McNair Paper 41, Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation, May 1995

Institute for National Strategic Studies

McNair Paper Number 41, Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation, May 1995


1. John Lancaster, "Aspin Pledges New Military Efforts to Counter Weapons Proliferation," The Washington Post, December 8, 1993, p. 7. See also, Paul Quinn-Judge, "U.S. Plans to Fight Spread of Weapons," Boston Globe, December 8, 1993, p. 3; Art Pine, "Pentagon Unveils Plan to Counter Mass-Destruction Arms," Los Angeles Times, December 8, 1993, p. 1; and Steve Komarrow, "U.S. Revamps Nuke Policy to Fit Times," USA Today, December 8, 1993, p. 4A.

2. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in this discussion will include two forms of nuclear weapons, nuclear explosives and radiological weapons. The definition also includes biological and chemical weapons.

3. Ibid. Les Aspin announced his departure from the Department of Defense shortly after the Defense Counter-Proliferation Initiative was announced, but there is no reason to believe that that the Clinton Administration will not continue the new policy direction since the underlying reasons for it remain. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, is the official in charge of coordinating counter-proliferation policies in the Pentagon.

4. Known as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System. See "Aspin Emphasizes Missile Defense In Proliferation Approach," Defense Daily, December 8, 1993, p. 347.

5. Suggesting revisions to the ABM Treaty will likely spark a major Senate debate given the popularity and support for the existing agreement.

6. Bill Gertz, "Aspin Outlines Threat of Arms Proliferation: Pentagon Unveils Counterstrategy,"Washington Times, December 8, 1993, p. 4. During the Gulf War, the United States forces failed to stockpile enough vaccine to inoculate all personnel to prevent infection from germ warfare agents, had they been used by Iraq. This shortfall is now being addressed.

7. United Nations Office of Public Information, U.N. Headquarters, New York, New York, 1993.

8. The declared nuclear weapons states in 1995 include the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom. Ukraine is in the process of dismantling its nuclear force. Belaurus and Kazakhstan have already done so. Undeclared nuclear weapons states that almost certainly have them are Israel and India. Undeclared nuclear weapons states that probably could assemble one within a year or two or perhaps already have a few are Pakistan and North Korea. South Africa is a special case. It claims to have had several nuclear weapons that have since been dismantled in the past few years.

9. Countries generally reported as having undeclared offensive chemical warfare capabilities include Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Syria, China, North Korea, Taiwan, Myanmar (Burma), and Vietnam. Both the United States, its NATO allies and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union have had chemical weapons that are now being destroyed or are in storage awaiting destruction. See Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993)pp. 65-66.

10. Countries generally reported as having undeclared offensive biological warfare programs include Iran, Iraq, Isreal, Libya, Syria, China, North Korea, and Taiwan. See Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993)pp. 65-66.

11. Pinpointing the numbers of states engaged in chemical and biological weapons production is far more difficult and the estimates are made with less confidence since it is relatively simple to operate clandestine CW and BW programs, the costs are relatively low, and the technology is within the reach of many countries. Data on ballistic missile programs is probably more accurate since there is no treaty barring possession, and such programs are easy to monitor in the test stage of development. For a good survey article on who has what kinds of WMD, see: Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should Be Done?" International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1, Summer 1991, pp. 43-72. For another good survey of where NBC arms and missile proliferation is going, see Brad Roberts, "From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1, Summer 1993, pp. 139-173. Also, every year or two for the past decade, Leonard S. Spector, a respected analyst from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has published a book updating the most recent events around the world concerning the spread of nuclear weapons. See his Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 1992); The Undeclared Bomb: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1987-1988(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1988); Going Nuclear: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1985-1986 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1987); The New Nuclear Nations: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1985 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 1985); and Nuclear Proliferation Today: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1984 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1984).

12. See Thomas W. Graham, "Winning the Nonproliferation Battle," Arms Control Today, September 1991, pp. 8-13.

13. The North Koreans have agreed to reopen their seven nuclear sites to IAEA inspections, but there is still uncertainty about whether they have diverted enough plutonium to build a nuclear bomb or two. See David E. Sanger, "Despite Atom Accord, U.S. Asks: Does North Korea Have a Bomb?" New York Times, January 9, 1994, p. 1.

