A N ARMY AT WAR must be able to view itself critically and learn from an internal assessment of its own experiences as well as from the observations of other professionals. The major measure of this learning effort is the ability to act on new knowledge and change patterns of action and education. British Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster’s essay in the November-December 2005 Military Review did us a great service by pointing out that the U.S. Army is at a watershed in its history. Warfare is changing and we might have been slow to recognize this change. Indeed, according to Aylwin-Foster we have been so insensitive to the Iraqis in particular and Phase IV-type operations in general that our cultural failings “arguably amounted to institutional racism.” He maintains that we also suffer from a decrease in overall professionalism and have little to no idea about how to win the current war in Phase IV.

While Aylwin-Foster was right to call attention to these critical questions and to problems the U.S. military has experienced in Iraq, his assessment is off-target, and the difference is significant. We American officers must be professional enough to learn from the observations of others, unhindered as they are by American lenses. Unquestionably, some Americans have shown too little sensitivity to Iraqi culture and the demands of counterinsurgency warfare, but in the heat of battle even those armies most experienced in counterinsurgency have been known to have problems, as the British Army demonstrated when it employed Warrior Fighting Vehicles to knock down the walls of a Basra jail to rescue two British soldiers taken prisoner by a local militia leader.

Aylwin-Foster, among others, asserts that the U.S. Army paid inadequate attention to planning for Phase IV of the campaign in Iraq. He also asserts that our Army is at a pivotal moment in its history and has been too slow to recognize the type of war we are fighting and what we need to do to set conditions for victory. I disagree with both assertions and offer a two-part counterpoint. The first part is historical. The second specifically addresses some of Aylwin-Foster’s more important claims.

Planning Phase IV

My experience in planning Operation Iraqi Freedom began in July 2002. While assigned to Third U.S. Army/Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) as the C/J5, I was privileged to direct development of the range of plans for the Land Command from before operations began in March 2003 until I left CFLCC in July 2003. Aylwin-Foster is wrong in claiming that we did not plan for Phase IV. The challenge was translating the plans into action while dealing with guidance and assumptions from higher echelons of command, the deployment process, and evolving policy. As a result, our plans never quite evolved to link ground operations to logical lines of operation that would lead to setting solid military conditions for policy objectives.

The first “C” in CFLCC stands for combined. This is an important point to bear in mind. Not only did CFLCC have Marine staff members, it also had Coalition officers serving in key billets. In the C/J5 section, Lieutenant Colonel Chris Field of the Australian Army and Major Nick Elliot of the British Army had the same access to intelligence and information as U.S. officers had; indeed, these two officers led many planning groups before and after operations began.

July-December 2002. When I arrived at Third Army/CFLCC headquarters in Atlanta, all of the J5 staff were engaged in planning the decisive maneuver, or combat phase, of the campaign. Those who were not directly involved in this effort were heavily engaged in building a time-phased force-deployment list (TPFDL) from deployment data.
Our operations plan, COBRA II, was designed to cover all phases of the campaign, as outlined by Central Command (CENTCOM) Campaign Plan 1003V. Based on previous experience, I decided to establish a group of officers, small as this group might be at first, to work on a skeleton of the Phase IV portion of the major operations plan. I felt we had to come to grips with the complexities of that portion of the campaign.\(^2\)

Developing a major operations plan that covered all phases of the campaign, including developing the force deployment list, and constantly working with CENTCOM planners on campaign plan revisions and briefings for our higher command echelon, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), kept planners and senior CFLCC leaders engaged, to say the least. The level of effort required to do these tasks and to refine a plan for Phase IV led me to ask for planner reinforcement. Four officers arrived in January 2003.

