Deconstructing Army Leadership
ARECENT STUDY at the U.S. Army War College
(USAWC) drew interesting conclusions about how the staff and faculty
defined leadership, both individually and collectively; for example,
the definition of the ideal leader is based on personal and cultural
expectations of what each of us believe good leaders should be.
Overall, the study revealed a healthy diversity of ideas. As an
institution, however, the Army does not embrace this diversity.
Despite the fact that "there is no universally agreed on definition
of leadership," the Army seeks consensus on a single hierarchical
theory of leadership.1 This theory is
not necessarily the mental model each of us actually applies when
entering the Army's leadership echelons. Although current Army doctrine
might inform our personal convictions, most of us have developed
our own theories of effective leadership, which are heavily influenced
by our upbringing, experiences, education, and training.
The Army's beliefs about leadership, and the
ones I present here, should not go unchallenged. Being a seasoned
military professional is all about acknowledging assumptions and
examining alternatives. This introspective process is an excellent
method for professional development.
The Affirmative Postmodern Method
The affirmative postmodern research methodology
- Requires all the instruments of traditional
criticism and more to deconstruct (identify and criticize) beliefs
and assumptions we take for granted.
- Sees the professional's duty as pursuing revolutionary challenges
to conventional wisdom.
- Mixes and matches styles to achieve an aesthetic, interdisciplinary
approach to research.
- Develops an important creative tension that can lead to transcendence
of old ways of thinking because, while postmodern research is informed
by traditional research, postmodernists are ambivalent toward it.
- Both celebrates and denies tradition and the myth of progress.
- Emphasizes paradox, irony, eclecticism, and pluralism.
- Suspects paradigmatic consensus as an outmoded value; hence, paradigm
consensus is an outmoded goal of social science inquiry; for example,
embracing diverse positions rather than synthesizing them.
- Believes that the dangerous dogma of normal science prevents necessary
shifting among competing paradigms.
Affirmative postmodern research assumes-
- Certain aspects of the contemporary world
can be reevaluated.
- Margins and softer voices can have as much meaning as majority
positions or the mythical mean.
- It is possible to transgress propriety, challenge convention,
and articulate voices previously silenced.
- There is a real world that can and should be systematically investigated
through coherent and outof- the-box sensemaking.
- There is a difference between puzzle-solving (using traditional
paradigms and theories to explain phenomena) and innovation (using
bold conjecture, controlled by self-criticism).
- The objective world created by traditional social scientists is
really a subjective interpretation. (These models have been socially
constructed; that is, invented by humans, but traditional social
sci- entists tend to forget that they are and that they are value-laden
and not objective.)2
The key to this critical discourse is to identify
underlying assumptions that might be taken as fact and then argue
for alternative assumptions.3 The deconstructive
process "look[s] for those spaces where the text is more likely
to be submerging 'its other.' It is there that the text is attempting
to construct its own 'truth'-where it can be shown to omit, ignore,
or devalue its opposite-and where it is likely to contradict its
own claims."4 Two types of outcomes
are possible after deconstruction. One is that the Army's current
leadership paradigm will be strengthened because the paradigm held
up well to attack. If so, deconstruction will be a reinforcing process,
and only incremental changes to the Army's theory will be necessary.
We can make quality improvements to understanding the problems at
hand within the limits of an incrementally improved theory of effective
leadership. The second outcome is realizing that the Army's assumptions
about leadership are myths (or are at least socially interpretable
and based on conflicting values), and that transcendence to a higher
plane of thinking is required to make new sense of the world.
Part of the greater societal paradigm is that
we routinely process information to remove paradox; that is, we
eliminate "contradictory yet interrelated elements . . . that
seem logical in isolation but absurd and irrational when appearing
simultaneously."5 But, when we
conceptualize what the paradox is, the act of conceptualization
can serve as a transcendental mechanism-through a healthy dose of
organizational dissonance. Transformational change can result from
dissonance and incommensurability. We can reach new ways of framing
the problems of paradox through synthesis and dialectical reasoning
or by accepting paradox as a normal state of organization.