14. On April 13, 1993 former President Bush began a three-day visit to Kuwait City. At that time, Kuwait authorities had discovered and prevented a terrorist attempt to kill Bush utilizing a powerful car bomb. Sixteen suspects were arrested, tried, and convicted. Their leaders included two Iraqi nationals. After a thorough investigation, the United States concluded that Iraq had planned, equipped, and launched the terrorist operation. On June 26, 1993 the United States launched a missile attack against Iraqi Intelligence Service Headquarters in Baghdad to retaliate for the assassination attempt. See "Challenges to UN Decisions Scrutinized: Baghdad sites attacked after assassination plot," UN Chronicle, September 1993, p. 20.

15. IAEA experts who inspected the Iraqi nuclear facilities, estimated that they were four years away from producing their first A-bomb. CIA Director James Woolsey has stated that Iraq has the capability to return to their pre-Gulf War nuclear status in two years from the time the IAEA and UN inspectors leave Iraq, if the Coalition forces withdraw and Saddam Hussein again has a free hand in Iraq.

16. Mohammed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Company, 1975), pp. 76-77. For a good general discussion, see Leonard S. Spector, The New Nuclear Nations (New York: Vintage Books, 1984) p. 150. See also, Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East (New York: Times Books, 1981) pp. 55-57. The story was broken by Cord Meyer, "Writer Reports Libya A-Bomb Bid," Washington Post, April 16, 1979. See also, Joseph V.R. Micallef, AA Nuclear Bomb for Libya? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August-September 1981, p. 14.

17. Weissman and Krosney, Op. Cit., pp. 210-213.

18. OTA, Op.Cit., p. 64.

19. It is estimated that North Korea could have an ICBM capable of reaching the continental United States within 15 years according to a CIA report made public. See Bill Gertz, "North Korea, Iran and Iraq Capable of Developing ICBM," The Washington Times, December 24, 1993, p. A3. See also, Thomas W. Lippman, AICBM Threat to U.S. is Called Slight, The Washington Post, December 24, 1993, p. A9. The Agency reported that there was no present evidence that either North Korea, Iran or Iraq were now working on such a project, although they all have the technical capability to do so within 15 years and are states that have both the political support and motivation to do so.

20. Most of these dictatorships are run by ruthless leaders who have ruled by a mixture of coercion and cunning. In the case of one or more, it hard to discern whether he retains full mental capacity. In the case of Brezhnev or Mao Tse-Tung in their last years, this is doubtful. History is full of heads of states that have had mental problems. According to Jerome Frank, AAt least seventy-five chiefs of state in the last four centuries, actually or symbolically, governed for a total of several centuries while suffering from severe mental disturbances - a not very surprising figure considering the inbreeding of royal families and the fact that the right to rule had nothing to do with competence. See Jerome Frank, Sanity and Survival, Psychological Aspects of War and Peace (New York: Random House, 1967) p. 57. Note also his original source for this information: R. L. Noland, "Presidential Disability and the Proposed Constitutional Amendment," American Psychologist, Vol. 21, March 1966, pp. 230-235.

21. India and Pakistan are both thought to be undeclared nuclear weapons states. Anticipating the possibilities of preemptive attacks on their nuclear facilities, each by the other, the two countries have signed an agreement banning such preemptive strikes against each other's nuclear facilities.

22. During WWII, the allies attempted to keep both the Germans and the Japanese from acquiring the atomic bomb. An allied saboteur sunk a Norwegian ferry carrying almost all the German heavy water during the war to end the Nazi A-bomb threat after air strikes failed to put the German-held Norwegian plant out of business. See David Irving, The German Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967). See also, Philip Gardner and Frank Waller, "1943 and 1991: U.S. Wartime Experience in Counterproliferation Operations," (McLean, Virginia: SAIC, 1994). Allied bombs also destroyed the most advanced Japanese nuclear facility in a Tokyo air raid. For details see Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986)pp. 327, 346, 375, 457-59, 580-82, and 612. See also, Sarah S. Doyle and Joseph A. Yeager, "Japan and U.S. Nonproliferation Policy" (McLean, Virginia: Science Applications International Corporation, December 6, 1993) pp. 32-33.

23. For an excellent summary these points see Phillip Gardner and F. Waller, "1943 and 1991: U.S. Wartime Experience in Counerproliferation-Counterforce Operations," SAIC, 1994, a research report prepared for the National Security Negotiations Division, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., p. 8.

