1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963) p. 129.
2. Stedman Chandler and Robert W. Robb, Front-Line Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946) p. 7. Available to Marine units as FMFRP 12-16, Front-Line Intelligence.
3. Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, ed. B. H. Liddell Hart, trans. Paul Findlay (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953) p. 122.
4. The surrounding environment includes weather, terrain, transportation network, local population, and any other factors needed to describe a potential area of employment.
5. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966) p. 3.
6. For a detailed explanation of the distinction between data, information, knowledge, and understanding, see MCDP 6, Command and Control (October 1996) pp. 6671.
7. Wayne M. Hall, "Intelligence Analysis in the 21st Century," Military Intelligence (January-March 1992) p. 9 and Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," Power, Strategy, and Security, ed. Klaus Knorr (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983) p. 211.
Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy,
9. Nancy Gibbs, "A Show of a Strength," Time (October 1994) pp. 3438.
10. Sherman Kent, "Estimates and Influence," Foreign Service Journal (April 1969) p. 17.
11. Principal sources used in this case study: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, April 1992); Col Charles J. Quilter, II, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 19901991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993); LtCol Charles H. Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 19901991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993) pp. 46; Dennis P. Mroczkowski, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 19901991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993); Interview with Maj-Gen J. M. Myatt, USMC, "The 1st Marine Division in the Attack," Proceedings (November 1991) pp. 7176; Interview 4 Nov 96 with LtCol David Hurley and Mr. Michael H. Decker conducted by Maj Emile Sander (during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, LtCol Hurley served as the officer in charge of the I MEF MAGTF all-source fusion center, while then Capt Decker served as the MAGTF all-source fusion center, Chief Intelligence Analyst).
2. Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr., "Reflections on the Corps: Some Thoughts on Expeditionary Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette (March 1995) p. 27.
3. Maj David L. Shelton, "Intelligence Lessons Known and Revealed During Operation Restore Hope Somalia," Marine Corps Gazette (February 1995) pp. 3740; Capt David Rababy, "Intelligence Support During a Humanitarian Mission," Marine Corps Gazette (February 1995) pp. 4042; LtCol David Shelton, "Intelligence Lessons Known and Revealed During Operation United Shield in Somalia," unpublished manuscript.
4. Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982) pp. 5662. See also Edwin P. Hoyt, The Bloody Road to Panmunjorn (New York: Military Heritage Press, 1985) pp. 17, 31, 4547, 5459.
5. U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 (Washington, D.C.: December 20, 1983) pp. 6466.
6. The senior military intelligence officer in Vietnam at the time of the Tet offensive later declared, "Even had I known exactly what was to take place, it was so preposterous that I probably would have been unable to sell it." Jack Shulimson, TET1968 (New York: Bantam Books) p. 45. See also Don Oberdorfer, Tet! (New York: Da Capo Press, 1984) pp. 117121.
7. For a full discussion of signals and noise, see Roberta Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight," Foreign Affairs (July 1965) pp. 691707.
8. Clausewitz, p. 101.
9. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning, pp. 6880.
10. Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).
11. The terms priority intelligence requirement (PIR) and intelligence requirement (IR) replace the terms essential elements of information (EEI) and other intelligence requirements (OIR) to correspond to joint doctrinal terminology. Priority intelligence requirements are a subset of commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs), a term used to describe the information and intelligence requirements a commander deems critical to mission success. CCIRs are discussed in FMFM 6-1, The Marine Division (to be redesignated as MCWP 3-11.1) .
12. Interview with LtCol Dwight Trafton, Intelligence Officer, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, December 30, 1996, conducted by LtCol J. D. Williams.
13. Specific security guidelinesparticularly restrictions and information classification guidanceare often dictated by higher echelon commanders in pertinent directives, operation orders, or classification guides.
14. For information on the use of signals intelligence during World War II, see David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (New York: New American Library, 1973); F. W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (New York, Harper & Row, 1974); Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War: The First Account of World War II's Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). For a discussion of the operation against Admiral Yamamoto, see Kahn, pp. 332338.
15. The principal source used in this case study is Col Peter F. C. Armstrong, USMC (Ret.), "Capabilities and Intentions," Marine Corps Gazette (September 1986) pp. 3847. Additional information was taken from Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1984) pp. 639641.
16. The southwest monsoon season ran from mid-March to mid-September, flooding much of the South Vietnamese delta while turning the Laos and Vietnamese highlands into a quagmire nearly impassable to heavy vehicles. As a result, major military operations could not begin until the ground had dried, normally in December.
1. Gen David M. Shoup, USMC, in Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1966) p. 161. Gen Shoup was the 22nd Commandant of the Marine Corps.
2. MajGen Charles E. Wilhelm, Commander, Marine Forces, Somalia, Situation Report for January 24, 1993.
Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy,
4. LtCol David Ingram, " 'Fighting Smart' with ACE Intelligence," Marine Corps Gazette (May 1989) pp. 3840. See also Len Deighton, Fighter: The True Story of the Battle of Britain (New York: Harper Paperbacks, 1994).
5. Maj Carl Hoffman, The Seizure of Tinian (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Division, 1951).
6. FMFRP 12-40, Professional Knowledge Gained from Operational Experience in Vietnam, 19651966 (September 1991) pp. 139-141.
7. Col William M. Rakow, "Marines in the Gulf1988," Marine Corps Gazette (December 1988) pp. 6268.
8. Principal sources used in this case study are Shelton, "Intelligence Lessons Known and Revealed During Operation Restore Hope Somalia"; Rababy, "Intelligence Support During a Humanitarian Mission"; Shelton, "Intelligence Lessons Known and Revealed During Operation United Shield in Somalia"; and Award Recommendation for Marine Forces Somalia Counterintelligence/ HUMINT teams, Department of Defense HUMINT Awards Recognition Program, Headquarters Marine Corps, Assistant Chief of Staff, C4I, September, 1993.
9. MajGen Charles E. Wilhelm, Commander, Marine Forces, "Operation Restore Hope," Situation Report, 24 January 1993.