As of summer 2003, a higher percentage of the total Army appears committed to active combat operations than during any period since World War II. While the Army moves to transform at a forced pace, it still defends against the most certain foreign threat the continental United States (CONUS) has faced since the War of 1812. Change is not new; it is a staple of defense. However, new combinations of requirements—quick response (expeditionary) and long-term national commitments (enduring)—require unusual solutions both overseas and in CONUS.

Several new challenges facing the Army are implementation requirements that stem from the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States. These competing requirements include—

- Preemption of global terrorist attacks.
- Support of domestic homeland security.
- Reconstruction of failed states to eliminate sources of terrorism.
- Evolving landpower for total-spectrum operations that accelerate Transformation across all services.

The result is that America’s Army must become more expeditionary—the first with the most—and more enduring—capable of providing long-term domination while rebuilding multiple failed states and defending the homeland.

**New National Security Strategy**

In June 2002 at West Point, New York, President George W. Bush introduced his principles of response to the threats of global terrorism. He said, “All nations that decide for aggression and terror will pay a price. We will not leave the safety of America and the peace of the planet at the mercy of a few mad terrorists and tyrants. We will lift this dark threat from our country and from the world.”

In two aspects, Bush’s statement is a remarkabledeparture from past national security strategies. First,
The U.S. Army, in a Federal Republic appropriately safeguarding the rights of the citizenry in a democracy, must support state and local governments as they fight terrorists who are willing to die and to kill thousands if not millions of Americans. America’s Army must underwrite, hopefully, zero-defect defense of the continent; it must be expeditionary—at home.

But there are other waves of challenges, such as Transformation and domestic defense. Civil authority over the U.S. military, supported consistently by legislative authority, is explicit in demanding Transformation to enable the offensive. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld is making the most sweeping changes to DOD since those mandated in The National Security Act of 1947, which created the department.7

Providing for landpower support in defense of the homeland is another aspect of The National Security Strategy that is challenging. As America’s Army, the U.S. Army, in a Federal Republic appropriately safeguarding the rights of the citizenry in a democracy, must support state and local governments as they fight terrorists who are willing to die and to kill thousands if not millions of Americans.

America’s Army must underwrite, hopefully, zero-defect defense of the continent; it must be expeditionary—at home. Composed as it is of active forces (Federal, national), U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) (state, regional), and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) (Federal, regional), America’s Army is superbly designed to support this mandate. Imagining a framework of sharing of responsibilities and authorities more suited to serious defense of the citizenry is difficult.8 But it is equally difficult to envision a force that is truly expeditionary—both foreign and domestic—simultaneously.

The Active Army naturally leads when the total Army of Active Component and Reserve Component units is projected globally in offensive or defensive operations under the constitutionally mandated powers of the President as commander-in-chief. In the past, the Active Army has often led federalized forces of the various state ARNGs during periods of domestic disturbance, such as the several Garden Plot operations to restore order in major urban areas in the 1960s. Although these are important precedents for ARNG service, it is unlikely that they apply to current homeland defense requirements.

In each state, the central executive authority responding to terrorist attack is the state governor. The state military force, mandated to provide such support as might be required to state and local first-responders, is the ARNG of each state. Just as U.S. defense is the first and dominant priority of the U.S. Army, homeland defense of each state would be the first and dominant responsibility of a state’s Joint National Guard.9

As Federal leadership (executive and legislative) provides military and other support to a state under
terrorist attack, it seems likely that those forces would be under the command of the state governor with appropriate authority and responsibility delegated to the state’s adjutant general. Not surprisingly, Lieutenant General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, appears to “want state adjutants general, under some conditions, to retain control of their activated units, as joint task force commanders, capable of addressing any mission presented, utilizing all the forces available within the state or attached from other sources.”

Joint task force (JTF) command within a state executing homeland defense is clearly an important, and certainly a logical, expanded role for the ARNG, and it is a role that will require the most serious professional leader development. Senior leaders in the ARNG (officers and noncommissioned officers) are clearly up to the task. After all, their demonstrated competence in conducting Partnership for Peace (PfP) operations with former Soviet Warsaw Pact nations in Eastern Europe contributed materially to the eastern expansion of NATO to Russia—a strategic achievement of the first magnitude.

