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University After Next

by Lieutenant General Montgomery C. Meigs, US Army, and Colonel Edward J. Fitzgerald III, US Army


The year is 2014. An Army After Next (AAN) commander of US forces will deploy to restore order over a wide area. A major military competitor is threatening to use force against a chief regional power. A rugged, forested terrain, a heavily populated seaboard and a confusing multitude of potential opponents ranging from irregular militia bands to regional states' regular army forces characterize this area of responsibility (AOR).

For the first time since the Soviet Union's fall, a major military competitor eager to take advantage of regional turmoil aggravates the crisis. This competitor may be bankrolling sophisticated computer hackers who seek to foster chaos in the area of operation (AO) by attacking regional commercial and government computers, as well as the US forces' command, control, communications, computer and information (C4I) systems. Then again, the paymaster for the cyber terrorists might be the regional drug syndicate.

Each of these asymmetrical threats would be glad to see US forces sucked into the coastal urban centers, where US strengths in firepower, sensors and information technology (IT) could be negated, and where the potential of casualties and clashes with the indigenous population is high. Worse still, the current crisis erupted unexpectedly. A major political scandal in the chief regional power, the worst weather since the early 1700s, the collapse of regional markets and the determination of criminal cartels to strike back against international crackdowns on arms and drug trafficking aggravate the crisis. The major military competitor is threatening to use force against the chief regional power.

US forces, while well trained, require additional gunnery and maneuver training at a Combat Training Center (CTC) to execute the peace enforcement mission that the National Command Authorities have handed to the commander. His forces must deploy to, and operate in, a volatile environment against diverse threats and challenges in an exceptionally fluid political setting. The staff must ensure that all deploying units receive appropriate training. Meanwhile, they must coordinate with theater command for the host nation support needed for the reception, staging and onward movement integration and follow-on logistic support for the force.

Fortunately, the command possesses unprecedented physical speed and precision and can apply that physical superiority because it knows what it needs to know more quickly and fully than its opponents. It possesses the ability to decide and act with uncanny versatility, speed and effectiveness. The "knowledge speed" derives from the interplay between available technology and the quality, skill and confidence of the soldiers.

As the commander moves to conduct an in-country reconnaissance, the units begin certification at their respective home stations. In the interim, units complete training and gunnery certification in preparation for overseas movement, including preparation of replacements. Upon the commander's return, the units will begin a cycle of mission rehearsals in simulation. Had there been more lead time, the CTCs would have tailored rotations focused on the social, political and military realities in the AOR, allowing units to be certified on mission-essential tasks. The deployment timetable is too short for that - deploying forces must rely on simulation-based training for their final tuneup. As the commander returns, units are completing the packing and preparation for movement to air and sea terminals.

As the final preparation progresses, key headquarters move to local training areas and set up in tactical configuration on wireless local area networks. Calls to the University After Next (UAN) when the unit received its warning order resulted in alert of the Battle Command Training Program's (BCTP's) Team Delta. The team immediately began working with planners of the joint task force (JTF) that will serve as higher headquarters to create a realistic exercise scenario to validate the campaign plan.

The UAN has also drawn digitized map data from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and has loaded the data bases of your Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) with the AOR's maps. The UAN has also populated your system with an opposing force data base tailored closely to the expected enemy's. Also, the Team Delta observer controllers (OCs) join the headquarters personnel as they deploy to their exercise tactical positions. In addition, they brought with them a UAN "Green Cell," experts in the area and players representing each senior official the US commander met in-country. They are busily putting the final touches on the roles they will play in the exercise. Team Delta also includes a leadership assessment team that will conduct 360-degree evaluations of the interpersonal functioning and knowledge generation and flow in the commander's leadership system throughout the exercise. Their feedback goes only to the commander and his key leaders. Their insights help assess how, over time and under pressure, the command group and staff operate as a human system in parallel with the information and decision-making system.