**January–April 2003.** Our reinforced team continued to refine the operations plan. We learned that there would be no single TPFDL decision for force flow; rather, we would have to submit requests for forces (in tailored unit packages) through channels to OSD. This additional workload, coupled with preparation for the final CENTCOM commanders’ conferences, a complete review of the written plan by the entire staff, and visits by senior general officers from Washington, kept the pressure on all planners and the staff in general. Nevertheless, the Phase IV planning team, including the British officers, refined planning assumptions and continued to wargame.\(^3\)

We made several key assumptions en route to refining our plan: We would be able to recall the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi governmental bureaucracy, policy guidance would change over time, and the removal of Ba’ath party members would be limited to senior-level bureaucrats and officers. We presented these assumptions to senior CFLCC leaders as well as to senior joint and Army staff general officers when they visited during January and February 2002.\(^4\)

On 15 February 2003, CFLCC commander Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan conducted a “rock drill.” The drill, held in a warehouse on Camp Doha, Kuwait, rehearsed actions en route to Baghdad, including the assumed entry of the 4th Infantry Division from the north. The following day, 16 February, the C5 handed over the plan to the C35 (Future Operations) for final refinement into an operations order. The C5 continued refining the Phase IV portion of the plan as well as continuing the difficult work of constructing requests for forces. Wargaming Phase IV was becoming more and more complex.

On 17 March 2003, I told McKiernan that the wargaming was so complex that I had to conclude Phase IV would be a true sequel to COBRA II and would require its own plan. Engaged with the details of impending D-Day (19 March 2003), McKiernan agreed and told me to work through the deputy commanding general of Phase IV, Major General Albert Whitley of the British Army. Planning efforts continued and included Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, Joint Task Force-IV, V Corps, and I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF).\(^5\)

Whitley engaged external agencies in the effort to “control as we go,” the guidance McKiernan had given to all commanders for COBRA II. After we gained control of the southern area of Iraq (Umm Qasr and Basrah), Whitley worked with the Kuwaiti Government on constructing a fresh-water pipeline into southern Iraq. He also coordinated the delivery of relief supplies into the port of Umm Qasr. Whitley and Colonel Marty Stanton, the head of CFLCC’s C9 (Civil-Military Operations Cell), worked to get international agencies and the U.N. back into Iraq.

We named our Phase IV sequel “ECLIPSE II.” CFLCC, V Corps, and I MEF planners reviewed data on the ethnic makeup of the country. We identified potential ethnic flashpoints, tribal areas, and regions in which Saddam’s form of ethnic cleansing had taken place (mostly in the northern Iraqi governates or states). In April 2003, Coalition forces entered Baghdad and, in accordance with the CENTCOM campaign plan, CFLCC established a forward headquarters in the city. At the same time, another C5 Plans to C35 Future Operations handover took place, this time of ECLIPSE II. CFLCC forces reoriented themselves into Phase IV

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zones of operation. A troop-to-task analysis led us to recommend that CFLCC establish a presence in Iraq’s major cities while an economy-of-force effort supported by electronic surveillance patrolled the open desert areas of the countryside. By the end of April, the planning focus was on transition criteria for handover of the mission to an undesignated follow-on headquarters.  

May-June 2003. For planners, this period was dominated by three key decisions: CFLCC would become Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), responsible for all of Iraq; CJTF-7 would hand over its responsibilities to V Corps; and the Iraqi Army would be disbanded. In early May 2003, the CENTCOM commander decided that CFLCC would become CJTF-7. This decision clarified the CFLCC planning direction, as we had concluded that there was no viable follow-on headquarters to oversee Phase IV.

Near the end of May or in early June, after establishing the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), CENTCOM decided that V Corps would relieve CFLCC of CJTF-7’s responsibilities. This required an extensive effort on the part of both staffs to coordinate the intricate handover of responsibilities for, among other things, the development of a joint manning document to ensure the V Corps staff would become a functioning joint staff.

Finally, in accordance with the campaign plan and ECLIPSE II, CFLCC coordinated with Iraqi Army generals to recall the Iraqi Army. Officers on the ground in Iraq reconnoitered locations for the recall while V Corps and I MEF forces collected weapons and munitions for reissue. In late May, CFLCC hosted Walt Slocombe, the CPA representative to the new Iraqi Ministry of Defense, at Camp Doha. After briefing him on the details of our efforts on the recall, we requested a decision on continuing the effort. His response was to thank us for the briefing. Later that month we learned of the decision to disband the Iraqi Army. CFLCC handed over the role of CJTF-7 to V Corps on 15 June 2003.