Mirror Images and Circular Logic
The Army's leadership construct, rooted in
the assumption of hierarchy, is an example of the stratified systems
theory (SST) proposed by psychologist Elliott Jaques.6
The essence of the SST is that hierarchy is the best way to organize
for accountability and control. Discovering what makes leaders at
the top of the hierarchy successful allows one to train and educate
successors in those same qualities.7
The theory espouses that strategic leaders at the hierarchy's higher
echelons have frames of reference that are more-
- Likely to anticipate second- and third-order
effects because their frames of reference contain complex adaptive
- Oriented on the organization's external environment. 8
The academe has commented unfavorably on hierarchical
theories of leadership because empirical evidence has led scholars
and practitioners away from assumptions about performance based
on age and experience and the need for hierarchical accountability.9
Indeed, the information available to people who occupy high positions
gives them significant advantages over those who do not have access
to that information, which produces information asymmetry. Thus,
studies confirm that strategic leaders make better decisions, but
such studies rely on circular logic; for example, the reason strategic
leaders make better decisions is because they are better informed,
and they are better informed because they are strategic leaders.
Because the Army is hierarchical, it is suitable
to theorize about leadership along these lines of thought. This
is the reality that SST deals with as a normative and descriptive
theory of "what is," but postindustrial organizations
do not have much in common with bureaucracies, with their layers
of management and stovepiped functional arrangements. In the 21st
century, it is no longer acceptable to assume that a leader's influence
on effectiveness is attributable to his position or rank. An understanding
of leadership requires a much broader, more complex view of organizational
effectiveness. Perhaps the Army's hierarchical view of leadership
blinds us to other interpretations. Gary Yukl, a leadership theorist,
makes the point that "viewing leadership in terms of reciprocal,
recursive influence processes among multiple parties in a systems
context is very different from studying the unidirectional effects
of a single leader on subordinates, and new research methods may
be needed to describe and analyze the complex nature of leadership
processes in a social system."10
Having invested heavily in its hierarchical
interpretation of leadership, in the late 1980s the Army sponsored
studies of the characteristics and traits of three- and four-star
generals. The studies defined effectiveness in terms of the characteristics
of "successful" leaders who had been promoted. In the
same tradition of research, the USAWC surveyed general officers
periodically to determine if officers who were its graduates were
effective as a result of the college's efforts to mold them into
strategic leaders.11 Because of this
closed-loop thinking, the Army generated a theory of leadership
with an obvious mirror-image problem. A leader is said to be effective
to the extent that he displays the characteristics of those who
are in positions of power (and, therefore, presumed to be effective);
this is clearly a case of circular logic.
Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership,
Be, Know, Do, is based squarely in the echelons- of-leadership paradigm.12
Army leadership doctrine seems flawed in many respects. The hidden
hand of the Army leadership paradigm is a traditional hierarchical
power arrangement. For the Army's theory of leadership to remain
internally valid, the Army must continue to view leadership in the
context of a hierarchical organizational design and to disregard
alternative organizational designs (for example, more democratic,
networked organizations and the much flatter power arrangements
that noncontiguous future operations might require).
The assumption that only a hierarchy can produce
effective leadership perpetuates the myth that the most senior person
knows more than others. As a result, the Army appears to not value
learning (except for "subordinates"). Chris Argyris, a
guru of executive learning, argues that the Army should change the
values "Be, Know, Do" to "Be, Learn, Do." He
says executives who think they "know" are ineffective,
"not because they have little to learn but because they have
a lot invested in appearing not to need to."13
In FM 22-100, the Army's leadership doctrine
is poorly linked to the literature it references. No footnotes footnotes
or endnotes provide more detail for serious students of Army leadership
issues nor does it provide a pathway for further scholarly inquiry.
This is unacceptable at a time when the Army is in the midst of
a professional-identity crisis.14
Army doctrine developers seem to be confused
about what leadership is. They define leadership in a unidirectional
or managerial way; that is, as a quality associated with position
and rank rather than influence with followers. The manager is interested
in substantive outcomes (goals achievement, mission performance
measures, and allocations of resources). However, leadership is
more about symbolic outcomes (sentiments, beliefs, attitudes, satisfaction,
values, and commitment). In the managerial view, the organization
decides who has positional power. In the symbolic or interpretive
view, followers decide who is a leader.
The Army seems to want to present management
as a subset of leadership and, therefore, confuses the two. At the
U.S. Military Academy, the statement "all officers are leaders"
is common. Another example is the common use of the term "leadership
position" in the Army vernacular. But the term is oxymoronic.