The UAN, with its virtual research library (VRL) and faculty, seamlessly "gloves" into the commander's C4I system, completing his situational awareness and providing him with the deep knowledge needed to synthesize the battlefield knowledge provided by sensors. It supplies the command and control (C2) system with a synthetic picture that enables the commander and staff to plan, rehearse and evaluate missions through full immersion in virtual simulation environments updated on the fly from sensors and VRL alike. Earlier, the staff learned in the UAN Leader Development Center (LDC) how to improve decision making in the revolutionary environment wrought by the UAN's unblinking eye, and mission-rehearsal and decision-support technologies. As units begin rehearsals, they hone the capability to fuse battlefield awareness with out-of-theater knowledge assets that will enable them to out-think, out-decide and out-perform manifold and diverse opponents to such a degree that they veer into psychological paralysis.

As the rehearsal unfolds, the staff and commanders build upon lessons learned in their last BCTP and CTC rotations. The simulation-supported exercise provides a grueling environment. The commander's staff works the central problems of planning and monitoring execution. Key leaders are continually confronted by role players. Working through interpreters slows the rate of exchange and dulls the commander's ability to assess nonverbal cues. With Team Delta's help, several disconnects in the operations plan (OPLAN) are isolated. The ABCS allow units to simultaneously E-mail the changes to subordinate commands. Connectivity to the Global Command and Control System has allowed the staff to update the JTF's draft plan with changes approved in a video teleconference collaborative planning session with the JTF commander miles away.

The Warfighter Simulation (WARSIM), with its ability to represent all operational environment elements - including snipers in 3D urban terrain, hostile crowds and conventional units - has helped all key players better understand their role in executing the plan. Team Delta's Leader System OCs have accomplished some important tasks. Because of software embedded in the ABCS, they have identified a number of system operators who need additional training on their assigned Army Tactical Command and Control System equipment. By comparing preparations of OPLAN products over time, the software also helps them point out staff elements that are not following sleep discipline. The staff has also been reminded of its own response to stress over time and its impact on the organization's function and decision process. In the after-action reviews on this aspect of the operation, the staff has worked out techniques for recognizing the unique signs indicating fatigue and dysfunction and for working with one another to minimize their effects.

The biggest surprise came from the information warfare section, whose experts in turning information into knowledge have reorganized information and display to suit the idiosyncratic needs of the JTF commander and staff. They have worked some additional tweaks to C2-protect procedures. They have proven adept at contributing in targeting meetings to integrating psychological operations, civil affairs, public affairs and command messages and actions in support of execution. Finally, the information warfare section's "fence riders" have made themselves indispensable. These "electronic scouts" not only mandate C2-protect procedures, they roam the pipes in cyberspace, reporting enemy manipulation of the commercial means that carry much of the data which forms situational awareness. They can even tell when a system is being influenced and rate the reliability of the input. In addition to their own expertise, they rely on operators at UAN and, through its connectivity, on other sources in the national information protect network.

The work to build this knowledge-based future is under way today. Existing in embryonic form at the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the UAN will be a center of gravity for the Army's knowledge-based future force. Given widespread public interest in knowledge management and technology-assisted learning issues and technologies, the UAN will likely spearhead national and international efforts to use IT on behalf of national objectives. However, realization of this promise requires early and full engagement of Army and other military leaders and unprecedented civil-military cooperation with US business, academic, entertainment and public sectors. To provide the leaders for the AAN in 2025, the UAN's foundation must be in place by the year 2000.

Origins, Partnerships, Research and Reinvention

In February 1996, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer directed inception of a program to develop an AAN vision, the potential Army of 2025. Like Joint Vision 2010, from which it was derived, AAN would build on two major US strengths - quality people and IT. In July 1997, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published Knowledge Speed, which outlined an emerging AAN vision that forged "a new marriage between battlefield knowledge and unprecedented land-power speed." In August 1997, TRADOC's Combined Arms Directorate responded to the recently published, emerging AAN vision and simulation, digital library, base operations and education efforts at Fort Leavenworth.

The vision projected a UAN to support the AAN in two ways: by developing leaders tailored to AAN's distinguishing characteristics and versatile in both wartime and peacetime missions, including those in between, such as peace enforcement and peacekeeping; and by providing online knowledge distilled within interactive libraries and simulation and available through extended faculty as virtual staff. The UAN will also leverage Army Training XXI - including the Army Distance Learning Plan - as a migration strategy, and bring coherence to, while mobilizing the benefits from, the cutting-edge information-age projects at CAC.