At issue for the ARNG is not the quality of performance, it is the quantity of support required. How much can the Nation expect the ARNG to do? Competence—current or achievable—is not the issue in expanding ARNG commitment to serious homeland defense. The issue is time and the ability of its citizen-soldier leaders to fulfill expanded, enduring, homeland-defense responsibilities. The ARNG must fulfill the homeland-defense role as well as be prepared to respond rapidly in an expeditionary mode to WMD attack. And, the ARNG must perform these roles without a serious degradation of the capability to support overseas offensive and defensive landpower operations that The National Security Strategy envisages.

Of course, the ARNG could be enlarged, or the USAR could be expanded to support offensive and homeland defense responsibilities. The USAR could also establish special-purpose, multifunctional units on call to conduct operations in support of ARNG JTFs in states under attack. The USAR could also form additional units prepared to replace priority ARNG units called to JTF duty in their state and,
therefore, no longer be available for overseas pre-
emption or stability operations. Certainly these things
are doable, but how large should the offensive-
defensive hedge be? The Severe Acute Respira-
tory Syndrome epidemic in China is a modest mea-
sure of what might occur after serious biological
weapon attack in the United States. Current formul-
ations of homeland defense might be too narrow.

Offensive operations to effect regime
change might or might not require destruction
of the enemy’s military, but it certainly will
require firm control of the population for as
long as is required to embed a new regime.
In Germany, Japan, and South Korea, doing
so took years, if not decades.

A destructive computer virus that interrupts vital ser-
vices or a sudden regional power blackout can in-
fuence millions in their homes or work environments
almost immediately. Sudden, direct attack against the
population can override, simultaneously, the protec-
tive shield of Nation, state, and local governments.

The complexity of day-to-day American life cre-
ates many pressure points for applying disruptive ter-
rorism. Recent examples include the sniper attacks
in and around Washington, D.C., and the electrical
blackouts in the northeast and upper Midwest. Un-
certainty and fear can create remarkable demands
for protection. For example, after a missile shot down
an Israeli civilian aircraft in Kenya in December
2002, politicians called for ARNG air defense units
to be placed at all U.S. airports.

The point is that the U.S. defense establishment
is now between a rock and a hard place in recon-
ciling new, nontraditional offensive missions and ex-
traordinary and unpredictable (including irrational but
compelling?) homeland defense requirements likely
to occur simultaneously. Both scenarios clearly re-
quire effective, quick-response (expeditionary) ca-
pabilities, whether overseas or at home, fully respon-
sive to public expectations.

The tension between what the public expects and
what the military can provide is aggravated by
emerging military requirements to bolster various
failed regimes in countries that are attractive to ter-
rorist networks. Such regimes have failed because
they were never viable (as in Congo and Somalia)
or because the U.S. changed their regimes, and we
now find ourselves responsible for rebuilding them
(as in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and most recently,
Iraq). Rebuilding takes years, if not decades, and
the result is a profoundly enduring presence. The nec-
essary size of an enduring presence is clearly de-
batable and appears to vary state by state.

Bosnia, aided by the European Union and NATO,
is a clear, good-news story. Similar PfP operations,
stability operations and support operations (SOSO)
in Bosnia and in Kosovo have resulted in significant
achievements. Such operations supporting substan-
tial joint, interagency, multinational (JIM), and inter-
governmental programs, ensure a highly effective
and enduring presence. By its actions in the Balkans,
the Army has demonstrated solid proficiency in inter-
governmental and JIM programs. A firmly insti-
tutionalized feedback process ensures that lessons
learned are shared and trained across the Army.

Unfortunately, this success record has not been
matched to date in Afghanistan. The growth in vio-
lence from 2002 to 2003 brings ominous recollec-
tions of the Vietnam experience.

We cannot yet predict the outcome of the regime
change in Iraq, but near-term omens are not favor-
able. Restoring basic services will come in time, as
will creating genuine political comity among compet-
ing ethnic groups. Low-intensity conflict (LIC) mixed
with SOSO will give way to SOSO when there is
clear restoration of law and order and basic needs,
such as electricity, water, and food. However, mili-
tary capability, sufficient to cause regime change,
decisively employed in a mosaic of land, sea, air, spe-
cial forces, and the CIA in midintensity conflict
(MIC), clearly has not proven to be sufficiently domi-
nant and enduring to enable effective follow-up
SOSO on the ground. Nor has such military capa-
bility been successful in preventing the development
of local insurgent and terrorist groups that will have
to be neutralized before there can be substantial
state-building. The enemy has a vote. Commend-
able intergovernmental and JIM practices from the
Balkans have not yet been translated throughout
Iraq.