While some American commanders have clearly failed to grasp the changing conduct of the Iraq war and how best to prosecute it, others have performed brilliantly.

The Watershed

The preceding is history from my perspective. As Aylwin-Foster concedes, the campaign is still ongoing; thus, definitive judgment is tough to make. However, his blanket statements about the U.S. Army’s conduct and inability to learn and adapt are exaggerated, to say the least. While some American commanders have clearly failed to grasp the changing conduct of the Iraq war and how best to prosecute it, others have performed brilliantly. Aylwin-Foster writes that the “Army’s approach to and conduct of operations was a contributory factor in the Coalition’s failure to exploit success immediately after the fall of Saddam.” He also says, “A hierarchically conscious command ethos, which encouraged centralization, and conversely discouraged low-level initiative or innovation,” contributed to the Army’s inability to adapt to the requirements of Phase IV, and according to him, “[e]ach commander had his own style, but if there was a common trend it was for micromanagement. . . .” Let us look for supporting or refuting evidence of these assertions. We all know or have known micromanagers, but in the words of one major I spoke with, “Combat has driven out the over-control freaks.”

Professionalism in Decline?

Aylwin-Foster asserts that “whilst the U.S. Army may espouse mission command, in Iraq it did not practice it. . . .” This germane issue is at the root of the Army’s ability to adapt to changing environments and a thinking enemy. Are we capable of encouraging mission command, or are we merely paying lip service to the doctrine? To answer these questions I looked into the written record of actions in Iraq and interviewed former commanders who were in-theater during the brigadier’s tour of duty.

On 15 August 2004, Major General Peter W. Chiarelli led the 1st Cavalry Division into Baghdad, relieving the 1st Armored Division in place while in contact. In an article in the July-August 2005 Military Review, Chiarelli outlines the lessons learned from his experience in-theater and describes the operations his 1st Cavalry Division conducted in Baghdad. Chiarelli quite pointedly remarks that “warfare as we know it has changed.”

Chiarelli’s major point is that a lopsided focus on security and kinetic operations, while in the Army’s
comfort zone, will not win this kind of war. Thus, he prepared his division to conduct operations along mutually supporting, logical lines of operation that balanced the application of all forms of power, both lethal and nonlethal. His article outlines how the 1st Cavalry Division conducted these operations during a crucial period in the overall campaign. His conclusions and recommendations are germane to the debate on how—or if—we have adapted to this defining moment in history.

**Our approach to war.** Chiarelli offers a straightforward comment on our approach to warfare: “Our own regulations, bureaucratic processes, staff relationships, and culture complicate the ability of our Soldiers and leaders to achieve synchronized, nonlethal effects across the battlespace. Our traditional training model, still shuddering from the echo of our Cold War mentality, has infused our organization to think only in kinetic terms. . . . Critical thinking, professionally grounded in the controlled application of violence, yet exposed to a broad array of expertise not normally considered as a part of traditional military functions, will help create a capacity to rapidly shift cognitively to a new environment.”

Chiarelli has stated that once operations began during his year in-theater, he never once met with all of his brigade commanders. We can infer from his writing that he used his intent and mission orders, in accordance with the lines of operation he derived before coming in-theater, to establish a command climate empowering small-unit leaders to adapt to changing mission and task requirements. His comment on this and future fights is that the abilities of junior leaders, based on preparation, will decide outcomes. Field-grade and general officers will be in the role of supporting “microdecisive actions performed along all interconnected lines of operation. . . .” Clearly, the 1st Cavalry Division adapted to the changing conduct of war. The cautionary note is that we must capitalize on the momentum for change. Did this spirit reside only in the 1st Cavalry Division? We must look at other echelons of command.

