilitarianism rather than rule utilitarianism is at stake
here.
[6]. Mazmanian, Daniel, & Sabatier, Paul. (1989).
Implementation and public policy (2nd ed.). Lanham, MD:
University Press of America.
Ch. 2.
[7]. Hoffman, Bruce. (2002, January). A nasty business. The Atlantic Monthly, pp. 49-52. P. 52.
[8]. duBois, Page.
(1991). Torture and truth. London:
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[9]. Hansen, Suzy.
(2002, September 12). Why
terrorism works [Interview with Alan
Dershowitz]. Retrieved November 18, 2002
from Salon.com web site:
http://www.salon.com/books/int/2002/09/12/dershowitz/index.html.
[10]. Hinkle, Lawrence. E. (1961).
The physiological state of the interrogation subject as it affects brain
function. In A.D. Biderman & H.
Zimmer (Eds.), The manipulation of human
behavior (pp. 19-49). New York: Wiley.
P. 19.
Hinkle also had a major planning role in the
CIA’s infamous mind control Project MKULTRA.— Marks, John. (1979).
The search for the "Manchurian Candidate"—The CIA and mind control. New York:
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[11]. An historical overview and bibliography
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(Journal of the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture
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[12]. Rasmussen, O. V. (1992). Medical aspects of torture [Special
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1-88.
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(1990). Extreme man-made stress
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[13]. School of the Americas. (1983, 1984, 1988). Human resource exploitation training manual. Fort Benning, GA: United States Army School of the
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[14]. Sobti, Jagdish C., Chaparwal, B. C.
Choudhary, P. K., Holst, Erik, & Bhatnagar, N. K. (n.d., c. 1996). Knowledge, attitude and practice of
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by mail questionnaire. Statistics are
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[15]. Iacopino, Vincent, Heisler, M., Pishevar, S.,
& Kirschner, R. H. (1996). Physician complicity in misrepresentation and
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[16]. Dôcker, Henrik. (2002).
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[17]. Livingston, Gordon. (1996, December 22). Serving two masters: The ethical dilemmas that military medical
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[18]. Oehmichen, M.
(1999). The forensic physician's
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[19]. Training Mexican doctors to investigate
torture. (Winter 2002-2003). Survivors International Outreach, 3. [Web site:
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[20]. Iacopino, Vincent, Keller, Allen, &
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[21]. E.g., Sciolino, Elaine. (2003, January 22). Iran is said to jail 2 lawyers who reported
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The New York Times.
[22]. Copher, Paul.
(2003, January 13 & February 18).
Personal communications.
“My team had nothing to do with the Nalan Gurtas
fiasco except to try to persuade the TNP not to harm her as she was present at
the assassination of four Americans....I told the locals that the US needed to
talk to her after she had some time to calm down....The Turks knew that their
‘taking care of it’ had really pissed me off but I can see their side of why
they did it.”
[23]. Oskamp, Stuart, & Schultz, P. Wesley.
(1998). Applied social psychology (2nd
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[24]. Greenberg, Jeff, Solomon, Veeder, Mitchell,
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[26]. Copher, Paul.
(2003, February 18). Personal
communication.
[27]. Hoffman, Peter. (1977).
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P. 519. Mike Dravis and Drake
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[28]. Stockdale, James Bond. (2001).
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314.
[29]. Glücklich, Ariel. (2001).
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[30]. Qouta, Samir,
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Peace and Conflict: Journal of
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[31]. Gudjonsson,Gisli. (1992).
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[32]. Silverman, Lisa. (2001).
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Chicago: University of Chicago
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[33]. Segal, Julius. (1957).
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Brainwashing [Special issue]. The
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Pp. 31-32, & 35.—Of 6658
American POWs, 3323 were repatriated.
“Most of the remaining POWs died in captivity, largely in the early
phases of the war, before the Chinese Communists began their planned program of
exploitation.” P. 31.
[34]. E.g., Toliver, Raymond F. (1997).
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[36]. These captured personnel are very valuable
assets to our job in the region. We
depend on them to keep us up to date, so killing themoff was not a good
thing....That is why we tried as hard as we could to get the person on our
side, to try various methods to convince them we might be able to help [them]
if they would come clean.—Copher, Paul.
