

# Developing the Warrior-Scholar

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THE END OF THE COLD WAR marked a new era for the US Army. Recent changes ranging from the geopolitical structure, to the nature and role of the family, to individual soldier values have significantly affected the US Army. As a result, the 21st-century Army is an organization in transition. The institutional level has responded with planned development and force modernization efforts that focus on new technology and mission roles. Likewise, at the soldier level, the Army is responding by redesigning efficiency reports and increasing the length of basic training.<sup>1</sup> While such changes are impressive, the Army must grapple with the issue of adequacy. In the rapidly changing post-Cold War environment, the Army cannot merely react to change and risk a large lag effect; it must continue to pursue a proactive approach to change.

One area strained by changes in the nature of war is officer education. The comparatively new, rapidly changing role of professional military officers necessitates their increased understanding and application of sociological concepts. As a discipline, sociology provides a systematic method from which to assess and organize social activity. A sociological background gives company grade combat arms officers the necessary conceptual skills to operate on the modern battlefield and prepares them to take advantage of advanced professional education later in their careers.<sup>2</sup> In effect, the Army can better prepare its officers for adverse and changing conditions associated with today's missions by using specific collegiate training rather than relying solely on institutional programs.

Recognizing the dilemma facing today's military leaders, the Center for Strategic and International Studies convened a committee in 1997 to assess the Professional Military Education (PME) System and provide recommendations. The committee found

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that "service schools and colleges must do more to help the officer corps adapt to the rapid technological advances of the information age and the changing mission of the post-Cold War era."<sup>3</sup> The committee noted that an Army captain patrolling in Bosnia not only has several times the information and advanced technology at his fingertips than a peer might have had even a few years ago but also confronts a far more complex operational environment. Today's missions require the captain to be equally peacekeeper, negotiator, diplomat and soldier.<sup>4</sup> However, while superbly identifying the dilemma surrounding today's junior officers, the committee stopped short of linking a solution to proposed changes in the PME System.

## Officer Development

In 1802 the United States Military Academy (USMA) was founded, marking one of America's earliest attempts to codify Army officer training. Since then officer development has experienced several significant changes, yet at the same time, such associated activities remain one of two distinct but mutually supporting components: ethos and intellect.

“Ethos” concerns fledgling officers’ corporate identity, developed through selection, institutional instruction and informal mentoring.<sup>5</sup> Ideally, it instills in young officers a sense of fraternity and a commitment to selfless service strong enough to endure the institution’s comprehensive demands.<sup>6</sup> In the end, ethos binds all Army officers, regardless of their branch, and directs their conduct and continued development throughout their careers.

“Intellect” represents the technical and mechanical skills officers require while executing their duties. Military revolutions of the 16th and 17th centuries redefined the officer corps. Early in the 18th century it became apparent to the great armies that it was too costly for all officers to be general practitioners who learned their craft solely on the battlefield. In response, specialized staff schools emerged, and the first permanent standing (staff) officer school appeared in France in 1780.<sup>7</sup> Unlike European military schools that developed seasoned officers, USMA focused on officer candidates. This arrangement enabled its primarily military faculty to develop both ethos and intellect simultaneously. A corporate sense of competence grew from mastering specialized military skills, a condition that eventually defined commissioned Army service as a profession.<sup>8</sup>

Although established as a profession, Army “officership” has not been stagnant. Continual changes in warfare have forced changes on the profession of arms, a process readily evident by tracing the changes in officers’ intellectual development. USMA spent its first decades providing a terminal professional education and a source of Army doctrine on tactics and strategy.<sup>9</sup> As a consequence of westward expansion, the Army officer’s role changed to include infrastructure development on the frontier. In response, USMA’s curriculum changed, resulting in the founding of the civil engineering field.<sup>10</sup> This precedent marked the first Army officer training changes in response to officer activities unrelated to warfare.<sup>11</sup> Continued curriculum changes allowed USMA’s admission and membership in the Association of American Colleges in 1927. In 1933 Congress authorized USMA and the US Naval Academy to confer Bachelor of Science degrees.<sup>12</sup>

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infantry and cavalry, a school for light artillery and the US Army War College in 1901.<sup>14</sup> The new PME System, established just before World War II, gave

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officers a broad undergraduate education that continued with specialized training once they entered the Regular Army. World War II’s mobilization demands disrupted PME, but the Army returned to it after the war and continued to refine it.