One officer I spoke with commanded a brigade combat team (BCT) north of Baghdad. Operating conditions and the adversary differ across Iraq. This commander categorized his adversaries as everything from “the remnants of the 1st Republican Guard Corps to criminals.” Nonetheless, his operating environment was similar to that of others—roughly 150 kilometers by 170 kilometers, or 22,500 square kilometers. He told me that the size of his zone alone precluded micromanagement even if he had wanted to operate in this manner. He relied on mission orders and intent to direct operations.

As the 1st Cavalry Division had, this officer used his command and control (C2) systems to push intelligence down to the lowest level possible. He said: “Decisionmaking in combat depends on honest and open interaction with subordinate commanders and leaders.” Although the zone in which he operated was primarily Sunni, he and his commanders recognized the absolute need to employ a combination of all means of power, from lethal to nonlethal, to establish a truly secure environment. He set in place a governing council of Sunni leaders that was ultimately confirmed by the CPA and the transitional Iraqi Government. He said: “My day job was spent in conversation with local leaders at lamb grabs, building relationships.” Clearly, the integration of civil-military operations with combat operations was a necessary, automatic part of his conduct of operations. Moreover, he routinely conducted combined operations with Iraqi security forces.

**Mission orders and intent.** The officer’s division commander also operated on mission orders and intent because the division zone was so large. The officer told me: “The principles of war matter and our doctrine works. We conducted IPB [intelligence preparation of the battlefield], developed the situation, and applied lethal and nonlethal means to accomplish our mission.” Obviously, given the scale of his area, he used his C2 systems to command, not control. A tendency to rely on technology was in fact a way of life in the 1st Cavalry Division and this commander’s BCT, because even in distributed operations commanders must be kept informed. Admittedly, setting requirements for information and measures of performance and effectiveness can be seen as micromanagement, and we must consider this as we debate how to operate more effectively in the changing environment of war.

In considering the aptness of Aylwin-Foster’s critique, I also talked with leaders (battalion and company commanders) who meet the daily demands of combat in the most personal way. Colonel Tim Parks, who served as a battalion task force commander
with the 4th Infantry Division, operated in an area northwest of Baghdad.

Before deploying, Parks’ task force was part of the heavy BCT that was sent to Kuwait in the aftermath of 9/11. Their experience in Kuwait prepared them to think through the problems they would face when they returned to the theater in 2003. Parks described the command climate within his brigade and division in Kuwait as one in which there was a willingness on the part of senior leaders to engage in discussions regarding new equipment and training opportunities that were not traditional for the division—to support and, in many cases, personally intervene to make nontraditional training opportunities available.

Parks’ unit executed multiple iterations of platoon urban combat exercises using “simmunitions” as well as running situational training exercises around the garrison to take advantage of the types of complex environments they expected to encounter in Iraq. He conducted these exercises in the middle of ongoing activities. His platoons conducted urban movement training through the barracks and headquarters areas of nearby units and were able to capture the effect of multiple players on the battlefield who were not interested or part of the exercise. This effect forced exercise participants to use more precise target-acquisition techniques to better identify threats among the nonthreatening populace of an urban setting.

Commander-to-commander. As he prepared for operations on a complex battlefield, Parks also participated in commander-to-commander discussions held in an atmosphere of trust. He said: “I made an S5 (Civil Affairs) section because I knew we could face a complex environment.” On entering battle, Parks faced the total range of enemy action, from encounters with organized remnants of the Iraqi regular army to insurgent action: “We prepared for an expectation of Phase IV, and when we met the reality of the situation we adapted our plans.” The adaptation was enabled by the atmosphere of earned trust that allowed the freedom to shift from what Parks described as a period of “rapid-fire raids” to “escort duty for the MeK [Mujahadeen e Khalq] to stay in place and hold a town.”