We do not occupy leadership positions; we occupy positions of authority
in an organization. We do not know if those who occupy such positions
are leaders until followers demonstrate they choose to follow. The
adage, "If you think you're leading but no one is following,
you're only taking a hike," applies here.
The Army assumes that strategic leaders (those
occupying the highest positions and rank) are its most influential
members, but this does not guarantee that members of the organization
will understand or act on strategic leaders' intentions. That those
in a position of authority can control how people make sense of
the world (that is, control their cultural beliefs and assumptions)
is doubtful. This is an inherent problem with the current top-down
Army Transformation process. Army Transformation is dealing ineffectively
with cultural transformation. The Army also implicitly assumes that
leadership is transactional in an economic sense. In 1984, political
scientist Terry M. Moe published a theory of hierarchy based in
principal-agent theory.15 The principal
(leader) interacts with the agent (the follower) by contractual
arrangement. The underlying assumption is that both want to maximize
the value of the outcome of the relationship. The principal wants
something done (has a goal) and employs his advantages over his
agents (particularly asymmetry of information) to get them to work
toward that goal.
The principal and agents work to settle conflicts
of interest and strive toward contractual settlement because both
are risk-averse. The principal wants to ensure that the agents are
not shirking, so the game of obtaining this result is what organization
is about (goal-setting, monitoring, and aligning value systems).
The image of leadership that this theory provides might hit close
to home for the Army, which uses superordinate goals, strategic
planning, and management-by-objectives in its hierarchical political-
military structure. Many Army officers say they want subordinates
to "buy into the program," as if their mission is to sell
the officers' interpretation of reality.
The Army's leadership doctrine has internal
validity problems as well. Doctrine stresses the need to calculate
strategy, yet it argues that the environment is too volatile, unpredictable,
complex, and ambiguous to do so. Doctrine espouses a top-down model
of leadership-a linear, cause-and-effect approach to strategic planning
and execution.16 But, many in the nonmilitary
literature argue that such an approach is not what really happens
(empirically) and perhaps is not what should happen (normatively).
Army doctrine recognizes effective strategic
leadership as the ability to create integrated policies that produce
substantive organizational outcomes (goals achievement, mission
performance, and allocations of resources). This definition of organizational
effectiveness-a result of strategic leadership and policymaking-is
inadequate and not suitable to today's hyperturbulent and hyperinterconnected
environment. Hierarchical leadership will suffice less and less
because more and more the environment demands that the entire organization
adapt to it simultaneously. Hyperturbulent environments do not wait
for change to trickle down the hierarchy. The process of doing things
effectively is dynamically nonlinear. If leadership really exists,
it is more likely a mutual process between leaders and followers,
with followers sometimes becoming leaders.
With few exceptions, Army leadership doctrine
focuses on military operations (in an international political-military
context). Junior and senior executives in the military are not expected
to change foreign policy. They administer an organization and prepare
for foreign and domestic policies that might change abruptly (that
is, they manage for success in changing domestic and international
contexts). In addition, current Army doctrine does not address the
political nature and the distribution of power in the Army's work
in the domestic political setting.
Finally, Army doctrine is based on a particle
theory of leadership-the belief that leadership can be broken down
into component parts, such as competencies, traits, characteristics,
and thinking patterns (for example, doctrinal "interpersonal,
technical, and conceptual" skills) and analyzed at various
levels ("direct, organizational, and strategic"). The
Army takes these assumptions for granted, but they can be easily
deconstructed. These are culturally biased statements of opinion,
not scientifically supportable propositions.
Social science research has failed to produce
conclusive, normalized, and statistically significant con- clusions
about leadership that demonstrate undisputable cause-and-effect
relationships. Many unsettled leadership variables exist because
the social variables studied are not linear, but recursive (that
is, they produce effects, and effects produce causes).17
In addition, this sort of quasi-scientific research names the variables
ephemerally and with little consistency.
The Army builds training and educational programs
around the particle theory of leadership and seems convinced that
organizations that receive these inculcated leaders are more effective
than they would be without them. The Army measures effective leadership
by its current leaders how effective think they are (based on criteria
it assumes to be relevant). This is an intellectual slippery slope.