### College Education: Historically

The Army’s near exponential growth from 1939 to 1944 turned PME on its head, largely reversing advances made over the previous 50 years. USMA’s college program was compressed and accelerated to meet immediate requirements while the size of incoming cohorts dwindled.<sup>15</sup> Reserve officers, who had earned commissions while attending civilian colleges, were mobilized while their former Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) commissioning sources were suspended.<sup>16</sup> Instead, the Army relied principally on officer candidate schools (OCS)—which did not require a college education—to meet its officer needs.<sup>17</sup>

Although World War II disrupted PME, it ultimately led to two principal refinements: developing professional officers to deal with other, non-conventional military affairs (such as political and economic) and the need to standardize PME across the services.<sup>18</sup> At war’s end USMA continued to commission officers with baccalaureate degrees but could not meet the Army’s greater need for career officers.<sup>19</sup> As a result, during the Korean War, ROTC experienced a large expansion with an accompanying increase in the number of ROTC officers receiving regular commissions.<sup>20</sup> Additionally, in 1952, ROTC accession programs at colleges were standardized and included a requirement for a college degree in any field for those aspiring for positions within the Active force.<sup>21</sup> Training in areas other than conventional military affairs was left to the service colleges at the other end of the PME System.<sup>22</sup>

A college education serves the Army officer in several ways. First, a college degree demonstrates an officer's capacity for learning and self-discipline. Likewise, the process of acquiring a college education develops the critical thinking and reasoning skills

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necessary to address unforeseen and unspecified future problems. Additionally, a college education can provide future officers with specific skills that are unattainable through the Army's institutional training.<sup>23</sup> Today, postsecondary education (to include USMA) generally offers degrees on a broad-based foundation of mandatory classes from which a person selects a field of study, or major. Historically, evolutionary changes in college education have been sufficient to meet the Army's needs. Until recently, college curriculum changes have kept pace with the Army's changing role and professional officers' needs. Regardless of an officer's field or branch, almost any college degree ensured adequate intellectual officer development and met the Army's needs.

### **College Education: Present and Future**

Today, given the magnitude and number of changes affecting the military, postsecondary schools can no longer adequately fulfill the intellectual component of officer development. While some colleges and universities can meet this need, the Army cannot assume that any bachelor's degree is adequate for most officers. The Army is undergoing significant changes because of internal and external pressures. While the two components of officer development remain valid, specific processes and products of these components—particularly college education—must change at a comparable rate.

Two significant changes affect the Army and military leaders: advances in the methods (technology) of war and variations in the nature of warfare, including peacekeeping and counterterrorism. These two forces, by their very nature, greatly affect junior officers. At higher echelons, specialized officers fill staff positions and stay current on specific

changes and provide senior commanders with appropriate advice on their functions. However, staffs below division level are comprised of generalists rather than specialists. At these lower levels, staff officers still advise commanders on matters related to their functions. However, unlike staffers at upper echelons, these company grade staff officers receive nearly identical training in the PME System—their specialized training is limited. Additionally, if the Army implements a force designed around brigade-sized units, then the density of specialized staff officers assisting commanders decreases further.<sup>24</sup> Consequently, as modern warfare pushes critical mission decisions down on subordinate leaders, the need for greater, more specialized education and training at lower levels increases. One way to handle this need is to further focus or specialize an officer's early development beyond the technical necessities of basic branch qualification.