The commanders nearest the action in the U.S. Army are company commanders. We must look to this level, too, for evidence of micromanagement. If we are facing an Armywide challenge to adjust to the changing conduct of war, the other theater of operations, Afghanistan, will repay scrutiny. Major Clay Novak commanded an airborne infantry company in Afghanistan. Novak, a member of Year Group (YG) 1995 (a mid-exodus group as described by analysts of the “captains’ exodus”), participated in Len Wong and Don Snider’s YG surveys. Novak told me that during the 1990s his peers were saying that the economy was so good they were losing money by staying in the Army. He believes, however, that the officers who were “best for the Army” remained on active duty. His experience in Afghanistan is relevant to the debate.

Independent judgment calls. The enemy in Afghanistan is different, but the demands of combat are similar to those in Iraq. Novak participated in 18 combat operations in Afghanistan, of which 14 were air assault operations and 4 were independent company operations. His battalion commander’s guidance consisted of the following: “You’ve got the task, purpose, and commander’s intent, get after it.” On his independent operations, he said: “Every judgment call was completely up to me. My comms with battalion was a TACSAT [tactical satellite] radio.” Speaking of his overall experience in Afghanistan he told me: “I think the perception that there are overcontrolling senior officers is just that, a perception. We earned our freedom of maneuver. They [battalion and brigade commanders] trust us and we trust them. I have not experienced micromanagement in any job I’ve had in the Army; platoon leader, company executive officer, and company commander, especially in combat.”

One might argue that I only spoke with exceptional officers, and while this might be true, what is also true is that commanders will deal with subordinates according to their estimate of the subordinates’ abilities. The best will be given maximum freedom of action; the others will get more guidance and control. This is not micromanagement; it is leadership.

Major Guy Jones served as a headquarters company commander in Afghanistan and as the secretary of the general staff of the 82d Airborne Division in Iraq. He also is a member of YG 1994, another of the exodus group of captains. Jones said: “The flight of captains was not about the military environment; it was about the booming economy and the perception
that we were in a shrinking Army with shrinking opportunities to advance.”

Jones’s company was based in Kandahar, Afghanistan, from June to December 2002. He supported his battalion, which operated from a forward operating base near Khost some 200 miles from him. His battalion did not seem to suffer from micromanagement or a lack of professionalism. While in Afghanistan he operated under mission orders for the duration of his deployment. His battalion commander gave him freedom of action based on earned trust, again an indication of leadership and a recognition of the demands of the operating environment.

**At a Watershed**

Are we at a watershed in our history? I agree with Aylwin-Foster that we are indeed at a point where we must think through our processes and approaches in order to capture the experiences of majors like Novak and Jones. We must ensure that we will never return to the days of, as Chiarelli says, “our traditional training model [and] our Cold War mentality.” But are we burdened by institutional racism in our dealings with the Iraqis, as Aylwin-Foster contends? In my experience and in that of those I spoke with, I think not. Must we understand the cultures of the lands and people with whom we deal while making war? Yes. But did we suffer from a de-professionalization of the force from the exodus of captains in the mid to late 1990s? Based on interviews I conducted for this article and the hundreds of interviews I have conducted during the selection process for admittance into the School of Advanced Military Studies, I would say “no” in the strongest possible manner. Our Army’s best captains did remain in uniform.

Is Aylwin-Foster right in claiming that “intuitively the use of options other than force came less easily to the U.S. Army than her allies?” Based on my own planning experiences and from articles I have read, I would argue this might have been true in 2003, but it is no longer the case. Our challenge is to develop an education system and command climate that values our officers’ intuitive abilities to face uncertainty without resorting reflexively to dogmatic doctrine.

**Was there a tendency in our Army toward micromanagement?**

Yes. We must be honest in facing that fact. Did we have a system of training that led us to think in only kinetic terms? Yes. Have we recognized the existence of these facts, and are we taking steps to correct them? Yes.