After the highly effective MIC operations in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq, even the most casual observer
can see that the military has been successful in con-
ducting operations that differ significantly from the
way operations were conducted in Operation Desert
Storm. The long, deliberate buildup to achieving
dominant landpower, characteristic of Operation
Desert Storm, is gone.

Rumsfeld’s recent commentary makes it clear that
he aggressively and successfully sought rapid mili-
tary action backed by sufficient land, sea, air, SOF,
Past doctrinal concepts of regime-building, such as imposition of constabulary forces, appear inappropriate for the practices of sudden changes in the mosaic that might have been stimulated by competent enemies; that is, requiring rapid changes in force composition and mission so as to continue to dominate local situations. Occupying forces might have to employ rapidly shifting combinations of SOSO, LIC, and MIC to retain the tactical initiative particularly when the stakes include potential use of WMD.

and CIA capabilities applied in a shifting mosaic sufficient to decisively remove Iraq’s old regime. This certainly reflects successful Transformation underway. Yet, expeditionary landpower successful for conventional midintensity fighting has proven inadequate for establishing the necessary enduring conditions for SOSO to build a new regime.

Looking back on the campaign from months or years of perspective, we might ask if landpower would have been more effective in achieving national objectives if a clearly dominant, enduring capability had been provided immediately to augment temporarily effective decisive expeditionary capability. As Richard Hart Sinnreich recently commented, “[F]ighting a war quickly and cheaply doesn’t guarantee winning it quickly and cheaply.” Decisive action certainly precluded destruction of oil fields and might have precluded the generation and employment of WMD in Iraq. Many other highly negative contingencies did not materialize, at least not during the first several months of occupation. Clearly U.S. forces achieved great successes, but the mission was essentially regime change, WMD or not. Failing to subsequently provide the enduring force dominant in LIC and SOSO might have made effective regime-building much more difficult—with more serious implications to come.

Some implications began to appear by early fall 2003, with continuing terrorist operations against U.S. and British occupying forces. The coalition of the willing appears anemic in providing military force appropriate to assist in effective occupation. The point is not to apply 20-20 hindsight to criticize a clearly brilliant campaign that was well led and well fought. Rather, it is to suggest that the expeditionary mindset that pervades execution of The National Security Strategy and thereby the design of major Army forces for a future military might be fallacious.

Perhaps such a mindset is appropriate for the U.S. Air Force (USAF), the U.S. Navy (USN), the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and certainly for the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), as the USMC’s basic rationale. Such a mindset is
essential when there is a fleeting target as envisaged by strategic planners within DOD. Andy Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, says, “If there is a terrorist training camp somewhere and we come to understand that there is something we can do militarily, we don’t have a month to do it. . . . We certainly don’t have six months to do it. We may only have hours to do it.”

The Army should certainly be an effective participant in expeditionary operations. However, expeditionary capability has not been the fundamental rationale for America’s Army, although it is clearly a useful capability to provide to the President and Secretary of Defense, particularly when unique forced-entry capabilities are required far inland.

The Army exists to control people—holding the bayonet at as many throats as required for as long as required to achieve the U.S. national will, whatever that might require as military, political, economic, and social change might be sought. How long “holding the bayonet” takes is a decision of national civil authority. After other services have gone back to their bases in the United States or overseas, America’s Army is expected to, and will, endure in the target state to underwrite America’s larger political, social, economic, or military objectives.

Offensive operations to effect regime change might or might not require destruction of the enemy’s military, but it certainly will require firm control of the population for as long as is required to embed a new regime. In Germany, Japan, and South Korea, doing so took years, if not decades. Firm control requires a solid, survivable, enduring presence sufficient to overcome the unpleasant uncertainties of occupation. Should that credible presence be provided in survivable, psychologically intimidating Abrams or Bradleys? Is it feasible or desirable to attempt to maintain an intimidating presence in light Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) or Future Combat Systems (FCS), which are potentially vulnerable to future hand-held weapons—top down or bottom up or whatever? The Abrams-Bradley pair clearly is world class—militarily and psychologically dominant. Would a lighter Objective Force, FCS-equipped, be as dominant and survivable?

So, on the one hand, national requirements increase for quick-response expeditionary operations—offensive and defensive. On the other hand, requirements mount for enduring landpower domination as failed states rebuild. Similar requirements rise for homeland defense. Now add Transformation. The response cannot be either-or; it must be all, and this is the challenge for America’s Army at war—expeditionary and enduring, foreign and domestic.

### Expeditionary and Enduring Force Design

The issue is not whether America’s Army should be equipped with a more readily deployable SBCT or whether it should strive for Objective Forces equipped with FCS. It should, when for national military reasons it is essential to augment the superb expeditionary capabilities of USAF, USN, and particularly, USMC and SOCOM. Certainly this was General Peter K. Schoomaker’s emphasis when he addressed the need for a “more ‘joint’, ‘expeditionary’ and ‘modular’” army.

The majority of America’s Army should be fully equipped with mobile, highly survivable, fully protected firepower capable of fighting and winning under the worst conceivable conditions while also thoroughly intimidating (hopefully, justifiably terrifying) any person or group electing to oppose the objectives of enduring national military commitment. Similar logic applies to the full combat, combat support, combat service support suite of materiel. Whatever a commander’s personal belief about what is happening in the targeted objective area, and as appropriate and justifiable as his actions might seem, the forcible presence of America’s Army should channel his actions to those desired by the Nation, for as long as the Nation elects to dominate the area. The enduring—not expeditionary—mission of the Army is enduring domination.

When future joint forces assemble for network-centric operations, landpower must be able to prevail across a broad spectrum of conflict. Former Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shenseki outlined his vision of the breadth of required capabilities early in 2000: “The spectrum of likely operations describes a need for land forces in joint, combined, and multinational formations for a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to peacekeeping and peace-making to major theater wars, including conflicts involving the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. The Army will be responsive and dominant at every point on that spectrum” [emphasis added]. There is no reason to believe that those imperatives no longer apply. In fact, recent events reinforce the requirements for full-spectrum readiness.
Now add the additional requirements of The National Security Strategy—inter alia regime change created through offensive preemptive operations. Clearly America’s Army needs adaptive leaders; organizations; adaptive doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); training; and most of all, superb soldiers. It goes back to the absolute requirements of balanced doctrine, training, leader, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS), each exploiting cascading excellence in America’s Army.23

There is more. We need to ensure that the requisite balanced DTLOMS will support varying mosaics of combat capability composed of land, sea, air, SOF, CIA, and such multinational capabilities as coalitions of the willing or combinations of Federal, state, and local government. Finally, add expectations of uncertain change in complex organizations. In his treatise “The Objective Force in 2005,” John Riggs says, “The Objective [Future] Force is composed of modular, scalable, flexible organizations for prompt and sustained land operations” [emphasis added].24 So, unpredictable changes in the composition of teams of decisionmakers during operations appear certain at about every echelon.

An ongoing discussion focuses on materiel and specifically the characteristics of the Objective Force-FCS. The debate is predictable and appropriate. After all, FCS will cost billions. But, the most dramatic new challenge to the Army does not come out of that debate, whatever the materiel solutions. The challenge comes with the ripple effects of comparable change in balancing DTLOMS in the face of sustained operations in a continually changing mosaic of expeditionary and enduring, foreign and domestic, national military capabilities mandated by The National Security Strategy. This is unprecedented.25

**Doctrine.** The Objective Force-FCS conceptual framework is comprehensive and thoughtful. Clearly this concept is adapting to the requirements of evolving joint doctrine. In fact, given strong Army paternity in creating doctrine, this is not surprising. It remains to be seen if a decisive capability to end a regime is sufficient to dominate and to create these conditions or whether diplomatic efforts can induce other nations to support us with military capabilities to create those conditions.

Employing highly flexible, varying mosaics of capabilities mandates review of doctrine to ensure that the use of new, perhaps transient, capabilities, such as Delta or CIA operatives or state and local governments, is understood and assimilated by leaders and that TTP have been embedded to ensure their effective integration. Past doctrinal concepts of regime-building, such as imposition of constabulary forces, appear inappropriate for the practices of sudden changes in the mosaic that might have been stimulated by competent enemies; that is, requiring rapid changes in force composition and mission so as to continue to dominate local situations. Occupying forces might have to employ rapidly shifting combinations of SOSO, LIC, and MIC to retain the tactical initiative, particularly when the stakes include potential use of WMD. The occupying force must possess joint tactical constructs, appropriate to rapid shifts up and down the spectrum of conflict.