Building on its role as the combined arms integrator, CAC has become the test-bed for Army, joint and federal pioneering efforts in technology-enhanced operational learning, knowledge management, digital records management and libraries and next-generation wireless technologies and applications for virtually unlimited bandwidth environments. The CAC prototype, serving as the military's "reinvention laboratory" for knowledge management, assimilation and dissemination, will provide a model that can then be replicated across the Army and DOD. This, in turn, will permit the integration of Army and joint data bases into the UAN, which will function as an information focal point for operational units and schools alike.

The UAN will start in 1998 at Fort Leavenworth, which must work closely from the outset with the US Army War College (AWC), Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and the National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., as well as with operational prototyping efforts at the Military Intelligence and Armor schools. It must expand to the remaining TRADOC schools and centers by 2000, and fully engage the other Program of Joint Military Education institutions. The Army's CTCs figure prominently in the UAN vision as providers of the most important new information on ground combat available in peacetime and as a source of the most expert members of the virtual faculty.

We already know that the AAN will be a voracious consumer of military, political and cultural knowledge drawn from data warehouses via the "living Internet." The AAN will conduct split-based operations. Left behind will be all "baggage" not directly related to closing with or gaining positional advantage over the enemy. At the operational commander's disposal will be the combined knowledge and experience of Army and DOD schools and staffs. Split-based operations, with their "reach-out" communications, knowledge and fire support - combined with "just-in-time" and "just-what's-needed" logistics - will maximize force protection and speed while considerably shortening the in-theater logistics tail.

We also know that knowledge-based operations will accelerate operating tempos and decision-making rates in staffs. Success in this stressful environment will require a special kind of leader, one who is technically capable in the tasks of digital decision making, but who retains the reliance on, and understanding of, how to maximize the unit's human potential.

UAN then must address these critical issues:

Synthetic training environments will prove decisive in shaping the requisite maturity and experience, with live training reserved for finishing exercises and soldier skill development and maintenance.

The projected UAN produces these leaders and ensures them unprecedented continuing support through several initiatives. Through reengineering of instruction at Army schools and distance learning, it will institute student-centered, interactive and technology-enhanced learning by maximizing simulation and interactive multimedia. By using technology to bring SMEs from the schoolhouses, CTCs, research centers and the outside world to the commander, UAN will provide leaders with a virtual extended staff to assist in the development of their plans, training, mission rehearsal and operations.

Through remote, distributed simulation and a VRL, UAN provides online tools and knowledge sets, as well as the capability for searching, visualizing, mining and tailoring those knowledge sets for operations, training and self-development. UAN will work with the commercial communications industry and those responsible for military enterprise systems to ensure synchronized development of UAN applications and the seamless continuum of wireless and wired bandwidth they require. The online knowledge sets, simulations and expertise intersect with the battlefield knowledge and decision-support tools to provide the "knowledge speed" essential to exploit AAN's physical speed to paralyze the enemy.

The target UAN will draw on advances in technology-assisted learning, seamless tactical engagement simulation, interactive entertainment and full immersion in virtual experiences to prepare soldiers to learn, know, decide and act in analogous real-life situations. It will research the interplay among technology, learning transfer and decision making to ensure maximum knowledge speed in leader development and operations. Through research and practice, UAN will contribute to the nation's competitive edge in developing people, systems and methods and to the international effort to use technology to maximize understanding and productivity.

Perhaps the greatest challenge is to develop new strategies for learning and decision making. Some estimates indicate that, even today, information technologies enable a fifteen-fold increase in learning transfer, yet no organization has:

Because the technology changes so quickly in telecommunications and information management, it is very difficult to template the decision-support systems that will come online in two years, let alone seven, the normal run for our Program Objective Memorandum cycle.

Fortunately, TRADOC, the AWC and TRADOC Analysis Command formed an AAN research alliance that can be applied to the emerging UAN as an AAN system. Moreover, Fort Leavenworth's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has already formed a web of enabling partnerships around its technology initiatives. Early in the process, CALL established an interlocking set of local relationships - cemented by common projects and coinvestment - with the garrison commander and his Directorate of Information Management, the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and its Combined Arms Research Library, the National Simulation Center and the Training Support Center. In early 1996, the visionary National Technology Alliance (NTA) selected CALL as model and test-bed for its national records management and digital library initiatives. On 23 May 1997, the assistant secretary of defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence chartered the NTA-CALL partnership as the Defense Information Technology Test (DITT), with Fort Leavenworth as the test-bed site. To implement the test, CALL signed memoranda of understanding with the Joint Warfighting Center, the secretary of the Air Force, Gulf War Declassification, the Defense Automated Printing Service and the Mounted Maneuver Battle Laboratory (MMBL). Formal and informal relationships bind CALL to the following agencies:

These external partnerships ensure that CALL can draw on the best ideas, methods and technology in developing UAN. Additionally, DITT's test-bed and technology transfer functions ensure that the innovations can be tested and exported for UAN implementation.

However, existing CALL partnerships are only a start. The UAN effort must assemble a learning research community, starting with the Army Research Institute and Army Research Laboratory. The community must extend to embrace civilian universities, both those that study learning and those paving the way in using technology to enhance it. Indeed, the UAN effort requires using even nontraditional collaborators, such as the movie, animation, video game, computer game and multimedia industries. Digital technologies provide multiple and intensely stimulating routes into the human mind, with its capacity to understand, translate full and repeated experience into an instinctive, decide and act process. Any industry or individual with a key to unlocking the power of these technologies must be brought to bear on the UAN.

Under UAN, CAC, CAC-associated schools and centers and CAC's partners become a virtual reinvention laboratory to spearhead a revolution in knowledge management, assimilation and worldwide dissemination. Applying advanced information-age technologies gained through extensive partnerships across the Army, DOD, the federal government, private business and industry, the laboratory forms the test-bed UAN hub. The virtual laboratory will make maximum use of reinvention and cooperative research agreements to access corporations and individuals with needed ideas and technologies. It will apply collaborative tools and networks that permit building and testing operational prototypes in the environment of unconstrained bandwidth that approximates the living Internet of 2010. The operational prototypes will support AAN information definition and learning requirements, and provide a startup UAN capability. Thus, the prototypes will support soldiers and leaders, giving them vital information, integrated in highly efficient and effective practical learning strategies, in real time while engaging them in the further refinement of knowledge requirements. Finally, CAC prototypes form the basis for the establishment of the objective UAN through the export of integrated enabling methods, technologies and systems.

In short, UAN can only be executed through unprecedented partnerships with commercial, civilian "knowledge" work and other government organizations. Only large-scale collaboration can provide the interorganizational, interdisciplinary expertise, financial resources and new and emerging technologies to solve revolutionary military, education and training, research library and technical problems. These problems are of equal interest, given differences in emphasis, to the joint military community; other armed services; federal, state and local governments; and the civilian education and business sectors. As a result, the Army, by building UAN in conjunction with its partners, can provide solutions applicable to every facet of national life. While presenting unprecedented legal complexities, partnership with the private sector is especially significant, since it has become the main driver and consumer of the enabling technologies for UAN, yet has much to learn from Army pioneering efforts in organizational learning and knowledge management.

The Virtual University

At UAN's heart is the virtual university. The UAN's purpose is twofold:

The virtual university will use new and emerging technologies to form a synthetic theater of learning that will be completely interoperable with the synthetic theater of war, and provide both to the operational commander via the living Internet to significantly accelerate the conduct of operations.

The virtual university includes a program of instruction reengineered to enable maximum learning through the application of technology at minimum costs consistent with that goal through the best mix of institutional and distance learning. It includes in a virtual library all Army repositories of interactive multimedia knowledge sets and the tools to exploit them, as well as links to outside knowledge sets. Interactive, student-centered instruction and multimedia knowledge are coupled with remote simulation to engage the complete cognitive faculties of leaders. The virtual university creates an extended faculty composed of those teaching at Army and joint schools, CTC staffs, the collective body of Army and joint SMEs and outside experts.

Through communications and tools, interactive multimedia and web-based instruction, other knowledge sets, extended or virtual faculty and remote simulation will be brought to the leader, providing the reach-out knowledge he or she needs to conduct the AAN's split-based operations. UAN will focus on the information requirements of units before, during and after a contingency or major training exercise deployment. But since it will also collect and absorb information from these events, UAN will also simultaneously provide the knowledge base needed to train our officers and soldiers to execute operations successfully at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

The virtual university will produce virtual doctrine and training manuals for the AAN. Available on-line, these manuals will leverage the revolution in learning transfer achieved for the UAN as a whole. The UAN virtual manual will fuse multimedia presentation, virtual reality, simulation and interactivity. They will incorporate new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) generated through the Army's organizational learning process from the CTCs and actual operations. They will likely break down the walls between doctrine, training and technical manuals. Anticipating this trend, the Armor School and Center's MMBL is already launching an operational prototype to define the requirement.

The UAN will mature the Army Training XXI tools, ably developed by the Army Training Support Center, for automated revision of doctrine and training literature, integrate them with the lessons-learned applications and VRL, and engage the entire virtual faculty in doctrine and training developments. The UAN, with the support of the reach-back faculty as extended staff, will export the capability for such developments to the battlefield, providing the methods and tools for confronting hitherto unknown individual and collective tasks with just-in-time TTPs and training.

The UAN will also include a Leader Development Center (LDC), which will develop digital decision makers, the leaders of Force XXI and the AAN. The heart of the projected LDC, the Digital Leader Reaction Course (DLRC), will teach leaders how to visualize the battlespace and make decisions in a time-constrained, digitized environment. Applicable to both conflict and virtual peacemaking scenarios, the DLRC will use full immersion in virtual battlefields replete with sensors, online knowledge, decision aids and other C2 systems. The LDC will also double as a research center and laboratory.

Initially focused on cognitive engineering, cybernetics and IT, the LDC will link the knowledge of civilian universities to the powerful combination of Army schools, operations research and simulation communities, battle laboratories and operational expertise in digital C2 systems at installations such as Fort Hood, Texas. As student leaders learn, they will report on their experiences, thereby helping to unlock the power of IT for decision making. Both the LDC's educational and research functions will require a powerful combination of networked operational systems, simulation and research tools to enable the Army and its partners to fully develop digital C2 theory. From this theory, the Army can develop the institutional architecture for digital C2 in its doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel and soldier systems. Since the LDC will reveal much about the first principles of technology-assisted decision making in a digital environment, it, like other UAN components, will have both ideas and systems that readily transfer to the civilian and public sectors.

Virtual Research Library

In the wake of the Cold War, the Army - in collaboration with other services, the joint community, the National Archives and partners in the academic and business sectors - developed a VRL under CALL, working with the Army Doctrine and Training Digital Library at Fort Eustis, Virginia. The Army recently reconceptualized this library as a UAN centerpiece. According to this concept, the VRL, like its parent UAN, educates and trains the AAN and provides online experts and knowledge sets tailored to meet the requirements of Army and joint leaders in the field as they prepare for and conduct operations. In split-based operations conducted abroad, but with direct support from outside the theater, the VRL projects knowledge to forces wherever they are deployed.

The VRL contains several kinds of knowledge assets:

The VRL strives to protect and reduce the secrecy of information by applying technology to achieve multilevel classification, and through computer-assisted and fully automated declassification, reclassification, public release and sanitization.

The VRL will constitute the UAN data warehouse for the field Army it supports. It provides knowledge sets that include interactive online course material; distributed simulation and data to update that simulation with just-in-time, cultural-terrain and scenario components; knowledge navigators; visualization and mining tools; decision-support tools; and an online human knowledge network. It serves both the UAN and the AAN in the field with whatever is required for knowledge speed but not available through battlefield systems.

The VRL will include Army Training XXI tools and resources and operational learning products, and it will help manage the Army's corporate knowledge from inception in garrison and battlefield systems - and in the brains of its SMEs - to incorporation into the library. The VRL should form part of a joint and national "library without walls," and may, through partnership, include fielding components of the national imagery or joint digital libraries and archives.

The VRL will also include significant information from the Army's battlefield knowledge systems. Whether through doubling as a national multimedia imagery repository or through links to that repository, it will also access the products of non-Army sensors, including multimedia imagery from UAVs. From this seamless web of sensors (the AAN's unblinking eye), the VRL - through technologies pioneered by NIMA, NRO and the Defense Information Agency - will provide the cultural-terrain data and tools for translating that data from 2D to 3D to support virtual simulation for decision support and mission rehearsal. Constantly updated military, political, socio-economic and cultural data will revise the data bases for the synthetic environment. Moreover, the VRL will store those simulations generated in support of ongoing operations for future study and use either at CGSC or over standard communication trunks to subscribers in the field.

In the near future at CAC, CGSC students will begin running experiments in the LDC that attempt to see into the distant future of cybernetic support of military decisions. Simultaneously, CALL's data archiving will improve to the point that, through artificial intelligence, knowledge sets will be collected, stored and available to students, faculty and units worldwide. Other developments will support distributed training of unprecedented power. These include the advent of entity-based simulations, such as WARSIM in its objective form, ABCS with software modules that can assess leader and user performance in a noninterference mode, simulators or translators compliant with the Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment and a hybrid BCTP decision-making, leader-development process. Modules of hybrid text data and simulation products would be readily available for self-development and small-group or unit training. Off-the-shelf simulation products would be available on call to drive battalion, brigade and division command post exercise training. Finally, in addition to BCTP training that assessed division and corps cadres as an operational system, as well as a leader-based network with a human dimension, mission rehearsals of unprecedented fidelity would be available to support units alerted for deployment. Not only would these units be able to exercise at home station in an accelerated BCTP WARFIGHTER focused on the operation, they would also be able to conduct mission rehearsals in-theater. Existing technology enables them to rehearse plans and work on training shortfalls over satellite communications even as they deploy.

The UAN presents tremendous potential to Force XXI trainers and leaders as they prepare to secure our future well into the next century. Combining current and envisioned networking and telecommunications networks, storage and processing capabilities and user-friendly search engines - all designed to provide the required knowledge sets, mind-developing simulations and split-based support for our soldiers - requires all of our current leadership and visionary skills. Building the UAN envisioned can only be accomplished through the combined efforts of the Army, DOD, the federal government, civilian industry and academia, with the results materially strengthening the national "knowledge factory" as well as the military.

Technology has enabled countless advances in military capabilities, and it promises to deliver even more. However, in the euphoria of technological advances, Army leaders must never lose sight of what will always be most potent - the human factor. Leadership and decision making, regardless of technology and knowledge sets, will rest with leaders. The tools UAN offers, such as imagery, real-time 3D, current situation simulations, are just that - tools. Nothing more. Nothing less. Our leaders will continue to determine success or failure. The task at hand is to train them to know and appreciate the new tools available. This training must always be done in a Total Army context. Now, more than ever before, the Active and Reserve partnership will be critical to national success, at all levels and in all endeavors. MR


Lieutenant General Montgomery C. Meigs is deputy commanding general, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, and commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy and an M.S. and Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin. He is a graduate of CGSC and the National War College. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States (CONUS) and Europe, including commander, 1st Infantry Division (ID), Würzburg, Germany, and in Bosnia; commander, 3d ID (Mechanized), Würzburg; deputy chief of staff, Operations, US Army Europe, Heidelberg, Germany; chief of staff, V Corps, Heidelberg; commander, 7th Army Training Command, Grafenwöhr, Germany; commander, 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Erlangen, Germany, and during Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield; and strategic planner, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. He has published numerous articles in professional journals and is the author of Slide Rules and Submarines.

Colonel Edward J. Fitzgerald III is director, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth. He received a B.S. from Seton Hall University and an M.S. from Long Island University. He is a graduate of CGSC and the US Army War College. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in CONUS and Turkey, including deputy chief, Office for Defense Cooperation-Turkey (ODC-T), Ankara, Turkey; chief, Army Directorate ODC-T, Ankara; G3, 7th ID (Light), Fort Ord, California; commander, 5th Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 5th ID (Mechanized), Fort Polk, Louisiana; and S3, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. His article "The Center for Army Lessons Learned: Winning in the Information Age," coauthored with Lieutenant General L.D. Holder, appeared in the July-August 1997 issue of Military Review.