Was there a tendency in our Army toward micromanagement? Yes. We must be honest in facing that fact. Did we have a system of training that led us to think in only kinetic terms? Yes. Here again we must face the facts. Have we recognized the existence of these facts, and are we taking steps to correct them? Yes. We are at a point in the changing conduct of war where the old forms do not provide the necessary answers to the challenges we face and the questions we pose.

Aylwin-Foster quotes Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl: “The American Army’s role from its very origins was the eradication of threats to national survival, in contrast to the British Army’s history as an instrument of limited war, designed to achieve limited goals at limited cost.” Nagl is absolutely correct: The U.S. Army was designed to protect first the homeland and then vital national interests. The British Army, on the other hand, was built first to expand and then police an empire. While Aylwin-Foster makes a somewhat persuasive argument that at this pivotal moment we should change our Army culture, I contend we should not. We are the Army of a Republic, and we serve to fight and win our Nation’s wars. This is right and proper. What we should be debating is how the definition of war and the role of force have changed in this new century and how to educate all of our officers to deal with this watershed.

**Our Challenges**

Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter J. Schoomaker put this challenge to us in his arrival speech: “War is ambiguous, uncertain, and unfair. When we are at war, we must think and act differently. We become more flexible and more adaptable. We must anticipate the ultimate reality check—combat. We...
We are the Army of a Republic, and we serve to fight and win our Nation's wars. This is right and proper.

must win both the war and the peace. We must be prepared to question everything. What is best for the Nation? What must endure? What must change?234

What must change, indeed? Right now, we must develop and refine our understanding of policy and policymakers. Whether or not our actions at the end of major combat operations contributed to the current difficulties we face is moot. What we are morally obligated to do is put in place a system of trust, one that empowers a continuous estimate and assessment process to ensure we are successful when we go to war. We must do this to ensure that tactical success, even if its only purpose is to buy the time needed for actions on other lines of operations, is directly tied to achieving operational and strategic objectives. Chiarelli points out that we must refine our operating regulations, bureaucratic processes, and staff relationships. We must also continue to refine our approach to training so that we can deal with the complexities of the changing conduct of warfare in the 21st century.

This debate must go far beyond a focus on Phase IV of a particular campaign. If we believe we are in a long war—and I do—then we need to redefine war and our understanding of it. As professionals we need to review the Clausewitzian notion that war is an extension of policy by other means and see that the use of force, defined as the use of military units to attain a policy objective regardless of the probability of combat, is an extension of policy. In this manner we can educate general staff officers and commanders to view the totality of a campaign and associated operations.

Commanders and general staff officers must acquire a more refined understanding of policy development as it relates to the other elements of national power. This is, in my estimation, the true logical extension of the deploy, employ, sustain, redeploy construct of Army force generation. There is no other way that we, the uniformed military, can inject some rigor into the interagency process for refining U.S. policy as it relates to the use of force.

Even as we come to understand the changing conduct of 21st-century warfare, the unchanging element remains: Warfare is a contest of wills between armed people. Does the U.S. Army get this fact? Yes. I would say we do. Do we, as an Army, also get the fact that in this form of warfare it is especially critical that tactical actions involving lethal means be subordinate to a policy purpose? Again, I would argue, we “get it.” Our challenge remains ensuring that getting it is not ephemeral and that we make and sustain positive change.

At the end of his article, Aylwin-Foster quotes Schoomaker: “When the historians review the events of our day, will the record for our Army at the start of the 21st century show an adaptive and learning organization? I think so, and we are committed to making it so.” This debate will ensure that Schoomaker’s “provisional verdict,” as Aylwin-Foster puts it, is indeed absolutely correct. Thank you, Brigadier!25