(2003, February 17).
[37]. Garcia, Ernest. (1997, March 1). Personal communication.—“There were times
when I would actually go inside and sleep inside of the cell where they were
being held, and sit there with them, and I could pump more information than
anybody could pump under force or pain....What you do is first you work on
their confidence, gaining their confidence.
You make them believe that you're in the same boat that you are. That you yourself have been a victim of the
world. And tell them how dissatisfied
you are with the system. It's very easy
to do that because you're actually dissatisfied with the system....”
[38]. Maio, Giovanni. (2001).
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1609-1611.
[39]. Hinkle served as President of the American
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honors.
[40]. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence
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Washington, DC: U.S. Government
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[41]. Weinstein, Harvey
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[42]. U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects
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[43]. Arrigo, Jean Maria. (1999).
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inquiry. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Claremont Graduate University.
P. 357.
[44]. Executive summary: Farwell Brain Fingerprinting. Retrieved December 23, 2002, from the
Lawrence A. Farwell web site:
http://www.brainwavescience.com.—Paul Copher contributed this example.
[45] Copher, Paul.
(2002, December 23, & 2003, February 17). Personal communications.
[46]. Qouta, Samir, Punamaki, Raija-Leena, &
Sarraj, Eyad El. (1997). P. 26.
[47]. N. Zeeberg, "Torture—A Public Health
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[48]. Heinz, Wolfgang S. (1993).
The military, torture and human rights:
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[49] Amnesty International. (2000).
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[50]. Kameda, Tasuya, Takezawa, Masanori, Hastie,
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One such scientist was MKULTRA psychiatrist Ewen
Cameron.—Weinstein, Harvey M.
(1990). Psychiatry and the CIA:
Victims of mind control.
[51]. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence
and Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human
Resources. (1977). Project MKULTRA: the CIA's program of
research in behavioral modification.
Advisory Committee on Human Radiation
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[52]. Arrigo, Jean Maria. (1999).
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[53]. Drogin, Bob, & Meyer, Josh. (2002, April 2). Detainee is bin Laden Aide; "He knows where people are." Los Angeles
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[54]. Haritos-Fatouros. (1993).
The official torturer: A learning
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[55]. Heinz, Wolfgang S. (1993).
The military, torture and human rights.
[56]. Allodi, F.
(1993). Somoza's National
Guard: A study of human rights abuses,
psychological health and moral development.
In F. D. Crelinsten & A. P. Schmid (Eds.), The politics of
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[57]. Cohen, Stanley, & Golan Daphna. (1991).
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pressure" or torture?
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[58]. Crelinsten, Ronald D. In their own words: The world of the torturer. In F. D. Crelinsten & A. P. Schmid
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[59]. Horne, Alistair. (1977).
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P. 206.—Alistair refers to "numerous cases like that of the
European police inspector found guilty of torturing his own wife and children,
which he explained as resulting from what he had been required to do to
Algerian suspects...."
[60]. Heinz, Wolfgang S. (1993).
The military, tortue and human rights.
P. 98.
In American military history, members of the
Office of Strategic Services, with its “dirty tricks” that mainly fell short of
torture, often experienced the contempt of the regular army. —Moon, Tom. (1991).
This grim and savage game: OSS
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[61]. McNair, Rachel M. (2002).
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Praeger.
[62]. Copher, Paul.
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[63]. Arrigo, J. M.. (1999).
P. 346.
[64]. Clark, Roy.
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[65]. Powers, Thomas. (2002, October 10). Secrets of September 11. The New York Review, pp. 47-52. P. 48.
[66]. Aussaresses, Paul. (2002).
The Battle of the Casbah:
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria 1955-57. New York:
Enigma.—Robin Bhatty contributed this example.
[67]. Horne, Alistair. (1977).
A savage war of peace: Algeria
1954-1962. London: Macmillan.
[68]. Gudjonsson,Gisli. (1992).
The psychology of interrogations, confessions, and testimony.
[69]. Biletzi, Anat. (2001)
The judicial rhetoric of morality:
Israel's High Court of Justice on the legality of torture [Electronic
version]. Unpublished paper. Occasional Papers of the School of Social
Science, No. 9. Tel Aviv University, Tel
Aviv Israel. P. 8.—Interviews were
conducted with 700 Palestinian interrogees. Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin himself
admitted that 8,000 had been subjected to violent shaking.
[70]. Copher, Paul.
(2003, January 7 & February 17).
Personal communication.
[71]. McGee, Jim.
(2001, November 28). Ex-FBI
officials criticize tactics on terrorism:
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[72]. Horne, Alistair. (1977).
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204-205.
[73]. E.g., Gordon, Nathan J., & Fleisher,
William L. (2002). Effective interviewing and interrogation
techniques. San Diego: Academic
Press.—The parasympathetic nervous system “decreases thoracic activity” (e.g.,
slows heart rate) and “increases abdominal activity” (e.g., stimulates
digestion). The sympathetic nervous
system “increases thoracic activity” (e.g., increases respiration rate) and
“decreases abdominal activity” (e.g., inhibits waste elimination.” Pp.
19-20.
Zulawski, David E., & Wicklander,
Douglas, E. (2002). Practical aspects of interview and
interrogation (2nd edn.). Boca Raton, FL: CRC.—Photo captions: “Untruthful individuals might posture themselves
in a slumping position, extending their legs toward the interviewer” (p. 130);
“Truthful individuals generally hold their heads upright” (p. 143).
[74]. Vrij, Aldert.
(2000). Detecting lies and
deceit: The psychology of lying and the implications for professional
practice. Chichester, UK: Wiley. Pp. 74-76, 96, 159.—Note: Among professional lie-catchers, Secret
Service members do a little better, and there are rare individuals with high
accuracy in lie detection.
“[S]ome professional polygraph examiners claim
an accuracy rate of 97% or above, whereas the scientific evidence indicates a
more modest accuracy of about 85%....”—Gudjonsson, Gisli. (1992).
P. 185.
[75]. Copher, Paul.
(2003, February 17).—For example, moral indignation may cause a false positive
response if the polygrapher accuses the subject of a particularly offensive
crime. “I would never depend on a
polygraph for anything,” said Copher.
[76]. Bowers, Faye.
(2002, October 8). The
intelligence divide: Can it be bridged? The Christian Science Monitor. Pp. 2 & 3.—Statistics quoted from FBI
Director Robert Mueller.
[77]. Heinz, Wolfgang S. (1993).
The military, torture and human rights.
P. 81.
[78]. Huff, C. Ronald, Rattner, Arye, &
Sagarin, Edward. (1986). Guilty until proved innocent: Wrongful conviction and public policy. Crime & Delinquency, 32 (4),
518-544. P. 523.
[79]. Crelinsten, Ronald D. In their own words. P. 61.
[80]. Silverman, Lisa. (2001).
Tortured subjects. P. 182.—I
interpret the error rate within their own belief system.
[81]. Hudson, Rex A. (1999).
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why? Federal Research Division, Library
of Congress. Retrieved January 27, 2003,
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56-58.
[82]. E.g., “[I]f due process is systematically
denied to accused al-Qaeda members, one likely consequence is that other
categories of accused persons—drug dealers, mass murderers, child molesters,
etc.—will be labeled as similarly undeserving.”—Neier, Aryeh. (2002, February 14). The military tribunals on trial. The New York Review of Books, 11-15. P. 14.
[83]. As a methodological detail, police
distinguish between the forensic interview of a person who may have knowledge
of a crime, with the intent of gathering information, and the interrogation of
a suspect, after guilt has been established, with the intent of securing a
confession.The ideal interview is portrayed as nonaccusatory and free-flowing,
and the interviewer speaks only 5% of the time.
The ideal interrogation is accusatory and manipulative, and interrogator
speaks 95% of the time. —Gordon, Nathan J., & Fleisher, William L. (2002).
Effective interviewing and interrogation techniques. San Diego: Academic Press. P. 29.
[84]. Gudjonsson, Gisli. (1992).