Individuals actually leadership evaluation criteria largely on their
own mental models. not want leadership group-think In addition,
the Army cannot to assume that leadership will all problems. Growing
evidence supports countervailing positions and Army's view of leadership
is a romantic than a matter of fact.
Romantic Myths and the Status Quo
In the 1985 study "The Romance of Leadership,"
researchers found a significant correlation between the performance
of 34 Fortune 500 firms and the emphasis on leadership in articles
from the Wall Street Journal.18 In
a second study of dissertations published between 1929 and 1979,
the same researchers found a significant correlation between an
interest in leadership and hard or good times in the economy. In
a third study of general business periodicals (1958-1983), the authors
found a significant relationship between economic upturns and downturns
and discussions of leadership.
Subsequent experiments revealed that subjects
attributed success or failure to leaders rather than to alternative
explanations (such as economic conditions), suggesting that society
gives credit for high performance to successful leaders and blames
low performance on unsuccessful ones. The authors labeled this phenomenon
romantic leadership because "observers are prone to overestimate
the amount of control that leaders exert [and that overestimation
is also] functional for those who occupy positions of formal authority
The authors also point out that past studies
of leader succession provided little empirical evidence to suggest
that a new broom sweeps clean, possibly "due in large part
to the lack of variability in the pool of individuals from which
both the incumbent and successor have been drawn."20
Finally, research indicates that external factors affecting whole
industries rather than leadership might also affect performance.
The authors conclude: "[F]aith in leadership is likely to exceed
the reality of control and will be used to account for variance
that is in fact uncontrollable." 21
The study demonstrates that the effects of leadership were imaginary
Jeffery Pfeffer presents compelling arguments
that leadership is only one among other forms of social control.22
Other forms include rewards, sanctions, surveillance, and organizational
culture. Pfeffer sees three issues confronting research on leadership.
The first issue is whether or not leadership matters. Studies of
executive leader-successors reveal a lack of compelling evidence.
A leader's influence on organizational performance is small, and
various leadership strategies produced little variance in organizational
The second issue is whether one can learn leadership
skills and behaviors. Most efficacy studies are based in student
ratings of the learning experience (similar to how the Army measures
educational effectiveness). According to Pfeffer, "[M]any of
these courses are at a minimum more pleasant than work and often
allow students to bond with other members of the class, and each
of these effects would also be expected to produce high levels of
participant- reported satisfaction with the programs."23
The third issue is what effective leaders do
in terms of specific behaviors and action. Pfeffer observes that
the "exercise of hierarchical, role-based leadership is less
relevant and the task of building the ability to take coordinated
collective action in the absence of hierarchical authority more
leadership is arguably more about the leader's interaction with
followers and the intangible rewards associated with that interaction.
A leader's critical role, then, is to lead an organizational interpretation
of the ambiguous social reality.
In his 1998 book Transformational Leadership:
Industry, Military, and Educational Impact, Bernard M. Bass reports
some findings that might be counterintuitive to the Army culture.25
Bass does not see transformational leadership as being the result
of a hierarchical position. No studies attributed higher transformational
leadership ratings to hierarchical or rank position. For example,
team members with low hierarchical rank might be transformational.
Gender-related studies reveal women tend to
have more transformational leadership attributes than men do. Women
tend to be more inclusive, have more charisma, and provide more
inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized
consideration than men do. Bass concludes that "women have
different leadership styles [and] are somewhat likely to be judged
more effective and satisfactory as leaders than their male counterparts."26
He also observes that the characteristics of women leaders are probably
better suited for postmodern organizations.
In 2001, Shannon K. Faris and Charles L. Outcalt
presented an interconnectedness model that includes a postmodern
description of leadership developed from James M. Burn's 1978 Pulitzer
Prize-winning book Leadership and his ideas on transformational
leadership.27 Their concept is "inclusive
leadership for the common good" on three levels-individual,
group, and society-that might be fostered in more democratized (postmodern)
organizations. "Leadership is an influence relationship among
leaders and their collaborators who intend real changes that reflect
their mutual purposes" [emphasis added].28
Faris and Outcalt review some industrial models of leadership that
seem to describe the Army's paradigm well:
- The military model, a Eurocentric, white-malecentered
leadership style characterized by hierarchical command and control,
can be illustrated by the metaphor of the pyramid and is similar
to the "Great Man" theory of leadership-with emphasis
on monarchical- style dominance and control.