Conceptually, it seems likely that the doctrinal expectation should move more and more envisage combined arms operations. Mounted combined arms forces are represented by the symbology of red, blue, yellow, and the lightning bolt of the Armor patch. Light forces are combined arms for foot, parachute, helicopter, or air and land mobility. SOF are combined arms that now include the USAF and the USN. Sustaining highly capable combinations of capabilities within these combined arms teams is challenging. Now, the national military vision is a combined arms of the combined arms; that is, having rapidly variable mixes of the entire base of combined arms that can assemble rapidly for decisive, then hopefully, dominant operations. This is not the conventional constabulary, nor is the appropriate conventional, predetermined, domestic, natural-disaster team when the threat is global terrorism.

Another doctrinal implication of shifting mosaics is the need to be prepared to operate across intergovernmental and JIM programs, utilizing joint (USAF, SOCOM); interagency (Department of State, CIA, FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency); intergovernmental (Federal, state, local); and multinational (Iraqi, Afghan, NATO) forces. Multinational
operations are particularly challenging because they might require interaction with groups of local leaders across the range of local agencies and governments. Imagine the complexity of operational frameworks 101st Air Assault units faced in governing Mosul, Iraq, while also facing sporadic insurgent operations. What doctrine and TTPs are required to prepare a senior tactical headquarters to assume effective, enduring governmental authorities over millions of people—many friendly, some indifferent, some quite hostile and capable; that is, enduring a Great Depression while staying ready to fight MICs to counter any hostile use of WMD in hours not days? This is not your conventional constabulary.

Leaders. Emerging patterns of operations confirm past expectations of evolving requirements for leaders in America’s Army. The extraordinary range and rapidity of change in the skills, knowledges, and attributes (SKA) required of leaders confirm the wisdom of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel in focusing on leader self-awareness and adaptability. Now leaders must broaden their service SKA to those intergovernmental and JIM operations require. Bright, motivated leaders, corporal and above, faced by the requirements of current operations, understand this. They learn experientially, as has been demonstrated in recent operations to the great satisfaction and pride of America observing the conventional combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom through the eyes of embedded media.

The challenge is to bring the wealth of experience back to the institution so that profound learning at whatever grade can be translated to higher and lower grades. Bringing distilled wisdom back to the institution will allow knowledge to multiply as it percolates among leaders, much as the insight gained through years of tactical wisdom engendered by the various combat training centers has seeped throughout the Army to be applied in expeditionary and enduring operations—foreign and domestic.

Fortunately, new capabilities, such as the Battle Command Knowledge System, evolve to encourage and, hopefully, accelerate the exchange of data, information, and knowledge, initially within America’s Army, then across intergovernmental and JIM missions as it suits national purposes. The Army, already one of America’s leading learning organizations, is about to become a premier learning and teaching organization. As this occurs and is translated to intergovernmental and JIM associates, there should be substantial opportunities to expand the coalition of the willing, which in turn, should generate the capabilities required for enduring domination while protecting rebuilding. There should be comparable opportunities to support homeland defense in expeditionary and in enduring aspects.

Leader development is alive and well. Now the focus migrates to preparing teams of leaders, such as the chain of command, as well as individual leaders. Such a progression should ensure that Army leaders and their units and organizations can exploit their current excellence to stay ahead of the accelerating change mandated by national military leadership, particularly the generation of necessary expeditionary and enduring capabilities.

Training. Current training doctrine and TTP are good and improving. A new training challenge comes with increasing reliance on intergovernmental and JIM operations. There is a compelling requirement to create intensive experiential training packages that can be rapidly modified on the ground to train to task, condition, and standard, shared with various intergovernmental and JIM combinations. The first requirement is to train to ensure effective communication, which requires much more than liaison-level understanding. Shared task proficiency is essential, given the pace of operations.

Organizations. Organizations are shaped by the doctrine and TTPs they are to implement. The requirements for modular, scalar organizations, combined with support of the varying mosaics of current operations, put a tough mark on the wall. I advocate an organizational structure of core fighting teams, similar to the Delta Force troop-level organization, with multiples of from four to six leader teams to which additional capabilities could be added and that would be described as SOCOM+ when all of the other services are added.

This proposal might seem quite revolutionary, but in terms of small unit combined arms teams, it actually approximates post-World War II armored cavalry platoons, which had a scout section, a tank section, an armored infantry squad, a mortar squad, and a platoon headquarters. By thoroughly modernizing (likely including some robotic capabilities), the diversity of capabilities, as represented in old armored cavalry squads, is an organizational precedent for future organizational design.

Now, however, combat power plug-in capabilities need to be built in. Since the operational environment might shift back and forth rapidly from SOSTO to LIC and potentially MIC with WMD, the base organization should readily expand or contract to accom-
moderate or release additional capabilities. What would be even more challenging and necessary is providing the same flexibility in order to add intergovernmental and JIM capabilities. Conventional mechanized infantry platoon leaders did that in Kosovo, and they now do it in Iraq, whether the intergovernmental or JIM participant is an Iraqi policeman, contractor repair personnel, or SOCOM/CIA/FBI operatives. Whether we are talking about separate platoon headquarters or a supplemental platoon liaison team or more communications to provide others, we need to revisit the organization of companies or troops and platoons. Similar logic applies for each of the other joint tactical constructs and for the requirements of homeland defense. Such a construct would not be like your father’s or grandfather’s starbacularly once the expeditionary phase of combat operations is over—nor would this be a postmodern military.

Soldiers. Soldiers—competent, confident, disciplined soldier—are the Army’s abiding strength. Superb young leaders, as diverse as is America, are endowed with curiosity and initiative to seek a better way to accomplish any task. They have precisely the attributes needed to master unanticipated situations. Innovative, effective recruiting continues. Favorable combat arms midterm reenlistment continues. Lateral-entry (continuum of support), which appears to be coming, will provide more opportunities with which to attract highly competent leaders. This is a clear “good news story” that should continue.

Advancing Transformation

We should regard current Transformation processes as a glass half full. Transformation is not going away in the face of other compelling challenges; nor should it. Transformation enables America’s Army to stay inside the decision loops of adversaries as part of a larger national effort. Those who believe the pace is too rapid will be disappointed. The pace will not slow; it will increase. The spectrum of conflict, including the challenges of homeland defense, is just too broad, and the global potential of terrorist and WMD threat too great, to brake the momentum for Transformation. In fact, the pace should quicken. We must address the enduring dominate military force requirements of effective and, therefore, enduring regime change, just as we must address the requirements associated with the clearly attractive flash of expeditionary operations.

The Army has been transforming throughout its history. As an institution, the Army thrives on change and does quite well at it. Of particular note is that the Army has accomplished recent change in the midst of a decade of severely constrained resources. Forcing change when every decision is a zero-sum game paid with another canceled program is tough and debilitating. But, it is nothing compared with earlier crises, such as at Valley Forge or during the Army’s precipitous decline after two world wars. The Army must transform as it leans into the challenge of addressing enduring domination as thoroughly as it addresses the clearly necessary expeditionary capability—foreign and domestic.

NOTES


9. U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force units are about to be organized as joint force headquarters in each state. For more information, see LTG H. Steven Blum, “The Army National Guard—Back to the Future,” Association of the United States Army, 3 September 2003.


14. Perhaps predictably, Rumsfeld advocates a “light” presence in Iraq. In “Beyond Nation-Building,” The Washington Post, 25 September 2003, A33, he says, “We are not in Iraq to engage in nation-building; our mission is to help Iraqis so that they can build their own nation. That is an important distinction.”


16. This is not a criticism of the performance of America’s Army units; the record is yet to be written. However, it appears that some U.S. leaders had unrealistic expecta-


25. Substantial change occurred in the 1980s, including AirLand Battle Doctrine, Big Five (Abrams, Bradley, Apache, Blackhawk, Patriot), new organizations, intensified leader and soldier development, but these changes were not up against simultaneous chang-

26. See also Brown, “Leaders for America’s Army.”


29. See also Brown, “Leaders for America’s Army.”

30. For one perspective of change, see Brown, “Perpetual Transitions.”

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