The Army has responded to changes in the methods of war with Force XXI and Army After Next initiatives, which represent a systematic institution-wide approach affecting everything from strategic doctrine to individual soldier training.<sup>25</sup> However, not all of the Army's adaptations to changes in warfare have been as methodical. While the Army aggressively and effectively wrestles with changes, other aspects relating to the changing nature of war and civil-military relations await review.<sup>26</sup>

Changes in the nature of war have altered the skills required for its conduct, but the ability to act decisively and employ coercion will remain essential.<sup>27</sup> The potential to employ controlled violence provides validity to many new military tasks captured under the heading of military operations other than war (MOOTW). Having established its credibility as a fighting force, the US Army now finds itself more frequently engaged in actions such as humanitarian assistance, nationbuilding and peace enforcement. For example, on an average day during 1998, the US Army had 143,000 soldiers deployed in 77 countries participating in 214 distinct missions.<sup>28</sup>

In the past, when the US Army's missions fell under more conventional parameters, junior officers received sufficient specialized education and training from institutional sources. Because of today's more diverse missions, wide range of threats and budget constraints, institutional military training can no longer fully prepare junior officers for the variance found within the full spectrum of conflict. Current and anticipated mission profiles require military leaders to affect environments defined by foreign military involvement, nongovernment organizations, varied local leaders, humanitarian issues and opposing security forces.<sup>29</sup> Tomorrow's



Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division patrol the streets of Aquin, Haiti, as local women continue washing clothes.

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officers require education coupled with training that allows them to assess varied missions and understand their human dimensions. One way to prepare leaders for this environment is to train them to apply sociology.

### **Sociology and Officer Training**

Advocating training and education in sociology does not mean all officers should become sociologists—quite the contrary. The increasing complexity and division of labor calls for a military composed of specialists in many areas. Likewise, because the Army requires various specialists, other academic backgrounds will continue to serve the Army through various personnel billets. However, for those leaders at the tip of the spear, an academic grounding in sociology may be the most efficient and useful collegiate specialization. Junior military officers who execute the Army's core function would benefit from an increased understanding of social sciences, sociological concepts in particular.

Forward-deployed junior officers face a widening array of relevant factors and need tools to organize conditions and information to respond effec-

tively. In terms of academic training, sociology meets this need by providing a framework within which to integrate and synthesize other fields for application to social conditions. Sociology integrates and draws upon components of several other social sciences by considering "social life and behavior, especially in relation to social systems, how they work, how they change, the consequences they produce and their complex relations to people's lives."<sup>30</sup> Contemporary research on civil-military relations applies sociology to military affairs but routinely does not deliberately apply sociology during operations. Studying sociology produces more effective professional officers. Segal, Segal and Wattendorf espoused such a position while discussing the utility of a sociology program at USMA.<sup>31</sup> They argue that this was likely to be the goal of any sociology program in a professional school setting.

### **The Need for Warrior-Scholars**

Changes in the nature of warfare demand that junior combat arms officers be warrior-scholars. The professional officer produced from a military education, complemented with a study of sociological

concepts, is a warrior-scholar. This concept is a variation of Segal's soldier-statesman/soldier-diplomat.<sup>32</sup> Warriors must be scholars according to Segal, "the range of military activities that military professionals will be called on to perform will be

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broadened . . . [and] is likely to have political implications at lower levels of organizational functioning."<sup>33</sup> This implies that the post-Cold War leaders are scholars because their decisions and actions on future battlefields reflect deliberate thought and understanding of larger social and political relationships. The understanding helps identify the second- and third-order effects of decisions and actions.

