Alliance and Coalition Warfare Alliance and Coalition Warfare

 

NATO developed mechanisms for delegating target approval authority to military commanders proved flexible in meeting the military requirements of the campaign while preserving the necessary level of political oversight.

NATO’s internal command relationships had not been used previously to plan and conduct sustained combat operations. Parallel U.S. and NATO command and control structures and systems complicated operational planning and maintenance of unity of command.

U.S. needs to work with allies to:

Enhance NATO’s contingency planning process for non-Article V operations (operations that do not involve an armed attack against one or more of NATO members)

Develop an overarching command and control policy

Enhance procedures and conduct exercises strengthening NATO’s political-military interfaces.

Operation Allied Force would not have been possible to conduct without the use of our allies’ military infrastructure, including military bases, airfields, and airspace.

Disparities between U.S. capabilities and those of our allies, including precision strike, mobility, and command, control, and communications capabilities had the effect of impeding U.S. ability to operate at optimal effectiveness with NATO allies.

Successful implementation of the Defense Capabilities Initiative must remain one of NATO’s top priorities because it will enhance allied military capabilities in five key areas: deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, effective engagement, survivability of forces and infrastructure, and C2 and information systems.

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