NOTES

2. MAJ Evan Huelfer, a planner on the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCCC) staff and a Ph.D. in history, recommended the name COBRA II. The initial COBRA was the first major operation of World War II in which the Third Army participated, and we feel it appropriate to tie this 21st-century operation to the Third Army’s history.
3. Aylwin-Foster served in Iraq from late 2003 to late 2004. This issue of Military Review contained seven articles about counterinsurgency, stability and reconstruction operations, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, including lessons learned from the Korean and Polish Army perspectives.
4. During a 23 March 2003 video-teleconference, I learned that “the policy of the U.S. Government is de-Baathification.” The subsequent discussion between senior participants in Washington, D.C.; Qatar; and Kuwait did not lend clarity to this policy. The assumption by some that the Iraqi governmental bureaucracy became somewhat problematic after this video-teleconference.
5. MG Albert Whitley served with LTG David D. McKiernan in the Balkans in the 1990s. McKiernan introduced Whitley to the CFLCC staff as his “British minder.” Whitley was made a Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George for a visit from a retired officer with extensive experience in the region who was serving as a consultant for a major media outlet. He told us that the two longest standing organizations in Iraq were the Army and the bureaucracy, dating back to the British colonial administration. He advised that these two organizations should be the key to our rebuilding efforts. I gave my word that I would not use his name; he gave his word that he would not divulge details of our efforts. We were also in contact with retired and active officers from the U.S. Army War College. Their work was invaluable in helping us refine our planning efforts. We also had portions of the U.S. Department of State’s “Future of Iraq” study.

LTC Glenn Patten, LTC Winston Gaines, and MAJ Willie Davis worked on the Phase IV of a particular campaign. If we believe we are in a long war—and I do—then we need to redefine war and our understanding of it. As professionals we need to review the Clausewitzian notion that war is an extension of policy by other means and see that the use of force, defined as the use of military units to attain a policy objective regardless of the probability of combat, is an extension of policy. In this manner we can educate general staff officers and commanders to view the totality of a campaign and associated operations.

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services rendered during Operation TELIC. I am proud to have served with this truly professional officer and gentleman.

Historians will debate the roles and functions of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and Joint Task Force-IV (JTF-IV). Such an effort is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that both organizations were composed of superb military officers (active and retired) and U.S. and British civilians. (Others joined ORHA and later its successor, the Coalition Provisional Authority.) We worked with them to develop a plan to guide action. MAJ Winston Mann from JTF-IV joined the CS when JTF-IV stood down.

6. In naming our work “ECLIPSE II,” we followed the same logic as naming COBRA II. The final World War II campaign that the Third Army conducted was the occupation of Germany, codenamed ECLIPSE. We tried to find a name in Arabic with roots in Iraqi history that would suggest rebirth, new growth, or some similar conceit, but we could not settle on one that would be insensitive to all ethnic groups in the country; therefore, we selected “ECLIPSE II.” CFLCC was not alone in planning for Phase IV. There was enormous energy dedicated to this phase of the campaign at CENTCOM. COL Mike Fitzgerald and MAJ John Fisher were the key points of contact within CENTCOM.


8. Aylwin-Foster, 6.


10. Ibid., 15.

11. Ibid., 16.

12. Anonymous former brigade combat team commander who served in Iraq from May 2003 through April 2004, telephone conversation notes by author, 23 January 2006 and 2 February 2006. All quotes are used with the anonymous officer’s approval.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. COL Tim Parks, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 31 January 2006. Parks, the former commander of 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, served as a task force commander in Iraq from April to June 2003. All quotes are used with Parks’ approval.

16. The Mujahadeen e Khalq (MeK) was an Iraq-based Iranian resistance dedicated to the overthrow of the Iranian theocracy. The U.S. Government lists MeK as a terrorist organization. It conducted operations in support of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

17. Len Wong and Don Snider, “Year Group Survey” (no other information given), cited by Novak during interview with author. All quotes are used with Novak’s approval.

18. Ibid.

19. MAJ Guy Jones, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 31 January 2006. Jones served as commander of Headquarters Company, 3d Battalion, 505th PIR, Afghanistan, from June to December 2002, and as secretary of the general staff, 82d Airborne Division, Iraq, from June 2003 to April 2004. All quotes are used with Jones’s approval.

20. Ibid.


22. Aylwin-Foster, 6.


25. Aylwin-Foster, 15.

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