Warrior characteristics are equally critical in post-Cold War leaders—specifically, lower-echelon officers must remain capable of employing traditional military force. Suggesting that military commanders on the ground will be confined to technical military and political matters in a peacekeeping environment, for example, indicates a failure to recognize operational ambiguity and blended skills.<sup>34</sup> It is important that peacekeepers assert themselves under fire or under pressure to forcibly keep combatants from harming others, for example, to "evacuate an area or to allow a convoy safe passage."<sup>35</sup>

Past military missions have been successful without warrior-scholars, but the absence did not include the entire military chain of command. In fact, several scholars (most notably Morris Janowitz) have suggested educating military elite forces that already possess warrior-scholar values. Based on his research on senior Army officers, Janowitz maintains that military professionals must be given a "candid and realistic education about political matters" and follow career patterns that sensitize them to political and social consequences of military action.<sup>36</sup> Early in the Cold War Janowitz explained how and

why an effective military establishment must depend on military elite forces by "maintaining a proper balance between military technologists, heroic leaders and military managers."<sup>37</sup> Characteristics of the latter two leader typologies comprise the definition of the warrior-scholar.

In defining a constabulary force, Janowitz foresaw a cadre of military elite leading subordinate officers whose duties place them in one of the three typologies.<sup>38</sup> As junior officers rise in rank, the heroic leader and military manager roles merge. As a result, the most senior officers represent a balanced combination of these two types, while subordinates continue to develop within one of the three distinct typologies.<sup>39</sup> The role of military technologists that Janowitz describes remains largely unchanged today, but the military manager and heroic leader roles have evolved. All combat arms officers must become warrior-scholars by maintaining an internal balance of heroic leader and military manager. The Army has succeeded with warrior-scholars only at the elite level. To be successful in the future, warrior-scholars must exist at every chain-of-command level.<sup>40</sup> However, the need to develop junior officers as warrior-scholars renders traditional methods of officer development obsolete.

### **The Theoretical Application of Sociology**

The development of "sociological imagination" provides direction for 21st-century leaders to apply sociology and better understand larger social relationships.<sup>41</sup> Modern persons often feel helpless, isolated and powerless to affect their own courses or circumstances. These people need more than information: "in this Age of Fact, information often dominates their attention and overwhelms their capacity to assimilate it. It is not only the skills of reason that they need—although their struggle to acquire these often exhausts their limited moral energy. What they need, and what they feel they need, is a quality of mind that will help them to use information and to develop reason in order to achieve lucid summaries of what is going on in the world and of what may be happening within themselves."<sup>42</sup>

The ability to obtain such understanding and reason is sociological imagination. A person develops sociological imagination by recognizing the unique or specific historical circumstances of a given society and their effect on actors while recognizing the actor's reciprocal effect, a process frequently explained as understanding the intersection of history and biography. The knowledge gained from applying sociological imagination reduces an actor's

sense of helplessness and social isolation.<sup>43</sup> People who do not see their roles in the larger social network become myopic and are easily misguided by powerful elites seeking to further their own ambitions.<sup>44</sup> Junior officers should apply sociological imagination to see an operation's larger social operating network and respond appropriately to their missions.

Although the upper military echelons may assess a society from a nation-state perspective, a company commander performing humanitarian assistance for a village must see that village as a society and act accordingly. Junior officers who apply sociological imagination to the following three question sets can assess systematically various 21st-century situations and societies they will confront:

- What is the structure of the society as a whole? What are its essential components and how do they relate to one another? How does it differ from other social orders? Within it, what is the meaning of any particular feature for its continuance and for its change?
- Where does this society stand in human history? How is it changing? What is its place within and its meaning for the development of humanity as a whole? How do particular features affect the historical period in which they move, and how is it, in turn, affected?
- What varieties of men and women prevail in this society and period? What varieties are coming to prevail? In what ways are they selected and formed, liberated and repressed, made sensitive and blunted?<sup>45</sup>

Answers to these questions provide insight into a society, specifically the interaction between relevant biographies and social histories. Sociological imagination visualizes a situation's relevant variables by including participating actors and their perceptions in the algorithm. It allows critical questioning without being aloof. In essence, sociological imagination calls for transcending individualism without sacrificing it as a core value. Warrior-scholars can address social problems while being a part of the society.

This pragmatic use of sociology draws from a distinct domain within the discipline—consensual sociology.<sup>46</sup> The consensual approach follows a long tradition of applying sociology to an audience outside academia.<sup>47</sup> The warrior-scholar would apply consensual sociology for practical solutions to specific social problems using a methodology called the enlightenment model.<sup>48</sup> Rather than developing specific cause-effect relationships capable of broader generalization (the engineering model), the enlightenment model works at problem solving for the

sake of specific institution-building within a given social setting.<sup>49</sup> In application, warrior-scholars seek solutions to immediate situations of which they are a part, so officers need sociological training to understand their environment as a larger system and,

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in turn, educate and serve its members. The company grade officer does this by applying sociological imagination—recognizing the history behind the current mission and the potential impact current actors have on its future. A focused sociological education can provide combat arms officers with tools to effectively and efficiently reason through various conditions surrounding next-century missions.

### **Sociologists in the Army Today**

Developing warrior-scholars to meet the changing nature of warfare presupposes an increased need for them that the current officer accession system is not already filling. Measuring the presence of these two conditions requires a longitudinal review. Three representative periods provide a basis for reference:

- 1987—the end of President Ronald Reagan's defense buildup (late Cold War).
- 1992—post-Cold War and *Desert Storm*.
- 1997—contemporary reference.

Comparing the number of soldiers deployed each fiscal year gauges varying US military involvement.<sup>50</sup> Since the Cold War's end, the US Army has shifted from a forward-deployed force operating under a bipolar deterrence model to a force-projection Army largely stationed in the Continental United States (CONUS). Under the new strategy, the Army deploys overseas primarily for specific missions and then returns to CONUS.<sup>51</sup> Given this change and the absence of US involvement in formal war during 1987, 1992 and 1997, the change in the number of deployed soldiers indicates relative US Army involvement in new, or nontraditional, forms of war. Under ideal conditions a proportional change in the number of officers with sociological training would match the Army's involvement in nontraditional forms of war.

As the Army has drawn down and shifted to force projection, the aggregate number of deployed soldiers has actually declined over the past 10 years.<sup>52</sup> However, the number and percentage of soldiers deployed outside US territories (for reasons other than NATO, Korea and Japan) have consistently increased—roughly doubling every five

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years. New diplomatic obligations explain only a small portion of this trend since few officers are assigned to embassy duty. A nearly three-fold increase in nontreaty deployments clearly demonstrates increased soldier involvement in nontraditional forms of warfare, a condition that greatly supports the call for warrior-scholars.

The Army needs to assess whether it has already responded to mission-profile changes by increasing the number of sociologically trained officers. Potentially, the institution, as part of a larger social system, may have already adjusted and could be developing warrior-scholars without deliberate intervention. Comparing the number of officers holding a degree in sociology as of 30 September (1987, 1992 and 1997) helps assess whether the Army's accession program has already responded to the new battlefield.<sup>53</sup> Under the former PME System, having a sociology degree did not guarantee that officers served in warrior-scholar positions or that they applied sociological imagination. These limitations aside, it is still important to explore whether the accessions process has responded to the increased need for sociologists serving in even a limited capacity.

Despite the increased need for warrior-scholars, the officer accessions program has not responded with a matching induction of sociologists. The total number of officer sociologists has declined as part of the drawdown, but more important, the percentage of sociologists has remained relatively constant at less than one and a half percent. The Army's officer accessions program has not responded to warfare changes by providing more officers with sociological training from which warrior-scholars can be developed.

The PME System has responded to 21st-century challenges by updating its curriculum and resources, but these efforts typically do not develop officers until at least the senior captain level. Because peacekeeping efforts are effective only as long as the peacekeeping force remains able to operate in the full spectrum of conflict, combat arms officer basic and advance courses remain grounded in traditional functions. While institutional schools have made laudable efforts to broaden curricula to cover MOOTW missions, they remain focused primarily on their core functions. Budget constraints keep schools from developing the reasoning skills and training to deal fully with modern warfare's ambiguous environment. Because initial PME schools currently cannot address new officers' 21st-century educational needs and advanced PME schools occur too late in an officer's career, precommissioning education becomes critical.

The Army currently assesses officers through OCS, USMA and ROTC programs at colleges and universities across the country. Each candidate has a contractual obligation to obtain a baccalaureate degree, and the Army should increasingly specify the courses. The idea of increasing specificity in precommissioning education is not new. Service academy curricula heavy in science, math and engineering produce military leaders and top technicians to deal with rapid technological change.<sup>54</sup> Unfortunately, hard science addresses only one aspect of change on a narrow front. USMA provides approximately 25 percent of all new active duty Army officers. Additionally, a heavy academic focus on the hard sciences addresses but one of two significant changes in warfare—technology. The need for further change is apparent at USMA, for the dean's academic goals clearly indicate a need for increased understanding of culture and human behavior.<sup>55</sup> Overall, the social and cultural aspects of MOOTW missions and future war lacks systematic treatment under PME, especially at the precommissioning level.

College classes grounded in the humanities may raise the old debate about whether to value breadth or depth. Dick Cheney notes that "the right balance between educational paths that stress a broader, liberal arts background versus educational paths that focus on science, math and engineering promises to prove one of the greatest challenges to the PME system."<sup>56</sup> One course of action has each officer becoming versed in both engineering and humanities, while an alternative has officers training deeply in a single field with a topical knowledge of the other. The balance in education may not come from training individuals but through an officer

corps comprised of widely assorted specialists.

While the Center for Strategic and International Studies panel spoke of education in terms of the humanities and hard sciences, actual changes require greater specificity. Just as the conditions of warfare

in 1850 made training in some disciplines more relevant than others, 21st-century warfare demands training in specific, albeit different, disciplines. Sociology is an academic field with great tactical value to modern leaders in MOOTW. 🇺🇸

## NOTES

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2. In this article, we define combat arms as those elements whose mission-essential tasks put them in direct contact with the other central actors of the mission. In 21st-century operations, central actors' activities could range from armed adversaries in a traditional combat role to assisting refugees in a humanitarian mission.
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4. *Ibid.*, 60.
5. Martin Van Creveld, *The Training of Officers* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1990); J. Crackel, "The Founding of West Point—Jefferson and the Politics of Security," *Armed Forces and Society*, 7, 1980, 529-44; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1971).
6. John W. Masland and Laurence Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); James Shelburne and Kenneth Groves, *Education in the Armed Forces* (New York: The Center for Applied Research in Education Inc., 1965); John P. Lovell, "The Service Academies in Transition: Continuity and Change," *The System of Educating Military Officers in the US*, ed. Lawrence J. Korb (Pittsburgh, PA: International Studies Association, University of Pittsburgh, 1976), 35-50.
7. Van Creveld.
8. Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
9. Shelburne and Groves, 54.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Changes in instruction as a consequence of technical advances in warfare occurred regularly.
12. Masland and Radway.
13. *Ibid.*, 81.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. William P. Snyder, "Leaders for the Volunteer Force: Problems and Prospects for ROTC," in *The System of Educating Military Officers in the US*, ed. Lawrence J. Korb (Pittsburgh, PA: International Studies Association, Occasional Paper No. 9, 1976).
17. Masland and Radway, Janowitz, 1971.
18. Masland and Radway, 104.
19. Snyder, 72; Shelburne and Groves, 54; ROTC, "ROTC History (Unofficial)," *The ROTC Heritage*, 30 January 1999, <<http://www.usarotc.com/History/shist01.htm>> accessed 18 April 2001.
20. Beginning in 1909 a few ROTC graduates were granted Regular Army commissions, but these numbers, up until the Korean War, relegated ROTC to a militia service.
21. Snyder, 72; "ROTC History." ROTC is now the largest commissioning source of career officers—those intending to serve longer than the minimum commitment.
22. Shelburne and Groves. Likewise, the Army realized that increasingly technical and complex weapons required all officers to have a college education. Thus, OCS shifted from a commissioning source for skilled enlisted soldiers to another commissioning method for college graduates from within and outside the service.
23. Masland and Radway.
24. USMA's ability to produce Army officers with the requisite skills for the artillery and engineer branches illustrates this very point.
25. GEN Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff, US Army, 99-01 Random Thoughts While Running, e-mail, Subject: As we close out 1998 and enter calendar year 1999, 1 January 1999; Douglas MacGregor, *Breaking the Phalanx* (West Port, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997).
26. Reimer, 99-02 Random Thoughts While Running, e-mail, Subject: Senior Leaders Training Conference at Camp Robinson, Alaska, 26 January 1999.
27. "Thinking Through the End of the Cold War," *The Adaptive Military: Armed Forces in a Turbulent World*, ed. James Burk, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 25-48; James Burk, *What We Should Know About Armed Forces in Democratic Societies*, remarks prepared for the Defense Education Agenda in the Americas: New Challenges for Teaching and Research Conference sponsored by the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense

- University, held in Williamsburg, Virginia, 8-11 November 1998.
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28. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Management Directorate, *Leading Change: Modular Briefing on Total Army Quality* (Alexandria, VA: Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army, 1998).
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33. *Ibid.*, 39.
34. Christopher Dandeker and James Gow, "The Future of Peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success," *Armed Forces and Society*, 1997, 327-48.
35. Fred A. Mael, Robert N. Kilcullen and Leonard A. White, "Soldier Attributes for Peacekeeping and Peacemaking," *Reserve Component Soldiers as Peacekeepers*, eds. Ruth H. Phelps and Beatrice J. Farr (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1996), 43.
36. Janowitz, 428.
37. *Ibid.*, 424.
38. *Ibid.*, 6, "the highest ranking officer" most capable of directing and influencing others.
39. *Ibid.*, 425.
40. Military technologists were a distinct population by virtue of traditional resistance to their innovative efforts to integrate new technology. Current research can determine whether such resistance still exists.
41. C. Wright Mills, "The Sociological Imagination: The Promise," *Down to Earth Sociology: Introductory Readings*, 9th edition, ed. J. Hensling, 1997 (New York, NY: The Free Press, originally published in 1959), 19-26. Ironically, Mills severely questioned the collective military, as well as political and corporate elites, as distinct members of the power elite.
42. *Ibid.*, 20-21.
43. *Ibid.*
44. C. Wright Mills, *The Causes of World War Three* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1958).
45. Mills, "The Sociological Imagination," 22.
46. Edward Shils, "The Calling of Sociology," *The Calling of Sociology and Other Essays in the Pursuit of Learning* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
47. Most often sociologists are thought of as working in either the technological mode—serving the government by assessing social policy—or the oppositional mode—seeking to expose deficiencies of the elite. Neither approach directly serves junior military officers.
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Ibid.*, 91-92. Consensual sociology is a substantive type of sociological investigation that cannot be wholly absorbed into the scientific and theoretical types of academic sociology.
50. Morris Janowitz, "Theory and Policy: Engineering versus Enlightenment Models," *Morris Janowitz on Social Organization and Social Control*, ed. James Burk (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 86-95.
51. Department of Defense, Headquarters Service Directorate of Information Operations and Reports, Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Region, Area and Country, <<http://web1.whs.osd.mil/midhome.htm>>, 1999.
52. From a regional or macro perspective, the number of soldiers stationed abroad as permanent liaisons in diplomatic posts is assumed to be relatively constant or inconsequential.
53. The force-projection readiness posture maintains most of the Army's combat divisions in CONUS and deploys units as needed. This condition stands in contrast to the forward-deployed Army of the Cold War, which placed combat divisions in anticipated theaters of operation such as Germany.
54. Army Research Institute-accessed official military personnel files maintained by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, USMA, West Point, New York in 1999.
55. Cheney, 27.
56. Office of the Dean, USMA, *Educating Army Leaders for the 21st Century Army* (West Point, NY: USMA Academic Board and Office of the Dean, 1998).
57. Cheney, 60.

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