- The trait model includes personal characteristics
or natural tendencies that make up leaders; that is, what the leader
is seems more important than what the leader does.
- The behavioral or style models present leadership
as a complex response to situations with effective and ineffective
These models also include charismatic and influence-
oriented leadership concepts. Post-modernists often criticize these
models for being elitist and exclusive. The authors propose alternative
images of leadership found in postmodern leadership literature published
in the 1990s. Despite the Army's managerial view of the subject,
leadership is more accurately-
- A relationship (not the property of an individual).
- A process.
- About (organizational and institutional) change.
- Something that can be learned.
- Made up of multiple relationships.
- Oriented toward social change.29
Chris Huxham and Siv Vangen produced a similar
study of collaborative leadership that might be relevant to the
Army.30 They highlight the fallacy
that "there is a formally acknowledged leader with managerial
responsibility and a hierarchical relationship with followers. .
. ."31 In collaborative relationships,
there is no formal chain of supervision or leadership within the
group. Ambiguity and complexity best describe members' roles. Goals
are often ambiguous, complex, and have no clear guidance from policymakers
on what the "end point" is. Huxham and Vangen emphasize
collaborative structures, processes, and participants and identify
three key activities of collaboration:
- Managing power and controlling the agenda;
for example, through manipulation and bargaining, empowerment, or
reflexivity-the latter meaning challenges to taken-for-granted assumptions.
- Representing and mobilizing member organizations;
for example, balancing the dilemma of representing the member organization's
needs while playing a partnership role, acting as conduits to the
resources of member organizations, and coordinating commitments.
- Enthusing and empowering those who can deliver
collaboration aims; for example, building commitment, overcoming
geographical barriers, and being assertive.
With the absence of formal rules and power
structure, trust-not positional power-becomes the controlling social
glue of the group (creating a "virtuous circle"). Collaborative
leadership is a gestalt of agendas, collaborative structures, processes,
and participants and the complex activities they produce.
Gary Gemmill and Judith Oakley sum up their
1992 critical review of research on the traditional leadership paradigm
by saying, "We further argue that the major significance of
most recent studies on leadership is not to be found in their scientific
validity but in their function in offering ideological support for
the existing social order. The idea of a leadership elite explains
in a Social Darwinistic manner why only certain members of a social
system are at the apex of power and entitled to a proportionally
greater share of the social wealth. So-called leader traits are
woven into a powerful social myth, which while serving to maintain
the status quo, also paradoxically sows the seeds of its own destruction
by accentuating helplessness, mindlessness, emotionlessness, and
meaninglessness. The social myth around leaders serves to program
life out of people (nonleaders) who, with the social lobotomization,
appear as cheerful robots. It is our contention that the myth making
around the concept of leadership is, as [Warren] Bennis asserts,
an unconscious conspiracy, or social hoax, aimed at maintaining
the status quo."32
Reconstructing Army Leadership
Alternative images can help form a new Army
leadership paradigm. Leaders often lead in a nonhierarchical context.
Advocating levels of leadership (direct, organizational, and strategic)
constrains Army Transformation. The Army assumes that a hierarchical
or bureaucratic structure is necessary, but the Army needs to unsubscribe
to the managerial principal-agent theory and drop the levels altogether.
Let us not confuse managerial authority with leadership as current
Authority is the character of order in a formal
classical realist or managerialist organization. Leadership, on
the other hand, is the informal social interrelationship between
a leader and followers that influences how they share purpose. Leadership
seeks unification of symbolic meaning about purpose; that is, the
leader interprets or frames the purpose in such a way that followers
voluntarily commit themselves to it. This does not mean the Army
should exclude a managerial perspective, but it should not confuse
management with leadership.
Leadership is holistic. Leadership means leading
laterally or collaboratively, and not just from upper echelons.
Leadership entails leading the people, the structure, and the process.
The level of analysis traditionally associated with individual leaders'
traits is overly simplistic. In their review of 20 years of research
on upper-echelon leadership, Kimberly B. Boal and Robert Hooijberg
argue that the question is not whether leadership matters, it is
whether we can determine the context in which leadership takes place.33
Appreciating the context is infinitely more important to the leader
than simply exercising managerial authority.