24. There is some possibility that not all the German nuclear scientists were working to secure a nuclear weapons for the Third Reich. Some claim that Werner Heisenberg acted to slow progress toward a bomb to prevent Hitler's regime from succeeding. See Geoffrey Brooks, Hitler's Nuclear Weapons: The Development and Attempted Deployment of Radiological Armaments by Nazi Germany (London: Leo Cooper, 1992). See also, Thomas Powers, Heisenberg's War: The Secret History of the German Bomb (New York: Alfred Knopf, Distributed by Random House, 1993).

25. Geoffrey Brooks, Hitler's Nuclear Weapons: The Development and Attempted Deployment of Radiological Armaments by Nazi Germany (London, Leo Cooper, 1992) p. 61.

26. Irving, Op. Cit.

27. Brooks, Op.Cit., pp. 61, 69-70. Marcel Baudot, The Historical Encyclopedia of World War II (New York: Facts on File, 1989). See also, Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, World War II: America at War, 1941-1945 (New York: Random House, 1991). Another source is Mark Walker, The Quest for Nuclear Power in National Socialist Germany, 1939-1945 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

28. For a full account, see David Irving, The German Atomic Bomb: The History of Nuclear Research in Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967).

29. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986) p. 327.

30. Ibid, p. 346.

31. Ibid, p. 457.

32. Ibid, p. 458.

33. Brooks, Op.cit., p. 191.

34. Ibid, p. 612. See also, a short summary in Sarah S. Doyle and Joseph A. Yeager, "Japan and U.S. Nonproliferation Policy" (McLean, Virginia: SAIC, December 6, 1993), pp. 32-33.

35. Brooks, Op.Cit., p. 171.

36. Ibid, p. 168.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid, p. 171. Brooks notes that United States officials did not know if there were other such German transtport submarines carrying similar cargos that U.S. forces had not been intercepted. This, he argues, may have put pressure on the Truman Administration to end the war as quickly as possible, adding still another reason for dropping U.S. A-bombs on Japan to avoid the possibility of Japanese radiological weapons being used against the United States, its allies, and its forces. The author is endebted to Lt.Col. Richard W. von Berckefeldt, USAF, for this source. See Richard W. von Berckefeldt, "Germany's Atomic Program, 1938-1944," Research Paper submitted as part of requirements of course given by the author on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Proliferation Issues, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, October 1994, pp. 1-12.

39. It is also interesting to note that the Iran-Iraq War was also the first conflict where both sides attacked the other with ballistic missiles, although these attacks did not target nuclear sites.

40. The reactor was a type of French reactor named after Osiris, the Egyptian God of the dead. The French renamed the one being built in Iraq, "Osiraq" to blend the name Osiris with that of the recipient state, Iraq. French orthography then made it "Osirak." It is called by both names in the literature. Iraq called the reactor "Tammuz," after the month in the Arabic calendar when the Ba'th party came to power in a 1968 coup. See Jed C. Snyder, "The Road To Osiraq: Baghdad's Quest for the Bomb," The Middle East Journal, Autumn 1983, p. 567.

41. Amos Permuletter, Chapter 35, "Begin Bombs the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor - and the 1981 Elections," The Life and Times of Menachem Begin (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1987) pp. 360-371. For an account of the actions leading up to the Osirak bombing within Iraq, see Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, A Political Biography (New York: The Free Press, 1993) pp. 126-128. See also, other accounts of "Operation Babylon" as the Israelis termed the operation: Seymour M. Hersh, The Sampson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991) pp. 8-13; Amos Perlmutter,, Two Minutes Over Baghdad (London: Valentine, Mitchell & Co. Ltd., 1982); Amos Perlmutter, "The Israeli Raid on Iraq: A New Proliferation Landscape," Strategic Review (Winter 1982); Shai Feldman, AThe Bombing of OsirakCRevisited," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 1982; "The Israeli Air Strike," Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1981); "The Iraqi Nuclear Threat-Why Israel Had to Act," Government of Israel, Jerusalem, 1981; Warren H. Donnelly, "Fact Sheet on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor Bombed by Israel on June 7, 1981," (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1981); and "Analysis of Six Issues About Nuclear Capabilities of India, Iraq, Libya and Pakistan," Prepared for the Subcommittee of Arms Control, Oceans, and International Operations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1982).

42. Weissman and Krosney, Op.Cit.,p. 8.

43. Ibid, p. 362.

44. Ibid, p. 363.

45. Ibid, p. 364.

46. Begin, after the Osirak raid, pointed out that Saddam Hussein had murdered his way to the top in Iraq and remained there through the same methods. He was equally violent against his neighbors, and Iraq had never recognized Israel's right to exist, maintaining a continuing state of war with Israel since 1948. Shortly after achieving power in 1979, Hussein told a personal guest that: "I know there are scores of people plotting to kill me and this is not difficult to understand. After all, did we not seize power by plotting against our predecessors? I am far cleverer than they are. I know they are conspiring to kill me long before they actually start planning to do it. This enables me to get them before they have the faintest chance of striking at me." See Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, A Political Biography (New York: The Free Press, 1993), p. 2. Two months prior to the Osirak attack, Israel intelligence prepared a 33-page psychological portrait of Saddam Hussein and sent it to Begin. The report portrayed Hussein as a hard-headed operator much of the time calling him at one and the same time, "cunning, sophisticated, cruel and brave." However, in an exceptional situation, filled with high stakes, they warned that Hussein could act very differently. "When he sees a chance to fulfill his megalomaniac ambitions for personal greatness, he is ready 'to take risks and drastic action, without weighing all the risks he is actually running in the situation.'" See Weissman and Krosney, Op.Cit., p. 20. The report said that "If in his (Hussein's) estimation, the use of atomic weapons would give him the chance to strike Israel, and gain for himself at the same time a leadership position in the Arab world, he would not hesitate to use the bomb...even if it would cost him similar retaliation from Israel, which would create damage and loss of life in Iraq itself." Ibid. This Israeli psychological portrait of Saddam Hussein as an extreme risk-taker was not dispelled in 1990-91 when he failed to compromise when confronted by overwhelming military strength by the coalition led by the world's foremost military power, the United States. The result was the ruin of Iraq and its military forces. Hussein perhaps thought the United States was bluffing, or found it impossible to compromise under the stress of the situation, or preferred to sacrifice his own people rather than look bad by backing down. He may have calculated that he had more to lose personally from being seen as withdrawing under U.S. pressure than by refusing to budge from Kuwait even if it meant suffering a military defeat.

47. Begin stated his view of the Iraqi leader after the Osirak attack: "Saddam Hussein, the ruler of Iraq, who with his own hands killed his best friends in order to be the sole ruler of that country, had an ambition. He wanted to develop nuclear weapons so that he can either try to bring Israel to its knees on behalf of the Arab world, or to destroy her men folk and infrastructure and the great part of her army, which consists of reservists in the cities. In other words, he wanted to destroy our existence-in fact, our people and our country."

48. Ibid, p. 363.

49. Perlmutter, Op.Cit., p. 362.

50. This was the position of General (ret.) Yehoshua Saguy, the head of the Intelligence Division of the IDF at the time of the air strike. He argued for continuing to try to find a non-military solution to the threat in the five to ten years he felt Israel still had before Iraq would have its first nuclear weapons. See Ilan Peleg, Begin's Foreign Policy, 1977-1983, Israel's Move To The Right (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), p. 187.

51. Ibid, P. 365. Begin told a close political advisor, "I know there is an election coming. If they (Labor) win, I will lose my chance to save the Jewish people."

52. See Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, Chapter 5, "Colonel Quaddafi's Bomb," and Chapters 11-13 on the Pakistani nuclear project in The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East (New York: Times Books, 1981),pp. 53-65 and pp. 162-223.

53. Based on an interview granted Neil Joeck by former Janata Party member Subramaniam Swamy, January 1984. See Neil Joeck, "Pakistani Security and Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia," in Joeck, ed., Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia (London: Frank Cass, 1986) p. 89. See also, "India Said to Eye Raid on Pakistani A-Plants," The Washington Post, December 20, 1982, p. 9; "The Islamic Bomb," in The Wall Street Journal, January 17, 1983, p. 24; and, finally, in AFour Minutes to Islamabad," Pakistan Times, April 1, 1985, p. 6.

54. Ibid.

55. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Iraq: The Threat From The Northern Gulf (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994) p. 105. See also: Nucleonics Week, November 19, 1987, p. 1; November 26, 1987, p. 5; March 3, 1988, p. 7; and July 28, 1988, p. 5.

56. This point was made by Harald Muller, David Fisher and Wolfgang Kotter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order (London: Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 131. They note that "A taboo connected with the non-proliferation regime was broken during the Persian Gulf War. For the first time, nuclear facilities (at Tuwaitha) containing irradiated material were purposefully attacked. Previous attacks on nuclear facilities (at Osiraq and Bushehr) took place when no fuel had been introduced into the reactors."

57. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, editors, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1993) pp. 78-79. Key Iraqi facilities remained undisturbed after 1,000 hours of air war. Only total defeat and subsequent inspection revealed the extent of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

58. Ibid, 82. This was the opinion of an American who participated in some of the IAEA inspection teams that went into Iraq under UN Resolution 687 in 1991.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid, p. 80.

61. Ibid, p. 82. The allies targeted three types of BW targets - research facilities, production facilities, and a series of refrigerated bunkers suspected of containing biological weapons. However, after the war, UN inspectors were not able to confirm that the Iraqis had actually produced any biological weapons prior to 17 January 1991.

62. Ibid, p. 81.

63. Ibid, pp. 78-79.

64. Ibid, p. 83.

65. Ibid, p. 83.

66. Ibid, p. 89.

67. Iraq almost developed a nuclear weapon without that fact being discovered by the outside world until too late. How did Saddam Hussein's government keep their project under wraps and still make such progress toward atomic weapons? First, Iraq's oil wealth bought much outside expertise and nuclear-related materials. Second, Iraq pursued multiple paths to a nuclear weapon, including 1940s Manhattan Project Calutron enrichment technology. Calutron technology was considered obsolete and was not even classified any longer in the United States. Third, Iraq went underground and disguised its other above-ground nuclear facilities to avoid detection. Fourth, Iraq joined the NPT and misled IAEA inspectors about their program, getting a clean bill of health from them just before the Persian Gulf War. Fifth, Iraq purchased dual use items and gave the impression that they were for non-nuclear projects. Sixth, Iraqi officials bought subcomponents rather than full components of nuclear technology and assembled them into larger units inside Iraq. Seventh, Iraq manufactured a fair amount of its own components indigenously, avoiding the necessity of purchasing items from abroad. Eighth, Iraq used third party intermediaries to purchase sensitive items for them. Ninth, Iraq used the bid and proposal process to pry secrets out of nuclear contractors eager for work in Iraq. They would elicit information from the contractors and often would walk away with the information without letting a contract. Tenth, Iraq found many contractors willing to sell the most sensitive information or technology for a price. Indeed, the Iraqis got a great deal of technical aid from companies in the United States and in Western Europe, as well as from the secondary nuclear supplier market that has sprung up in recent years. See, for example, Gary Milhollin, "Licensing Mass Destruction: U.S. Exports to Iraq: 1985-1990," (Washington, D.C.: Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, June 1991) and Harald Muller, "Europe's Leaky Borders," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 49, No. 5, June 1993, pp. 2729.

68. David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Iraq's Quest for the Nuclear Grail: What Can We Learn?", Arms Control Today, July/August, 1992, p. 5.

69. Ibid, p. 3. See also, Stephen J. Hedges and Peter Cary,, "Saddam's Secret Bomb: How Money and an Obsession with Weapons of Mass Destruction Very Nearly Made Iraq a Nuclear Power," U.S. News & World Report, November 25, 1991, pp. 34-42.

70. Albright and Hibbs, Op. Cit., p. 5.

71. Ibid, p. 3.

72. In January 1992, retired Soviet General Anatoly I. Gribkov revealed that "The Soviets had tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba and the military commanders there were authorized to use them without asking permission, should the United States launch an invasion." See Warren Rogers, "Nuclear Brink, Plus 32," The Washington Times, October 30, 1994.

73. In one sense this was true. Clearly, the Soviet nuclear capability would have been enhanced against U.S. targets by the additional medium range missiles in Cuba. One the other hand, how much nuclear firepower is enough to do totally unacceptable damage to U.S. cities and forces? Some would argue that the Soviet Union already had achieved such a capability without the added dimension given them by positioning missiles in Cuba. McNamara summed this up during one of the Missile Crisis discussions when he said that "A missile is a missile," meaning that it mattered little if a nuclear missile came from Cuba or the Soviet Union, the result was the same, and they already could massively hit the United States from their homeland. Soviet capability grew considerably in later years in absolute quantities, but not so much relative to the soft target set in the United States. They had that covered in 1962.

74. See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 126. There might also have been a moral reason factored into President Kennedy's decision not opt for an air strike. The experience of Pearl Harbor, where a Japanese preemptive air strike crippled the U.S. Pacific fleet, left a bad taste about preemptive bolt-from-the-blue strikes in the American consciousness. During the ExCom debate over the air strike option, Robert Kennedy passed Theodore Sorenson a note saying AI now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor." While the two historical situations may have been radically different, the remark shows RFK's bias. Whether he shared this particular view with his brother, the President, is not on record. See Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years, Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963 (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991) p. 435.

75. There were roughly 330,000 U.S. battle deaths in all of World War II.

76. The term "vital interests" is often used inappropriately to describe interests important but not absolutely necessary to the United States. In this criteria, the author is talking about a threat to the life of a significant portion of the American nation, such as destruction of major U.S. cities or any step that could ruin the U.S. economy on a massive scale.

77. Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Cited in Caspar Weinberger, Fighting For Peace: Seven Critical Years In The Pentagon (Warner Books, 1990 ), p. 441.

78. See Caspar Weinberger, Fighting For Peace: Seven Critical Years In The Pentagon (Warner Books, 1990 ), p. 441. Former Secretary of Defense Weinberger advocates six major tests to be applied when U.S. leaders are weighing the use of combat forces abroad. One, don't commit unless your vital interests are engaged. Two, put enough force in to win. Three, have clearly defined political and military objectives. Four, keep ends and means in proportion. Five, assertain that there is support from the American people and the U.S. Congress for the venture. Six, commit forces only as a last resort. See Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," Remarks to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., November 28, 1984.

79. Ibid.

80. William Shakespeare, Julius Ceasar, Act IV, Scene e, Line 217.

81. Arms Control Association, "Chronology of North Korea's Nuclear Program," Press Release, Washington, D.C., October 19, 1994, pp. 1-7.

82. Ibid, p. 1. For a critical and negative analysis of this agreement, see Albert Wohlstetter and Gregory S. Jones, "Breakthrough In North Korea," Wall Street Journal, November 4, 1994. These authors point out that the dangers that the DPRK will renege on the agreement and decide to enrich and reprocess the plutonium produced by the light-water reactors to be supplied by the U.S. allies. They also point out that the DPRK leadership promised in 1985 to forswear nuclear weapons when it signed the NPT. They then apparently broke their pledge. Wohlstetter and Jones ask what makes anyone believe these same leaders will keep their word this time?

83. Byung Chul Koh, "Images of the United States," The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990) pp. 88-93.

84. Marguerite Johnson and Edwin M. Riengold, "No Words for the Bitterness, A Nation in Mourning Points a Finger At Its Northern Neighbor," Time Magazine, October 24, 1983, p. 46. See also, "South Korea's Grief and Rage, A Terrorist Bombing Decimates Chun's Government - and Seoul Blames the North," Newsweek Magazine, October 24, 1983, p. 87.

85. Brian Jeffries, "The Slaughter in Rangoon," Macleans, October 17, 1983. See also, Brian Jeffries, "A Bitter Quest for Revenge," Macleans, October 24, 1993, p. 36.

86. Some dispute this view of Kim Jong Il, suggesting that the "psychotic" label is one put out by propagandists in the South Korean intelligence services. See Bruce Cumings, "Crazy Kim," The Nation, November 29, 1993, p. 644.

87. For a good discussion, see Leonard S. Spector and Jacquiline R. Smith, "North Korea: The Next Nuclear Nightmare?" Arms Control Today, Vol. 21, No. 2, March 1991, pp. 8-13.

88. North Korea is the source of funds and training for terrorists recruited from their own population. For example, they were responsible for the detonation of a bomb aboard a Korean Airlines (KAL) jet in 1987 which killed all aboard. DPRK assassins were caught and confessed to the act.