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[85]. Gudjonsson,
Gisli. (1992). The psychology of
interrogations, confessions, and testimony.
Skolnick, Jerome H., & Fyfe, James J. (1993).
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excessive use of force. New York: Free Press.
[86]. E.g.,
Pearse, John, & Gudjonnson, Gisli, H. (1996).
Police interviewing techniques at two South London police stations
[Abstract]. Psychology, Crime & Law,
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[87]. Fricks, Richard Lawayne. (1997).
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reconciled [On-line abstract]. Unpublished master’s thesis, School of Law,
Robertson School of Government, Regent University, Virginia Beach,
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[88]. Kassin, Saul M. (1997).
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[89]. Heinz, Wolfgang S. (1993).
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P. 87.
[90]. Aussaresses, Paul. (2002).
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[91]. Gur-Arye, Miriam. (1989).
Excerpts of the Report. Symposium
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[92]. Gudjonsson, Gisli. (1992).
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269 & 272.
[93]. For a British example, see the “Birmingham
Six” in: Gudjonsson, Gisli. (1992). Pp.
269 & 272. For an Israeli
example, see the “Nafsu case” in:
Gur-Arye, Miriam. (1989). Introduction.
Pp. 149-152.
[94]. Dershowitz, Alan M. (2002, January 22). Want to torture? Get a warrant [Electronic version]. San Francisco Chronicle, p. A-19.
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P. 95.
[96]. Chapman, Robert D. (2002).
The new intelligence agenda — I
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[97]. Jonkers, Roy.
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(2003, January 6). Personal
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[99]. Cohen, Barak.
(2001). Democracy and the
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P. 357.
[101] Wechsler, Lawrence. (1991).
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P, 66.
[102]. Moon, Tom.
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[103]. Schwab, Stephen I. (2002).
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[104]. Anderson, Russell. (2002).
[Review of the book Body of secrets:
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[105]. Kane, Thomas M. (2002, March). Strategic analysis: To hear the thunder. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin,
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America's invisible gulag.
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[109]. Moore, Richard Gary. (2003, February 4). Personal communication from an ethics
instructor at the U.S. Army Logistics
Management College at
[110]. Kendall, Kenneth. (1997, April 6). Commentary on Levin’s proposal for torture
interrogation of terrorists. Interview
conducted via telephone by Jean Maria Arrigo, from Claremont, CA, to
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[113]. Judging from newsletters and personal
communications with members. ACHES-MC,
363 Pearl St., #2, Thunder Bay, Ontario, P7B1E9; http://www.aches-mc.org. SMART, P.O. Box 1295, Easthampton, MA 01027;
http://www.members.aol.com/SMARTNEWS.
SurvivorShip, 139 Mission St., San Francisco, CA 94110;
http://www.survivorship.org. Cahra: http://www.dcn.davis.ca.us/~welsh/ —
primarily concerned with electro-magnetic resonance targeting of civilians.
A weather station on a
military base in upstate New York, accessible only by helicopter, has been
mentioned as a covert torture interrogation site in the 1960s.
[114]. Campbell, Rodney. (1977).
The Luciano Project: The secret
wartime collaboration of the mafia and the U.S. Navy. New York:
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[115]. Personal communications from four
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dissertation. University of California,
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Task Force tells government...We are still
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source stated that confession evidence is
important in the prosecution of about 20% of criminal cases.—Gudjonsson,
Gisli. (1992). P. 324.
[123]. A cognitive process called “moral
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war: Use of the “Peace Test” scale among
student groups in 21 nations. Peace and
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[124]. The Programme Coordinator of the
International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims in Copenhagen observes
that torture is very effectively used in well-functioning democracies "as
a means to keep an opposition quiet...."— Buhelt, Anders. (2001).
Torture in well-functioning democracies.
[Book review of Torture in the Basque Country, Report 2000, by TAT Group
Against Torture. (1999).] Torture, 11
(3), 92.
[125]. Horne, Alistair. (1977).
A savage war of peace. Pp.
206-207.
[126]. Dershowitz, Alan M. (2002).
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turbulent age (pp. 470-479). Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. P.
477.