Leadership is symbolic. Leadership is about
the influence of meanings and interpretations that important constituencies
give to the organization's functioning. Language and symbolism are
primary tools of the leader's trade. The act of leading is a cultural,
or sensemaking, endeavor. Karl E. Weick emphasizes that leadership
is really the "management of eloquence . . . defined as fluent,
forceful, moving expression."34
He warns: "[E]loquence affects sensemaking. And leaders ignore
that reality at their own peril. . . . Given the critical role of
language in sensemaking, leaders who want to influence the sense
people make of their activities must be sensitive to their own words.
Followers often appropriate leaders' words and treat them as their
own when they try to see what they are thinking."35
Leadership is paradoxical. Leadership in complex
organizations and environments requires the acceptance of paradox
and seeks the unity of opposites, which can lead to transformational
thinking, finding a new paradigm with new explanatory power for
processing information. Paradox exists in all organizations and
their environments. Army soldiers and civilians need tools to decipher
what those paradoxes are and, if necessary, embrace paradox as the
way things are. Instead of seeking a consensual, single model of
leadership, the Army should embrace multiple models, even if they
Leadership is less than or, at best, only equal
to other important contributors to effectiveness. Currently, the
Army's view of leadership is an incomplete cause-effect myth that
perhaps works in combination with other environmental and social
phenomena to produce effectiveness. Current research points to other
important influences on effectiveness, such as-
- Organizational culture and identity.36
- Organizations as complex adaptive systems.37
- Images and metaphor (the art of framing).38
- Sensemaking in organizations.39
- Building organizational trust as an alternative to formal control.40
- Political contexts and power relationships.41
- The value of paradox and reflexivity.42
The Big Question
If the Army's concept of leadership is the
myth that it appears to be, the Army risks defining and trying to
solve the wrong problem. The Army seems to think that leadership
is the hammer, and every problem looks like a nail. The Army should
transcend this point of view and begin to search for a new paradigm
or sets of paradigms to make sense out of what it is pursuing in
its quest for Transformation. The alternative assumptions suggest
the Army needs a more complete paradigm-one that extends beyond
the myth of leadership and permits a new image or multiple images
The big question might not be, "What does
the leader of the future look like?" The question might be,
"What does Army effectiveness in the future look like?"
The former question constrains the Army's answer to a romantic solution:
educate leaders to look like "that," and we can handle
anything that comes along. The latter question requires the Army
to examine a broader, more complex set of problems.
To find solutions to the problem of effectiveness,
we must go beyond the leader's ability to make congruent, consensus-built
decisions and policy. We must inject a deeper meaning into the interconnectedness
of its educational, organization-development, and other programs
in these hyperturbulent times. The Army must find a new frame or
set of frames that permits its institutions to teach multiple views
of effectiveness. The Army romance of leadership offers a partial
and simplistic view of effectiveness. The transforming Army and
the Nation deserve a better explanation.
1. Mostafa Rejai and Kay Phillips,
Leaders and Leadership: An Appraisal of Theory and Research (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1997), 87.
2. Adapted from Martin
Kilduff and Ajay Mehra, "Postmodernism and Organizational Research,"
Academy of Management Review 22, no. 2 (1997): 453-81.
3. My methodology is
essentially a postmodern approach derived from the following sources:
Marta B. Calas, "Deconstructing Charismatic Leadership: Re-reading
the Weber from the Darker Side," Leadership Quarterly 4 (1993):
305-28; Richard O. Mason and Ian I. Mitroff, Challenging Strategic
Planning Assumptions: Theory, Cases, and Technique (New York: John
Wiley & Sons), 1981.
4. Calas, 309.
6. Elliott Jaques, "The
Development of Intellectual Capability: A Discussion of Stratified
Systems Theory," The Journal of Applied Behavioral Sciences
22, no. 4 (1986): 361-83.
7. Jaques, A General
Theory of Bureaucracy (London: Heinemann, 1976).
8.See George B. Forsythe,
"Cognitive Frames of Reference and Strategic Thinking,"
The National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield,
VA, 5 April 1991.
9. See, for example,
James R. Meindl's book review of Robert L. Phillips and James G.