89. Mark Mathews, "Clinton Says North Korea Must Not Develop A Nuclear Bomb," Baltimore Sun, November 8, 1993.

90. For an interesting historical discussion of mentally-ill world leaders see Jerome D. Frank, Sanity and Survival, Psychological Aspects of War and Peace (New York: Vintage Books, 1967).

91. Rutherford M. Poats, Decision in Korea (New York: The McBride Company, 1954) p. 337. The United States suffered 29,550 dead, 103,492 wounded, with 3,486 missing in action. The Republic of Korea suffered 415,004 dead, and 428,568 wounded. No figures exist on the number of ROK troops missing in action. Additional casualties, including 3,143 dead and 11,833 wounded, were suffered by the United Kingdom, Turkey, Canada, Australia, France, Thailand, Greece, Netherlands, Colombia, Ethiopia, Belgium-Luxembourg, Phillipines, New Zealand, and South Africa.

92. Arms Control Association, Fact Sheet: "North Korea's Nuclear Facilities," (Washington, D.C.: ACA, October 1992).

93. Senator Frank Murkowski, Republican from Alaska, and new Chairman of the East Asia Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reports that North Korean officials "told us that they have frozen development of their 50 megawatt and 200 megawatt (nucler) reactors and stopped operating the 5 megawatt reactor." See T.R. Reid, "Visiting Senators Learn Little of N. Korean Leader," Washington Post, December 12, 1994, p. A1.

94. Leonard L. Spector and Jacquiline R. Smith, "North Korea: The Next Nuclear Nightmare?" Arms Control Today, March 1991, p. 13. See also, Roger M. May and Roger D. Speed, "Should Nuclear Weapons Be Used?" in W. Thomas Wander and Eric Arnett, Eds., The Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry: Technology, Motivations, and Responses (Washington, D.C.: AAAS, 1992) p. 242.

95. Bill Gertz, AU.S. Intelligence: North Korea Could Have Nukes," Washington Times, December 2, 1993, p. 3.

96. Steven A. Holmes, "U.S., in Stern Terms, Warns North Koreans on A-Arms," New York Times, November 18, 1993, p. 1.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. David E. Sanger, "U.S. Delay Urged on Korea Sanction," New York Times, International Edition, November 4, 1994.

100. Eliot Cohen, director of strategic studies at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, questions, "But really, who can imagine a President authorizing a large-scale, unilateral attack against a country that has done no direct harm to the United States or its allies?" Cohen asserts that "The days of Osirak-type raids on a single, easily located and above-surface nuclear facility are over. Secrecy, camouflage, deception and dispersion will make preemption a far more extensive and uncertain operation than ever before." See Eliot Cohen, comments on Heather Wilson's "Missed Opportunities: Washington Politics and Nuclear Proliferation," The National Interest, Winter 1993/94, p. 38.

101. North Korea would be legally protected from nuclear attack by NPT Membership, something that the United States would need to take into account in any PCP action, not only for legal reasons. Such a direct violation of the NPT could undermine it, causing non-nuclear state parties to the NPT to revise their thinking about acquiring nuclear weapons and going it alone. Also, nuclear use by the United States would greatly weaken the "no nuclear use" international norm that has grown up since Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed in 1945. American decision-makers would be constrained to use only conventional forces in PCP actions if they ever wished to retain legitimacy and credibility when advising against, criticizing, or taking actions against the spread of nuclear weapons.

102. Victor E. Alessi, then-Director, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technology Support, Department of Energy, Statement before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, November 13, 1991, pp. 4-5. Alessi addressed DOE's contributions to uncovering and limiting the Iraqi nuclear weapons complex after the Gulf War and he laid out some suggestions for strengthening U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy.

103. It is interesting that Saddam Hussein's forces did not strike the coalition with its full complement of chemical arms like they did in the Iran-Iraq war earlier. Perhaps Saddam was deterred by the superior WMD warfare capability of the United States that might have been unleashed. In the parlance of the strategist, the United States had escalation dominance.

104. Saddam Hussein, just before Desert Storm, asserted that: "With the help of Allah, we shall rid the region of American influence. Our missiles cannot reach Washington, but if they could, we would hit there as necessary."

105. Karsh and Rautsi, Op.Cit., p. 2-5.

106. In domestic law, preemptive action is legal if it can be proven to be "anticipatory self defense."

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