Hunt, eds., Strategic Leadership: A Multiorganizational-Level Perspective
(Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1992), in Academy of Management Review
19, no. 2 (1994): 345-48. See also a chapter in that book by Kimberly
B. Boal and Carlton J. Whitehead, "A Critique and Extension
of the Stratified Systems Theory Perspective," 237-53, in which
the authors conclude that "SST leadership theory is both incomplete
10. Gary Yukl, Leadership
in Organizations (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002),
11. See Patricia Harris
and Kenneth W. Lucas, "Executive Leadership: Requisite Skills
and Developmental Processes for Three- and Four-Star Assignments,"
U.S. Army Report, NTIS, Springfield, VA, 1994.
12. Field Manual (FM)
22-100, Army Leadership, Be, Know, Do (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office [GPO], 31 August 1999).
13. Chris Argyris,
"Teaching Smart People How to Learn," Harvard Business
Review (May-June 1991): 99-109.
14. Don M. Snyder
and Gayle L. Watkins, "Introduction," in Lloyd J. Mathews,
ed., The Future of the Army Profession (Boston: McGraw-Hill Primis,
15. Terry M. Moe,
"The New Economics of Organization," American Journal
of Political Science 26 (1982): 197-224.
16. The theory that
all decisions and actions can be "calculated" ahead of
time depends on the quality of analysis conducted.
17. Gregory Bateson,
Mind and Nature (Toronto: Bantam, 1979), 251.
18. Suggested by James
R. Meindl, Sanford B. Ehrlich, and Janet M. Dukerich, "The
Romance of Leadership," Administrative Science Quarterly 30,
19. Ibid., 97.
20. Ibid., 98.
21. Ibid., 99.
22. Jeffrey Pfeffer,
New Directions for Organization Theory: Problems and Prospects (New
York: Oxford University, 1997).
23. Ibid., 134.
24. Ibid., 130.
25. Bernard M. Bass,
Transformational Leadership: Industry, Military, and Educational
Impact (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998), 85, 132-33.
26. Ibid., 73-74,
27. Shannon K. Faris
and Charles L. Outcalt, "The Emergence of Inclusive, Process-Oriented
Leadership," in Charles L. Outcalt, Shannon K. Faris, and Kathleen
N. McMahon, eds., Developing Non-Hierarchical Leadership on Campus:
Case Studies and Best Practices in Higher Education (Westport, CT:
Greenwood, 2000), 9-18.
28. Ibid., 9-10.
29. Ibid., 14.
30. Chris Huxham and
Siv Vangen, "Leadership in the Shaping and Implementation of
Collaboration Agendas: How Things Happen in a (Not Quite) Joined-Up
World," Academy of Management Journal 43, no. 6 (2000): 1,159-75.
31. Ibid., 1,160.
32. Gary Gemmill and
Judith Oakley, "Leadership: An Alienating Social Myth?"
Human Relations 45, no. 2 (1992): 115.
33. Kimberly B. Boal
and Robert Hooijberg, "Strategic Leadership Research: Moving
On," Leadership Quarterly 11, no. 4 (2001): 518.
34. Karl E. Weick,
"The Management of Eloquence," in David R. Hampton, Charles
E. Sumner, and Ross A. Webber, Organizational Behavior and the Practice
of Management, 5th ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman and Company,
35. Ibid., 583.
36. See Kim Cameron
and Robert E. Quinn, Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1999).
37. For the nature
of "complex adaptive systems," see Christopher R. Paparone,
Ruth A. Anderson, and Reuben R. McDaniel, Jr., "The United
States Military: Where Professionalism Meets Complexity Science
," unpublished manuscript , 2003.
38. See Linda Smircich
and Gareth Morgan, "Leadership: The Management of Meaning,"
The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 18, no. 3 (1982): 257-73.
39. Weick, Sensemaking
in Organizations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995).
40. See Paparone,
"The Nature of Soldierly Trust," Military Review (November-December
41. See Samuel B.
Bacharach and Edward J. Lawler, Power and Politics in Organizations
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1980); Henry Mintzberg, Power In and
Around Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Free Press, 1983); Larry
Greiner and Virginia E. Schein, Power and Organization Development:
Mobilizing Power to Implement Change (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,
42. See Robert E.
Quinn and Kim S. Cameron, Paradox and Transformation: Toward a Theory
of Change in Organization and Management (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger,